EX BIBLIOTHECA
FRANCES A. YATES

φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἄν τις μὴ θυμῷ λέγοι περὶ θεῶν ὡς εἰσίν, ἀνάγκη γὰρ δὴ χαλεπῶς φέρειν
γ' μισεῖν ἐκείνους οἱ τούτων ἡμῖν ἄιτιοι τῶν λόγων γεγένηνται καὶ γίγνονται. Plato L. 10. de leg.

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE:

THE FIRST PART;

WHEREIN

All the REASON and PHILOSOPHY of *ATHEISM* is Confuted,

AND

Its IMPOSSIBILITY Demonſtrated.

WITH

A DISCOURSE concerning the True Notion of the LORD's SUPPER;

AND

Two SERMONS, on 1 *John* II. 3, 4. and 1 *Cor.* XV. 57.

By *RALPH CUDWORTH*, D. D.

THE SECOND EDITION;

In which are now firſt added REFERENCES to the ſeveral Quotations in the *Intellectual Syſtem*; and an Account of the *Life* and *Writings* of the AUTHOR:

By *THOMAS BIRCH*, M. A. and F. R. S.

LONDON:

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M DCC XLIII.


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TO THE

Right Reverend Father in GOD,

JOSEPH,

Lord Biſhop of *Briſtol*,

AND

Dean of ST. PAUL'S.

My Lord,

THE Value of the preſent Work is ſo univerſally acknowledg'd, that to offer any thing here in recommendation of it, might ſeem equally to reflect upon your Lordſhip's Judgment, as on the Character of the excellent Author. It will be a ſufficient Honour and Satisfaction to me, to have contributed in any meaſure to the Improvement of the *Intellectual Syſtem*, and to the ſpreading a Performance, one of the nobleſt of the laſt Age, and at leaſt as neceſſary to the preſent, for ſupporting the grand Foundations of all Religion and Virtue, againſt Ignorance, Sophiſtry, and every pernicious Effect of Vice and Senſuality upon the human Underſtanding. Such a De-

ſign, I perſuade myſelf, wants no Apology, eſpecially to a perſon, whoſe Writings diſplay the Evidence, and whoſe Character exemplifies the Beauty and Dignity of Chriſtianity. I ſhall therefore only add, that, upon theſe accounts, I am, with the higheſt Eſteem and Veneration,

MY LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient

and moſt humble Servant,

London
Novemb. 6.
1742.

THOMAS BIRCH.

Advertiſement to the Reader.

THE former Edition of the *Intellectual Syſtem*, tho' the moſt valuable Treaſure of the ancient Theology and Philoſophy extant in any Language, had one conſiderable Defect, (frequent amongſt even the beſt Writers of the laſt Age,) that the References of its numerous Quotations were very few, and thoſe obſcure and imperfect. Such as were wanting are therefore ſupplied in the preſent Edition with the utmoſt exactneſs, chiefly from Dr. *Laurence Moſheim*'s Latin Tranſlation of this Work, and placed at the Bottom of the Page; thoſe of the Author being ſtill left in the Margin, with proper Additions, included in [ ] to render them more clear and determinate.

The Dedication to the Houſe of Commons in 1647, of the Sermon on 1 *John* ii. 3, 4. omitted in the ſecond and third Editions, is reſtored likewiſe from the firſt.

To the whole is prefix'd a new Life of the Author, wherein is given a very particular Account of his ſeveral excellent Works ſtill in Manuſcript, as well as of thoſe already publiſhed.

An ACCOUNT of the LIFE and WRITINGS OF RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

DR. *Ralph Cudworth* was ſon of Dr. *Ralph Cudworth*, at firſt Fellow of *Emanuel College* in the Univerſity of *Cambridge*, and afterwards Miniſter of St. *Andrew's* Church in that town, and at laſt Rector of *Aller* in *Somerſetſhire*, and Chaplain to King *James* I. * He died in *Auguſt* or *September* 1624. † Tho' he was a man of Genius and Learning, he publiſh'd only a *Supplement* to Mr. *William Perkins*'s *Commentary upon St. Paul's Epiſtle to the Galatians*, of which, as well as ſeveral other works of that Divine, he was Editor.

Our Author's Mother was of the family of *Machell*, and had been nurſe to Prince *Henry*, eldeſt ſon of King *James* I. and after Dr. *Cudworth*'s death, married to Dr. *Stoughton* ‖. Our Author himſelf was born at *Aller* in the year 1617, and educated with great care by his father-in-law Dr. *Stoughton*, and in 1630, was admitted penſioner in *Emanuel College*, the Doctor giving him this teſtimony, that he was as well grounded in ſchool-learning as any boy of his age, that went to the Univerſity. *July* 5, 1632, he was matriculated as a ſtudent in the Univerſity, and applied himſelf to all parts of literature with ſuch vigour, that in 1639, he was created Maſter of Arts with great applauſe. Soon after he was choſen Fellow of his college, and became an eminent Tutor there, and had at one time eight and twenty pupils; an inſtance ſcarce ever known before, even in the largeſt Colleges of the Univerſity. Among theſe was Mr. *William Temple*, afterwards famous for his embaſſies and writings. Not long after, he was preſented to the Rectory of *North Cadbury* in *Somerſetſhire*, worth three hundred pounds *per annum*.

In 1642 he publiſh'd *a Diſcourſe concerning the true Notion of the Lord's Supper*. It was printed at *London* in quarto, with only the initial letters of his

* *See* Dr. John Laurence Moſheim's Preface *to his Latin tranſlation of* Dr. Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem. *The Pages of this Preface are not number'd.*

† Wood, Faſti Oxon. *Vol. I. Col.* 187. *2d Edit.* London, 1721.

‖ Moſheim, *ubi ſupra.*

his name. *Bochart*, *Spencer*, *Selden*, and other eminent writers quote this diſcourſe with great commendations; and my moſt ingenious and learned friend Mr. *Warburton*, in a Letter of excellent Remarks upon our Author, which he favour'd me with, ſtyles it *a maſter-piece in its kind*; and obſerves that *he has undoubtedly given the true nature and idea of the Sacrament, and ſupported it with all his learning.* The ſame year likewiſe appeared his treatiſe intitled, *The Union of Chriſt and the Church a Shadow, by R. C.* printed at *London* in quarto.

He took the degree of Batchelor of Divinity in the year 1644, upon which occaſion he maintained at the Commencement in the Univerſity the two following Theſes: I. *Dantur boni & mali rationes æternæ & indiſpenſabiles*: II. *Dantur ſubſtantiæ incorporeæ ſuâ naturâ immortales.* Hence it appears, that even at that time he was examining and revolving in his mind thoſe important ſubjects, which he ſo long afterwards clear'd up with ſuch uncommon penetration in his *Intellectual Syſtem*, and other works ſtill preſerv'd in manuſcript.

In the ſame year 1644, he was appointed Maſter of *Clare-Hall* in *Cambridge*, in the room of Dr. *Paſke*, who had been ejected by the Parliamentary Viſitors. In 1645, Dr. *Metcalf* having reſign'd the Regius profeſſorſhip of the Hebrew tongues, Mr. *Cudworth* was unanimouſly nominated on the 15th of *October* by the ſeven Electors to ſucceed him. From this time he abandon'd all the functions of a Miniſter, and applied himſelf only to his academical employments and ſtudies, eſpecially that of the Jewiſh antiquities. And we find the following paſſage in a manuſcript letter of Mr. *John Worthington*, afterwards Maſter of *Jeſus College*, dated *May* 12 1646. "Our learned "friend Mr. *Cudworth* reads every *Wedneſday* in the ſchools. His ſubject is "*Templum Hieroſolymitanum.*" When his affairs required his abſence from the Univerſity, he ſubſtituted Mr. *Worthington* in his room. *March* 31. 1647, he preach'd before the Houſe of Commons at *Weſtminſter*, upon a day of public humiliation, a ſermon upon 1 *John* ii. 3, 4. for which he had the thanks of that Houſe returned him on the ſame day. This ſermon was printed the ſame year at *Cambridge* in quarto, with the following motto in the title-page, Ἐυσέβει, ὦ τέκνον· ὁ γὰρ ἐυσεβῶν ἄκρως Χριστιανίζει· and with a Dedication to the Houſe of Commons, which was omitted in the ſecond and third editions, but reſtored in the preſent. In 1651 he took the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Tho' the places, which he held in the Univerſity were very honourable, yet he found the revenue of them not ſufficient to ſupport him; for which reaſon he had thoughts of leaving *Cambridge* intirely, and indeed actually retir'd from it, tho' but for a ſhort time. This appears from two manuſcript letters of Mr. *Worthington*; the former dated *January* 6. 1651. where he writes thus: "If thro' want of maintenance he (*R. C.*) "ſhould be forced to leave *Cambridge*, for which place he is ſo eminently "accompliſhed with what is noble and exemplarily academical, it would "be an ill omen." In the latter dated *January* 30. 1654, is this paſſage: "After many toſſings Dr. *Cudworth* is, thro' God's provi-"dence, returned to *Cambridge*, and ſettled in *Chriſt*'s *College*, and by his "marriage more ſettled and fixed." For upon the deceaſe of Dr. *Samuel Bolton*,

Bolton, Maſter of that college, in 1654, our Author was choſen to ſucceed him, and married the ſame year. In this ſtation he ſpent the reſt of his life, proving highly ſerviceable to the Univerſity and the whole Church of *England*. In *January* $165\frac{5}{6}$ he was one of the perſons nominated by a committee of the parliament to be conſulted about the Engliſh tranſlation of the Bible; as appears from the following paſſage of *Whitelocke* *.

January 16*th*. *At the grand Committee for religion, ordered, that it be referred to a ſub-committee to ſend for and adviſe with Dr.* Walton, *Mr.* Hughes, *Mr.* Caſtell, *Mr.* Clark, *Mr.* Poulk, *Dr.* Cudworth, *and ſuch others as they ſhall think fit; and to conſider of the tranſlations and impreſſions of the Bible, and to offer their opinions therein to this Committee; and that it be eſpecially commended to the Lord Commiſſioner* Whitelocke *to take care of this Buſineſs.*

"This committee, ſays *Whitelocke*, often met at my houſe, and had the "moſt learned men in the oriental tongues to conſult with in this great buſi- "neſs, and divers excellent and learned obſervations of ſome miſtakes in the "tranſlations of the Bible in Engliſh; which yet was agreed to be the beſt "of any tranſlation in the world. I took pains in it; but it became fruitleſs "by the parliament's diſſolution."

Our Author had a great ſhare in the friendſhip and eſteem of *John Thurloe* Eſq; Secretary of State to the Protectors *Oliver* and *Richard Cromwell*, who frequently correſponded with him, and conſulted him with regard to the characters of ſuch perſons in the Univerſity, as were proper to be employ'd in political and civil affairs. For which purpoſe Dr. *Cudworth* wrote, among others, the following letter †.

"*Honoured Sir*,

"I muſt in the firſt place crave your pardon for the delay of this my ſecond "Letter thus long, (for, I ſuppoſe, you have receved my former in anſwere to "yours,) which, had not ſome unavoidable occaſions hindred me, had come "ſooner to your hands. Sir, I think there are divers men in the Univerſity "at this time, of ſingular parts and accompliſhments for learning; ſome of "which are ſo farre engaged in divinity, that they cannot well divert them- "ſelves to other profeſſions or employments; others perhaps ſo much ad- "dicted to a contemplative life, that they could not ſo well apply themſelves "to politicall and civill affairs. But for thoſe, which I conceve to be more "free and undetermined, I ſhall here preſent you with a catalogue of ſome of "their names, ſuch as I conceve beſt qualified for civill employments. Firſt, "Mr. *Page*, a Fellow of *King's Colledge*, an excellent Latiniſt, and one, that hath "travelled abroad for above ten yeares together. He is above 40 years of age; "but how he hath been or is affected to the Parliament or preſent government, "I cannot tell. He is now abſent from the Univerſity, and, I think, at preſent "with the Earle of *Devonſhire*. Secondly, Dr. *Bagge*, Fellow of *Cajus College*, "and Doctor of Phyſick, a ſingularly good and ready Latiniſt; and I beleeve "there is none of his yeares in *England* equall to him in the profeſſion of phy- "ſick. He hath excellent parts, but I know not certainly, whether being "ſo

* Memorials of the Engliſh Affairs, *p.* 654. *edit.* London. 1732 *in fol.*

† *Thurloe*'s manuſcript State-Papers *Vol. XXXVIII. p.* 259.

" ſo eminent in that way (though a very young Doctour) he would put himſelfe " upon State-employment; neither do I fully know how he is affected. There " are of *Trinity Colledge* ſeverall, that are very good Latiniſts, and well furniſht " with all the politer Learning; as Mr. *Valentine* (a ſober diſcreet Man) and " Mr. *Linne* (well known for an excellent Poet.)

" Mr. *Mildmay* of *Peter-houſe*, one, whoſe inclination ſeemes to be peculiarly " carried out towards Politicall and Civill employments, a Scholar and a diſ- " creet man.

" Mr. *Croone* of *Emanuell Colledge*, a young Maſter of Arts, of excellent " good parts, and a general ſcholar.

" Mr. *Miles*, Fellow of *Clare-hall*, formerly my pupill; one that hath no " mind to profeſſe Divinity, but a very good Scholar, and alſo a junior Maſter " of Arts.

" Laſtly of *Chriſt-Colledge* there is a young Man, that is Maſter of Arts this " yeare, one Mr. *Leigh*, that for his ſtanding is very well accompliſhed, and " I doubt not but in a very little time would be exceedinge fitte for any ſuch " employment, as you would deſigne him for.

" Many more names I could ſet down; but theſe may ſuffice for your " choice; and you may, if you thinke good, enquire further concerning any " of them from ſome others, and, if you pleaſe, from this Gentleman, whom " I have for that purpoſe deſired to preſent this to you, Mr. *George Ruſt* *, " Fellow of *Chriſt-Colledge*, who can further enforme and ſatisfy you concern- " ing them. He is an underſtanding, pious, diſcreet man, and himſelfe I " know to bee a Man of exceeding good Parts, and a generall Scholar, but one " that ſeemes not ſo willing to divert himſelfe from Preaching and Divinity, " which he hath of late intended; otherwiſe I know his parts are ſuch, as " would enable him for any Employment.

" If you pleaſe to enquire further from him, and by him ſignify your fur- " ther pleaſure to me, I ſhall be ready in this or any thing elſe, that I am able, " to expreſſe my ſelfe,

" Sir,

" Your affectionately devoted Freind and Servant,

R. CUDWORTH."

Dr. *Cudworth* likewiſe recommended † to the Secretary, for the place of Chaplain to the *Engliſh* Merchants at *Liſbon*, Mr. *Zachary Cradock*, afterwards Provoſt of *Eaton College*, and famous for his uncommon Genius and Learning, and his Abilities as a Preacher.

In *January* $165\frac{8}{9}$, he wrote the following Letter to Secretary *Thurloe*, upon his deſign of publiſhing ſome Latin Diſcourſes in defence of Chriſtianity againſt Judaiſm ‡.

a " *Sir*,

* Afterwards Dean of *Dromore* in *Ireland*.

† *Thurloe*'s Manuſcript State-Papers, *Vol. XLIII. p.* 329. of the printed Papers, *Vol. V. p.* 522, 523.

‡ *Thurloe*'s Manuſcript State-Papers, *Vol. LXIII. p.* 43.

" *Sir*,

" Having this opportunity offered by Doctour *Sclater*, who desires to " waite upon you, upon your kind invitation, which I acquainted him with, " I could do no lesse then accompany him with these few lines to present " my service to you. I am perswaded, you will be well satisfied in his inge- " nuity, when yon are acquainted with him. Now I have this opportunity, " I shall use the freedom to acquaint you with another busines. I am per- " swaded by friends to publish some Discourses, which I have prepared in " Latine, that will be of a polemicall nature in defense of Christianity against " Judaisme, explaining some cheef places of Scripture controverted be- " ween the Jewes and us, (as *Daniel's* prophecy of the 70 Weekes, never " yet sufficiently cleared and improved) and withall extricating many diffi- " culties of Chronologie. Which taske I the rather undertake, not onely " because it is suitable to my *Hebrew* Profession, and because I have " lighted on some Jewish writings upon the argument, as have scarcely " ever been seen by any Christians, which would the better inable me " fully to confute them ; but also because I conceive it a worke proper and " suitable to this present age. However, though I should not be able myselfe " to be any way instrumental to these great transactions of Providence (not " without cause, hoped for of many) amongst the Jews ; yet I perswade myselfe " my pains may not be alltogether unprofitable for the setling and establishing " of Christians ; or at least I shall give an account of my spending such va- " cant hours, as I could redeeme from my preaching and other occasions, and " the perpetual distractions of the Bursarship, which the Statutes of this Col- " ledge impose upon me. It was my purpose to dedicate these fruits of my " studies to his Highnes, (to whose noble father I was much obliged) if I " may have leave, or presume so to doe ; which I cannot better understand " by any than yourselfe, if you shall think it convenient, when you have an " opportunity to insinuate any such thing, which I permitte wholy to your " prudence. I intend, God willing, to be in *London* some time in *March* ; and " then I shall waite upon you to receve your information. In the mean time " craving pardon for this prolixity of mine, and freedome, I subscribe myselfe,

" Your really devoted Friend
and humble Servant,
R. CUDWORTH.

Jan. 20. 1658.
Christ's Coll. Cambr.

The Discourse concerning *Daniel*'s Prophecy of the LXX Weeks, mention'd in this letter, and which is still extant in manuscript, is highly commended, by Dr. *Henry More* in his Preface §. 18. p. xvi. to his *Explanation of the grand Mystery of Godliness*, printed at *London* 1660. in fol. where he observes, that Dr. *Cudworth* in that Discourse, which was read in the publick Schools of the University, had undeceiv'd the world, which had been misled too long by the over-great opinion they had of *Joseph Scaliger*; and that taking *Funccius*'s *Epocha*, he had demonstrated the manifestation of the *Messiah* to have fallen out at the end of the

the ſixty-ninth week, and his Paſſion in the midſt of the laſt, in the moſt natural and proper ſenſe thereof; "which demonſtration of his is of as much "price and worth in Theology, as either the Circulation of the Blood in Phy-"ſic, or the Motion of the Earth in natural Philoſophy."

Upon the Reſtauration of King *Charles* II. he wrote a Copy of Verſes, publiſh'd in *Academiæ Cantabrigienſis* ΣΩΣΤΡΑ, *ſive ad Carolum II. reducem de Regnis ipſi, Muſis per ipſum reſtitutis, Gratulatio*, printed at *Cambridge* 1660 in quarto. In 1662 he was preſented by Dr. *Gilbert Sheldon*, Biſhop of *London*, to the Vicarage of *Aſhwell* in *Hertfordſhire*, * to which he was admitted on the firſt of *December* that year.

In the beginning of the year 1665 he had a deſign to publiſh a Diſcourſe concerning *Moral Good and Evil*, as appears from the following extracts of Letters written by him and by Dr. *Henry More* Fellow of his College †.

Dr. *Cudworth* in a Letter to Dr. *John Worthington*, *January* 166$\frac{4}{5}$.

"You know, I have had this Deſigne concerning *Good and Evil*, or *natu-*"*ral Ethicks*, a great while; which I begun above a year agoe, (when I made "the firſt Sermon in the Chapel about the argument) to ſtudy over anew, "and diſpatch a diſcourſe about it. No man had ſo frequently exhorted me "to it, and ſo earneſtly, as this friend.—But about three months ſince unex-"pectedly he told me on a ſuddain, he had begun a diſcourſe on the ſame "argument. The next day in writing I imparted my mind more fully and "plainly to him. Whereupon he came to me, and told me, he would "ſpeak with me about it after a day or two. So he did; and then excuſed "the buſineſs; that he could not tell, whether I would diſpatch and finiſh it "or no, becauſe I had been ſo long about it; that Mr. *Fullwood* and Mr. "*Jenks* had ſollicited him to do this; and that you were very glad, that he "would undertake it. But now he underſtood I was reſolved to go through "with it, he was very glad of it; that he would deſiſt, and throw his into a "corner. All this I impart to you privately, becauſe a common friend. I "have not ſpoken to any body elſe but Mr. *Standiſh*, and ſomething to Mr. "*Jenks* and *Fullwood*."

Dr. *H. More* in a Letter to Dr. *Worthington*, *January* 24. 166$\frac{4}{5}$.

"I underſtand by Mr. *Standiſh*'s letter, that he unawares ſpeaking to the "Maſter ‖ of my *Enchiridion Ethicum*, he ſhew'd again his diſguſt, *&c.*—that "if I perſiſted in the reſolution of publiſhing my book, he would deſiſt in "his, though he had moſt of it then ready to ſend up to be licenſed that "week. I pray you, ſpur him up to ſet his to the preſs. For my part, it is "well known, I have no deſigne at all but to ſerve the publick; and that I "enter'd upon the taſk extreamly againſt my own will; and yet I have fi-"niſh'd it all but a chapter. Whether, or when, I ſhall publiſh it, I ſhall "have leiſure enough to conſider."

* Newcourt, Repertorium, *Vol. II. p.* 462.

† Communicated by my very learned Friend, Mr. *John Ward*, F. R. S. and Profeſſor of Rhetorick in *Greſham College*.

‖ Dr. *Cudworth*.

Dr. *More* in a Letter to Dr. *Worthington*, *Feb.* 7. 166$\frac{4}{5}$.

" Some few friends at *Cambridge* were exceeding earneſt with me to write a " ſhort *Ethicks*, alledging no ſmall reaſon for it. I did not only heartily reject " them more than once, but with great zeal, if not rudeneſs, alledging ſe- " veral things, which were too long to write, indeed in a manner vilifying " the project, preferring Experience of Life before all ſuch fine Syſtems; al- " ledging alſo, that Dr. *Cudworth* had a deſign for the greateſt curioſity of " that ſubject. But nothing would content them but my ſetting upon the " work; that it was uncertain, when Dr. *Cudworth*'s would come out; and " beſides, mine being a ſmall treatiſe, running through the whole body of " Ethicks, they would not interfere one with another. For my part, till I " had by chance told Dr. *Cudworth* of my purpoſe, (which I did ſimply, " thinking nothing) and how many chapters I had finiſhed, I knew nothing " either of the time, or the ſcope of his writing; or if he intended a " *general Ethicks*. But the effect of thoſe Friends earneſtneſs (to tell you " plainly how the caſe ſtood) was this: A day or two after their laſt impor- " tunity, I waking in the morning, and ſome of their weightieſt allegations " recurring to my mind; and alſo remembring, with what an exceſſive ear- " neſtneſs one of them ſollicited me to this work (in which I thought there " might be ſomething more than ordinary, and that he was actuated in " this buſineſs I knew not how,) I began ſeriouſly to think with my ſelf of " the matter; and at laſt was ſo conſcientiouſly illaqueated therein, that I " could not abſolutely free myſelf therefrom to this very day. Nor was this " only an act of mere conſcience, but of preſent ſelf-denial. For it did very " vehemently croſs other great and innocent pleaſures, that I promiſed myſelf " in a certain order of my ſtudies, which I had newly propoſed to myſelf at " that very time. But when I was once engaged, I proceeded not without " ſome pleaſure."

Dr. *More*, in a Letter to Dr. *Worthington*, *May* 10. 1665.

" I thank you for your freedom both to him and to me. It never came " into my mind to print this *Enchiridion*, till his book was out, unleſs he would " have profeſſed his like of the project. I have new tranſcribed it all. Mr. " *Jenks* and Mr. *Fullwood* are exceeding earneſt to ſee it, and would tranſcribe " it for their preſent ſatisfaction. But if they ſhould do ſo, and it be known, " it would, it may be, diſguſt Dr. *Cudworth*, whom I am very loth any way " to grieve. But if yourſelf have a mind to ſee it, and could get a fair and " true copy tranſcrib'd of it, I would willingly pay the Tranſcriber, and the " Copy ſhould be yours; for I am loth, that what I have writ on ſo edifying " a ſubject, ſhould be loſt."

Irreligion began now to lift up its head; but the progreſs of it was oppoſed by no perſon with greater force and learning than by our Author. For this purpoſe in 1678, he publiſh'd at *London*, in folio, his *True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe: The firſt Part, wherein all the Reaſon and Philoſophy of Atheiſm*

Atheiſm is confuted, and its Impoſſibility demonſtrated. The *Imprimatur* by Dr. *Samuel Parker*, Chaplain to Archbiſhop *Sheldon*, is dated *May* 29, 1671, ſeven years before the publication of this Work; which met with great oppoſition from ſome of the Courtiers of King *Charles* II. who endeavoured to deſtroy the reputation of it, when it was firſt publiſh'd *. Nor has it eſcap'd the cenſures of Writers of different parties ſince that time.

The firſt Piece, which appear'd againſt it, was from a Roman Catholic, in *A Letter to Mr.* R. Cudworth, *D. D.* printed at the end of a Tract, intitled, *Anti-Haman, or an Anſwer to Mr.* G. Burnet's Myſtery of Iniquity unvailed: *wherein is ſhewed the Conformity of the Doctrine, Worſhip, and Practice of the Roman-Catholic Church with thoſe of the pureſt times; the Idolatry of the Pagans is truly ſtated, and the Imputation of Pagan Idolatry clearly confuted; and the Reaſons are given, why Catholics avoid the Communion of the Proteſtant Church. To which is annexed a Letter to* R. Cudworth *D. D. by* W. E. *Student in Divinity. With leave of Superiours*; 1679 in octavo. This Writer attacks Dr. *Cudworth*'s aſſertion, that tho' very few of the antient Philoſophers thought God to be corporeal, as *Epicurus*, *Strato*, &c. yet that the greateſt part of them believed him to be a pure Spirt, and adored the only true God under the names of *Jupiter*, *Minerva*, *Oſiris* and *Venus*. In oppoſition to which his Antagoniſt maintains †, "that altho' all Pagans (nay all "men) had naturally a knowledge of the true God, yet thoſe, they adored; "were Men:" in ſupport of which he urges four proofs taken, 1. *from the diverſity of their Sexes*: 2. *from their Generation*: 3. *from their Death*: 4. *from their Rites*. He likewiſe attempts to confute what Dr. *Cudworth* has ſtrenuouſly defended throughout his Book, that the *Unity of God* was a prime Article of the Pagan Creed.

But let us now ſee, in how ſevere a manner he was treated even by a Proteſtant Divine, Mr. *John Turner*, in his *Diſcourſe of the Meſſiah* ‖. He tells us ‡, *we muſt conclude Dr.* Cudworth *to be himſelf a* Tritheiſtic, *a ſect, for which, I believe, he may have a kindneſs, becauſe he loves hard words; or ſomething elſe without either* ſtick *or* trick, *which I will not name, becauſe his Book pretends to be written againſt it.* And again ⁂, that "the moſt, that Charity itſelf can "allow the Doctor, if it were to ſtep forth, and ſpeak his moſt favourable "character to the world, is, that he is an Arian, a Socinian, or a Deiſt."

Mr. *Dryden* likewiſe tells us **, that our Author "has raiſed ſuch ſtrong "objections againſt the being of a God and Providence, that many think he "has not anſwered them." And the late Earl of *Shafteſbury*, in his *Moraliſts, a Rhapſody* ††, has the following paſſage: "You know the common fate "of thoſe, who dare to appear fair Authors. What was that pious and "learned man's caſe, who wrote the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe?* I "confeſs, it was pleaſant enough to conſider, that tho' the whole world were "no leſs ſatisfied with his Capacity and Learning, than with his Sincerity in

* Vide Joannis Clerici Vitam, *ad ann.* 1711. *p.* 129 *Edit. Amſtelod.* 1711. in octavo.

† *P.* 335, &c.

‖ *See p.* 16, 17, 19, 162. *edit.* London 1685 *in octavo.*

‡ *P.* 17. ⁂ P. 19.

** Dedication *of his* Tranſlation of *Virgil's Æneid, Vol. II p.* 578. *edit.* London 1730. *in octavo.*

†† *Part. II. Sect.* 3. Characteriſticks *Vol. II. p.* 262 *edit.* London 1737. *in octavo.*

" the Cauſe of the Deity; yet was he accuſed of giving the upper hand to the " Atheiſts, for having only ſtated their reaſons and thoſe of their Adverſaries " fairly together."

Such was the treatment, which our great Author receiv'd for his immortal Volume; wherein, as Mr. *Warburton* ſays *, *with a Boldneſs uncommon indeed, but very becoming a Man conſcious of his own Integrity, and of the Truth and Evidence of his cauſe, he launch'd out into the immenſity of the* Intellectual Syſtem; *and at his firſt eſſay penetrated the very darkeſt receſſes of Antiquity, to ſtrip Atheiſm of all its diſguiſes, and drag up the lurking Monſter to Conviction. Where tho' few readers could follow him, yet the very ſloweſt were able to unravel his ſecret purpoſe——to tell the world——that he was an Atheiſt in his heart, and an* Arian *in his Book.——However, thus ran the popular clamour againſt this excellent perſon. Would the reader know the conſequence? Why, the Zealots inflam'd the Bigots:*

'Twas the time's plague, when madmen led the blind:

The ſilly calumny was believ'd; the much injured Author grew diſguſted; his Ardour ſlackened; and the reſt and far greateſt part of the Defence never appear'd.

The ſame Gentleman likewiſe, in his Letter to me above cited, obſerves, that among the other excellencies of this Work " all his Tranſlations from " the Greek Writers are wonderfully exact, and a vaſt judgment and pene- " tration ſhewn in explaining their ſenſe."

In 1706 there was publiſh'd at *London*, in two Volumes in quarto, an Abridgment of the *Intellectual Syſtem* under this title: *A Confutation of the Reaſon and Philoſophy of Atheiſm: being in a great meaſure either an Abridgment, or an Improvement, of what Dr.* Cudworth *offered to that purpoſe in his* true Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe. *Together with an Introduction, in which, among accounts of other matters relating to this Treatiſe, there is an impartial Examination of what that learned Perſon advanced touching the Chriſtian Doctrine of a Trinity in Unity, and the Reſurrection of the Body. By* Thomas Wiſe *B. D. Fellow of* Exeter-College *in* Oxford, *and Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of* Ormond.

In the *Introduction* Mr. *Wiſe* ſtyles Dr. *Cudworth*'s Book *the vaſteſt Magazine of Reaſoning and Learning, that ever ſingly appear'd againſt Atheiſm*; and then examines his Notions concerning the Trinity and the Reſurrection of the Body. With regard to the former, he obſerves, that Dr. *Cudworth* having laid down a general Propoſition, that the Heathens univerſally held but *one unmade independent God*, comes to ſhew, that the Platoniſts in particular maintained an Unity of the Godhead in their three divine Hypoſtaſes, viz. *Monad* or *Good*, *Mind*, and *Soul*, notwithſtanding that they owned theſe three Hypoſtaſes to be numerically diſtinct, or to have diſtinct ſingular Eſſences of their own. To vindicate the Platoniſts in this point, he tells us, that *the antient orthodox Fathers of the Chriſtian Church were generally of no other perſuaſion than this, that that Eſſence or Subſtance of the Godhead, which all the three perſons or hypoſtaſes agree in, as each of them is God, was not one ſingular or individual, but only one common or univerſal Eſſence or Subſtance.*

" This, ſays Mr. *Wiſe*, and other aſſertions of the like nature in Dr. " *Cudworth's Intellectual Syſtem*, have made ſo much noiſe in the world, that " there

* Preface *to the ſecond Volume of his* Divine Legation *of* Moſes, *p.* x, xi, xii.

" there has hardly been a pamphlet or book written for ſome years about the " bleſſed Trinity, eſpecially in *England*, and in the heterodox way, which " does not bring in Dr. *Cudworth* upon the ſtage, and vouch his name and " quotations for its purpoſe. While on the other hand, the truly Orthodox " (tho' often thro' a miſunderſtanding of his ſenſe) do aim at his Doctrine as " a mark of their Invectives; and others, who call themſelves alſo by that " name, entertaining no little veneration for the very words uſed by the an- " tient Fathers, eſpecially when repeated and revived by ſo learned a perſon " as Dr. *Cudworth*, and reſolving whatever ſhould come of it, to ſtand by " them, have unhappily fallen into a kind of *Tritheiſm*." Mr. *Wiſe* therefore endeavours, as much as poſſible, to clear up and juſtify our Author's Doctrine. However, Mr. *Robert Nelſon*, in his *Life of Biſhop* Bull *, declares, that Dr. *Cudworth*'s Notion with regard to the Trinity was the ſame with Dr. *Samuel Clarke*'s, and repreſents it in the following terms; *That the three Perſons of the Trinity are three diſtinct ſpiritual Subſtances, but that the Father alone is truly and properly God; that he alone in the proper ſenſe is ſupreme; that abſolute ſupreme Honour is due to him only; and that he, abſolutely ſpeaking, is the only God of the Univerſe, the Son and Spirit being God but only by the Father's concurrence with them, and their ſubordination and ſubjection to him.* But to return to Mr. *Wiſe*; he next conſiders our Author's opinion about the Reſurrection, who, as appears from ſeveral paſſages of his *Intellectual Syſtem*, thought, that the Reſurrection-body will not conſiſt of the ſame ſubſtance with that, which was buried; and that it will not be a body of fleſh, but an æthereal one; and that the preſent body is only a ſeed of the Reſurrection. However Mr. *Wiſe* ſhews from other paſſages in his Works, that he has as plainly aſſerted the Reſurrection of the ſame numerical Body, as in ſome places he has denied it.

In the year 1703, *&c.* Monſieur *Le Clerc* gave large extracts of the *Intellectual Syſtem* in his *Bibliotheque Choiſie*, Tom. I. II. III. V. VII. VIII. IX. which engag'd him in a diſpute with Monſieur *Bayle*, concerning Dr. *Cudworth*'s Notion of *Plaſtic Natures*. Monſieur *Bayle*, in his *Continuation des Penſées diverſes ſur les Cometes* †, had obſerved, that " the Atheiſts are very " much perplex'd, how to account for the Formation of Animals, which they " aſcrib'd to a cauſe, which was not conſcious of what it did, and yet followed " a regular Plan, without knowing according to what laws it went to work. " But Dr. *Cudworth*'s *Plaſtic Nature*, and Dr. *Grew*'s *Vital Principle* ‖ are " exactly in the ſame caſe; and thus they take away the whole ſtrength of " this objection againſt the Atheiſts. For if God could communicate ſuch " a plaſtic power, it follows, that it is not inconſiſtent with the nature of " things, that there be ſuch agents. They may therefore exiſt of themſelves, " will the adverſary ſay; whence it would alſo follow, that the regularity, " which we obſerve in the univerſe, may be the effect of a blind cauſe, " which was not conſcious of what it did." Mr. *Bayle* however own'd, that Dr. *Cudworth* and Dr. *Grew* were not aware of the conſequence, which, according

* §. LXI. *p.* 339, 340. *edit.* London. 1714. *in octavo.*

† *Tom. I.* §. 21.

‖ See Dr. *Nehemiah Grew*'s Coſmologia Sacra, *printed at* London, 1701. *in folio.*

according to him, followed from their ſyſtem. Monſieur *Le Clerc* return'd an anſwer in the fifth Volume of his *Bibliotheque Choiſie* * ; wherein he obſerv'd, that the plaſtic or vital Natures, which thoſe two Writers admit, cannot in the leaſt favour the Atheiſts ; becauſe theſe natures are only inſtruments in the hand of God, and have no power nor efficacy, but what they receive from him, who rules and directs all their actions. That tney are only inſtrumental cauſes produced and employ'd by the chief and firſt Cauſe ; and that it cannot be ſaid, that a palace has been built up without art, becauſe not only hammers, rules, ſaws, *&c.* but even the arms of men, which made uſe of theſe inſtruments, are deſtitute of knowledge. It is ſufficient, that the mind of the Builder directed all theſe things, and employ'd them in the Execution of his Deſign. It is therefore plain, that the Atheiſts, who deny the Being of an intelligent Cauſe, cannot retort the argument of Dr. *Cudworth* and Dr. *Grew* upon them. Monſieur *Bayle*, in his Anſwer †, endeavour'd to ſhew, that if theſe Writers had conſider'd the plaſtic Natures only as inſtruments in the hand of God, this Syſtem would have been expoſed to all the difficulties, to which the Carteſian hypotheſis is liable, and which they intend to avoid. That therefore we muſt ſuppoſe their opinion to have been, that theſe Natures are active Principles, which do not want to be continually ſet on and directed ; but that it is ſufficient, if God does but put them in a proper ſituation, and ſuperintend their actions, to ſet them right, if it be neceſſary. This being the caſe, Monſieur *Bayle* pretends, that the Argument may be retorted againſt thoſe Writers. For, ſays he, ſince when the order and regularity of this world are alledg'd as a proof of the Being of a God, it is ſuppoſed, that a Being cannot produce a regular work, without having an idea of it ; yet, according to Dr. *Cudworth*, the plaſtic Natures, which produce plants and animals, have not the leaſt idea of what they do. If it be anſwer'd, that they have been created with that faculty by a Being, who knows all, and whoſe Ideas they only put in execution ; the Stratonician will reply, that if they do it onlyas efficient Cauſes, this is as incomprehenſible as that, which is objected to him ; ſince it is as difficult for any Being to perform a ſcheme, which it does not underſtand, but which another underſtands, as it is to perform a ſcheme, which no Being at all has any notion of. Since you acknowledge, will the Stratonician ſay, that God could endow ſome Creatures with a power of producing excellent works, tho' without any knowledge ; you muſt alſo confeſs, that there is no neceſſary connection between the power of producing excellent works, and the idea and knowledge of their eſſence, and of the manner of producing them : conſequently you ought not to aſſert, that theſe things cannot ſubſiſt ſeparately in nature, and that nature cannot have of it ſelf, what, according to you, the plaſtic Beings received from God. In ſhort, Monſieur *Bayle* aſk'd, whether theſe Writers maintain'd, that the Plaſtic and Vital Natures are only paſſive inſtruments in the hand of God, as Monſieur *Le Clerc* ſeem'd to ſuppoſe by his Compariſon of an Architect. Monſieur *Le Clerc* anſwer'd ‖, that, according to Dr. *Cudworth*, the plaſtic Natures were not paſſive

* *P.* 283, &c.
† Hiſt. des Ouvrages des Sçavans, *Août* 1704 *Art.* 7. *p.* 380, *&c.*
‖ Biblioth. Choiſie. *Tom. VI. Artic.* 7. *p.* 422.

paſſive inſtruments; but that they are under God's direction, who conducts them, tho' we cannot explain after what manner. Nor can the Atheiſts, added he, retort the argument, becauſe God is the author of the regularity and order, with which the Plaſtic Natures act; whereas, according to the Atheiſts, Matter moves of itſelf, without any Cauſe to direct it, and to give it a power of moving regularly. This diſpute was carried on ſtill further, with ſome warmth, and a great many repetitions on both ſides. But what has been ſaid is ſufficient to give the reader a notion of this controverſy, for the progreſs of which he may conſult the following Books: *Hiſtoire des Ouvrages des Scavans.* Decemb. 1704. Art. 12. *Bibliotheque Choiſie,* Tom. VII. Art. 7. *Réponſ. aux Queſtions d'un Provincial,* Tom. III. Chap. 179. *Bibliotheque Choiſie,* Tom. IX. Art. 10. *Réponſe pour Mr.* Bayle *a Mr.* Le Clerc, p. 31. annex'd to the fourth Volume of the *Réponſ. aux Queſt. d'un Provincial.*—— Upon the whole, Mr. *Warburton,* in his Letter to me above cited, is of opinion, that our Author's "*Plaſtic Life of Nature* is fully overthrown by "Monſieur *Bayle,*——whoſe ſuperiority in that diſpute with Monſieur *Le* "*Clerc,* is clear and indiſputable."

Monſieur *Le Clerc* * expreſs'd his wiſhes, that ſome Man of Learning would tranſlate the *Intellectual Syſtem* into Latin; but this deſign, tho' reſolv'd upon and attempted by ſeveral perſons in *Germany* †, was never executed 'till the Year 1733, when Dr. *Moſheim* publiſh'd his Tranſlation of it under the following title: RADULPHI CUDWORTH *Theologiæ Doctoris, & in Academiâ Cantabrigienſi Profeſſoris, Syſtema Intellectuale hujus Univerſi, ſeu de veris Naturæ Rerum originibus Commentarii; quibus omnis eorum Philoſophia, qui Deum eſſe negant, funditùs evertitur. Accedunt reliqua ejus Opuſcula.* Joannes Laurentius Moſhemius, *Theologiæ Doctor, ſereniſſimi Ducis Brunſvicenſis à Conſiliis Rerum ſanctiorum, Abbas Cœnobiorum Vallis S.* Mariæ *& Lapidis S.* Michaelis, *omnia ex Anglico Latinè vertit, recenſuit, variis Obſervationibus & Diſſertationibus illuſtravit, & auxit.* Jenæ, 2 Volumes in folio. Dr. *Moſheim,* in his Preface, repreſents the difficulties of tranſlating this work to be very great; and obſerves ſome Miſtakes, which Monſieur *Le Clerc* has committed with regard to the ſenſe of our Author in his Extracts in the *Bibliotheque Choiſie.* Monſieur *Bourdelin,* a Member of the French Academy of Inſcriptions and *Belles Lettres,* had begun a Tranſlation of the *Intellectual Syſtem* into French ‖, but was prevented from compleating it by his death, which happened in *May* 1717.

But to return to our Author: in 1678, he was inſtall'd Prebendary of *Glouceſter* ‡. He died at *Cambridge June* 26, 1688. and was interr'd in the Chapel of *Chriſt*'s *College,* with the following Inſcription on his Monument:

"Here lyeth the Body of Dr. RALPH CUDWORTH, late Maſter of *Chriſt*'s "*College,* about thirty Years Hebrew Profeſſor, and Prebendary of *Gloceſter.* "He died the 26th of *June* 1688, in the ſeventy-firſt Year of his Age."

* Biblioth. Choiſie. *Tom. I. p.* 65.

† See Dr. *Moſheim*'s Preface.

‖ *See his* Eloge in Hiſt. de l'Academie des Inſcriptions & Belles Lettres. *Tom. II. p.* 562. *edit.* Amſterdam.

‡ Survey of the Cathedrals of *York,* &c. by *Browne Willis* Eſq; *p.* 743. *edit.* London 1727. *in quarto.*

He was a Man of very extenſive Learning, excellently ſkill'd in the learned Languages and Antiquity, a good Mathematician, a ſubtile Philoſopher, and a profound Metaphyſician. He embraced the Mechanical or Corpuſcular Philoſophy; but with regard to the Deity, Intelligences, Genii, Ideas, and in ſhort the Principles of human Knowledge, he followed *Plato*, and even the latter Platoniſts *. A great number of Writers commend his Piety and Modeſty; and † Biſhop *Burnet* having obſerv'd, that Dr. *Henry More ſtudied to conſider Religion as a Seed of a Deiform Nature, and in order to this, ſet young Students much on reading the antient Philoſophers, chiefly* Plato, Tully, *and* Plotin, *and on conſidering the Chriſtian Religion as a Doctrine ſent from God both to elevate and ſweeten human Nature*, tells us, that "Dr. *Cudworth* "carried this on with a great Strength of Genius, and a vaſt Compaſs of "Learning;" and that "he was a Man of great Conduct and Prudence; "upon which his Enemies did very falſely accuſe him of Craft and Diſſimu-"lation." The late Earl of *Shafteſbury* ‖ ſtyles him *an excellent and learned Divine, of higheſt Authority at home, and Fame abroad.*

Beſides his Sermon on 1 *John* ii. 3, 4. above-mentioned, he publiſh'd likewiſe another on 1 *Cor.* xv. 57. the third Edition of both which was printed at *London* 1676, in folio.

He left ſeveral poſthumous Works, moſt of which ſeem to be a Continuation of his *Intellectual Syſtem*, of which he had given the world only the firſt Part. One of theſe was publiſh'd by Dr. *Edward Chandler*, Biſhop of *Durham*, at *London*, in 1731, under this Title; *A Treatiſe concerning eternal and immutable Morality.* In the Preface ‡ to which the Biſhop obſerves, that in this Book our Author "proves the falſeneſs of the Conſe-"quences with reſpect to *natural Juſtice and Morality in God*, which are de-"ducible from the Principles of thoſe, that maintain the ſecond ſort of "Fate, denominated by him *Theologic.* And thus it may be reckoned to be "a ſequel in part of his firſt Book againſt *Material Fate.* Had it come "abroad as early as it was written, it had ſerved for a proper Antidote to the "Poiſon in ſome of Mr. *Hobbes*'s and others Writings, who reviv'd in that "Age the exploded Opinions of *Protagoras* and other antient Greeks, and "took away the *eſſential and eternal Diſcriminations of moral Good and Evil*, "*of juſt and unjuſt*, and made them *all arbitrary Productions of divine or human* "*Will.* Againſt the antient and modern Patrons of this Doctrine, no one "hath writ better than Dr. *Cudworth.* His Book is indeed a Demonſtration "of the truth of the contrary Opinion, and is drawn up with that Beauty, "Clearneſs, and Strength, as muſt delight as well as convince the Reader, if I "may judge of the affection of others from the effect it had on me. It will "certainly give a juſt Idea of the Writer's good Senſe, as well as vaſt Learning. "We are not certain, that this Treatiſe is quoted ſo perfect as the Author "deſign'd it; but it appears from the Manuſcript, that he tranſcribed the "beſt part of it with his own hand, as if it was ſpeedily to have been ſent "to the Preſs."

The

* Moſheim, *ubi ſupra.*
† Hiſtory of his own Time, *Vol. I. p.* 187.
‖ Characteriſticks, *Vol. III. Chap.* 2. *p.* 64.
‡ P. 9, 10, 11.

The Titles and Subjects of the reſt of our Author's Manuſcripts are as follow:

A Diſcourſe of moral Good and Evil in ſeveral Folios, containing near 1000 Pages.

Heads of the Chapters of one of thoſe Books.

Chap. 1. The Opinions of the antient Adverſaries of natural Juſtice explained, p. 1.

2. Objections againſt Morality, p. 11.

3. Anſwers to the firſt Objection, p. 29.

4. Anſwer to the ſecond and third Objection, p. 45.

5. Inconſiſtencies with a Common-wealth, p. 49.

6. Juſtice made by God's arbitrary Command, p. 79.

7. The ſixth and ſeventh Objections anſwer'd, p. 112.

8. Pleaſure; wherein the ancient Hedonic Philoſophy is explain'd, and it is largely debated, whether Pleaſure is the *Summum Bonum*, p. 117.

9. Anſwer to the ninth Objection, p. 175.

10. Notion of Morality ſettled, p. 198.

11. Happineſs; and the Philoſophy of *Epicurus* concerning it examined and refuted, p. 253.

12. True Happineſs in divine Life, p. 296.

13. Reſult of the former Diſcourſe; incorporeal Subſtance Deity, p. 303.

14. Controverſy of Liberty ſtated. A new philoſophical Hypotheſis, p. 336.

15. Objections againſt Liberty. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν φαινόμενον.

16. Argument from the Phænomenon of Incontinency, p. 382.

Heads of another Book of Morality, wherein *Hobbes*'s Philoſophy is explain'd. *Prolegomena*; to ſhew, that if nothing is naturally juſt or unjuſt, nothing can be made ſo. Chap. 2. Not by Laws. Chap. 3. Not by Laws of Nature. Chap. 4. Not by Covenants. Chap. 5. To explain his Doctrine, generally and particularly. Chap. 6. State of Nature. Chap. 7. Laws of Nature. Chap. 8. Common Repreſentative. Chap. 9. To diſcover his Equivocations. Chap. 10. About Obligation. Chap. 11. According to him, there can be no Ethic. Chap. 12. Judgment on his Politics, that no Politic can be built on theſe Principles.

A Diſcourſe of Liberty and Neceſſity, in which the Grounds of the atheiſtical Philoſophy are confuted, and Morality vindicated and explained. This Book contains 1000 pages in folio.

Heads of the Chapters of one of the Books.

Chap. 1. The Neceſſity of all human Actions aſſerted by three ſorts of Men, and in different ways: firſt, ſome Chriſtian Theologers of the latter age: ſecondly, the old Zenonian Stoics: thirdly, the Democritical Phyſiologers or atheiſtical Fataliſts, p. 1.

2. Chriſtian Fataliſts pleading, p. 37.

3. The Stoical Fataliſts pleading, p 70.

4. Atheiſtical Fataliſts pleading, p. 84.

5. Anſwer to the Phænomena objected, p. 119.

6. Of Motion and Senſe, p. 167.

7. Of Intellection, p. 196.

8. Anſwer to *Hobbes*'s Reflections, p. 305.
9. Morality, p. 317.

Heads of the Chapters of another Book *De libero Arbitrio.*

Chap. 1. Dreams. 2. Indifferences. 3. General Account. 4. Particular or full Account. 5. Definition and particular Account. 6. An Imperfection not formally in God. 7. Arguments to prove ſuch a thing. 8. That that, which rules all, is not ἀνάγκη ἀπαραίτητος, but προνοία ἱλασμός. 9. Anſwer to the objection, μηδὲν ἀναίτιον. 10. Contingences. 11. Argument for Neceſſity, taken from the Nature of God.

Upon *Daniel*'s prophecy of the LXX Weeks, wherein all the Interpretations of the Jews are conſidered and confuted, with ſeveral of ſome learned Chriſtians. In two Volumes in Folio.

Of the Verity of the Chriſtian Religion againſt the Jews. Dr. *Cudworth* mentions this in his MSS. but it is not yet found.

A Diſcourſe of the Creation of the World, and Immortality of the Soul, in 8vo.

Hebrew Learning.

An Explanation of *Hobbes*'s Notion of God, and of the Extenſion of Spirits.

Our Author had ſeveral ſons, who probably died young, but he left one daughter, *Damaris*, who was ſecond wife to Sir *Francis Maſham*, of *Oates* in the County of *Eſſex*, Bart. * by whom ſhe had a ſon, the late *Francis-Cudworth Maſham* Eſq; †, one of the Maſters of the high Court of Chancery, and Accountant General of the ſaid Court, and foreign Appoſer in the Court of Exchequer. This Lady had a great friendſhip with Mr. *Locke*, who died at her houſe at *Oates*, where he had reſided for ſeveral years before. She was diſtinguiſh'd for her uncommon genius and learning; and in the year 1696 publiſh'd at *London* in 12°, without her name, *A Diſcourſe concerning the Love of God* ‖. She introduces this Tract with obſerving, that "whatever reproaches have been made by the Romaniſts, on the one "hand, of the want of books of devotion in the Church of *England*, or "by the Diſſenters, on the other, of a dead and lifeleſs way of preaching, "it may be affirmed, that there cannot any where be found ſo good a col-"lection of diſcourſes on moral ſubjects, as might be made of *Engliſh* "ſermons, and other treatiſes of that nature, written by the Divines of our "church. Which books are certainly in themſelves of the greateſt, and "moſt general uſe of any; and do moſt conduce to that, which is the chief "aim of Chriſtianity, a good Life." She then animadverts upon thoſe, who undervalue morality ‡, and others, who ſtrain the duties of it to an impracticable pitch, and pretend to aſcend by it to ſomething beyond or above it *‖; and afterwards proceeds to conſider the conduct of thoſe, who *build their practical and devotional Diſcourſes upon Principles, which will not bear the teſt, but which oblige them to lay down ſuch aſſertions of Morality, as ſober and well-diſpoſed Chriſtians cannot underſtand to be practicable* **. And here

* He died at his ſeat at *Oates* on *Sunday* the 3d of *March* 1706-7, in the 77th year of his age.

† He died *May* 17th, 1731.

‖ It contains 126 pages, beſides the preface.

‡ Pag. 2, 3.

*‖ P. 3, 4, 5, 6.

** P. 7.

here ſhe applies herſelf to the examination of Mr. *John Norris*'s * Scheme in his *Practical Diſcourſes* and other Treatiſes, wherein he maintains., that "mankind are obliged ſtrictly, as their duty, to love, with deſire, nothing "but God only, every degree of deſire of any creature whatſoever being "ſinful:" which aſſertion Mr. *Norris* defends upon this ground, that *God, not the creature, is the immediate efficient cauſe of our Senſations; for whatſoever gives us pleaſure, has a right to our love: but God only gives us pleaſure; therefore he only has a right to our love.* This hypotheſis is conſidered with great accuracy and ingenuity by Lady *Maſham*, and the bad conſequences of it repreſented in a ſtrong light. Her Diſcourſe was tranſlated into *French* by Mr. *Peter Coſte*, and printed at *Amſterdam* in 1705. She lies buried in the cathedral church of *Bath*, where a monument is erected to her memory with the following inſcription:

"Near this place lies Dame DAMARIS MASHAM, daughter of "*Ralph Cudworth* D. D. and ſecond Wife of Sir *Francis Maſham* of *Oates* in "the County of *Eſſex* Bart. who to the Softneſs and Elegancy of her own "Sex, added ſeveral of the nobleſt Accompliſhments and Qualities to the "other.

"She poſſeſſed theſe Advantages in a degree unuſual to either, and tem-"pered them with an Exactneſs peculiar to herſelf.

"Her Learning, Judgment, Sagacity, and Penetration, together with her "Candour and Love of Truth, were very obſervable to all, that converſed with "her, or were acquainted with thoſe ſmall treatiſes ſhe publiſhed in her "life-time, tho' ſhe induſtriouſly concealed her Name.

"Being Mother of an only Son, ſhe applied all her natural and acquired "Endowments to the care of his Education.

"She was a ſtrict Obſerver of all the Virtues belonging to every Station "of her Life; and only wanted Opportunities to make theſe Talents ſhine in "the world, which were the Admiration of her Friends.

"She was born on the 18th of *January* 1658, and died on the 20th of "*April* 1708."

* This Divine borrowed his hypotheſis from Father *Mallebranche*.

THE

THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE:

THE FIRST PART;

WHEREIN

All the REASON and PHILOSOPHY of *ATHEISM* is confuted,

AND

Its IMPOSSIBILITY demonſtrated.

By *RALPH CUDWORTH*, D. D.

Γυμνάσιον τῆς ψυκῆς Ἡ ἈΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗ ΣΟΦΙΑ, Τέλος δὲ Ἡ ΘΕΙΑ.

ORIGENES.

THE SECOND EDITION;

In which are now firſt added REFERENCES to the ſeveral Quotations.

To the Right Honourable

HENEAGE

LORD *FINCH*,

BARON *of DAVENTRY*,

Lord High CHANCELLOR *of* England,
and one of His MAJESTY's most Honourable Privy Council.

My Lord,

THE many Favours I have formerly received from You, as they might juſtly challenge, whenever I had a fit opportunity, a publick and thankful Acknowledgment; ſo have they encourag'd me at this time, to the Preſumption of this Dedication to your Lordſhip. Whom, as your perſpicacious Wit, and ſolid Judgment, together with Your acquired Learning, render every way a moſt accompliſhed and deſirable Patron; ſo did I perſuade my ſelf, that your hearty Affection to Religion, and Zeal for it, would make you not unwilling, to take that into your Protection, which is written wholly in the Defence thereof; ſo far forth, as its own Defects, or Miſcarriages, ſhould not render it uncapable of the ſame. Nor can I think it probable, that in an Age of ſo much Debauchery, Scepticiſm, and Infidelity, an Under-

taking of this kind ſhould be judged by You uſeleſs or unſeaſonable. And now, having ſo fit an Opportunity, I could moſt willingly expatiate in the large Field of your Lordſhip's Praiſes; both that I might do an Act of *Juſtice* to your ſelf, and provoke others to your Imitation. But I am ſenſible, that as no Eloquence, leſs than that of your own, could be fit for ſuch a Performance; ſo the Nobleneſs and Generoſity of your Spirit is ſuch, that you take much more Pleaſure in doing praiſe-worthy things, than in hearing the repeated Echo's of them. Wherefore inſtead of purſuing Encomiums, which would be the leaſt pleaſing to your ſelf, I ſhall offer up my Prayers to Almighty God, for the Continuation of your Lordſhip's Life and Health; that ſo his MAJESTY may long have ſuch a loyal Subject and wiſe Counſellor; the Church of *England* ſuch a worthy Patron; the High Court of Chancery ſuch an Oracle of impartial Juſtice; and the whole Nation ſuch a Pattern of Virtue and Piety. Which ſhall ever be the hearty Deſire of,

MY LORD,

YOUR LORDSHIP'S

Moſt Humble, and

Moſt Affectionate Servant,

R. CUDWORTH.

THE PREFACE TO THE READER.

THOUGH, I confeſs, I have ſeldom taken any great pleaſure, in reading other men's apologies, yet muſt I at this time make ſome my ſelf. Firſt therefore, I acknowledge, that when I engaged the preſs, I intended only a diſcourſe concerning Liberty and Neceſſity, or to ſpeak out more plainly, againſt the fatal neceſſity of all Actions and Events; which, upon whatſoever grounds or principles maintain'd, will (as we conceive) ſerve the deſign of Atheiſm, and undermine Chriſtianity, and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, puniſhments and rewards, and plainly rendring a day of judgment ridiculous; and it is evident, that ſome have purſued it of late, in order to that end. But afterwards we conſider'd, that this, which is indeed a controverſy concerning the *True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*, does, in the full extent thereof, take in other things; the neceſſity of all actions and events being maintained by ſeveral perſons, upon very different grounds, according to that tripartite Fataliſm, mentioned by us in the beginning of the firſt chapter. For firſt, the Democritick Fate is nothing but the material neceſſity of all things without a God, it ſuppoſing ſenſeleſs matter, neceſſarily moved, to be the only original and principal of all things: which therefore is called by *Epicurus*, the Phyſiological; by us, the Atheiſtick Fate. Beſides which, the Divine Fate is alſo bipartite; ſome Theiſts ſuppoſing God, both to decree and do all things in us (evil as well as good) or by his immediate influence to determine all actions, and ſo make them alike neceſſary to us. From whence it follows, that his will is no way regulated or determined by any eſſential and immutable goodneſs and juſtice; or that he hath nothing of morality in his nature, he being only arbitrary Will omnipotent. As alſo that all good and evil moral, to us creatures, are meer thetical or poſitive things;

νόμῳ, and not φύσει, by *law* or *command* only, and not by nature. This therefore may be called the Divine Fate immoral, and violent. Again, there being other divine Fataliſts, who acknowledge ſuch a Deity, as both ſuffers other things, beſides it ſelf, to act, and hath an eſſential goodneſs and juſtice in its nature, and conſequently, that there are things, juſt and unjuſt to us naturally, and not by law and arbitrary conſtitution only; and yet nevertheleſs take away from men all ſuch liberty, as might make them capable of praiſe and diſpraiſe, rewards and puniſhments, and objects of diſtributive juſtice; they conceiving neceſſity to be intrinſecal to the nature of every thing, in the actings of it, and nothing of contingency to be found any where: from whence it will follow, that nothing could poſſibly have been otherwiſe, in the whole world, than it is. And this may be called the Divine Fate moral, (as the other immoral,) and natural, (as the other violent;) it being a concatenation, or implexed ſeries of cauſes, all in themſelves neceſſary, depending upon a Deity moral, (if we may ſo ſpeak) that is, ſuch as is eſſentially good, and naturally juſt, as the head thereof; the firſt contriver, and orderer of all. Which kind of Divine Fate hath not only been formerly aſſerted by the Stoicks, but alſo of late by divers modern writers. Wherefore of the three fataliſms, or falſe hypotheſes of the univerſe, mentioned in the beginning of this book; one is abſolute Atheiſm; another immoral Theiſm, or religion without any natural juſtice and morality; (all juſt and unjuſt, according to this hypotheſis, being meer thetical or factitious things, made by arbitrary will and command only:) The third and laſt ſuch a Theiſm, as acknowledges not only a God, or omnipotent underſtanding Being, but alſo natural juſtice and morality, founded in him, and derived from him; nevertheleſs no liberty from neceſſity anywhere, and therefore no diſtributive or retributive juſtice in the world. Whereas theſe three things are (as we conceive) the fundamentals or eſſentials of true religion. Firſt, that all things in the world do not float without a head and governour; but that there is a God, an omnipotent underſtanding Being, preſiding over all. Secondly, that this God being eſſentially good and juſt, there is φύσει καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ſomething in its own nature, immutably and eternally juſt, and unjuſt; and not by arbitrary will, law, and command only. And laſtly, that there is ſomething ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or, that we are ſo far forth principles or maſters of our own actions, as to be accountable to juſtice for them, or to make us guilty and blame-worthy for what we do amiſs, and to deſerve puniſhment accordingly. Which three fundamentals of religion, are intimated by the author to the *Hebrews* in theſe words; *he that cometh to God, muſt believe, that he is, and that he is a rewarder of thoſe, who ſeek him out.* For to ſeek out God here, is nothing elſe, but to ſeek a participation of his image, or the recovery of that nature and life of his, which we have been alienated from. And theſe three things, namely, that all things do not float without a head and governor, but there is an omnipotent underſtanding Being preſiding over all; that this God, hath an eſſential goodneſs and juſtice; and that the differences of good and evil moral, honeſt and diſhoneſt, are not by meer will and law only,

but

but by nature; and consequently, that the Deity cannot act, influence, and necessitate men to such things, as are in their own nature evil; and lastly, that necessity is not intrinsecal to the nature of every thing, but that men have such a liberty, or power over their own actions, as may render them accountable for the same, and blame-worthy when they do amiss; and consequently, that there is a justice distributive of rewards and punishments running through the world: I say, these three, (which are the most important things, that the mind of man can employ it self upon) taken all together, make up the wholeness and entireness of that, which is here called by us, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, in such a sense, as Atheism may be called a false System thereof; the word *Intellectual* being added, to distinguish it from the other, vulgarly so called, *Systems of the World*, (that is, the visible and corporeal world) the Ptolemaick, Tychonick, and Copernican; the two former of which are now commonly accounted false, the latter true. And thus our prospect being now enlarged into a threefold fatalism, or spurious and false hypothesis of the Intellectual System, making all things necessary upon several grounds; we accordingly designed the confutation of them all, in three several books. The first, against Atheism, (which is the Democritick fate) wherein all the reason and philosophy thereof is refelled, and the existence of a God demonstrated; and so that ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or *material necessity* of all things, overthrown. The second, for such a God, as is not meer arbitrary will omnipotent, decreeing, doing, and necessitating all actions, evil as well as good, but essentially moral, good and just; and for a natural *discrimen honestorum & turpium*, whereby another ground of the necessity of all human actions will be removed. And the third and last, against necessity intrinsecal and essential to all action, and for such a liberty, or *sui-potestas*, in rational creatures, as may render them accountable, capable of rewards and punishments, and so objects of distributive or retributive justice; by which the now only remaining ground, of the fatal necessity of all actions and events, will be taken away. And all these three under that one general title of *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*; each book having, besides, its own particular title: as, against Atheism; for natural Justice and Morality, founded in the Deity; for Liberty from Necessity, and a distributive Justice of Rewards and Punishments in the world. And this we conceive may fully satisfy, concerning our general title, all those, who are not extremely critical or captious, at least as many of them as ever heard of the astronomical systems of the world; so that they will not think us hereby obliged, to treat of the hierarchy of angels, and of all the several species of animals, vegetables, and minerals, *&c.* that is, to write *de omni ente*, of whatsoever is contained within the complexion of the universe. Though the whole scale of Entity is here also taken notice of; and the general ranks of substantial beings, below the Deity (or Trinity of Divine hypostases) consider'd; which yet, according to our philosophy, are but two; souls of several degrees, (angels themselves being included within that number) and body or matter; as also the immortality of those souls proved. Which notwithstanding is suggested by us, only to satisfy some

men's

men's curioſity. Nevertheleſs, we confeſs, that this general title might well have been here ſpared by us, and this volume have been preſented to the reader's view, not as a part or piece, but a whole compleat and entire thing by it ſelf, had it not been for two reaſons; firſt, our beginning with thoſe three Fataliſms, or falſe hypotheſes of the *Intellectual Syſtem*, and promiſing a confutation of them all then, when we thought to have brought them within the compaſs of one volume; and ſecondly, every other page's, throughout this whole volume, accordingly bearing the inſcription of book the firſt upon the head thereof. This is therefore that, which, in the firſt place, we here apologize for, our publiſhing one part or book alone by it ſelf, we being ſurprized in the length thereof; whereas we had otherwiſe intended two more along with it. Notwithſtanding which, there is no reaſon, why this volume ſhould be therefore thought imperfect and incomplete, becauſe it hath not all the three things at firſt deſigned by us; it containing all that belongeth to its own particular title and ſubject, and being in that reſpect no piece, but a whole. This indeed muſt needs beget an expectation of the two following treatiſes, (eſpecially in ſuch as ſhall have received any ſatisfaction from this firſt,) concerning thoſe two other Fataliſms, or falſe hypotheſes mentioned; to make up our whole *Intellectual Syſtem* compleat: the one to prove, that God is not mere arbitrary Will omnipotent, (without any eſſential goodneſs and juſtice) decreeing and doing all things in the world, as well evil as good; and thereby making them alike neceſſary to us; from whence it would follow, that all good and evil moral are mere thetical, poſitive, and arbitrary things, that is, not nature, but will: which is the defence of natural, eternal immutable juſtice, or morality. The other, that neceſſity is not intrinſecal to the nature of every thing, God and all creatures, or eſſential to all action; but, that there is ſomething ἐφ ἡμῖν, or, that we have ſome liberty, or power over our own actions: which is the defence of a diſtributive or retributive juſtice, diſpenſing rewards and puniſhments throughout the whole world. Wherefore we think fit here to advertiſe the reader concerning theſe, that though they were, and ſtill are, really intended by us; yet the compleat finiſhing and publication of them will notwithſtanding depend upon many contingencies; not only of our life and health, the latter of which, as well as the former, is to us very uncertain; but alſo of our leiſure, or vacancy from other neceſſary employments.

In the next place, we muſt apologize alſo for the fourth chapter; inaſmuch as, though, in regard of its length, it might rather be called a book, than a chapter, yet it doth not anſwer all the contents prefixed to it. Here therefore muſt we again confeſs our ſelves ſurprized; who, when we wrote thoſe Contents, did not ſuſpect in the leaſt, but that we ſhould have ſatisfied them all within a leſſer compaſs. And our deſign then was, beſides anſwering the objection, againſt the naturality of the idea of God, from the Pagan polytheiſm, (we having then ſo fit an occaſion) to give ſuch a further account of the idolatry and religion of the Gentiles, as might prepare our way for a defence of Chriſtianity, to be ſubjoined in the cloſe; it being not only agreeable to the ſenſe of ancient doctors, but alſo expreſly declared in the Scripture,

Scripture, that one design of Christianity was to abolish and extirpate the Pagan polytheism and idolatry. And our reasons for this intended defence of Christianity were: First because we had observed, that some professed opposers of atheism, had either incurred a suspicion, or at least suffered under the imputation, of being mere Theists, or natural Religionists only, and no hearty believers of Christianity, or friends to revealed Religion. From which either suspicion or imputation therefore we thought it justice to free our selves, we having so unshaken a belief, and firm assurance of the truth of the whole Christian Doctrine. But, secondly and principally, because we had further observed it to have been the method of our modern Atheists, to make their first assault against Christianity, as thinking that to be the most vulnerable; and that it would be an easy step for them, from thence, to demolish all religion and theism. However, since the satisfying the former part of those contents had already taken up so much room, that the pursuit of the remainder would have quite excluded our principally intended confutation of all the atheistick grounds; the forementioned objection being now sufficiently answered, there was a necessity, that we should there break off, and leave the further account of the Pagan Idolatry and Religion, together with our Defence of Christianity, to some other more convenient opportunity.

And now we shall exhibit to the reader's view a brief and general synopsis of the whole following work, together with some particular reflections upon several parts thereof, either for his better information concerning them, or for their vindication; some of which therefore will be of greater use, after the book has been read, than before. The first chapter is an account of the Atomick physiology, as made the foundation of the Democritick fate. Where the reader is to understand, that this Democritick fate, which is one of the three false hypotheses of the *Intellectual System*, there mentioned, is the very self-same thing with the Atomick atheism, the only form of atheism, that hath publickly appeared upon the stage, as an entire philosophick system, or hath indeed been much taken notice of in the world for these two thousand years past. For, though it be true, That *Epicurus*, (who was also an Atomick Atheist, as is afterwards declared, having, in all probability, therefore a mind to innovate something, that he might not seem to have borrowed all from *Democritus*,) did by violence introduce liberty of will into his hypothesis; for the solving whereof he ridiculously devised, that his Third Motion of Atoms, called by *Lucretius*

——*Exiguum Clinamen Principiorum:*

yet was this, as *Cicero* * long since observed, a most heterogeneous patch, or *assumentum* of his, and altogether as contradictious to the tenour of his own principles, as it was to the doctrine of *Democritus* himself. There can be nothing more absurd, than for an Atheist to assert liberty of will; but it is most of all absurd, for an atomick one. And therefore our modern Atheists do here plainly disclaim *Epicurus*, (though otherwise so much admired by them,) and declare open war against this liberty of will; they apprehending

* De Nat. Deor. L. 1. c. 25.

prehending, that it would unavoidably introduce incorporeal ſubſtance; as alſo well knowing, that neceſſity, on the contrary, effectually overthrows all religion, it taking away guilt and blame, puniſhments and rewards; to which might be added alſo prayers and devotions.

And as there was a neceſſity for us here, to give ſome account of that antient Atomick phyſiology, with which atheiſm now became thus blended and complicated; ſo do we, in this firſt chapter, chiefly inſiſt upon two things concerning it. Firſt, that it was no invention of *Democritus* nor *Leucippus*, but of much greater antiquity; not only from that tradition tranſmitted by *Poſidonius* the Stoick, that it derived its original from one *Moſchus* a Phœnician, who lived before the Trojan wars, (which plainly makes it to have been Moſaical;) but alſo from *Ariſtotle*'s affirmation, that the greater part of the antient philoſophers entertained this hypotheſis; and further becauſe it is certain, that divers of the Italicks, and particularly *Empedocles*, before *Democritus*, phyſiologized atomically; which is the reaſon he was ſo much applauded by *Lucretius*. Beſides which, it is more than a preſumption, that *Anaxagoras* his Homœomery, or ſimilar atomology, was but a degeneration from the true and genuine atomology of the ancient Italicks, that was an Anomœomery, or doctrine of diſſimilar and unqualified atoms. Wherefore all that is true concerning *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, is only this, that theſe men were indeed the firſt atheizers of this ancient atomick phyſiology, or the inventors and broachers of the atomick atheiſm. Which is *Laertius* his true meaning, (though it be not commonly underſtood,) when he recordeth of them, that they were the firſt, who made unqualified atoms the principles of all things in the univerſe without exception; that is, not only of inanimate bodies, (as the other ancient religious Atomiſts, the Italicks, before had done,) but alſo of ſoul and mind.

And whereas we conceive this atomick phyſiology, as to the eſſentials thereof, to be unqueſtionably true, *viz.* That the only principles of bodies are magnitude, figure, ſite, motion, and reſt; and that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are really nothing, but ſeveral combinations of theſe, cauſing ſeveral phancies in us; (which excellent diſcovery therefore, ſo long ago made, is a notable inſtance of the wit and ſagacity of the ancients:) ſo do we in the next place make it manifeſt, that this atomick phyſiology rightly underſtood is ſo far from being either the mother or nurſe of atheiſm, or any ways favourable thereunto, (as is vulgarly ſuppoſed) that it is indeed the moſt directly oppoſite to it of any, and the greateſt defence againſt the ſame. For, firſt, we have diſcovered, that the principle, upon which this atomology is founded, and from whence it ſprung, was no other than this, *nothing out of nothing*, in the true ſenſe thereof; or, that *nothing can be cauſed by nothing*: from whence it was concluded, that in natural generations there was no new real entity produced, which was not before: the genuine conſequence whereof was two-fold; that the qualities and forms of inanimate bodies are no entities really diſtinct from the magnitude, figure, ſite and motion of parts; and that ſouls are ſubſtances incorporeal, not generated out of matter. Where we have ſhewed, that the Pythagorick

doctrine, of the præ-existence of souls, was founded upon the very same principles with the Atomick physiology. And it is from this very principle rightly understood, that ourselves afterwards undertake to demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all Atheism. Moreover, we have made it undeniably evident, that the intrinsick constitution of this Atomick physiology also is such, as that whosoever admits it, and rightly understands it, must needs acknowledge incorporeal substance; which is the absolute overthrow of Atheism. And from hence alone it is certain to us, without any testimonies from antiquity, that *Democritus* and *Leucippus* could not possibly be the first inventors of this philosophy, they either not rightly understanding it, or else wilfully depraving the same; and the Atomick atheism being really nothing else, but a rape committed upon the Atomick physiology. For which reason, we do by no means here applaud *Plato*, nor *Aristotle*, in their rejecting this most ancient Atomick physiology, and introducing again that unintelligible first matter, and those exploded qualities and forms, into philosophy. For though this were probably done by *Plato*, out of a disgust and prejudice against the Atomick Atheists, which made him not so well consider nor understand that physiology; yet was he much disappointed of his expectation herein, that atomology, which he exploded, (rightly understood,) being really the greatest bulwark against Atheism; and, on the contrary, those forms and qualities, which he espoused, the natural seed thereof, they, besides their unintelligible darkness, bringing something out of nothing, in the impossible sense; which we shew to be the inlet of all Atheism. And thus, in this first chapter, have we not only quite disarmed Atheism of Atomicism, or shewed, that the latter (rightly understood) affordeth no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest, that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same. Which is a thing afterwards further insisted on.

As to the second Chapter, we have no more to say, but only this; that here we took the liberty to reveal the arcane mysteries of Atheism, and to discover all its pretended grounds of reason, that we could find any where suggested in writings, those only excepted, that are peculiar to the Hylozoick form, (which is directly contrary to the Atomick;) and that to their best advantage too; nevertheless to this end, that these being afterwards all baffled and confuted, Theism might, by this means, obtain the greater and juster triumph over Atheism.

In the third chapter, we thought it necessary, in order to a fuller confutation of Atheism, to consider all the other forms thereof, besides the Atomick. And here do we, first of all, make a discovery of a certain form of Atheism, never before taken notice of by any modern writers, which we call the Hylozoick: which notwithstanding, though it were long since started by *Strato*, in way of opposition to the Democritick and Epicurean hypothesis, yet because it afterwards slept in perfect silence and oblivion, should have been here by us passed by silently, had we not had certain knowledge of its being of late awakened and revived by some, who were so sagacious, as plainly to perceive, that the Atomick form could never do

their buſineſs, nor prove defenſible, and therefore would attempt to carry on this cauſe of atheiſm, in quite a different way, by the life and perception of matter; as alſo that this, in all probability, would ere long publickly appear upon the ſtage, though not bare-faced, but under a diſguiſe. Which atheiſtick hypotheſis is partly confuted by us, in the cloſe of this chapter, and partly in the fifth.

In the next place, it being certain, that there had been other philoſophick Atheiſts in the world before thoſe Atomicks, *Epicurus* and *Democritus*; we declare, out of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, what that moſt ancient atheiſtick hypotheſis was; namely, the eduction of all things, even life and underſtanding it ſelf, out of matter, in the way of qualities, or as the paſſions and affections thereof, generable and corruptible. Which form of atheiſm is ſtyled by us, not only Hylopathian, but alſo Anaximandrian: however, we grant ſome probability of that opinion, that *Anaximander* held an Homœomery of qualified atoms, as *Anaxagoras* afterwards did; the difference between them being only this, that the latter aſſerted an unmade mind, whereas the former generated all mind and underſtanding out of thoſe qualified Atoms, hot and cold, moiſt and dry, compounded together; becauſe we judged this difference not to be a ſufficient ground to multiply forms of atheiſm upon. And here do we give notice of that ſtrange kind of religious atheiſm, or atheiſtick Theogoniſm, which aſſerted, not only other underſtanding beings, ſuperiour to men, called by them Gods, but alſo, amongſt thoſe, one ſupreme or *Jupiter* too; nevertheleſs native, and generated at firſt out of Night and Chaos, (that is, ſenſeleſs matter,) as alſo mortal and corruptible again into the ſame.

Beſides which, there is yet a fourth atheiſtick form taken notice of, out of the writings of the ancients, (though perhaps junior to the reſt, it ſeeming to be but the corruption and degeneration of Stoiciſm) which concluded the whole world, not to be an animal, (as the Pagan Theiſts then generally ſuppoſed) but only one huge plant or vegetable, having an artificial, plantal, and plaſtick nature, as its higheſt principle, orderly diſpoſing the whole, without any mind or underſtanding. And here have we ſet down the agreement of all the atheiſtick forms, (however differing ſo much from one another) in this one general principle, *viz.* that all animality, conſcious life and underſtanding, is generated out of ſenſeleſs matter, and corruptible again into it.

Wherefore in the cloſe of this third Chapter, we inſiſt largely upon an artificial, regular, and plaſtick nature, devoid of expreſs knowledge and underſtanding, as ſubordinate to the Deity; chiefly in way of confutation of thoſe Coſmo-plaſtick and Hylozoick atheiſms. Though we had a further deſign herein alſo, for the defence of Theiſm; foraſmuch as without ſuch a nature, either God muſt be ſuppoſed to do all things in the world immediately, and to form every gnat and fly, as it were, with his own hands; which ſeemeth not ſo becoming of him, and would render his providence, to human apprehenſions, laborious and diſtractious; or elſe the whole ſyſtem of this corporeal univerſe muſt reſult only from fortuitous mechaniſm, without the direction of any mind: which hypotheſis once admitted, would unque-

unqueſtionably, by degrees, ſupplant and undermine all Theiſm. And now, from what we have declared, it may plainly appear, that this digreſſion of ours concerning an artificial, regular and plaſtick nature, (ſubordinate to the Deity) is no wen, or excreſcency in the body of this book; but a natural and neceſſary member thereof.

In the fourth chapter; after the idea of God fully declared, (where we could not omit his eſſential goodneſs and juſtice, or, if we may ſo call it, the morality of the Deity, though that be a thing properly belonging to the ſecond book, the confutation of the divine fate immoral) there is a large account given of the Pagan polytheiſm; to ſatisfy a very conſiderable objection, that lay in our way from thence, againſt the naturality of the idea of God, as including onelineſs and ſingularity in it. For had that, upon enquiry, been found true, which is ſo commonly taken for granted, that the generality of the Pagan nations had conſtantly ſcattered their devotions amongſt a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent, and independent deities, they acknowledging no ſovereign Numen; this would much have ſtumbled the naturality of the divine idea. But now it being, on the contrary, clearly proved, that the Pagan theologers all along acknowledged one ſovereign and omnipotent Deity, from which all their other gods were generated or created; we have thereby not only removed the forementioned objection out of the way, but alſo evinced, that the generality of mankind have conſtantly had a certain prolepſis or anticipation in their minds, concerning the actual exiſtence of a God, according to the true idea of him. And this was the rather done fully and carefully by us, becauſe we had not met with it ſufficiently performed before; *A. Steuchus Eugubinus* having laboured moſt in this ſubject, from whoſe profitable induſtry though we ſhall no way detract, yet whoſoever will compare what he hath written, with ours, will find no juſt cauſe to think ours ſuperfluous and unneceſſary, much leſs, a tranſcription out of his. In which, beſides other things, there is no account at all given of the many pagan, poetical, and political gods, what they were; which is ſo great a part of our performance, to prove them really to have been but the polyonymy of one God. From whence it follows alſo, that the Pagan religion, though ſufficiently faulty, yet was not altogether ſo nonſenſical, as the Atheiſts would repreſent it, out of deſign, that they might from thence infer all religion to be nothing but a meer cheat and impoſture; they worſhipping only one ſupreme God, in the ſeveral manifeſtations of his goodneſs, power, and providence throughout the world, together with his inferiour miniſters. Nevertheleſs we cannot deny, that being once engaged in this ſubject, we thought our ſelves the more concerned to do the buſineſs thoroughly and effectually, becauſe of that controverſy lately agitated concerning idolatry, (which cannot otherwiſe be decided, than by giving a true account of the Pagan religion;) and the ſo confident affirmations of ſome, that none could poſſibly be guilty of idolatry, in the Scripture ſenſe, who believed one God the Creator of the whole world: whereas it is moſt certain, on the contrary, that the Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry conſiſted not in worſhipping many creators, or uncreateds, but in giving religious worſhip

to creatures, beſides the Creator; they directing their devotion, (as *Athanaſius* * plainly affirmeth of them,) ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς, to *one uncreated only*; but, beſides him, to many created gods. But as for the polemick management of this controverſy, concerning idolatry, we leave it to other learned hands, that are already engaged in it.

Moreover, we have, in this fourth chapter, largely inſiſted alſo upon the Trinity. The reaſon whereof was, becauſe it came in our way, and our contents engaged us thereunto, in order to the giving a full account of the Pagan theology; it being certain, that the Platonicks and Pythagoreans at leaſt, if not other Pagans alſo, had their trinity, as well as Chriſtians. And we could not well avoid the comparing of theſe two together: upon which occaſion we take notice of a double Platonick trinity; the one ſpurious and adulterated, of ſome latter Platoniſts; the other true and genuine, of *Plato* himſelf, *Parmenides*, and the ancients. The former of which, though it be oppoſed by us to the Chriſtian Trinity, and confuted, yet betwixt the latter and that, do we find a wonderful correſpondence; which is largely purſued in the Platonick Chriſtian apology. Wherein, notwithſtanding, nothing muſt be looked upon, as dogmatically aſſerted by us, but only offered, and ſubmitted to the judgment of the learned in theſe matters; we confining our ſelves, in this myſterious point of the Holy Trinity, within the compaſs of thoſe its three eſſentials declared: Firſt, that it is not a Trinity of meer names and words, or of logical notions only; but of perſons or hypoſtaſes. Secondly, that none of thoſe perſons or hypoſtaſes are creatures, but all uncreated. And laſtly, that they are all three, truely and really one God. Nevertheleſs we acknowledge, that we did therefore the more copiouſly inſiſt upon this argument, becauſe of our then deſigned defence of Chriſtianity; we conceiving, that this paralleliſm, betwixt the ancient or genuine Platonick, and the Chriſtian Trinity, might be of ſome uſe to ſatisfy thoſe amongſt us, who boggle ſo much at the Trinity, and look upon it as the choak-pear of Chriſtianity; when they ſhall find, that the freeſt wits amongſt the Pagans, and the beſt philoſophers, who had nothing of ſuperſtition to determine them that way, were ſo far from being ſhy of ſuch an hypotheſis, as that they were even fond thereof. And that the Pagans had indeed ſuch a Cabala amongſt them, (which ſome perhaps will yet hardly believe, notwithſtanding all that we have ſaid,) might be further convinced, from that memorable relation in *Plutarch* †, of *Theſpeſius Solenſis*, who, after he had been looked upon as dead for three days, reviving, affirmed, amongſt other things, which he thought he ſaw or heard in the mean time in his ecſtaſy, this of three Gods in the form of a triangle, pouring in ſtreams into one another; *Orpheus* his ſoul being ſaid to have arrived ſo far; accordingly as from the teſtimonies of other Pagan writers we have proved, that a Trinity of Divine hypoſtaſes was a part of the Orphick Cabala. True indeed, our belief of the Holy Trinity is founded upon no Pagan Cabala, but only Scripture revelation; it being that

* Oratione IV. contra Arianos T. I. Operum p. 469.

† Libro de his, qui ſero à Numine puniuntur, Tom. II. Oper. p. 563. ſ.

that, which Christians are, or should be, all baptized into. Nevertheless these things are reasonably noted by us to this end, that that should not be made a prejudice against Christianity and Revealed Religion, nor looked upon as such an affrightful bugbear or *mormo* in it, which even Pagan philosophers themselves, and those of the most accomplished intellectuals, and uncaptivated minds, though having neither councils, nor creeds, nor Scriptures, had so great a propensity and readiness to entertain, and such a veneration for.

In this fourth chapter, we were necessitated, by the matter it self, to run out into philology and antiquity; as also in the other parts of the book, we do often give an account of the doctrine of the ancients: which, however some over-severe philosophers may look upon fastidiously, or undervalue and depreciate, yet as we conceived it often necessary, so possibly may the variety thereof not be ungrateful to others; and this mixture of philology, throughout the whole, sweeten and allay the severity of philosophy to them; the main thing, which the book pretends to, in the mean time, being the philosophy of religion. But for our parts, we neither call philology, nor yet philosophy, our mistress; but serve our selves of either, as occasion requireth.

As for the last chapter; though it promise only a confutation of all the atheistick grounds, yet we do therein also demonstrate the absolute impossibility of all atheism, and the actual existence of a God. We say demonstrate, not *à priori*, which is impossible and contradictious; but by necessary inference from principles altogether undeniable. For we can by no means grant to the Atheists, that there is no more than a probable persuasion, or opinion to be had of the existence of a God, without any certain knowledge or science. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that whosoever shall read these demonstrations of ours, and understand all the words of them, must therefore of necessity be presently convinced, whether he will or no, and put out of all manner of doubt or hesitancy, concerning the existence of a God. For we believe that to be true, which some have affirmed, that were there any interest of life, any concernment of appetite and passion, against the truth of geometrical theorems themselves, as of a triangle's having three angles equal to two right, whereby men's judgments might be clouded and bribed, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of them, many would remain, at least sceptical about them. Wherefore mere speculation, and dry mathematical reason, in minds unpurified, and having a contrary interest of carnality, and a heavy load of infidelity and distrust sinking them down, cannot alone beget an unshaken confidence and assurance of so high a truth as this, the existence of one perfect understanding Being, the original of all things. As it is certain also, on the contrary, that minds cleansed and purged from vice may, without syllogistical reasonings, and mathematical demonstrations, have an undoubted assurance of the existence of a God, according to that of the philosopher, ἡ κάθαρσις ποιεῖ ἐν γνώσει τῶν ἀρίστων εἶναι, *Purity possesses men with an assurance of the best things*; whether this assurance be called a vaticination or divine sagacity, (as it is by *Plato* and *Aristotle*,) or faith, as in the Scripture. For the Scripture-faith is not a mere believing of historical things,

and

and upon inartificial arguments, or teſtimonies only; but a certain higher and diviner power in the ſoul, that peculiarly correſpondeth with the Deity. Notwithſtanding which, knowledge or ſcience added to this faith, (accord to the Scripture advice) will make it more firm and ſtedfaſt, and the better able to reſiſt thoſe aſſaults of ſophiſtical reaſonings, that ſhall be made againſt it.

In this fifth chapter, as ſometimes elſewhere, we thought our ſelves concerned, in defence of the divine Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Perfection againſt Atheiſts, to maintain, (with all the antient philoſophick Theiſts,) the perfection of the creation alſo; or that the whole ſyſtem of things, taken all together, could not have been better made and ordered than it is. And indeed, this divine Goodneſs and Perfection, as diſplaying and manifeſting it ſelf in the works of Nature and Providence, is ſuppoſed in Scripture to be the very foundation of our Chriſtian faith; when that is defined to be the ſubſtance and evidence *rerum ſperandarum*; that is, *of whatſoever is* (by a good man) *to be hoped for.* Notwithſtanding which, it was far from our intention therefore to conclude, that nothing neither in Nature nor Providence could be otherwiſe than it is; or that there is nothing left to the free will and choice of the Deity. And though we do, in the third ſection, inſiſt largely upon that ancient Pythagorick Cabala, that ſouls are always united to ſome body or other, as alſo, that all rational and intellectual creatures conſiſt of ſoul and body; and ſuggeſt ſeveral things from reaſon and Chriſtian antiquity in favour of them both; yet would we not be underſtood to dogmatize in either of them, but to ſubmit all to better judgments.

Again, we ſhall here advertiſe the reader, (though we have caution'd concerning it in the book it ſelf) that in our defence of incorporeal ſubſtance againſt the Atheiſts, however we thought ourſelves concerned to ſay the utmoſt, that poſſibly we could, in way of vindication of the ancients, who generally maintained it to be unextended, (which to ſome ſeems an abſolute impoſſibility;) yet we would not be ſuppoſed our ſelves dogmatically to aſſert any more in this point, than what all Incorporealiſts agree in, that there is a ſubſtance ſpecifically diſtinct from body; namely ſuch, as conſiſteth not of parts ſeparable from one another, and which can penetrate body, and laſtly, is ſelf-active, and hath an internal energy, diſtinct from that of local motion. (And thus much is undeniably evinced, by the arguments before propoſed.) But whether this ſubſtance be altogether unextended, or extended otherwiſe than body; we ſhall leave every man to make his own judgment concerning it.

Furthermore, we think fit here to ſuggeſt, that whereas throughout this chapter and whole book, we conſtantly oppoſe the generation of ſouls, that is, the production of life, cogitation and underſtanding, out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter; and aſſert all ſouls to be as ſubſtantial as matter it ſelf: this is not done by us, out of any fond addictedneſs to Pythagorick whimſeys, nor indeed out of a mere partial regard to that cauſe of Theiſm neither, which we were engaged in, (though we had great reaſon to be tender of that too;) but becauſe we were enforced thereunto, by dry mathematical reaſon; it being

being as certain to us, as any thing in all geometry, that cogitation and underſtanding can never poſſibly reſult out of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and local motions (which is all that our ſelves can allow to body) however compounded together. Nor indeed in that other way of qualities, is it better conceivable, how they ſhould emerge out of hot and cold, moiſt and dry, thick and thin; according to the Anaximandrian atheiſm. And they, who can perſuade themſelves of the contrary, may believe, that any thing may be cauſed by any thing; upon which ſuppoſition, we confeſs it impoſſible to us, to prove the exiſtence of a God, from the phænomena.

In the cloſe of this fifth chapter; becauſe the Atheiſts do in the laſt place pretend, theiſm and religion to be inconſiſtent with civil ſovereignty, we were neceſſitated, briefly to unravel and confute all the atheiſtick ethicks and politicks, (though this more properly belong to our ſecond book intended:) Where we make it plainly to appear, that the Atheiſts artificial and factitious juſtice is nothing but will and words; and that they give to civil ſovereigns no right nor authority at all, but only belluine liberty, and brutiſh force. But, on the contrary, as we aſſert juſtice and obligation, not made by law and commands, but in nature, and prove this, together with conſcience and religion, to be the only baſis of civil authority; ſo do we alſo maintain all the rights of civil ſovereigns; giving both to *Cæſar* the things that are *Cæſar*'s, and to God the things that are God's.

And now, having made all our apologies and reflexions, we have no more to add, but only the retractation or retraction of one paſſage, page 761. Where mentioning that opinion of a modern atheiſtick writer, That cogitation is nothing elſe but local motion, we could not think *Epicurus* and *Democritus* to have ſunk to ſuch a degree, either of ſottiſhneſs or impudence as this; whereas we found cauſe afterwards, upon further conſideration, to change our opinion herein, page 846. Foraſmuch as when *Epicurus* derived liberty of will in men, merely from that motion of ſenſeleſs atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular; it is evident, that, according to him, volition it ſelf muſt be really local motion. As indeed in the Democritick fate, and material neceſſity of all things, it is implied, that human cogitations are but mechaniſm and motion. Notwithſtanding which, both *Democritus* and *Epicurus* ſuppoſed, that the world was made without cogitation, though by local motion. So that the meaning of theſe beſotted Atheiſts, (if at leaſt they had any meaning) ſeems to have been this, That all cogitation is really nothing elſe but local motion; nevertheleſs all motion not cogitation, but only in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances, or in bodies ſo modified.

And now we are not ignorant, that ſome will be ready to condemn this whole labour of ours, and of others in this kind, againſt atheiſm, as altogether uſeleſs and ſuperfluous; upon this pretence, that an Atheiſt is a mere Chimæra, and there is no ſuch thing any where to be found in the world. And indeed we could heartily wiſh, upon that condition, that all this labour of ours were ſuperfluous and uſeleſs. But as to Atheiſts, theſe ſo confident exploders of them are both unſkilled in the monuments of antiquity, and

unacquainted with the preſent age they live in; others having found too great an aſſurance, from their own perſonal converſe, of the reality of them. Nevertheleſs, this labour of ours is not intended only for the converſion of downright and profeſſed Atheiſts, (of which there is but little hope, they being ſunk into ſo great a degree of ſottiſhneſs;) but for the confirmation of weak, ſtaggering, and ſceptical Theiſts. And unleſs theſe exploders of Atheiſts will affirm alſo, that all men have conſtantly an unſhaken faith, and belief of the exiſtence of a God, without the leaſt mixture of doubtful diſtruſt or heſitancy, (which if it were ſo, the world could not poſſibly be ſo bad as now it is) they muſt needs grant, ſuch endeavours as theſe, for the confirming and eſtabliſhing of men's minds in the belief of a God, by philoſophick reaſons, in an age ſo philoſophical, not to be ſuperfluous and uſeleſs.

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Sam. Parker, Reverendmo in Chriſto Patri ac Domino, Domino *Gilberto*, Divinâ Providentiâ Archiep. *Cantuar.* à Sacr. Dom.

THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

1. *The fatal neceſſity of all human actions and events maintained upon three ſeveral grounds, which are ſo many falſe hypotheſes of the intellectual ſyſtem of the univerſe.* 2. *Concerning the mathematical or aſtrological fate.* 3. *Concerning the opinion of thoſe, who ſuppoſe a fate ſuperiour to the higheſt Deity.* 4. *The moderation of this diſcourſe.* 5. *The Atheiſtical hypotheſis or Democritical fate being founded upon the atomical phyſiology: the neceſſity of giving an account of it, and that firſt briefly deſcribed.* 6. *The antiquity of this phyſiology, and the account, which is given of it by* Ariſtotle. 7. *A clear and full record of the ſame phyſiology in* Plato, *that hath not been taken notice of.* 8. *That neither* Democritus, *nor* Leucippus, *nor* Protagoras, *nor any Atheiſts were the firſt inventors of this philoſophy; and of the neceſſity of being thoroughly acquainted with it, in order to the confutation of Atheiſm.* 9. *The tradition of* Poſidonius *the Stoick, that* Moſchus *an ancient* Phœnician *was the firſt inventor of the atomical phyſiology.* 10. *That this* Moſchus, *the inventor of the atomical phyſiology, was probably the ſame with* Mochus *the phyſiologer in* Jamblichus, *with whoſe ſucceſſors, prieſts and prophets,* Pythagoras *converſed at* Sidon. 11. *Other probabilities for this, that* Pythagoras *was acquainted with the atomical phyſiology.* 12. *That* Pythagoras *his* Monads *were atoms.* 13. *Proved plainly, that* Empedocles, *who was a Pythagorean, phyſiologized atomically.* 14. *The ſame further convinced from* Plato, Ariſtotle, Plutarch *and* Stobæus. 15. *That* Anaxagoras *was a ſpurious Atomiſt, or unſkilful imitator of that philoſophy.* 16. *That* Ecphantus *the Pythagorean,* Xenocrates, Heraclides, Diodorus *and* Metrodorus

Chius *were all ancient aſſerters of the atomical phyſiology; together with* Ariſtotle's *teſtimony, that the ancient phyſiologers generally went that way.* 17. *How* Ariſtotle *is to be reconciled with himſelf, and the credit of other writers to be ſalved, who impute this philoſophy to* Leucippus *and* Democritus; *that they were the firſt atheizers of it, or the founders of that philoſophy, which is atheiſtically atomical.* 18. *That the Atomiſts before* Democritus *were aſſertors of a Deity and ſubſtance incorporeal.* 19. *A confutation of thoſe neotericks, who deny that incorporeal ſubſtance was ever aſſerted by any of the ancients, and the antiquity of that doctrine proved from* Plato, *who himſelf profeſſedly maintained it.* 20. *That* Ariſtotle *likewiſe aſſerted incorporeal ſubſtance.* 21. *That* Epicurus *endeavoured to confute this opinion, as that which* Plato *and others of the ancients had maintained.* 22. *That all thoſe philoſophers, who held the immortality of the ſoul, and a Deity diſtinct from the world, held incorporeal ſubſtance; and that beſides* Thales, Pythagoras *was a grand champion for the ſame, who alſo aſſerted a divine triad.* 23. Parmenides *an aſſerter of incorporeal ſubſtance, together with all thoſe, who maintain'd that all things did not flow, but ſomething ſtand.* 24. Empedocles *vindicated from being either an atheiſt or corporealiſt at large.* 25. Anaxagoras *a plain aſſerter of incorporeal ſubſtance.* 26. *Inferred that the ancient Atomiſts before* Democritus *were both theiſts and incorporealiſts.* 27. *That there is not only no inconſiſtency between atomology and theology, but alſo a natural cognation proved from the origine of the atomical phyſiology, and firſt a general account thereof.* 28. *A more particular account of the origin of this philoſophy from that principle of reaſon, That in nature, nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing.* 29. *That the ſame principle, which made the ancients diſcard ſubſtantial forms and qualities, made them alſo to aſſert incorporeal ſubſtance.* 30. *That from the ſame ground of reaſon alſo they aſſerted the immortality of ſouls.* 31. *That the doctrine of pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration of ſouls had its original from hence alſo.* 32. *That the ancients did not confine this to human ſouls only, but extend it to all ſouls and lives whatſoever.* 33. *All this proved from* Empedocles, *who aſſerted the pre-exiſtence as well as the poſt-exiſtence of all ſouls upon that ground.* 34. *A cenſure of this doctrine; that the reaſon of it is irrefragable for the poſt-eternity of all human ſouls; and that the hypotheſis of the creation of human ſouls, which ſalves their immortality without pre-exiſtence, is rational.* 35. *A new hypotheſis to ſalve the incorporeity of the ſouls of brutes, without their poſt-exiſtence and ſucceſſive tranſmigrations.* 36. *That this will not prejudice the immortality of human ſouls.* 37. *That the Empedoclean hypotheſis is more rational than the opinion of thoſe, that would make the ſouls of brutes corporeal.* 38. *That the conſtitution of the atomical phyſiology is ſuch, that whoſoever entertains it, and thoroughly underſtands it, muſt needs hold incorporeal ſubſtance, in five particulars.* 39. *Two general advantages of the atomical or mechanical phyſiology; firſt, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible.* 40. *The ſecond advantage of it, that it prepares an eaſy and clear way for the demonſtration of incorporeal ſubſtance.* 41. *Concluded, that the ancient Moſchical philoſophy conſiſted of two parts, atomical phyſiology, and theology or pneumatology.* 42. *That this entire philoſophy was afterwards mangled and diſmembred, ſome taking*

king one part of it alone, and some the other. 43. *That* Leucippus *and* Democritus, *being atheistically inclined, took the atomical physiology, endeavouring to make it subservient to Atheism; and upon what occasion they did it, and how unsuccessfully.* 44. *That* Plato *took the theology and pneumatology of the ancients, but rejected their atomical physiology, and upon what accounts.* 45. *That* Aristotle *followed* Plato *herein, with a commendation of* Aristotle's *philosophy.*

THEY, that hold the necessity of all human actions and events, do it upon one or other of these two grounds; either because they suppose, that necessity is inwardly essential to all agents whatsoever, and that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, a thing impossible or contradictious, which can have no existence any where in nature; the sense of which was thus expressed by the Epicurean poet [1],

> ———*Quòd res quæque Necessum*
> *Intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis*, &c.

That every thing naturally labours under an intestine necessity: or else, because though they admit contingent liberty not only as a thing possible, but also as that which is actually existent in the Deity, yet they conceive all things to be so determin'd by the will and decrees of this Deity, as that they are thereby made necessary to us. The former of these two opinions, that contingent liberty is πρᾶγμα ἀνυπόστατον, such a thing as can have no existence in nature, may be maintained upon two different grounds; either from such an hypothesis as this, That the universe is nothing else but body and local motion; and nothing moving it self, the action of every agent is determined by some other agent without it; and therefore that ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, material and mechanical necessity must needs reign over all things: or else, though cogitative beings be supposed to have a certain principle of activity within themselves, yet that there can be no contingency in their actions, because all volitions are determined by a necessary antecedent understanding.

Plotinus [2] makes another distribution of Fatalists, which yet in the conclusion will come to the same with the former; διττοὺς ἄν τις θέμενος τούτους οὐκ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποτυγχάνοι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ἑνός τινος τὰ πάντα ἀναρτῶσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐκ οὕτω· *A man* (saith he) *will not do amiss, that will divide all Fatalists first into these two general heads, namely, that they derive all things from one principle, or not*; the former of which may be called divine Fatalists, the latter atheistical. Which divine Fatalists he again subdivides into such, as first make God by immediate influence to do all things in us; as in animals the members are not determined by themselves, but by that which is the hegemonick in every one: and secondly, such as make fate to be an implexed series or concatenation of causes, all in themselves necessary, whereof God is the chief. The former seems to be a description of that very fate, that is main-

[1] Lucret. Lib. II. v. 289, &c. [2] Libro de Fato, Ennead. III. Lib. 1. c. 2. p. 230.

maintain'd by ſome neoterick Chriſtians; the latter is the fate of the Stoicks.

Wherefore Fataliſts, that hold the neceſſity of all human actions and events, may be reduced to theſe three heads: *Firſt*, Such as aſſerting the Deity, ſuppoſe it irreſpectively to decree and determine all things, and thereby make all actions neceſſary to us; which kind of fate, though philoſophers and other ancient writers have not been altogether ſilent of it, yet it has been principally maintained by ſome neoterick Chriſtians, contrary to the ſenſe of the ancient church. *Secondly*, Such as ſuppoſe a Deity, that acting wiſely, but neceſſarily, did contrive the general frame of things in the world; from whence by a ſeries of cauſes doth unavoidably reſult whatſoever is now done in it. Which fate is a concatenation of cauſes, all in themſelves neceſſary, and is that, which was aſſerted by the ancient Stoicks *Zeno* and *Chryſippus*, whom the Jewiſh Eſſenes ſeemed to follow. And, *laſtly*, ſuch as hold the material neceſſity of all things without a Deity; which fate *Epicurus*[1] calls τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένην, *the fate of the Naturaliſts*, that is, indeed the Atheiſts, the aſſerters whereof may be called alſo the Democritical Fataliſts. Which three opinions concerning fate are ſo many ſeveral hypotheſes of the intellectual ſyſtem of the univerſe: all which we ſhall here propoſe, endeavouring to ſhew the falſeneſs of them, and then ſubſtitute the true mundane ſyſtem in the room of them.

II. The mathematical or aſtrological fate ſo much talked of, as it is a thing no way conſiderable for the grounds of it, ſo whatſoever it be, it muſt needs fall under one or other of thoſe two general heads in the *Plotinical* diſtribution laſt mentioned, ſo as either to derive all things from one principle, or not. It ſeems to have had its firſt emerſion amongſt the *Chaldæans* from a certain kind of blind Polytheiſm (which is but a better ſort of diſguiſed Atheiſm) but it was afterwards adopted and fondly nurſed by the Stoicks, in a way of ſubordination to their divine fate; for *Manilius*, *Firmicus*, and other maſters of that ſect were great promoters of it. And there was too much attributed to aſtrology alſo by thoſe, that were no Fataliſts, both Heathen and Chriſtian philoſophers, ſuch as were *Plotinus*, *Origen*, *Simplicius* and others; who though they did not make the ſtars to neceſſitate all human actions here below, they ſuppoſed, that divine providence (fore-knowing all things) had contrived ſuch a ſtrange coincidence of the motions and configurations of the heavenly bodies with ſuch actions here upon earth, as that the former might be prognoſticks of the latter. Thus *Origen*[2] determines, that the ſtars do not make but ſignify; and that the heavens are a kind of divine volume, in whoſe characters they that are ſkilled, may read or ſpell out human events. To the ſame purpoſe *Plotinus*[3], Φέρεται μὲν ταῦτα ἐπὶ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων, παρέχεσθαι δὲ καὶ ἀλλὴν χρείαν τὴν τῶ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ γράμματα βλέποντας, τὰς τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν σχημάτων κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεθοδεύοντας τὸ σημαινόμενον· ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ ὑψηλὸς ὄρνις σημαίνει ὑψηλάς τινας πράξεις· *The motion of the ſtars was intended for the*

[1] Vide Epiſtol. Epicuri ad Menecœum apud Diogen. Laërtium, Lib. X. Segm. 134. p. 659. Edit. Meibomii.

[2] Vide P. Dan. Huetium Origenianor. Lib. II. c. VIII. §. V. p. 129.

[3] Libro de Fato, Ennead. III. Lib. I. c. VI. p. 233. Videas etiam Ennead. II. Lib. III. c. I. p. 137. & c. VII. p. 140, 141.

the phyſical good of the whole; but they afford alſo another uſe collaterally in order to prognoſtication, namely that they, who are ſkilled in the grammar of the heavens, may be able from the ſeveral configurations of the ſtars, as it were letters, to ſpell out future events, by making ſuch analogical interpretations as they uſe to do in augury: as when a bird flies high, to interpret this of ſome high and noble exploit. And *Simplicius* [1] in like manner, Σύμφωνός ἐστιν ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιφορὰ τῇ προβολῇ τῶν ψυχῶν τῇ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐρχομένῃ εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναλικάζουσα μὲν τὰς τῶνδε ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τῶνδε, σύμφωνος δὲ ὅσα ταῖς ὀρέξεσιν αὐτῶν. *The fatal converſion of the heavens is made to correſpond with the production of ſouls into generation at ſuch and ſuch times, not neceſſitating them to will this or that, but conſpiring agreeably with ſuch appetites and volitions of theirs.* And theſe philoſophers were the rather inclinable to this perſuaſion from a ſuperſtitious conceit, which they had, that the ſtars being animated, were intellectual beings of a far higher rank than men. And ſince God did not make them, nor any thing elſe in the world, ſingly for themſelves alone, but alſo to contribute to the publick good of the univerſe, their phyſical influence ſeeming inconſiderable, they knew not well what elſe could be worthy of them, unleſs it were to portend human events. This indeed is the beſt ſenſe, that can be made of aſtrological prognoſtication; but it is a buſineſs that ſtands upon a very weak and tottering, if not impoſſible foundation.

III. There is another wild and extravagant conceit, which ſome of the Pagans had, who though they verbally acknowledged a deity, yet ſuppoſed a certain fate ſuperior to it, and not only to all their other petty Gods, but alſo to *Jupiter* himſelf. To which purpoſe is that of the Greek Poet, Latin'd by *Cicero* [2], *Quod fore paratum eſt, id ſummum exuperat Jovem*; and that of *Herodotus* [3], Τὴν περωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατον ἐστιν ἀποφυγέειν οὐδὲ τῷ Θεῷ· *It is impoſſible for God himſelf to avoid the deſtin'd fate:* And δοῦλος Θεὸς ἀνάγκης [4], *God himſelf is a ſervant of neceſſity.* According to which conceit, *Jupiter* in *Homer* [5] laments his condition, in that the fates having determined, that his beloved *Sarpedon* ſhould be ſlain by the ſon of *Menœtius*, he was not able to withſtand it. Though all theſe paſſages may not perhaps imply much more than what the Stoical hypotheſis it ſelf imported; for that did alſo in ſome ſenſe make God himſelf a ſervant to the neceſſity of the matter, and to his own decrees, in that he could not have made the ſmalleſt thing in the world otherwiſe than now it is, much leſs was able to alter any thing: according to that of *Seneca* [6], *Eadem neceſſitas & Deos alligat. Irrevocabilis divina pariter atque humana curſus vehit. Ille ipſe omnium conditor ac rector ſcripſit quidem Fata, ſed ſequitur. Semper paret, ſemel juſſit. One and the ſame chain of neceſſity ties God and men. The ſame irrevocable and unalterable courſe carries on divine and human things. The very maker and governour of all things, that writ the fates, follows them. He did but once command, but he always obeys.* But if there were this further meaning in the paſſages before cited, that a neceſſity without God, that was invincible by him, did

Lact. L. 1. c. 11. Lucian. *Jupit. confutatus.*

[1] Comment. in Epictetum, c. I. p. 26. Edit. Salmaſii.

[2] De Diviinat. Lib. II. c. X. p. 3196. Edit. Verburgii.

[3] Lib. I. c. 91. p. 38. Ed. Gronovii.

[4] Vide Menandri & Philemonis reliquias à Jo. Clerico editas, p. 307.

[5] Iliad. l. μ.

[6] De Providentiâ, c. V. p. 195. Edit. Jo. Fred. Gronovii.

did determine his will to all things; this was nothing but a certain confuſed and contradictious jumble of atheiſm and theiſm both together; or an odd kind of intimation, that however the name of God be uſed in compliance with vulgar ſpeech and opinion, yet indeed it ſignifies nothing, but materiall neceſſity; and the blind motion of matter is really the higheſt Numen in the world. And here that of *Balbus* the Stoick in *Cicero* [1] is opportune: *Non eſt natura Dei præpotens & excellens, ſiquidem ea ſubjecta eſt ei vel neceſſitati vel naturæ, quâ cœlum, maria, terræque reguntur. Nihil autem eſt præſtantius Deo. Nulli igitur eſt naturæ obediens aut ſubjectus Deus. God would not be the moſt powerfull and excellent being, if he were ſubject to that either neceſſity or nature, by which the heavens, ſeas and earth are governed. But the notion of a God implies the moſt excellent being. Therefore God is not obedient or ſubject to any nature.*

IV. And now we think fit here to ſuggeſt, that however we ſhall oppoſe thoſe three fataliſms before mentioned, as ſo many falſe hypotheſes of the mundane ſyſtem and oeconomy, and endeavour to exclude that ſevere tyranneſs (as *Epicurus* calls it) of univerſal neceſſity reigning over all, and to leave ſome ſcope for contingent liberty to move up and down in, without which neither rational creatures can be blame-worthy for any thing they do, nor God have any object to diſplay his juſtice upon, nor indeed be juſtified in his providence; yet, as we vindicate to God the glory of all good, ſo we do not quite baniſh the notion of fate neither, nor take away all neceſſity; which is a thing the *Clazomenian* philoſopher [2] of old was taxed for, affirming μηδὲν τῶν γινομένων γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλὰ εἶναι κενὸν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα· *That nothing at all was done by fate, but that it was altogether a vain name.* And the Sadduceans among the Jews have been noted for the ſame [3]: Τὴν μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἀναιροῦσιν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ταύτην ἀξιοῦντες, οὔτε κατ' αὐτὴν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τέλῳ λαμβάνειν, ἅπαντα δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τιθέντες· *They take away all fate, and will not allow it to be any thing at all, nor to have any power over human things, but put all things entirely into the hands of mens own free-will.* And ſome of our own ſeem to have approached too near to this extreme, attributing perhaps more to the power of free-will, than either religion or nature will admit. But the hypotheſis, that we ſhall recommend, as moſt agreeable to truth, of a πρόνοια ἱλάσμῳ, *placable providence*, of a Deity eſſentially good, preſiding over all, will avoid all extremes, aſſerting to God the glory of good, and freeing him from the blame of evil; and leaving a certain proportionate contemperation and commixture of contingency and neceſſity both together in the world; as nature requires a mixture of motion and reſt, without either of which there could be no generation. Which temper was obſerved by ſeveral of the ancients; as the Phariſaick ſect amongſt the Jews, who determined [4] τινὰ μὲν πάντα τῆς εἱμαρμένης εἶναι ἔργον, τινὰ δὲ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, *That ſome things and not all were the effects of fate, but ſome things were left in mens own power and liberty:* and alſo by *Plato* [5] amongſt the philo-

[1] De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. c. 30. p. 3000.

[2] *Anaxagoras*, who was cenſured for this opinion by *Alexander Aphrodiſienſis* de Fato §. II. p. 11. Edit. Lond. 1658. in 12°.

[3] Joſephi Antiq. Judaic. Lib. XIII. c. V. §. 9. p. 649. Tom. I. Edit. Havercampi.

[4] Id. ibid.

[5] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſophorum, Lib. I. c. XXVII. p. 844. T. II. Oper. Edit. Francof. 1599. Fol.

philoſophers, Πλάτων ἐξαρμένει μὲν εἱμαρμένην ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν καὶ βίων, συνεισάγει δὲ καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμᾶς αἰτίαν. Plato *inſerts ſomething of fate into human lives and actions, and he joins with it liberty of will alſo.* He doth indeed ſuppoſe human ſouls to have within themſelves the cauſes of their own changes to a better or worſe ſtate, and every where declares God to be blameleſs for their evils; and yet he [1] ſomewhere makes the three fatal ſiſters notwithſtanding, *Clotho*, *Lacheſis* and *Atropos*, to be buſy about them alſo. For according to the ſenſe of the ancients, fate is a ſervant of divine providence in the world, and takes place differently upon the different actings of free-willed beings. And how free a thing ſoever the will of man may ſeem to be to ſome, yet I conceive it to be out of queſtion, that it may contract upon it ſelf ſuch neceſſities and fatalities, as it cannot upon a ſudden rid it ſelf of at pleaſure. But whatſoever is ſaid in the ſequel of this diſcourſe by way of oppoſition to that fataliſm of the neoterick Chriſtians, is intended only to vindicate what was the conſtant doctrine of the Chriſtian church in its greateſt purity, (as ſhall be made manifeſt,) and not to introduce any new-fangled conceit of our own.

V. We muſt now proceed to give a more full and perfect account of theſe three ſeveral fates, or hypotheſes of the mundane ſyſtem before-mentioned, together with the grounds of them, beginning firſt with that, which we principally intend the confutation of, the Atheiſtical or Democritical fate: Which as it is a thing of the moſt dangerous conſequence of all, ſo it ſeems to be moſt ſpreading and infectious in theſe latter times.

Now this atheiſtical ſyſtem of the world, that makes all things to be materially and mechanically neceſſary, without a God, is built upon a peculiar phyſiological hypotheſis, different from what hath been generally received for many ages; which is called by ſome atomical or corpuſcular, by others mechanical: of which we muſt therefore needs give a full and perfect account. And we ſhall do it firſt in general, briefly, not deſcending to thoſe minute particularities of it, which are diſputed amongſt theſe Atomiſts themſelves, in this manner.

The atomical phyſiology ſuppoſes, that body is nothing elſe but διαστατὸν ἀντίτυπον, that is, extended bulk; and reſolves therefore, that nothing is to be attributed to it, but what is included in the nature and idea of it, *viz.* more or leſs magnitude, with diviſibility into parts, figure, and poſition, together with motion or reſt, but ſo as that no part of body can ever move it ſelf, but is always moved by ſomething elſe. And conſequently it ſuppoſes, that there is no need of any thing elſe beſides the ſimple elements of magnitude, figure, ſite and motion (which are all clearly intelligible as different modes of extended ſubſtance) to ſolve the corporeal phænomena by; and therefore, not of any ſubſtantial forms diſtinct from the matter; nor of any other qualities really exiſting in the bodies without, beſides the reſults or aggregates of thoſe ſimple elements, and the diſpoſition of the inſenſible parts of bodies in reſpect of figure, ſite and motion; nor of any intentional ſpecies or ſhews, propagated from the objects to our ſenſes; nor, laſtly, of any other kind of motion or action really diſtinct from local motion (ſuch as generation,

[1] Vide Platon. de Republicâ L. X. p. 520.

ration and alteration) they being neither intelligible, as modes of extended ſubſtance, nor any ways neceſſary. Foraſmuch as the forms and qualities of bodies may well be conceived to be nothing but the reſult of thoſe ſimple elements of magnitude, figure, ſite and motion, variouſly compounded together, in the ſame manner as ſyllables and words in great variety reſult from the different combinations and conjunctions of a few letters, or the ſimple elements of ſpeech; and the corporeal part of ſenſation, and particularly that of viſion, may be ſolved only by local motion of bodies, that is, either by corporeal effluvia (called *ſimulachra*, *membranæ* and *exuviæ*) ſtreaming continually from the ſurface of the objects, or rather, as the later and more refined atomiſts [1] conceived, by preſſure made from the object to the eye, by means of light in the medium. So that [2] ὡς διὰ βακληρίας τῆ ταθέντι ἀέρι τὸ βλεπόμενον ἁπτόμεθαι· the ſenſe taking cognizance of the object by the ſubtle interpoſed medium, that is tenſe and ſtretched, (thruſting every way from it upon the optick nerves) doth by that as it were by a ſtaff touch it. Again, generation and corruption may be ſufficiently explained by concretion and ſecretion, or local motion, without ſubſtantial forms and qualities. And laſtly, thoſe ſenſible ideas of light and colours, heat and cold, ſweet and bitter, as they are diſtinct things from the figure, ſite and motion of the inſenſible parts of bodies, ſeem plainly to be nothing elſe but our own fancies, paſſions and ſenſations, however they be vulgarly miſtaken for qualities in the bodies without us.

VI. Thus much may ſuffice for a general account of the atomical phyſiology. We ſhall in the next place conſider the antiquity thereof, as alſo what notice *Ariſtotle* hath taken of it, and what account he gives of the ſame. For though *Epicurus* went altogether this way, yet it is well known, that he was not the firſt inventor of it. But it is moſt commonly fathered on *Democritus*, who was ſenior both to *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, being reported to have been born the year after *Socrates*; from whoſe fountains *Cicero* [3] ſaith, that *Epicurus* watered his orchards, and of whom *Sex. Empiricus* [4] and *Laertius* [5] teſtify that he did ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ποιότητας, *caſhier qualities*; and *Plutarch* [6], that he made the firſt principles of the whole univerſe ἀτόμους ἀπόους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς, *atoms devoid of all qualities and paſſions*. But *Laertius* [7] will have *Leucippus*, who was ſomewhat ſenior to *Democritus*, to be the firſt inventer of this philoſophy, though he wrote not ſo many books concerning it as *Democritus* did. *Ariſtotle*, who often takes notice of this philoſophy, and aſcribes it commonly to *Leucippus* and *Democritus* jointly, gives us this deſcription of it in his metaphyſics [8]; Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτῆ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν ἔιναί φασι, λέγοντες ὅιον τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων φασί ταύτας μέντοι τρεῖς, σχῆμά τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν, διαφέρειν γὰρ τὸ ὂν ῥυσμῷ καὶ διαθιγῆ καὶ τροπῆ· Leucippus *and his companion* Democritus *make the firſt principles of all*

[1] Vide Carteſii Dioptric. c. I. & II. p. 50. Tom. 1. Oper. Ed. Amſtelod. 1692. in 4to

[2] Apollodorus apud Diogenem Laertium Lib. VII. Segm. 157. p. 466. Vide etiam Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſophor. Lib IV. c. XV. Tom. II. Oper. p. 911.

[3] De Nat. Deor. Lib. I. c. XLIII. p. 2948. T. IX. Oper.

[4] Lib. II. adv. Logicos, p. 459. Vide etiam Lib. VI. adv. Muſicos, p. 367. & Lib. I. adv. Logicos, p. 399.

[5] Lib. IX. Segm. 72. p. 586.

[6] Libro adverſus Colotem, Tom. II. Oper. p. 1110.

[7] Lib. IX. Segm. 30. p. 567.

[8] Lib. I. c. IV. p. 268. Tom. IV. Oper.

all things to be Plenum *and* Vacuum (*body and space*) *whereof one is* Ens, *the other* Non-ens, *and the differences of the body, which are only figure, order and position, to be the causes of all other things.* Which differences they call by these names *Rysmus*, *Diathige* and *Trope*. And in his book *De Anima* [1], having declared that *Democritus* made fire and the soul to consist of round atoms, he describes those atoms of his after this manner, οἷον ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα ἐν ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτίσι, ὧν τὴν παντοσπερμίαν στοιχεῖα λέγει Δημόκριτος τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Λεύκιππος· *They are* (saith he) *like those* ramenta *or dusty particles which appear in the sun-beams, an omnifarious seminary whereof* Democritus *makes to be the first elements of the whole universe, and so doth* Leucippus *likewise*. Elsewhere [2] the same *Aristotle* tells us, that these two philosophers explained generation and alteration without forms and qualities by figures and local motion: Δημόκριτος καὶ Λεύκιππος ποιήσαντες τὰ σχήματα τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ τούτων ποιοῦσι, διακρίσει μὲν καὶ συγκρίσει γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, τάξει δὲ καὶ θέσει ἀλλοίωσιν: Democritus *and* Leucippus *having made figures*, (or variously figured atoms) *the first principles, make generation and alteration out of these; namely generation together with corruption from the concretion and secretion of them, but alteration from the change of their order and position.* Again he elsewhere [3] takes notice of that opinion of the Atomists, that all sense was a kind of touch, and that the sensible qualities of bodies were to be resolved into figures, imputing it not only to *Democritus*, but also to the generality of the old philosophers, but very much disliking the same: Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι, πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι καὶ εἰς σχήματα ἀνάγουσι τὰς χύμους· Democritus *and most of the physiologers here commit a very great absurdity, in that they make all sense to be touch, and resolve sensible qualities into the figures of insensible parts or atoms.* And this opinion he endeavours to confute by these arguments. First, because there is contrariety in qualities, as in black and white, hot and cold, bitter and sweet, but there is no contrariety in figures; for a circular figure is not contrary to a square or multangular; and therefore there must be real qualities in bodies distinct from the figure, site and motion of parts. Again, the variety of figures and dispositions being infinite, it would follow from thence, that the species of colours, odours, and tastes should be infinite likewise, and reducible to no certain number. Which arguments I leave the professed Atomists to answer. Furthermore, *Aristotle* somewhere also censures that other fundamental principle of this atomical physiology, that the sensible ideas of colours and tastes, as red, green, bitter and sweet, formally considered, are only passions and fancies in us, and not real qualities in the object without. For as in a rainbow there is really nothing without our sight, but a rorid cloud diversely refracting and reflecting the sun-beams, in such an angle; nor are there really such qualities in the diaphanous prism; when refracting the light, it exhibits to us the same colours of the rainbow; whence it was collected, that those things are properly the phantasms of the sentient, occasioned by different motions on the optick nerves: so they conceived the case to be the same in all other colours, and that both the colours of the prism and rainbow were as real as other colours, and all other colours as phantastical as

[1] Lib. I. cap. II. p. 4. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] De Generat. & Corrupt. Lib. I. c. II. p. 700. Tom. I. Oper.
[3] De Sensu & Sensibili c. IV. p. 70. Tom. II. Oper.

they: and then by parity of reaſon they extended the buſineſs further to the other ſenſibles. But this opinion *Ariſtotle* condemns in theſe words [1], Οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο μὲ καλῶς ἔλεγον, λευκὸν ὅτε μὴδὲν οἰόμενοι ὅτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, ὅτε χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως· *The former phyſiologers were generally out in this, in that they thought there was no black or white without the ſight, nor no bitter or ſweet without the taſte.* There are other paſſages in *Ariſtotle* concerning this philoſophy, which I think ſuperfluous to inſert here; and I ſhall have occaſion to cite ſome of them afterward for other purpoſes.

VII. But in the next place it will not be amiſs to ſhew, that *Plato* alſo hath left a very full record of this mechanical or atomical phyſiology (that hath hardly been yet taken notice of) which notwithſtanding he doth not impute either to *Democritus* (whoſe name *Laertius* [2] thinks he purpoſely declined to mention throughout all his writings) or to *Leucippus*, but to *Protagoras*. Wherefore in his *Theætetus*, having firſt declared in general, [3] that the Protagorean philoſophy made all things to conſiſt of a commixture of parts (or atoms) and local motion, he repreſents it, in particular concerning colours, after this manner [4]; ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν ὅτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι, ἀλλὰ μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ δὲ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα, ὅτε τὸ προσβάλλον ὅτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· *Firſt, as to that which belongs to the ſight, you muſt conceive that which is called a white or a black colour not to be any thing abſolutely exiſting either without your eyes or within your eyes; but black and white, and every other colour, is cauſed by different motions made upon the eye from objects differently modified: ſo that it is nothing either in the agent nor the patient abſolutely, but ſomething which ariſes from between them both.* Where it follows immediately, ἦ σὺ διαχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἷόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ; *Can you or any man elſe be confident, that as every colour appears to him, ſo it appears juſt the ſame to every other man and animal, any more than taſtes and touches, heat and cold do?* From whence it is plain, that *Protagoras* made ſenſible qualities not to be all abſolute things exiſting in the bodies without, but to be relative to us, and paſſions in us; and ſo they are called preſently after τίνα ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα, certain fancies, ſeemings, or appearances in us. But there is another paſſage [5], in which a fuller account is given of the whole Protagorean doctrine, beginning thus; Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν· ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεσθαι ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις ἀεὶ συνεκτικτόμενα καὶ γενναμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, &c. *The principle upon which all theſe things depend is this, that the whole univerſe is motion* (of atoms) *and nothing elſe beſides; which motion is conſidered two ways, and accordingly called by two names, action and paſſion; from the mutual congreſs, and as it were attrition together of both which, are begotten innumerable offſprings, which though infinite in number, yet may be reduced to two general heads, ſenſibles and ſenſations, that are both*

[1] De Anima Lib. II. c. I. p. 43. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] Lib. IX. Segm. 40. p. 571.
[3] P. 118.
[4] Ibid. p. 119.
[5] Ibid. p. 120.

both generated at the same time; the sensations are seeing and hearing and the like, and the correspondent sensibles, colours, sounds, &c. *Wherefore when the eye, or such a proportionate object meet together, both the* αἰσθητὸν *and the* αἴσθησις, *the sensible* idea *of white and black, and the sense of seeing, are generated together, neither of which would have been produced if either of those two had not met with the other.* Καὶ τ' ἄλλα δὲ ἅτω ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ, πάντα γίγνεσθαι, καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως· *The like is to be conceived of all other sensibles, as hot and cold,* &c. *that none of these are absolute things in themselves, or real qualities in the objects without, but they are begotten from the mutual congress of agent and patient with one another, and that by motion: so that neither the agent has any such thing in it before its congress with the patient, nor the patient before its congress with the agent.* Ἐκ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος πρὸς τὰ ἄλληλα συνγιγνομένων καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποῖα ἄττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα· *But the agent and patient meeting together, and begetting sensation and sensibles, both the object and the sentient are forthwith made to be so and so qualified, as when honey is tasted, the sense of tasting and the quality of sweetness are begotten both together, though the sense be vulgarly attributed to the taster, and the quality of sweetness to the honey.* The conclusion of all which is summed up thus, κοὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τινὶ αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, *That none of those sensible things is any thing absolutely in the objects without, but they are all generated or made relatively to the sentient.* There is more in that dialogue to this purpose, which I here omit; but I have set down so much of it in the author's own language, because it seems to me to be an excellent monument of the wisdom and sagacity of the old philosophers; that which is the main curiosity in this whole business of the mechanical or atomical philosophy being here more fully and plainly expressed, than it is in *Lucretius* himself, *viz.* that sensible things, according to those ideas that we have of them, are not real qualities absolutely existing without us, but ἐν ἡμῖν φάσματα, fancies or fantasms in us: so that both the Latin interpreters *Ficinus* and *Serranus*, though probably neither of them at all acquainted with this philosophy, as being not yet restored, could not but understand it after the same manner; the one expressing it thus, *Color ex aspectu motúque medium quiddam resultans est. Talis circa oculos passio*; and the other, *ex varia aspicientis diathesi, variáque sensilis specie colores varios & videri & fieri, ita tamen ut sint φαντάσματα, nec nisi in animo subsistant.* However, it appears by *Plato*'s manner of telling the story, and the tenour of the whole dialogue, that himself was not a little prejudiced against this philosophy. In all probability the rather, because *Protagoras* had made it a foundation both for scepticism and atheism.

VIII. We have now learnt from *Plato*, that *Democritus* and *Leucippus* were not the sole proprietaries in this philosophy, but that *Protagoras*, though not vulgarly taken notice of for any such thing (being commonly represented as a Sophist only) was a sharer in it likewise: which *Protagoras* indeed *Laertius*[1] and others affirm to have been an auditor of *Democritus*; and so he might be, notwithstanding what *Plutarch* tells us[2], that *Democritus*

[1] Lib. IX. Segm. 50. p. 575, 576. Videas etiam A. Gellium Noct. Attic. Lib. V. c. III. & Suidam voce Πρωταγόρας.

[2] Libro adversus Colotem, Tom. II. Oper. p. 1108, 1109.

wrote againſt his taking away the abſolute natures of things. However we are of opinion, that neither *Democritus*, nor *Protagoras*, nor *Leucippus* was the firſt inventor of this philoſophy; and our reaſon is, becauſe they were all three of them Atheiſts (though *Protagoras* alone was baniſhed for that crime by the *Athenians*) and we cannot think, that any Atheiſts could be the inventors of it, much leſs that it was the genuine ſpawn and brood of atheiſm itſelf, as ſome conceit, becauſe however theſe Atheiſts adopted it to themſelves, endeavouring to ſerve their turns of it, yet if rightly underſtood, it is the moſt effectual engine againſt atheiſm that can be. And we ſhall make it appear afterwards, that never any of thoſe Atheiſts, whether ancient or modern (how great pretenders ſoever to it) did throughly underſtand it, but perpetually contradicted themſelves in it. And this is the reaſon, why we inſiſt ſo much upon this philoſophy here, not only becauſe without the perfect knowledge of it, we cannot deal with the Atheiſts at their own weapon; but alſo becauſe we doubt not but to make a ſovereign antidote againſt atheiſm out of that very philoſophy, which ſo many have uſed as a *vehiculum* to convey this poiſon of atheiſm by.

IX. But beſides reaſon, we have alſo good hiſtorical probability for this opinion, that this philoſophy was a thing of much greater antiquity than either *Democritus* or *Leucippus*. And firſt, becauſe *Poſidonius*, an ancient and learned philoſopher, did (as both *Empiricus* [1] and *Strabo* [2] tell us) avouch it for an old tradition, that the firſt inventor of this atomical philoſophy was one *Moſchus* a *Phœnician*, who, as *Strabo* alſo notes, lived before the *Trojan* wars.

X. Moreover it ſeems not altogether improbable, but that this *Moſchus* a *Phœnician* philoſopher, mentioned by *Poſidonius*, might be the ſame with that *Mochus* a *Phœnician* phyſiologer in *Jamblichus*, with whoſe ſucceſſors, prieſts and prophets, he affirms that *Pythagoras*, ſometimes ſojourning at *Sidon* (which was his native city) had convers'd: which may be taken for an intimation, as if he had been by them inſtructed in that atomical phyſiology, which *Moſchus* or *Mochus* the *Phœnician* is ſaid to have been the inventor of. *Mochus* or *Moſchus* is plainly a *Phœnician* name, and there is one *Mochus* a *Phœnician* writer cited in *Athenæus*, whom the Latin tranſlator calls *Moſchus*; and Mr. *Selden* approves of the conjecture of *Arcerius*, the publiſher of *Jamblichus*, that this *Mochus* was no other than the celebrated *Moſes* of the *Jews*, with whoſe ſucceſſors the Jewiſh philoſophers, prieſts and prophets, *Pythagoras* converſed at *Sidon*. Some fantaſtic Atomiſts perhaps would here catch at this, to make their philoſophy to ſtand by divine right, as owing its original to revelation; whereas philoſophy being not a matter of faith but reaſon, men ought not to affect (as I conceive) to derive its pedigree from revelation, and by that very pretence ſeek to impoſe it tyrannically upon the minds of men, which God hath here purpoſely left free to the uſe of their own faculties, that ſo finding out truth by them, they might enjoy that pleaſure and ſatisfaction, which ariſes from thence. But we aim here at nothing more, than a confirmation of this truth, that the atomical phyſiology was both older than *Democritus*,

[1] Lib. IX. adverſ. Mathemat. p. 621. [2] Lib. XVI. p. 718.

mocritus, and had no ſuch atheiſtical original neither. And there wants not other good authority for this, that *Pythagoras* did borrow many things from the *Jews*, and tranſlate them into his philoſophy.

XI. But there are yet other conſiderable probabilities for this, that *Pythagoras* was not unacquainted with the atomical phyſiology. And firſt from *Democritus* himſelf, who as he was of the Italick row, or Pythagorick ſucceſſion, ſo it is recorded of him in *Laertius* [1], that he was a great emulator of the Pythagoreans, and ſeemed to have taken all his philoſophy from them; inſomuch that if chronology had not contradicted it, it would have been concluded, that he had been an auditor of *Pythagoras* himſelf, of whom he teſtified his great admiration in a book entitled by his name. Moreover ſome of his opinions had a plain correſpondency with the Pythagorick doctrines, foraſmuch as *Democritus* [2] did not only hold, φέρεσθαι ἀτόμους ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δινουμένας, *that the atoms were carried round in a vortex*; but altogether with *Leucippus*, τὴν γῆν ὀχεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον δινουμένην, *that the earth was carried about the middle or centre of this* vortex (which is the Sun) *turning in the mean time round upon its own axis.* And juſt ſo the Pythagorick opinion is expreſſed by *Ariſtotle* [3], τὴν γῆν ἓν τῶν ἄστρων ὄσαν κύκλῳ φερομένην περὶ τὸ μέσον νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν ποιεῖν· *That the earth, as one of the ſtars* (that is a planet) *being carried round about the middle or centre* (which is fire or the ſun) *did in the mean time by its circumgyration upon its own axis make day and night.* Wherefore it may be reaſonably from hence concluded, that as *Democritus* his philoſophy was Pythagorical, ſo *Pythagoras* his philoſophy was likewiſe Democritical or Atomical.

XII. But that which is of more moment yet, we have the authority of *Ecphantus* a famous Pythagorean for this, that *Pythagoras* his monads, ſo much talked of, were nothing elſe but corporeal atoms. Thus we find it in *Stobæus* [4], τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς Μονάδας ἔτι πρῶτος ἀπεφήνατο σωματικάς, *Ecphantus* (who himſelf [5] aſſerted the doctrine of atoms) *firſt declared, that the Pythagorick monads were corporeal*, i. e. atoms. And this is further confirmed from what *Ariſtotle* [6] himſelf writes of theſe Pythagoreans and their monads, τὰς Μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος· *they ſuppoſe their monads to have magnitude.* And from that he elſewhere [7] makes monads and atoms to ſignify the ſame thing, οὐδὲν διαφέρει Μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια σμικρά· *It is all one to ſay monades or ſmall corpuſcula.* And *Gaſſendus* [8] hath obſerved out of the Greek epigrammatiſt [9], that *Epicurus* his atoms were ſometimes called monads too;

——————μάτην Ἐπίκουρον ἐάσον
Πᾶ τὸ κενὸν ζητεῖν καί τινες αἱ Μονάδες.

XIII.

[1] Lib. IX. Segm. 38. p. 570.
[2] Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 573. & Segm. 30. p. 567.
[3] De Cœlo, Lib. II. c. 13. p. 658. Tom. I. Oper.
[4] Eclog. Phyſ. Lib. I. cap. XIII. p. 27. Edit Plantin. 1575. fol.
[5] Stob. ubi ſupra, Lib. I. c. XXV. p. 48.
[6] Metaphyſ. Lib. XI. c. VI. Tom. IV. Oper. p. 424.
[7] De Animâ, Lib. II. c. VI. p. 13. Tom. II. Oper.
[8] Phyſices Sect. I. Lib. III. c. IV. p. 256. Tom. I. Oper. & in Notis ad Lib. IX. Diog. Laertii p. 70. Tom. V. Oper
[9] Anthолog. Græcor. Epigram. Lib. I. XV. p. 32. Edit. Francof. 1600. Fol.

XIII. But to pass from *Pythagoras* himself; that *Empedocles*, who was a Pythagorean also, did physiologize atomically, is a thing that could hardly be doubted of, though there were no more proof for it than that one passage of his in his philosophick poems;[1]

φύσις οὐδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστου
Ἀλλὰ μόνου μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων.

Nature is nothing but the mixture and separation of things mingled; or thus, *There is no production of any thing anew, but only mixture and separation of things mingled.* Which is not only to be understood of animals, according to the Pythagorick doctrine of the transmigration of souls, but also, as himself expounds it, universally of all bodies, that their generation and corruption is nothing but mixture and separation; or, as *Aristotle*[2] expresses it, σύγκρισις καὶ διάκρισις, *concretion and secretion* of parts, together with change of figure and order. It may perhaps be objected, that *Empedocles* held four elements, out of which he would have all other bodies to be compounded; and that as *Aristotle* affirms[3], he made those elements not to be transmutable into one another neither. To which we reply, that he did indeed make four elements, as the first general concretions of atoms, and therein he did no more than *Democritus* himself, who, as *Laertius* writes[4], did from atoms moving round in a vortex, πάντα συγκρίματα γεννᾶν πῦρ, ὕδωρ, ἀέρα, γῆν, εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ ἀτόμων τινῶν συστήματα, *generate all concretions, fire, water, air and earth, these being systems made out of certain atoms.* And *Plato* further confirms the same; for in his book *de Legibus*[5] he describes (as I suppose) that very atheistical hypothesis of *Democritus*, though without mentioning his name, representing it in this manner; that by the fortuitous motion of senseless matter were first made those four elements, and then out of them afterward sun, moon, stars and earth. Now both *Plutarch*[6] and *Stobæus*[7] testify, that *Empedocles* compounded the four elements themselves out of atoms. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα, καὶ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων· Empedocles *makes the elements to be compounded of other small corpuscula, which are the least, and as it were the elements of the elements.* And the same *Stobæus* again observes[8], Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα· Empedocles *makes the smallest particles and fragments of body* (that is, atoms) *to be before the four elements.* But whereas *Aristotle* affirms, that *Empedocles* denied the transmutation of those elements into one another, that must needs be either a slip in him, or else a fault in our copies; not only because *Lucretius*, who was better versed in that philosophy, and gives a particular account of *Empedocles* his doctrine (besides many others of the ancients) affirms the quite contrary; but also because himself, in those fragments of his still preserved, expressly acknowledges this transmutation:

Καὶ

[1] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philos. Lib. I. c. XXX. p. 885. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] De Generat. & Corrupt. Lib. II. c. VI. p. 729. Tom I. Oper.
[3] Ibid. p. 734. & Lib. I. c. III. p. 699.
[4] Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 573.
[5] Lib. X. p. 666. Oper.
[6] De Placitis Philos. Lib. I. c. XVII. p. 883. Tom. II. Oper. Vide etiam c. XIII. p. 883.
[7] Eclog. Physic. Lib. I. c. XX. p. 36.
[8] Ibid. Lib. I. c. XVII. p. 33.

Καὶ φθείνει εἰς ἄλληλα, καὶ αὔξεται ἐν μέρει αἴσης.

XIV. Besides all this, no less author than *Plato* affirms, that according to *Empedocles*, vision and other sensations were made by ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων, *the defluxions of figures*, or effluvia of atoms, (for so *Democritus* his atoms are called in *Aristotle* σχήματα, because they were bodies which had only figure without qualities) he supposing, that some of these figures or particles corresponded with the organs of one sense, and some with the organs of another. [1] Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροάς τινας τῶν ὄντων κατὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ πόρους, εἰς οὕς, καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται, καὶ τῶν ἀπορρῶν τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττειν ἐνίοις τῶν πόρων, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἢ μείζους εἶναι· *You say then, according to the doctrine of* Empedocles, *that there are certain corporeal effluvia from bodies of different magnitudes and figures, as also several pores and meatus's in us diversly corresponding with them: so that some of these corporeal effluvia agree with some pores, when they are either too big or too little for others.* By which it is evident, that *Empedocles* did not suppose sensations to be made by intentional species or qualities, but as to the generality, in the atomical way; in which notwithstanding there are some differences among these Atomists themselves. But *Empedocles* went the same way here with *Democritus*, for *Empedocles*'s ἀπορροαὶ σχημάτων, *defluxions of figured bodies*, are clearly the same thing with *Democritus* his εἰδώλων εἰσκρίσεις, *insinuations of simulachra*, or *exuvious images of bodies.* And the same *Plato* adds further [2], that according to *Empedocles's*, the definition of colour was this, ἀπορροὴ σχημάτων ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός, *The defluxion of figures, or figured corpuscula* (without qualities) *commensurate to the sight and sensible.* Moreover, that *Empedocles* his physiology was the very same with that of *Democritus*, is manifest also from this passage of *Aristotle* [3], Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ Δημόκριτον λανθάνουσιν αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς, ἃ γενέσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ποιοῦντες, ἀλλὰ φαινομένην γένεσιν· ἐνυπάρχον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐκκρίνεσθαί φασιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀγγείου τῆς γενέσεως ὕστης· Empedocles *and* Democritus *deceiving themselves, unawares destroy all generation of things out of one another, leaving a seeming generation only: for they say, that generation is not the production of any new entity, but only the secretion of what was before inexistent; as when divers kinds of things confounded together in a vessel are separated from one another.* Lastly, we shall confirm all this by the clear testimony of *Plutarch*, or the writer *de Placitis Philosophorum* [4]: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ πάντες ὅσοι κατὰ συναθροισμὸν τῶν λεπτομερῶν σωμάτων κοσμοποιοῦσι, συγκρίσεις μὲν καὶ διακρίσεις εἰσάγουσι, γενέσεις δὲ καὶ φθορὰς οὐ κυρίως, ἃ γὰρ κατὰ ποιὸν ἐξ ἀλλοιώσεως, κατὰ δὲ πόσον ἐκ συναθροισμοῦ ταύτας γίνεσθαι· Empedocles *and* Epicurus, *and all those that compound the world of small atoms, introduce concretions and secretions, but no generations or corruptions properly so called; neither would they have these to be made according to quality by alteration, but only according to quantity by aggregation.* And the same writer sets down the order and method of the *Cosmopœia* according to *Empedocles* [5]; Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, τὸν μὲν αἰθέρα πρῶτον διακριθῆναι, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ, ἐφ' ᾧ τὴν γῆν ἐξ ἄγαν

[1] Plato in Menone, p. 14.
[2] Ibid.
[3] De Cœlo, Lib. III. cap. VII. p. 680. Tom. I. Oper.
[4] Lib. I. c. XXIV. p. 884. Oper.
[5] Lib. II. cap. VI. p. 887.

ἄγαν περισφιγομένης τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς περιφορᾶς, ἀναβλύσαι τὸ ὕδωρ, ἐξ ἧς ἀτμισθῆναι τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ γενέσθαι τὸν μὲν οὐρανὸν ἐκ τοῦ αἰθέρος, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ πυρός. Empedocles *writes, that æther was firſt of all ſecreted out of the confuſed chaos of atoms, afterward the fire, and then the earth, which being conſtringed, and as it were ſqueezed by the force of agitation, ſent forth water bubbling out of it; from the evaporation of which did proceed air; and from the æther was made the heavens, from fire the ſun.* We ſee therefore, that it was not without cauſe, that *Lucretius* [1] did ſo highly extol *Empedocles*, ſince his phyſiology was really the ſame with that of *Epicurus* and *Democritus*; only that he differed from them in ſome particularities, as in excluding a vacuum, and denying ſuch phyſical minima as were indiviſible.

XV. As for *Anaxagoras*, though he philoſophized by atoms, ſubſtituting concretion and ſecretion in the room of generation and corruption, inſiſting upon the ſame fundamental principle, that *Empedocles*, *Democritus* and the other Atomiſts did; which was (as we ſhall declare more fully afterward) that nothing could be made out of nothing, nor reduced to nothing; and therefore that there were neither any new productions nor deſtructions of any ſubſtances or real entities: yet, as his *Homœomeria* is repreſented by *Ariſtotle*, *Lucretius* and other authors, that bone was made of bony atoms, and fleſh of fleſhy, red things of red atoms, and hot things of hot atoms; theſe atoms being ſuppoſed to be endued originally with ſo many ſeveral forms and qualities eſſential to them, and inſeparable from them, there was indeed a wide difference betwixt his philoſophy and the atomical. However, this ſeems to have had its riſe from nothing elſe but this philoſopher's not being able to underſtand the atomical hypotheſis, which made him decline it, and ſubſtitute this ſpurious and counterfeit atomiſm of his own in the room of it.

XVI. Laſtly, I might add here, that it is recorded by good authors concerning divers other ancient philoſophers, that were not addicted to Democriticiſm or Atheiſm, that they followed this atomical way of phyſiologizing, and therefore in all probability did derive it from thoſe religious atomiſts before *Democritus*. As for example; *Ecphantus* the Syracuſian Pythagoriſt, who, as *Stobæus* writes, made τὰ ἀδιαίρετα σώματα καὶ τὸ κενὸν, indiviſible bodies and vacuum the principles of phyſiology, and as *Theodoret* alſo teſtifies, taught ἐκ τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, *that the corporeal world was made up of atoms*; *Xenocrates* [2], that made μεγέθη ἀδιαίρετα, *indiviſible magnitudes* the firſt principles of bodies; *Heraclides* [3], that reſolved all corporeal things into ψήγματα καὶ θραύσματά τινα ἐλάχιστα, *certain ſmalleſt fragments of bodies*; *Aſclepiades* [4], who ſuppoſed all the corporeal world to be made ἐξ ἀνομοίων καὶ ἀναρμων ὄγκων, not of ſimilar parts (as *Anaxagoras*) but of diſſimilar and inconcinn moleculæ, *i. e.* atoms of different magnitude and figures; and *Diodo-*

[1] Lib. I. verſ. 744, 745.

[2] Vide Georg. Pachymer. libellum περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμῶν, qui extat inter Ariſtotelis Opera, Tom. II. cap. I. p. 819.

[3] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſ. Lib. I. cap. XIII. p. 883. Tom. II. Oper.

[4] Vide Sextum Empiric. Hypotypoſ. Pyrrhon. Lib. III. cap. IV. p. 136.

Diodorus [1], that ſolved the material phænomena by ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα, the ſmalleſt indiviſibles of body. And laſtly, *Metrodorus* [2] (not *Lampſacenus* the Epicurean, but) *Chius*, who is reported alſo to have made indiviſible particles and atoms the firſt principles of bodies. But what need we any more proof for this, that the atomical phyſiology was ancienter than *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, and not confined only to that ſect, ſince *Ariſtotle* himſelf [3] in the paſſages already cited doth expreſsly declare, that beſides *Democritus*, the generality of all the other phyſiologers went that way; Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, &c. Democritus *and the moſt of the phyſiologers make all ſenſe to be touch, and reſolve ſenſible qualities, as the taſtes of bitter and ſweet*, &c. *into figures*. And again [4], he imputes it generally to all the phyſiologers that went before him, οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι, *the former phyſiologers* (without any exception) *ſaid not well in this, that there was no black and white without the ſight, nor bitter and ſweet without the taſte*. Wherefore, I think, it cannot be reaſonably doubted, but that the generality of the old phyſiologers before *Ariſtotle* and *Democritus* did purſue the atomical way, which is to reſolve the corporeal phænomena, not into forms, qualities and ſpecies, but into figures, motions and fancies.

XVII. But then there will ſeem to be no ſmall difficulty in reconciling *Ariſtotle* with himſelf, who doth in ſo many places plainly impute this philoſophy to *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, as the firſt ſource and original of it; as alſo in ſalving the credit of *Laertius*, and many other ancient writers, who do the like, *Democritus* having had for many ages almoſt the general cry and vogue for atoms. However, we doubt not but to give a very good account of this buſineſs, and reconcile the ſeemingly different teſtimonies of theſe ancient writers, ſo as to take away all contradiction and repugnancy between them. For although the atomical phyſiology was in uſe long before *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, ſo that they did not make it, but find it; yet theſe two, with their confederate Atheiſts (whereof *Protagoras* ſeems to have been one) were undoubtedly the firſt, that ever made this phyſiology to be a complete and entire philoſophy by it ſelf, ſo as to derive the original of all things in the whole univerſe from ſenſeleſs atoms, that had nothing but figure and motion, together with vacuum, and made up ſuch a ſyſtem of it, as from whence it would follow, that there could not be any God, not ſo much as a corporeal one. Theſe two things were both of them before ſingly and apart. For there is no doubt to be made, but that there hath been atheiſm lurking in the minds of ſome or other in all ages; and perhaps ſome of thoſe ancient Atheiſts did endeavour to philoſophize too, as well as they could, in ſome other way. And there was atomical phyſiology likewiſe before, without atheiſm. But theſe two thus complicated together, were never before atomical atheiſm, or atheiſtical atomiſm. And therefore *Democritus* and his comrade *Leucippus* need not be envied the glory

[1] Sext. Empiric. Lib. I. adv. Phyſicos, Sect. 363. p. 621. Vide etiam Lib. III. Hypotheſ. cap. IV. p. 136.

[2] Vide Stobæi Eclog. Phyſic. Lib. I. cap. XIII. p. 27.

[3] Lib. de Senſu & Senſibili, cap. IV. p. 70. Tom. II. Oper.

[4] De Animâ, Lib. II. cap. I. p. 43. Tom. II. Oper.

of being reputed the firſt inventors or founders of the atomical philoſophy atheized and adulterated.

XVIII. Before *Leucippus* and *Democritus*, the doctrine of atoms was not made a whole entire philoſophy by it ſelf, but look'd upon only as a part or member of the whole philoſophick ſyſtem, and that the meaneſt and loweſt part too, it being only uſed to explain that which was purely corporeal in the world; beſides which they acknowledged ſomething elſe, which was not meer bulk and mechaniſm, but life and ſelf-activity, that is, immaterial or incorporeal ſubſtance; the head and ſummity whereof is the Deity diſtinct from the world. So that there have been two ſorts of Atomiſts in the world, the one atheiſtical, the other religious. The firſt and moſt ancient Atomiſts holding incorporeal ſubſtance, uſed that phyſiology in a way of ſubordination to theology and metaphyſicks. The other allowing no other ſubſtance but body, made ſenſeleſs atoms and figures, without any mind and underſtanding (*i. e.* without any God) to be the original of all things; which latter is that, that was vulgary known by the name of atomical philoſophy, of which *Democritus* and *Leucippus* were the ſource.

XIX. It hath been indeed of late confidently aſſerted by ſome, that never any of the ancient philoſophers dream'd of any ſuch thing as incorporeal ſubſtance; and therefore they would bear men in hand, that it was nothing but an upſtart and new-fangled invention of ſome bigotical religioniſts; the falſity whereof we ſhall here briefly make to appear. For though there have been doubtleſs in all ages ſuch as have diſbelieved the exiſtence of any thing but what was ſenſible, whom *Plato*[1] deſcribes after this manner; οἱ διατείνοιντ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμπιέζειν εἰσὶν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστί· *that would contend, that whatſoever they could not feel or graſp with their hands, was altogether nothing*; yet this opinion was profeſſedly oppoſed by the beſt of the ancient philoſophers, and condemned for a piece of ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity. Wherefore the ſame *Plato* tells us, that there had been always, as well as then there was, a perpetual war and controverſy in the world, and, as he calls it, a kind of gigantomachy betwixt theſe two parties or ſects of men; the one, that held there was no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body; the other, that aſſerted incorporeal ſubſtance. The former of theſe parties or ſects is thus deſcribed by the philoſopher; Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες, τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων, διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν ἢ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταυτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁρίζόμενοι· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴτις φησὶ μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν· *Theſe* (ſaith he) *pull all things down from heaven and the inviſible region, with their hands to the earth, laying hold of rocks and oaks; and when they graſp all theſe hard and groſs things, the confidently affirm, that that only is ſubſtance, which they can feel, and will reſiſt yheir touch; and they conclude, that body and ſubſtance are one and the ſelf ſame tthing; and if any one chance to ſpeak to them of ſomething which is not body, i. e.* of incorporeal ſubſtance, *they will altogether deſpiſe him, and not hear a word more from*

[1] In Sophiſtâ, p. 160.

from him. And many such the philosopher there says he had met withal. The other he represents in this manner; Οἱ πρὸς αὐτὰς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου τόπου ἀμύνονται ἰοῦσι καὶ ἀτλα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη, βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις αἰεὶ ξυνέστηκε· *The adversaries of these Corporealists do cautiously and piously assault them from the invisible region, fetching all things from above by way of descent, and by strength of reason convincing, that certain intelligible and incorporeal forms are the true or first substance, and not sensible things. But betwixt these two there hath always been* (saith he) *a great war and contention.* And yet in the sequel of his discourse he adds, that those Corporealists were then grown a little more modest and shame-faced than formerly their great champions had been, such as *Democritus* and *Protagoras*; for however they still persisted in this, that the soul was a body, yet they had not, it seems, the impudence to affirm, that wisdom and vertue were corporeal things, or bodies, as others before and since too have done. We see here, that *Plato* expressly asserts a substance distinct from body, which sometimes he calls οὐσίαν ἀσώματον, *incorporeal substance*, and sometimes οὐσίαν νοητήν, *intelligible substance*, in opposition to the other which he calls αἰσθητήν, *sensible*. And it is plain to any one, that hath had the least acquaintance with *Plato*'s philosophy, that the whole scope and drift of it, is to raise up mens minds from sense to a belief of incorporeal things as the most excellent: τὰ γὰρ ἀσώματα κάλλιστα ὄντα καὶ μέγιστα λόγῳ μόνον, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενὶ, σαφῶς δείκνυται, as he writes in another place [1]; *for incorporeal things, which are the greatest and most excellent things of all, are* (saith he) *discoverable by reason only, and nothing else.* And his subterraneous cave, so famously known, and so elegantly described by him [2], where he supposes men tied with their backs towards the light, placed at a great distance from them, so that they could not turn about their heads to it neither, and therefore could see nothing but the shadows (of certain substances behind them) projected from it, which shadows they concluded to be the only substances and realities, and when they heard the sounds made by those bodies that were betwixt the light and them, or their reverberated echo's, they imputed them to those shadows which they saw; I say, all this is a description of the state of those men, who take body to be the only real and substantial thing in the world, and to do all that is done in it; and therefore often impute sense, reason, and understanding, to nothing but blood and brains in us.

XX. I might also shew in the next place, how *Aristotle* did not at all dissent from *Plato* herein, he plainly asserting [3], ἄλλην οὐσίαν παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, *another substance besides sensibles*, οὐσίαν χωριστὴν καὶ κεχωρισμένην τῶν αἰσθητῶν, *a substance separable and also actually separated from sensibles*, ἀκίνητον οὐσίαν, *an immoveable nature or essence* (subject to no generation or corruption) adding, that the Deity was to be sought for here: nay, such a substance, ἣν μέγεθος οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι, *as hath no magnitude at all, but is impartible and indivisible.* He also blaming *Zeno* (not the Stoick, who was junior to *Aristotle*, but an ancienter philosopher of that name) for making

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[1] In Politico, p. 182. Oper.
[2] De Repub. Lib. VII. p. 483.
[3] Metaphys. Lib. XIV. cap. VII. p. 480. Tom. IV. Oper. & in multis aliis locis.

king God to be a body, in theſe words [1]; αὐτὸς γὰρ σῶμα λέγει εἶναι τὸν Θεόν· εἴτε δὲ τόδε τὸ πᾶν, εἴτε ὅτι δήποτε αὐτὸς λέγων· ἀσώματος γὰρ ὢν πῶς ἂν σφαιροειδὴς εἴη; ὅταν ἵστως στ' ἂν κινοῖτο, στ' ἂν ἠρεμοῖ, μηδαμῆ τε ὤν· ἐπεὶ δὲ σῶμά ἐστι, τί ἂν αὐτὸ κωλύει κινεῖσθαι· Zeno *implicitly affirms God to be a body, whether he mean him to be the whole corporeal univerſe, or ſome particular body; for if God were incorporeal, how could he be ſpherical? nor could he then either move or reſt, being not properly in any place: but if God be a body, then nothing hinders but that he may be moved.* From which, and other places of *Ariſtotle*, it is plain enough alſo, that he did ſuppoſe incorporeal ſubſtance to be unextended, and as ſuch, not to have relation to any place. But this is a thing to be diſputed afterwards. Indeed ſome learned men conceive *Ariſtotle* to have reprehended *Zeno* without cauſe, and that *Zeno* made God to be a ſphere, or ſpherical, in no other ſenſe, than *Parmenides* did in that known verſe of his [2];

Πάντοθεν εὐκύκλε σφαίρας ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ.

Wherein he is underſtood to deſcribe the divine eternity. However, it plainly appears from hence, that according to *Ariſtotle*'s ſenſe, God was ἀσώματος, an incorporeal ſubſtance diſtinct from the World.

XXI. Now this doctrine, which *Plato* eſpecially was famous for aſſerting, that there was οὐσία ἀσώματος, *incorporeal ſubſtance*, and that the ſouls of men were ſuch, but principally the Deity; *Epicurus* taking notice of it, endeavoured with all his might to confute it, arguing ſometimes after this manner: *There can be no incorporeal God (as* Plato *maintained) not only becauſe no man can frame a conception of an incorporeal ſubſtance, but alſo becauſe whatſoever is incorporeal muſt needs want ſenſe, and prudence, and pleaſure, all which things are included in the notion of God; and therefore an incorporeal Deity is a contradiction.* And concerning the ſoul of man; [4] οἱ λέγοντες ἀσωμάτου εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιάζουσι, &c. *They who ſay, that the ſoul is incorporeal, in any other ſenſe, than as that word may be uſed to ſignify a ſubtile body, talk vainly and fooliſhly; for then it could neither be able to do nor ſuffer any thing. It could not act upon any other thing, becauſe it could touch nothing; neither could it ſuffer from any thing, becauſe it could not be touch'd by any thing; but it would be juſt like to vacuum or empty ſpace, which can neither do nor ſuffer any thing, but only yield bodies a paſſage through it.* From whence it is further evident, that this opinion was profeſſedly maintained by ſome philoſophers before *Epicurus* his time.

XXII. But *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* were not the firſt inventors of it; for it is certain, that all thoſe philoſophers, who held the immortality of the human ſoul, and a God diſtinct from this viſible world, (and ſo properly the creator of it and all its parts) did really aſſert *incorporeal ſubſtance.* For that a corporeal ſoul cannot be in its own nature immortal and incorruptible, is plain to every one's underſtanding, becauſe of its parts being ſeparable from one another; and whoſoever denies God to be incorporeal, if he make him

[1] Libro de Zenone, Xenophane, & Gorgiâ, cap. IV. p. 844. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Apud Ariſtot. in Libro jam laudato, cap. IV. p. 843. Tom. II. Oper. et apud Platonem in Sophiſtâ, & veterum alios.

[3] Cicero de Natur. Deor. Lib. 1. cap. XII. p. 2897. Tom. IX. Oper.

[4] Vide Diog. Laërt. Lib. X. Segm. 67, 68. p. 630.

him any thing at all, he muſt needs make him to be either the whole corporeal world, or elſe a part of it. Wherefore if God be neither of theſe, he muſt then be an incorporeal ſubſtance. Now *Plato* was not the firſt, who aſſerted theſe two things, but they were both maintained by many philoſophers before him. *Pherecydes Syrus*, and *Thales*, were two of the moſt ancient philoſophers among the *Greeks*; and it is ſaid of the former of them [1], that by his lectures and diſputes concerning the immortality of the ſoul, he firſt drew off *Pythagoras* from another courſe of life to the ſtudy of philoſophy. *Pherecydes Syrus* (ſaith *Cicero* [2],) *primus dixit animos hominum eſſe ſempiternos.* And *Thales* in an Epiſtle [3], directed to him, congratulates his being the firſt, that had deſigned to write to the *Greeks* concerning divine things; which *Thales* alſo (who was the head of the Ionick ſucceſſion of philoſophers, as *Pythagoras* of the Italick) is joined with *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, by the writer *de placitis philoſophorum* [4], after this manner, ἅπτοι πάντες οἱ προτεταγμένοι ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσει λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ θείαν νοητήν· *All theſe determined the ſoul to be incorporeal, making it to be naturally ſelf-moving* (or ſelf-active) *and an intelligible ſubſtance*, that is, not ſenſible. Now he, that determines the ſoul to be incorporeal, muſt needs hold the Deity to be incorporeal much more. *Aquam dixit* Thales *eſſe initium rerum* (ſaith *Cicero* [5],) *Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret.* Thales *ſaid that water was the firſt principle of all corporeal things, but that God was that mind, which formed all things out of water.* For *Thales* was a *Phœnician* by extraction, and accordingly ſeemed to have received his two principles from thence, water, and the divine ſpirit moving upon the waters. The firſt whereof is thus expreſſed by *Sanchoniathon* [6], in his deſcription of the *Phœnician* theology, χάος θολερὸν, ἐρεβώδες, *a turbid and dark chaos*; and the ſecond is intimated in theſe words, ἠράσθη τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν, *the Spirit was affected with love towards its own principles*; perhaps expreſſing the force of the *Hebrew* word *Merachepheth*, and both of them implying an underſtanding prolifical goodneſs, forming and hatching the corporeal world into this perfection; or elſe a plaſtick power, ſubordinate to it. *Zeno* (who was alſo originally a *Phœnician)* tells us [7], that *Heſiod*'s chaos was water; and that the material heaven as well as earth was made out of water (according to the judgment of the beſt interpreters) is the genuine ſenſe of ſcripture, 2 *Pet.* iii. 5. by which water ſome perhaps would underſtand a *Chaos of atoms confuſedly moved.* But whether *Thales* were acquainted with the Atomical phyſiology or no [8]; it is plain that he aſſerted, beſides the ſoul's immortality, a Deity diſtinct from the corporeal world.

We paſs to *Pythagoras*, whom we have proved already to have been an Atomiſt; and it is well known alſo, that he was a profeſſed Incorporealiſt. That he aſſerted the immortality of the ſoul, and conſequently its immateriality, is evident from his doctrine of pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration: and that

[1] Vide Auguſtin, cap. 137. pag. 308. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Tuſculan. Quæſt. Lib. I. c. XVI. p. 2586. Tom. VIII. Oper.

[3] Apud Diogen. Laert. Lib. I. Segm. 43. p. 25.

[4] Lib. IV. cap. III. p. 908.

[5] De Natur. Deor. Lib. I. cap. X. p. 2894. Tom. IX. Oper.

[6] Apud Euſeb. de Præparatione Evangelicâ, Lib. II. cap. X. p. 33.

[7] Vide Scholiaſten in Apollon. Argonautic. Lib. IV. verſ. 676. ſ. citatum ab Hug. Grotio, in Notis ad Lib. I. de Veritate Relig. Chriſt. § XVI. p. 30, 31.

[8] Vide Plutarch. de Placitis Philoſ. Lib. I. cap. XVI. p 883.

that he likewiſe held an incorporeal Deity diſtinct from the world, is a thing not queſtioned by any. But if there were any need of proving it, (becauſe there are no monuments of his extant) perhaps it might be done from hence, becauſe he was the chief propagator of that doctrine amongſt the *Greeks*, concerning three hypoſtaſes in the Deity.

For, that *Plato* and his followers held τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις, *three hypoſtaſes in the Deity, that were the firſt principles of all things*, is a thing very well known to all; though we do not affirm, that theſe Platonick hypoſtaſes are exactly the ſame with thoſe in the Chriſtian trinity. Now *Plato* himſelf ſufficiently intimates this not to have been his own invention; and *Plotinus* tells us, that it was παλαιὰ δόξα, an ancient opinion before *Plato*'s time, which had been delivered down by ſome of the Pythagoricks. Wherefore, I conceive, this muſt needs be one of thoſe Pythagorick monſtroſities, which *Xenophon* covertly taxes *Plato* for entertaining, and mingling with the Socratical philoſophy, as if he had thereby corrupted the purity and ſimplicity of it. Though a Corporealiſt may pretend to be a theiſt; yet I never heard, that any of them did ever aſſert a trinity, reſpectively to the Deity, unleſs it were ſuch an one, as I think not fit here to mention.

XXIII. That *Parmenides*, who was likewiſe a Pythagorean, acknowledged a Deity diſtinct from the corporeal world, is evident from *Plato* [1]. And *Plotinus* tells us alſo, that he was one of them, that aſſerted the triad of divine hypoſtaſes. Moreover, whereas there was a great controverſy amongſt the ancient philoſophers before *Plato*'s time [2], between ſuch as held all things to flow, (as namely *Heraclitus* and *Cratylus*;) and others, who aſſerted that ſome things did ſtand, and that there was ἀκίνητος οὐσία, *a certain immutable nature*, to wit, an eternal mind, together with eternal and immutable truths, (amongſt which were *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*;) the former of theſe were all Corporealiſts, (this being the very reaſon why they made all things to flow, becauſe they ſuppoſed all to be body) though theſe were not therefore all of them Atheiſts. But the latter were all both Incorporealiſts and Theiſts; for whoſoever holds incorporeal ſubſtance, muſt needs (according to reaſon) alſo aſſert a Deity.

And although we did not before particularly mention *Parmenides* amongſt the atomical philoſophers, yet we conceive it to be manifeſt from hence, that he was one of that tribe, becauſe he was an eminent aſſerter of that principle, οὐδὲν οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, *that no real entity is either made or deſtroyed, generated or corrupted.* Which we ſhall afterwards plainly ſhew, to be the grand fundamental principle of the atomical philoſophy.

XXIV. But whereas we did evidently prove before, that *Empedocles* was an atomical phyſiologer, it may notwithſtanding with ſome colour of probability be doubted, whether he were not an Atheiſt, or at leaſt a Corporealiſt, becauſe *Ariſtotle* accuſes him of theſe following things. Firſt [3], of making knowledge

[1] In Parmenide.
[2] Vide Platon. in Theæteto, p. 130, 131.
[3] Ariſtot. de Animâ, Lib. III. cap. III. p. 45. Tom. II. Oper.

knowledge to be ſenſe, which is indeed a plain ſign of a Corporealiſt; and therefore in the next place alſo [1], of compounding the ſoul out of the four elements, making it to underſtand every corporeal thing by ſomething of the ſame within it ſelf, as fire by fire, and earth by earth; and laſtly [2], of attributing much to fortune, and affirming that divers of the parts of animals were made ſuch by chance, and that there were at firſt certain mongrel animals fortuitouſly produced, that were βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, ſuch as had *ſomething of the ſhape of an ox, together with the face of a man*, (though they could not long continue;) which ſeems to give juſt cauſe of ſuſpicion, that *Empedocles* atheized in the ſame manner that *Democritus* did.

To the firſt of theſe we reply, that ſome others, who had alſo read *Empedocles*'s poems, were of a different judgment from *Ariſtotle* as to that, conceiving *Empedocles* not to make ſenſe, but reaſon the criterion of truth. Thus *Empiricus* informs us [3]: *Others ſay, that, according to* Empedocles, *the criterion of truth is not ſenſe, but right reaſon; and alſo that right reaſon is of two ſorts, the one* θεῖος, *or divine, the other* ἀνθρώπινος, *or human: of which the divine is inexpreſſible, but the human declarable.* And there might be ſeveral paſſages cited out of thoſe fragments of *Empedocles* his poems yet left, to confirm this; but we ſhall produce only this one:

Γήων πίστιν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον [4].

To this ſenſe; *Suſpend thy aſſent to the corporeal ſenſes, and conſider every thing clearly with thy mind or reaſon.*

And as to the ſecond crimination, *Ariſtotle* [5] has much weakened his own teſtimony here, by accuſing *Plato* alſo of the very ſame thing. Πλατὼν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ, γινώσκεται γὰρ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι· Plato *compounds the ſoul out of the four elements, becauſe like is known by like, and things are from their principles.* Wherefore it is probable, that *Empedocles* might be no more guilty of this fault (of making the ſoul corporeal, and to conſiſt of earth, water, air, and fire) than *Plato* was, who in all mens judgments was as free from it, as *Ariſtotle* himſelf, if not more. For *Empedocles* [6] did in the ſame manner, as *Pythagoras* before him, and *Plato* after him, hold the tranſmigration of ſouls, and conſequently, both their future immortality and pre-exiſtence; and therefore muſt needs aſſert their incorporeity; *Plutarch* [7] rightly declaring this to have been his opinion; Εἶναι καὶ τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας καὶ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας· *that as well thoſe who are yet unborn, as thoſe that are dead, have a being.* He alſo aſſerted human ſouls to be here in a lapſed ſtate [8]; μελανάσας, καὶ ξένους, καὶ φυγάδας, *wanderers, ſtrangers, and fugitives from God*; declaring, as *Plotinus* [9] tells us, that it was a divine law, ἁμαρτανούσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα, *that ſouls ſinning ſhould fall down into theſe earthly bodies.* But the fulleſt record of the *Empedoclean* philoſophy concerning the ſoul is contained in this of *Hierocles* [10],

Κάτεισι

[1] Ariſt. Lib. I. cap. II. p. 5. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] Id. de Partibus Animal. Lib. I. cap. I. p. 470, Tom. II. Oper. & Phyſicor. Lib. II. cap. VIII. p. 475, & 477.
[3] Lib. VII. adv. Math. §. 122. p. 396.
[4] Ib. § 125. p. 347.
[5] De Animâ, L. I. c. II p. 5. Tom. II. Op.
[6] Diogen. Laert. Lib. VIII. Segm. 78. p. 359. & Plut. de Solertiâ Animal. Tom. II. p. 964. Oper.
[7] Libro Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. Tom. II. Oper.
[8] Plutarch. de Exilio, p. 607.
[9] De Animæ Deſcenſu in Corpora, En. IV. Lib. VIII. cap. I. p. 468.
[10] In Aurea Pythagoræ Carmina, p. 186.

Κάτεισι καὶ ἀποπίπλει τῆς εὐδαίμονος χώρας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, --- Φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος. ——— Ἄνεισι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἕξιν ἀπολαμβάνει,

Εἰ φεύξει τὰ περὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν ἀτερπέα χῶρον,
Ἔνθα φόνος τε κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν.

Εἰς ὃν οἱ ἐκπεσόντες ——— Ἄτης
——— ἀνὰ λειμῶνα τε καὶ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν.

Ἡ δὲ ἔφεσις τοῦ φεύγοντος τὸν τῆς Ἄτης λειμῶνα πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας ἐπείγεται λειμῶνα, ὃν ἀπολιπὼν τῇ ὁρμῇ τῆς περιρρύσεως εἰς γήινον ἔρχεται σῶμα, Ὀλβίου—αἰῶνος ἀμελθείς· *Man falleth from his happy ſtate, as* Empedocles *the Pythagorean ſaith,——By being a fugitive, apoſtate, and wanderer from God, acted with a certain mad and irrational ſtrife or contention. --- But he aſcends again, and recovers his former ſtate, ——— if he decline and avoid theſe earthly things, and deſpiſe this unpleaſant and wretched place, where murder, and wrath, and a troop of all other miſchiefs reign. Into which place they who fall, wander up and down through the field of* Ate *and darkneſs. But the deſire of him, that flees from this field of* Ate, *carries him on towards the field of truth; which the ſoul at firſt relinquiſhing, and loſing its wings, fell down into this earthly body, deprived of its happy life.* From whence it appears that *Plato*'s περιρρύησις was derived from *Empedocles* and the Pythagoreans.

Now from what hath been already cited it is ſufficiently manifeſt, that *Empedocles* was ſo far from being either an Atheiſt or Corporealiſt, that he was indeed a rank Pythagoriſt, as he is here called. And we might add hereunto, what *Clemens Alexandrinus* obſerves [1], that according to *Empedocles*, ἣν ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως διαβιώσωμεν, μακάριοι μὲν ἐνταῦθα, μακαριώτεροι δὲ μελὰ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἀπαλλαγήν· οὐ χρόνῳ τινὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ ἐν αἰῶνι ἀναπαύεσθαι δυνάμενοι, Ἀθανάτοις ἄλλοισιν ὁμέστιοι, ἐν δὲ τραπέζαις, &c. *If we live holily and juſtly, we ſhall be happy here, and more happy after our departure hence; having our happineſs not neceſſarily confined to time, but being able to reſt and fix in it to all eternity; feaſting with the other immortal beings,* &c. We might alſo take notice, how, beſides the immortal *ſouls* of men, he acknowledged dæmons or angels; declaring that ſome of theſe fell from heaven, and were ſince proſecuted by a divine *Nemeſis*. For theſe in *Plutarch* [2] are called, οἱ θεήλατοι καὶ οὐρανοπελεῖς ἐκεῖνοι τοῦ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονες· *Thoſe Empedoclean dæmons lapſed from heaven, and purſued with divine vengeance*; whoſe reſtleſs torment is there deſcribed in ſeveral verſes of his [3]. And we might obſerve likewiſe, how he acknowledged a natural and immutable juſtice, which was not topical and confined to places and countries, and relative to particular laws, but catholick and univerſal, and every where the ſame, through infinite light and ſpace; as he expreſſes it with poetick pomp and bravery:

[4] Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον, διὰ τ' εὐρυμέδοντος
Αἰθέρος, ἠνεκέως τέταται, διὰ τ' ἀπλέτου αὐγῆς.

And the aſſerting of natural morality is no ſmall argument of a Theiſt.

But

[1] Stromatum Lib. V. p. 722.
[2] De vitando ære alieno, Tom. II. Oper. p. 830.
[3] Apud Plut. de Exilio, T. II. Oper. p. 607.
[4] Apud Ariſtot. Rhetoric. Lib. I. cap. XIII. p. 737. Tom. III. Oper.

But what then ſhall we ſay to thoſe other things, which *Empedocles* is charged with by *Ariſtotle*, that ſeem to have ſo rank a ſmell of atheiſm? Certainly thoſe mungril and biform animals, that are ſaid to have ſprung up out of the earth by chance, look as if they were more a-kin to *Democritus* than *Empedocles*; and probably it is the fault of the copies, that it is read otherwiſe, there being no other philoſopher that I know of, that could ever find any ſuch thing in *Empedocles* his poems [1]. But for the reſt, if *Ariſtotle* do not miſrepreſent *Empedocles*, as he often doth *Plato*, then it muſt be granted, that he being a mechanical phyſiologer, as well as theologer, did ſomething too much indulge to fortuitous mechaniſm; which ſeems to be an extravagancy, that mechanical philoſophers and Atomiſts have been always more or leſs ſubject to. But *Ariſtotle* doth not charge *Empedocles* with reſolving all things into fortuitous mechaniſm, as ſome philoſophers have done of late, who yet pretend to be Theiſts and Incorporealiſts, but only that he would explain ſome things in that way. Nay, he clearly puts a difference betwixt *Empedocles* and the Democritick Atheiſts in theſe words ſubjoined [2]; Εἰσὶ δὲ τινὲς, &c. which is as if he ſhould have ſaid, *Empedocles reſolved ſome things in the fabrick and ſtructure of animals into fortuitous mechaniſm; but there are certain other philoſophers, namely* Leucippus *and* Democritus, *who would have all things whatſoever in the whole world, heaven and earth and animals, to be made by chance and the fortuitous motion of atoms, without a Deity.* It ſeems very plain, that *Empedocles* his *Philia* and *Neikos*, his friendſhip and diſcord, which he makes to be the ἀρχὴ δραστήριον, *the active cauſe*, and principle of motion in the univerſe, was a certain plaſtick power, ſuperior to fortuitous mechaniſm: and *Ariſtotle* himſelf acknowledges ſomewhere as much. And *Plutarch* tells us [3], that, according to *Empedocles*, the order and ſyſtem of the world is not the reſult of material cauſes and fortuitous mechaniſm, but of a divine wiſdom, aſſigning to every thing οὐκ ἣν ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χώραν, ἀλλ' ἣν ἡ σοφὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἔργον σοφεῖ σύνταξις· *not ſuch a place as nature would give it, but ſuch as is moſt convenient for the good of the whole.* *Simplicius* [4], who had read *Empedocles*, acquaints us, that he made two worlds, the one intellectual, the other ſenſible; and the former of theſe to be the exemplar and archetype of the latter. And ſo the writer *De Placitis Philoſophorum* obſerves [5], that *Empedocles made* δύο ἡλίους, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ φαινόμενον, *two ſuns, the one archetypal and intelligible, the other apparent or ſenſible.*

But I need take no more pains to purge *Empedocles* from thoſe two imputations of corporealiſm and atheiſm, ſince he hath ſo fully confuted them himſelf in thoſe fragments of his ſtill extant. Firſt, by expreſſing ſuch a hearty reſentment of the excellency of piety, and the wretchedneſs and ſottiſhneſs of atheiſm in theſe verſes:

[6] Ὄλβιος ὃς θείων σοφιδων ἐκλήσατο σλοῦτον,
Δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν σέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.

[1] Some Verſes of *Empedocles*, wherein he expreſly maintains that opinion, are extant in *Ælian* de Naturâ Animalium, Lib. XVI. c. XXIX.

[2] Phyſicor. Lib. II. cap. IV. p. 470. Oper.

[3] Sympoſiac. Lib. I. Quæſt. II. p. 618.

[4] Commentar. ad Ariſtot. Libr. Phyſicor. p. 74 b. Edit. Græc. Aldinæ.

[5] Lib. II. cap. XX. p. 900. Tom. II. Oper. Plutarchi.

[6] Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. Lib. V. cap. XIV. p. 733.

To this ſenſe: *He is happy, who hath his mind richly fraught and ſtored with the treaſures of divine knowledge; but he miſerable, whoſe mind is darkened as to the belief of a God.* And, ſecondly, by denying God to have any human form, or members,

[1] Οὐ μὲν γὰρ βροτεῇ κεφαλῇ καλὰ γῦα κέκασται, &c.

Or otherwiſe to be corporeal,

[2] Οὐκ ἔστιν τελάσσαθ' οὐθ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἐφικτὸν
Ἡμετέροις, ἢ χερσὶ λαβεῖν.

And then poſitively affirming what he is,

[3] Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον,
Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καλαΐσσουσα θοῇσιν.

Only a holy and ineffable mind, that by ſwift thoughts agitates the whole world.

XXV. And now we ſhall ſpeak ſomething alſo of *Anaxagoras*, having ſhewed before, that he was a ſpurious Atomiſt. For he likewiſe agreed with the other Atomiſts in this, that he aſſerted incorporeal ſubſtance in general as the active cauſe and principle of motion in the univerſe, and particularly an incorporeal Deity diſtinct from the world; affirming, that there was beſides atoms, Νοῦς ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, (as it is expreſs'd in *Plato* [4]) *An ordering and diſpoſing mind, that was the cauſe of all things.* Which mind (as *Ariſtotle* tells us [5]) he made to be μόνον τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγῆ καὶ καθαρόν, *the only ſimple, unmixed, and pure thing* in the world. And he ſuppoſed this to be that, which brought the confuſed chaos of omnifarious atoms into that orderly compages of the world that now is.

XXVI. And by this time we have made it evident, that thoſe atomical phyſiologers, that were before *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, were all of them Incorporealiſts; joining theology and pneumatology, the doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtance and a Deity, together with their atomical phyſiology. This is a thing expreſly noted concerning *Ecphantus* the Pythagorean in *Stobæus* [6], Ἔκφαντος ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων συνεστάναι τὸν κόσμον, διοικεῖσθαι δὲ ἀπὸ προνοίας· Ecphantus *held the corporeal world to conſiſt of atoms, but yet to be ordered and governed by a divine providence:* that is, he joined atomology and theology both together. And the ſame is alſo obſerved of *Arceſilas*, or perhaps *Archelaus*, by *Sidonius Apollinaris* [7];

Poſt

[1] Apud Tzetz. Chiliad. XIII. Hiſt. CCCCLXIV. v. 80. & Ammonium in Comment. in Ariſtotel. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, fol. 107. Edit. Aldin.

[2] Apud Clem. Alexandr. Stromat. Lib. V. p. 694.

[3] Apud Tzetz. & Ammonium, ubi ſupra.

[4] In Phædon. p. 393. Oper.

[5] De Animâ Lib. I. cap. II. p. 6. Tom. II. Oper.

[6] Eclog. Phyſic. Lib. I. cap. XXV. p. 48.

[7] Carm. XV. in Epithalamio Polemî & Arancolæ v. 94. p. 132. Edit. Savaronis.

Poſt hos Arceſilaus *diviná mente paratam*
Conjicit hanc molem, confectam partibus illis,
Quas atomos vocat ipſe leves.

Now, I ſay, as *Ecphantus* and *Archelaus* aſſerted the corporeal world to be made of atoms, but yet notwithſtanding held an incorporeal Deity diſtinct from the ſame, as the firſt principle of activity in it; ſo in like manner did all the other ancient Atomiſts generally before *Democritus* join theology and incorporealiſm with their atomical phyſiology. They did atomize as well as he, but they did not atheize; but that atheiſtical atomology was a thing firſt ſet on foot afterward by *Leucippus* and *Democritus.*

XXVII. But becauſe many ſeem to be ſo ſtrongly poſſeſſed with this prejudice, as if atheiſm were a natural and neceſſary appendix to atomiſm, and therefore will conclude, that the ſame perſons could not poſſibly be Atomiſts and Incorporealiſts or Theiſts, we ſhall further make it evident, that there is not only no inconſiſtency betwixt the atomical phyſiology and theology, but alſo that there is, on the contrary, a moſt natural cognation between them.

And this we ſhall do two manner of ways; firſt, by inquiring into the origin of this philoſophy, and conſidering what grounds or principles of reaſon they were, which firſt led the ancients into this atomical or mechanical way of phyſiologizing. And ſecondly, by making it appear, that the intrinſical conſtitution of this phyſiology is ſuch, that whoſoever entertains it, if he do but thoroughly underſtand it, muſt of neceſſity acknowledge, that there is ſomething elſe in the world beſides body.

Firſt therefore, this atomical phyſiology ſeems to have had its riſe and origin from the ſtrength of reaſon, exerting its own inward active power and vigour, and thereby bearing it ſelf up againſt the prejudices of ſenſe, and at length prevailing over them, after this manner. The ancients conſidering and revolving the ideas of their own minds, found that they had a clear and diſtinct conception of two things, as the general heads and principles of whatſoever was in the univerſe; the one whereof was paſſive matter, and the other active power, vigour and virtue. To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by expreſs conſciouſneſs or no. Both which together may be called by one general name of life; ſo that they made theſe two general heads of being or entity, paſſive matter or bulk, and ſelf-activity or life. The former of theſe was commonly called by the ancients the τὸ πάσχον, *that which ſuffers and receives*, and the latter the τὸ ποιοῦν, *the active principle*, and the τὸ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, *that from whence motion ſprings. In rerum natura* (ſaith *Cicero* [1] according to the general ſenſe of the ancients) *duo quærenda ſunt; unum, quæ materia ſit, ex qua quæque res efficiatur; alterum, quæ res ſit quæ quicque efficiat: There are two things to be enquired after in nature; one, what is the matter out of which every thing is made; another, what is the active cauſe or efficient.* To the ſame purpoſe *Seneca* [2]; *Eſſe debet aliquid unde fiat, deinde à quo fiat; hoc eſt cauſa,* αἴτιον δραστήριον καὶ ποιητικόν. Philo.

[1] De finibus bonorum & malorum Lib. I. cap. VI. p. 2346. Tom. VIII. Oper.

[2] Epiſtol. LXV. Tom. II. Oper. p. 160.

illud materia: There must be something out of which a thing is made, and then something by which it is made; the latter is properly the cause, and the former the matter. Which is to be understood of corporeal things and their differences, that there must be both matter, and an active power, for the production of them. And so also that of *Aristotle* [1], οὔσης αἰτίας μιᾶς μὲν ὅθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φαμεν τῆς κινήσεως, μιᾶς δὲ τῆς ὕλης· *That, from whence the principle of motion is, is one cause, and the matter is another.* Where *Aristotle* gives that name of cause to the matter also, though others did appropriate it to the active power. And the writer *de Placitis Philosophorum* [2] expresses this as the general sense of the ancients: ἀδύνατον ἀρχὴν μίαν ὕλην τῶν ὄντων ἐξ ἧς τὰ πάντα ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον χρὴ ὑποτιθέναι, οἷον οὐκ ἄργυρος ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἔκπωμα γενέσθαι ἂν μὴ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν ᾖ, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀργυροκόπος, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαλκοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ξύλου, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ὕλης· *It is impossible, that matter alone should be the sole principle of all things, but there must of necessity be supposed also an agent or efficient cause: as silver alone is not sufficient to make a cup, unless there be an artificer to work upon it. And the same is to be said concerning brass, wood, and other natural bodies.*

Now as they apprehended a necessity of these two principles, so they conceived them to be such, as could not be confounded together into one and the same thing or substance, they having such distinct ideas and essential characters from one another; the Stoicks being the only persons, who offering violence to their own apprehensions, rudely and unskilfully attempted to make these two distinct things to be one and the same substance. Wherefore as the first of these, *viz.* matter, or passive extended bulk, is taken by all for substance, and commonly called by the name of body; so the other, which is far the more noble of the two, being that, which acts upon the matter, and hath a commanding power over it, must needs be substance too, of a different kind from matter or body; and therefore immaterial or incorporeal substance. Neither did they find any other entity to be conceivable, besides these two, passive bulk or extension, which is corporeal substance, and internal self-activity or life, which is the essential character of substance incorporeal; to which latter belongs not only cogitation, but also the power of moving body.

Moreover, when they further considered the first of these, the material or corporeal principle, they being not able clearly to conceive any thing else in it, besides magnitude, figure, site, and motion or rest, which are all several modes of extended bulk, concluded therefore according to reason, that there was really nothing else existing in bodies without, besides the various complexions and conjugations of those simple elements, that is, nothing but mechanism. Whence it necessarily followed, that whatsoever else was supposed to be in bodies, was, indeed, nothing but our modes of sensation, or the fancies and passions in us begotten from them, mistaken for things really existing without us. And this is a thing so obvious, that some of those philosophers, who had taken little notice of the atomical physiology, had notwithstanding a suspicion of it; as for example *Plotinus* [3], who writing of the criterion of truth, and the power of reason, hath these words, Καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἃ οὐ δοκεῖ πιστὰ ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις,

[1] Physicor. Lib. II. cap. III. p. 463. Tom. I Oper.

[2] Lib. I. cap. III. p. 876. Tom. I. Oper. Plutarchi.

[3] Libro, quod intelligibilia non sint extra intellectum, Ennead. V. Lib. V. cap. I. p. 520.

μένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχη τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κριτόντων· *Though the things of ſenſe ſeem to have ſo clear a certainty, yet notwithſtanding it is doubted concerning them, whether* (the qualities of them) *have any real exiſtence at all in the things without us, and not rather a ſeeming exiſtence only, in our own paſſions; and there is need of mind or underſtanding to judge in this caſe, and to determine the controverſy, which ſenſe alone cannot decide.* But the ancient phyſiologiſts concluded without any heſitancy, ὃ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, ἢ τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζεσθαι, *That the nature of honey in itſelf is not the ſame thing with my being ſweetned, nor of wormwood with that ſenſe of bitterneſs which I have from it;* διαφέρειν δὲ τὸ πάθος τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου, καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνειν, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη· *But that the paſſion of ſenſe differ'd from the abſolute nature of the thing it ſelf without; the ſenſes not comprehending the objects themſelves, but only their own paſſions from them.*

I ſay therefore, that the ancients concluded the abſolute nature of corporeal things in themſelves to be nothing but a certain diſpoſition of parts, in reſpect of magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion, which in taſtes cauſe us to be differently affected with thoſe ſenſes of ſweetneſs and bitterneſs, and in ſight with thoſe fancies of colours, and accordingly in the other ſenſes with other fancies; and that the corporeal world was to be explained by theſe two things, whereof one is abſolute in the bodies without us, the various mechaniſm of them; the other relative only to us, the different fancies in us, cauſed by the reſpective differences of them in themſelves. Which fancies or fantaſtick ideas are no modes of the bodies without us, but of that only in our ſelves, which is cogitative or ſelf-active, that is, incorporeal. For the ſenſible idea's of hot and cold, red and green, *&c.* cannot be clearly conceived by us as modes of the bodies without us, but they may be eaſily apprehended as modes of cogitation, that is, of ſenſation, or ſympathetical perception in us.

The reſult of all which was, that whatſoever is either in our ſelves, or the whole world, was to be reduced to one or other of theſe two principles; paſſive matter, and extended bulk, or ſelf-active power and virtue; corporeal or incorporeal ſubſtance; mechaniſm or life; or elſe to a complication of them both together.

XXVIII. From this general account, which we have now given of the origin of the atomical phyſiology, it appears, that the doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtance ſprung up together with it. But this will be further manifeſt from that which follows. For we ſhall in the next place ſhew, how this philoſophy did, in eſpecial manner, owe its original to the improvement of one particular principle of reaſon, over and beſides all the reſt; namely, that famous axiom, ſo much talked of amongſt the ancients,

[1] *De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil poſſe reverti;*

That *nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing.* For though *Democritus, Epicurus* and *Lucretius* abuſed this theorem, endeavouring to carry it further than

[1] Perſii Satir. III. ver. 84.

than the intention of the firſt Atomiſts, to the diſproving of a divine creation of any thing out of nothing by it; *Nullam rem à nihilo gigni divinitùs unquam* [1]; and conſequently of a Deity: yet as the meaning of it was at firſt confined and reſtrained, that *nothing of it ſelf could come from nothing nor go to nothing*, or that according to the ordinary courſe of nature (without an extraordinary divine power) nothing could be rais'd from nothing, nor reduced to nothing; it is not only an undoubted rule of reaſon in itſelf, but it was alſo the principal original of that atomical phyſiology, which, diſcarding forms and qualities, acknowledged really nothing elſe in body beſides mechaniſm.

Wherefore it was not in vain, or to no purpoſe, that *Laertius* in the life of *Democritus* [2] takes notice of this as one of his *Dogmata*, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν φθείρεσθαι, that *nothing was made or generated out of nothing, nor corrupted into nothing*; this being a fundamental principle, not only of his atheiſm, but alſo of that very atomical phyſiology it ſelf, which he purſued. And *Epicurus*, in his epiſtle to *Herodotus* [3], plainly fetches the beginning of all his philoſophy from hence: Πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μηδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, καὶ μηδὲν φθείρεται εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐγίνετο τὸ ἐκφαινόμενον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ' ἂν, σπερμάτων γε μηδὲν προσδεόμενον· καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπολώλει τὰ πράγματα μὴ ὄντων τῶν εἰς ἃ διελύετο· *We fetch the beginning of our philoſophy* (ſaith he) *from hence, that nothing is made out of nothing or deſtroy'd to nothing; for if things were made out of nothing, then every thing might be made out of every thing, neither would there be any need of ſeeds. And if whatſoever is corrupted were deſtroyed to nothing, then all things would at length be brought to nothing.* *Lucretius* in like manner beginning here, inſiſts more largely upon thoſe grounds of reaſon hinted by *Epicurus*. And firſt, that nothing can be made out of nothing he proves thus;

[4] *Nam ſi de nihilo fierent, ex omnibus rebus*
Omne genus naſci poſſet: nil ſemine egeret:
E mare primùm homines & terra poſſet oriri
Squamigerum genus, &c.
Nec fructus iidem arboribus conſtare ſolerent,
Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia poſſent.
Præterea cur vere roſam, frumenta calore,
Vites autumno fundi ſuadente videmus? &c.
Quòd ſi de nihilo fierent, ſubitò exorerentur
Incerto ſpatio atque alienis partibus anni.

In like manner he argues, to prove that nothing is corrupted into nothing:

[5] *Huc accedit utì quicque in ſua corpora rurſum*
Diſſolvat natura; neque ad nihilum interimat res:
Nam ſi quid mortale à cunctis partibus eſſet,
Ex oculis res quæque repentè erepta periret.

Præ-

[1] Lucret. Lib. I. ver. 151.
[2] Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 572.
[3] Apud Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 38, 39. p. 619.
[4] Lucret. Lib. I. ver. 160, &c.
[5] Id. Lib. I. ver. 216, &c.

Præterea quæcunque vetuſtate amovet ætas,
Si penitus perimit, conſumens materiam omnem,
Unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitæ
Redducit Venus? aut redductum Dædala tellus
Unde alit atque auget? generatim pabula præbens, &c.
[1] *Haud igitur penitus pereunt quæcunque videntur,*
Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura; nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur niſi morte adjutam alienâ.

In which paſſages, though it be plain, that *Lucretius* doth not immediately drive at atheiſm, and nothing elſe, but primarily at the eſtabliſhing of a peculiar kind of atomical phyſiology, upon which indeed theſe Democriticks afterward endeavoured to graft atheiſm; yet to take away that ſuſpicion, we ſhall in the next place ſhew, that generally the other ancient Phyſiologers alſo, who were Theiſts, did likewiſe build the ſtructure of their philoſophy upon the ſame foundation, that *nothing can come from nothing, nor go to nothing:* as for example, *Parmenides*, *Meliſſus*, *Zeno*, *Xenophanes*, *Anaxagoras* and *Empedocles*. Of *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus* *Ariſtotle* thus writes [2], οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίνεσθαί φασιν οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων· *They ſay that no real entity is either generated or corrupted*, that is, made anew out of nothing, or deſtroy'd to nothing. And *Simplicius* tells us [3], that *Parmenides* gave a notable reaſon for the confirmation of this aſſertion, that nothing in nature could be made out of nothing, αἰτίαν τῦ δεῖν πάντως ἐξ ὄντος, γίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον, θαυμασίως ὁ Παρμενίδης προσέθηκεν, ὅλως γάρ φησιν, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τίς ἡ ἀποκλήρωσις τῦ τότε γενέσθαι ὅτε ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον· *Becauſe if any thing be made out of nothing, then there could be no cauſe, why it ſhould then be made, and neither ſooner nor later.* Again *Ariſtotle* [4] teſtifies of *Xenophanes* and *Zeno*, that they made this a main principle of their philoſophy, μὴ ἐνδεχέσθαι γίνεσθαι μηδὲν ἐκ μηδενός, that *it cannot be, that any thing ſhould be made out of nothing:* And of this *Xenophanes*, *Sextus* the philoſopher tells us [5], that he held ὅτι εἷς καὶ ἀσώματός ἐστι θεός· *That there was but one God, and that he was incorporeal*, ſpeaking thus of him;

Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,
Οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος, οὔτε νόημα.

Ariſtotle [6] alſo writes in like manner concerning *Empedocles*, ἅπαντα ταῦτα κατασκευάζων ὁμολογεῖ ὅτι ἐκ τε μὴ ὄντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι, τό τε ὂν ἰξόλλυσθαι ἀνήνυστον

[1] Id. Lib. I. ver. 263, &c.
[2] De Cœlo Lib. III. cap. I. p. 668. Tom. I. Oper.
[3] Commentar. in Libros phyſicos Ariſtot. fol. 22. b. Edit Græc.
[4] Libro de Xenophane, Gorgiâ, & Zenone, cap. I. p. 834. Tom. II. Oper.
[5] Dr. *Cudworth* was led into a miſtake by *Henry Stephens*, who in his *Poeſis Philoſophica*, p. 36. where he ſtates this opinion of *Xenophanes* concerning the Deity, and produces the verſes, which contain it, tells us, that he had borrow'd them from *Sextus the Philoſopher*, by whom he undoubtedly means *Sextus Empiricus*. But tho' this latter writer in his Hypotypoſ. Pyrrhon. Lib. I. cap. XXXIII. p. 59. gives a large account of *Xenophanes*'s opinion concerning God; yet we do not find in any part of his writings what is quoted from him by *Stephens*, who ſhould have cited to that purpoſe Clemens Alexandrin. Stromat. Lib. V. c. XIV. p. 714.
[6] De Xenophane, &c. cap II. p. 836.

νυστον καὶ ἄῤῥηκτον. Empedocles *acknowledges the very ſame with other philoſophers, that it is impoſſible any thing ſhould be made out of nothing, or periſh into nothing.* And as for *Anaxagoras*, it is ſufficiently known to all, that his Homœomeria, or doctrine of ſimilar atoms, (which was a certain ſpurious kind of atomiſm) was nothing but a ſuperſtructure made upon this foundation. Beſides all which, *Ariſtotle* [2] pronounces univerſally concerning the ancient phyſiologers without any exception, that they agreed in this one thing, περὶ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης οἱ περὶ Φύσεως, ὅτι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον· *The phyſiologers generally agree in this* (laying it down for a grand foundation) *that it is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould be made out of nothing.* And again he calls this κοινὴν δόξαν τῶν Φυσικῶν, *the common opinion of naturaliſts*; intimating alſo, that they concluded it the greateſt abſurdity, that any phyſiologer could be guilty of, to lay down ſuch principles, as from whence it would follow, that any real entity in nature did come from nothing, and go to nothing.

Now it may well be ſuppoſed, that all theſe ancient phyſiologers (the moſt of which were alſo Theiſts) did not keep ſuch a ſtir about this buſineſs for nothing; and therefore we are in the next place to ſhow, what it was that they drove at in it. And we do affirm, that one thing, which they all aimed at, who inſiſted upon the forementioned principle, was the eſtabliſhing ſome atomical phyſiology or other, but moſt of them at ſuch as takes away all forms and qualities of bodies, (as entities really diſtinct from the matter and ſubſtance) and reſolves all into mechaniſm and fancy. For it is plain, that if the forms and qualities of bodies be entities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance, and its various modifications, of figure, ſite, and motion, that then in all the changes and tranſmutations of nature, all the generations and alterations of body, (thoſe forms and qualities being ſuppoſed to have no real exiſtence any where before) ſomething muſt of neceſſity be created or produced miraculouſly out of nothing; as likewiſe reduced into nothing in the corruptions of them, they having no being any where afterward. As for example; when ever a candle is but lighted or kindled into a flame, there muſt needs be a new form of fire, and new qualities of light and heat, really diſtinct from the matter and ſubſtance, produced out of nothing, that is, created; and the ſame again reduced into nothing, or annihilated, when the flame is extinguiſhed. Thus, when water is but congealed at any time into ſnow, hail, or ice, and when it is again diſſolved; when wax is by liquefaction made ſoft and tranſparent, and changed to moſt of our ſenſes; when the ſame kind of nouriſhment taken in by animals is turned into blood, milk, fleſh, bones, nerves, and all the other ſimilar parts; when that, which was in the form of bright flame, appears in the form of dark ſmoke; and that which was in the form of vapour, in the form of rain or water, or the like: I ſay, that in all theſe mutations of bodies, there muſt needs be ſomething made out of nothing. But that in all the Protean transformations of nature, which happen continually, there ſhould be real

[2] Phyſicor. Lib. I. cap. V. p. 451. Tom. I. Oper.

real entities thus perpetually produced out of nothing and reduced to nothing, ſeemed to be ſo great a paradox to the ancients, that they could by no means admit of it. Becauſe, as we have already declared, firſt they concluded it clearly impoſſible by reaſon, that any real entity ſhould of it ſelf riſe out of nothing; and ſecondly, they thought it very abſurd to bring God upon the ſtage, with his miraculous extraordinary power, perpetually at every turn; as alſo, that every thing might be made out of every thing, and there would be no cauſe in nature for the production of one thing rather than another, and at this time rather than that, if they were miraculouſly made out of nothing. Wherefore they ſagaciouſly apprehended, that there muſt needs be ſome other myſtery or intrigue of nature in this buſineſs, than was commonly dream'd of, or ſuſpected; which they concluded to be this, that in all theſe transformations there were no ſuch real entities of forms and qualities diſtinct from the matter, and the various diſpoſition of its parts, in reſpect of figure, ſite and motion (as is vulgarly ſuppoſed) produced and deſtroyed; but that all theſe feats were done, either by the concretion and ſecretion of actually inexiſtent parts, or elſe by the different modifications of the ſame pre-exiſtent matter, or the inſenſible parts thereof. This only being added hereunto, that from thoſe different modifications of the ſmall particles of bodies, (they being not ſo diſtinctly perceived by our ſenſes) there are begotten in us certain confuſed *phaſmata* or *phantaſmata*, apparitions, fancies and paſſions, as of light and colours, heat and cold, and the like, which are thoſe things, that are vulgarly miſtaken for real qualities exiſting in the bodies without us; whereas indeed there is nothing abſolutely in the bodies themſelves like to thoſe fantaſtick idea's that we have of them; and yet they are wiſely contriv'd by the author of nature for the adorning and embelliſhing of the corporeal world to us.

So that they conceived, bodies were to be conſidered two manner of ways, either as they are abſolutely in themſelves, or elſe as they are relatively to us: and as they are abſolutely in themſelves, that ſo there never was any entity really diſtinct from the ſubſtance produced in them out of nothing, nor corrupted or deſtroyed to nothing, but only the accidents and modifications altered. Which accidents and modifications are no entities really diſtinct from their ſubſtance; for as much as the ſame body may be put into ſeveral ſhapes and figures, and the ſame man may ſucceſſively ſtand, ſit, kneel and walk, without the production of any new entities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of his body. So that the generations, corruptions and alterations of inanimate bodies are not terminated in the production or deſtruction of any ſubſtantial forms, or real entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance, but only in different modifications of it. But ſecondly, as bodies are conſidered relatively to us, that ſo beſides their different modifications and mechanical alterations, there are alſo different fancies, ſeemings, and apparitions begotten in us from them; which unwary and unſkilful philoſophers miſtake for abſolute forms and qualities in bodies themſelves. And thus they concluded, that all the phænomena of inanimate bodies, and their various transformations, might be clearly reſolved into theſe two things; partly ſomething that is real and

abſolute in bodies themſelves, which is nothing but their different mechaniſm, or diſpoſition of parts in reſpect of figure, ſite and motion; and partly ſomething that is fantaſtical in the ſentient.

That the atomical phyſiology did emerge after this manner from that principle of reaſon, that nothing comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, might be further convinced from the teſtimony of *Ariſtotle*, [1] writing thus concerning it: Ἐκ τῦ γίνεθαι ἐξ ἀλλήλων τ'ανακλία ἐνυπῆρχεν ἄρα· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἀνάγκη γίνεθαι ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐξ μὴ ὄντος· τύτων δὲ τὸ μεν, ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεθαι ἀδύνατον, περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ Φύσεως· τὸ λειπον ἤδε συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐνόμισαν· ἐξ ὄντος μὲν καὶ ἐνυπαρχόντων γίνεθαι, διὰ δὲ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων ἐξ ἀναιθήτων ἡμῖν. *The ancient phyſiologers concluded, that becauſe contraries were made out of one another, that therefore they were before (one way or other) inexiſtent; arguing in this manner, that if whatſoever be made, muſt needs be made out of ſomething or out of nothing, and this latter* (that any thing ſhould be made out of nothing) *is impoſſible, according to the general conſent of all the ancient phyſiologers; then it follows of neceſſity, that all corporeal things are made or generated out of things that were really before and inexiſtent, though by reaſon of the ſmallneſs of their bulks they were inſenſible to us.* Where *Ariſtotle* plainly intimates, that all the ancient philoſophers, whoſoever inſiſted upon this principle, that, nothing comes from, nor goes to nothing, were one way or other atomical, and did reſolve all corporeal things into ὄγκους τινὰς διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα ἀναιθήτους ἡμῖν, *certain moleculæ or corpuſcula, which by reaſon of their ſmallneſs were inſenſible to us*, that is, into atoms. But yet there was a difference between theſe Atomiſts, foraſmuch as *Anaxagoras* was ſuch an Atomiſt, as did notwithſtanding hold forms and qualities really diſtinct from the mechanical modifications of bodies. For he not being able (as it ſeems) well to underſtand that other atomical phyſiology of the ancients, that, exploding qualities, ſolved all corporeal phænomena by mechaniſm and fancy; and yet acknowledging, that that principle of theirs, which they went upon, muſt needs be true, that nothing could of itſelf come from nothing nor go to nothing, fram'd a new kind of atomology of his own, in ſuppoſing the whole corporeal world or maſs of matter to conſiſt of ſimilar atoms, that is, ſuch as were originally endued with all thoſe different forms and qualities that are vulgarly conceived to be in bodies, ſome bony, ſome fleſhy, ſome firy, ſome watery, ſome white, ſome black, ſome bitter, ſome ſweet and the like, ſo that all bodies whatſoever had ſome of all ſorts of theſe atoms (which are in a manner infinite) ſpecifically differing from one another in them. [2] πᾶν ἐν παντὶ μεμίχθαι, διότι πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται, Φαίνεθαι δὲ διαΦέροντα, καὶ προσαγορεύεθαι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐκ τῦ μάλιστα ὑπερέχοντος διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐν τῇ μίξει τῶν ἀπείρων, &c. *That all things were in every thing mingled together, becauſe they ſaw, that every thing was made of every thing; but that things ſeemed to differ from one another, and were denominated to be this or that, from thoſe atoms, which are moſt predominant in the mixture, by reaſon of their multiplicity:* Whence he concluded, that all the generations,

[1] Phyſicor. Lib. I. cap. V. p. 451. [2] Ibid.

generations, corruptions and alterations of bodies were made by nothing but the concretions and ſecretions of inexiſtent and pre-exiſtent atoms of different forms and qualities, without the production of any new form and quality out of nothing, or the reduction of any into nothing. This very account *Ariſtotle* gives of the *Anaxagorean* hypotheſis: ἔοικε Ἀναξαγόρας οὕτως ἄπειρα οἰηθῆναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν, τὴν κοινὴν δόξην τῶν φυσικῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς οὐ γινομένου οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. Anaxagoras *ſeemeth therefore to make infinite atoms endued with ſeveral forms and qualities to be the elements of bodies, becauſe he ſuppoſed that common opinion of phyſiologers to be true, that nothing is made of nothing.* But all the other antient phyſiologers that were before *Anaxagoras*, and likewiſe thoſe after him, who inſiſting upon the ſame principle of nothing coming from nothing did not *Anaxagorize*, as *Empedocles*, *Democritus* and *Protagoras*, muſt needs make ὄγκους ἀνομοίους, diſſimilar moleculæ, and ἀτόμους ἀποίους, atoms unformed and unqualified, otherwiſe than by magnitude, figure and motion, to be the principles of bodies, and caſhiering forms and qualities (as real entities diſtinct from the matter) reſolve all corporeal phænomena into mechaniſm and fancy. Becauſe, if no real entity can come from nothing, nor go to nothing, then one of theſe two things is abſolutely neceſſary, that either theſe corporeal forms and qualities, being real entities diſtinct from the matter, ſhould exiſt before generations and after corruptions, in certain inſenſible atoms originally ſuch, according to the *Anaxagorean* doctrine; or elſe, that they ſhould not be real entities diſtinct from the matter, but only the different modifications and mechaniſms of it, together with different fancies. And thus we have made it evident, that the genuine atomical phyſiology did ſpring originally from this principle of reaſon, that no real entity does of itſelf come from nothing, nor go to nothing.

XXIX. Now we ſhall in the next place ſhow, how this very ſame principle of reaſon, which induced the ancients to reject ſubſtantial forms and qualities of bodies, and to phyſiologize atomically, led them alſo unavoidably to aſſert incorporeal ſubſtances; and that the ſouls of men and animals were ſuch, neither generated nor corrupted. They had argued againſt ſubſtantial forms and qualities, as we have ſhewed, in this manner, that ſince the forms and qualities of bodies are ſuppoſed by all to be generated and corrupted, made anew out of nothing and deſtroyed to nothing, that therefore they could not be real entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter, but only different modifications of it in reſpect of figure, ſite and motion, cauſing different ſenſations in us; and were all to be reſolved into mechaniſm and fancy. For as for that conceit of *Anaxagoras*, of præ and poſt-exiſtent atoms, endued with all thoſe ſeveral forms and qualities of bodies ingenerably and incorruptibly; it was nothing but an adulteration of the genuine atomical philoſophy, and a mere dream of his, in which very few follow'd him. And now they argue contrariwiſe for the ſouls of men and animals, in this manner; becauſe they are plainly real entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter and its modification, and men and brutes are not mere machines, neither can life and cogitation, ſenſe and conſciouſneſs, reaſon and underſtanding, appetite and will

ever reſult from magnitudes, figures, ſites and motions, that therefore they are not corporeally generated and corrupted, as the forms and qualities of bodies are. Ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαί τι ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋπαρχοντος. *It is impoſſible for a real entity to be made or generated from nothing pre-exiſting.* Now there is nothing of ſoul and mind, reaſon and underſtanding, nor indeed of cogitation and life, contained in the modifications and mechaniſm of bodies; and therefore to make ſoul and mind to riſe out of body whenſoever a man is generated, would be plainly to make a real entity to come out of nothing, which is impoſſible. I ſay, becauſe the forms and qualities of bodies are generated and corrupted, made and unmade, in the ordinary courſe of nature, therefore they concluded, that they were not real entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body and its various modifications: but becauſe ſoul and mind is plainly a real entity diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body, its modification and mechaniſm; that therefore it was not a thing generated and corrupted, made and unmade, but ſuch as had a being of its own, a ſubſtantial thing by it ſelf. Real entities and ſubſtances are not generated and corrupted, but only modifications.

Wherefore theſe ancients apprehended, that there was a great difference betwixt the ſouls of men and animals and the forms and qualities of other inanimate bodies, and conſequently betwixt their ſeveral productions: foraſmuch as in the generation of inanimate bodies there is no real entity acquired diſtinct from the ſubſtance of the thing it ſelf, but only a peculiar modification of it. The form of ſtone, or of timber, of blood, fleſh and bone, and ſuch other natural bodies generated, is no more a diſtinct ſubſtance or entity from the matter, than the form of an houſe, ſtool or table is: there is no more new entity acquired in the generation of natural bodies, than there is in the production of artificial ones. When water is turn'd into vapour, candle into flame, flame into ſmoak, graſs into milk, blood and bones, there is no more miraculous production of ſomething out of nothing, than when wool is made into cloth, or flax into linnen; when a rude and unpoliſh'd ſtone is hewen into a beautiful ſtatue; when brick, timber and mortar, that lay together before diſorderly, is brought into the form of a ſtately palace; there being nothing neither in one nor other of theſe, but only a different diſpoſition and modification of pre-exiſtent matter. Which matter of the univerſe is always ſubſtantially the ſame, and neither more nor leſs, but only Proteanly tranſformed into different ſhapes. Thus we ſee, that the generation of all inanimate bodies is nothing but the change of accidents and modifications, the ſubſtance being really the ſame both before and after. But in the generations of men and animals, beſides the new diſpoſition of the parts of matter and its organization, there is alſo the acquiſition and conjunction of another real entity or ſubſtance diſtinct from the matter, which could not be generated out of it, but muſt needs come into it ſome other way. Though there be no ſubſtantial difference between a ſtately houſe or palace ſtanding, and all the materials of the ſame ruinated and demoliſhed, but only a difference of accidents and modifications; yet between a living man and a dead carcaſe, there is beſides the accidental modification of the body, another ſubſtantial

ſtantial difference, there being a ſubſtantial ſoul and incorporeal inhabitant dwelling in the one and acting of it, which the other is now deſerted of. And it is very obſervable, that *Anaxagoras* [1] himſelf, who made bony and fleſhy atoms, hot and cold, red and green, and the like, which he ſuppoſed to exiſt before generations and after corruptions, always immutably the ſame, (that ſo nothing might come from nothing and go to nothing) yet he did not make any animaliſh atoms ſenſitive and rational. The reaſon whereof could not be, becauſe he did not think ſenſe and underſtanding to be as real entities as hot and cold, red and green; but becauſe they could not be ſuppoſed to be corporeal forms and qualities, but muſt needs belong to another ſubſtance that was incorporeal. And therefore *Anaxagoras* could not but acknowledge, that all ſouls and lives did præ and poſt-exiſt by themſelves, as well as thoſe corporeal forms and qualities, in his ſimilar atoms.

XXX. And now it is already manifeſt, that from the ſame principle of reaſon before-mentioned, that nothing of it ſelf can come from nothing nor go to nothing, the ancient philoſophers were induced likewiſe to aſſert the ſoul's immortality, together with its incorporeity or diſtinctneſs from the body. No ſubſtantial entity ever vaniſheth of itſelf into nothing; for if it did, then in length of time all might come to be nothing. But the ſoul is a ſubſtantial entity, really diſtinct from the body, and not the mere modification of it; and therefore when a man dies, his ſoul muſt ſtill remain and continue to have a being ſomewhere elſe in the univerſe. All the changes that are in nature, are either accidental transformations and different modifications of the ſame ſubſtance, or elſe they are conjunctions and ſeparations, or anagrammatical tranſpoſitions of things in the univerſe; the ſubſtance of the whole remaining always entirely the ſame. The generation and corruption of inanimate bodies is but like the making of a houſe, ſtool, or table, and the unmaking or marring of them again; either different modifications of one and the ſame ſubſtance, or elſe divers mixtures and ſeparations, concretions and ſecretions. And the generation and corruption of animals is likewiſe nothing but

——————— μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων,

The conjunction of ſouls together with ſuch particular bodies, and the ſeparation of them again from one another, and ſo as it were the anagrammatical tranſpoſition of them in the univerſe. That ſoul and life, that is now fled and gone from a lifeleſs carcaſe, is only a loſs to that particular body or compages of matter, which by means thereof is now diſanimated; but it is no loſs to the whole, it being but tranſpoſed in the univerſe, and lodged ſomewhere elſe.

XXXI. It is alſo further evident, that this ſame principle, which thus led the ancients to hold the ſoul's immortality, or its future permanency after death,

[1] Vide Ariſtot. de Animâ, Lib. I. cap. II. p. 5. Tom. II. & Metaphyſic. Lib. I. c. III. Tom. IV. p. 266.

death, must needs determine them likewise to maintain its προϋπαρξις, or pre-existence, and consequently its μετενσωμάτωσις, or transmigration. For that, which did pre-exist before the generation of any animal, and was then somewhere else, must needs transmigrate into the body of that animal where now it is. But as for that other transmigration of human souls into the bodies of brutes, though it cannot be denied but that many of these ancients admitted it also, yet *Timæus Locrus* [1], and divers others of the Pythagoreans, rejected it, any otherwise than as it might be taken for an allegorical description of that beastly transformation, that is made of mens souls by vice. *Aristotle* tells us again [2], agreeably to what was declared before, ὅτι μάλιστα φοβούμενοι διετέλεσαν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ἐκ μηδενὸς γίνεσθαί τι προϋπάρχοντος· *that the ancient philosophers were afraid of nothing more, than this one thing, that any thing should be made out of nothing pre-existent:* and therefore they must needs conclude, that the souls of all animals pre-existed before their generations. And indeed it is a thing very well known, that, according to the sense of philosophers, these two things were always included together in that one opinion of the soul's immortality, namely its pre-existence as well as its post-existence. Neither was there ever any of the ancients before Christianity, that held the soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence; they clearly perceiving, that if it were once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted. And therefore the assertors of the soul's immortality commonly begun here; first, to prove its pre-existence, proceeding thence afterward to establish its permanency after death. This is the method used in *Plato* [3], ἦν πᾰ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῶδε τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι, ὥστε κἀταύτη ἀθάνατόν τι ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι· *Our soul was somewhere, before it came to exist in this present human form, and from thence it appears to be immortal, and such as will subsist after death.* And the chief demonstration of the soul's pre-existence to the ancients before *Plato* was this, because it is an entity really distinct from body or matter and the modifications of it; and no real substantial entity can either spring of itself out of nothing, or be made out of any other substance distinct from it, because nothing can be made ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπάρχοντος, *from nothing either in-existing or pre-existing*; all natural generations being but the various dispositions and modifications of what was before existent in the universe. But there was nothing of soul and mind in-existing and pre-existing in body before, there being nothing of life and cogitation in magnitude, figure, site, and motion. Wherefore this must needs be, not a thing made or generated, as corporeal forms and qualities are, but such as hath a being in nature ingenerably and incorruptibly. The mechanism of human body was a thing made and generated, it being only a different modification of what was before existent, and having no new entity in it distinct from the substance: and the *totum* or *compositum* of a man or animal may be said to be generated and corrupted, in regard of the union and disunion, conjunction and separation of those two parts, the soul and body. But the soul it self, according to these principles,

[1] De Animâ Mundi & Naturâ, inter Scriptores Mythologicos à Tho. Gale editos, p. 566.

[2] De Generatione & Corruption., Lib. I. cap. III. p. 704. Tom. I. Oper.

[3] In Phædone, p. 382.

principles, is neither a thing generable nor corruptible, but was as well before the generation, and will be after the deaths and corruptions of men, as the ſubſtance of their body, which is ſuppoſed by all to have been from the firſt creation, and no part of it to be annihilated or loſt after death, but only ſcattered and diſperſed in the univerſe. Thus the ancient Atomiſts concluded, that ſouls and lives being ſubſtantial entities by themſelves, were all of them as old as any other ſubſtance in the univerſe, and as the whole maſs of matter, and every ſmalleſt atom of it is: that is, they who maintained the eternity of the world, did conſequently aſſert alſo *æternitatem animorum* (as *Cicero* calls it) the eternity of ſouls and minds. But they, who conceived the world to have had a temporary beginning or creation, held the coevity of all ſouls with it, and would by no means be induced to think, that every atom of ſenſeleſs matter and particle of duſt had ſuch a privilege and pre-eminency over the ſouls of men and animals, as to be the ſenior to them. *Syneſius*, though a Chriſtian, yet having been educated in this philoſophy, could not be induced by the hopes of a biſhoprick to ſtifle or diſſemble this ſentiment of his mind [1], ἀμέλει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν· *I ſhall never be perſuaded to think my ſoul to be younger than my body.* But ſuch, it ſeems, was the temper of thoſe times, that he was not only diſpenſed withal as to this, but alſo as to another heterodoxy of his concerning the reſurrection.

XXXII. It is already plain alſo, that this doctrine of the ancient Atomiſts concerning the immateriality and immortality, the præ and poſt-exiſtence of ſouls, was not confined by them to human ſouls only, but extended univerſally to all ſouls and lives whatſoever; it being a thing, that was hardly ever called into doubt or queſtion by any before *Carteſius*, whether the ſouls of brutes had any ſenſe, cogitation or conſciouſneſs in them or no. Now all life, ſenſe and cogitation was undoubtedly concluded by them to be an entity really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body, and not the mere modification, motion or mechaniſm of it; life and mechaniſm being two diſtinct ideas of the mind, which cannot be confounded together. Wherefore they reſolved, that all lives and ſouls whatſoever, which now are in the world, ever were from the firſt beginning of it, and ever will be; that there will be no new ones produced, which are not already, and have not always been, nor any of thoſe, which now are, deſtroyed, any more than the ſubſtance of any matter will be created or annihilated. So that the whole ſyſtem of the created univerſe, conſiſting of body, and particular incorporeal ſubſtances or ſouls, in the ſucceſſive generations and corruptions or deaths of men and other animals, was, according to them, really nothing elſe, but one and the ſame thing perpetually anagrammatized, or but like many different ſyllables and words variouſly and ſucceſſively compoſed out of the ſame pre-exiſtent elements or letters.

XXXIII. We have now declared, how the ſame principle of reaſon, which made the ancient phyſiologers to become Atomiſts, muſt needs induce them alſo

[1] Epiſtol. CV. p. 249. Oper.

alſo to be Incorporealiſts; how the ſame thing, which perſuaded them, that corporeal forms were no real entities diſtinct from the ſubſtance of the body, but only the different modifications and mechaniſms of it, convinced them likewiſe, that all cogitative beings, all ſouls and lives whatſoever, were ingenerable and incorruptible, and as well pre-exiſtent before the generations of particular animals, as poſt-exiſtent after their deaths and corruptions. Nothing now remains but only to ſhow more particularly, that it was *de facto* thus; that the ſame perſons did from this principle (that nothing can come from nothing and go to nothing) both atomize in their phyſiology, taking away all ſubſtantial forms and qualities, and alſo theologize or incorporealize, aſſerting ſouls to be a ſubſtance really diſtinct from matter and immortal, as alſo to pre-exiſt. And this we ſhall do from *Empedocles*, and firſt from that paſſage of his cited before in part:

[1] Ἄλλο δέ σοι ἐρέω, φύσις ὠδενός ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ
Θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις ὀλομένη θανάτοιο γενέθλη, (*al. lect.* τελεύτη)
Ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων
Ἔστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισι.

Which I find Latin'd thus;

Aſt aliud dico; nihil eſt mortalibus ortus,
Eſt nihil interitus, qui rebus morte paratur;
Miſtio ſed ſolum eſt, & conciliatio rerum
Miſtilium; hæc dici ſolita eſt mortalibus ortus.

The full ſenſe whereof is plainly this, that there *is no* φύσις *or production of any thing, which was not before; no new ſubſtance made, which did not really pre-exiſt: and therefore that in the generations and corruptions of inanimate bodies, there is no form or quality really diſtinct from the ſubſtance produced and deſtroyed, but only a various compoſition and modification of matter. But in the generations and corruptions of men and animals, where the ſouls are ſubſtances really diſtinct from the matter, that there, there is nothing but the conjunction and ſeparation of ſouls and particular bodies, exiſting both before and after, not the production of any new ſoul into being, which was not before, nor the abſolute death and deſtruction of any into nothing.* Which is further expreſſed in theſe following verſes:

[2] Νήπιοι, οὐ γὰρ σφιν δολιχόφρονες εἰσὶ μέριμναι,
Οἳ δὴ γίνεσθαι πάρος ὃν οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν,
Ἢτοι καὶ ἀθνήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἅπαντα.

To

[1] Apud Plutarch. adverſ. Colotem, P. IV. Tom. II. Oper. & ex parte apud Ariſtot. de Generatione & Corruptione, Lib. I. c. I. p. 698. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. Tom. II. Oper.

To this ſenſe; *that they are infants in underſtanding, and ſhort-ſighted, who think any thing to be made, which was nothing before, or any thing to die, ſo as to be deſtroyed to nothing.* Upon which *Plutarch* gloſſes after this manner: οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οὐδὲ φθοράν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πάντη, τουτέστι τὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀπολύουσαν· Empedocles *does not here deſtroy generation, but only ſuch as is out of nothing; nor corruption, but ſuch as is into nothing.* Which, as we have already intimated, is to be underſtood differently in reſpect to inanimate and animate things; for in things inanimate there is nothing produced or deſtroyed, becauſe the forms and qualities of them are no entities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance, but only diverſe mixtures and modifications. But in animate things, where the ſouls are real entities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of the body, there is nothing produced nor deſtroyed neither, becauſe thoſe ſouls do both exiſt before their generations, and after their corruptions; which buſineſs, as to men and ſouls, is again more fully expreſſed thus;

[1] Οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαυλεύσαιτο,
Ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,
Τόφρα μὲν ἔν εἰσι, καὶ σφιν πάρα δειναὶ καὶ ἐσθλαὶ,
Πρὶν δὲ παγέντε βροτοὶ καὶ λυθέντες ὀδὲν ἄρ εἰσί.

That good and ill did firſt us here attend,
And not from time before, the ſoul deſcend;
That here alone we live, and when
Hence we depart, we forthwith then
Turn to our old non-entity again;
Certes ought not to be believ'd by wiſe and learned men.

Wherefore, according to *Empedocles*, this is to be accounted one of the vulgar errors, that men then only have a being and are capable of good and evil, when they live here that which is called life; but that both before they are born, and after they are dead, they are perfectly nothing.

And beſides *Empedocles*, the ſame is repreſented by the Greek tragedian alſo[2], as the ſenſe of the ancient philoſophers;

Θνήσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων,
Διακρινόμενον δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
Μόρφην ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξεν.

That *nothing dies or utterly periſheth; but things being variouſly concreted and ſecreted, tranſpoſed and modified, change their form and ſhape only, and are put into a new dreſs.*

[1] Apud Plutarch. adv. Colotem, p. 1113. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Euripid. in Chryſippo apud Clement. Alexandr. Stromat. Lib. VI. p. 750.

Agreeably whereunto, *Plato* alſo tells us [1], that it was παλαιὸς λόγος, an ancient tradition or doctrine before his time, τὰς ζῶνλας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώντων γεγονέναι, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τὰς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων· *that as well the living were made out of the dead, as the dead out of the living*; and that this was the conſtant circle of nature. Moreover, the ſame philoſopher acquaints us, that ſome of thoſe ancients were not without ſuſpicion, that what is now called death, was to men more properly a nativity or birth into life, and what is called generation into life, was comparatively rather to be accounted a ſinking into death; the former being the ſoul's aſcent out of theſe groſs terreſtrial bodies to a body more thin and ſubtil, and the latter its deſcent from a purer body to that which is more craſs and terreſtrial. [2] τίς οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι καθθανεῖν, τὸ καθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν· *who knows whether that which is called living be not indeed rather dying; and that which is called dying, living?*

Moreover, that this was the doctrine of *Pythagoras* himſelf, that no real entity periſhes in corruptions, nor is produced in generations, but only new modifications and tranſpoſitions made; is fully expreſſed by the Latin poet [3], both as to inanimate, and to animate things. Of the firſt thus;

Nec perit in tanto quicquam (mihi credite) mundo,
Sed variat, faciemque novat: naſcique vocatur
Incipere eſſe aliud, quàm quod fuit antè; morique
Deſinere illud idem. Cum ſint huc forſitan illa,
Hæc tranſlata illuc: ſummâ tamen omnia conſtant.

Of the ſecond, that the ſouls of animals are immortal, did pre-exiſt and do tranſmigrate, from the ſame ground, after this manner;

Omnia mutantur; nihil interit: errat & illinc,
Huc venit, hinc illuc, & quoſlibet occupat artus
Spiritus, éque feris humana in corpora tranſit,
Inque feras noſter, nec tempore deperit ullo.
Utque novis facilis ſignatur cera figuris,
Nec manet ut fuerat, nec formas ſervat eaſdem,
Sed tamen ipſa eadem eſt; animam ſic ſemper eandem
Eſſe, ſed in varias doceo migrare figuras.

Wherefore though it be a thing, which hath not been commonly taken notice of, of late, yet we conceive it to be unqueſtionably true, that all thoſe ancient

[1] In Phædone, p. 381.

[2] This paſſage of *Euripides* is cited by many of the ancients, as *Plato*, *Cicero*, *Clemens Alex.* and *Sextus Empiricus*. See the Notes of Dr. *Potter*, now Archbp. of *Canterbury*, on Clem. Alexand. Stromat. Lib. III. cap. III. p. 517. & Jo. Albert Fabricius on Sextus Empiric. Hypotyp. Pyrrhon. Lib. III. cap. XXIV. p. 185.

[3] Ovid. Metam. Lib. XV. verſ. 254. & verſ. 165.

ancient philoſophers, who inſiſted ſo much upon this principle, οὐδὲν ἀδὲ γίνεσθαι ἀδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων· *that no real entity is either generated or corrupted*, did therein at once drive at theſe two things: firſt, the eſtabliſhing of the immortality of all ſouls, their præ and poſt-exiſtence, foraſmuch as being entities really diſtinct from the body they could neither be generated nor corrupted; and ſecondly, the making of corporeal forms and qualities to be no real entities diſtinct from the body and the mechaniſm thereof, becauſe they are things generated and corrupted, and have no præ and poſt-exiſtence. *Anaxagoras*, in this latter, being the only diſſenter; who ſuppoſing thoſe forms and qualities to be real entities likewiſe, diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body, therefore attributed perpetuity of being to them alſo, præ and poſt-exiſtence, in ſimilar atoms, as well as to the ſouls of animals.

And now we have made it ſufficiently evident, that the doctrine of the incorporeity and immortality of ſouls, we might add alſo, of their pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration, had the ſame original and ſtood upon the ſame baſis with the atomical phyſiology; and therefore it ought not at all to be wondered at (what we affirmed before) that the ſame philoſophers and Pythagoreans aſſerted both thoſe doctrines, and that the ancient Atomiſts were both Theiſts and Incorporealiſts.

XXXIV. But now to declare our ſenſe freely concerning this philoſophy of the ancients, which ſeems to be ſo prodigiouſly paradoxical, in reſpect of that pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration of ſouls; we conceive indeed, that this ratiocination of theirs from that principle, that nothing naturally, or of it ſelf, comes from nothing, nor goes to nothing, was not only firmly concluſive againſt ſubſtantial forms and qualities of bodies, really diſtinct from their ſubſtance, but alſo for ſubſtantial incorporeal ſouls, and their ingenerability out of matter, and particularly for the future immortality or poſt-exiſtence of all human ſouls. For ſince it is plain, that they are not a mere modification of body or matter, but an entity and ſubſtance really diſtinct from it, we have no more reaſon to think, that they can ever of themſelves vaniſh into nothing, than that the ſubſtance of the corporeal world, or any part thereof, can do ſo. For that in the conſumption of bodies by fire, or age, or the like, there is the deſtruction of any real ſubſtance into nothing, is now generally exploded as an idiotical conceit; and certainly it cannot be a jot leſs idiotical to ſuppoſe, that the rational ſoul in death is utterly extinguiſhed.

Moreover, we add alſo, that this ratiocination of the ancients would be altogether as firm and irrefragable likewiſe for the pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration of ſouls, as it is for their poſt-exiſtence and future immortality; did we not (as indeed we do) ſuppoſe ſouls to be created by God immediately, and infuſed in generations. For they being unqueſtionably a diſtinct ſubſtance from the body, and no ſubſtance, according to the ordinary courſe of nature, coming out of nothing, they muſt of neceſſity either

pre-exiſt in the univerſe before generations, and tranſmigrate into their reſpective bodies; or elſe come from God immediately, who is the fountain of all, and who at firſt created all that ſubſtance that now is in the world beſides himſelf. Now the latter of theſe was a thing, which thoſe ancient philoſophers would by no means admit of; they judging it altogether incongruous to bring God upon the ſtage perpetually, and make him immediately interpoſe every where, in the generations of men and all other animals, by the miraculous production of ſouls out of nothing. Notwithſtanding which, if we well conſider it, we ſhall find, that there may be very good reaſon on the other ſide for the ſucceſſive divine creation of ſouls; namely, that God did not do all at firſt, that ever he could or would do, and put forth all his creative vigour at once, in a moment, ever afterwards remaining a ſpectator only of the conſequent reſults, and permitting nature to do all alone, without the leaſt interpoſition of his at any time, juſt as if there were no God at all in the world. For this may be, and indeed often hath been, the effect of ſuch an hypotheſis as this, to make men think, that there is no other God in the world but blind and dark nature. God might alſo, for other good and wiſe ends unknown to us, reſerve to himſelf the continual exerciſe of this his creative power, in the ſucceſſive production of new ſouls. And yet theſe ſouls nevertheleſs, after they are once brought forth into being, will, notwithſtanding their juniority, continue as firmly in the ſame, without vaniſhing of themſelves into nothing, as the ſubſtance of ſenſeleſs matter, that was created many thouſand years before, will do.

And thus our vulgar hypotheſis of the new creation of ſouls, as it is rational in itſelf, ſo it doth ſufficiently ſolve their incorporeity, their future immortality, or poſt-eternity, without introducing thoſe offenſive abſurdities of their pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration.

XXXV. But if there be any ſuch, who, rather than they would allow a future immortality or poſt-exiſtence to all ſouls, and therefore to thoſe of brutes, which conſequently muſt have their ſucceſſive tranſmigrations, would conclude the ſouls of all brutes, as likewiſe the ſenſitive ſoul in man, to be corporeal, and only allow the rational ſoul to be diſtinct from matter; to theſe we have only thus much to ſay, that they, who will attribute life, ſenſe, cogitation, conſciouſneſs and ſelf-enjoyment, not without ſome footſteps of reaſon many times, to blood and brains, or mere organized bodies in brutes, will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human ſouls, as moſt probably they do not intend any ſuch thing. For either all conſcious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or elſe nothing can be proved to be incorporeal. From whence it would follow alſo, that there is no Deity diſtinct from the corporeal world. But though there ſeem to be no very great reaſon, why it ſhould be thought abſurd, to grant perpetuity of duration to the ſouls of brutes, any more than to every atom of matter, or particle of duſt that is in the whole world; yet we ſhall endeavour to ſuggeſt ſomething towards the eaſing the minds of thoſe, who are ſo much burthened with this difficulty; *viz.* that they may, if they pleaſe, ſuppoſe the ſouls of brutes,

brutes, being but ſo many particular eradiations or effluxes from that ſource of life above, whenſoever and whereſoever there is any fitly prepared matter capable to receive them, and to be actuated by them, to have a ſenſe and fruition of themſelves in it, ſo long as it continues ſuch; but as ſoon as ever thoſe organized bodies of theirs, by reaſon of their indiſpoſition, become uncapable of being further acted upon by them, then to be reſumed again and retracted back to their original head and fountain. Since it cannot be doubted, but what creates any thing out of nothing, or ſends it forth from it ſelf by free and voluntary emanation, may be able either to retract the ſame back again to its original ſource, or elſe to annihilate it at pleaſure.

And I find, that there have not wanted ſome among the gentile philoſophers themſelves, who have entertained this opinion, whereof *Porphyry* is one: λύεται ἑκάστη δύναμις ἄλογος εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τοῦ παντός, *every irrational power is reſolved into the life of the whole.*

XXXVI. Neither will this at all weaken the future immortality or poſt-eternity of human ſouls. For if we be indeed Theiſts, and do in very good earneſt believe a Deity, according to the true notion of it, we muſt then needs acknowledge, that all created being whatſoever owes the continuation and perpetuity of its exiſtence, not to any neceſſity of nature without God, and independently upon him, but to the divine will only. And therefore, though we had never ſo much rational and philoſophical aſſurance, that our ſouls are immaterial ſubſtances, diſtinct from the body, yet we could not, for all that, have any abſolute certainty of their poſt-eternity, any otherwiſe than as it may be derived to us from the immutability and perfection of the divine nature and will, which does always that which is beſt. For the eſſential goodneſs and wiſdom of the Deity is the only ſtability of all things. And for aught we mortals know, there may be good reaſon, why that grace or favour of future immortality and poſt-eternity, that is indulged to human ſouls, endued with reaſon, morality, and liberty of will, (by means whereof they are capable of commendation and blame, reward and puniſhment) that ſo they may be objects for divine juſtice to diſplay it ſelf upon after this life, in different retributions may notwithſtanding be denied to thoſe lower lives and more contemptible ſouls of brutes, alike devoid both of morality and liberty.

XXXVII. But if any, for all this, will ſtill obſtinately contend for that ancient Pythagorick and Empedoclean hypotheſis, that all lives and ſouls whatſoever are as old as the firſt creation, and will continue to eternity, or as long as the world doth, as a thing more reaſonable and probable than our continual creation of new ſouls, by means whereof they become juniors both to the matter of the world and of their own bodies, and whereby alſo (as they pretend) the divine creative power is made too cheap and proſtituted a thing, as being famulative always to brutiſh, and many times to

to unlawful luſts and undue conjunctions; but eſpecially than the continual decreation and annihilation of the ſouls of brutes; we ſhall not be very unwilling to acknowledge thus much to them, that indeed of the two this opinion is more reaſonable and tolerable than that other extravagancy of thoſe, who will either make all ſouls to be generated, and conſequently to be corporeal, or at leaſt the ſenſitive ſoul, both in men and brutes. For beſides the monſtroſity of this latter opinion, in making two diſtinct ſouls and perceptive ſubſtances in every man, which is a thing ſufficiently confuted by internal ſenſe, it leaves us alſo in an abſolute impoſſibility of proving the immortality of the rational ſoul, the incorporeity of any ſubſtance, and by conſequence, the exiſtence of any Deity diſtinct from the corporeal world.

And as for that pretence of theirs, that ſenſeleſs matter may as well become ſenſitive, and, as it were, kindled into life and cogitation, as a body, that was devoid of light and heat, may be kindled into fire and flame; this ſeems to argue too much ignorance of the doctrine of bodies in men otherwiſe learned and ingenious; the beſt naturaliſts having already concluded, that fire and flame is nothing but ſuch a motion of the inſenſible parts of a body, as whereby they are violently agitated, and many times diſſipated and ſcattered from each other, begetting in the mean time thoſe fancies of light and heat in animals. Now there is no difficulty at all in conceiving, that the inſenſible particles of a body, which were before quieſcent, may be put into motion; this being nothing but a new modification of them, and no entity really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body, as life, ſenſe and cogitation are. There is nothing in fire and flame, or a kindled body, different from other bodies, but only the motion or mechaniſm, and fancy of it. And therefore it is but a crude conceit, which the Atheiſts and Corporealiſts of former times have been always ſo fond of, that ſouls are nothing but firy or flammeous bodies. For though heat in the bodies of animals be a neceſſary inſtrument for ſoul and life to act by in them, yet it is a thing really diſtinct from life; and a red-hot iron hath not therefore any nearer approximation to life than it had before, nor the flame of a candle than the extinguiſh'd ſnuff or tallow of it; the difference between them being only in the agitation of the inſenſible parts. We might alſo add, that, according to this hypotheſis, the ſouls of animals could not be numerically the ſame throughout the whole ſpace of their lives; ſince that fire, that needs a pabulum to prey upon, doth not continue always one and the ſame numerical ſubſtance. The ſoul of a new-born animal could be no more the ſame with the ſoul of that animal ſeveral years after, than the flame of a new lighted candle is the ſame with that flame that twinkles laſt in the ſocket; which indeed are no more the ſame, than a river or ſtream is the ſame at ſeveral diſtances of time. Which reaſon may be alſo extended further to prove the ſoul to be no body at all, ſince the bodies of all animals are in a perpetual flux.

XXXVIII.

XXXVIII. We have now ſufficiently performed our firſt taſk, which was to ſhow from the origin of the atomical phyſiology, that the doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtance muſt needs ſpring up together with it. We ſhall, in the next place, make it manifeſt, that the inward conſtitution of this philoſophy is alſo ſuch, that whoſoever really entertains it, and rightly underſtands it, muſt of neceſſity admit incorporeal ſubſtance likewiſe. Firſt therefore, the atomical hypotheſis, allowing nothing to body, but what is either included in the idea of a thing impenetrably extended, or can clearly be conceived to be a mode of it, as more or leſs magnitude, with diviſibility, figure, ſite, motion and reſt, together with the reſults of their ſeveral combinations, cannot poſſibly make life and cogitation to be qualities of body; ſince they are neither contained in thoſe things before mentioned, nor can reſult from any συζυγίαι, or conjugations of them. Wherefore it muſt needs be granted, that life and cogitation are the attributes of another ſubſtance diſtinct from body, or incorporeal.

Again, ſince according to the tenour of this phyſiology, body hath no other action belonging to it but that of local motion, which local motion, as ſuch, is eſſentially heterokineſy, that which never ſprings originally from the thing it ſelf moving, but always from the action of ſome other agent upon it; that is, ſince no body could ever move it ſelf, it follows undeniably, that there muſt be ſomething elſe in the world beſides body, or elſe there could never have been any motion in it. Of which we ſhall ſpeak more afterwards.

Moreover, according to this philoſophy, the corporeal phænomena themſelves cannot be ſolved by mechaniſm alone without fancy. Now fancy is no mode of body, and therefore muſt needs be a mode of ſome other kind of being in ourſelves, that is cogitative and incorporeal.

Furthermore, it is evident from the principles of this philoſophy, that ſenſe it ſelf is not a mere corporeal paſſion from bodies without, in that it ſuppoſeth, that there is nothing really in bodies like to thoſe fantaſtick ideas that we have of ſenſible things, as of hot and cold, red and green, bitter and ſweet, and the like, which therefore muſt needs owe their being to ſome activity of the ſoul it ſelf; and this is all one as to make it incorporeal.

Laſtly, from this philoſophy, it is alſo manifeſt, that ſenſe is not the κριτήριον of truth concerning bodies themſelves, it confidently pronouncing, that thoſe ſuppoſed qualities of bodies, repreſented ſuch by ſenſe, are merely fantaſtical things; from whence it plainly follows, that there is ſomething in us ſuperior to ſenſe, which judges of it, detects its fantaſtry, and condemns its impoſture, and determines what really is and is not, in bodies without us, which muſt needs be a higher ſelf-active vigour of the mind, that will plainly ſpeak it to be incorporeal.

XXXIX. And now this atomical phyſiology of the ancients ſeems to have two advantages or pre-eminences belonging to it, the firſt whereof is this, that it renders the corporeal world intelligible to us; ſince mechaniſm is a thing that we can clearly underſtand, and we cannot clearly and diſtinctly conceive any thing in bodies elſe. To ſay that this or that is done by a form or quality, is nothing elſe but to ſay, that it is done we know not how; or, which is yet more abſurd, to make our very ignorance of the cauſe, diſguiſed under thoſe terms of forms and qualities, to be it ſelf the cauſe of the effect.

Moreover, hot and cold, red and green, bitter and ſweet, *&c.* formally conſidered, may be clearly conceived by us as different fancies and vital paſſions in us, occaſioned by different motions made from the objects without upon our nerves; but they can never be clearly underſtood as abſolute qualities in the bodies themſelves, really diſtinct from their mechanical diſpoſitions; nor is there indeed any more reaſon, why they ſhould be thought ſuch, than that, when a man is pricked with a pin, or wounded with a ſword, the pain which he feels ſhould be thought to be an abſolute quality in the pin or ſword. So long as our ſenſible ideas are taken either for ſubſtantial forms or qualities in bodies without us, really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of the matter, ſo long are they perfectly unintelligible by us. For which cauſe *Timæus Locrus* [1] philoſophizing (as it ſeemeth) after this manner, did conſentaneouſly thereunto determine, that corporeal things could not be apprehended by us, otherwiſe than αἰσθήσει κ᾽ νόθῳ λογισμῷ, *by ſenſe and a kind of ſpurious or baſtardly reaſon*; that is, that we could have no clear conceptions of them in our underſtanding. And for the ſame reaſon *Plato* [2] himſelf diſtinguiſheth betwixt ſuch things as are νοήσει μετὰ λόγυ περιληπλά· *comprehenſible by the underſtanding with reaſon*, and thoſe which are only δόξῃ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγυ, *which can only be apprehended by opinion, together with a certain irrational ſenſe*; meaning plainly, by the latter, corporeal and ſenſible things. And accordingly the Platoniſts frequently take occaſion from hence, to enlarge themſelves much in the diſparagement of corporeal things, as being, by reaſon of that ſmallneſs of entity that is in them, below the underſtanding, and not having ſo much οὐσίαν as γένεσιν [3], *eſſence* as *generation*, which indeed is fine fancy. Wherefore we muſt either, with theſe philoſophers, make ſenſible things to be ἀκαλάληπλα or ἀπερίληπλα, altogether *incomprehenſible* and *inconceivable* by our human underſtandings, (though they be able in the mean time clearly to conceive many things of a higher nature;) or elſe we muſt entertain ſome kind of favourable opinion concerning that which is the ancienteſt of all phyſiologies, the atomical or mechanical, which alone renders ſenſible things intelligible.

XL. The ſecond advantage, which this atomical phyſiology ſeems to have, is this, that it prepares an eaſy and clear way for the demonſtration of

[1] De Animâ Mundi, inter Scriptor. Mythologos à Tho. Gale editos, p. 545.

[2] Vide Theætetum, p. 139. f. Oper. Sophiſtam. p. 166, 167, & de Repub. Lib. VII. p. 484.

[3] Plato de Republicâ, ubi ſuprà.

of incorporeal ſubſtances, by ſettling a diſtinct notion of body. He, that will undertake to prove, that there is ſomething elſe in the world beſides body, muſt firſt determine what body is, for otherwiſe he will go about to prove, that there is ſomething beſides he knows not what. But now if all body be made to conſiſt of two ſubſtantial principles, whereof one is matter devoid of all form, (and therefore of quantity as well as qualities) from whence theſe philoſophers * themſelves conclude, that it is incorporeal; the other, form, which being devoid of all matter, muſt needs be incorporeal likewiſe. (And thus *Stobæus* [1] ſets down the joint doctrine both of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*; ὃν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἀφαιρεθὲν ἀσώματον, ὕτως καὶ τὴν ὕλην τοῦ εἴδους χωρισθέντος ἡ σῶμα εἶναι, δεῖν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τῆς συνόδου, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑπόστασιν· *That in the ſame manner, as form alone ſeparated from matter is incorporeal, ſo neither is matter alone, the form being ſeparated from it, body. But there is need of the joint concurrence of both theſe, matter and form together, to make up the ſubſtance of the body.*) Moreover, if to forms qualities be likewiſe ſuperadded, of which it is conſentaneouſly alſo reſolved by the Platoniſts, ὅτι αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματοι, *that qualities are incorporeal*, as if they were ſo many ſpirits poſſeſſing bodies; I ſay, in this way of philoſophizing, the notions of body and ſpirit, corporeal and incorporeal, are ſo confounded, that it is impoſſible to prove any thing at all concerning them; body itſelf being made incorporeal (and therefore every thing incorporeal;) for whatſoever is wholly compounded and made up of incorporeals, muſt needs be itſelf alſo incorporeal.

* ἀσώματον ὃ καὶ ἡ ὕλη. *Matter is incorporeal.* Plotin. p. 164.

Alcinous cap. 11. [Introd. in Philoſ. Platon. p. 479.]

Furthermore, according to this doctrine of matter, forms and qualities in body, life and underſtanding may be ſuppoſed to be certain forms or qualities of body. And then the ſouls of men may be nothing elſe but blood or brains, endued with the qualities of ſenſe and underſtanding; or elſe ſome other more ſubtle, ſenſitive and rational matter, in us. And the like may be ſaid of God himſelf alſo; that he is nothing but a certain rational, or intellectual, ſubtle and firy body, pervading the whole univerſe; or elſe that he is the form of the whole corporeal world, together with the matter making up but one ſubſtance. Which conceits have been formerly entertained by the beſt of thoſe ancients, who were captivated under that dark infirmity of mind, to think, that there could be no other ſubſtance beſides body.

But the ancient atomical philoſophy, ſettling a diſtinct notion of body, that it is διαστατὸν ἀντίτυπον, *a thing impenetrably extended*, which hath nothing belonging to it, but magnitude, figure, ſite, reſt, and motion, without any ſelf-moving power, takes away all confuſion; ſhews clearly how far body can go, where incorporeal ſubſtance begins; as alſo that there muſt of neceſſity be ſuch a thing in the world.

Again, this diſcovering not only that the doctrine of qualities had its original from mens miſtaking their own fancies for abſolute realities in bodies

[1] Eclog. Phyſ. Lib. I. cap. XIV. p. 29.

themſelves; but alſo that the doctrine of matter and form ſprung from another fallacy or deception of the mind, in taking logical notions, and our modes of conceiving, for modes of being, and real entities in things without us; it ſhewing likewiſe, that becauſe there is nothing elſe clearly intelligible in body, beſides magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion, and their various conjunctions, there can be no ſuch entities of forms and qualities really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of body; makes it evident, that life, cogitation and underſtanding can be no corporeal things, but muſt needs be the attributes of another kind of ſubſtance diſtinct from body.

XLI. We have now clearly proved theſe two things; firſt, that the phyſiology of the ancients, before, not only *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, but alſo *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, was atomical or mechanical. Secondly, that as there is no inconſiſtency between the atomical phyſiology and theology, but indeed a natural cognation; ſo the ancient Atomiſts before *Democritus* were neither Atheiſts nor Corporealiſts, but held the incorporeity and immortality of ſouls, together with a Deity diſtinct from the corporeal world. Wherefore the firſt and moſt ancient Atomiſts did not make ἀτόμους ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων, they never endeavoured to make up an entire philoſophy out of atomology; but the doctrine of atoms was to them only one part or member of the whole philoſophick ſyſtem, they joining thereunto the doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtance and theology, to make it up complete: accordingly as *Ariſtotle* hath declared in his Metaphyſicks, that the ancient philoſophy conſiſted of theſe two parts, φυσιολογία and θεολογία or ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, phyſiology, and theology or Metaphyſicks. Our ancient Atomiſts never went about, as the blundering *Democritus* afterwards did, to build up a world out of mere paſſive bulk, and ſluggiſh matter, without any ἀρχαὶ δραστήριοι, any active principles, or incorporeal powers; underſtanding well, that thus they could not have ſo much as motion, mechaniſm, or generation in it; the original of all that motion that is in bodies ſpringing from ſomething that is not body, that is, from incorporeal ſubſtance. And yet if local motion could have been ſuppoſed to have riſen up, or ſprung in upon this dead lump and maſs of matter, no body knows how, and without dependance upon any incorporeal being, to have actuated it fortuitouſly; theſe ancient Atomiſts would ſtill have thought it impoſſible for the corporeal world itſelf to be made up, ſuch as now it is, by fortuitous mechaniſm, without the guidance of any higher principle. But they would have concluded it the greateſt impudence or madneſs, for men to aſſert, that animals alſo conſiſted of mere mechaniſm; or, that life and ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding, were really nothing elſe but local motion, and conſequently, that themſelves were but machines and automata. Wherefore they joined both active and paſſive principles together, the corporeal and incorporeal nature, mechaniſm and life, atomology and pneumatology; and from both theſe united, they made up one entire ſyſtem of philoſophy, correſpondent with, and agreeable to, the true and real world without them. And this ſyſtem of philoſophy, thus conſiſting of the doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtance (whereof God is the head) together with the atomical and me-

chanical phyſiology, ſeems to have been the only genuine, perfect, and complete.

XLII. But it did not long continue thus; for, after a while, this entire body of philoſophy came to be mangled and diſmembered, ſome taking one part of it alone, and ſome another; ſome ſnatching away the atomical phyſiology, without the pneumatology and theology; and others, on the contrary, taking the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, without the atomical or mechanical phyſiology. The former of theſe were *Democritus*, *Leucippus*, and *Protagoras*, who took only the dead carcaſs or ſkeleton of the old Moſchical philoſophy, namely the atomical phyſiology; the latter, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, who took indeed the better part, the ſoul, ſpirit, and quinteſſence of it, the theology and doctrine of incorporeals, but unbodied, and diveſted of its moſt proper and convenient vehicle, the atomical phyſiology, whereby it became expoſed to ſundry inconveniencies.

XLIII. We begin with *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; who being atheiſtically inclined, quickly perceived, that they could not in the ordinary way of phyſiologizing ſufficiently ſecure themſelves againſt a Deity, nor effectually urge Atheiſm upon others; foraſmuch as *Heraclitus* and other philoſophers, who held that all ſubſtance was body, as well as themſelves, did notwithſtanding aſſert a corporeal Deity, maintaining, that the form of the whole corporeal world was God, or elſe that he was ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, *a certain kind of body or matter*, as (for example) a *methodical and rational fire*, pervading (as a ſoul) the whole univerſe; the particular ſouls of men and animals being but, as it were, ſo many pieces, cut and ſliced out of the great mundane ſoul: ſo that, according to them, the whole corporeal univerſe, or maſs of body, was one way or other a God, a moſt wiſe and underſtanding animal, that did frame all particularities within itſelf in the beſt manner poſſible, and providently govern the ſame. Wherefore thoſe Atheiſts now apprehending, upon what tickliſh and uncertain terms their atheiſtical philoſophy then ſtood, and how that thoſe very forms and qualities, and the ſelf-moving power of body, which were commonly made a ſanctuary for atheiſm, might notwithſtanding chance to prove, contrariwiſe, the latibulum and aſylum of a Deity, and that a corporeal God (do what they could) might lie lurking under them, aſſaulting mens minds with doubtful fears and jealouſies; underſtanding moreover, that there was another kind of phyſiology ſet on foot, which baniſhing thoſe forms and qualities of body, attributed nothing to it but magnitude, figure, ſite, and motion, without any ſelf-moving power; they ſeemed preſently to apprehend ſome great advantage to themſelves and cauſe from it; and therefore greedily entertained this atomical or mechanical phyſiology, and violently cutting it off from that other part, the doctrine of incorporeals, which it was naturally and vitally united to, endeavoured to ſerve their turns of it. And now joining theſe two things together, the atomical phyſiology, which ſuppoſes that there is nothing in body, but magnitude, figure, ſite and motion, and that prejudice or prepoſſeſſion of their own minds, that there was no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body; be-

tween them both they begat a certain mungrel and ſpurious philoſophy, atheiſtically-atomical, or atomically-atheiſtical.

But though we have ſo well proved, that *Leucippus* and *Democritus* were not the firſt inventors, but only the depravers and adulterators of the atomical philoſophy; yet if any will notwithſtanding obſtinately contend, that the firſt invention thereof ought to be imputed to them, the very principles of their atheiſm ſeeming to lead them naturally to this, to ſtrip and diveſt body of all thoſe forms and qualities, it being otherwiſe impoſſible for them, ſurely and ſafely, to exclude a corporeal Deity; yet ſo, as that the wit of theſe Atheiſts was alſo much to be admired, in the managing and carrying on of thoſe principles in ſuch a manner, as to make up ſo entire a ſyſtem of philoſophy out of them, all whoſe parts ſhould be ſo coherent and conſiſtent together: we ſhall only ſay thus much; that if thoſe Atheiſts were the firſt inventors of this philoſophy, they were certainly very unhappy and unſucceſsful in it, whilſt endeavouring by it to ſecure themſelves from the poſſibility and danger of a corporeal God, they unawares laid a foundation for the clear demonſtration of an incorporeal one, and were indeed ſo far from making up any ſuch coherent frame as is pretended, that they were forced every where to contradict their own principles. So that nonſenſe lies at the bottom of all, and is interwoven throughout their whole atheiſtical ſyſtem; and that we ought to take notice of the invincible power and force of truth, prevailing irreſiſtibly againſt all endeavours to oppreſs it; and how deſperate the cauſe of atheiſm is, when that very atomical hypotheſis of theirs, which they would erect and build up for a ſtrong caſtle to garriſon themſelves in, proves a moſt effectual engine againſt themſelves, for the battering of all their atheiſtical ſtructure down about their ears.

XLIV. *Plato*'s mutilation and interpolation of the old Moſchical philoſophy was a great deal more excuſable, when he took the theology and metaphyſicks of it, the whole doctrine of incorporeals, and abandoned the atomical or mechanical way of phyſiologizing. Which in all probability he did, partly becauſe thoſe forementioned Atheiſts having ſo much abuſed that philoſophy, adopting it as it were to themſelves, he thereupon began to entertain a jealouſy and ſuſpicion of it; and partly, becauſe he was not of himſelf ſo inclinable to phyſiology as theology, to the ſtudy of corporeal as of divine things; which ſome think to be the reaſon, why he did not attend to the Pythagorick ſyſtem of the corporeal world, till late in his old age. His genius was ſuch, that he was naturally more addicted to ideas than to atoms, to formal and final than to material cauſes. To which may be added, that the way of phyſiologizing by matter, forms and qualities, is a more huffy and fanciful thing than the other; and laſtly, that the atomical phyſiology is more remote from ſenſe and vulgar apprehenſion, and therefore not ſo eaſily underſtood. For which cauſe many learned *Greeks* of later times, though they had read *Epicurus* his works, and perhaps *Democritus* his too, yet they were not able to conceive, how the corporeal and ſenſible phænomena could poſſibly be ſolved without real qualities; one inſtance

ſtance whereof might be given in *Plutarch*, writing againſt *Colotes* the Epicurean. Wherefore *Plato*, that was a zealous aſſerter of an incorporeal Deity, diſtinct from the world, and of immortal ſouls, ſeriouſly phyſiologized only by matter, forms and qualities, generation, corruption and alteration; and he did but play and toy ſometimes a little with atoms and mechaniſm; as where he would compound the earth of cubical, and fire of pyramidal atoms, and the like. For that he did therein imitate the atomical phyſiology, is plain from theſe words of his; [1] πάνυ δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ ἔτως, ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον ἀδὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν, τὰς ὄγκας αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι· *All theſe cubical and pyramidal corpuſcula of the fire and earth are in themſelves ſo ſmall, that by reaſon of their parvitude none of them can be perceived ſingly and alone, but only the aggregations of many of them together.*

XLV. And *Ariſtotle* here trod in *Plato*'s footſteps, not only in the better part, in aſſerting an incorporeal Deity, and an immoveable firſt mover; but alſo in phyſiologizing by forms and qualities, and rejecting that mechanical way by atoms, which had been ſo generally received amongſt the ancients. Wherefore though the genius of theſe two perſons was very different, and *Ariſtotle* often contradicteth *Plato*, and really diſſents from him in ſeveral particularities; yet, ſo much I think may be granted to thoſe reconcilers, (*Porphyry*, *Simplicius*, and others) that the main eſſentials of their two philoſophies are the ſame.

Now, I ſay, the whole Ariſtotelical ſyſtem of philoſophy is infinitely to be preferred before the whole Democritical; though the former hath been ſo much diſparaged, and the other cried up of late amongſt us. Becauſe, though it cannot be denied, but that the Democritick hypotheſis doth much more handſomely and intelligibly ſolve the corporeal phænomena, yet in all thoſe other things, which are of far the greateſt moment, it is rather a madneſs than a philoſophy. But the Ariſtotelick ſyſtem is right and ſound here, as to thoſe greater things; it aſſerting incorporeal ſubſtance, a Deity diſtinct from the world, the naturality of morality, and liberty of will. Wherefore though a late writer of politicks do ſo exceedingly diſparage *Ariſtotle*'s Ethicks, yet we ſhall do him this right here to declare, that his Ethicks were truly ſuch, and anſwered their title; but that new model of ethicks, which hath been obtruded upon the world with ſo much faſtuoſity, and is indeed nothing but the old Democritick doctrine revived, is no ethicks at all, but a mere cheat, the undermining and ſubverſion of all morality, by ſubſtituting ſomething like it in the room of it, that is a mere counterfeit and changeling; the deſign whereof could not be any other than to debauch the world.

We add further, that *Ariſtotle*'s ſyſtem of philoſophy ſeems to be more conſiſtent with piety, than the Carteſian hypotheſis it ſelf, which yet plainly ſuppoſeth incorporeal ſubſtance. For as much as this latter makes God to contribute nothing more to the fabrick of the world, than the turning round of a vortex

[1] In Timæ. p. 537. Oper.

vortex or whirlpool of matter; from the fortuitous motion of which, according to certain general laws of nature, muſt proceed all this frame of things that now is, the exact organization and ſucceſſive generation of animals, without the guidance of any mind or wiſdom. Whereas *Ariſtotle*'s Nature is no fortuitous principle, but ſuch as doth nothing in vain, but all for ends, and in every thing purſues the beſt; and therefore can be no other than a ſubordinate inſtrument of the divine wiſdom, and the manuary opificer or executioner of it.

However, we cannot deny, but that *Ariſtotle* hath been taxed by ſundry of the ancients, Chriſtians and others, for not ſo explicitely aſſerting theſe two things, the immortality of human ſouls, and providence over men, as he ought to have done, and as his maſter *Plato* did. Though, to do him all the right we can, we ſhall obſerve here, that in his Nicomachian [1] Ethicks, he ſpeaks favourably for the latter; εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εὔλογον χαίρειν αὐτὰς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο γὰρ εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τὰς ἀγαπῶνας μάλιστα καὶ τὰς τιμῶντας ἀνταποδιδόναι, ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους, ὀρθῶς τε καλῶς πράττοντας· *If God take any care of human things, as it ſeems he doth, then it is reaſonable to think alſo, that he is delighted with that which is the beſt, and neareſt akin to himſelf* (*which is mind or right reaſon*) *and that he rewards thoſe who moſt love and honour it* (*as taking care of ſuch things as are moſt pleaſing to him*) *in doing rightly and honeſtly.* A very good ſentence, were it not uſhered in with too much of ſcepticiſm. And as for the point of the ſoul's immortality; it is true, that whereas other philoſophers before *Ariſtotle* aſſerted the pre-exiſtence, incorporeity, and immortality of all ſouls, not only the rational, but the ſenſitive alſo, (which in men they concluded to be one and the ſame ſubſtance) according to that of *Plato*'s πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, *every ſoul is immortal*, they reſolving that no life nor cogitation could be corporeal; *Ariſtotle*, on the contrary, doth expreſly deny the pre-exiſtence, that is, the ſeparability, incorporeity and immortality of all ſenſitive ſouls, not in brutes only, but alſo every where, giving his reaſon for it in theſe words; [2] ὅτι μὲν οὐκ οἷόν τε πάσας προϋπάρχειν, φανερόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσων γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματικὴ, δῆλον, ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὰς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσιέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους ὄσας, ἀπ' ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι· *That all ſouls cannot pre-exiſt, is manifeſt from hence, becauſe thoſe principles, whoſe action is corporeal, cannot poſſibly exiſt without the body, as the power of walking without the feet. Wherefore it is impoſſible, that theſe ſenſitive ſouls* (*pre-exiſting*) *ſhould come into the body from without, ſince they can neither come alone by themſelves naked and ſtript of all body, they being inſeparable from it; neither can they come in with a body, that is, the ſeed.* This is *Ariſtotle*'s argument, why all ſenſitive ſouls muſt needs be corporeal, becauſe there is no walking without feet, nor ſeeing without eyes. But at the ſame time, he declares, that the mind or intellect does pre-exiſt and come in from without, that is, is incorporeal, ſeparable

[1] Lib. X. cap. IX. p. 185. Tom. III. Oper.

[2] De Generat. & Corruptione Lib. II. cap. III. p. 618. Tom. II. Oper.

ſeparable and immortal, giving his reaſon for it in like manner [1]: λείπεται δὲ τὸν νῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια· *It remains, that the mind or intellect, and that alone* (pre-exiſting) *enter from without, and be only divine; ſince its energy is not blended with that of the body's, but it acts independently upon it.* Notwithſtanding which, *Ariſtotle* elſewhere [2] diſtinguiſhing concerning this mind or intellect, and making it to be twofold, agent and patient, concludes the former of them only to be immortal, but the latter corruptible; τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτὸς, *the agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the paſſive is corruptible:* where ſome interpreters, that would willingly excuſe *Ariſtotle*, contend that by the paſſive intellect, is not meant the patient, but the fantaſy only, becauſe *Ariſtotle* ſhould otherwiſe contradict himſelf, who had before affirmed the intellect to be ſeparable, unmixed and inorganical, which they conceive muſt needs be underſtood of the patient. But this ſalvo can hardly take place here, where the paſſive intellect is directly oppoſed to the agent. Now what *Ariſtotle*'s agent underſtanding is, and whether it be any thing in us, any faculty of our human ſoul or no, ſeems to be a thing very queſtionable, and has therefore cauſed much diſpute amongſt his interpreters; it being reſolved by many of them to be the divine intellect, and commonly by others, a foreign thing. Whence it muſt needs be left doubtful, whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us. And the rather becauſe, laying down this principle, that nothing is incorporeal, but what acts independently upon the body, he ſomewhere plainly determines, that there is no intellection without corporeal fantaſms. That, which led *Ariſtotle* to all this, poſitively to affirm the corporeity of ſenſitive ſouls, and to ſtagger ſo much concerning the incorporeity of the rational, ſeems to have been his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal ſubſtance are confounded together, ſo that the limits of each could not be diſcerned by him. Wherefore we cannot applaud *Ariſtotle* for this; but that, which we commend him for, is chiefly theſe four things: firſt, for making a perfect incorporeal intellect to be the head of all; and ſecondly, for reſolving, that nature, as an inſtrument of this intellect, does not merely act according to the neceſſity of material motions, but for ends and purpoſes, though unknown to it ſelf; thirdly, for maintaining the naturality of morality; and laſtly, for aſſerting the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, autexouſy, or liberty from neceſſity.

[1] Ibid. [2] De Animâ, Lib. III. cap. VI. p. 50. Tom. II. Oper.

CHAP.

THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. II.

In this Chapter are contained all the grounds of reaſon for the atheiſtick hypotheſis. 1. *That the Democritick philoſophy, which is made up of theſe two principles, corporealiſm and atomiſm complicated together, is eſſentially atheiſtical.* 2. *Though* Epicurus, *who was an Atomical-Corporealiſt, pretended to aſſert a democracy of Gods, yet he was, for all that, an abſolute Atheiſt: and that Atheiſts commonly equivocate and diſguiſe themſelves.* 3. *That the Democritical philoſophy is nothing elſe but a ſyſtem of atheology, or atheiſm ſwaggering under the glorious appearance of philoſophy. And though there be another form of atheiſm, which we call Stratonical, yet the Democritick atheiſm is only conſiderable; all whoſe dark myſteries will be here revealed.* 4. *That we being to treat concerning the Deity, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed ſtuff of Atheiſts in order to a confutation, the divine aſſiſtance and direction ought to be implored.* 5. *That there are two things here to be performed: firſt, to ſhew what are the Atheiſts pretended grounds of reaſon againſt the Deity; and ſecondly, how they endeavour either to ſolve or confute the contrary phænomena. The firſt of thoſe grounds, that no man can have an idea or conception of God, and that he is an incomprehenſible nothing.* 6. *The ſecond atheiſtick argument, that there can be no creation out of nothing, nor no omnipotence, becauſe nothing can come from nothing; and therefore whatſoever ſubſtantially is, was from eternity ſelf-exiſtent, and uncreated by any Deity.* 7. *The third pretended*

reaſon againſt a Deity, that the ſtricteſt notion of a God implying him to be incorporeal, there can be no ſuch incorporeal Deity, becauſe there is no other ſubſtance but body. 8. *The Atheiſts pretence, that the doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtances ſprung from a ridiculous miſtaking of abſtract names and notions for realities. They impudently make the Deity to be but the chief of ſpectres, and an* Oberon *or prince of fairies and fancies. Their fourth argument againſt a Deity, that to ſuppoſe an incorporeal mind to be the original of all things is but to make a mere accident and abſtract notion to be the firſt cauſe of all.* 9. *Their fifth argument; a confutation of a corporeal Deity from the principles of corporealiſm it ſelf, that matter being the only ſubſtance, and all other differences of things nothing but accidents, generable and corruptible, no living underſtanding being can be eſſentially incorruptible. The Stoical God incorruptible, only by accident.* 10. *Their ſixth ratiocination from a complication of atomiciſm; that the firſt principle of all things whatſoever in the univerſe is atoms or corpuſcula devoid of all qualities, and conſequently of ſenſe and underſtanding, (which ſpring up afterwards from a certain compoſition of them) and therefore Mind or Deity was not the firſt original of all.* 11. *In the ſeventh place they diſprove the world's animation, or its being govern'd by a living underſtanding animaliſh nature, preſiding over the whole; becauſe ſenſe and underſtanding are a peculiar appendix to fleſh, blood and brains, and reaſon is no where to be found but in human form.* 12. *The eighth atheiſtick ground, that God being taken by all for a moſt happy, eternal and immortal animal, (or living being) there can be no ſuch thing, becauſe all living beings are concretions of atoms, that were at firſt generated, and are liable to death and corruption by the diſſolution of their compages. And that life is no ſimple primitive nature, but an accidental modification of compounded bodies, which upon the diſunion of their parts vaniſheth into nothing.* 13. *The ninth pretended atheiſtick demonſtration, that by God is meant a firſt cauſe or mover, which was not before moved by any thing elſe without it; but nothing can move it ſelf, and therefore there can be no unmoved mover, nor any firſt in the order of cauſes, that is, a God.* 14. *Their further proof of this principle, that nothing can move it ſelf, with an atheiſtick corollary from thence, that no thinking being could be a firſt cauſe, no cogitation ariſing of it ſelf without a cauſe; which may be reckoned a tenth argument.* 15. *Another myſtery of atheiſm, that all knowledge, and mental conception is the information of the things themſelves known, exiſting without the knower, and a paſſion from them; and therefore the world muſt needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cauſe.* 16. *The twelfth argumentation, that things could not be made by a God, becauſe they are ſo faulty and ill made, that they were not contriv'd for the good of man; and that the deluge of evils, that overflows all, ſhows that they did not proceed from any Deity.* 17. *The thirteenth inſtance of the Atheiſts againſt a Deity, from the defect of Providence, that in human affairs all is* Tohu *and* Bohu, *chaos and confuſion.* 18. *The fourteenth atheiſtick ground, that it is not poſſible for any one being to animadvert and order all things in the diſtant places of the whole world at once: but if it were poſſible,*

ble, that ſuch infinite negotioſity would be abſolutely inconſiſtent with happineſs. 19. *Several bold but ſlight queries of Atheiſts, why the world was not made ſooner? and what God did before? why it was made at all, ſince it was ſo long unmade? and, how the architect of the world could rear up ſo huge a fabrick?* 20. *The Atheiſts pretence, that it is the great intereſt of mankind, that there ſhould be no God; and that it was a noble and heroical exploit of the Democriticks, to chaſe away that affrightful ſpectre out of the world, and to free men from the continual fear of a Deity and puniſhment after death, imbittering all the pleaſures of life.* 21. *Another pretence of theirs, that Theiſm is inconſiſtent with civil ſovereignty, it introducing a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan; and that any other conſcience allowed of beſides the civil law (being private judgment) is,* ipſo facto, *a diſſolution of the body politick, and a return to the ſtate of nature.* 22. *The Atheiſts concluſion from the former premiſſes, as ſet down in* Plato *and* Lucretius, *that all things ſprung originally from nature and chance, without any Mind or God, that is, proceeded from the neceſſity of material motions, undirected for ends; that infinite atoms devoid of life and ſenſe, moving in infinite ſpace from eternity, by their fortuitous rencounters and intanglements, produced the ſyſtem of the whole univerſe, and as well animate as inanimate things.*

I. HAving in the former chapter given an account of the genuine and primitive atomical philoſophy, which may be called the Moſchical; we are in the next place to conſider the Democritical, that is, the atheized and adulterated atomology; which had its origin from nothing elſe but the joining of this heterogeneous and contradictious princip'e to the atomical phyſiology, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body. Now we ſay, that that philoſophy, which is thus compounded and made up of theſe two things, atomiciſm and corporealiſm complicated together, is eſſentially atheiſtical, though neither of them alone be ſuch. For the atomical phyſiology, as we have declared already, is in its own nature ſufficiently repugnant to atheiſm. And it is poſſible for one, who holds, that there is nothing in the world beſides body, to be perſuaded notwithſtanding of a corporeal Deity, and that the world was at firſt framed and is ſtill governed by an underſtanding nature lodged in the matter. For thus ſome of theſe Corporealiſts have fancied the whole univerſe itſelf to be a God. that is, an underſtanding and wiſe animal, that ordered all things within it ſelf, after the beſt manner poſſible, and providently governed the ſame. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this is a very great infirmity of mind, that ſuch perſons lie under, who are not able to conceive any other ſubſtance beſides body, by which is underſtood that, which is impenetrably extended, or elſe, in *Plato*'s language, which hath πρωτβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν, *that thruſts againſt other bodies and reſiſts their impulſe*; or, as others expreſs it, which is τόπου πληρωτικὸν, *that* ſo *fills up place*, as to exclude any other body or ſubſtance from coexiſting with it therein; and ſuch muſt needs have not only very imperfect, but alſo ſpurious and falſe conceptions of the Deity, ſo long as they apprehend it to be thus corporeal; but yet it does not therefore follow, that they muſt needs be accounted Atheiſts. But whoſoever holds theſe two

principles (before mentioned) together, that *there is no other ſubſtance beſides body*, and *that body hath nothing elſe belonging to it but magnitude, figure, ſite and motion, without qualities:* I ſay, whoſoever is that confounded thing of an Atomiſt and Corporealiſt jumbled together, he is eſſentially and unavoidably that, which is meant by an Atheiſt, though he ſhould in words never ſo much diſclaim it, becauſe he muſt needs fetch the original of all things from ſenſleſs matter; whereas to aſſert a God is to maintain, that all things ſprung originally from a knowing and underſtanding nature.

II. *Epicurus*, who was one of thoſe mongrel things before mentioned, (an Atomical-Corporealiſt or Corporeal-Atomiſt) did notwithſtanding profeſs to hold a multifarious rabble and democracy of Gods, ſuch as though they were ἀνθρωπόμορφοι [1], *of human form*, yet were ſo thin and ſubtle, as that comparatively with our terreſtrial bodies they might be called incorporeal; they having not ſo much *carnem* as *quaſi-carnem*, nor *ſanguinem* as *quaſi-ſanguinem*, a certain kind of aërial or etherial fleſh and blood: which gods of his were not to be ſuppoſed to exiſt any where within the world, upon this pretence, that there was no place in it fit to receive them;

> [2] *Illud item non eſt, ut poſſis credere ſedes*
> *Eſſe Deûm ſanctas, in mundi partibus ullis.*

And therefore they muſt be imagined to ſubſiſt in certain intermundane ſpaces, and Utopian regions without the world, the deliciouſneſs whereof is thus elegantly deſcribed by the poet;

> [3] *Quas neque concutiunt venti, neque nubila nimbis*
> *Adſpergunt, neque nix acri concreta pruinâ*
> *Cana cadens violat, ſempérque innubilus Æther*
> *Integit, & largè diffuſo lumine ridet.*

Whereunto was added, that the chief happineſs of theſe gods conſiſted *in omnium vacatione munerum*, *in freedom from all buſineſs and employment*, and doing nothing at all, that ſo they might live a ſoft and delicate life. And laſtly, it was pretended, that though they had neither any thing to do with us, nor we with them, yet they ought to be worſhipped by us for their own excellent nature's ſake, and happy ſtate.

But whoſoever had the leaſt ſagacity in him could not but perceive, that this theology of *Epicurus* was but romantical, it being directly contrary to his avowed and profeſſed principles, to admit of any other being, than what was concreted of atoms, and conſequently corruptible; and that he did this upon a politick account, thereby to decline the common odium, and thoſe dangers and inconveniencies, which otherwiſe he might have incurred by a downright denial of a God, to which purpoſe it accordingly ſerved his turn. Thus *Poſidonius* [4] rightly pronounced, *Nullos eſſe*

[1] Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. Lib I. cap. XVIII. p. 2907. Tom. IX. Oper.
[2] Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 147.
[3] Id. Lib. III. ver. 19.
[4] Apud Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. Lib. I. cap. XLIV. p 2949. Tom. IX. Oper.

eſſe deos Epicuro *videri*; *quæque is de diis immortalibus dixerit, invidiæ deteſtandæ gratiâ dixiſſe.* Though he was partly jocular in it alſo, it making no ſmall ſport to him, in this manner, to delude and mock the credulous vulgar [1]; *Deos jocandi causâ induxit* Epicurus *perlucidos & perflabiles, & habitantes tanquam inter duos lucos, ſic inter duos mundos propter metum ruinarum.* However, if *Epicurus* had been never ſo much in earneſt in all this, yet, by *Gaſſendus* his leave, we ſhould pronounce him to have been not a jot the leſs an Atheiſt, ſo long as he maintained, that the whole world was made μηδενὸς διατάττοντος ἢ διατάξοντος τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας, *without the ordering and direction of any underſtanding being, that was perfectly happy and immortal*; and fetch'd the original of all things in the univerſe, even of ſoul and mind, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτόμων σωμάτων ἀπρονόητον καὶ τυχαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν κίνησιν, *from ſenſleſs atoms fortuitouſly moved.* He, together with *Democritus*, hereby making the world to be, in the worſt ſenſe ᾠὸν τῆς νυκτὸς, *an egg of the night*, that is, not the off-ſpring of mind and underſtanding, but of dark ſenſleſs matter, of *Tohu* and *Bohu*, or confuſed chaos; and deriving the original of all the perfections in the univerſe from the moſt imperfect being, and the loweſt of all entities, than which nothing can be more atheiſtical. And as for thoſe romantick monogrammous Gods of *Epicurus*, had they been ſeriouſly believed by him, they could have been nothing elſe but a certain kind of aerial and ſpectrous men, living by themſelves, no body knows where, without the world; [2] Ἐπίκουρος ὡς μὲν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀπολείπει Θεὸν ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν πραγμάτων ἐδαμῶς· Epicurus, *according to vulgar opinion, leaves a God*; *but, according to the nature of things, none at all.*

And as *Epicurus*, ſo other Atheiſts in like manner have commonly had their vizards and diſguiſes; atheiſm for the moſt part prudently chuſing to walk abroad in maſquerade. And though ſome over-credulous perſons have been ſo far impoſed upon hereby, as to conclude, that there was hardly any ſuch thing as an Atheiſt any where in the world, yet they, that are ſagacious, may eaſily look through theſe thin veils and diſguiſes, and perceive theſe Atheiſts oftentimes inſinuating their atheiſm even then, when they moſt of all profeſs themſelves Theiſts, by affirming, that it is impoſſible to have any idea or conception at all of God; and that as he is not finite, ſo he cannot be infinite, and that no knowledge or underſtanding is to be attributed to him; which is in effect to ſay, that there is no ſuch thing. But whoſoever entertains the Democritick principles, that is, both rejects forms and qualities of body, and makes all things to be body, though he pretend never ſo much to hold a corporeal Deity, yet he is not at all to be believed in it, it being a thing plainly contradictious to thoſe principles.

III. Wherefore this mungrel philoſophy, which *Leucippus*, *Democritus* and *Protagoras*, were the founders of, and which was entertained afterwards by *Epicurus*, that makes (as *Laertius* writes [3]) ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, *ſenſleſs atoms to be the firſt principles*, not only of all bodies (for that was a thing admitted

[1] Cicero de Divin. L. II. c. XVII. p. 3202. Tom. IX. Oper. [2] Vide Sext. Empir. adv. Mathemat. Lib. IX. p. 565. Edit. Fabricii. [3] Lib. X. ſegm. 41. p. 620, & alias.

mitted before by *Empedocles* and other Atomiſts that were Theiſts) but alſo of all things whatſoever in the whole univerſe, and therefore of ſoul and mind too; this, I ſay, was really nothing elſe but a philoſophical form of atheology, a gigantical and Titanical attempt to dethrone the Deity, not only by ſolving all the phænomena of the world without a God, but alſo by laying down ſuch principles, from whence it muſt needs follow, that there could be neither an incorporeal nor corporeal Deity. It was atheiſm openly ſwaggering under the glorious appearance of wiſdom and philoſophy.

There is indeed another form of atheiſm, which (inſiſting on the vulgar way of philoſophizing by forms and qualities) we for diſtinction ſake ſhall call Stratonical; ſuch as, being too modeſt and ſhamefaced to fetch all things from the fortuitous motion of atoms, would therefore allow to the ſeveral parts of matter a certain kind of natural (though not animal) perception, ſuch as is devoid of reflexive conſciouſneſs, together with a plaſtick power, whereby they may be able artificially and methodically to form and frame themſelves to the beſt advantage of their reſpective capabilities; ſomething like to *Ariſtotle*'s nature, but that it hath no dependance at all upon any higher Mind or Deity. And theſe Atheiſts may be alſo called hylozoick (as the other atomick) becauſe they derive all things in the whole univerſe, not only ſenſitive, but alſo rational ſouls, together with the artificial frame of animals, from the life of matter. But this kind of atheiſm ſeems to be but an unſhapen embryo of ſome dark and cloudy brains, that was never yet digeſted into an entire ſyſtem, nor could be brought into any ſuch tolerable form, as to have the confidence to ſhew it ſelf abroad in full and open view. But the Democritick and Atomick atheiſm, as it is the boldeſt and rankeſt of all atheiſms, it not only undertaking to ſolve all phænomena by matter fortuitouſly moved, without a God, but alſo to demonſtrate, that there cannot be ſo much as a corporeal Deity; ſo it is that alone, which, pretending to an entire and coherent ſyſtem, hath publickly appeared upon the ſtage, and therefore doth, in a manner, only deſerve our conſideration.

And now we ſhall exhibit a full view and proſpect of it, and diſcover all its dark myſteries and profundities; we being much of this perſuaſion, that a plain and naked repreſentation of them will be a great part of a confutation at leaſt: not doubting but it will be made to appear, that though this monſter, big-ſwoln with a puffy ſhew of wiſdom, ſtrut and ſtalk ſo gigantically, and march with ſuch a kind of ſtately philoſophick grandeur, yet it is indeed but like the giant *Orgoglio* in our *Engliſh* poet, a mere empty bladder, blown up with vain conceit, an Empuſa, phantaſm, or ſpectre, the off-ſpring of night and darkneſs, non-ſenſe and contradiction.

And yet for all that, we ſhall not wrong it the leaſt in our repreſentation, but give it all poſſible advantages of ſtrength and plauſibility, that ſo the Atheiſts may have no cauſe to pretend (as they are wont to do, in ſuch caſes) that either we did not underſtand their myſteries, nor apprehend the full ſtrength of their cauſe, or elſe did purpoſely ſmother and conceal it.

Which indeed we have been ſo far from, that we muſt confeſs we were not altogether unwilling this buſineſs of theirs ſhould look a little like ſomething, that might deſerve a confutation. And whether the Atheiſts ought not rather to give us thanks for mending and improving their arguments, than complain that we have any way impaired them, we ſhall leave it to the cenſure of impartial judgments.

IV. *Plato* [1] tells us, that even amongſt thoſe Pagans in his time there was generally ſuch a religious humour, that πάνλες ὅσοι καλὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσι, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικρᾷ καὶ μεγάλῃ πράγματος, Θεὸν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐπικαλοῦσι· *Whoſoever had but the leaſt of ſerioufneſs and ſobriety in them, whenſoever they took in hand any enterprize, whether great or ſmall, they would always invoke the Deity for aſſiſtance and direction.* Adding moreover, that himſelf ſhould be very faulty, if in his *Timæus*, when he was to treat about ſo grand a point, concerning the whole world, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ καὶ ἀγενής ἐστι, *whether it were made or unmade*, he ſhould not make his entrance thereinto by a religious invocation of the Deity. Wherefore certainly it could not be leſs than a piece of impiety in a Chriſtian, being to treat concerning the Deity itſelf, and to produce all that profane and unhallowed ſtuff of Atheiſts out of their dark corners, in order to a confutation, and the better confirmation of our faith in the truth of his exiſtence, not to implore his direction and aſſiſtance. And I know no reaſon, but that we may well do it in that ſame litany of *Plato*'s, καλὰ νῦν ἐκείνῳ μὲν μάλιστα, ἑπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, *that we may firſt ſpeak agreeably to his own mind, or becomingly of his nature, and then conſentaneouſly with our ſelves.*

V. Now there are theſe two things here to be performed by us, firſt to diſcover and produce the chief heads of arguments, or grounds of reaſon, inſiſted on by the Atheiſts to diſprove a Deity, evincing withal briefly the ineffectualneſs and falſeneſs of them: and ſecondly, to ſhew how they endeavour either to confute or ſolve, conſiſtently with their own principles, all thoſe phænomena, which are commonly urg'd againſt them to prove a Deity and incorporeal ſubſtance; manifeſting likewiſe the invalidity thereof.

The grounds of reaſon alledged for the atheiſtical hypotheſis are chiefly theſe that follow. Firſt, That we have no idea of God, and therefore can have no evidence of him; which argument is further flouriſh'd and deſcanted upon in this manner. That notion or conception of a Deity, that is commonly entertained, is nothing but a bundle of incomprehenſibles, unconceivables, and impoſſibles; it being only a compilement of all imaginable attributes of honour, courtſhip, and complement, which the confounded fear and aſtoniſhment of men's minds made them huddle up together, without any ſenſe or philoſophic truth. This ſeems to be intimated by a modern writer [2] in theſe words; *The attributes of God ſignify not true nor falſe, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are not ſufficient premiſſes to infer truth, or convince falſhood.* And the ſame thing again is further ſet out, with no ſmall pretence

[1] In Timæo, p. 235. [2] Hobbes.

tence to wit, after this manner; *They that venture to diſpute philoſophically, or reaſon of God's nature, from theſe attributes of honour, loſing their underſtanding in the very firſt attempt, fall from one inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the ſame manner as when one, ignorant of the ceremonies of court, coming into the preſence of a greater perſon than he is uſed to ſpeak to, and ſtumbling at his entrance, to ſave himſelf from falling, lets ſlip his cloak, to recover his cloak lets fall his hat, and with one diſorder after another diſcovers his aſtoniſhment and ruſticity.* The meaning of which, and other like paſſages of the ſame writer, ſeems to be this; that the attributes of God (by which his nature is ſuppoſed to be expreſſed) having no philoſophick truth or reality in them, had their only original from a certain ruſtick aſtoniſhment of mind, proceeding from exceſs of fear, raiſing up the phantaſm of a Deity, as a bug-bear for an object to it ſelf, and affrighting men into all manner of confounded non-ſenſe, and abſurdity of expreſſions concerning it, ſuch as have no ſignification, nor any conception of the mind anſwering to them. This is the firſt argument, uſed eſpecially by our modern Democriticks, againſt a Deity, that becauſe they can have no phantaſtick idea of it, nor fully comprehend all that is concluded in the notion thereof, that therefore it is but an incomprehenſible nothing.

VI. Secondly, another argument much inſiſted on by the old Democritick Atheiſts, is directed againſt the divine omnipotence and creative power, after this manner. By God is always underſtood a creator of ſomething or other out of nothing. For however the Theiſts be here divided amongſt themſelves, ſome of them believing, that there was once nothing at all exiſting in this whole ſpace, which is now occupied by the world, beſides the Deity, and that he was then a ſolitary being, ſo that the ſubſtance of the whole corporeal univerſe had a temporary beginning, and novity of exiſtence, and the duration of it hath now continued but for ſo many years only. Others perſuading themſelves, that though the matter and ſubſtance at leaſt, (if not the form alſo) of the corporeal world, did exiſt from eternity, yet nevertheleſs, they both alike proceeded from the Deity by way of emanation, and do continually depend upon it, in the ſame manner as light, though coeval with the ſun, yet proceeded from the ſun, and depends upon it, being always, as it were, made a-new by it; wherefore, according to this hypotheſis, though things had no antecedent non-entity in time, yet they were as little of themſelves, and owed all their being as much to the Deity, as if they had been once actually nothing, they being, as it were, perpetually created out of nothing by it. Laſtly, others of thoſe Theiſts reſolving, that the matter of the corporeal univerſe was not only from eternity, but alſo ſelf-exiſtent and uncreated, or independent upon any Deity as to its being; but yet the forms and qualities of all inanimate bodies, together with the ſouls of all Animals in the ſucceſſive generations of them, (being taken for entities diſtinct from the matter) were created by the Deity out of nothing. We ſay, though there be ſuch difference among the Theiſts themſelves, yet

yet they all agree in this, that God is, in ſome ſenſe or other, the creator of ſome real entity out of nothing, or the cauſe of that which otherwiſe would not have been of it ſelf, ſo that no creation out of nothing, (in that enlarged ſenſe) no Deity. Now it is utterly impoſſible, that any ſubſtance or real entity ſhould be created out of nothing (it being contradictious to that indubitable axiom of reaſon, *de nihilo nihil*, from nothing nothing. The argument is thus urged by *Lucretius*, according to the minds of *Epicurus* and *Democritus:*

[1] *Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia ſumet,*
Nullam rem è nihilo gigni divinitùs unquam.
Quippe ità formido mortales continet omnes,
Quòd multa in terris fieri cœlóque tuentur,
Quorum operum cauſas nullâ ratione videre
Poſſunt, ac fieri divino numine rentur:
Quas ob res, ubi viderimus nil poſſe creari
De nihilo, tum quod ſequimur, jam tutiùs indè
Perſpiciemus, & undè queat res quæque creari,
Et quo quæque modo fiant opera ſine divûm.

It is true indeed, that it ſeems to be chiefly level'd by the poet againſt that third and laſt ſort of Theiſts before mentioned, ſuch as *Heraclitus* and the Stoicks, (which latter were contemporary with *Epicurus*) who held the matter of the whole world to have been from eternity of it ſelf uncreated, but yet the forms of mundane things in the ſucceſſive generations of them (as entities diſtinct from the matter) to be created or made by the Deity out of nothing. But the force of the argument muſt needs lie ſtronger againſt thoſe other Theiſts, who would have the very ſubſtance and matter it ſelf of the world, as well as the forms, to have been created by the Deity out of nothing. Since nothing can come out of nothing, it follows, that not ſo much as the forms and qualities of bodies (conceiv'd as entities really diſtinct from the matter,) much leſs the lives and ſouls of animals, could ever have been created by any Deity, and therefore certainly not the ſubſtance and matter it ſelf. But all ſubſtance and real entity, whatſoever is in the world, muſt needs have been from eternity, uncreated and ſelf-exiſtent. Nothing can be made or produced but only the different modifications of pre-exiſtent matter. And this is done by motions, mixtures and ſeparations, concretions and ſecretions of atoms, without the creation of any real diſtinct entity out of nothing; ſo that there needs no Deity for the effecting of it, according to that of *Epicurus*, ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῆ προσαγέσθω, *no divine power ought to be called in for the ſolving of thoſe phænomena.* To conclude therefore, if no ſubſtance, nor real entity can be made, which was not before, but all whatſoever is, will be, and can be, was from eternity ſelf-exiſtent; then creative power, but eſpecially that attribute of omnipotence, can belong to nothing; and this is all one as to ſay, there can be no Deity.

[1] Lib. 1. verſ. 150, &c.

VII. Thirdly, the Atheists argue against the stricter and higher sort of Theists, who will have God to be the creator of the whole corporeal universe and all its parts out of nothing, after this manner: that which created the whole mass of matter and body, cannot be it self body; wherefore this notion of God plainly implies him to be incorporeal. But there can be no incorporeal Deity, because by that word must needs be understood, either that which hath no magnitude nor extension at all, or else that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body. If the word be taken in the former sense, then nothing at all can be so incorporeal, as to be altogether unextended and devoid of geometrical quantity, because extension is the very essence of all existent entity, and that which is altogether unextended is perfectly nothing. There can neither be any substance, nor mode or accident of any substance, no nature whatsoever unextended. But if the word incorporeal be taken in the latter sense, for that which is indeed extended, but otherwise than body, namely so as to penetrate bodies and co-exist with them, this is also a thing next to nothing; since it can neither act upon any other thing, nor be acted upon by, or sensible of, any thing; it can neither do nor suffer any thing.

[1] *Nam facere & fungi nisi corpus nulla potest res.*

Wherefore to speak plainly, this can be nothing else but empty space, or vacuum, which runs through all things, without laying hold on any thing, or being affected from any thing. This is the only incorporeal thing, that is or can be in nature, space or place; and therefore to suppose an incorporeal Deity is to make empty space to be the creator of all things.

This argument is thus proposed by the Epicurean poet:

[2] *——— Quodcunque erit esse aliquid, debebit id ipsum*
Augmine vel grandi vel parvo———
Cui si tactus erit, quamvis levis exiguúsque,
Corporum augebit numerum summámque sequetur:
Sin intactile erit, nulla de parte quod ullam
Rem prohibere queat per se transire meantem,
Scilicet hoc id erit vacuum quod inane vocamus.

Whatsoever is, is extended or hath geometrical quantity and mensurability in it; which if it be tangible, then it is body, and fills up a place in the world, being part of the whole mass; but if it be intangible, so that it cannot resist the passage of any thing through it, then it is nothing else but empty space or vacuum. There is no third thing besides these two, and therefore whatsoever is not body, is space or nothing;

[1] —*Præter*

[1] Lucret. Lib. I. vers. 444, &c.

[2] Id. Lib. I. vers. 434, &c.

[1] ——— *Præter inane & corpora tertia per ſe,*
Nulla poteſt rerum in numero natura relinqui.

Thus the ancient Epicureans and Democriticks argued; there being nothing incorporeal but ſpace, there can be no incorporeal Deity.

But becauſe this ſeems to give advantage to the Theiſts, in making ſpace ſomething, or that which hath a real nature or entity without our conception, from whence it will follow, that it muſt needs be either it ſelf a ſubſtance, or elſe a mode of ſome incorporeal ſubſtance; the modern Democriticks are here more cautious, and make ſpace to be no nature really exiſting without us, but only the fantaſm of a body, and as it were the ghoſt of it, which has no reality without our imagination. So that there are not two natures of body and ſpace, which muſt needs infer two diſtinct ſubſtances, one whereof muſt be incorporeal, but only one nature of body. The conſequence of which will be this, that an incorporeal ſubſtance is all one with an incorporeal body, and therefore nothing.

VIII. But becauſe it is generally conceived, that an error cannot be ſufficiently confuted, without diſcovering τὸ αἴτιον τῆ ψεύδους, *the cauſe of the miſtake*; therefore the Atheiſts will in the next place undertake to ſhow likewiſe the original of this doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtances, and from what miſapprehenſion it ſprung; as alſo take occaſion from thence, further to diſprove a Deity.

Wherefore they ſay, that the original of this doctrine of incorporeal ſubſtances proceeded chiefly from the abuſe of abſtract names, both of ſubſtances (whereby the eſſences of ſingular bodies, as of a man or an horſe, being abſtracted from thoſe bodies themſelves, are conſider'd univerſally;) as alſo of accidents, when they are conſider'd alone without their ſubjects or ſubſtances. The latter of which is a thing, that men have been neceſſitated to, in order to the computation or reckoning of the properties of bodies, the comparing of them with one another, the adding, ſubtracting, multiplying and dividing of them; which could not be done, ſo long as they are taken concretely together with their ſubjects. But yet, as there is ſome uſe of thoſe abſtract names, ſo the abuſe of them has been alſo very great; foraſmuch as, though they be really the names of nothing, ſince the eſſence of this and that man is not any thing without the man, nor is an accident any thing without its ſubſtance, yet men have been led into a groſs miſtake by them, to imagine them to be realities exiſting by themſelves. Which infatuation hath chiefly proceeded from ſcholaſticks, who have been ſo intemperate in the uſe of theſe words, that they could not make a rational diſcourſe of any thing, though never ſo ſmall, but they muſt ſtuff it with their quiddities, entities, eſſences, hæcceities and the like. Wherefore theſe are they, who being firſt deluded themſelves, have alſo deluded the world, introducing an opinion into the minds of men,

[1] Id. Lib. I. verſ. 446.

that the eſſence of every thing is ſomething without that thing it ſelf, and alſo eternal; and therefore when any thing is made or generated, that there is no new being produced, but only an antecedent and eternal eſſence cloathed (as it were) with a new garment of exiſtence: as alſo that the mere accidents of bodies may exiſt alone by themſelves without their ſubſtances. As for example, that the life, ſenſe and underſtanding of animals, commonly call'd by the names of ſoul and mind, may exiſt without the bodies or ſubſtances of them by themſelves, after the animals are dead; which plainly makes them to be incorporeal ſubſtances, as it were the ſeparate and abſtract eſſences of men. This hath been obſerved by a modern writer in theſe words; *Eſt hominum abſtractorum tum in omni vita, tum in philoſophia, magnus & uſus & abuſus. Abuſus in eo conſiſtit, quòd cùm videant aliqui, conſiderari poſſe, id eſt, inferri in rationes, accidentium incrementa & decrementa, ſine conſideratione corporum, ſive ſubjectorum ſuorum, (id quod appellatur abſtrahere) loquuntur de accidentibus, tanquam poſſent ab omni corpore ſeparari: hinc enim originem trahunt quorundam Metaphyſicorum craſſi errores. Nam ex eo, quod conſiderari poteſt cogitatio, ſine conſideratione corporis, inferre ſolent non eſſe opus corporis cogitantis. It is a great abuſe, that ſome Metaphyſicians make of theſe abſtract names, becauſe cogitation can be conſidered alone without the conſideration of body, therefore to conclude, that it is not the action or accident of that body that thinks, but a ſubſtance by it ſelf.* And the ſame writer elſewhere obſerves, *that it is upon this ground, that when a man is dead and buried, they ſay his ſoul (that is, his life) can walk, ſeparated from his body, and is ſeen by night amongſt the graves.* By which means the vulgar are confirmed in their ſuperſtitious belief of ghoſts, ſpirits, dæmons, devils, fairies and hob-goblins, inviſible powers and agents, called by ſeveral names, and that by thoſe perſons, whoſe work it ought to be rather to free men from ſuch ſuperſtition. Which belief at firſt had another original, not altogether unlike the former; namely from mens miſtaking their own fancies for things really exiſting without them. For as in the ſenſe of viſion, men are commonly deceived, in ſuppoſing the image behind the glaſs to be a real thing exiſting without themſelves, whereas it is indeed nothing but their own fancy; in like manner when the minds of men ſtrongly poſſeſs'd with fear, eſpecially in the dark, raiſe up the fantaſms of ſpectres, bug-bears, or affrightful apparitions to them, they think them to be objects really exiſting without them, and call them ghoſts and ſpirits, whilſt they are indeed nothing but their own fancies; ſo the fantaſm or fancy of a Deity (which is indeed the chief of all ſpectres) created by fear, has upon no other account been taken for a reality. To this purpoſe a modern writer, *From the fear, that proceeds from the ignorance it ſelf, of what it is that hath the power to do men good or harm, men are inclined to ſuppoſe and feign to themſelves ſeveral kinds of powers inviſible, and to ſtand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of diſtreſs to invoke them, as alſo in the time of an unexpected good ſucceſs to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancies, their Gods.* Which though it be prudently ſpoken in the plural number, that ſo it might be diverted and put off to the heathen gods; yet he is very ſimple, that does not perceive the reaſon of it to be the ſame concerning

cerning that one Deity, which is now commonly worſhipped; and that therefore this alſo is but the creature of mens fear and fancy, the chief of all fantaſtick ghoſts and ſpectres, as it were an *Oberon* or prince of fairies and fancies. This (we ſay) was the firſt original of that vulgar belief of inviſible powers, ghoſts, and gods; mens taking their own fancies for things really exiſting without them. And as for the matter and ſubſtance of theſe ghoſts, they could not by their own natural cogitation fall into any other conceit, but that it was the ſame with that, which appeareth in a dream to one that ſleepeth, or in a looking-glaſs to one that is awake, thin aerial bodies, which may appear and vaniſh when they pleaſe. But the opinion, that ſuch ſpirits were incorporeal and immaterial could never enter into the minds of men by nature, unabuſed by doctrine; but it ſprung up from thoſe deceiving and deceived literati, ſcholaſticks, philoſophers, and theologers enchanting mens underſtandings, and making them believe, that the abſtract notions of accidents and eſſences could exiſt alone by themſelves, without the bodies, as certain ſeparate and incorporeal ſubſtances.

To conclude therefore, to make an incorporeal mind to be the cauſe of all things is to make our own fancy, an imaginary ghoſt of the world, to be a reality; and to ſuppoſe the mere abſtract notion of an accident, and a ſeparate eſſence, to be not only an abſolute thing by it ſelf, and a real ſubſtance incorporeal, but alſo the firſt original of all ſubſtances, and of whatſoever is in the univerſe. And this may be reckon'd for a fourth atheiſtick ground.

IX. Fifthly, the Atheiſts pretend further to prove, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body; as alſo from the principles of corporealiſm it ſelf to evince, that there can be no corporeal Deity, after this manner. No man can deviſe any other notion of ſubſtance, than that it is a thing extended, exiſting without the mind, not imaginary but real and ſolid magnitude; for whatſoever is not extended, is nowhere and nothing. So that *res extenſa* is the only ſubſtance, the ſolid *baſis* and *ſubſtratum* of all. Now this is the very ſelf-ſame thing with body; for ἀντιτυπία, or *reſiſtance*, ſeems to be a neceſſary conſequence and reſult from extenſion, and they that think otherwiſe, can ſhow no reaſon, why bodies, may not alſo penetrate one another, as ſome Corporealiſts think they do; from whence it is inferred, that body or matter is the only ſubſtance of all things. And whatſoever elſe is in the world, that is, all the differences of bodies, are nothing but ſeveral accidents and modifications of this extended ſubſtance, body or matter. Which accidents, though they may be ſometimes call'd by the names of real qualities, and forms, and though there be different apprehenſions concerning them amongſt philoſophers, yet generally they agree in this, that there are theſe two properties belonging to them; firſt, that none of them can ſubſiſt alone by themſelves, without extended ſubſtance or matter, as the baſis and ſupport of them; and ſecondly, that they may be all deſtroyed without the deſtruction of any ſubſtance. Now as blackneſs and whiteneſs, heat and cold, ſo likewiſe life, ſenſe and underſtanding, are ſuch accidents, modifications or qualities of body, that can neither exiſt by themſelves, and may be deſtroyed without the de-

deſtruction of any ſubſtance or matter. For if the parts of the body of any living animal be diſunited and ſeparated from one another, or the organical diſpoſition of the matter alter'd, thoſe accidents, forms or qualities, of life and underſtanding, will preſently vaniſh away to nothing, all the ſubſtance of the matter ſtill remaining one where or other in the univerſe entire, and nothing of it loſt. Wherefore the ſubſtance of matter and body, as diſtinguiſh'd from the accidents, is the only thing in the world, that is uncorruptible and undeſtroyable. And of this it is to be underſtood, that nothing can be made out of nothing, and deſtroyed to nothing, (*i. e.*) that every entire thing, that is made or generated, muſt be made of ſome pre-exiſtent matter; which matter was from eternity ſelf-exiſtent and unmade, and is alſo undeſtroyable, and can never be reduc'd to nothing. It is not to be underſtood of the accidents themſelves, that are all makeable and deſtroyable, generable and corruptible. Whatſoever is in the world is but ὕλη πῶς ἔχουσα, *matter ſo and ſo modified* or *qualified*, all which modifications and qualifications of matter are in their own nature deſtroyable, and the matter it ſelf (as the baſis of them, not neceſſarily determin'd to this or that accident) is the only ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, the only neceſſarily exiſtent. The concluſion therefore is, that no animal, no living underſtanding body, can be abſolutely and eſſentially incorruptible, this being an incommunicable property of the matter; and therefore there can be no corporeal Deity, the original of all things, eſſentially undeſtroyable.

Though the Stoicks imagined the whole corporeal univerſe to be an animal or Deity, yet this corporeal God of theirs was only by accident incorruptible and immortal; becauſe they ſuppoſed, that there was no other matter, which exiſting without this world, and making inroads upon it, could diſunite the parts of it, or diſorder its compages. Which if there were, the life and underſtanding of this Stoical God, or great mundane animal, as well as that of other animals in like caſes, muſt needs vaniſh into nothing. Thus from the principles of corporealiſm it ſelf, it plainly follows, that there can be no corporeal deity, becauſe the Deity is ſuppoſed to be ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, a thing that was never made, and is eſſentially undeſtroyable, which are the privileges and properties of nothing but ſenſeleſs matter.

X. In the next place, the Atheiſts undertake more effectually to confute that corporeal God of the Stoicks and others, from the principles of the atomical philoſophy, in this manner. All corporeal Theiſts, who aſſert, that an underſtanding nature or mind, reſiding in the matter of the whole univerſe, was the firſt original of the mundane ſyſtem, and did intellectually frame it, betray no ſmall ignorance of philoſophy and the nature of body, in ſuppoſing real qualities, beſides magnitude, figure, ſite and motion, as ſimple and primitive things, to belong to it; and that there was ſuch a quality or faculty of underſtanding in the matter of the whole univerſe, coeternal with the ſame, that was an original thing uncompounded and underived from any thing elſe. Now to ſuppoſe ſuch original qualities and powers, which are really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of extended matter and its modifications, of diviſibility, figure, ſite and motion, is really to ſuppoſe ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances, which therefore muſt needs be in-

corporeal. So that theſe philoſophers fall unawares into that very thing, which they are ſo abhorrent from. For this quality or faculty of underſtanding, in the matter of the univerſe, original and underiv'd from any other thing, can be indeed nothing elſe but an incorporeal ſubſtance. *Epicurus* ſuggeſted a caution againſt this vulgar miſtake, concerning qualities, to this purpoſe: *Non ſic cogitandæ ſunt qualitates, quaſi ſint quædam per ſe exiſtentes naturæ ſeu ſubſtantiæ, ſiquidem id mente aſſequi non licet; ſed ſolummodo ut varii modi ſeſe habendi corporis conſiderandæ ſunt.*

Body, as ſuch, hath nothing elſe belonging to the nature of it, but what is included in the idea of extended ſubſtance, diviſibility, figure, ſite, motion or reſt, and the reſults from the various compoſitions of them, cauſing different fancies. Wherefore, as vulgar philoſophers make their firſt matter (which they cannot well tell what they mean by it) becauſe it receives all qualities, to be itſelf devoid of all quality; ſo we conclude, that atoms (which are really the firſt principles of all things) have none of thoſe qualities in them, which belong to compounded bodies; they are not abſolutely of themſelves black or white, hot or cold, moiſt or dry, bitter or ſweet, all theſe things ariſing up afterwards from the various aggregations and contextures of them, together with different motions. Which *Lucretius* confirms by this reaſon, agreeable to the tenour of the atomical philoſophy, that if there were any ſuch real qualities in the firſt principles, then in the various corruptions of nature things would at laſt be reduced to nothing:

[1] *Immutabile enim quiddam ſuperare neceſſe eſt,*
Nè res ad nihilum redigantur funditùs omnes;
Proinde colore cave contingas ſemina rerum,
Nè tibi res redeant ad nilum funditùs omnes.

Wherefore he concludes, that it muſt not be thought, that white things are made out of white principles, nor black things out of black principles;

[2] *————Nè ex albis alba rearis*
Principiis eſſe,————
Aut ea quæ nigrant, nigro de ſemine nata:
Neve alium quemvis, quæ ſunt induta, colorem,
Propterea gerere hunc credas, quòd materiaï
Corpora conſimili ſint ejus tincta colore;
Nullus enim color eſt omnino materiaï
Corporibus, neque par rebus, neque denique diſpar.

Adding, that the ſame is to be reſolved likewiſe concerning all other ſenſible qualities as well as colours.

[3] *Sed nè fortè putes ſolo ſpoliata colore*
Corpora prima manere; etiam ſecreta teporis
Sunt, ac frigoris omnino, calidique vaporis:

Et

[1] Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 750, 751, 754, 755.
[2] Id. Lib. II. ver. 730, &c.
[3] Id. Lib. II. ver. 841, &c.

Et ſonitu ſterila, & ſucco jejuna feruntur,
Nec jaciunt ullum proprio de corpore odorem.

Laſtly, he tells us in like manner, that the ſame is to be underſtood alſo concerning life, ſenſe and underſtanding; that there are no ſuch ſimple qualities or natures in the firſt principles, out of which animals are compounded, but that theſe are in themſelves altogether devoid of life, ſenſe and underſtanding:

[1] *Nunc ea, quæ ſentire videmus cunque, neceſſe 'ſt*
Ex inſenſilibus tamen omnia confiteare
Principiis conſtare: neque id manifeſta refutant,
Sed magìs ipſa manu ducunt, & credere cogunt,
Ex inſenſilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
Quippe videre licet, vivos exiſtere vermes
Stercore de tetro, putrorem cum ſibi nacta 'ſt
Intempeſtivis ex imbribus humida tellus.

All ſenſitive and rational animals are made of irrational and ſenſeleſs principles, which is proved by experience, in that we ſee worms are made out of putrified dung, moiſtened with immoderate ſhowers.

Some indeed, who are no greater friends to a Deity than our ſelves, will needs have that ſenſe and underſtanding, that is in animals and men, to be derived from an antecedent life and underſtanding in the matter. But this cannot be, becauſe if matter as ſuch had life and underſtanding in it, then every atom of matter muſt needs be a diſtinct percipient, animal, and intelligent perſon by itſelf; and it would be impoſſible for any ſuch men and animals as now are to be compounded out of them, becauſe every man would be *variorum animalculorum acervus*, a heap of innumerable animals and percipients.

Wherefore as all the other qualities of bodies, ſo likewiſe life, ſenſe, and underſtanding ariſe from the different contextures of atoms devoid of all thoſe qualities, or from the compoſition of thoſe ſimple elements of magnitudes, figures, ſites and motions, in the ſame manner as from a few letters variouſly compounded all that infinite variety of ſyllables and words is made;

[2] *Quin etiam refert noſtris in verſibus ipſis*
Cum quibus & quali poſiturâ contineantur;
Namque eadem cœlum, mare, terras, flumina, ſolem
Significant, eadem, fruges, arbuſta, animantes;
Sic ipſis in rebus item jam materiaï
Intervalla, viæ, connexus, pondera, plagæ,
Concurſus, motus, ordo, poſitura, figuræ,
Cùm permutantur, mutari res quoque debent.

From

[1] Id. Lib. II. ver. 684, &c. [2] Id. Lib. II. ver. 1012.

From the fortuitous concretions of ſenſeleſs unknowing atoms did riſe up afterwards, in certain parts of the world called animals, ſoul, and mind, ſenſe and underſtanding, counſel and wiſdom. But to think, that there was any animaliſh nature before all theſe animals, or that there was an antecedent mind and underſtanding, counſel and wiſdom, by which all animals themſelves, together with the whole world, were made and contrived, is either to run round in a ſenſeleſs circle, making animals and animality to be before one another infinitely; or elſe to ſuppoſe an impoſſible beginning of an original underſtanding quality in the matter. Atoms in their firſt coalitions together, when the world was a making, were not then directed by any previous counſel or preventive underſtanding, which were things as yet unborn and unmade,

> [1] *Nam certè neque conſilio primordia rerum*
> *Ordine ſe quæque atque ſagaci mente locârunt,*
> *Nec quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profectò.*

Mind and underſtanding, counſel and wiſdom did not lay the foundations of the univerſe; they are no archical things, that is, they have not the nature of a principle in them; they are not ſimple, original, primitive and primordial, but as all other qualities of bodies, ſecondary, compounded and derivative, and therefore they could not be architectonical of the world. Mind and underſtanding is no God, but the creature of matter and motion.

The ſenſe of this whole argument is briefly this; The firſt principle of all things in the whole univerſe is matter, or atoms devoid of all qualities, and conſequently of all life, ſenſe and underſtanding; and therefore the original of things is no underſtanding nature, or deity.

XI. Seventhly, The Democritick Atheiſts argue further after this manner: They who aſſert a Deity, ſuppoſe ἔμψυχον εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, *the whole world to be animated*, that is, to have a living, rational and underſtanding nature preſiding over it. Now it is already evident from ſome of the premiſed arguments, that the world cannot be animated, in the ſenſe of Platoniſts, that is, with an incorporeal ſoul, which is in order of nature before body, it being proved already, that there can be no ſubſtance incorporeal; as likewiſe that it cannot be animated neither in the Stoical ſenſe, ſo as to have an original quality of underſtanding or mind in the matter; but yet nevertheleſs ſome may poſſibly imagine, that as in our ſelves and other animals, though compounded of ſenſeleſs atoms, there is a ſoul and mind, reſulting from the contexture of them, which being once made, domineers over the body, governing and ordering it at pleaſure; ſo there may be likewiſe ſuch a living ſoul and mind, not only in the ſtars, which many have ſuppoſed to be leſſer deities, and in the ſun, which has been reputed a principal deity; but alſo in the whole mundane ſyſtem, made up of earth, ſeas, air, ether, ſun, moon, and ſtars all together; one general ſoul and mind, which though reſulting at firſt from the fortuitous motion of matter, yet being once produced,

[1] Id. Lib. I. ver. 1020.

may rule, govern and ſway the whole, underſtandingly, and in a more perfect manner than our ſouls do our bodies; and ſo long as it continues, exerciſe a principality and dominion over it. Which although it will not amount to the full notion of a God, according to the ſtrict ſenſe of Theiſts, yet it will approach very near unto it, and indanger the bringing in of all the ſame inconveniencies along with it. Wherefore they will now prove, that there is no ſuch ſoul or mind as this, (reſulting from the contexture of atoms) that preſides over the corporeal univerſe, that ſo there may not be ſo much as the ſhadow of a Deity left.

It was obſerved before, that life, ſenſe, reaſon and underſtanding are but qualities of concreted bodies, like thoſe other qualities of heat, and cold, *&c.* ariſing from certain particular textures of atoms. Now as thoſe firſt principles of bodies, namely ſingle atoms, have none of thoſe qualities in them, ſo neither hath the whole univerſe any (that it can be denominated from) but only the parts of it. The whole world is neither black nor white, hot nor cold, pellucid nor opake, it containing all thoſe qualities in its ſeveral parts. In like manner, the whole has no life, ſenſe, nor underſtanding in it, but only the parts of it, which are called animals. That is, life and ſenſe are qualities, that ariſe only from ſuch a texture of atoms as produceth ſoft fleſh, blood, and brains, in bodies organized, with head, heart, bowels, nerves, muſcles, veins, arteries and the like;

[1] ——————*Senſus jungitur omnis*
Viſceribus, nervis, venis, quæcunque videmus,
Mollia mortali conſiſtere corpore creta;

And reaſon and underſtanding, properly ſo called, are peculiar appendices to human ſhape; [2] *Ratio nuſquam eſſe poteſt niſi in hominis figura.* From whence it is concluded, that there is no life, ſoul nor underſtanding acting the whole world, becauſe the world hath no blood nor brains, nor any animaliſh or human form [3]. *Qui mundum ipſum animantem ſapientemque eſſe dixerunt, nullo modo viderunt animi naturam, in quam figuram cadere poſſet.* Therefore the Epicurean poet concludes upon this ground, that there is no divine ſenſe in the whole world;

[4] *Diſpoſitum videtur ubi eſſe & creſcere poſſit*
Seorſim anima atque animus; tanto magis inficiandum,
Totum poſſe extra corpus formámque animalem,
Putribus in glebis terrarum, aut ſolis in igni,
Aut in aqua durare, aut altis ætheris oris.
Haud igitur conſtant divino prædita ſenſu,
Quandoquidem nequeunt vitaliter eſſe animata.

Now if there be no life nor underſtanding above us, nor round about us, not any where elſe in the world, but only in our ſelves and fellow animals, and we

[1] Id. Lib. II. ver. 903, &c.
[2] Velleius apud Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. cap. XVIII. p. 2907.
[3] Id. ibid. Lib. I. cap. X. p. 2893. Tom. IX Oper.
[4] Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 143, &c.

we be the higheſt of all beings; if neither the whole corporeal ſyſtem be animated, nor thoſe greater parts of it, ſun, moon nor ſtars, then there can be no danger of any Deity.

XII. Eighthly, the Democritick Atheiſts diſpute further againſt a Deity in this manner: the Deity is generally ſuppoſed to be ζῶον μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον, *a perfectly happy animal, incorruptible and immortal.* Now there is no living being incorruptible and immortal, and therefore none perfectly happy neither. For, according to that Democritick hypotheſis of atoms in vacuity, the only incorruptible things will be theſe three: firſt of all, vacuum or empty ſpace, which muſt needs be ſuch, becauſe it cannot ſuffer from any thing, ſince it is *plagarum expers*,

[1] *Et manet intactum, nec ab ictu fungitur hilum.*

Secondly, the ſingle atoms, becauſe by reaſon of their parvitude and ſolidity they are indiviſible; and laſtly, the *ſumma ſummarum* of all things, that is the comprehenſion of all atoms diſperſed every where throughout infinite ſpace.

[2] *——Quia nulla loci ſtat copia certum*
Quò quaſi res poſſint diſcedere diſſoluüique.

But according to that other hypotheſis of ſome modern Atomiſts (which alſo was entertained of old by *Empedocles*) that ſuppoſes a plenity, there is nothing at all incorruptible, but the ſubſtance of matter it ſelf. All ſyſtems and compages of it, all συγκρίματα and ἀθροίσματα, all concretions and coagmentations of matter divided by motion, together with the qualities reſulting from them, are corruptible and deſtroyable: [3] *quæ eſt coagmentatio rerum non diſſolubilis?* Death deſtroys not the ſubſtance of any matter; for as no matter came from nothing, but was ſelf-eternal, ſo none of it can ever vaniſh into nothing; but it diſſolves all the aggregations of it.

[4] *Non ſic interimit mors res, ut materiaï*
Corpora conficiat, ſed cœtum diſſupat ollis.

Life is no ſubſtantial thing, nor any primitive or ſimple nature; it is only an accident or quality ariſing from the aggregation and contexture of atoms or corpuſcula, which when the compages of them is diſunited and diſſolved, though all the ſubſtance ſtill remain ſcattered and diſperſed, yet the life utterly periſhes and vaniſheth into nothing. No life is immortal; there is no immortal ſoul; nor immortal animal, or Deity. Though this whole mundane ſyſtem were it ſelf an animal, yet being but an aggregation of matter, it would be both corruptible and mortal. Wherefore ſince no living being can poſſibly

[1] Id. Lib. V. verſ. 358. Addas etiam Lib. III. verſ. 814.
[2] Id. Lib. III. verſ. 815.
[3] Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. cap. VIII. p. 2891. Tom. IX. Oper.
[4] Lucret. Lib. II. verſ. 1001.

have any ſecurity of its future permanency, there is none that can be perfectly happy. And it was rightly determined by our fellow-atheiſts, the Hedonicks and Cyrenaicks, [1] εὐδαιμονία ἀνύπαρκτον, *perfect happineſs is a mere notion*, a romantick fiction, a thing which can have no exiſtence any where. This is recorded to have been one of *Democritus* his chief arguments againſt a Deity, becauſe there can be no living being immortal, and conſequently none perfectly happy. [2] *Cum Democritus, quia nihil ſemper ſuo ſtatu maneat, neget eſſe quicquam ſempiternum, nonne Deum ità tollit omnino, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat?*

XIII. A ninth pretended demonſtration of theDemocritick Atheiſts is as followeth. By God is underſtood a firſt cauſe or mover, which being not before acted upon by any thing elſe, but acting originally from it ſelf, was the beginning of all things. Now it is an indubitable axiom, and generally received among philoſophers, that nothing can move it ſelf, but *quicquid movetur, ab alio movetur*; *whatſoever is moved, is moved by ſomething elſe*; nothing can act otherwiſe than it is made to act by ſomething without it, acting upon it. The neceſſary conſequence whereof is this, that there can be no ſuch thing as any firſt mover, or firſt cauſe, that is, no God. This argument is thus urged by a modern writer [3], agreeably to the ſenſe of the ancient Democriticks; *Ex eo quòd nihil poteſt movere ſeipſum, non inferretur, id quod inferri ſolet, nempe Eternum Immobile, ſed contrà Æternum Motum, ſiquidem ut verum eſt, nihil moveri à ſeipſo, ita etiam verum eſt nihil moveri niſi à moto. From hence, that nothing can move it ſelf, it cannot be rightly inferred, as commonly it is, that there is an eternal immoveable mover* (that is, a God) *but only an eternal moved mover; or that one thing was moved by another from eternity, without any firſt mover. Becauſe as it is true, that nothing can be moved from it ſelf; ſo it is likewiſe true, that nothing can be moved but from that which was it ſelf alſo moved by ſomething elſe before:* and ſo the progreſs upwards muſt needs be infinite, without any beginning or firſt mover. The plain drift and ſcope of this ratiocination is no other than this, to ſhew that the argument commonly taken from motion, to prove a God, (that is, a firſt mover or cauſe) is not only ineffectual and inconcluſive; but alſo that, on the contrary, it may be demonſtrated from that very topick of motion, that there can be no abſolutely firſt mover, no firſt in the order of cauſes, that is, no God.

XIV. Tenthly, becauſe the Theiſts conceive that though no body can move it ſelf, yet a perfect cogitative and thinking being might be the beginning of all, and the firſt cauſe of motion; the Atheiſts will endeavour to evince the contrary, in this manner. No man can conceive how any cogitation, which was not before, ſhould riſe up at any time, but that there was ſome cauſe for it, without the thinker. For elſe there can be no reaſon given, why this thought rather than that, and at this time rather than another, ſhould ſtart up. Wherefore this is univerſally true of all motion and action whatſoever, as it was rightly urged by the Stoicks, that there can be no κίνησις ἀναίτιος, no motion without a cauſe, *i. e.* no motion, which has not ſome cauſe without the

[1] Diog. Laert. Lib. II. ſegm. 94. p. 135.
[2] Cicero de Nat. Deor. L. I. cap. XII. p. 2897.
[3] Hobbs's Element. Philoſoph. Part IV. ſive Phyſic. cap. XXVI. §. 1. p. 204.

the ſubject of it, or, as the ſame thing is expreſſed by a modern writer, *Nothing taketh beginning from it ſelf but from the action of ſome other immediate agent without it.* Wherefore no thinking being could be a firſt cauſe, any more than an *automaton* or machine could. To this purpoſe, it is further argued, that theſe two notions, the one of a knowing underſtanding being, the other of a perfectly happy being, are contradictious, becauſe all knowledge eſſentially implies dependance upon ſomething elſe, as its cauſe; *ſcientia & intellectus ſignum eſt potentiæ ab alio dependentis, id quod non eſt beatiſſimum.* They conclude, that cogitation, and all action whatſoever, is really nothing elſe but local motion, which is eſſentially heterokineſy, that which can never riſe of it ſelf, but is cauſed by ſome other agent without its ſubject.

XV. In the eleventh place, the Democritick Atheiſts reaſon thus: If the world were made by any antecedent mind or underſtanding, that is, by a Deity; then there muſt needs be an idea, platform and exemplar of the whole world before it was made; and conſequently actual knowledge, both in order of time and nature, before things. But all knowledge is the information of the things themſelves known; all conception of the mind is a paſſion from the things conceived, and their activity upon it; and is therefore junior to them. Wherefore the world and things were before knowledge and the conception of any mind, and no knowledge, mind or deity before the world as its cauſe. This argument is thus propoſed by the atheiſtick Poet;

[1] *Exemplum porro gignundis rebus & ipſa*
Notities hominum Di vis unde inſita primùm,
Quid vellent facere, ut ſcirent, animoque viderent?
Quove modo eſt unquam vis cognita principiorum,
Quidnam inter ſeſe permutato ordine poſſent,
Si non ipſa dedit ſpecimen natura creandi?

How could the ſuppoſed Deity have a pattern or platform in his mind, to frame the world by, and whence ſhould he receive it? How could he have any knowledge of men before they were made, as alſo what himſelf ſhould will to do, when there was nothing? How could he underſtand the force and poſſibility of the principles, what they would produce when variouſly combined together, before nature and things themſelves, by creating, had given a ſpecimen?

XVI. A twelfth argumentation of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts againſt a Deity is to this purpoſe: that things could not be made by a Deity, that is ſuppoſed to be a being every way perfect, becauſe they are ſo faulty and ſo ill made: the argument is thus propounded by *Lucretius* [2];

Quòd ſi jam rerum ignorem primordia quæ ſint,
Hoc tamen ex ipſis cœli rationibus auſim
Confirmare, aliiſque ex rebus reddere multis,
Nequaquam nobis divinitùs eſſe paratam
Naturam rerum, tantâ ſtat prædita culpâ.

This

[1] Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 182. [2] Lib. II. ver. 177. & Lib. V. ver. 196.

This Argument, *à cœli rationibus*, from aſtronomy, or the conſtitution of the heavens, is this: [1] that the mundane ſphere is ſo framed, in reſpect of the diſpoſition of the æquator and ecliptic, as renders the greateſt part of the earth uninhabitable to men and moſt other animals; partly by that exceſs of heat in the torrid zone (containing all between the tropicks) and partly from the extremity of cold in both the frigid zones, towards either pole. Again, whereas the Stoical Theiſts contemporary with *Epicurus* concluded, that the whole world was made by a Deity, only for the ſake of men,

[2] ——————— *Horum omnia cauſâ*
Conſtituiſſe Deum fingunt ———————

it is urged on the contrary, that a great part of the habitable earth is taken up by ſeas, lakes and rocks, barren heaths and ſands, and thereby made uſeleſs for mankind; and that the remainder of it yields no fruit to them, unleſs expugned by obſtinate labour; after all which, men are often diſappointed of the fruits of thoſe labours by unſeaſonable weather, ſtorms and tempeſts. Again, that nature has not only produced many noxious and poiſonous herbs, but alſo deſtructive and devouring animals, whoſe ſtrength ſurpaſſeth that of mens; and that the condition of mankind is ſo much inferior to that of brutes, that nature ſeems to have been but a ſtep-mother to the former, whilſt ſhe hath been an indulgent mother to the latter. And to this purpoſe, the manner of mens coming into the world is thus aggravated by the poet:

[3] *Tum porro puer, ut ſævis projectus ab undis*
Navita, nudus humi jacet, infans, indigus omni
Vitaï auxilio, cùm primùm in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit:
Vagitúque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum 'ſt,
Quoi tantum in vita reſtet tranſire malorum.

But on the contrary, the comparative advantages of brutes and their privileges, which they have above men, are deſcribed after this manner:

[4] *At variæ creſcunt pecudes, armenta, feræque:*
Nec crepitacula eis opu' ſunt nec quoiquam adhibenda 'ſt
Almæ nutricis blanda atque infracta loquela;
Nec varias quærunt veſtes pro tempore cœli.
Denique non armis opus eſt, non mœnibus altis,
Queis ſua tutentur, quando omnibus omnia largè
Tellus ipſa parit, naturáque Dædala rerum.

And laſtly, the topick of evils in general, is inſiſted upon by them, not thoſe which are called *culpæ*, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democritick Atheiſts utterly explode in the genuine ſenſe of it) but the evils of pain and trouble; which they diſpute concerning, after this manner. [5] The ſuppoſed Deity and maker of

[1] Vid. Lucret. Lib V. ver. 205, 206. &. Cicer. in Somnio Scipionis cap. VI. p. 3981. Tom. XI. Oper.

[2] Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 174, 175.

[3] Id. Lib. V. ver. 223.

[4] Id. ibid.

[5] Vide Lactat. de Irâ Dei. cap. XIII. p. 942. Edit. Walchii.

of the world was either willing to aboliſh all evils, but not able; or he was able but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able; or elſe laſtly, he was both able and willing. This latter is the only thing that anſwers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the ſuppoſed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to aboliſh all evils, is plain, becauſe then there would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore ſince there is ſuch a deluge of evils overflowing all, it muſt needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or elſe he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or laſtly, he was neither able nor willing, and then he was both impotent and envious.

XVII. In the twelfth place, the Atheiſts further diſpute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence; and if there were any providence, it muſt appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is *Tohu* and *Bohu*, chaos and confuſion; things happening alike to all, to the wiſe and fooliſh, religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For theſe names the Atheiſt cannot chuſe but make uſe of, though by taking away natural morality, they really deſtroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by the tumbling billows of careleſs fortune and chance. The impieties of *Dionyſius* [1], his ſcoffing abuſes of religion, and whatſoever was then ſacred, or worſhip'd under the notion of a God, were moſt notorious; and yet it is obſerved, that he fared never a jot the worſe for it. *Hunc nec Olympius Jupiter fulmine percuſſit, nec Æſculapius miſero diuturnóque morbo tabeſcentem interemit; verùm in ſuo lectulo mortuus, in Tympanidis rogum illatus eſt, eámque poteſtatem, quam ipſe per ſcelus nactus erat, quaſi juſtam & legitimam, hæreditatis loco tradidit: Neither did* Jupiter Olympius *ſtrike him with a thunderbolt, nor* Æſculapius *inflict any languiſhing diſeaſe upon him; but he died in his bed, and was honourably interred, and that power, which he had wickedly acquired, he tranſmitted, as a juſt and lawful inheritance, to his poſterity.* And *Diogenes* the Cynick, though much a Theiſt, could not but acknowledge, that *Harpalus* a famous robber or pirate in thoſe times, who committing many villanous actions, notwithſtanding lived proſperouſly, did thereby *Teſtimonium dicere contra deos, bear teſtimony againſt the Gods* [2]. Though it has been objected by the Theiſts, and thought to be a ſtrong argument for providence, that there were ſo many tables hung up in temples, the monuments of ſuch as having prayed to the gods in ſtorms and tempeſts, had eſcaped ſhipwreck; yet as *Diagoras* obſerved, *Nuſquam picti ſunt, qui naufragium fecerunt, there are no tables extant of thoſe of them, who were ſhipwreck'd* [3]. Wherefore it was not conſidered by theſe Theiſts, how many of them that prayed as well to the gods, did notwithſtanding ſuffer ſhipwreck; as alſo how many of thoſe, which never made any devotional addreſſes at all to any deity, eſcaped equal dangers of ſtorms and tempeſts.

Moreover, it is conſentaneous to the opinion of a God, to think, that thunder rattling in the clouds with thunder-bolts ſhould be the immediate ſignifications

[1] Cicer. de Nat. Deor. Lib. III. cap. XXXV. p. 3101.

[2] Id. ibid. cap. XXXIV. p. 3099.

[3] Ibid. cap. XXXVIII. p. 3104.

ſignifications of his wrath and diſpleaſure: whereas it is plain, that theſe are flung at random, and that the fury of them often lights upon the innocent, whilſt the notoriouſly guilty ſcape untouched; and therefore we underſtand not, how this can be anſwered by any Theiſts.

[1] *Cur, quibus incautum ſcelus averſabile cumque eſt,*
Non faciunt, ictti flammas ut fulguris halent,
Pectore perfixo; documen mortalibus acre?
Et potiùs nullæ ſibi turpis conſcius reii,
Volvitur in flammis innoxius, inque peditur,
Turbine cæleſti ſubito correptus, & igni?

Now the force of this argument appears to be very powerful, becauſe it hath not only ſtaggered and confounded Theiſts in all ages, but alſo hath effectually transformed many of them into Atheiſts. For *Diagoras Melius* [2] himſelf was once a ſuperſtitious religioniſt, in ſo much that being a Dithyrambick poet, he began one of his poems with theſe words, κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τύχην πάντα τελεῖται, *all things are done by God and fortune.* But being injured afterwards by a perjured perſon, that ſuffered no evil nor diſaſter thereupon, he therefore took up this contrary perſuaſion, that there was no Deity. And there have been innumerable others, who have been ſo far wrought upon by this conſideration, as if not abſolutely to diſclaim and diſcard a Deity, yet utterly to deny providence, and all care of human affairs by any inviſible powers. Amongſt whom the poet was one, who thus expreſſed his ſenſe:

[3] *Sed cùm res hominum tantâ caligine volvi*
Aſpicerem, lætóſque diu florere nocentes,
Vexaríque pios, rurſus labefacta cadebat
Relligio, cauſæque viam non ſponte ſequebar
Alterius, vacuo quæ currere ſemina motu
Affirmat, magnúmque novas per inane figuras,
Fortunâ, non arte regi; quæ numina ſenſu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel neſcia noſtri.

XVIII. A thirteenth argumentation of the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts is to this purpoſe; that whereas the Deity is ſuppoſed to be ſuch a being, as both knows all that is done every where in the moſt diſtant places of the world at once, and doth himſelf immediately order all things, this is, firſt, impoſſible for any one being thus to animadvert and order all things in the whole univerſe:

[4] *Quis regere immenſi ſummam, quis habere profundi*
Indu manu validas potis eſt moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter cœlos omneis convertere? & omneis

Ignibus

[1] Lucret Lib. VI. ver. 389, &c.
[2] Vide Sext. Empiric. Lib IX. adver. Mathemat. §. LIII. p. 561.
[3] Claudian. in Rufinum Lib. I. ver. 12, &c.
[4] Lucret. Lib. II. ver. 1094, &c.

Ignibus ætheriis terras ſuffire feraceis?
Omnibus inque locis eſſe omni tempore præſtò;
Nubibus ut tenebras faciat, cælique ſerena
Concutiat ſonitu? &c.

And ſecondly, if it were ſuppoſed to be poſſible, yet ſuch infinite negotioſity would be abſolutely inconſiſtent with a happy ſtate; nor could ſuch a Deity ever have any quiet enjoyment of himſelf, being perpetually filled with tumult and hurliburly:[1] ὁ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματείαι καὶ φρονήσεις καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίνεται· *Diſtraction of buſineſs and ſollicitous cares, diſpleaſures and favours, do not at all agree with happineſs, but they proceed from imbecility, indigency and fear:*[2] Το μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται, ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον· *That which is happy and incorruptible, would neither have it ſelf any buſineſs to do, nor create any to others; it would neither have diſpleaſure nor favour towards any other perſons, to engage it in action; all this proceeding from indigency.* That is, favour and benevolence, as well as anger and diſpleaſure, ariſe only from imbecility. That which is perfectly happy, and wanteth nothing, ὅλον ὂν περὶ τὴν συνοχὴν τῆς ἰδίας εὐδαιμωνίας, *being wholly poſſeſſed and taken up in the enjoyment of its own happineſs*, would be regardleſs of the concernments of any others; and mind nothing beſides it ſelf, either to do it good or harm. Wherefore, this *curioſus & plenus negotii deus*[3], *this buſy, reſtleſs, and practmatical deity*, that muſt needs intermeddle and have to do with every thing in the whole world, is a contradictious notion, ſince it cannot but be the moſt unhappy of all things.

XIX. In the next place, the Atheiſts diſpute further by propounding ſeveral bold quæries, which they conceive unanſwerable, after this manner. If the world were made by a Deity, why was it not made by him ſooner? or ſince it was ſo long unmade, why did he make it at all?[4] *Cur mundi ædificator repentè extiterit, innumerabilia antè ſæcula dormierit? How came this builder and architect of the world to ſtart up upon a ſudden, after he had ſlept for infinite ages*, and bethink himſelf of making a world? For, certainly, if he had been awake all that while, he would either have made it ſooner, or not at all; becauſe there was either ſomething wanting to his happineſs, before, or nothing: if there had been any thing wanting before, then the world could not have been ſo long unmade; but if he were completely happy in himſelf without it, then μηδὲν ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἔμελλεν ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεσι, *wanting nothing, he vainly went about to make ſuperfluous things.* All deſire of change and novelty argues a faſtidious ſatiety, proceeding from defect and indigency;

[5] *Quidve novi potuit tantò pòſt, antè quietos*
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?

[1] Epicur. in Epiſt. ad Herodotum apud Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 77. p. 634.
[2] Vide Diog. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 139. 661.
[3] Velleius apud Cicer. de Natur. Deor. Lib. I. cap. XX. p. 2911.
[4] Id. ibid. Lib. I. cap. IX. p. 2891.
[5] Lucret. Lib. V. ver. 169, &c.

Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur
Quoi veteres obſunt; ſed quoi nil accidit ægri
Tempore in anteacto, cùm pulchrè degeret ævum,
Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?

Did this Deity therefore light up the ſtars, as ſo many lamps or torches, in that vaſt abyſs of infinite darkneſs, that himſelf might thereby have a more comfortable and chearful habitation? Why would he then content himſelf from eternity, to dwell in ſuch a melancholick, horrid, and forlorn dungeon?

[1] *An, credo, in tenebris vitâ & mœrore jacebat,*
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo?

Was company and that variety of things, by which heaven and earth are diſtinguiſhed, deſireable to him? Why then would he continue ſolitary ſo long, wanting the pleaſure of ſuch a ſpectacle? Did he make the world and men in it to this end, that himſelf might be worſhipped and adored, feared and honoured by them? But what could he be the better for that, who was ſufficiently happy alone in himſelf before? Or did he do it for the ſake of men, to gratify and oblige them?

[2] ——————*At quid immortalibus atque beatis*
Gratia noſtra queat largirier emolumenti,
Ut noſtrâ quicquam causâ gerere aggrediantur?

Again, if this were done for the ſake of men, then it muſt be either for wiſe men or for fools: if for wiſe men only, then all that pains was taken but for a very few; but if for fools, what reaſon could there be, why the Deity ſhould ſeek to deſerve ſo well at their hands? Beſides this, what hurt would it have been to any of us, (whether wiſe or fooliſh) never to have been made?

[3] *Quídve mali fuerat nobis non eſſe creatis?*
Natus enim debet quicunque eſt, velle manere
In vita, donec retinebit blanda voluptas:
Qui nunquam verò vitæ guſtavit amorem,
Nec fuit in numero, quid obeſt non eſſe creatum?

Laſtly, [4] if this Deity muſt needs go about moliminouſly to make a world, ἐργάτης δίκην καὶ τέκτονος, *like an artificer and carpenter*, what tools and inſtruments could he have to work withal? what miniſters and ſubſervient opificers? what engines and machines for the rearing up of ſo huge a fabrick? How could he make the matter to underſtand his meaning, and obey his beck? how could he move it, and turn it up and down? for if incorporeal, he could neither touch nor be touched, but would run through all things, without.

[1] Id. ibid. ver. 175, 176.
[2] Id. ibid. ver. 166.
[3] Id. ibid. ver. 177, &c.
[4] Vide Ciceron. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. cap. VIII. p. 2890.

out faſtening upon any thing; but if corporeal, then the ſame thing was both materials and architect, both timber and carpenter, and the ſtones muſt hew themſelves, and bring themſelves together, with diſcretion, into a ſtructure.

XX. In the laſt place, the Atheiſts argue from intereſt (which proves many times the moſt effectual of all arguments) againſt a Deity; endeavouring to perſuade, that it is, firſt, the intereſt of private perſons, and of all mankind in general, and ſecondly, the particular intereſt of civil ſovereigns, and commonwealths, that there ſhould neither be a God, nor the belief of any ſuch thing entertained by the minds of men; that is, no religion. Firſt, they ſay therefore, that it is the intereſt of mankind in general; becauſe ſo long as men are perſuaded, that there is an underſtanding being infinitely powerful, having no law but his own will, (becauſe he has no ſuperiour) that may do whatever he pleaſes at any time to them, they can never ſecurely enjoy themſelves or any thing, nor be ever free from diſquieting fear and ſolicitude. What the poets fable of *Tantalus* in hell, being always in fear, of a huge ſtone hanging over his head, and ready every moment to tumble down upon him, is nothing to that true fear, which men have of a Deity, and religion, here in this life, which indeed was the very thing mythologized in it.

[1] *Nec miſer impendens magnum timet aëre ſaxum*
Tantalus, (ut fama eſt) caſsâ formidine torpens:
Sed magìs in vita, divûm metus urget inanis
Mortales, casúmque timent, quemcumque ferat fors.

For beſides mens inſecurity from all manner of preſent evils, upon the ſuppoſition of a God, the immortality of ſouls can hardly be kept out, but it will croud in after it; and then the fear of eternal puniſhments after death will unavoidably follow thereupon, perpetually embittering all the ſolaces of life, and never ſuffering men to have the leaſt ſincere enjoyment.

[2] ————*ſi certum finem eſſe viderent*
Ærumnarum homines, aliquâ ratione valerent
Relligionibus, atque minis obſiſtere vatum.
Nunc ratio nulla eſt reſtandi, nulla facultas:
Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum.
Ignoratur enim, quæ ſit natura animaï,
Nata ſit, an contrà naſcentibus inſinuetur;
Et ſimul intereat nobiſcum morte dirempta,
An tenebras Orci viſat vaſtáſque lacunas.

Wherefore it is plain, that they, who firſt introduced the belief of a Deity and religion, whatever they might aim at in it, deſerved very ill of all mankind, becauſe they did thereby infinitely debaſe and depreſs mens ſpirits under a ſervile fear;

[3] *Efficiunt animos humiles, formidine divûm,*
Depreſsóſque premunt ad terram:

[1] Lucret. Lib. III. ver. 993. [2] Id. Lib. I. ver. 108, &c. [3] Id. Lib. VI. ver. 51.

As alſo cauſe the greateſt griefs and calamities, that now diſturb human life,

> [1] *Quantos tum gemitus ipſi ſibi, quantáque nobis*
> *Volnera, quas lachrymas peperere minoribu' noſtris?*

There can be no comfortable and happy living, without baniſhing from our mind the belief of theſe two things, of a Deity, and the ſoul's immortality;

> [2] *Et metus ille foràs præceps Acheruntis agendus*
> *Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo,*
> *Omnia ſuffundens mortis nigrore, neque ullam*
> *Eſſe voluptatem liquidam purámque relinquit.*

It was therefore a noble and heroical exploit of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, thoſe two good-natur'd men, who ſeeing the world thus oppreſſed under the grievous yoke of religion, the fear of a Deity, and puniſhment after death, and taking pity of this ſad condition of mankind, did manfully encounter that affrightful ſpectre, or empuſa, of a providential Deity; and by clear philoſophick reaſons, chaſe it away, and baniſh it quite out of the world; laying down ſuch principles, as would ſolve all the phænomena of nature without a God;

> [3] *Quæ bene cognita ſi teneas, natura videtur*
> *Libera continuò, dominis privata ſuperbis,*
> *Ipſa ſuâ per ſe ſponte omnia dîs agere expers.*

So that *Lucretius* does not without juſt cauſe erect a triumphal arch or monument to *Epicurus*, for this conqueſt or victory of his obtained over the Deity and religion, in this manner;

> [4] *Humana ante oculos fœdè quum vita jaceret*
> *In terris, oppreſſa gravi ſub relligione,*
> *Quæ caput à cœli regionibus oſtendebat,*
> *Horribili ſuper aſpectu mortalibus inſtans;*
> *Primùm Graius homo mortales tendere contrà*
> *Eſt oculos auſus, primúſque obſiſtere contrà;*
> *Quem nec fama deûm nec fulmina, nec minitanti*
> *Murmure compreſſit cœlum, &c.*

XXI. That it is alſo the intereſt of civil ſovereigns and of all commonwealths, that there ſhould neither be Deity nor religion, the Democritick Atheiſts would perſuade in this manner: A body politick or commonwealth is made up of parts, that are all naturally diſſociated from one another, by reaſon of that principle of private ſelf-love, who therefore can be no otherwiſe held together than by fear. Now if there be any greater fear than the fear of the Leviathan, and civil

[1] Id. Lib. V. ver. 1195.
[2] Id. Lib. III. ver. 37.
[3] Id. Lib. II. ver. 1089.
[4] Id. Lib. I. ver. 63.

civil repreſentative, the whole ſtructure and machine of this great coloſs muſt needs fall a-pieces, and tumble down. The civil ſovereign reigns only in fear; wherefore unleſs his fear be the king and ſovereign of all fears, his empire and dominion ceaſes. But as the rod of *Moſes* devoured the rods of the magicians, ſo certainly will the fear of an omnipotent Deity, that can puniſh with eternal torments after death, quite ſwallow up and devour that comparatively petty fear of civil ſovereigns, and conſequently deſtroy the being of commonwealths, which have no foundation in nature, but are mere artificial things, made by the enchantment and magical art of policy. Wherefore it is well obſerved by a modern writer, *That men ought not to ſuffer themſelves to be abuſed by the doctrine of ſeparated eſſences and incorporeal ſubſtances*, (ſuch as God and the ſoul) *built upon the vain philoſophy of* Ariſtotle, *that would fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, (as of hell, damnation, fire and brimſtone) as men fright birds from the corn with an empty hat, doublet, and a crooked ſtick.* And again, *If the fear of ſpirits* (the chief of which is the Deity) *were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are for civil obedience.*

Moreover, the power of civil ſovereigns is perfectly indiviſible; 'tis either all or nothing; it muſt be abſolute and infinite, or elſe 'tis none at all. Now it cannot be ſo, if there be any other power equal to it, to ſhare with it, much leſs if there be any ſuperiour (as that of the Deity) to check it and controul it. Wherefore the Deity muſt of neceſſity be removed and diſplaced, to make room for the Leviathan to ſpread himſelf in.

Laſtly, 'tis perfectly inconſiſtent with the nature of a body politick, that there ſhould be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, juſt or unjuſt allowed. But conſcience (which theiſm and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictious to civil ſovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conſcience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) beſides the law of the country; the allowance of private conſcience being, *ipſo facto*, a diſſolution of the body politick, and a return to the ſtate of nature. Upon all theſe accounts it muſt needs be acknowledged, that thoſe philoſophers, who undermine and weaken theiſm and religion, do highly deſerve of all civil ſovereigns and commonwealths.

XXII. Now from all the premiſed conſiderations, the Democriticks confidently conclude againſt a Deity; that the ſyſtem and compages of the univerſe had not its original from any underſtanding nature; but that mind and underſtanding it ſelf, as well as all things elſe in the world, ſprung up from ſenſleſs nature and chance, or from the unguided and undirected motion of matter. Which is therefore called by the name of nature, becauſe whatſoever moves is moved by nature and neceſſity; and the mutual occurſions and rencounters of atoms, their *plagæ*, their ſtrokes and daſhings againſt one another, their reflexions and repercuſſions, their coheſions, implexions and entanglements, as alſo their ſcattered diſperſions and divulſions, are all natural and

and neceſſary; but it is called alſo by the name of chance and fortune, becauſe it is all unguided by any mind, counſel or deſign.

Wherefore infinite atoms of different ſizes and figures, devoid of all life and ſenſe, moving fortuitouſly from eternity in infinite ſpace, and making ſucceſſively ſeveral encounters, and conſequently various implexions and entanglements with one another, produced firſt a confuſed chaos of theſe omnifarious particles, jumbling together with infinite variety of motions, which afterward, by the tugging of their different and contrary forces, whereby they all hindred and abated each other, came, as it were by joint conſpiracy, to be conglomerated into a vortex or vortexes; where after many convoluſions and evolutions, molitions and eſſays (in which all manner of tricks were tried, and all forms imaginable experimented) they chanced, in length of time, here to ſettle, into this form and ſyſtem of things, which now is, of earth, water, air and fire; ſun, moon and ſtars; plants, animals and men; ſo that ſenſleſs atoms, fortuitouſly moved, and material chaos, were the firſt original of all things.

This account of the *coſmopœia*, and firſt original of the mundane ſyſtem, is repreſented by *Lucretius* [1] according to the mind of *Epicurus*, though without any mention of thoſe vortices, which were yet an eſſential part of the old Democritick hypotheſis.

Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiaï
Fundarit cœlum, ac terram, pontique profunda,
Solis, lunaï curſus, ex ordine ponam.
Nam certè neque conſilio primordia rerum
Ordine ſe quæque atque ſagaci mente locarunt:
Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profectò.
Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum,
Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis,
Ponderibúſque ſuis conſuerunt concita ferri,
Omni-modiſque coire, atque omnia pertentare,
Quæcunque inter ſe poſſent congreſſa creare:
Proptereà fit, utì magnum volgata per ævum,
Omnigenos cœtus, & motus experiundo,
Tandem ea conveniant, quæ ut convenere, repentè
Magnarum rerum fiant exordia ſæpe,
Terraï, maris, & cœli, generiſque animantum.

But becauſe ſome ſeem to think that *Epicurus* was the firſt founder and inventor of this doctrine, we ſhall here obſerve, that this ſame atheiſtick hypotheſis was long before deſcribed by *Plato*, when *Epicurus* was, as yet unborn; and therefore doubtleſs according to the doctrine of *Leucippus*, *Democritus* and *Protagoras*; though that Philoſopher, in a kind of diſdain (as it ſeems) refuſed to mention either of their names: [2] πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, Φύσει παντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ ἀδεν τάτων. καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα αὖ σώματα, γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ἄστρων τε πέρι, διὰ τάτων γεγονέναι, παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. τύχῃ δὲ

[1] Lib. V. ver. 417, &c.

[2] Plato de Legibus, Lib X. p 666. Oper.

δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἑκάστων, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν, ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πως, &c. ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα οὕτω γεγεννηκέναι τὸν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα κατ' οὐρανόν· καὶ ζῶα αὖ καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα, ὡρῶν πασῶν ἐκ τούτων γενομένων· οὐ διὰ νοῦν (φασιν) οὐδὲ διά τινα θεόν, οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην, ἀλλὰ, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ, τέχνην δὲ ὕστερον ἐκ τούτων ὑστέραν γενομένην, &c. *The Atheiſts ſay, that fire, water, air and earth* (*i. e.* the four elements) *were all made by nature and chance; and none of them by art or mind* (that is, they were made by the fortuitous motion of atoms, and not by any Deity) *and that thoſe other bodies, of the terreſtrial globe, of the ſun, the moon, and the ſtars* (which by all, except theſe Atheiſts, were, in thoſe times, generally ſuppoſed to be animated, and a kind of inferior Deities) *were afterwards made out of the aforeſaid elements, being altogether inanimate. For they being moved fortuitouſly, or as it happened, and ſo making various commixtures together, did, by that means, at length produce the whole heavens and all things in them, as likewiſe plants and animals here upon earth; all which were not made by mind, nor by art, nor by any God; but, as we ſaid before, by nature and chance; art, and mind it ſelf, riſing up afterwards from the ſame ſenſleſs principles in animals.*

CHAP.

THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. III.

An introduction to the confutation of the atheiſtick grounds, in which is contained a particular account of all the ſeveral forms of atheiſm. 1. *That the grounds of the hylozoick atheiſm could not be inſiſted on in the former chapter, together with thoſe of the atomick, they being directly contrary each to other; with a further account of this hylozoick atheiſm.* 2. *A ſuggeſtion, by way of caution, for the preventing of all miſtakes, that every Hylozoiſt muſt not therefore be condemned for an Atheiſt, or a mere counterfeit hiſtrionical Theiſt.* 3. *That nevertheleſs, ſuch Hylozoiſts as are alſo Corporealiſts can by no means be excuſed from the imputation of atheiſm, for two reaſons.* 4. *That* Strato Lampſacenus, *commonly called* Phyſicus, *ſeems to have been the firſt aſſerter of the hylozoick atheiſm, he holding no other God but the life of nature in matter.* 5. *Further proved, that* Strato *was an Atheiſt, and that of a different form from* Democritus, *he attributing an energetick nature, but without ſenſe and animality, to all matter.* 6. *That* Strato *not deriving all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as the Democritick Atheiſts did, nor yet acknowledging any one plaſtick nature to preſide over the whole, but deducing the original of things from a mixture of chance and plaſtick nature both together in the ſeveral parts of matter, muſt therefore needs be an hylozoick Atheiſt.* 7. *That the famous* Hippocrates *was neither an Hylozoick nor Democritick Atheiſt, but rather an Heraclitick corporeal Theiſt.* 8. *That* Plato *took no notice of the hylozoick atheiſm, nor of any*

 other

other than what derives the original of all things from a mere fortuitous nature; and therefore, either the Democritical, or the Anaximandrian Atheiſm, which latter will be next declared. 9. *That it is hardly imaginable, there ſhould have been no philoſophick Atheiſts in the world before* Democritus *and* Leucippus, *there being in all ages, as* Plato *obſerves, ſome or other ſick of the atheiſtick diſeaſe. That* Ariſtotle *affirms many of the firſt philoſophers to have aſſigned only a material cauſe of the mundane ſyſtem, without either efficient or intending cauſe; they ſuppoſing matter to be the only ſubſtance, and all things elſe nothing but the paſſions and accidents of it, generable and corruptible.* 10. *That the doctrine of theſe Materialiſts will be more fully underſtood from the exceptions, which* Ariſtotle *makes againſt them: his firſt exception, That they aſſigned no cauſe of motion, but introduced it into the world unaccountably,* 11. Ariſtotle's *ſecond exception, That theſe Materialiſts did aſſign no cauſe* τῦ εὖ καλῶς, *of well and fit, and give no account of the orderly regularity of things. That* Anaxagoras *was the firſt Ionick philoſopher, who made mind and good a principle of the univerſe.* 12. *Concluded, That* Ariſtotle's *Materialiſts were downright Atheiſts, not merely becauſe they held all ſubſtance to be body, ſince* Heraclitus *and* Zeno *did the like, and yet are not therefore accounted Atheiſts, (they ſuppoſing their fiery matter to be originally intellectual, and the whole world to be an animal;) but becauſe theſe made ſtupid matter, devoid of all underſtanding and life, to be the only principle.* 13. *As alſo, becauſe they ſuppoſed every thing beſides the ſubſtance of matter, life and underſtanding, and all particular beings, to be generable, and corruptible, and conſequently, that there could be no other God, than ſuch as was native and mortal. That thoſe ancient theologers, who were Theogoniſts, and generated all the Gods out of night and chaos, were only verbal Theiſts, but real Atheiſts; ſenſleſs matter being to them the higheſt* Numen. 14. *The great difference obſerved betwixt* Ariſtotle's *atheiſtical Materialiſts and the Italick philoſophers, the former determining all things, beſides the ſubſtance of matter, to be made or generated, the latter that no real entity was either generated or corrupted; thereupon both deſtroying qualities and forms of body, and aſſerting the ingenerability and incorporeity of ſouls.* 15. *How* Ariſtotle's *atheiſtick Materialiſts endeavoured to baffle and elude that axiom of the Italick philoſophers, That nothing can come from nothing nor go to nothing; and that* Anaxagoras *was the firſt amongſt the Ionicks, who yielded ſo far to that principle, as from thence to aſſert incorporeal ſubſtance, and the pre-exiſtence of qualities and forms in ſimilar atoms, foraſmuch as he conceived them to be things really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of matter.* 16. *The error of ſome writers, who becauſe* Ariſtotle *affirms, that the ancient philoſophers did generally conclude the world to have been made, from thence infer, that they were all Theiſts, and that* Ariſtotle *contradicts himſelf in repreſenting many of them as Atheiſts. That the ancient Atheiſts did generally* κοσμοποιεῖν, *aſſert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning; as alſo ſome Theiſts did maintain its eternity, but in a way of dependency upon the Deity. That we ought here to diſtinguiſh betwixt the ſyſtem of the world, and the ſubſtance of the matter, all Atheiſts aſſerting the matter to have been, not only eternal, but alſo ſuch independently upon any other being.* 17. *That* Plato *and others concluded this materialiſm, or hylo-*

pathian atheiſm, to have been at leaſt as old as Homer, *who made the ocean (or fluid matter) the father of all the gods. And that this was indeed the ancienteſt of all atheiſms, which verbally acknowledging gods, yet derived the original of them all from night and chaos. The deſcription of this atheiſtick hypotheſis in* Ariſtophanes, *That night and chaos firſt laid an egg, out of which ſprung forth love, which afterwards mingling with chaos, begat heaven and earth, animals and all the Gods.* 18. *That notwithſtanding this, in* Ariſtotle's *judgment,* Parmenides, Heſiod, *and others, who made love in like manner, ſenior to all the gods, were to be exempted out of the number of Atheiſts; they underſtanding this love to be an active principle, or cauſe of motion in the univerſe, which therefore could not riſe from an egg of the night, nor be the off-ſpring of chaos, but muſt be ſomething in order of nature before matter.* Simmias Rhodius *his Wings, a poem in honour of this heavenly love. This not that love, which was the offſpring of* Penia *and* Porus *in* Plato. *In what rectified ſenſe it may paſs for true theology, that love is the ſupreme Deity and original of all things.* 19. *That though* Democritus *and* Leucippus *be elſewhere taxed by* Ariſtotle *for this very thing, that they aſſigned only a material cauſe of the univerſe; yet they were not the perſons intended by him in the fore-cited accuſation, but certain ancienter philoſophers, who alſo were not Atomiſts, but Hylopathians.* 20. *That* Ariſtotle's *atheiſtick Materialiſts were all the firſt Ionick philoſophers before* Anaxagoras, Thales *being the head of them. But that* Thales *is acquitted from this imputation of atheiſm by ſeveral good authors (with an account how he came to be thus differently repreſented) and therefore that his next ſucceſſor* Anaximander *is rather to be accounted the prince of this atheiſtick philoſophy.* 21. *A paſſage out of* Ariſtotle *objected, which, at firſt ſight, ſeems to make* Anaximander *a divine philoſopher, and therefore hath led both modern and ancient writers into that miſtake. That this place well conſidered proves the contrary, That* Anaximander *was the chief of the old atheiſtick philoſophers.* 22. *That it is no wonder, if* Anaximander *called ſenſleſs matter the* τὸ θεῖον, *or God, ſince to all Atheiſts that muſt needs be the higheſt* Numen; *alſo how this is ſaid to be immortal, and to govern all; with the concurrent judgment of the* Greek *ſcholiaſts upon this place.* 23. *A further account of the Anaximandrian philoſophy, manifeſting it to have been purely atheiſtical.* 24. *What ill judges the vulgar have been of Theiſts and Atheiſts; as alſo that learned men have commonly ſuppoſed fewer Atheiſts than indeed there were.* Anaximander *and* Democritus *Atheiſts both alike, though philoſophizing different ways. That ſome paſſages in* Plato *reſpect the Anaximandrian form of Atheiſm, rather than the Democritical.* 25. *Why* Democritus *and* Leucippus *new-modell'd atheiſm into the atomick form.* 26. *That beſides the three forms of atheiſm already mentioned, we ſometimes meet with a fourth, which ſuppoſes the univerſe, though not to be an animal, yet a kind of plant or vegetable, having one plaſtick nature in it, devoid of underſtanding and ſenſe, which diſpoſes and orders the whole.* 27. *That this form of atheiſm, which makes one plaſtick life to preſide over the whole, is different from the hylozoick, in that it takes away all fortuitouſneſs, and ſubjects all to the fate of one plaſtick methodical nature.* 28. *Though it be poſſible, that ſome in all ages might have entertained this atheiſtical conceit, that things are diſpenſed by one regular and methodical, but unknowing ſenſleſs nature; yet*

it seems to have been chiefly asserted by certain spurious Heracliticks and Stoicks. And therefore this form of atheism, which supposes one cosmoplastick nature, may be called Pseudo-Zenonian. 29. *That, besides the philosophic Atheists, there have been always enthusiastick and fanatical Atheists, though in some sense all Atheists may be said also to be both enthusiasts and fanaticks, they being led by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, or irrational impetus.* 30. *That there cannot easily be any other form of atheism, besides those four already mentioned, because all Atheists are Corporealists, and yet all Corporealists not Atheists, but only such as make the first principle of all things not to be intellectual.* 31. *A distribution of atheisms producing the former quaternio, and showing the difference between them.* 32. *That they are but bunglers at atheism, who talk of sensitive and rational matter; and that the canting astrological Atheists are not at all considerable, because not understanding themselves.* 33. *Another distribution of atheisms; That they either derive the original of things from a merely fortuitous principle, the unguided motion of matter, or else from a plastick and methodical, but senseless nature. What Atheists denied the eternity of the world, and what asserted it.* 34. *That of these four forms of atheism, the Atomick or Democritical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical are the chief; and that these two being once confuted, all atheism will be confuted.* 35. *These two forms of atheism being contrary to one another, how we ought in all reason to insist rather upon the atomick; but that afterwards we shall confute the hylozoick also, and prove against all Corporealists, that no cogitation nor life belongs to matter.* 36. *That in the mean time we shall not neglect any form of atheism, but confute them all together, as agreeing in one principle; as also show, how the old atomick Atheists did sufficiently overthrow the foundation of the Hylozoists.* 37. *Observed here, that the Hylozoists are not condemned merely for asserting a plastic life, distinct from the animal, (which, with most other philosophers, we judge highly probable, if taken in a right sense;) but for grosly misunderstanding it, and attributing the same to matter. The plastick life of nature largely explained.* 38. *That though the confutation of the atheistic grounds, according to the laws of method, ought to have been reserved for the last part of this discourse; yet we having reasons to violate those laws, crave the reader's pardon for this preposterousness. A considerable observation of* Plato's, *that it is not only moral vitiosity, which inclines men to atheize, but also an affectation of seeming wiser than the generality of mankind; as likewise, that the Atheists, making such pretence to wit, it is a seasonable undertaking to evince, that they fumble in all their ratiocinations. That we hope to make it appear, that the Atheists are no conjurers; and that all forms of atheism are nonsense and impossibility.*

I. WE have now represented the grand mysteries of atheism, which may be also called the *mysteries of the kingdom of darkness*; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the Atheists endeavours to solve the phænomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of atheisms in general, as also of that most notorious form of atheism in particular, that is called *Atomical*. But whereas there hath been already mentioned another form of

atheiſm, called by us hylozoical; the principles hereof could not poſſibly be inſiſted on in this place, where we were to make the moſt plauſible plea for atheiſm, they being directly contrary to thoſe of the Atomical, ſo that they would have mutually deſtroyed each other. For, whereas the Atomick atheiſm ſuppoſes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended reſiſting bulk, and conſequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; hylozoiſm, on the contrary, makes all body, as ſuch, and therefore every ſmalleſt atom of it, to have life eſſentially belonging to it (natural perception, and appetite) though without any animal ſenſe or reflexive knowledge, as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame ſubſtance, called body. By reaſon of which life (not animal, but only plaſtical) all parts of matter being ſuppoſed able to form themſelves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive conſideration) to the greateſt advantage of their preſent reſpective capabilities, and therefore alſo ſometimes by organization to improve themſelves further into ſenſe and ſelf-enjoyment in all animals, as alſo to univerſal reaſon and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no neceſſity at all left, either of any incorporeal ſoul in men to make them rational, or of any Deity in the whole univerſe to ſolve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt theſe two forms of atheiſm is this, that the Atomical ſuppoſes all life whatſoever to be accidental, generable and corruptible; but the hylozoick admits of a certain natural or plaſtick life, eſſential and ſubſtantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, though attributing the ſame only to matter, as ſuppoſing no other ſubſtance in the world beſides it.

II. Now to prevent all miſtakes, we think fit here by way of caution to ſuggeſt, that as every Atomiſt is not therefore neceſſarily an Atheiſt, ſo neither muſt every Hylozoiſt needs be accounted ſuch. For whoever ſo holds the life of matter, as notwithſtanding to aſſert another kind of ſubſtance alſo, that is immaterial and incorporeal, is no ways obnoxious to that foul imputation. However, we ought not to diſſemble, but that there is a great difference here betwixt theſe two, atomiſm and hylozoiſm, in this regard; that the former of them, namely atomiſm (as hath been already declared) hath in it ſelf a natural cognation and conjunction with incorporeiſm, though violently cut off from it by the Democritick Atheiſts; whereas the latter of them, hylozoiſm, ſeems to have altogether as cloſe and intimate a correſpondence with corporealiſm; becauſe, as hath been already ſignified, if all matter, as ſuch, have not only ſuch a life, perception and ſelf-active power in it, as whereby it can form it ſelf to the beſt advantage, making this a ſun, and that an earth or planet, and fabricating the bodies of animals moſt artificially, but alſo can improve it ſelf into ſenſe and ſelf-enjoyment; it may as well be thought able to advance it ſelf higher, into all the acts of reaſon and underſtanding in men; ſo that there will be no need either of an incorporeal immortal ſoul in men, or a deity in the univerſe. Nor indeed is it eaſily conceivable, how any ſhould be induced to admit ſuch

ſuch a monſtrous paradox as this is, That every atom of duſt or other ſenſeleſs matter is wiſer than the greateſt politician and the moſt acute philoſopher that ever was, as having an infallible omniſcience of all its own capabilities and congruities; were it not by reaſon of ſome ſtrong prepoſſeſſion, againſt incorporeal ſubſtance and a Deity: there being nothing ſo extravagant and ouragiouſly wild, which a mind once infected with atheiſtical ſottiſhneſs and diſbelief will not rather greedily ſwallow down, than admit a Deity, which to ſuch is the higheſt of all paradoxes imaginable, and the moſt affrightful bug-bear. Notwithſtanding all which, it may not be denied, but that it is poſſible for one, who really entertains the belief of a Deity and a rational ſoul immortal, to be perſuaded, firſt, that the ſenſitive ſoul in men as well as brutes is merely corporeal; and then that there is a material plaſtick life in the ſeeds of all plants and animals, whereby they do artificially form themſelves; and from thence afterward to deſcend alſo further to hylozoiſm, that all matter, as ſuch, hath a kind of natural, though not animal life in it: in conſideration whereof, we ought not to cenſure every Hylozoiſt, profeſſing to hold a Deity and a rational ſoul immortal, for a mere diguiſed Atheiſt, or counterfeit hiſtrionical Theiſt.

III. But tho' every Hylozoiſt be not therefore neceſſarily an Atheiſt, yet whoſoever is an Hylozoiſt and Corporealiſt both together, he that both holds the life of matter in the ſenſe before declared, and alſo that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body and matter, cannot be excuſed from the imputation of atheiſm, for two reaſons: firſt, becauſe though he derive the original of all things, not from what is perfectly dead and ſtupid, as the atomick Atheiſt doth, but from that which hath a kind of life or perception in it, nay an infallible omniſcience, of whatſoever it ſelf can do or ſuffer, or of all its own capabilities and congruities, which ſeems to bear ſome ſemblance of a Deity; yet all this being only in the way of natural, and not animal perception, is indeed nothing but a dull and drowſy, plaſtic and ſpermatick life, devoid of all conſciouſneſs and ſelf-enjoyment. The Hylozoiſts nature is a piece of very myſterious nonſenſe, a thing perfectly wiſe, without any knowledge or conſciouſneſs of it ſelf; whereas a Deity, according to the true notion of it, is ſuch a perfect underſtanding being, as with full conſciouſneſs and ſelf-enjoyment is completely happy. Secondly, becauſe the hylozoick Corporealiſt, ſuppoſing all matter, as ſuch, to have life in it, muſt needs make infinite of thoſe lives, (foraſmuch as every atom of matter has a life of its own) coordinate and independent on one another, and conſequently, as many independent firſt principles, no one common life or mind ruling over the whole. Whereas, to aſſert a God, is to derive all things ἀφ' ἑνός τινος, *from ſome one principle*, or to ſuppoſe one perfect living and underſtanding being to be the original of all things, and the architect of the whole univerſe.

Thus we ſee, that the hylozoick Corporealiſt is really an Atheiſt, though carrying more the ſemblance and diſguiſe of a Theiſt, than other Atheiſts, in

in that he attributes a kind of life to matter. For indeed every Atheiſt muſt of neceſſity caſt ſome of the incommunicable properties of the Deity, more or leſs, upon that which is not God, namely matter; and they, who do not attribute life to it, yet muſt needs beſtow upon it neceſſary ſelf-exiſtence, and make it the firſt principle of all things, which are the peculiarities of the Deity. The Numen, which the hylozoick Corporealiſt pays all his devotions to, is a certain blind ſhe-god or goddeſs, called Nature, or the life of matter; which is a very great myſtery, a thing that is perfectly wiſe, and infallibly omniſcient, without any knowledge or conſciouſneſs at all; ſomething like to that τῶν παίδων αἴνιγμα (in * *Plato*) περὶ τοῦ εὐνούχου βολῆς τῆς νυκτερίδος, that vulgar enigma or riddle of boys concerning an eunuch ſtriking a bat; *a man and not a man, ſeeing and not ſeeing, did ſtrike and not ſtrike, with a ſtone and not a ſtone, a bird and not a bird, &c.* the difference being only this, that this was a thing intelligible, but humourſomly expreſſed; whereas the other ſeems to be perfect nonſenſe, being nothing but a miſunderſtanding of the plaſtick power, as ſhall be ſhowed afterwards.

* *De Rep. l.* 5. [p. 468.]

IV. Now the firſt and chief aſſertor of this hylozoick atheiſm was, as we conceive, *Strato Lampſacenus*[1], commonly called alſo *Phyſicus*, that had been once an auditor of *Theophraſtus*, and a famous Peripatetick, but afterwards degenerated from a genuine Peripatetick into a new-formed kind of Atheiſt. For *Velleius*, an Epicurean Atheiſt in *Cicero*, reckoning up all the ſeveral ſorts of Theiſts, which had been in former times, gives ſuch a character of this *Strato*, as whereby he makes him to be a ſtrange kind of atheiſtical Theiſt, or divine Atheiſt, if we may uſe ſuch a contradictious expreſſion: his words are theſe, † *Nec audiendus* Strato, *qui* Phyſicus *appellatur, qui omnem vim divinam in natura ſitam eſſe cenſet, quæ cauſas gignendi, augendi, minuendive habeat, ſed careat omni ſenſu. Neither is* Strato, *commonly called the Naturaliſt or Phyſiologiſt, to be heard, who places all divinity in nature, as having within itſelf the cauſes of all generations, corruptions and augmentations, but without any manner of ſenſe.* *Strato*'s deity therefore was a certain living and active, but ſenſeleſs nature. He did not fetch the original of all things, as the Democritick and Epicurean Atheiſts, from a mere fortuitous motion of atoms, by means whereof he bore ſome ſlight ſemblance of a Theiſt; but yet he was a down-right Atheiſt for all that, his God being no other than ſuch a life of nature in matter, as was both devoid of ſenſe and conſciouſneſs, and alſo multiplied together with the ſeveral parts of it. He is alſo in like manner deſcribed by *Seneca* in St. *Auguſtine* ‖ as a kind of mongrel thing, betwixt an Atheiſt and a Theiſt; *Ego feram aut* Platonem, *aut Peripateticum* Stratonem, *quorum alter deum ſine corpore fecit, alter ſine animo? Shall I endure either* Plato, *or the Peripatetick* Strato, *whereof the one made God to be without a body, the other witout a mind?* In which words *Seneca* taxes theſe two philoſophers, as guilty of two contrary extremes; *Plato*, becauſe he made God to be a pure mind or a perfectly incorporeal being; and *Strato*, becauſe he made him to be a body without a mind, he

† *De Nat. Deor. l.* 1. [Cap. XIII. p. 2902.]

‖ *De Civ. Dei l.* 6. *c.* 10. [§. 1. p. 122. Tom. VII. Oper. Ed. Benedict.]

[1] Vide Diogen. Laert. ſegm. 58. p. 298.

he acknowledging no other deity than a certain ſtupid and plaſtick life, in all the ſeveral parts of matter, without ſenſe. Wherefore this ſeems to be the only reaſon, why *Strato* was thus ſometimes reckoned amongſt the Theiſts, though he were indeed an Atheiſt, becauſe he diſſented from that only form of Atheiſm, then ſo vulgarly received, the Democritick and Epicurean, attributing a kind of life to nature and matter.

V. And that *Strato* was thus an Atheiſt, but of a different kind from *Democritus*, may further appear from this paſſage of *Cicero*'s * ; Strato Lampſacenus *negat operâ deorum ſe uti ad fabricandum mundum ; quæcunque ſint docet omnia eſſe effecta natura, nec ut ille, qui aſperis, & lævibus, & hamatis uncinatiſque corporibus concreta hæc eſſe dicat, interjecto inani ; ſomnia cenſet hæc eſſe* Democriti, *non docentis, ſed optantis.* Strato *denies, that he makes any uſe of a God, for the fabricating of the world, or the ſolving the phænomena thereof ; teaching all things to have been made by nature ; but yet not in ſuch a manner, as he who affirmed them to be all concreted out of certain rough and ſmooth, hookey and crooked atoms, he judging theſe things to be nothing but the mere dreams and dotages of* Democritus, *not teaching but wiſhing.* Here we ſee, that *Strato* denied the world to be made by a Deity or perfect underſtanding nature, as well as *Democritus* ; and yet that he diſſented from *Democritus* notwithſtanding, holding another kind of nature, as the original of things, than he did, who gave no account of any active principle and cauſe of motion, nor of the regularity that is in things. *Democritus* his nature was nothing but the fortuitous motion of matter ; but *Strato*'s nature was an inward plaſtick life in the ſeveral parts of matter, whereby they could artificially frame themſelves to the beſt advantage, according to their ſeveral capabilities, without any conſcious or reflexive knowledge. *Quicquid aut ſit aut fiat,* (ſays the ſame author[1]) *naturalibus fieri, aut factum eſſe docet ponderibus & motibus.* Strato *teaches whatſoever is, or is made, to be made by certain inward natural forces and activities.*

* *Acad. Quæſt.* l. 4. [Cap. 38. p. 2318. Tom. VIII. Oper.]

VI. Furthermore it is to be obſerved, that though *Strato* thus attributed a certain kind of life to matter, yet he did by no means allow of any one common life, whether ſentient and rational, or plaſtick and ſpermatick only, as ruling over the whole maſs of matter and corporeal univerſe ; which is a thing in part affirmed by *Plutarch* †, and may in part be gathered from theſe words of his ; τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν ἢ ζῶον εἶναί φησι, τόδε κατὰ φύσιν ἕπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην, ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶτα οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον. Strato *affirmeth, that the world is no animal (or god) but that what is natural in every thing, follows ſomething fortuitous antecedent, chance firſt beginning, and nature acting conſequently thereupon.* The full ſenſe whereof ſeems to be this, that though *Strato* did not derive the original of all mundane things from mere fortuitous mechaniſm, as *Democritus* before him had done, but ſuppoſed a life and natural perception in the matter, that was directive of it ; yet not acknowledging any one common life, whether animal or plaſtick,

† *Adverſ. Colotem.* [p. 1115 Tom. II. Oper.]

[1] Ibid.

ſtick, as governing and ſwaying the whole, but only ſuppoſing the ſeveral parts of matter to have ſo many plaſtick lives of their own, he muſt needs attribute ſomething to fortune, and make the mundane ſyſtem to depend upon a certain mixture of chance and plaſtick or orderly nature both together, and conſequently muſt be an Hylozoiſt. Thus we ſee, that theſe are two ſchemes of atheiſm, very different from one another [1]; that, which fetches the original of all things from the mere fortuitous and unguided motion of matter, without any vital or directive principle; and that, which derives it from a certain mixture of chance and the life of matter both together, it ſuppoſing a plaſtick life, not in the whole univerſe, as one thing, but in all the ſeveral parts of matter by themſelves; the firſt of which is the Atomick and Democritick atheiſm, the ſecond the Hylozoick and Stratonick,

VII. It may berhaps be ſuſpected by ſome, that the famous *Hippocrates*, who lived long before *Strato*, was an aſſertor of the Hylozoick atheiſm, becauſe of ſuch paſſages in him as theſe, ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐκ τοῦ σάκ * μαθοῦσα τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν· *Nature is unlearned or untaught, but it learneth from itſelf what things it ought to do:* and again, ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους, οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας· *Nature find out ways to it ſelf, not by ratiocination.* But there is nothing more affirmed here concerning nature by *Hippocrates*, than what might be affirmed likewiſe of the Ariſtotelick and Platonick nature, which is ſuppoſed to act for ends, though without conſultation and ratiocination. And I muſt confeſs, it ſeems to me no way miſ-becoming of a Theiſt, to acknowledge ſuch a nature or principle in the univerſe, as may act according to rule and method for the ſake of ends, and in order to the beſt, though it ſelf do not underſtand the reaſon of what it doth; this being ſtill ſuppoſed to act dependently upon a higher intellectual principle, and to have been firſt ſet a work and employed by it, it being otherwiſe nonſenſe. But to aſſert any ſuch plaſtick nature, as is independant upon any higher intellectual principle, and ſo it ſelf the firſt and higheſt principle of activity in the univerſe, this indeed muſt needs be, either that Hylozoick atheiſm already ſpoken of, or elſe another different form of atheiſm, which ſhall afterwards be deſcribed. But though *Hippocrates* were a corporealiſt, yet we conceive he ought not to lie under the ſuſpicion of either of thoſe two atheiſms; foraſmuch as himſelf plainly aſſerts a higher intellectual principle, than ſuch a plaſtic nature, in the univerſe, namely an Heraclitick corporeal God, or underſtanding fire, immortal, pervading the whole world, in theſe words; Δοκέει δέ μοι ὃ καλέομεν θερμὸν, ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι, καὶ νοεῖν πάντα, καὶ ὁρῆν, καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι· *It ſeems to me, that that which is called heat or fire, is immortal, and omniſcient, and that it ſees, hears, and know all things, not only ſuch as are preſent, but alſo future.* Wherefore we conclude, that *Hippocrates* was neither an Hylozoick nor Democritick Atheiſt, but an Heraclitick corporeal Theiſt.

VI. *Epidem. Sect.* 5. [Sect. 2. Tom. II. Oper. p. 1184.]
* *Al. lect.* καὶ ὁ μαθὼν, τὰ δίκαια ποιέει.

De Princip. aut Carnibus. Sect. 1. [p. 249. Tom. I. Oper.]

[1] Vide Lactant. de Irâ Dei, cap. X. p. 918.

VIII. Poſſibly it may be thought alſo, that *Plato* in his Sophiſt intends this hylozoick atheiſm, where he declares it as the opinion of many, [1] τὴν φύσιν πάντα γεννᾶν, ἀπό τινος αἰτίας αὐτομάτης, μὴ ἄνευ διανοίας φυσικῆς· That *nature generates all things from a certain ſpontaneous principle, without any reaſon and underſtanding*. But here the word αὐτομάτης may be as well rendred fortuitous, as ſpontaneous; however, there is no neceſſity, that this ſhould be underſtood of an artificial or methodical unknowing nature. It is true indeed, that *Plato* himſelf ſeems to acknowledge a certain plaſtick or methodical nature in the univerſe, ſubordinate to the Deity, or that perfect mind, which is the ſupreme governor of all things; as may be gathered from theſe words of his, τὴν φύσιν μετὰ λόγου καὶ σὺν λόγῳ καὶ νῷ τὰ πάντα διακοσμεῖν· that *nature does rationally (or orderly) together with reaſon and mind, govern the whole univerſe*. Where he ſuppoſes a certain regular nature to be a partial and ſubordinate cauſe of things under the divine intellect. And it is very probable, that *Ariſtotle* derived that whole doctrine of his concerning a regular and artificial nature, which acts for ends, from the Platonick ſchool. But as for any ſuch form of atheiſm, as ſhould ſuppoſe a plaſtick or regular, but ſenſeleſs nature either in the whole world, or the ſeveral parts of matter by themſelves, to be the higheſt principle of all things, we do not conceive, that there is any intimation of it to be found any where in *Plato*. For in his *De Legibus*, where he profeſſedly diſputes againſt atheiſm, he ſtates the doctrine of it after this manner, τὰ μὲν μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἀπεργάζεσθαι φύσιν καὶ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· that *nature and chance produced all the firſt, greateſt and moſt excellent things, but that the ſmaller things were produced by human art*. The plain meaning whereof is this, that the firſt original of things, and the frame of the whole univerſe, proceeded from a mere fortuitous nature, or the motion of matter unguided by any art or method. And thus it is further explained in the following words, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι καὶ τύχῃ φασί· τέχνῃ δὲ ἤδη τάτων, &c. *That the firſt elements, fire, water, air, and earth, were all made by nature and chance, without any art or method*; and then, *that the bodies of the ſun, moon and ſtars, and the whole heavens, were afterward made out of thoſe elements, as devoid of all manner of life*, and only fortuitouſly moved and mingled together; and laſtly, that the whole mundane ſyſtem, together with the orderly ſeaſons of the year, as alſo plants, animals and men did ariſe after the ſame manner, from the mere fortuitous motion of ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter. In the very ſame manner does *Plato* ſtate this controverſy again, betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts, in his *Philebus*; Πότερον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα, καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὅλον, ἐπιτρεπεύειν φῶμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῆ δύναμιν, καὶ τὰ ὅπη ἔτυχεν; ἢ τἀναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττεσθαι διακυβερνᾶν; *Whether ſhall we ſay, O* Protarchus, *that this whole univerſe is diſpenſed and ordered, by a mere irrational, temerarious and fortuitous principle, and ſo as it happens; or contrariwiſe, (as our forefathers have inſtructed us) that mind, and a certain wonderful wiſdom, did at firſt frame, and does ſtill govern all things?*

Lib. 10. [p. 665, 666.]

p. 28. *Ed. Ser.*

Where-

[1] P. 168. Oper.

Wherefore we conclude, that *Plato* took no notice of any other form of atheiſm, as then ſet on foot, than ſuch as derives all things from a mere fortuitous principle, from nature and chance, that is, the unguided motion of matter, without any plaſtick artificialneſs or methodicalneſs, either in the whole univerſe, or the parts of it. But becauſe this kind of atheiſm, which derives all things from a mere fortuitous nature, had been managed two manner of ways, by *Democritus* in the way of atoms, and by *Anaximander* and others in the way of forms and qualities; (of which we are to ſpeak in the next place;) therefore the atheiſm, which *Plato* oppoſes, was either the Democritick or the Anaximandrian atheiſm; or elſe (which is moſt probable) both of them together.

IX. It is hardly imaginable, that there ſhould be no philoſophick Atheiſts in the world before *Democritus* and *Leucippus*. *Plato*[1] long ſince concluded, that there have been Atheiſts, more or leſs, in every age, when he beſpeaks his young Atheiſt after this manner; Οὐ σὺ μόνος οὐδὲ σοὶ φίλοι πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτον ταύτην δόξαν περὶ θεῶν ἔσχετε, γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες· The full ſenſe whereof ſeems to be this; *Neither you, my ſon, nor your friends* (*Democritus*, *Leucippus* and *Protagoras*) *are the firſt, who have entertained this opinion concerning the gods, but there have been always ſome more or leſs ſick of this atheiſtick diſeaſe.* Wherefore we ſhall now make a diligent ſearch and enquiry, to ſee if we can find any other philoſophers, who atheized before *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, as alſo what form of atheiſm they entertained. p. 888. *Ed. Ser.*

Ariſtotle in his Metaphyſicks, ſpeaking of the quaternio of cauſes, affirms, that many of thoſe, who firſt philoſophized, aſſigned only a material cauſe of the whole mundane ſyſtem, without either intending or efficient cauſe. The reaſon whereof he intimates to have been this, becauſe they aſſerted matter to be the only ſubſtance; and that whatſoever elſe was in the world, beſides the ſubſtance or bulk of matter, were all nothing elſe but πάθη, different paſſions and affections, accidents and qualities of matter, that were all generated out of it, and corruptible again into it; the ſubſtance of matter always remaining the ſame, neither generated nor corrupted, but from eternity unmade; *Ariſtotle*'s words are * theſe: τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνον ὠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων, ἐξ ὧν γὰρ ἐστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίγνεσθαι πρώτων, καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης, τοῖς δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοιχεῖον, καὶ ταύτην τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι· *Moſt of thoſe, who firſt philoſophized, took notice of no other principle of things in the univerſe, than what is to be referred to the material cauſe; for that, out of which all things are, and out of which all things are firſt made, and into which they are all at laſt corrupted and reſolved, the ſubſtance always remaining the ſame, and being changed only in its paſſions and qualities; this they concluded to be the firſt original and principle of all things.* * *Lib.* I. *c.* 3. [Tom. IV. Oper. p. 264.]

[1] De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 665.

X. But the meaning of theſe old Material philoſophers will be better underſtood by thoſe exceptions, which *Ariſtotle* makes againſt them, which are two: firſt, that becauſe they acknowledged no other ſubſtance beſides matter, that might be an active principle in the univerſe, it was not poſſible for them to give any account of the original of motion and action. Εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πᾶσα φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ἔκ τινος, ὡς ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἐστὶν, διὰ τί τοῦτο συμβαίνει, καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον; ἡ γὰρ δὴ τό γε ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτό· λέγω δὲ οἷον, ἔτε τὸ ξύλον, ἔτε τὸ χαλκὸς αἴτιον τῷ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλου κλίνην, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον· τό δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ζητεῖν ἀρχήν, ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίημεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως· *Though all generation be made never ſo much out of ſomething as the matter, yet the queſtion ſtill is, by what means this cometh to paſs, and what is the active cauſe which produceth it? becauſe the ſubject-matter cannot change itſelf; as for example, neither timber, nor braſs, is the cauſe, that either of them are changed; for timber alone does not make a bed, nor braſs a ſtatue, but there muſt be ſomething elſe as the cauſe of the change; and to enquire after this is to enquire after another principle beſides matter, which we would call that, from whence motion ſprings.* In which words *Ariſtotle* intimates, that theſe old Material philoſophers ſhuffled in motion and action into the world unaccountably, or without a cauſe; foraſmuch as they acknowledged no other principle of things beſides paſſive matter, which could never move, change or alter it ſelf.

Ariſt. Met. l. 1. *c.* 3. [p. 265.]

XI. And *Ariſtotle*'s ſecond exception againſt theſe old Material philoſophers is this; that ſince there could be no intending cauſality in ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter, which they made to be the only principle of all things, they were not able to aſſign τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, *any cauſe of well and fit*, and ſo could give no account of the regular and orderly frame of this mundane ſyſtem; τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἴσως οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐθὲν, εἰκὸς αἴτιον εἶναι· οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ, καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει· *That things partly are ſo well in the world, and partly are made ſo well, cannot be imputed either to earth or water, or any other ſenſeleſs body; much leſs is it reaſonable to attribute ſo noble and excellent an effect as this to mere chance or fortune.* Where *Ariſtotle* again intimates, that as theſe Material philoſophers ſhuffled in motion into the world without a cauſe, ſo likewiſe they muſt needs ſuppoſe this motion to be altogether fortuitous and unguided; and thereby in a manner make fortune, which is nothing but the abſence or defect of an intending cauſe, to ſupply the room both of the active and intending cauſe, that is, efficient and final. Whereupon *Ariſtotle* ſubjoins a commendation of *Anaxagoras*, as the firſt of the Ionick philoſophers, who introduced mind or intellect for a principle in the univerſe; that in this reſpect he alone ſeemed to be ſober and in his wits, comparatively with thoſe others that went before him, who talked ſo idly and atheiſtically. For *Anaxagoras* his principle was ſuch, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, as was ἅμα τοῦ καλῶς αἰτία, καὶ τοιαύτη ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει, *at once a cauſe of motion and alſo of well and fit*; of all the regularity, aptitude, pulchritude and order

Met. l. 1 *c.* 3. [. 266.]

der that is in the whole univerſe. And thus it ſeems *Anaxagoras* himſelf had determined: Ἀναξαγόρας τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς νοῦν λέγει, *Anaxagoras ſaith, that mind is the only cauſe of right and well*; this being proper to mind to aim at ends and good, and to order one thing fitly for the ſake of another. Whence it was, that *Anaxagoras* concluded good alſo, as well as mind, to have been a principle of the univerſe, Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς κινοῦν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχήν, ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ ἕνεκά τινος, ὥστε ἕτερον· *Anaxagoras makes good a principle, as that which moves; for though mind move matter, yet it moves it for the ſake of ſomething, and being itſelf, as it were, firſt moved by good: ſo that good is alſo a principle.* And we note this the rather, to ſhow how well theſe three philoſophers, *Ariſtotle*, *Plato* and *Anaxagoras*, agreed all together in this excellent truth, that mind and good are the firſt principle of all things in the univerſe.

Ariſt de An. Lib. 1. *c.* 2. [p. 5. Tom. II. Oper.]

Ariſt. Met. l. 14. *c.* 10. [p. 485. Tom IV. Oper.]

XII. And now we think it is ſufficiently evident, that theſe old Materialiſts in *Ariſtotle*, whoever they were, were downright Atheiſts; not ſo much becauſe they made all ſubſtance to the body or matter, for *Heraclitus* firſt, and after him *Zeno*, did the like, deriving the original of all things from fire, as well as *Anaximenes* did from air, and *Thales* is ſuppoſed by *Ariſtotle*[1] to have done from water, and that with ſome little more ſeeming plauſibility, ſince fire being a more ſubtle and moveable body than any other, was therefore thought by ſome ancients to be ἀσωματώτατον, the moſt incorporeal of all bodies, as earth was for that cauſe rejected by all thoſe corporeal philoſophers from being a principle, by reaſon of the groſſneſs of its parts. But *Heraclitus* and *Zeno*, notwithſtanding this, are not accounted Atheiſts, becauſe they ſuppoſed their fiery matter to have not only life, but alſo a perfect underſtanding originally belonging to it, as alſo the whole world to be an animal: whereas thoſe Materialiſts of *Ariſtotle* made ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter, devoid of all underſtanding and life, to be the firſt principle and root of all things. For when they ſuppoſed life and underſtanding, as well as all other differences of things, to be nothing but mere paſſions and accidents of matter, generable out of it, and corruptible again into it, and indeed to be produced, but in a ſecondary way, from the fortuitous commixture of thoſe firſt elementary qualities, heat and cold, moiſt and dry, thick and thin, they plainly implied the ſubſtance of matter in it ſelf to be devoid of life and underſtanding. Now if this be not atheiſm, to derive the original of all things, even of life and mind it ſelf, from dead and ſtupid matter fortuitouſly moved, then there can be no ſuch thing at all.

XIII. Moreover, *Ariſtotle*'s Materialiſts concluded every thing beſides the ſubſtance of matter, (which is in itſelf indifferent to all things,) and conſequently all particular and determinate beings, to be generable and corruptible. Which is a thing, that *Plato* takes notice of as an atheiſtick principle, expreſſing it in theſe words; ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδὲν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται, that *nothing ever is, but every thing is made and generated.* Foraſmuch as it plainly follows from hence,

In Theæt.

[1] Metaphyſic. Lib. I. c. III. p. 265. Tom. IV. Oper.

hence, that not only all animals and the ſouls of men, but alſo if there were any gods, which ſome of thoſe Materialiſts would not ſtick, at leaſt verbally, to acknowledge, (meaning thereby certain underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men) theſe likewiſe muſt needs have been all generated, and conſequently be corruptible. Now to ſay, that there is no other God, than ſuch as was made and generated, and which may be again unmade, corrupted and die, or that there was once no God at all till he was made out of the matter, and that there may be none again, this is all one as to deny the thing itſelf. For a native and mortal God is a pure contradiction. Therefore whereas *Ariſtotle*, in his Metaphyſicks, tells us of certain Theologers, οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες, *ſuch as did generate all things* (even the gods themſelves) *out of Night and Chaos*, we muſt needs pronounce of ſuch Theologers as theſe, who were Theogoniſts, and generated all the gods (without exception) out of ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter, that they were but a kind of atheiſtical Theologers, or theological Atheiſts. For though they did admit of certain beings, to which they attributed the name of gods, yet according to the true notion of God, they really acknowledged none at all, (*i. e.* no underſtanding nature as the original of things) but Night and Chaos, ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter, fortuitouſly moved, was to them the higheſt of all Numens. So that this theology of theirs was a thing wholly founded in atheiſtical nonſenſe.

Lib. 14. *c.* 6. [p. 477.]

XIV. And now we think it ſeaſonable here to obſerve, how vaſt a difference there was betwixt theſe old Materialiſts in *Ariſtotle*, and thoſe other philoſophers, mentioned before in the firſt chapter, who determined, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων· *That no real entity at all was generated or corrupted*, for this reaſon, becauſe nothing could be made out of nothing. Theſe were chiefly the philoſophers of the Italick or Pythagorick ſucceſſion; and their deſign in it was not, as *Ariſtotle* was pleaſed ſomewhere to affirm, ἀνελεῖν πᾶσαν τὴν γένεσιν, to contradict common ſenſe and experience, in denying all natural generations and alterations; but only to interpret nature rightly in them, and that in way of oppoſition to thoſe atheiſtick Materialiſts, after this manner; that in all the mutations of nature, generations and alterations, there was neither any new ſubſtance made, which was not before, nor any entity really diſtinct from the pre-exiſting ſubſtances, but only that ſubſtance which was before, diverſly modified; and ſo nothing produced in generations, but new modifications, mixtures, and ſeparations of pre-exiſtent ſubſtances.

Now this doctrine of theirs drove at theſe two things; firſt, the taking away of ſuch qualities and forms of body, as were vulgarly conceived to be things really diſtinct from the ſubſtance of extended bulk, and all its modifications of more or leſs magnitude, figure, ſite, motion or reſt. Becauſe, if there were any ſuch things as theſe, produced in the natural generations and alterations of bodies, there would then be ſome real entity made ἐκ μηδενὸς ἐνυπάρχοντος ἢ προϋπαρχόντος, *out of nothing inexiſtent or pre-exiſtent*. Wherefore

fore they concluded, that these supposed forms and qualities of bodies were really nothing else, but only the different modifications of pre-existent matter, in respect of magnitude, figure, site and motion, or rest; or different concretions and secretions, which are no entities really distinct from the substance, but only cause different phasmata, fancies and apparitions in us.

The second thing, which this doctrine aimed at, was the establishing the incorporeity and ingenerability of all souls. For since life, cogitation, sense and understanding, could not be resolved into those modifications of matter, magnitude, figure, site and motion, or into mechanism and fancy, but must needs be entities really distinct from extended bulk, or dead and stupid matter; they concluded, that therefore souls could not be generated out of matter, because this would be the production of some real entity out of nothing inexisting or pre-existing; but that they must needs be another kind of substance incorporeal, which could no more be generated or corrupted, than the substance of matter itself; and therefore must either pre-exist in nature, before generations, or else be divinely created and infused in them.

It hath been already proved in the first chapter, that the upshot of that Pythagorick doctrine, that nothing could be generated out of nothing pre-existing, amounted to those two things mentioned, viz. the asserting of the incorporeity and ingenerability of souls, and the rejecting of those fantastick entities of forms and real qualities of bodies, and resolving all corporeal phænomena into figures or atoms, and the different apparitions or fancies caused by them. But the latter of these may be further confirmed from this passage of *Aristotle*'s, where, after he had declared, that *Democritus* and *Leucippus* made the soul and fire to consist of round atoms or figures, like those ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, *those ramenta that appear in the air* when the sun-beams are transmitted through crannies; he adds ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθαγορείων λεγόμενον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν, ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν, ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ, τὸ τοῦτα κινοῦν. *And that which is said amongst the Pythagoreans seems to have the same sense, for some of them affirm, that the soul is those very* ξύσματα, ramenta *or atoms; but others of them, that it is that which moves them*; which latter doubtless were the genuine Pythagoreans. However, it is plain from hence, that the old Pythagoreans physiologized by ξύσματα, as well as *Democritus*; that is, figures and atoms, and not qualities and forms.

Nat. Ausc. I. c. 2. [This Reference is a mistake, for the passage is Lib. I. de anima, cap. II. p. 4. Tom. II. Oper.

But *Aristotle*'s Materialists, on the contrary, taking it for granted, that matter, or extended bulk, is the only substance, and that the qualities and forms of bodies are entities really distinct from those modifications of magnitude, figure, site, motion or rest; and finding also by experience, that these were continually generated and corrupted, as likewise that life, sense and understanding were produced in the bodies of such animals, where it had not been before, and again extinguished at the death or corruption of them, concluded, that the souls of all animals, as well as those other qualities and forms of bodies, were generated out of the matter, and corrupted again into it; and consequently, that every thing that is in the whole world, besides

beſides the ſubſtance of matter, was made or generated, and might be again corrupted.

L. 3. c. 1. [p.668. Tom. I. Oper.] Of this atheiſtick doctrine, *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks elſewhere, as in his book *De Cœlo.* εἰσι γάρ τινες οἳ φασιν, οὐθὲν ἀγέννετον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι· μάλιστα μεν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ πρῶτοι φυσιολογήσαντες· οἱ δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί τε φασὶ, καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν. ἓν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μεταχημαλίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· *There are ſome, who affirm, that nothing is ingenerable, but that all things are made; as* Heſiod *eſpecially, and alſo among the reſt they who firſt phiſiologized, whoſe meaning was, that all other things are made* (or generated) *and did flow, none of them having any ſtability; only that there was one thing* (namely matter) *which always remained, out of which all thoſe other things were transformed and metamorphized.* Though as to *Heſiod*, *Ariſtotle* afterwards ſpeaks differently. So likewiſe in his Phyſicks, after he had declared, that ſome of the ancients made air, ſome water, and ſome other matter, the principle of all things; he adds, * τοῦτο καὶ τοσαύτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα πάθη τούτων, καὶ ἕξεις, καὶ διαθέσεις· καί τούτων μὲν ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἀΐδιον· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι ἀπειράκις· *This they affirmed to be all the ſubſtance or eſſence that was; but all other things, the paſſions, affections and diſpoſitions of it; and that this therefore was eternal, as being capable of no change, but all other things infinitely generated and corrupted.*

* L. 2. c. 1. [p 463. Oper.]

XV. But theſe Materialiſts being ſometimes aſſaulted by the other Italick philoſophers, in the manner before declared, that no real entities, diſtinct from the modifications of any ſubſtance, could be generated or corrupted, becauſe nothing could come from nothing nor go to nothing; they would not ſeem plainly to contradict that theorem, but only endeavoured to interpret it into a compliance with their own hypotheſis, and diſtinguiſh concerning the ſenſe of it in this manner; that it ought to be underſtood only of the ſubſtance of matter and nothing elſe, viz. that no matter could be made or corrupted, but that all other things whatſoever, not only forms and qualities of bodies, but alſo ſouls; life, ſenſe and underſtanding, though really different from magnitude, figure ſite and motion, yet ought to be accounted only the πάθη, the paſſions and accidents of this matter, and therefore might be generated out of it, and corrupted again into it, and that without the production or deſtruction of any real entity, matter being the only thing that is accounted ſuch. All this we learn from theſe words of *Ariſtotle*, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὅτε γίνεσθαι ἁπλῶς οἴονται, ὅτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης. ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτη φαμὲν ὅτε γίγνεσθαι ἁπλῶς, ὅταν γίγνεται καλὸς ἢ μουσικὸς, ὅτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, διὰ τὸ ὑπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τὸν Σωκράτη αὐτὸν, ὅτως οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ἢ μίαν, ἢ πλείους μιᾶς, ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τὰ ἄλλα, σωζομένης ἐκείνης· The ſenſe whereof is this; *And therefore as to that axiom of ſome philoſophers, that nothing is either generated or deſtroyed, theſe Materialiſts admit it to be true in reſpect of the ſubſtance of matter only, which is always preſerv'd the ſame, As,* ſay they, *we do not ſay, that* Socrates *is ſimply or abſolutely made, when he is made either handſome or muſical, or that*

Metaph. l. 1. c. 3. p. 264. Tom. IV. Oper.

that he is deſtroyed, when he loſeth thoſe diſpoſitions, becauſe the ſubject Socrates *ſtill remains the ſame; ſo neither are we to ſay, that any thing elſe is abſolutely either generated or corrupted, becauſe the ſubſtance or matter of every thing always continues. For there muſt needs be ſome certain nature, from which all other things are generated, that ſtill remaining one and the ſame.*

We have noted this paſſage of *Ariſtotle*'s the rather, becauſe this is juſt the very doctrine of Atheiſts at this day; that the ſubſtance of matter or extended bulk is the only real entity, and therefore the only unmade thing, that is neither generable nor creatable, but neceſſarily exiſtent from eternity; but whatever elſe is in the world, as life and animality, ſoul and mind, being all but accidents and affections of this matter (as if therefore they had no real entity at all in them) are generable out of nothing and corruptible into nothing, ſo long as the matter, in which they are, ſtill remains the ſame. The reſult of which is no leſs than this, that there can be no other gods or god, than ſuch as was at firſt made or generated out of ſenſeleſs matter, and may be corrupted again into it. And here indeed lies the grand myſtery of atheiſm, that every thing beſides the ſubſtance of matter is made or generated, and may be again unmade or corrupted.

However *Anaxagoras*, though an Ionick philoſopher, and therefore, as ſhall be declared afterward, ſucceſſor to thoſe atheiſtick Materialiſts, was at length ſo far convinced by that Pythagorick doctrine, that no entity could be naturally generated out of nothing, as that he departed from his predeceſſors herein, and did for this reaſon acknowledge mind and ſoul, that is, all cogitative being, to be a ſubſtance really diſtinct from matter, neither generable out of it nor corruptible into it; as alſo that the forms and qualities of bodies (which he could not yet otherwiſe conceive of than as things really diſtinct from thoſe modifications of magnitude, figure, ſite and motion) muſt for the ſame cauſe pre-exiſt before generations in certain ſimilar atoms, and remain after corruptions, being only ſecreted and concreted in them. By means whereof he introduced a certain ſpurious atomiſm of his own; for whereas the genuine Atomiſts before his time had ſuppoſed ὄγκους ἀνομοίους, *diſſimilar atoms*, devoid of all forms and qualities, to be the principles of all bodies, *Anaxagoras* ſubſtituted in the room of them his ὁμοιομέρεια, his *ſimilar atoms*, endued from eternity with all manner of forms and qualities incorruptibly.

XVI. We have made it manifeſt, that thoſe Material philoſophers, deſcribed by *Ariſtotle*, were abſolute Atheiſts, not merely becauſe they made body to be the only ſubſtance, though that be a thing, which *Ariſtotle* himſelf juſtly reprehends them for alſo in theſe words of his, ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν, ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικήν, καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι, τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶνδε ἀσωμάτων δ', ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων· *They who ſuppoſe the world to be one uniform thing, and acknowledge only one nature as the matter, and this corporeal or indued with magnitude, it is evident, that they err many ways, and particularly in this, that they ſet down only the elements of bodies, and not of incorporeal things, though there* *Metaph. l. 1. c. 7.* [p. 274. Tom. IV. Oper.]

be alſo things incorporeal. I ſay, we have not concluded them Atheiſts, merely for this reaſon, becauſe they denied incorporeal ſubſtance, but becauſe they deduced all things whatſoever from dead and ſtupid matter, and made every thing in the world, beſides the bare ſubſtance of matter, devoid of all quality, generable and corruptible.

Now we ſhall take notice of an objection, made by ſome late writers, againſt this Ariſtotelick accuſation of the old philoſophers, founded upon a paſſage of *Ariſtotle*'s own, who elſewhere in his book *De Cælo*, ſpeaking of the heaven or world, plainly affirms, γενόμενον μὲν ἅπαντες εἶναί φασιν, that *all the philoſophers before himſelf did aſſert the world to have been made, or have had a beginning*. From whence theſe writers infer, that therefore they muſt needs be all Theiſts, and hold the divine creation of the world; and conſequently, that *Ariſtotle* contradicts himſelf, in repreſenting many of them as Atheiſts, acknowledging only one material principle of the whole univerſe, without any intending or efficient cauſe. But we cannot but pronounce this to be a great error in theſe writers, to conclude all thoſe, who held the world to have been made, therefore to have been Theiſts; whereas it is certain on the contrary, that all the firſt and moſt ancient Atheiſts did (in *Ariſtotle*'s language) κοσμοποιεῖν ἢ γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον, *make or generate to the world*, that is, ſuppoſe it not to have been from eternity, but to have had a temporary beginning; as likewiſe that it was corruptible, and would ſome time or other, have an end again. The ſenſe of which atheiſtick philoſophers is repreſented by *Lucretius* in this manner [1]:

L. 1 *c.* 10. [p. 632. Tom. I. Oper.]

Et quoniam docui, mundi mortalia templa
Eſſe, & nativo conſiſtere corpore cælum,
Et quæcunque in eo fiunt, fientque, neceſſe
Eſſe ea diſſolvi.

And there ſeems to be indeed a neceſſity, in reaſon, that they, who derive all things from a fortuitous principle, and hold every thing beſides the ſubſtance of matter to have been generated, ſhould ſuppoſe the world to have been generated likewiſe, as alſo to be corruptible. Wherefore it may well be reckoned for one of the vulgar errors, that all Atheiſts held the eternity of the world.

Moreover, when *Ariſtotle* ſubjoins immediately after, ἀλλὰ γενόμενου, οἱ μὲν ἀΐδιον, οἱ δὲ φθαρτὸν, that though the ancient philoſophers all held the world to have been made, yet notwithſtanding they were divided in this, that ſome of them ſuppoſed for all that, that it would continue to eternity ſuch as it is, others, that it would be corrupted again; the former of theſe, who conceived the world to be γενόμενον, but ἀΐδιον, made, but eternal, were none of them Atheiſts, but all Theiſts. Such as *Plato*, whom *Ariſtotle* ſeems particularly to perſtringe for this, who in his *Timæus* introduceth the ſupreme Deity beſpeaking thoſe inferior gods, the ſun, moon and ſtars (ſuppoſed by that philoſopher to

[1] Lib. VI. ver. 43. Adde Lib. V. ver. 236.

to be animated) after this manner; ἃ δὶ ἐμοῦ γενόμενα, ἄλυτα, ἐμοῦγε θέλοντος, τὸ μὲν οὖν δεθὲν πᾶν λυτὸν· τόγε μὴν καλῶς ἁρμοσθὲν καὶ ἔχον εὖ, λύειν ἐθέλειν, κακοῦ· δὶ ἃ καὶ ἐπείπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ, οὐδ' ἄλυτοι τὸ πάμπαν· οὔτι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας· τῆς ἐμῆς βουλήσεως μείζονος ἔτι δεσμῶ καὶ κυριωτέρου λαχόντες· *Those things, which are made by me, are indiſſoluble by my will; and though every thing which is compacted, be in its own nature diſſolvable, yet it is not the part of one that is good, to will the diſſolution or deſtruction of any thing that was once well made. Wherefore though you are not abſolutely immortal, nor altogether indiſſolvable, yet notwithſtanding you ſhall not be diſſolved, nor ever die; my will being a ſtronger band to hold you together, than any thing elſe can be to looſen you.* *Philo* and other Theiſts followed *Plato* in this, aſſerting, that though the world was made, yet it would never be corrupted, but have a poſt-eternity. Whereas all the ancient Atheiſts, namely thoſe, who derived the original of things from nature and fortune, did at once deny both eternities to the world, paſt and future. Though we cannot ſay, that none but Atheiſts did this; for *Empedocles* and *Heraclitus*, and afterward the Stoicks, did not only ſuppoſe the world likewiſe generated, and to be again corrupted, but alſo that this had been, and would be done over and over again, in infinite viciſſitudes.

Tim. p. 41. *Ser.*

Furthermore, as the world's eternity was generally oppoſed by all the ancient Atheiſts, ſo it was maintained alſo by ſome Theiſts, and that not only *Ariſtotle* [1], but alſo before him, by *Ocellus Lucanus* [2] at leaſt, though *Ariſtotle* thought not fit to take any notice of him; as likewiſe the latter Platoniſts univerſally went that way, yet ſo, as that they always ſuppoſed the world to have as much depended upon the Deity, as if it had been once created out of nothing by it.

To conclude therefore; neither they, who aſſerted the world's generation and temporary beginning, were all Theiſts; nor they, who maintained its eternity, all Atheiſts; but before *Ariſtotle*'s time, the Atheiſts univerſally, and moſt of the Theiſts, did both alike conclude the world to have been made; the difference between them lying in this, that the one affirmed the world to have been made by God, the other by the fortuitous motion of matter.

Wherefore if we would put another difference betwixt the Theiſts and Atheiſts here, as to this particular, we muſt diſtinguiſh betwixt the ſyſtem of the world and the ſubſtance of the matter. For the ancient Atheiſts, though they generally denied the eternity of the world, yet they ſuppoſed the ſubſtance of the matter, not only to have been eternal, but alſo ſelf-exiſtent and independent upon any other Being; they making it the firſt principle and original of all things, and conſequently the only Numen. Whereas the genuine Theiſts, though many of them maintained the world's eternity, yet they all

[1] Phyſic. auſcultat. Lib. VIII.

[2] περὶ πάντων φύσεως, inter Scriptor. Mythol. à Tho. Gale editos, p. 501.

concluded, both the form and ſubſtance of it to have always depended upon the Deity, as the light doth upon the ſun; the Stoicks with ſome others being here excepted.

XVII. *Ariſtotle* tells us, ſome were of opinion, that this atheiſtick philoſophy, which derives all things from ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter in the way of forms and qualities, was of great antiquity, and as old as any records of time amongſt the Greeks; and not only ſo, but alſo that the ancient Theologers themſelves entertained it: Εἰσὶ δέ τινες, οἱ καὶ τὰς παμπαλαίας, καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως, καὶ πρώτας θεολογήσαντας, ὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως διαλαβεῖν. Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τήθυν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν. τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον· ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν· *There are ſome who conceive, that even the moſt ancient of all, and the moſt remote from this preſent generation, and they alſo who firſt theologized, did phyſiologize after this manner; foraſmuch as they made the Ocean and* Tethys *to have been the original of generation: and for this cauſe the oath of the gods is ſaid to be by water (called by the poets* Styx) *as being that, from which they all derived their original. For an oath ought to be by that, which is moſt honourable: and that which is moſt ancient, is moſt honourable.* In which words it is very probable, that *Ariſtotle* aimed at *Plato*; however it is certain, that *Plato*, in his [1] *Theætetus*, affirms this atheiſtick doctrine to have been very ancient, ὅτι πάντα ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως, *that all things were the offſpring of flux and motion*, that is, that all things were made and generated out of matter; and that he chargeth *Homer* with it, in deriving the original of the gods themſelves in like manner from the ocean (or floating matter) in this verſe of his,

Met. l. 1. c. 3. [Tom. IV. Oper. p. 265.]

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

The father of all gods the ocean is,
Tethys *their mother.*

Wherefore theſe indeed ſeem to have been the ancienteſt of all Atheiſts, who though they acknowledged certain beings ſuperior to men, which they called by the name of gods, did notwithſtanding really deny a God, according to the true notion of him, deriving the original of all things whatſoever in the univerſe from the ocean, that is, fluid matter, or, which is all one, from night and chaos; and ſuppoſing all their gods to have been made and generated, and conſequently to be mortal and corruptible. Of which atheiſtick theology *Ariſtophanes* gives us the deſcription in his [2] *Aves*, after this manner: *That at firſt was nothing but Night and Chaos, which laying an egg, from thence was produced Love, that mingling again with Chaos, begot heaven, and earth, and animals, and all the gods.*

Χάος μὲν ἦν, καὶ νύξ, ἔρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον, καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς.
Γῆ δ', οὐδ' ἀὴρ, οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν· ἐρέβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροσι κόλποις

Τίκτει

[1] P. 118.

[2] Ver. 694. p. 404. Edit. Kuſteri.

Τίκτει πρώτιστον ὑπηνέμιον νὺξ ἠλιανόπτερος ὠόν.
Ἐξ οὗ περιτελλομέναις ὥραις ἔβλαστεν Ἔρως ὁ ποθεινός.
Στίλβων νώτου πτερύγοιν χρυσαῖν. εἰκὼς ἀνεμώκεσι δίναις.
Οὗτος δὲ χάει πλερόεντι μιγεὶς νυχίῳ, κατὰ Τάρταρον εὐρύν,
Ἐνεότλευσε γένος ἡμέτερον, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνήγαγεν εἰς φῶς,
Πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν Ἔρως συνέμιξεν ἅπαντα.

First all was chaos, one confused heap;
Darkness enwrapt the disagreeing deep;
In a mixt croud the jumbling elements were,
Nor earth, nor air, nor heaven did appear;
Till on this horrid vast abyss of things,
Teeming Night spreading o'er her coal-black wings,
Laid the first egg; whence, after time's due course,
Issu'd forth Love (the world's prolifick Source)
Glistering with golden wings; which fluttering o'er
Dark chaos, gendred all the numerous store
Of animals and gods, &c.

And whereas the poet there makes the birds to have been begotten between Love and Chaos before all the gods; though one might think this to have been done jocularly by him, merely to humour his plot; yet *Salmasius*[1] conceives, and not without some reason, that it was really a piece of the old Atheistic cabala, which therefore seems to have run thus. That chaos or matter confusedly moved being the first original of all, things did from thence rise up gradually from lesser to greater perfection. First inanimate things, as the elements, heaven, earth and seas; then brute-animals; afterwards men, and last of all the gods. As if not only the substance of matter, and those inanimate bodies of the elements, fire, water, air and earth, were, as *Aristotle* somewhere speaks, according to the sense of those Atheistic theologers, * φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, *first in order of nature before God, as being themselves also gods*, but also brute-animals at least, if not men too. And this is the atheistick creation of the world, gods and all, out of senseless and stupid matter, or dark chaos, as the only original Numen; the perfectly inverted order of the universe.

* *De Gen. & Cor. Lib.* 2. *c.* 6. [p. 735. Tom. I. Oper.]

XVIII. But though this hypothesis be purely atheistical, that makes Love, which is supposed to be the original deity, to have itself sprung at first from an egg of the night; and consequently that all deity was the creature or off-spring of matter and Chaos, or dark fortuitous nature; yet *Aristotle* somewhere conceives, that not only *Parmenides*, but also *Hesiod*, and some others, who did in like manner make Love the supreme deity, and derive all things from Love and Chaos, were to be exempted out of the number of those atheistick Materialists before described; forasmuch as they seemed to understand by love, an active principle and cause of motion in

[1] Exercitat. Plinian. in Solinum, Tom. I. p. 309.

in the univerſe; which therefore could not ſpring from an egg of the night, nor be the creature of matter, but muſt needs be ſomething independent on it, and in order of nature before it: [1] ὑποπτεύσειε δ' ἄν τις, Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος, Ἔρωτα ἢ Ἐπιθυμίαν, ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθηκεν ὡς ἀρχήν, οἷον καὶ Παρμενίδης. Καὶ γὰρ οὕτως κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν,

Πρώτιστον μὲν (φησιν) ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

Ησίοδος δὲ,

Πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ'· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ εὐρύστερνος, ——
Ἠδ' ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν.

ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ αἰτίαν, ἥτις κινήσει καὶ συνέξει τὰ πράγματα. τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον. *One would ſuſpect, that* Heſiod, *and if there be any other who made love or deſire a principle of things in the univerſe, aimed at this very thing, (namely, the ſettling of another active principle beſides matter:) for* Parmenides *deſcribing the generation of the univerſe, makes Love to be the ſenior of all the gods; and* Heſiod, *after he had mentioned chaos, introduced Love as the ſupreme Deity. As intimating herein, that beſides matter, there ought to be another cauſe or principle, that ſhould be the original of motion and activity, and alſo hold and conjoin all things together. But how theſe two principles are to be ordered, and which of them was to be placed firſt, whether Love or Chaos, may be judged of afterwards.* In which latter words *Ariſtotle* ſeems to intimate, that Love, as taken for an active principle, was not to be ſuppoſed to ſpring from Chaos, but rather to be in order of nature before it; and therefore by this Love of theirs muſt needs be meant the deity. And indeed *Simmias Rhodius* in his *Wings*, a hymn made in honour of this Love, that is ſenior to all the gods, and a principle in the univerſe, tells us plainly, that it is not *Cupid*, *Venus*'s ſoft and effeminate ſon, but another kind of love,

Οὔτί γε Κύπριδος παῖς·
Ὠκυπέτας δ' αὐτὸς Ἔρως καλεῦμαι·
Οὔτι γὰρ ἔκρινα βιάζειν, παράγω δὲ πειθοῖ.
Γαῖα, θαλάσσας τε μυχοὶ, οὐρανίων πᾶς τε θεός μοι ἔκει.
Τῶν δ' ἐγὼν ἐκνοσφισάμην ὠγύγιον σκᾶπτρον, ἐκρανά τέ σφιν θέμιστας.

I'm not that wanton boy,
The ſea-froath goddeſs's only joy.
Pure heavenly Love I hight, and my
Soft magick charms, not iron bands, faſt tye
Heaven, earth and ſeas. The gods themſelves do readily
Stoop to my laws. The whole world daunces to my harmony.

Moreover, this cannot be that Love neither, which is deſcrib'd in *Plato*'s *Sympoſium* (as ſome learned men have conceived) that was begotten between *Penia*

[1] Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. Lib. I. cap. IV. p. 267.

Penia and *Porus*, this being not a divine but dæmoniack thing (as the philoſopher there declares,) no God, but a dæmon only, or of a middle nature. For it is nothing but φιλοκαλία, or the love of pulchritude as ſuch, which, though rightly uſed, may perhaps wing and inſpire the mind to noble and generous attempts, and beget a ſcornful diſdain in it of mean, dirty, and ſordid things; yet it is capable of being abuſed alſo, and then it will ſtrike downward into brutiſhneſs and ſenſuality. But at beſt it is an affection belonging only to imperfect and parturient beings; and therefore could not be the firſt principle of all things. Wherefore we ſee no very great reaſon, but that in a rectified and qualified ſenſe this may paſs for true theology; that Love is the ſupreme Deity and original of all things; namely, if by it be meant eternal, ſelf-originated, intellectual Love, or eſſential and ſubſtantial goodneſs, that having an infinite overflowing fulneſs and fecundity diſpenſes itſelf uninvidiouſly, according to the beſt wiſdom, ſweetly governs all, without any force or violence (all things being naturally ſubject to its authority, and readily obeying its laws) and reconciles the whole world into harmony. For the Scripture telling us, that God is love, ſeems to warrant thus much to us, that love in ſome rightly qualified ſenſe is God.

XIX. But we are to omit the fabulous age, and to deſcend to the philoſophical, to enquire there, who they were among the profeſſed philoſophers, who atheized in that manner before deſcribed. It is true indeed, that *Ariſtotle* in other places accuſes *Democritus* and *Leucippus* of the very ſame thing, that is, of aſſigning only a material cauſe of the univerſe, and giving no account of the original of motion; but yet it is certain, that theſe were not the perſons intended by him here; thoſe, which he ſpeaks of, being τινὲς τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων, *ſome of the firſt and moſt ancient philoſophers of all.* Moreover, it appears by the deſcription of them, that they were ſuch as did not philoſophize in the way of atoms, but reſolved all things whatſoever in the univerſe into ὕλη and πάθη τῆς ὕλης, matter, and the paſſions or affections, qualities and forms of matter; ſo that they were not atomical, but hylopathian philoſophers. Theſe two, the old Materialiſts and the Democriticks, did both alike derive all things from dead and ſtupid matter, fortuitouſly moved; and the difference between them was only this, that the Democriticks managed this buſineſs in the way of atoms, the other in that more vulgar way of qualities and forms: ſo that indeed this is really but one and the ſame atheiſtick hypotheſis, in two ſeveral ſchemes. And as one of them is called the *atomick atheiſm*, ſo the other, for diſtinction's ſake, may be called the *hylopathian.*

XX. Now *Ariſtotle* tells us plainly, that theſe hylopathian Atheiſts of his were all the firſt philoſophers of the Ionick order and ſucceſſion, before *Anaxagoras.* Whereof *Thales* being the head, he is conſentaneouſly thereunto by *Ariſtotle* made to be ἀρχηγὸς τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας, *the prince and leader of this kind of atheiſtical philoſophy*, he deriving all things whatſoever, as *Homer* had done before him, from water, and acknowledging no other principle but the fluid matter.

Not-

Notwithſtanding which accuſation of *Ariſtotle*'s, *Thales* is far otherwiſe repreſented by good authors; *Cicero* [1] telling us, that beſides water, which he made to be the original of all corporeal things, he aſſerted alſo mind for another principle, which formed all things out of the water; and *Laertius* [2] and *Plutarch* [3] recording, that he was thought to be the firſt of all philoſophers, who determined ſouls to be immortal. He is ſaid alſo to have affirmed [4], that God was πρεσβύτατον πάντων, *the oldeſt of all things*, and that the world was ποιήμα θεοῦ, *the workmanſhip of God. Clemens* [5] likewiſe tells us, that being aſked, εἰ λανθάνει τὸ θεῖον πράττων τι ὁ ἄνθρωπος; καὶ πῶς, εἶπεν, ὅγε οὐδὲ διανοούμενος: *whether any of a man's actions could be concealed from the Deity? he replied, not ſo much as any thought.* Moreover *Laertius* [6] further writes of him, that he held τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη, *that the world was animated, and full of dæmons.* Laſtly, *Ariſtotle* [7] himſelf elſewhere ſpeaks of him as a Theiſt, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες ψυχὴν μεμίχθαι φασὶν. ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ὠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. *Some think* (ſaith he) *that ſoul and life is mingled with the whole univerſe; and thence perhaps was that of* Thales, *that all things are full of Gods.* Wherefore we conceive, that there is very good reaſon, why *Thales* ſhould be acquitted from this accuſation of atheiſm. Only we ſhall obſerve the occaſion of his being thus differently repreſented, which ſeems to have been this; becauſe as *Laertius* [8] and *Themiſtius* [9] intimate, he left no philoſophick writings or monuments of his own behind him, (*Anaximander* being the firſt of all the philoſophick writers:) whence probably it came to paſs, that in after-times ſome did interpret his philoſophy one way, ſome another; and that he is ſometimes repreſented as a Theiſt, and ſometimes again as a down-right Atheiſt.

But though *Thales* be thus by good authority acquitted, yet his next ſucceſſor *Anaximander* can by no means be excuſed from this imputation; and therefore we think it more reaſonable to faſten that title upon him, which *Ariſtotle* beſtows on *Thales*, that he was ἄρχηγος τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας, *the prince and founder of this atheiſtic philoſophy*; who derived all things from matter, in the way of forms and qualities; he ſuppoſing a certain infinite *materia prima*, which was neither air, nor water, nor fire, but indifferent to every thing, or a mixture of all, to be the only principle of the univerſe, and leading a train of many other Atheiſts after him, ſuch as *Hippo*, ſurnamed ἄθεος by *Simplicius* and others, *Anaximenes*, and *Diogenes Apolloniates*, and many more; who, though they had ſome petty differences amongſt themſelves, yet all agreed in this one thing, that matter devoid of underſtanding and life was the firſt principle of all things; till at length *Anaxagoras* ſtopt this atheiſtic current amongſt theſe Ionick philoſophers, introducing mind as a principle of the univerſe.

XXI.

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. I. cap. X. p. 2894. Tom. IX. Oper.

[2] Lib. I. ſegm. 24. p. 16.

[3] De Placit. Philoſ. Lib. IV. cap. II. p. 908. Tom. II. Oper.

[4] Diog. Laert. Lib I. ſegm. 35. p. 21. & Plutarch in Convivio ſeptem ſapientum, p. 153. Tom. II. Oper.

[5] Clemens Alex. Stromat. Lib. V. p. 704. Edit. Potteri.

[6] Lib. I. ſegm. 27. p. 18.

[7] De anima Lib. I. cap. V. p. 17. Tom. II. Oper.

[8] Lib. I. ſegm. 23. p. 15.

[9] Orat. XXVI. p. 317. Edit. Harduin.

XXI. But there is a paſſage in *Ariſtotle*'s Phyſicks, which ſeems at firſt ſight to contradict this again; and to make *Anaximander* alſo not to have been an Atheiſt, but a divine philoſopher. Where having declared, that ſeveral of the ancient phyſiologers made ἄπειρον, or Infinite, to be the principle of all things, he ſubjoins theſe words, διὸ καθάπερ λέγομεν, ὑ ταύτης ἀρχὴ, ἀλλ' αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, ὡς φασιν ὅσοι μὴ ποιοῦσι παρὰ τὸ ἄπειρον ἄλλας αἰτίας, οἷον νοῦν, ἢ φιλίαν. Καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, ὥσπερ φησὶν ὁ Ἀναξίμανδρος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων· *Therefore there ſeems to be no principle of this Infinite, but this to be the principle of other things, and to contain all things, and govern all things, as they all ſay, who do not make, beſides infinite, any other cauſes, ſuch as mind, or friendſhip; and that this is the only real Numen or God in the world, it being immortal and incorruptible, as* Anaximander *affirms, and moſt of the phyſiologers.* From which place ſome late writers have confidently concluded, that *Anaximander*, with thoſe other phyſiologers there mentioned, did, by Infinite, underſtand God, according to the true notion of him, or an Infinite mind, the efficient cauſe of the univerſe, and not ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter; ſince this could not be ſaid to be immortal, and to govern all things; and conſequently, that *Ariſtotle* groſly contradicts himſelf, in making all thoſe Ionick philoſophers before *Anaxagoras* to have been mere Materialiſts or Atheiſts. And it is poſſible, that *Clemens Alexandrinus* alſo might from this very paſſage of *Ariſtotle*'s, not ſufficiently conſidered, have been induced to rank *Anaximander* amongſt the divine philoſophers, as he doth in his Protreptrick to the Greeks; where, after he had condemned certain of the old philoſophers as atheiſtick Corporealiſts, he ſubjoins theſe words; * τῶν δὲ ἄλλων φιλοσόφων, ὅσοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑπερβάντες, ἐπολυπραγμόνησάν τι ὑψηλότερον καὶ περιττότερον, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τὸ ἄπειρον καθύμνησαν, ὧν Ἀναξίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἦν, καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Κλαζομένιος, καὶ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος Ἀρχέλαος· *But of the other philoſophers, who tranſcending all the elements, ſearched after ſome higher and more excellent thing, ſome of them praiſed Infinite, amongſt which was* Anaximander *the Mileſian,* Anaxagoras *the Clazomenian, and the Athenian* Archelaus. As if theſe three had all alike acknowledged an incorporeal Deity, and made an infinite mind, diſtinct from matter, the firſt original of all things.

* *Clem. Prot.* p. 43 [Cap. V. p. 57. Tom. I. Oper.]

But that forecited paſſage of *Ariſtotle's* alone, well conſider'd, will it ſelf afford a ſufficient confutation of this opinion; where *Anaximander*, with thoſe other phyſiologers, is plainly oppoſed to *Anaxagoras*, who beſides infinite ſenſeleſs matter, or ſimilar atoms, made mind to be a principle of the univerſe, as alſo to *Empedocles*, who made a plaſtick life and nature, called friendſhip, another principle of the corporeal world; from whence it plainly follows, that *Anaximander* and the reſt ſuppoſed not infinite mind, but infinite matter, without either mind or plaſtick matter, to have been the only original of all things, and therefore the only Deity or Numen.

Moreover, *Democritus* being linked in the context with *Anaximander*, as making both of them alike, τὸ ἄπειρον, or *Infinite*, to be the firſt principle of all; it might as well be inferred from this place, that *Democritus* was a

genuine Theiſt, as *Anaximander*. But as *Democritus* his only principle was infinite atoms, without any thing of mind or plaſtick nature; ſo likewiſe was *Anaximander*'s an infinity of ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter; and therefore they were both of them Atheiſts alike, though *Anaximander*, in the cited words, had the honour (if it may be ſo called) to be only named, as being the moſt ancient of all thoſe atheiſtical phyſiologers, and the ringleader of them.

XXII. Neither ought it at all to ſeem ſtrange, that *Anaximander* and thoſe other atheiſtical Materialiſts ſhould call infinite matter, devoid of all underſtanding and life, the τὸ θεῖον, *the Deity* or *Numen*, ſince to all thoſe, who deny a God, (according to the true notion of him) whatſoever elſe they ſubſtitute in his room, by making it the firſt principle of all things, though it be ſenſeleſs and ſtupid matter, yet this muſt needs be accounted the only Numen, and divineſt thing of all.

Nor is it to be wondred at neither, that this infinite, being underſtood of matter, ſhould be ſaid to be, not only incorruptible, but alſo immortal, theſe two being often uſed as ſynonymous and equivalent expreſſions. For thus in *Lucretius* [1], the corruption of all inanimate bodies is called death.

——— *Mors ejus quod fuit ante*;

And again,

[2] *Quando aliud ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam*
Rem gigni patitur, niſi morte adjutam alienâ.

In like manner mortal is uſed by him for corruptible,

[3] *Nam ſiquid mortale à cunctis partibus eſſet,*
Ex oculis res quæque repentè erepta periret.

And this kind of language was very familiar with *Heraclitus* [4], as appears from theſe paſſages of his, πυρὸς θάνατος, ἀέρι γένεσις· καὶ ἀέρος θάνατος ὕδατι γένεσις· *The death of fire is generation to air; and the death of air is generation to water*; that is, the corruption of them. And again, ψυχῇσιν θάνατος, ὕδωρ γενέσθαι· ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος, γῆν γενέσθαι· *It is death to vapour or air, to be made water; and death to water, to be made earth.* In which *Heraclitus* did but imitate *Orpheus*, as appears from this verſe of his, cited by *Clemens Alexand.* [5]

Ἔστιν ὕδωρ ψυχῇ, θάνατος δ' ὑδάτεσσιν ἀμοιβή·

Beſides which, there are many examples of this uſe of the word ἀθάνατος, in

[1] Lib. I. verſ. 672.
[2] Lib. I. verſ. 264, 265.
[3] Lib. I. verſ. 219.
[4] Vide Henr. Stephan. in Poeſi Philoſophic. p. 137.
[5] Stromat. Lib. VI. cap. II. p. 476.

in other Greek writers, and ſome in *Ariſtotle* [1] himſelf, who ſpeaking of the heavens, attributes ἀθανασία and ἀϊδιότης to them, as one and the ſame thing; as alſo affirms, that the ancients therefore made heaven to be the ſeat of the Deity, ὡς ὄντα μόνον ἀθάνατον, *as being only immortal*, that is, *incorruptible*.

Indeed that other expreſſion, at firſt ſight, would ſtagger one more, where it is ſaid of this ἄπειρον, or *infinite*, that it doth not only contain, but alſo govern all things: but *Simplicius* [2] tells us, that this is to be underſtood likewiſe of matter, and that no more was meant by it, than that all things were derived from it, and depended on it, as the firſt principle; ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῖς τοιούτοις περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τῶν ὑπερ φύσιν, εἰ δὲ καὶ περιέχειν ἔλεγον καὶ κυβερνᾶν οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιέχειν ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑλικῷ αἰτίῳ, ὡς διὰ πάντων χωροῦντι, τὸ δὲ κυβερνᾶν ὡς κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδειότητα αὐτοῦ, τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένων· *Theſe philoſophers ſpake only of natural principles, and not of ſupernatural; and though they ſay, that this infinite of theirs does both contain and govern all things, yet this is not at all to be wondered at; foraſmuch as containing belongs to the material cauſe, as that which goes through all things, and likewiſe governing, as that from which all things, according to a certain aptitude of it, are made.* *Philoponus* (who was a Chriſtian) repreſents *Ariſtotle*'s ſenſe in this whole place more fully, after this manner. *Thoſe of the ancient phyſiologers, who had no reſpect to any active efficient cauſe, as* Anaxagoras *had to mind, and* Empedocles *to friendſhip and contention, ſuppoſed matter to be the only cauſe of all things; and that it was infinite in magnitude, ingenerable and incorruptible, eſteeming it to be a certain divine thing, which did govern all, or preſide over the compages of the univerſe, and to be immortal, that is, undeſtroyable. This* Anaximenes *ſaid to be air,* Thales *to be water, but* Anaximander, *a certain middle thing; ſome one thing, and ſome another.* Καὶ οὐδέν γε θαυμαστόν φησιν, ἐν τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς περιόδῳ τὰς πρώτας μὴ ἐπισήσαντας τῇ ἐφεκτικῇ τῶν ὅλων δυνάμει, ἓν τῶν στοιχείων, ὅπερ ἂν ὑπόπτευεν ἕκαστος, αἴτιον τοῖς ἄλλοις τε εἶναι, τοῦτο εὐθὺς καὶ Θεὸν ὑπονοῆσαι· *And* Ariſtotle *in this paſſage tells us, that it is no wonder, if they, who did not attend to the active cauſe, that preſides over the univerſe, did look upon ſome one of the elements (that which each of them thought to be the cauſe of all other things) as God. But as they conſidering only the material principle, conceived that to be the cauſe of all things; ſo* Anaxagoras *ſuppoſed mind to be the principle of all things, and* Empedocles *friendſhip and contention.*

XXIII. But to make it further appear, that *Anaximander*'s philoſophy was purely atheiſtical, we think it convenient to ſhew what account is given of it by other writers. *Plutarch*, in his *Placita Philoſophorum*, does at once briefly repreſent the Anaximandrian philoſophy, and cenſure it after this manner: Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι, τῶν ὅλων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον, ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο πάντα φθείρεσθαι, διὸ καὶ γεννᾶσθαι ἀπείρους κόσμους, καὶ πάλιν φθείρεσθαι· λέγει δ' ἂν διὰ τί ἄπειρόν ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἐλλείπῃ ἡ γένεσις ἢ ὑφισαμένη· ἁμαρτάνει δὲ ὅτι, τὴν μὲν ὕλην *Lib.* I. *c.* 3. [p. 875. Tom. II. Oper.

[1] De Cœlo Lib. I. cap. III. p. 614, 615. Edit. Aldin. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Commentar. in octo Libros Phyſic. Auſcultat. Ariſtot. Lib. I. cap. III. p. 32. Edit. Græcæ Venet. 1535. fol.

[3] Comment. in IV. primos Libros Phyſicor. Lib. I. cap III. a. 10. Adde cap. I.

ὕλην ἀποφαινόμενος, τὸ δὲ ποιῆν αἴτιον ἀναιρῶν, τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον ἁπλῶς ἄλλο, ἢ ὕλη ἐστίν· ἃ δύναται δὲ ἡ ὕλη εἶναι ἐνέργεια, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ποιῆν ὑποκέηται· Anaximander *the Milesian affirms Infinite to be the first principle; and that all things are generated out of it, and corrupted again into it; and therefore that infinite worlds are successively thus generated and corrupted. And he gives the reason why it is infinite, that so there might be never any fail of generations. But he erreth in this, that, assigning only a material cause, he takes away the active principle of things. For* Anaximander's *Infinite is nothing else but matter; but matter can produce nothing, unless there be also an active cause.* Where he shews also, how *Anaximenes* followed *Anaximander* herein, in assigning only a material cause of the universe, without any efficient; though he differed from him, in making the first matter to be air, and deriving all things from thence by rarefaction and condensation. Thus, we see, it is plain, that *Anaximander*'s Infinite was no infinite mind, which is the true Deity, but only infinite matter, devoid of any life or active power. *Eusebius* is more particular in giving an account of *Anaximander*'s *Cosmopœia*;

Ev. Præp. Lib. 1. *p.* 15. *Ed. Steph.*

τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τῶ παντὸς γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ ἧ δὴ φησι τάς τε οὐρανὺς ἀποκεκρίθαι, καὶ καθόλω τὺς ἀπείρους ἀπείρως ὄντας κόσμως· φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶ ἀϊδίω γόνιμον θερμῶ τε καὶ ψυχρῶ, κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τῶδε τῶ κόσμω ἀποκριθῆναι, καὶ τινα ἐκ τύτω φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι, ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν. ἧς τινος ἀπορραγείσης, καὶ εἰς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλως, ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον, καὶ τὴν σελήνην, καὶ τὺς ἀστέρας· Anaximander *affirms infinite* (matter) *to be the only cause of the generation and corruption of all things; and that the heavens, and infinite worlds, were made out of it, by way of secretion or segregation. Also that those generative principles of heat and cold, that were contained in it from eternity, being segregated, when this world was made, a certain sphere of flame or fire did first arise and incompass the air, which surrounds this earth, (as a bark doth a tree) which being afterwards broken, and divided into smaller spherical bodies, constituted the sun and moon and all the stars.* Which Anaximandrian *Cosmopœia* was briefly hinted at by *Aristotle* in these words,

Phys. L. 1. *c.* 4.

οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶ ἑνὸς, ἐνύστας τὰς ἐναντιότητας, ἐκκρίνυσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξίμανδρός φησι· *Some philosophers generate the world by the secretion and segregation of inexistent contrarieties, as* Anaximander *speaks.* And elsewhere in his Metaphysicks, he takes notice of

L. 14. *c.* 4.

Ἀναξιμάνδρω τὸ μίγμα, Anaximander's *mixture of things.* Whence we conclude, that *Anaximander*'s Infinite was nothing else but an infinite chaos of matter, in which were either actually, or potentially, contained all manner of qualities; by the fortuitous secretion and segregation of which, he supposed infinite worlds to be successively generated and corrupted. So that we may now easily guess, whence *Leucippus* and *Democritus* had their infinite worlds, and perceive how near a-kin these two atheistick hypotheses were. But it will not be amiss to take notice also of that particular conceit, which *Anaximander* had, concerning the first original of brute animals, and mankind. Of the former, *Plutarch* gives us this account;

Pla. Ph. l. 5. *c.* 19. [*p.* 908. *Tom.* II. *Oper.*]

Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶα, φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαινύσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον, καὶ περιρρηγυμένω τῶ φλοιῶ, ἐπὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι· *That the first animals were generated in moisture, and encompass'd about with certain thorny barks, by which they were guarded and defended; which after further growth, coming to be more dry and cracking, they issued*

iſſued forth, but lived only a ſhort time after. And as for the firſt original of men, *Euſebius* repreſents his ſenſe thus: Ἐξ ἀλλοειδῶν ζώων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγενήθη, ἐκ τὰ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι' ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνου δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολυχρονίᾳ δεῖσθαι τιθηνήτεως, διὸ κ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἂκ ἂν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι· *Men were at firſt generated in the bellies of other animals, foraſmuch as all other animals, after they are brought forth, are quickly able to feed and nouriſh themſelves, but man alone needs to be nurſed up a long time; and therefore could not be preſerved at firſt, in any other way.* But *Plutarch* expreſſeth this ſomething more particularly. Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ἰχθύσιν ἰσγενέσθαι τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπους ἀποφαίνεται, κ τραφέντας κ γενομένους ἱκανοὺς ἑαυτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἐκβληθῆναι τηνικαῦτα κ γῆς λαβέσθαι. Anaximander *concludes, that men were at firſt generated in the bellies of fiſhes, and being there nouriſhed, till they grew ſtrong, and were able to ſhift for themſelves, they were afterward caſt out upon dry land.* Laſtly, *Anaximander*'s theology is thus both repreſented to us, and cenſured, by *Velleius* the Epicurean philoſopher in *Cicero*: *Anaximandri opinio eſt nativos eſſe deos, longis intervallis orientes occidentéſque, eóſque innumerabiles eſſe mundos; ſed nos deum niſi ſempiternum intelligere quî poſſumus?* Anaximander's *opinion is, that the gods are native, riſing and vaniſhing again, in long periods of times; and that theſe gods are innumerable worlds; but how can we conceive that to be a God, which is not eternal?* We learn from hence, that *Anaximander* did indeed ſo far comply with vulgar opinion, as that he retained the name of gods, but however that he really denied the exiſtence of the thing it ſelf, even according to the judgment of this Epicurean philoſopher. Foraſmuch as all his Gods were native and mortal, and indeed nothing elſe, but thoſe innumerable worlds, which he ſuppoſed in certain periods of time to be ſucceſſively generated and deſtroyed. Wherefore it is plain, that *Anaximander*'s only real Numen, that is, his firſt principle, that was ingenerable and incorruptible, was nothing but infinite matter, devoid of all underſtanding and life, by the fortuitous ſecretion of whoſe inexiſtent qualities and parts, he ſuppoſed, firſt, the elements of earth, water, air and fire, and then, the bodies of the ſun, moon and ſtars, and both bodies and ſouls of men and other animals, and laſtly, innumerable or infinite ſuch worlds as theſe, as ſo many ſecondary and native gods, (that were alſo mortal) to have been generated, according to that atheiſtical hypotheſis deſcribed in *Plato* [1].

E. P. l. 1.

Symp. lib. 8. Q. 8 [p. 730. Tom. II. Oper.]

De Nat. D. Lib. 1. [c. X. p. 2894. Tom. IX. Oper.]

XXIV. It is certain, that the vulgar in all ages have been very ill judges of Theiſts and Atheiſts, they having condemned many hearty Theiſts, as guilty of atheiſm, merely becauſe they diſſented from them in ſome of their ſuperſtitious rites and opinions. As for example; *Anaxagoras* the Clazomenian, though he was the firſt of all the Ionick philoſophers (unleſs *Thales* ought to be excepted) who made an infinite mind to be a principle, that is, aſſerted a Deity, according to the true notion of it; yet he was, notwithſtanding, generally cried down for an Atheiſt, merely becauſe he affirmed the ſun to be μύδρον διάπυρον, *a maſs of fire*, or a *fiery globe*, and *the moon to be an earth*; that is, becauſe he denied them to be animated and endued with underſtanding

Pla. Apol. Socr. [p. 362.]

[1] De Legibus Lib. X. p. 666.

ing ſouls, and conſequently to be gods. So likewiſe *Socrates* was both accuſed, and condemned, for atheiſtical impiety, as denying all gods, though nothing was pretended to be proved againſt him, but only this, that he did θεὺς διδάσκειν μὴ νομίζειν, ὃς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινὰ εἰσφέρειν, *teach that thoſe were not true gods, which the city worſhipt, and in the room thereof introduce other new gods.* And laſtly, the Chriſtians in the primitive times, for the ſame reaſon, were vulgarly traduced for Atheiſts by the Pagans, as *Juſtin Martyr* declares in his apology [1], ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα, καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι· *We are called Atheiſts; and we confeſs ourſelves ſuch, in reſpect of thoſe gods which they worſhip, but not of the true God.* And as the vulgar have unjuſtly condemned many Theiſts for Atheiſts, ſo have they alſo acquitted many rank Atheiſts from the guilt of that crime, merely becauſe they externally complied with them, in their religious worſhip, and forms of ſpeech. Neither is it only the vulgar, that have been impoſed upon herein, but alſo the generality of learned men, who have been commonly ſo ſuperficial in this buſineſs, as that they have hardly taken notice of above three or four Atheiſts, that ever were in former times, as namely, *Diagoras*, *Theodorus*, *Euemerus*, and *Protagoras*; whereas *Democritus* and *Anaximander* were as rank Atheiſts as as any of them all, though they had the wit to carry themſelves externally with more cautiouſneſs. And indeed it was really one and the ſelf-ſame form of atheiſm, which both theſe entertained, they deriving all things alike, from dead and ſtupid matter fortuitouſly moved, the difference between them being only this, that they managed it two different ways; *Anaximander* in the way of qualities and forms, which is the more vulgar and obvious kind of atheiſm; but *Democritus* in the way of atoms and figures, which ſeems to be a more learned kind of atheiſm.

Plat. Apol.

And though we do not doubt at all, but that *Plato*, in his tenth *de Legibus*, where he attacks atheiſm, did intend the confutation as well of the Democritick as the Anaximandrian atheiſm; yet whether it were, becauſe he had no mind to take any notice at all of *Democritus*, who is not ſo much as once mentioned by him any where, or elſe becauſe he was not ſo perfectly acquainted with that atomick way of phyſiologizing, certain it is, that he there deſcribes the atheiſtick hypotheſis more according to the Anaximandrian than the Democritick form. For when he repreſents the atheiſtick generation of heaven and earth, and all things in them, as reſulting from the fortuitous commixture of hot and cold, hard and ſoft, moiſt and dry corpuſcula; this is clearly more agreeable with the Anaximandrian generation of the world, by the ſecretion of inexiſtent contrarieties in the matter, than the Democritick Coſmopœia, by the fortuitous concourſe of atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities and forms.

Some indeed ſeem to call that ſcheme of atheiſm, that deduces all things from matter, in the way of qualities and forms, by the name of Peripatetick or Ariſtotelick atheiſm; we ſuppoſe for this reaſon, becauſe *Ariſtotle* phyſiologized in that way of forms and qualities, educing them out of the power of the matter. But ſince *Ariſtotle* himſelf cannot be juſtly taxed

[1] P. 56. Oper.

juſtly taxed for an Atheiſt, this form of theiſm ought rather, as we conceive, to be denominated from *Anaximander*, and called the Anaximandrian atheiſm.

XXV. Now the reaſons, why *Democritus* and *Leucippus* new-modelled atheiſm, from the Anaximandrian and Hylopathian into the Atomick form, ſeem to have been chiefly theſe; firſt, becauſe they being well inſtructed in that atomick way of phyſiologizing, were really convinced, that it was not only more ingenious, but alſo more agreeable to truth; the other, by real qualities and forms, ſeeming a thing unintelligible. Secondly, becauſe they foreſaw, as *Lucretius* intimates, that the production of forms and qualities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, would prepare an eaſy way for men's belief of a divine creation and annihilation. And laſtly, becauſe, as we have already ſuggeſted, they plainly perceived, that theſe forms and qualities of matter were of a doubtful nature; and therefore, as they were ſometimes made a ſhelter for atheiſm, ſo they might alſo prove, on the contrary, an aſylum for corporeal theiſm; in that it might poſſibly be ſuppoſed, that either the matter of the whole world, or elſe the more ſubtle and fiery part of it, was originally endued with an underſtanding form or quality, and conſequently the whole an animal or god. Wherefore they took another more effectual courſe, to ſecure their atheiſm, and exclude all poſſibility of a corporeal God, by deriving the original of all things from atoms, devoid of all forms and qualities, and having nothing in them, but magnitude, figure, ſite and motion, as the firſt principles; it following unavoidably from thence, that life and underſtanding, as well as thoſe other qualities, could be only accidental and ſecondary reſults from certain fortuitous concretions and contextures of atoms; ſo that the world could be made by no previous counſel or underſtanding, and therefore by no Deity.

XXVI. We have here repreſented three ſeveral forms of atheiſm, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical and the Stratonical. But there is yet another form of atheiſm, different from them all, to be taken notice of, which is ſuch, as ſuppoſes one kind of plaſtick and ſpermatick, methodical and artificial nature, but without any ſenſe or conſcious underſtanding, to preſide over the whole world, and diſpoſe and conſerve all things, in that regular frame in which they are. Such a form of atheiſm as this is hinted to us in that doubtful paſſage of *Seneca*'s; *Sive animal eſt mundus*, (for ſo it ought be read, and not *anima*) *ſive corpus naturâ gubernante, at arbores, ut ſata*; *whether the whole world be an animal* (i. e. *endued with one ſentient and rational life*) *or whether it be only a body governed by* (*a certain plaſtick and methodical, but ſenſeleſs*) *nature, as trees, and other plants or vegetables.* In which words are two ſeveral hypotheſes of the mundane ſyſtem, ſceptically propoſed by one, who was a Corporealiſt, and took it for granted that all was body. Firſt, that the whole world, though having nothing but body in it, yet was notwithſtanding an animal, as our human bodies are, endued

Nat. Quæſt. l. 3. Sect. 29.

with one sentient or rational life and nature, one soul or mind, governing and ordering the whole. Which corporeal cosmo-zoism we do not reckon amongst the forms of atheism, but rather account it for a kind of spurious theism, or theism disguised in a pagnick dress, and not without a complication of many false apprehensions, concerning the Deity, in it. The second is, that the whole world is no animal, but, as it were, one huge plant or vegetable, a body endued with one plastick or spermatick nature, branching out the whole, orderly and methodically, but without any understanding or sense. And this must needs be accounted a form of atheism, because it does not derive the original of things in the universe from any clearly intellectual principle or conscious nature.

XXVII. Now this form of atheism, which supposes the whole world (there being nothing but body in it) not to be an animal, but only a great plant or vegetable, having one spermatick form, or plastick nature, which without any conscious reason or understanding orders the whole, though it have some nearer correspondence with that hylozoick form of atheism before described, in that it does not suppose nature to be a mere fortuitous, but a kind of artificial thing; yet it differs from it in this, that the hylozoick supposing all matter, as such, to have life essentially belonging to it, must therefore needs attribute to every part of matter (or at least every particular totum, that is one by continuity) a distinct plastick life of its own, but acknowledge no one common life, as ruling over the whole corporeal universe; and consequently impute the original of all things (as hath been already observed) to a certain mixture of chance, and plastick or methodical nature, both together. Whereas the cosmo-plastick atheism quite excludes fortune or chance, subjecting all things to the regular and orderly fate of one plastick or plantal nature, ruling over the whole. Thus that philosopher before mentioned concludes, that whether the world were an animal (in the Stoical sense) or whether it were a mere plant or vegetable, *Ab initio ejus usque ad exitum, quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut in semine, omnis futuri ratio hominis comprehensa est. Et legem barbæ & canorum nondum natus infans habet; totius enim corporis, & sequentis ætatis, in parvo occultoque lineamenta sunt. Sic origo mundi non magis solem & lunam, & vices syderum, & animalium ortus, quàm quibus mutarentur terranea, continuit. In his fuit inundatio, quæ non secus quàm hyems, quàm æstas, lege mundi venit. Whatsoever, from the beginning to the end of it, it can either do or suffer, it was all at first included in the nature of the whole; as in the seed is contained the whole delineation of the future man, and the embryo or unborn infant hath already in it the law of a beard and gray hairs; the lineaments of the whole body, and of its following age, being there described as it were in a little and obscure compendium. In like manner, the original and first rudiments of the world contained in them not only the sun and moon, the courses of the stars, and the generation of animals, but also the vicissitudes of all terrestrial things; and every deluge or inundation of water comes to pass no less by the law of the world* (its spermatick or plastick nature) *than winter and summer doth.*

Nat. Q. l. 3. c. 29.

XXVIII.

XXVIII. We do not deny it to be possible, but that some in all ages might have entertained such an atheistical conceit as this, that the original of this whole mundane system was from one artificial, orderly and methodical, but senseless nature lodged in the matter; but we cannot trace the footsteps of this doctrine any where so much as among the Stoicks, to which sect *Seneca*, who speaks so waveringly and uncertainly in this point, (whether the world were an animal or a plant) belonged. And indeed diverse learned men have suspected, that even the Zenonian and Heraclitick Deity it self was no other than such a plastick nature or spermatick principle in the universe, as in the seeds of vegetables and animals doth frame their respective bodies orderly and artificially. Nor can it be denied, but that there hath been just cause given for such a suspicion; forasmuch as the best of Stoicks, sometimes confounding God with nature, seemed to make him nothing but an artificial fire, orderly and methodically proceeding to generation. And it was familiar with them, as *Laertius* [1] tells us, to call God σπερματικὸν λόγον τῦ κόσμυ, *the spermatick reason*, or *form of the world*. Nevertheless, because *Zeno* [2] and others of the chief Stoical doctors did also many times assert, that there was φύσις ιερὰ καὶ λογικὴ, *a rational and intellectual nature* (and therefore not a plastick principle only) in the matter of the universe; as likewise that the whole world was an animal, and not a mere plant: therefore we incline rather to excuse the generality of the first and most ancient Stoicks from the imputation of atheism, and to account this form of atheism, which we now speak of, to be but a certain degeneracy from the right Heraclitick and Zenonian *Cabala*, which seemed to contain these two things in it; first, that there was an animalish, sentient and intellectual nature, or a conscious soul and mind, that presided over the whole world, though lodged immediately in the fiery matter of it: secondly, that this sentient and intellectual nature, or corporeal soul and mind of the universe, did contain also under it, or within it, as the inferior part of it, a certain plastick nature, or spermatick principle which was properly the fate of all things. For thus *Heraclitus* [3] defined Fate, λόγον τὸν διὰ τῆς ὑσίας τοῦ παντὸς διήκοντα, ἢ αἰθέριον σῶμα, σπέρμα τῆς τῦ παντὸς γενέσεως· *A certain reason passing through the substance of the whole world, or an ethereal body, that was the seed of the generation of the universe.* And *Zeno*'s [4] first principle, as it is said to be an intellectual nature, so it is also said to have contained in it πάντας τὺς σπερματικὺς λόγυς, καθ' ὃς ἕκαστα καθ' εἱμαρμένην γίγνεσθαι, *all the spermatick reasons and forms, by which every thing is done according to fate.* However, though this seem to have been the genuine doctrine, both of *Heraclitus* and *Zeno*; yet others of their followers afterwards divided these two things from one another, and taking only the latter of them, made the plastick or spermatick nature, devoid of all animality or conscious intellectuality, to be the highest principle in the universe. Thus *Laertius* tells us [5],

R S that

[1] Lib. VII. segm. 136. p. 450.
[2] Vide Diog. Laert. Lib. VII. segm. p 148. p. 459.
[3] Apud Plutarch. de Placitis Philosophor. Lib. I. cap. XXVIII. p. 885. Tom. II. Oper.
[4] Vide Plutarch. ubi supra, Lib. I. cap. VII. p. 881.
[5] Lib. VII. segm. 143. p. 455.

that *Boethus*, an eminent and famous Stoical doctor did plainly deny the world to be an animal, that is, to have any ſentient, conſcious or intellectual nature preſiding over it; and conſequently muſt needs make it to be but *corpus naturâ gubernante, ut arbores, ut ſata, a body governed by a pleſtic or vegetative nature, as trees, plants and herbs.* And as it is poſſible, that other Stoicks and Heracliticks might have done the like before *Boethus*, ſo it is very probable, that he had after him many followers; amongſt which, as *Plinius Secundus* may be reckoned for one, ſo *Seneca* himſelf was not without a doubtful tincture of this atheiſm, as hath been already ſhewed. Wherefore this form of atheiſm, which ſuppoſes one plaſtick or ſpermatic nature, one plantal or vegetative life in the whole world, as the higheſt principle, may, for diſtinction ſake, be called the Pſeudo-Stoical, or Stoical atheiſm.

XXIX. Beſides theſe philoſophic Atheiſts, whoſe ſeveral forms we have now deſcribed, it cannot be doubted, but that there have been in all ages many other Atheiſts that have not at all philoſophized, nor pretended to maintain any particular atheiſtick ſyſtem or hypotheſis, in a way of reaſon, but were only led by a certain dull and ſottiſh, though confident diſbelief of whatſoever they could not either ſee or feel: which kind of Atheiſts may therefore well be accounted enthuſiaſtical or fanatical Atheiſts. Though it be true in the mean time, that even all manner of Atheiſts whatſoever, and thoſe of them, who moſt of all pretend to reaſon and philoſophy, may, in ſome ſenſe, be juſtly ſtyled alſo both Enthuſiaſts and Fanaticks. Foraſmuch as they are not led or carried on, into this way of atheizing, by any clear dictates of their reaſon or underſtanding, but only by an ὁρμὴ ἄλογος, *a certain blind and irrational impetus*; they being, as it were, inſpired to it by that lower earthly life and nature, which is called in the Scripture oracles, τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου, *the ſpirit of the world, or a mundane ſpirit*, and is oppoſed to the τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, *the ſpirit that is of God.* For when the Apoſtle ſpeaks after this manner, *We have not received the ſpirit of the world, but the ſpirit that is of God*, he ſeems to intimate thus much to us, that as ſome men were led and inſpired by a divine ſpirit, ſo others again are inſpired by a mundane ſpirit, by which is meant the earthly life. Now the former of theſe two are not to be accounted Enthuſiaſts, as the word is now commonly taken in a bad ſenſe; becauſe the ſpirit of God is no irrational thing, but either the very ſelf-ſame thing with reaſon, or elſe ſuch a thing as *Ariſtotle* (as it were vaticinating concerning it) ſomewhere calls λόγου τι κρεῖττον, *a certain better and diviner thing than reaſon*, and *Plotinus* ῥίζαν λόγου, *the root of reaſon.* But on the contrary, the mundane ſpirit, or earthly life, is irrational ſottiſhneſs; and they, who are atheiſtically inſpired by it (how abhorrent ſoever they may otherwiſe ſeem to be from enthuſiaſm and revelations) are notwithſtanding really no better than a kind of bewitched Enthuſiaſts and blind Spiritati, that are wholly ridden and acted by a dark, narrow, and captivated principle of life, and, to uſe their own language, in-blown by it, and by it bereft, even in ſpeculative things, of all free reaſon and underſtanding. Nay, they are Fanaticks too, however that word ſeems to have a more peculiar reſpect to ſomething of a Deity; all Atheiſts being that blind goddeſs Nature's Fanaticks.

XXX.

XXX. We have deſcribed four ſeveral forms of atheiſm; firſt, the Hylopathian or Anaximandrian, that derives all things from dead and ſtupid matter, in the way of qualities and forms, generable and corruptible: ſecondly, the Atomical or Democritical, which doth the ſame thing in the way of atoms and figures: thirdly, the Coſmoplaſtic or Stoical atheiſm, which ſuppoſes one plaſtick and methodical but ſenſeleſs nature, to preſide over the whole corporeal univerſe: and laſtly, the Hylozoick or Stratonical, that attributes to all matter, as ſuch, a certain living and energetick nature, but devoid of all animality, ſenſe and conſciouſneſs. And as we do not meet with any other forms or ſchemes of atheiſm beſides theſe four, ſo we conceive, that there cannot eaſily be any other excogitated or deviſed; and that upon theſe two following conſiderations. Firſt, becauſe all Atheiſts are mere Corporealiſts, that is, acknowledge no other ſubſtance beſides body or matter. For as there was never any yet known, who aſſerting incorporeal ſubſtance, did deny a Deity; ſo neither can there be any reaſon, why he that admits the former ſhould exclude the latter. Again, the ſame dull and earthly diſbelief or confounded ſottiſhneſs of mind, which makes men deny a God, muſt needs incline them to deny all incorporeal ſubſtance alſo. Wherefore as the phyſicians ſpeak of a certain diſeaſe or madneſs, called hydrophobia, the ſymptom of thoſe that have been bitten by a mad dog, which makes them have a monſtrous antipathy to water; ſo all Atheiſts are poſſeſſed with a certain kind of madneſs, that may be called Pneumatophobia, that makes them have an irrational but deſperate abhorrence from ſpirits or incorporeal ſubſtances, they being acted alſo, at the ſame time, with an Hylomania, whereby they madly doat upon matter, and devoutly worſhip it as the only Numen.

The ſecond conſideration is this, becauſe as there are no Atheiſts but ſuch as are mere Corporealiſts, ſo all Corporealiſts are not to be accounted Atheiſts neither: thoſe of them, who notwithſtanding they make all things to be matter, yet ſuppoſe an intellectual nature in that matter to preſide over the corporeal univerſe, being in reaſon and charity to be exempted out of that number. And there have been always ſome, who, though ſo ſtrongly captivated under the power of groſs imagination, as that an incorporeal God ſeemed to them to be nothing but a God of words, (as ſome of them call it) a mere empty ſound or contradictious expreſſion, ſomething and nothing put together; yet notwithſtanding, they have been poſſeſſed with a firm belief and perſuaſion of a Deity, or that the ſyſtem of the univerſe depends upon one perfect underſtanding being as the head of it; and thereupon have concluded that ὕλη πως ἔχουσα, a certain *kind of body or matter is God.* The groſſeſt and moſt ſottiſh of all which corporeal Theiſts ſeem to be thoſe, who contend, that God is only one particular piece of organized matter, of human form and bigneſs, which endued with perfect reaſon and underſtanding exerciſeth an univerſal dominion over all the reſt. Which hypotheſis however it hath been entertained by ſome of the Chriſtian profeſſion, both in former and later times, yet it hath ſeemed very ridiculous, even to many of thoſe Heathen philoſophers themſelves, who were mere Corporealiſts, ſuch as the Stoicks, who exploded it with a kind of indig-

nation, contending earneſtly [1] μὴ εἶναι θεὸν ἀνθρωπόμορφον, that God (though corporeal) yet muſt not be conceived to be of any human ſhape. And *Xenophanes* [2], an ancient philoſophick poet, expreſſeth the childiſhneſs of this conceit after this manner;

Ἀλλ' εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες,
Ἢ γράψαι χείρεσσι, καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,
Καί κε θεῶν ἰδίας ἔγραφον, καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
Τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὶ αὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον.

If oxen, lions, aſſes and horſes, had all of them a ſenſe of a Deity, and were able to limn and paint, there is no queſtion to be made, but that each of theſe ſeveral animals would paint God according to their reſpective form and likeneſs, and contend, that he was of that ſhape and no other. But that other corporeal Theiſm ſeems to be of the two rather more generous and genteel, which ſuppoſes the whole world to be one animal, and God to be a certain ſubtle and etherial, but intellectual matter, pervading it as a ſoul: which was the doctrine of others before the Stoicks, [3] τὸ πῦρ θεὸν ὑπειλήφατον Ἱππασός τε ὁ Μεταπόντιον καὶ ὁ Ἐφέσιος Ἡράκλειτος, Hippaſus *of Metapontus and* Heraclitus *the Epheſian ſuppoſed the fiery and etherial matter of the world to be God.* However, neither theſe Heracliticks and Stoicks nor yet the other Anthropomorphites, are by us condemned for downright Atheiſts, but rather look'd upon as a ſort of ignorant, childiſh, and unſkilful Theiſts.

Wherefore we ſee, that Atheiſts are now reduced into a narrow compaſs, ſince none are concluded to be Atheiſts, but ſuch as are mere Corporealiſts; and all Corporealiſts muſt not be condemned for Atheiſts neither, but only thoſe of them, who aſſert, that there is no conſcious intellectual nature, preſiding over the whole univerſe. For this is that, which the Adepti in atheiſm, of what form ſoever, all agree in, that the firſt principle of the univerſe is no animaliſh, ſentient and conſcious nature, but that all animality, ſenſe and conſciouſneſs, is a ſecondary, derivative and accidental thing, generable and corruptible, ariſing out of particular concretions of matter organized and diſſolved together with them,

XXXI. Now if the firſt principle and original of all things in the univerſe be thus ſuppoſed to be body or matter, devoid of all animality, ſenſe and conſciouſneſs, then it muſt of neceſſity be either perfectly dead and ſtupid, and without all manner of life; or elſe endued with ſuch a kind of life only, as is by ſome called plaſtick, ſpermatical and vegetative, by others the life of nature, or natural perception. And thoſe Atheiſts, who derive all things from dead and ſtupid matter, muſt alſo needs do this, either in the way of qualities and forms, and theſe are the Anaximandrian Atheiſts; or elſe in the way of atoms and figures, which are the Democritical. But thoſe, who make matter endued with a plaſtick life to be the firſt original of all things, muſt needs ſuppoſe either one ſuch plaſtick and ſpermatick life only in the whole maſs of matter or corporeal univerſe, which are the Stoical Atheiſts; or elſe all matter as ſuch to have

[1] Theſe are the words of *Clemens Alexandrinus* concerning *Xenophanes*, Stromat. Lib. V. p. 714.

[2] Apud Clem. Alex. ubi ſupra, p. 715.

[3] Idem in Protreptico, cap. V. p. 55.

have life and an energetick nature belonging to it, (though without any animal ſenſe or ſelf-perception,) and conſequently all the particular parts of matter, and every totum by continuity, to have a diſtinct plaſtick life of its own, which are the Stratonick Atheiſts. Wherefore there does not ſeem to be any room now left for any other form of Atheiſm, beſides theſe four, to thruſt in.

And we think fit here again to inculcate, what hath been already intimated, that one grand difference amongſt theſe ſeveral forms of Atheiſm is this, that ſome of them attributing no life at all to matter, as ſuch, nor indeed acknowledging any plaſtick life of nature, diſtinct from the animal, and ſuppoſing every thing whatſoever is in the world, beſides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare ſubſtance of matter conſidered as devoid of all qualities, (that is, mere extended bulk,) to be generated and corrupted; conſequently reſolve, that all manner of life whatſoever is generable and corruptible, or educible out of nothing, and reducible to nothing again; and theſe are the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheiſms. But the other, which are the Stoical and Stratonical, do on the contrary ſuppoſe ſome life to be fundamental and original, eſſential and ſubſtantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, as being a firſt principle of things; nevertheleſs, this not to be any animal, conſcious and ſelf-perceptive life, but a plaſtick life of nature only; all Atheiſts ſtill agreeing in thoſe two forementioned things; firſt, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body; ſecondly, that all animal life, ſenſe and ſelf-perception, conſcious underſtanding and perſonality are generated and corrupted, ſucceſſively educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

XXXII. Indeed we are not ignorant, that ſome, who ſeem to be well-wiſhers to Atheiſm, have talk'd ſometimes of ſenſitive and rational matter, as having a mind to ſuppoſe, three ſeveral ſorts of matter in the univerſe, ſpecifically different from one another, that were originally ſuch, and ſelf-exiſtent from eternity; namely ſenſleſs, ſenſitive and rational: As if the mundane ſyſtem might be conceived to ariſe from a certain jumble of theſe three ſeveral ſorts of matter, as it were ſcuffling together in the dark, without a God, and ſo producing brute animals and men. But as this is a mere precarious hypotheſis, there being no imaginable account to be given, how there ſhould come to be ſuch an eſſential difference betwixt matters, or why this piece of matter ſhould be ſenſitive, and that rational, when another is altogether ſenſleſs; ſo the ſuggeſtors of it are but mere novices in Atheiſm, and a kind of bungling well-wiſhers to it. Firſt, becauſe, according to this hypotheſis, no life would be produced or deſtroyed in the ſucceſſive generations and corruptions of animals, but only concreted and ſecreted in them; and conſequently all human perſonalities muſt be eternal and incorruptible: Which is all one, as to aſſert the præ and poſt-exiſtence of all ſouls from eternity to eternity, a thing that all genuine and thorow-pac'd Atheiſts are in a manner as abhorrent from, as they are from the Deity itſelf. And ſecondly, becauſe there can be no imaginable reaſon given by them, why there might not be as well, a certain divine matter perfectly intellectual

and ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, as a ſenſitive and rational matter. And therefore ſuch an hypotheſis as this can never ſerve the turn of Atheiſts. But all thoſe, that are maſters of the craft of Atheiſm, and thorowly catechized or initiated in the dark myſteries thereof, (as hath been already inculcated) do perfectly agree in this, that all animal, ſentient and conſcious life, all ſouls and minds, and conſequently all human perſonalities, are generated out of matter, and corrupted again into it, or rather educed out of nothing and reduced into nothing again.

We underſtand alſo, that there are certain canting aſtrological Atheiſts, who would deduce all things from the occult qualities and influences of the ſtars, according to their different conjunctions, oppoſitions and aſpects, in a certain blind and unaccountable manner. But theſe being perſons devoid of all manner of ſenſe, who neither ſo much as pretend to give an account of theſe ſtars, whether they be animals or not, as alſo whence they derive their original, (which if they did undertake to do atheiſtically, they muſt needs reſolve themſelves at length into one or other of thoſe hypotheſes already propoſed) therefore, as we conceive, they deſerve not the leaſt conſideration. But we think fit here to obſerve, that ſuch devotos to the heavenly bodies, as look upon all the other ſtars as petty deities, but the ſun as the ſupreme deity and monarch of the univerſe, in the mean time conceiving it alſo to be perfectly intellectual, (which is in a manner the ſame with the Cleanthean hypotheſis) are not ſo much to be accounted Atheiſts, as ſpurious, paganical and idolatrous Theiſts. And upon all theſe conſiderations we conclude again, that there is no other philoſophick form of Atheiſm, that can eaſily be deviſed, beſides theſe four mentioned, the Anaximandrian, the Democritical, the Stoical, and the Stratonical.

XXXIII. Amongſt which forms of Atheiſm, there is yet another difference to be obſerved, and accordingly another diſtribution to be made of them. It being firſt premiſed, that all theſe forementioned ſorts of Atheiſts (if they will ſpeak conſiſtently and agreeably to their own principles) muſt needs ſuppoſe all things to be one way or other neceſſary. For though *Epicurus* introduced contingent liberty, yet it is well known, that he therein plainly contradicted his own principles. And this indeed was the firſt and principal thing intended by us, in this whole undertaking, to confute that falſe hypotheſis of the mundane ſyſtem, which makes all actions and events neceſſary upon atheiſtick grounds, but eſpecially in the mechanick way. Wherefore in the next place we muſt obſerve, that though the principles of all Atheiſts introduce neceſſity, yet the neceſſity of theſe Atheiſts is not one and the ſame, but of two different kinds; ſome of them ſuppoſing a neceſſity of dead and ſtupid matter, which is that, which is commonly meant by ὑλικὴ ἀνάγκη, or material neceſſity, and is alſo called by *Ariſtotle*, an abſolute neceſſity of things: others, the neceſſity of a plaſtick life, which the ſame *Ariſtotle* calls an hypothetical neceſſity. For the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheiſts do both of them aſſert a material and abſolute neceſſity of all things; one in the way of qualities, and the other of motion

motion and mechaniſm: but the Stoical and Stratonical Atheiſts aſſert a plaſtical and hypothetical neceſſity of things only.

Now one grand difference betwixt theſe two ſorts of Atheiſms and their neceſſities lies in this, that the former, though they make all things neceſſary, yet they ſuppoſe them alſo to be fortuitous; there being no inconſiſtency between theſe two. And the ſenſe of both the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheiſms ſeems to be thus deſcribed by *Plato*, [1] πάντα κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράσθη, *All things were mingled together by neceſſity according to fortune.* For that nature, from whence theſe Atheiſts derived all things, is at once both neceſſary and fortuitous. But the Plaſtick Atheiſms ſuppoſe ſuch a neceſſary nature for the firſt principle of things, as is not merely fortuitous, but regular, orderly and methodical; the Stoical excluding all chance and fortune univerſally, becauſe they ſubject all things to one Plaſtick nature ruling over the whole univerſe, but the Stratonical doing it in part only, becauſe they derive things from a mixture of chance and Plaſtick nature both together.

And thus we ſee, that there is a double notion of nature amongſt Atheiſts, as well as Theiſts; which we cannot better expreſs than in the words of *Balbus* the Stoick, perſonated by *Cicero*: *Alii naturam cenſent eſſe vim quandam ſine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus neceſſarios; alii autem vim participem ordinis, tanquam viâ progredientem. Cujus ſolertiam, nulla ars, nulla manus, nemo opifex, conſequi poteſt imitando; ſeminis enim vim eſſe tantam, ut id quanquam perexiguum, nactumque ſit materiam, quâ ali augerique poſſit, ita fingat & efficiat, in ſuo quidque genere, partim ut per ſtirpes alantur ſuas, partim ut movere etiam poſſint, & ex ſe ſimilia ſui generare. Some by nature mean a certain force without reaſon and order, exciting neceſſary motions in bodies; but others underſtand by it ſuch a force, as participating of order proceeds as it were methodically. Whoſe exquiſiteneſs, no art, no hand, no opificer can reach to by imitation. For the force of ſeed is ſuch, that though the bulk of it be very ſmall, yet if it get convenient matter for its nouriſhment and increaſe, it ſo forms and frames things in their ſeveral kinds, as that they can partly through their ſtocks and trunks be nouriſhed, and partly move themſelves alſo, and generate their like.* And again; *Sunt qui omnia naturæ nomine appellent, ut* Epicurus; *ſed nos, cum dicimus naturâ conſtare adminiſtrarîque mundum, non ita dicimus, ut glebam, aut fragmentum lapidis, aut aliquid ejuſmodi, nulla cohærendi natura; ſed ut arborem, ut animalia, in quibus nulla temeritas, ſed ordo apparet & artis quædam ſimilitudo. There are ſome, who call all things by the name of nature, as* Epicurus; *but we, when we ſay that the world is adminiſtred by Nature, do not mean ſuch a nature, as is in clods of earth and pieces of ſtone, but ſuch as is in a tree or animal, in whoſe conſtitution there is no temerity, but order and ſimilitude of art.* Now, according to theſe two different notions of nature, the four forementioned forms of Atheiſm may be again dichotomized after this manner; into ſuch as derive all things from a mere fortuitous and temerarious nature, devoid of all order and methodicalneſs;

De Nat. De. l. 2. [Cap. xxxii. p. 3001. Tom. IX. Oper.]

[1] De Legibus. Lib. X. p. 666. Oper.

ness; and such as deduce the original of things from a certain orderly, regular and artificial, though senseless nature in matter. The former of which are the Anaximandrian and Democritick Atheisms, the latter the Stoical and Stratonical.

It hath been already observed, that those Atheisms, that derive all things from a mere fortuitous principle, as also suppose every thing, besides ὕλη ἄποιος, *the bare substance of matter* or extended bulk, to be generated and corrupted; though they asserted the eternity of matter, yet they could not, agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain the eternity and incorruptibility of the world. And accordingly hereunto, both the Anaximandrian [1] and Democritick [2] Atheists did conclude the world to be γενόμενον καὶ φθαρτὸν, *such as was at first made, and should be again corrupted.* And upon this account, *Lucretius* concerns himself highly herein, to prove both the novity of the world, and also its future dissolution and extinction, that

Totum nativum mortali corpore constat.

But instead of the world's eternity, these two sorts of Atheists introduced another paradox, namely an ἀπειρία κόσμων, *an infinity of worlds*; and that not only successive, in that space, which this world of ours is conceived now to occupy, in respect of the infinity of past and future time, but also a contemporary infinity of coexistent worlds, at all times, throughout endless and unbounded space.

However it is certain, that some persons atheistically inclined have been always apt to run out another way, and to suppose, that the frame of things, and system of the world, ever was from eternity, and ever will be to eternity, such as now it is, dispensed by a certain orderly and regular, but yet senseless and unknowing nature. And it is prophesied in scripture, that such Atheists as these should especially abound in these latter days of ours; *There shall*
2 Pet. 3. *come in the last days* (ἐμπαῖκται) *atheistical scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming? For since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.* Which latter words are spoken only according to the received hypothesis of the Jews, the meaning of these Atheists being quite otherwise, that there was neither creation nor beginning of the world; but that things had continued, such as now they are, from all eternity. As appears also from what the Apostle there adds by way of confutation, That they *were wilfully ignorant of this, that by the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water; and that as the world, that then was, overflowing with water perished, so the heavens and earth, which now are, by the same word are kept in store, and reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men.* And it is evident, that some of these Atheists at this very day march in the garb of enthusiastical religionists, acknowledging no more a God than a Christ without them, and allegorizing the day of judgment and future conflagration into a kind of seemingly mystical, but really atheistical nonsense. These, if they did philosophize, would resolve themselves into one or other of those two hypotheses before mentioned;

[1] Vide Diog. Laert. Lib. IX. Segm. 44. p. 573. [2] Vide eundem Lib. II. Segm. 1, 2. p. 78, 79.

mentioned; either that of one plastick orderly and methodical, but sensless nature, ruling over the whole universe; or else that of the life of matter, making one or other of these two natures to be their only God or Numen; it being sufficiently agreeable to the principles of both these atheistick hypotheses (and no others) to maintain the world's both *antè* and *post*-eternity; yet so as that the latter of them, namely the Hylozoists, admitting a certain mixture of chance together with the life of matter, would suppose, that though the main strokes of things might be preserved the same, and some kind of constant regularity always kept up in the world, yet that the whole mundane system did not in all respects continue the same, from eternity to eternity, without any variation. But as *Strabo* tells us, that *Strato Physicus* maintain'd, *the Euxine sea at first to have had no outlet by* Byzantium *into the Mediterranean, but that by the continual running in of rivers into it, causing it to overflow, there was in length of time a passage opened by the* Propontis *and* Hellespont; *as also that the Mediterranean sea forced open that passage of the Herculean straits, being a continual* Isthmus *or neck of land before; that many parts of the present continent were heretofore sea, as also much of the present ocean habitable land:* so it cannot be doubted, but that the same *Strato* did likewise suppose such kind of alternations and vicissitudes as these, in all the greater parts of the mundane system. *Strab. l.* 1.

But the Stoical Atheists, who made the whole world to be dispensed by one orderly and plastick nature, might very well, and agreeably to their own hypothesis, maintain, besides the world's eternity, one constant and invariable course or tenor of things in it, as *Plinius Secundus* doth, who, if he were any thing, seems to have been one of these Atheists; *Mundum & hoc quod nomine alio cælum appellare libuit, (cujus circumflexu reguntur cuncta) Numen esse, credi par est, æternum, immensum, neque genitum, neque interiturum——Idem rerum naturæ opus, & rerum ipsa natura. The world, and that which by another name is called the heavens, by whose circumgyration all things are governed, ought to be believed to be a Numen, eternal, immense, such as was never made, and shall never be destroyed.* Where, by the way, it may be again observed, that those Atheists, who denied a God, according to the true notion of him, as a conscious, understanding being, presiding over the whole world, did notwithstanding look upon either the world itself, or else a mere sensless plastick nature in it, as a kind of Numen or Deity, they supposing it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. Which same *Pliny*, as upon the grounds of the Stoical Atheism he maintained against the Anaximandrians and Democriticks the world's eternity and incorruptibility; so did he likewise in way of opposition to that ἀπειρία κόσμων, that *infinity of worlds* of theirs, assert, that there was but one world, and that finite. In like manner we read concerning that famous Stoick *Boethus*, whom *Laertius* affirms to have denied the world to be an animal, (which, according to the language and sense of those times, was all one as to deny a God) that he also maintained, contrary to the received doctrine of the Stoicks, the world's ante-eternity and incorruptibility; *Philo* in his treatise περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, or *the incorruptibility of the world*, testifying the same of him. *Nat. H. l.* 2. *c.* 1.

Nevertheless

Nevertheleſs it ſeems, that ſome of theſe Stoical Atheiſts did alſo agree with the generality of the other Stoical Theiſts, in ſuppoſing a ſucceſſive infinity of worlds generated and corrupted, by reaſon of intervening periodical conflagrations; though all diſpenſed by ſuch a ſtupid and ſenſleſs nature, as governs plants and trees. For thus much we gather from thoſe words of *Seneca* before cited, where deſcribing this Atheiſtical Hypotheſis, he tells us, that though the world were a plant, that is, governed by a vegetative or plaſtick nature, without any animality, yet notwithſtanding, *ab initio ejus uſque ad exitum*, &c. it had both a beginning, and will have an end; and from its beginning to its end, all was diſpenſed by a kind of regular law, even its ſucceſſive conflagrations too, as well as thoſe inundations or deluges, which have ſometimes happened. Which yet they underſtood after ſuch a manner, as that in theſe ſeveral revolutions and ſucceſſive circuits or periods of worlds, all things ſhould be ἀπαραλλαξία, exactly alike, to what had been infinitely before, and ſhould be again infinitely afterwards. Of which more elſewhere.

XXXIV. This quadripartite Atheiſm, which we have now repreſented, is the kingdom of darkneſs divided, or labouring with an inteſtine ſeditious war in its own bowels, and thereby deſtroying itſelf. Inſomuch that we might well ſave ourſelves the labour of any further confutation of Atheiſm, merely by committing theſe ſeveral forms of Atheiſm together, and daſhing them one againſt another, they oppoſing and contradicting each other, no leſs than they do Theiſm itſelf. For firſt, thoſe two pairs of Atheiſms, on the one hand the Anaximandrian and Democritick, on the other the Stoical and Stratonical, do abſolutely deſtroy each other; the former of them ſuppoſing the firſt principle of all things to be ſtupid matter devoid of all manner of life, and contending that all life as well as other qualities is generable and corruptible, or a mere accidental thing, and looking upon the plaſtick life of nature as a figment or phantaſtick capricio, a thing almoſt as formidable and altogether as impoſſible as a Deity; the other, on the contrary, founding all upon this principle, that there is a life and natural perception eſſential to matter, ingenerable and incorruptible, and contending it to be utterly impoſſible to give any account of the phænomena of the world, the original of motion, the orderly frame and diſpoſition of things, and the nature of animals, without this fundamental life of nature.

Again, the ſingle Atheiſms belonging to each of theſe ſeveral pairs quarrel as much alſo between themſelves. For the Democritick Atheiſm explodes the Anaximandrian qualities and forms, demonſtrating that the natural production of ſuch entities out of nothing, and the corruption of them again into nothing, is of the two rather more impoſſible than a divine creation and annihilation. And on the other ſide, the Anaximandrian Atheiſt plainly diſcovers, that when the Democriticks and Atomicks have ſpent all their fury againſt theſe qualities and forms, and done what they can to ſolve the phænomena of nature without them another way, themſelves do notwithſtanding like drunken men reel and ſtagger back into them, and

and are unavoidably neceſſitated at laſt to take up their ſanctuary in them.

In like manner, the Stoical and Stratonical Atheiſts may as effectually undo and confute each other; the former of them urging againſt the latter, that beſides that prodigious abſurdity of making every atom of ſenſleſs matter infallibly wiſe or omniſcient, without any conſciouſneſs, there can be no reaſon at all given by the Hylozoiſts, why the matter of the whole univerſe might not as well conſpire and confederate together into one, as all the ſingle atoms that compound the body of any animal or man; or why one conſcious life might not as well reſult from the totum of the former, as of the latter; by which means the whole world would become an animal or God. Again, the latter contending, that the Stoical or Coſmo-plaſtick Atheiſt can pretend no reaſon, why the whole world might not have one ſentient and rational, as well as one plaſtick ſoul in it, that is, as well be an animal as a plant: Moreover, that the ſenſitive ſouls of brute animals, and the rational ſouls of men, could never poſſibly emerge out of one ſingle, plaſtick and vegetative ſoul in the whole univerſe: And laſtly, that it is altogether as impoſſible, that the whole world ſhould have life in it, and yet none of its parts have any life of their own, as that the whole world ſhould be white or black, and yet no part of it have any whiteneſs or blackneſs at all in it: And therefore that the Stoical Atheiſts, as well as the Stoical Theiſts, do both alike deny incorporeal ſubſtance but in words only, whilſt they really admit the thing itſelf; becauſe one and the ſame life, ruling over all the diſtant parts of the corporeal univerſe, muſt needs be an incorporeal ſubſtance, it being all in the whole, and all acting upon every part, and yet none of it in any part by itſelf; for then it would be many, and not one. From all which it may be concluded, that Atheiſm is a certain ſtrange kind of monſter, with four heads, that are all of them perpetually biting, tearing, and devouring one another.

Now though theſe ſeveral forms of Atheiſm do mutually deſtroy each other, and none of them be really conſiderable or formidable in itſelf, as to any ſtrength of reaſon which it hath; yet as they are compared together among themſelves, ſo ſome of them may be more conſiderable than the reſt. For firſt, as the qualities and forms of the Anaximandrian Atheiſt, ſuppoſed to be really diſtinct from the ſubſtances, are things unintelligible in themſelves; ſo he cannot, with any colour or pretence of reaſon, maintain the natural production of them out of nothing, and the reduction of them again into nothing, and yet withſtand a divine creation and annihilation, as an impoſſibility. Moreover, the Anaximandrian Atheiſm is as it were ſwallowed up into the Democritick, and further improved in it; this latter carrying on the ſame deſign, with more ſeeming artifice, greater plauſibility of wit, and a more pompous ſhow of ſomething where indeed there is nothing. Upon which account, it hath for many ages paſt beaten the Anaximandrian Atheiſm in a manner quite off the ſtage, and reigned there alone. So that

that the Democritick or Atomick Atheiſm ſeems to be much more conſiderable of the two, than the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian.

Again, as for the two other forms of Atheiſm, if there were any life at all in matter, as the firſt and immediate recipient of it, then in reaſon this muſt needs be ſuppoſed to be after the ſame manner in it, that all other corporeal qualities are in bodies, ſo as to be diviſible together with it, and ſome of it be in every part of the matter; which is according to the hypotheſis of the Hylozoiſts. Whereas on the contrary the Stoical Atheiſts ſuppoſing one life only in the whole maſs of matter, after ſuch a manner, as that none of the parts of it by themſelves ſhould have any life of their own, do thereby, no leſs than the Stoical Theiſts, make this life of theirs to be no corporeal quality or form, but an incorporeal ſubſtance; which is to contradict their own hypotheſis. From whence we may conclude, that the Coſmo-plaſtick or Stoical Atheiſm is, of the two, leſs conſiderable than the Hylozoick or Stratonical.

Wherefore amongſt theſe four forms of Atheiſm, that have been propounded, theſe two, the Atomick or Democritical, and the Hylozoick or Stratonical are the chief. The former of which, namely the Democritick Atheiſm, admitting a true notion of body, that (according to the doctrine of the firſt and moſt ancient Atomiſts) it is nothing but reſiſting bulk devoid of all manner of life; yet becauſe it takes for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance in the world beſides body, does therefore conclude, that all life and underſtanding in animals and men is generated out of dead and ſtupid matter, though not as qualities and forms (which is the Anaximandrian way) but as reſulting from the contextures of atoms, or ſome peculiar compoſition of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions; and conſequently that they are themſelves really nothing elſe but local motion and mechaniſm: which is a thing, that ſome time ſince was very pertinently and judiciouſly both obſerved and perſtringed by the learned [1] author of the *Exercitatio Epiſtolica*, now a reverend biſhop. But the latter, namely the Hylozoick, though truly acknowledging on the contrary, that life, cogitation and underſtanding are entities really diſtinct from local motion and mechaniſm, and that therefore they cannot be generated out of dead and ſtupid matter, but muſt needs be ſomewhere in the world, originally, eſſentially, and fundamentally; yet becauſe they take it alſo for granted, that there is no other ſubſtance beſides matter, do thereupon adulterate the notion of matter or body, blending and confounding it with life, as making them but two inadequate conceptions of ſubſtance, and concluding that all matter and ſubſtance, as ſuch, hath life and perception or underſtanding natural and inconſcious eſſentially belonging to it; and that ſenſe and conſcious reaſon or underſtanding in animals ariſes only from the accidental modification of this fundamental life of matter by organization.

Sect. 4. *c.* 3.

[1] Dr. *Seth Ward, Savilian* Profeſſor of Aſtronomy in the Univerſity of *Oxford*; and ſucceſſively Biſhop of *Exeter* and *Salisbury*.

We conclude therefore, that if theſe two Atheiſtick hypotheſes, which are found to be the moſt conſiderable, be once confuted, the reality of al Atheiſm will be *ipſo facto* confuted; there being indeed nothing more requiſite to a thorough confutation of Atheiſm, than the proving of theſe two things; firſt, that life and underſtanding are not eſſential to matter as ſuch; and ſecondly, that they can never poſſibly riſe out of any mixture or modification of dead and ſtupid matter whatſoever. The reaſon of which aſſertion is, becauſe all Atheiſts, as was before obſerved, are mere Corporealiſts, of which there can be but theſe two ſorts; either ſuch as make life to be eſſential to matter, and therefore to be ingenerable and incorruptible; or elſe ſuch as ſuppoſe life and every thing beſides ὕλη ἄποιος, the bare ſubſtance of matter, or extended bulk, to be merely accidental, generable or corruptible, as riſing out of ſome mixture or modification of it. And as the proving of thoſe two things will overthrow all Atheiſm, ſo it will likewiſe lay a clear foundation, for the demonſtrating of a Deity diſtinct from the corporeal world.

XXXV. Now that life and perception, or underſtanding, ſhould be eſſential to matter as ſuch, or that all ſenſleſs matter ſhould be perfectly and infallibly wiſe (though without conſciouſneſs) as to all its own congruities and capabilities, which is the doctrine of the Hylozoiſts; this, I ſay, is an hypotheſis ſo prodigiouſly paradoxical, and ſo outragiouſly wild, as that very few men ever could have atheiſtick faith enough, to ſwallow it down and digeſt it. Wherefore this Hylozoick Atheiſm hath been very obſcure ever ſince its firſt emerſion, and hath found ſo few fautors and abettors, that it hath looked like a forlorn and deſerted thing. Neither indeed are there any publick monuments at all extant, in which it is avowedly maintained, ſtated and reduced into any ſyſtem. Inſomuch that we ſhould not have taken any notice of it at this time, as a particular form of Atheiſm, nor have conjured it up out of its grave, had we not underſtood, that *Strato*'s ghoſt had begun to walk of late; and that among ſome well-wiſhers to Atheiſm, deſpairing in a manner of the Atomick form, this Hylozoick hypotheſis began already to be looked upon, as the riſing ſun of Atheiſm, ——— *Et tanquam ſpes altera Trojæ*, it ſeeming to ſmile upon them, and flatter them at a diſtance, with ſome fairer hopes of ſupporting that ruinous and deſperate cauſe.

Whereas on the contrary, that other Atomick Atheiſm, as it inſiſts upon a true notion of body, that it is nothing but reſiſting bulk; by which means we, joining iſſue thereupon, ſhall be fairly conducted on to a clear deciſion of this preſent controverſy, as likewiſe to the diſintangling of many other points of philoſophy; ſo it is that, which hath filled the world with the noiſe of it, for two thouſand years paſt; that, concerning which ſeveral volumes have been formerly written, in which it hath been ſtated and brought into a kind of ſyſtem; and which hath of late obtained a reſurrection amongſt us, together with the Atomick phyſiology, and been recommended

to the world anew, under a ſpecious ſhew of wit and profound philoſophy.

Wherefore, as we could not here inſiſt upon both theſe forms of Atheiſm together, becauſe that would have been to confound the language of Atheiſts, and to have made them, like the *Cadmean* off-ſpring, to do immediate execution upon themſelves; ſo we were in all reaſon obliged to make our firſt and principal aſſault upon the Atomick Atheiſm, as being the only conſiderable, upon this account, becauſe it is that alone, which publickly confronts the world, and like that proud uncircumciſed Philiſtine, openly defies the hoſts of the living God; intending nevertheleſs in the cloſe of this whole diſcourſe, (that is, the laſt book) where we are to determine the right intellectual ſyſtem of the univerſe, and to aſſert an incorporeal Deity, to demonſtrate, that life, cogitation and underſtanding do not eſſentially belong to matter, and all ſubſtance as ſuch, but are the peculiar attributes and characteriſticks of ſubſtance incorporeal.

XXXVI. However, ſince we have now ſtarted theſe ſeveral forms of Atheiſm, we ſhall not in the mean time neglect any of them neither. For in the anſwer to the ſecond atheiſtick ground, we ſhall confute them all together at once, as agreeing in this one fundamental principle, *That the original of all things in the univerſe is ſenſleſs matter*, or *matter devoid of all animality or conſcious life.* In the reply to the fourth atheiſtick argumentation, we ſhall briefly hint the grounds of reaſon, from which incorporeal ſubſtance is demonſtrated. In the examination of the fifth, we ſhall confute the Anaximandrian Atheiſm there propounded, which is, as it were, the firſt ſciography and rude delineation of Atheiſm. And in the confutation of the ſixth, we ſhall ſhew, how the ancient Atomick Atheiſts did preventively overthrow the foundation of Hylozoiſm. Beſides all which, in order to a fuller and more thorough confutation, both of the Coſmoplaſtick and Hylozoick Atheiſms, we ſhall in this very place take occaſion to inſiſt largely upon the plaſtick life of nature, giving in the firſt place a true account of it; and then afterwards ſhewing, how groſly it is miſunderſtood, and the pretence of it abuſed by the aſſerters of both theſe Atheiſtick hypotheſes. The heads of which larger digreſſion, becauſe they could not be ſo conveniently inſerted in the contents of the chapter, ſhall be repreſented to the reader's view at the end of it.

XXXVII. For we think fit here to obſerve, that neither the Coſmoplaſtick or Stoical, nor the Hylozoick or Stratonical Atheiſts are therefore condemned by us, becauſe they ſuppoſe ſuch a thing as a plaſtick nature, or life diſtinct from the animal; albeit this be not only exploded, as an abſolute non-entity, by the Atomick Atheiſts, who might poſſibly be afraid of it, as that which approached too near to a Deity, or elſe would hazard the introducing of it; but alſo utterly diſcarded by ſome profeſſed Theiſts of later times, who might notwithſtanding have an undiſcerned tang of the Mechanick Atheiſm, hanging about them, in that their ſo confident

confident rejecting of all final and intending cauſality in nature, and admitting of no other cauſes of things, as philoſophical, ſave the material and mechanical only; this being really to baniſh all mental, and conſequently divine cauſality, quite out of the world; and to make the whole world to be nothing elſe, but a mere heap of duſt, fortuitouſly agitated, or a dead cadaverous thing, that hath no ſignatures of mind and underſtanding, counſel and wiſdom at all upon it; nor indeed any other vitality acting in it, than only the production of a certain quantity of local motion, and the conſervation of it according to ſome general laws; which things the Democritick Atheiſts take for granted, would all be as they are, though there were no God. And thus *Ariſtotle* deſcribes this kind of philoſophy, that it made the whole world to conſiſt, ἐκ σωμάτων μόνον, καὶ μονάδων τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν, *of nothing but bodies and monads* (that is, atoms or ſmall particles of matter) *only ranged and diſpoſed together into ſuch an order, but altogether dead and inanimate.* *De Cœl. l. 2. c. 12. [p. 656. Tom. I. Oper.]*

2. For unleſs there be ſuch a thing admitted as a plaſtick nature, that acts ἕνεκά τε, for the ſake of ſomething, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially and methodically, it ſeems, that one or other of theſe two things muſt be concluded; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to paſs fortuitouſly, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or underſtanding; or elſe, that God himſelf doth all immediately, and, as it were with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, inſect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whoſe members have ſo much of contrivance in them, that *Galen* profeſſed he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly, (and yet he would have admired the wiſdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the uſe of microſcopes:) I ſay, upon ſuppoſition of no plaſtick nature, one or other of theſe two things muſt be concluded; becauſe it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus adminiſtred, with ſuch exact regularity and conſtancy every where, merely by the wiſdom, providence, and efficiency of thoſe inferior ſpirits, dæmons or angels. As alſo, though it be true, that the works of nature are diſpenſed by a divine law and command, yet this is not to be underſtood in a vulgar ſenſe, as if they were all effected by the mere force of a verbal law or outward command, becauſe inanimate things are not commendable nor governable by ſuch a law. And therefore beſides the divine will and pleaſure, there muſt needs be ſome other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; ſince not ſo much as a ſtone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cauſe; but either God himſelf muſt immediately impel it, or elſe there muſt be ſome other ſubordinate cauſe in nature for that motion. Wherefore the divine law and command, by which the things of nature are adminiſtred, muſt be conceived to be the real appointment of ſome energetick, effectual, and operative cauſe for the production of every effect.

3. Now to aſſert the former of theſe two things, that all the effects of nature come to paſs by material and mechanical neceſſity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or direction, is a thing no leſs irrational than it is impious and atheiſtical. Not only becauſe it is utterly unconceivable and impoſſible, that ſuch infinite regularity and artificialneſs, as is every where throughout the whole world, ſhould conſtantly reſult out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but alſo becauſe there are many ſuch particular phænomena in nature, as do plainly tranſcend the powers of mechaniſm, of which therefore no ſufficient mechanical reaſons can be deviſed, as the motion of reſpiration in animals: as there are alſo other phænomena, that are perfectly croſs to the laws of mechaniſm; as for example, that of the diſtant poles of the æquator and ecliptick, which we ſhall inſiſt upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other inſtances propoſed by my learned friend Dr. *More*, in his *Enchiridion Metaphyſicum*, and very ingeniouſly improved by him to this very purpoſe, namely to evince, that there is ſomething in nature beſides mechaniſm, and conſequently ſubſtance incorporeal.

Moreover, thoſe Theiſts, who philoſophize after this manner, by reſolving all the corporeal phænomena into fortuitous mechaniſm, or the neceſſary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing elſe in the world, but an idle ſpectator of the various reſults of the fortuitous and neceſſary motions of bodies; and render his wiſdom altogether uſeleſs and inſignificant, as being a thing wholly incloſed and ſhut up within his own breaſt, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

Furthermore, all ſuch Mechaniſts as theſe, whether Theiſts or Atheiſts, do, according to that judicious cenſure paſſed by *Ariſtotle* long ſince upon *Democritus*, but ſubſtitute as it were χειρα ξυλίνην τέκτονος, *a carpenter's or artificer's wooden hand, moved by ſtrings and wires, inſtead of a living hand.* They make a kind of dead and wooden world, as it were a carved ſtatue, that hath nothing neither vital nor magical at all in it. Whereas to thoſe, who are conſiderative, it will plainly appear, that there is a mixture of life or plaſtick nature, together with mechaniſm, which runs through the whole corporeal univerſe.

De part. An. l. 1. *c.* 1. [p. 473. Tom. II. Oper.]

And whereas it is pretended, not only that all corporeal phænomena may be ſufficiently ſolved mechanically, without any final, intending and directive cauſality, but alſo that all other reaſons of things in nature, beſides the material and mechanical, are altogether unphiloſophical, the ſame *Ariſtotle* [1] ingeniouſly expoſes the ridiculouſneſs of this pretence after this manner; telling us, that it is juſt as if a carpenter, joiner, or carver ſhould give this account, as the only ſatisfactory, of any artificial fabrick or piece of carved imagery, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τῷ ὀργάνῳ τὸ μὲν κοῖλον ἐγίνετο, τόδε ἐπίπεδον, *that becauſe the inſtruments, axes and hatchets, plains and chiſſels, happened to fall ſo and ſo upon the timber, cutting it here and there, that*

[1] Ubi ſupra.

that therefore it was hollow in one place, and plain in another, and the like; and by that means the whole came to be of ſuch a form. For is it not altogether as abſurd and ridiculous, for men to undertake [1] to give an account of the formation and organization of the bodies of animals, by mere fortuitous mechaniſm, without any final or intending cauſality, as why there was an heart here, and brains there; and why the heart had ſo many and ſuch different valves in the entrance and outlet of its ventricles; and why all the other organick parts, veins and arteries, nerves and muſcles, bones and cartilages, with the joints and members, were of ſuch a form? Becauſe forſooth, the fluid matter of the ſeed happened to move ſo and ſo in ſeveral places, and thereby to cauſe all thoſe differences, which are alſo diverſe in different animals; all being the neceſſary reſult of a certain quantity of motion at firſt indifferently impreſſed upon the ſmall particles of the matter of this univerſe turned round in a vortex. But, as the ſame *Ariſtotle* adds, no carpenter or artificer is ſo ſimple, as to give ſuch an account as this, and think it ſatisfactory, but he will rather declare, that himſelf directed the motion of the inſtruments, after ſuch a manner, and in order to ſuch ends: * βέλτιον ὁ τέκτων, ὁ γὰρ ἱκανὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ, τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐμπεσόντος τοῦ ὀργάνου, &c. ἀλλὰ διότι τὴν πληγὴν ἐποιήσατο τοιαύτην, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, ἐρεῖ τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅπως τοιόνδε ἢ τοιονδήποτε τὴν μορφὴν γένηται. *A carpenter would give a better account than ſo, for he would not think it ſufficient to ſay, that the fabrick came to be of ſuch a form, becauſe the inſtruments happened to fall ſo and ſo, but he will tell you that it was becauſe himſelf made ſuch ſtrokes, and that he directed the inſtruments and determined their motion after ſuch a manner, to this end that he might make the whole a fabrick fit and uſeful for ſuch purpoſes.* And this is to aſſign the final cauſe. And certainly there is ſcarcely any man in his wits, that will not acknowledge the reaſon of the different valves in the heart from the apparent uſefulneſs of them, according to thoſe particular ſtructures of theirs, to be more ſatisfactory, than any, which can be brought from mere fortuitous mechaniſm, or the unguided motion of the ſeminal matter.

* *De Part. An. l. 1. c. 1.*

4. And as for the latter part of the diſjunction, that every thing in nature ſhould be done immediately by God himſelf; this, as, according to vulgar apprehenſion, it would render divine Providence operoſe, ſollicitous and diſtractious, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to Atheiſts; ſo, in the judgment of the writer *de mundo*, it is not ſo decorous in reſpect of God neither, that he ſhould αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, ſet his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meaneſt and triflingeſt things himſelf drudgingly, without making uſe of any inferior and ſubordinate inſtruments. * Εἴπερ ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτὸν δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, καὶ διατελεῖν ἃ βούλοιτο, καὶ ἐφιστάμενον διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη τῷ θεῷ. Σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ πρεπωδέστερον τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τῶν σύμπαντος κόσμου διηκόσαν, ἥλιόν τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην, &c. *If it were not congruous in reſpect of the ſtate and majeſty of* Xerxes *the great King of* Perſia, *that he ſhould condeſcend to do all the meaneſt offices himſelf; much*

* *Cap. 7.*

[1] Vide Carteſ. Libr. de Homine, & de Formatione Fœtûs.

much leſs can this be thought decorous in reſpect of God. But it ſeems far more auguſt, and becoming of the Divine Majeſty, that a certain power and virtue, derived from him, and paſſing through the univerſe, ſhould move the ſun and moon, and be the immediate cauſe of thoſe lower things done here upon earth.

Moreover, it ſeems not ſo agreeable to reaſon neither, that nature, as a diſtinct thing from the Deity, ſhould be quite ſuperſeded or made to ſignify nothing, God himſelf doing all things immediately and miraculouſly; from whence it would follow alſo, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or elſe artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their own.

Laſtly; This opinion is further confuted by that ſlow and gradual proceſs, that is in the generations of things, which would ſeem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as alſo by thoſe ἁμαρτήματα (as *Ariſtotle* calls them) thoſe errors and bungles, which are committed, when the matter is inept and contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irreſiſtible, and that nature is ſuch a thing, as is not altogether uncapable (as well as human art) of being ſometimes fruſtrated and diſappointed, by the indiſpoſition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could diſpatch its work in a moment, ſo it would always do it infallibly and irreſiſtibly; no ineptitude or ſtubbornneſs of matter being ever able to hinder ſuch a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing.

5. Wherefore ſince neither all things are produced fortuitouſly, or by the unguided mechaniſm of matter, nor God himſelf may reaſonably be thought to do all things immediately and miraculouſly; it may well be concluded, that there is a plaſtick nature under him, which, as an inferior and ſubordinate inſtrument, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence, which conſiſts in the regular and orderly motion of matter; yet ſo as that there is alſo, beſides this, a higher providence to be acknowledged, which preſiding over it, doth often ſupply the defects of it, and ſometimes over-rule it; for as much as this plaſtick nature cannot act elective, nor with diſcretion. And by this means the wiſdom of God will not be ſhut up nor concluded wholly within his own breaſt, but will diſplay itſelf abroad, and print its ſtamps and ſignatures every where throughout the world; ſo that God, as *Plato* [1] (after *Orpheus* [2]) ſpeaks, will be not only the beginning and end, but alſo the middle of all things; they being as much to be aſcribed to his cauſality, as if himſelf had done them all immediately, without the concurrent inſtrumentality of any ſubordinate natural cauſe. Notwithſtanding which, in this way it will appear alſo to human reaſon, that all things are diſpoſed and ordered by the Deity, without any ſollicitous care or diſtractious providence.

And indeed thoſe mechanick Theiſts, who rejecting a plaſtick nature, affect to concern the Deity as little as is poſſible in mundane affairs, either for fear of debaſing him, and bringing him down to too mean offices, or elſe of

[1] De Legibus, Lib. IV. p. 600. Oper. [2] Vide Apuleium de Mundo, p. 25.

of ſubjecting him to ſollicitous incumberment, and for that cauſe would have God to contribute nothing more to the mundane ſyſtem and oeconomy, than only the firſt impreſſing of a certain quantity of motion upon the matter, and the after-conſerving of it, according to ſome general laws: theſe men (I ſay) ſeem not very well to underſtand themſelves in this. For as much as they muſt of neceſſity, either ſuppoſe theſe their laws of motion to execute themſelves, or elſe be forced perpetually to concern the Deity in the immediate motion of every atom of matter throughout the univerſe, in order to the execution and obſervation of them. The former of which being a thing plainly abſurd and ridiculous, and the latter that, which theſe philoſophers themſelves are extremely abhorrent from, we cannot make any other concluſion than this, that they do but unſkilfully and unawares eſtabliſh that very thing, which in words they oppoſe; and that their laws of nature concerning motion are really nothing elſe, but a plaſtick nature, acting upon the matter of the whole corporeal univerſe, both maintaining the ſame quantity of motion always in it, and alſo diſpenſing it (by tranſferring it out of one body into another) according to ſuch laws, fatally impreſſed upon it. Now if there be a plaſtick nature, that governs the motion of matter every where, according to laws, there can be no reaſon given, why the ſame might not alſo extend farther to the regular diſpoſal of that matter, in the formation of plants, and animals, and other things, in order to that apt coherent frame and harmony of the whole univerſe.

6. And as this plaſtick nature is a thing, which ſeems to be in itſelf moſt reaſonable, ſo hath it alſo had the ſuffrage of the beſt philoſophers in all ages. For firſt, it is well known, that *Ariſtotle* concerns himſelf in nothing more zealouſly than this, that mundane things are not effected merely by the neceſſary and unguided motion of matter, or by fortuitous mechaniſm, but by ſuch a nature as acts regularly and artificially for ends; yet ſo as that this nature is not the higheſt principle neither, or the ſupreme Numen, but ſubordinate to a perfect mind or intellect; he affirming, that νοῦς αἴτιον ἡ φύσις τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, *that Mind together with nature was the cauſe of this univerſe*; and that heaven and earth, plants and animals, were framed by them both; that is, by Mind as the principal and directive cauſe, but by nature as a ſubſervient or executive inſtrument: and elſewhere joining in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, *That God and nature do nothing in vain.*

Neither was *Ariſtotle* the firſt broacher or inventor of this doctrine, *Plato* before him having plainly aſſerted the ſame. For in a paſſage already cited, he affirms, that *nature together with reaſon, and according to it, orders all things*; thereby making nature, as a diſtinct thing from the Deity, to be a ſubordinate cauſe under the reaſon and wiſdom of it. And elſewhere he reſolves, that there are ἔμφρονος φύσεως αἰτίαι, αἷς ὑπηρετήσαις ὁ θεὸς χρῆται, *certain cauſes of a wiſe and artificial nature, which the Deity uſes as ſubſervient to itſelf*; as alſo, that there are ξυναίτια οἷς ξυνεργοῖς θεὸς χρῆται, *concauſes, which God makes uſe of, as ſubordinately co-operative with himſelf.*

Moreover,

Moreover, before *Plato*, *Empedocles* philoſophized alſo in the ſame manner, when ſuppoſing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made φιλία and νεῖκος, *friendſhip* and *diſcord*, to be the ἀρχὴ δραστήριον, the *active principle* and *immediate operator* in this lower world: he not underſtanding thereby, as *Plutarch*[1] and ſome others have conceited, two ſubſtantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil, but only a plaſtick nature, as *Ariſtotle* in ſundry places intimates: which he called by that name, partly becauſe he apprehended, that the reſult and upſhot of nature in all generations and corruptions amounted to nothing more than mixtures and ſeparations, or concretion and ſecretion of pre-exiſtent things; and partly becauſe this plaſtick nature is that, which doth reconcile the contrarieties and enmities of particular things, and bring them into one general harmony in the whole. Which latter is a notion, that *Plotinus*, deſcribing this very ſeminary reaſon or plaſtick nature of the world, (though taking it in ſomething a larger ſenſe than we do in this place) doth ingeniouſly purſue after this manner; Αἰτιθεὶς δὲ ἀλλήλοις τὰ μέρη, καὶ ποιήσας ἐνδεᾶ, πολέμια καὶ μάχης σύστασιν καὶ γένεσιν εἰργάσατο· καὶ ὅτως ἐστὶν εἷς πᾶς, εἰ μὴ ἓν εἴη· γενόμενον γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τοῖς μέρεσι πολέμιον, ὅτως ἕν ἐστι καὶ φίλον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δράματος λόγος εἷς, ὁ τὸ δράμα, ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πολλὰς μάχας· τὸ μὲν ἓν δράμα τὰ μεμαχημένα, οἷον εἰς μίαν ἁρμονίαν, ἄγει σύμφωνον.——ὡς τε μᾶλλον ἄν τις τὴ ἁρμονία τῆ ἐκ μαχομένων εἰκάσειε. *The ſeminary reaſon or plaſtick nature of the univerſe, oppoſing the parts to one another, and making them ſeverally indigent, produces by that means war and contention. And therefore though it be one, yet notwithſtanding it conſiſts of different and contrary things. For there being hoſtility in its parts, it is nevertheleſs friendly and agreeable in the whole; after the ſame manner as in a dramatick poem, claſhings and contentions are reconciled into one harmony. And therefore the ſeminary and plaſtick nature of the world may fitly be reſembled to the harmony of diſagreeing things.* Which Plotinick doctrine may well paſs for a commentary upon *Empedocles*, accordingly as *Simplicius* briefly repreſents his ſenſe, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δύο κόσμους συνίστησι, τὸν μὲν ἡνωμένον καὶ νοητὸν, τὸν δὲ διακεκριμένον καὶ αἰσθητὸν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κόσμῳ τὴν ἕνωσιν ὁρᾷ καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν· Empedocles *makes two worlds, the one united and intelligible, the other divided and ſenſible; and in this lower ſenſible world, he takes notice both of unity and diſcord.*

En. 3. *l.* 2. §. 16. [P. 267. Oper.]

In Ariſt. de Cæl. l. 1. *c.* 10. [p. 71. Edit. Græc. Venet. 1526 fol.]

It was before obſerved, that *Heraclitus* likewiſe did aſſert a regular and artificial nature, as the fate of things in this lower world; for his *reaſon paſſing thorough the ſubſtance of all things*, or *ethereal body*, *which was the ſeed of the generation of the univerſe*, was nothing but that ſpermatick or plaſtick nature which we now ſpeak of. And whereas there is an odd paſſage of this philoſopher's recorded[2], κόσμου τόνδε ὔτε τις θεῶς οὔτ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησε, *that neither any God nor man made this world*, which as it is juſtly derided by *Plutarch* for its ſimplicity, ſo it looks very atheiſtically at firſt ſight; yet becauſe *Heraclitus* hath not been accounted an Atheiſt, we therefore conceive the meaning of it to have been this, that the world was not made by any whatſoever, after ſuch a manner as an artificer makes an houſe, by

[1] De Iſide & Oſiride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Apud Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, Tom. II. Oper. p. 1014. & apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. Lib. V. Cap. XIV. p. 711.

by machines and engines, acting from without upon the matter, cumberſomly and moliminouſly, but by a certain inward plaſtick nature of its own.

And as *Hippocrates* followed *Heraclitus* in this, (as was before declared,) ſo did *Zeno* and the Stoicks alſo; they ſuppoſing, beſides an intellectual nature, as the ſupreme architect and maſter-builder of the world, another plaſtick nature as the immediate workman and operator: which plaſtick nature hath been already deſcribed, in the words of *Balbus*, as a thing, which acts not fortuitouſly, but regularly, orderly and artificially. And *Laertius* tells [1] us, it was defined by *Zeno* himſelf after this manner: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὡρισμένοις χρόνοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' οἵων ἀπεκρίθη. *Nature is a habit moved from itſelf according to ſpermatick reaſons or ſeminal principles, perfecting and containing thoſe ſeveral things, which in determinate times are produced from it, and acting agreeably to that from which it was ſecreted.*

[1] *In Vita Zen.* [Lib. VII. ſegm. 148. p. 459.]

Laſtly, as the latter Platoniſts and Peripateticks have unanimouſly followed their maſters herein, whoſe vegetative ſoul alſo is no other than a plaſtick nature; ſo the Chymiſts and Paracelſians inſiſt much upon the ſame thing, and ſeem rather to have carried the notion on further, in the bodies of animals, where they call it by a new name of their own, the Archeus.

Moreover, we cannot but obſerve here, that, as amongſt the ancients they were generally condemned for downright Atheiſts, who acknowledged no other principle beſides body or matter, neceſſarily and fortuitouſly moved, ſuch as *Democritus* and the firſt Ionicks; ſo even *Anaxagoras* himſelf, notwithſtanding that he was a profeſſed Theiſt, and plainly aſſerted mind to be a principle, yet, becauſe he attributed too much to material neceſſity, admitting neither this plaſtick nature nor a mundane ſoul, was ſeverely cenſured, not only by the vulgar, (who unjuſtly taxed him for an Atheiſt) but alſo by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, as a kind of ſpurious and imperfect Theiſt, and one who had given great advantage to atheiſm. *Ariſtotle*, in his Metaphyſicks, thus repreſents his philoſophy [2]: Ἀναξαγόρας τε γὰρ μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ νῷ, πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιΐαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε ἕλκει αὐτὸν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γινομένων ἢ νοῦν. Anaxagoras *uſeth mind and intellect, that is, God, as a machine in the* Coſmopœia; *and when he is at a loſs to give an account of things by material neceſſity, then, and never but then, does he draw in mind or God to help him out; but otherwiſe he will rather aſſign any thing elſe for a cauſe than mind.* Now, if *Ariſtotle* cenſure *Anaxagoras* in this manner, though a profeſſed Theiſt, becauſe he did but ſeldom make uſe of a mental cauſe for the ſolving of the phænomena of the world, and only then when he was at a loſs for other material and mechanical cauſes (which it ſeems he ſometimes confeſſed himſelf to be) what would that philoſopher have thought of thoſe our ſo confident Mechaniſts of later times, who will never vouchſafe ſo much as once to

[2] *L. 1. c. 4.* [Pag. 267. Tom. 4. Oper.]

be beholden to God Almighty for any thing in the oeconomy of the corporeal world, after the firſt impreſſion of motion upon the matter?

Plato likewiſe, in his *Phædo*[1], and elſewhere, condemns this *Anaxagoras* by name for this very thing, that though he acknowledged mind to be a cauſe, yet he ſeldom made uſe of it for ſolving the phænomena; but in his twelfth *de legibus*, he perſtringeth him unnamed, as one who, though a profeſſed Theiſt, had notwithſtanding given great encouragement to atheiſm, after this manner:[2] Λέγουσες ὡς νοῦς ἔιη ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανὸν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πάλιν ἁμαρτάνουσες ψυχῆς φύσεως, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἔιη σωμάτων, ἅπαντ' ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔπος, ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν, τὰ γὰρ δὴ πρὸ τῶν ὁμμάτων πάντα, αὐτοῖς ἐφάνη, τὰ καθ' οὐρανὸν φερόμενα, μεστὰ ἔιναι λίθων, καὶ γῆς, καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων ἀψύχων σωμάτων, διανεμόντων τὰς αἰτίας παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου, ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ τότε ἐξειργασμένα πολλὰς ἀθεότητας· *Some of them, who had concluded, that it was mind, that ordered all things in the heavens, themſelves erring concerning the nature of the ſoul, and not making that older than the body, have overturned all again; for heavenly bodies being ſuppoſed by them to be full of ſtones, and earth, and other inanimate things, (diſpenſing the cauſes of the whole univerſe) they did by this means occaſion much atheiſm and impiety.*

[2] P. 967. Steph.

Furthermore, the ſame *Plato* there tells us, that in thoſe times of his, aſtronomers and phyſiologers commonly lay under the prejudice and ſuſpicion of atheiſm amongſt the vulgar, merely for this reaſon, becauſe they dealt ſo much in material cauſes; Οἱ πολλοὶ διανοοῦνται τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μεταχειρισαμένους, ἀστρονομία τε καὶ ταῖς μετὰ ταύτης ἀναγκαίαις ἄλλαις τέχναις, ἀθέους γίγνεσθαι, καθεωρακότας ὡς οἷόντε γιγνόμενα ἀνάγκαις τὰ πράγματ', ἀλλ' οὐ διανοίαις βελήσεως ἀγαθῶν πέρι τελεσμένων· *The vulgar think, that they, who addict themſelves to aſtronomy and phyſiology, are made Atheiſts thereby, they ſeeing as much as is poſſible, how things come to paſs by material neceſſities, and being thereby diſpoſed to think them not to be ordered by mind and will, for the ſake of good.* From whence we may obſerve, that, according to the natural apprehenſions of men in all ages, they, who reſolve the phænomena of nature into material neceſſity, allowing of no final nor mental cauſality (diſpoſing things in order to ends) have been ſtrongly ſuſpected for friends to atheiſm.

7. But becauſe ſome may pretend, that the plaſtick nature is all one with an occult quality, we ſhall here ſhow, how great a difference there is betwixt theſe two. For he, that aſſerts an occult quality for the cauſe of any phænomenon, does indeed aſſign no cauſe at all of it, but only declare his own ignorance of the cauſe: but he, that aſſerts a plaſtick nature, aſſigns a determinate and proper cauſe, nay the only intelligible cauſe, of that which is the greateſt of all phænomena in the world, namely the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the *orderly, regular and artificial frame* of things in the univerſe, whereof the mechanick philoſophers, however pretending to ſolve all phænomena by matter and motion, aſſign no cauſe at all. Mind and underſtanding is the only true cauſe of orderly regularity; and he that aſſerts a plaſtick

[1] P. 393.

plaſtick nature, aſſerts mental cauſality in the world; but the fortuitous Mechaniſts, who exploding final cauſes, will not allow mind and underſtanding to have any influence at all upon the frame of things, can never poſſibly aſſign any cauſe of this grand phænomenon, unleſs confuſion may be ſaid to be the cauſe of order, and fortune or chance of conſtant regularity; and therefore themſelves muſt reſolve it into an occult quality. Nor indeed does there appear any great reaſon, why ſuch men ſhould aſſert an infinite mind in the world, ſince they do not allow it to act any where at all, and therefore muſt needs make it to be in vain.

8. Now, this plaſtick nature being a thing, which is not without ſome difficulty in the conception of it, we ſhall here endeavour to do theſe two things concerning it; firſt, to ſet down a right repreſentation thereof; and then afterwards to ſhow, how extremely the notion of it hath been miſtaken, perverted and abuſed by thoſe Atheiſts, who would make it to be the only God almighty, or firſt principle of all things.

How the plaſtick nature is in general to be conceived, *Ariſtotle* inſtructs us in theſe words: [1] εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγικὴ ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει· *If the naupegical art, that is, the art of the ſhipwright, were in the timber itſelf operatively and effectually, it would there act juſt as nature doth.* And the caſe is the ſame for all other arts. If the oecodomical art, which is in the mind of the architect, were ſuppoſed to be tranſuſed into the ſtones, bricks and mortar, there acting upon them in ſuch a manner as to make them come together of themſelves, and range themſelves into the form of a complete edifice, as *Amphion* was ſaid, by his harp, to have made the ſtones move, and place themſelves orderly of their own accord, and ſo to have built the walls of *Thebes*; or if the muſical art were conceived to be immediately in the inſtruments and ſtrings, animating them as a living ſoul, and making them to move exactly, according to the laws of harmony, without any external impulſe: theſe, and ſuch like inſtances, in *Ariſtotle*'s judgment, would be fit iconiſms or repreſentations of *the plaſtick nature*, that *being art itſelf acting immediately upon the matter as an inward principle in it.* To which purpoſe the ſame philoſopher adds, that this thing might be further illuſtrated by another inſtance or reſemblance, μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τὶς ἰατρεύει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, τοῦτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις· *Nature may be yet more clearly reſembled to the medicinal art, when it is employed by the phyſician in curing himſelf.* So that the meaning of this philoſopher is, that nature is to be conceived as art acting not from without and at a diſtance, but immediately upon the thing itſelf which is formed by it. And thus we have the firſt general conception of the plaſtick nature, that *it is art itſelf, acting immediately on the matter as an inward principle.*

[1] *Phyſ. l. 2. c. 8.* [Pag. 447. Tom. I. Oper.]

9. In the next place, we are to obſerve, that though the plaſtick nature be a kind of art, yet there are ſome conſiderable preeminences which it hath above human art: the firſt whereof is this, that whereas human art cannot act upon the matter otherwiſe than from without and at a diſtance,

nor communicate itſelf to it, but with a great deal of tumult and hurliburly, noiſe and clatter, it uſing hands and axes, ſaws and hammers, and after this manner with much ado, by knockings and thruſtings, ſlowly introducing its form or idea (as for example of a ſhip or houſe) into the materials; nature in the mean time is another kind of art, which inſinuating itſelf immediately into things themſelves, and there acting more commandingly upon the matter as an inward principle, does its work eaſily, cleaverly, and ſilently. Nature is art as it were incorporated and embodied in matter, which doth not act upon it from without mechanically, but from within vi-

Pl. En. 3. *l.* 8. § 1. [P. 344.] tally and magically; οὔτε χεῖρες ἐνταῦθα, οὔτε πόδες, οὔτε τὶ ὄργανον ἐπακτὸν ἢ σύμφυτον, ὕλης δὲ δεῖ ἐφ' ἧς ποιήσει, ᾗ ἦν ἐν εἴδει ποιεῖ, πάντῃπῃ δῆλον. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μοχλεύειν ἀφελεῖν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ποιήσεως. ποῖος γὰρ ὠθισμός, ἢ τὶς μοχλεία, &c. *Here are no hands, nor feet, nor any inſtrument, connate, or adventitious, there being only need of matter to work upon, and to be brought into a certain form, and nothing elſe. For it is manifeſt that the operation of nature is different from mechaniſm, it doing not its work by truſion or pulſion, by knockings or thruſtings, as if it were without that which it wrought upon.* But as God is inward to every thing, ſo nature acts immediately upon the matter, as an inward and living ſoul, or law in it.

10. Another preeminence of nature above human art is this, that whereas human artiſts are often to ſeek and at a loſs, and therefore conſult and deliberate, as alſo upon ſecond thoughts mend their former work; nature, on the contrary, is never to ſeek what to do, nor at a ſtand; and for that reaſon alſo (beſides another that will be ſuggeſted afterwards) it doth never conſult nor deliberate. Indeed *Ariſtotle* intimates, as if this had been the grand objection of the old atheiſtick philoſophers againſt the plaſtick nature, *That becauſe we do not ſee natural bodies to conſult or deliberate, therefore there could be nothing of art, counſel or contrivance in them, but all*

Phyſ. l. 2. *c.* 8. [P. 477. Tom. I. Oper.] *came to paſs fortuitouſly.* But he confutes it after this manner: Ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά τϰ γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βϰλευσάμενον, καίτοι ᾗ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βϰλεύεται· *It is abſurd for men to think nothing to be done for ends, if they do not ſee that which moves to conſult, altho' art itſelf doth not conſult.* Whence he concludes, that nature may act artificially, orderly and methodically, for the ſake of ends, though it never conſult or deliberate. Indeed human artiſts themſelves do not conſult properly as they are artiſts, but when ever they do it, it is for want of art, and becauſe they are to ſeek, their art being imperfect and adventitious: but art itſelf or perfect art is never to ſeek, and therefore doth never conſult or deliberate. And nature is this art, which never heſitates nor ſtudies, as unreſolved what to do, but is always readily prompted; nor does it ever repent afterwards of what it hath formerly done, or go about, as it were upon ſecond thoughts, to alter and mend its former courſe, but it goes on in one conſtant unrepenting tenor, from generation to generation, becauſe it is the ſtamp or impreſs of that infallibly omniſcient art, of the divine underſtanding, which is the very law and rule of what is ſimply the beſt in every thing.

And

And thus we have ſeen the difference between nature and human art; that the latter is imperfect art, acting upon the matter from without, and at a diſtance; but the former is art itſelf, or perfect art, acting as an inward principle in it. Wherefore when art is ſaid to imitate nature, the meaning thereof is, that imperfect human art imitates that perfect art of nature, which is really no other than the divine art itſelf; as before *Ariſtotle*, *Plato* had declared in his Sophiſt [1], in theſe words; τὰ φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ· *Thoſe things, which are ſaid to be done by nature, are indeed done by divine art.*

11. Notwithſtanding which, we are to take notice in the next place, that as nature is not the Deity itſelf, but a thing very remote from it, and far below it, ſo neither is it the divine art, as it is in itſelf pure and abſtract, but concrete and embodied only; for the divine art conſidered in itſelf is nothing but knowledge, underſtanding, or wiſdom in the mind of God. Now knowledge and underſtanding, in its own nature, is κεχωρισμένον τι, *a certain ſeparate and abſtract thing*, and of ſo ſubtile and refined a nature, as that it is not capable of being incorporated with matter, or mingled and blended with it, as the ſoul of it. And therefore *Ariſtotle*'s ſecond inſtance, which he propounds as moſt pertinent to illuſtrate this buſineſs of nature by, namely of the phyſician's art curing himſelf, is not ſo adequate thereunto; becauſe when the medicinal art cures the phyſician, in whom it is, it doth not there act as nature, that is, as concrete and embodied art, but as knowledge and underſtanding only, which is art naked, abſtract and unbodied; as alſo it doth its work ambagiouſly, by the phyſician's willing and preſcribing to himſelf the uſe of ſuch medicaments, as do but conduce, by removing of impediments, to help that, which is nature indeed, or the inward archeus to effect the cure. Art is defined by *Ariſtotle* [2] to be λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἄνευ ὕλης, *the reaſon of the thing without matter*; and ſo the divine art or knowledge in the mind of God is unbodied reaſon: but nature is *ratio merſa & confuſa*, reaſon immerſed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it, and confounded with it. Nature is not the divine art archetypal, but only ectypal; it is a living ſtamp or ſignature of the divine wiſdom; which though it act exactly according to its archetype, yet it doth not at all comprehend nor underſtand the reaſon of what itſelf doth. And the difference between theſe two may be reſembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, *the reaſon of the mind and conception*, called *verbum mentis*, and the λόγος προφορικὸς, *the reaſon of external ſpeech*; the latter of which, though it bear a certain ſtamp and impreſs of the former upon it, yet itſelf is nothing but articulate ſound, devoid of all underſtanding and ſenſe. Or elſe we may illuſtrate this buſineſs by another ſimilitude, comparing the divine art and wiſdom to an architect, but nature to a manuary opificer; the difference betwixt which two is thus ſet forth by *Ariſtotle* pertinently to our purpoſe; τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν, καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν. οἱ δ' ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια, ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ. τα μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὶ. *Met. l. 1. c. 1.* [P. 260. Tom. IV. Oper.]

[1] P. 168. Oper. [2] De Partib. Animal. Lib. I. Cap. I. p. 472. Tom. II. Oper.

τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον· τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος. *We account the architects in every thing more honourable than the manuary opificers, because they understand the reason of things done; whereas the other, as some inanimate things, only do, not knowing what they do: the difference between them being only this, that inanimate things act by a certain nature in them, but the manuary opificer by habit.* Thus nature may be called the χειροτέχνης, or manuary opificer, that acts subserviently under the architectonical art and wisdom of the divine understanding [1], ἢ παῖει μὲν οὐκ εἰδῦα, *which does do without knowing the reason of what it doth.*

12. Wherefore as we did before observe the preeminences of nature above human art, so we must here take notice also of the imperfections and defects of it, in which respect it falls short of human art, which are likewise two; and the first of them is this, that though it act artificially for the sake of ends, yet itself doth neither intend those ends, nor understand the reason of that it doth. Nature is not master of that consummate art and wisdom, according to which it acts, but only a servant to it, and a drudging executioner of the dictates of it. This difference betwixt nature and abstract art or wisdom is expressed by *Plotinus* in these words: τί διοίσει τῆς λεγομένης Φύσεως Φρόνησις; ὅτι ἡ μὲν Φρόνησις πρῶτον, ἡ δὲ Φύσις ἔσχατον, ἴνδαλμα γὰρ Φρονήσεως ἡ Φύσις, καὶ ψυχῆς ἔσχατον ὄν, ἔσχατον καὶ τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐλλαμπόμενον λογὸν ἔχει. οἷον εἰ ἐν κηρῷ βαθεῖ, διικνεῖτο εἰς ἔσχατον ἐπὶ θάτερα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ τύπος· ἐνάργως μὲν ὕλος τὸ ἄνω, ἰχνοῦς δὲ ἀσθενῆς ὕλος τοῦ κάτω, ὅθεν οὐδὲ οἶδε Φύσις, μόνον δὲ ποιεῖ. *How doth wisdom differ from that, which is called nature? verily in this manner, that wisdom is the first thing, but nature the last and lowest; for nature is but an image or imitation of wisdom, the last thing of the soul, which hath the lowest impress of reason shining upon it; as when a thick piece of wax is thoroughly impressed upon by a seal, that impress, which is clean and distinct in the superiour superficies of it, will in the lower side be weak and obscure; and such is the stamp and signature of nature, compared with that of wisdom and understanding, nature being a thing, which doth only do, but not know.* And elsewhere the same writer declares the difference between the spermatick λόγοι, or reasons, and knowledges or conceptions of the mind in this manner; Πότερα δὲ οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οἱ ἐν ψυχῇ νοήματα; ἀλλὰ πῶς κατὰ τὰ νοήματα ποιήσει; ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἐν ὕλῃ ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν Φυσικῶς, οὐ νόησις, οὐδὲ ὅρασις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τρεπτικὴ τῆς ὕλης, οὐκ εἰδῦα, ἀλλὰ δρῶσα μόνον, οἷον τύπον καὶ σχῆμα ἐν ὕδατι. *Whether are these plastick reasons or forms in the soul knowledges? but how shall it then act according to those knowledges? for the plastick reason or form acts or works in matter, and that which acts naturally is not intellection nor vision, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do, and makes as it were a stamp or figure in water.*

En. 4. *l.* 4. *c.* 13. [P. 467.]

En. 2. *l.* 3. *f.* 17. [P. 147.]

And with this doctrine of the ancients, a modern judicious writer and sagacious inquirer into nature seems fully to agree, that nature is such a thing as doth not know, but only do: for after he had admired that wisdom and art, by which the bodies of animals are framed, he concludes, that one or other

[1] Plotin. Libro utrum Stellæ aliquid agant. Ennead. II. Lib. III. Cap. XVII. p. 147.

other of these two things must needs be acknowledged, that either the vegetative or plastick power of the soul, by which it fabricates and organizes its own body, is more excellent and divine than the rational; or else, *in naturæ operibus neque prudentiam nec intellectum inesse, sed ita solùm videri conceptui nostro, qui secundùm artes nostras & facultates, seu exemplaria à nobismetipsis mutuata, de rebus naturæ divinis judicamus; quasi principia naturæ activa effectus suos eo modo producerent, quo nos opera nostra artificialia solemus: That in the works of nature there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works.* Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and mimick the divine art and wisdom, itself not understanding those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion. *Harv. de Gen. Animal. Ex.* 49.

13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act ἕνεκά του, *for the sake of ends*, and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation or studied consideration, what the next following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself composed, or learnt before, he will presently take it from you, and that perhaps before he is thoroughly awake, going on with it, and singing out the remainder of the whole song to the end. Thus the fingers of an exercised lutonist, and the legs and whole body of a skilful dancer, are directed to move regularly and orderly, in a long train and series of motions, by those artificial habits in them, which do not themselves at all comprehend those laws and rules of musick or harmony, by which they are governed. So that the same thing may be said of these habits, which was said before of nature, that they do not know, but only do. And thus we see there is no reason, why this plastick nature (which is supposed to move body regularly and artificially) should be thought to be an absolute impossibility, since habits do, in like manner, gradually evolve themselves in a long train or series of regular and artificial motions, readily prompting the doing of them, without comprehending that art and reason, by which they are directed. The forementioned philosopher illustrates the seminary reason and plastick nature of the universe, by this very instance: ἡ τοίνυν ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς τεχνικὴ ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ ὀρχούμενος, κινούμενος εἴη. ὁ γὰρ ὀρχιστὴς, τῇ οὕτω τεχνικῇ ζωῇ ἔοικεν αὐτος, καὶ ἡ τέχνη αὐτὸν κινεῖ, καὶ οὕτω κινεῖ, ὡς τῆς ζωῆς αὐτῆς τοιαύτης πῶς οὔσης. *The energy* [*En.* 3. *l.* 2. *c.* 16. Pag. 267. Oper.]

of

of nature is artificial, as when a dancer moves; for a dancer reſembles this artificial life of nature, foraſmuch as art itſelf moves him, and ſo moves him as being ſuch a life in him. And agreeably to this conceit, the ancient mythologiſts repreſented the nature of the univerſe by *Pan* playing upon a pipe or harp, and being in love with the nymph *Echo*; as if nature did, by a kind of ſilent melody, make all the parts of the univerſe every where dance in meaſure and proportion, itſelf being as it were in the mean time delighted and raviſhed with the re-echoing of its own harmony. Habits are ſaid to be an adventitious and acquired nature, and nature was before defined by the Stoicks [1] to be ἕξις, or a habit: ſo that there ſeems to be no other difference between theſe two, than this, that whereas the one is acquired by teaching, induſtry and exerciſe; the other, as was expreſſed by *Hippocrates* [2], is ἀπαίδευτος καὶ οὐκ μαθοῦσα, *unlearned and untaught*, and may in ſome ſenſe alſo be ſaid to be αὐτοδίδακτος, *ſelf-taught*, though ſhe be indeed always inwardly prompted, ſecretly whiſpered into, and inſpired by the divine art and wiſdom.

14. Moreover, that ſomething may act artificially and for ends, without comprehending the reaſon of what it doth, may be further evinced from thoſe natural inſtincts that are in animals, which without knowledge direct them to act regularly, in order both to their own good, and the good of the univerſe. As for example; the bees in mellification, and in framing their combs and hexagonial cells, the ſpiders in ſpinning their webs, the birds in building their neſts, and many other animals in ſuch like actions of theirs, which would ſeem to argue a great ſagacity in them, whereas notwithſtanding, as *Ariſtotle* obſerves [3], οὔτε τέχνῃ, οὔτε ζητήσαντα, οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ· *They do theſe things, neither by art, nor by counſel, nor by any deliberation of their own*; and therefore are not maſters of that wiſdom, according to which they act, but only paſſive to the inſtincts and impreſſes thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all theſe things by a knowledge of their own, and which themſelves are maſters of, and that without deliberation and conſultation, were to make them to be endued with a moſt perfect intellect, far tranſcending that of human reaſon; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above conſultation, but below it, and that theſe inſtincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is in the next place another imperfection to be obſerved in the plaſtick nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reaſon of its own action, ſo neither is it clearly and expreſly conſcious of what it doth; in which reſpect, it doth not only fall ſhort of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themſelves, who though they do not underſtand the reaſon of thoſe actions, that their natural inſtincts lead them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conſcious of them, and to do them by fancy; whereas

[1] Apud Diogen. Laert. Lib. VII. Segm. 148. p. 459.

[2] Epidemicor. Lib. VI. Sect. V. p. 509. Tom. I. Edit. Vander Linden. Vide etiam eundem περὶ τροφῆς. §. VIII. p. 597. Tom. I. Oper.

[3] Phyſicor. Lib. II. Cap. X. p. 476. Tom. I. Oper.

whereas the plaſtick nature in the formation of plants and animals ſeems to have no animal fancy, no expreſs συναίσθησις, *con-ſenſe* or *conſciouſneſs* of what it doth. Thus the often commended philoſopher, ἡ φύσις οὐδὲ φαντασίαν ἔχει, ἡ δὲ νόησις φαντασίας κρείττων, φαντασία δὲ μεταξὺ φύσεως τύπου καὶ νοήσεως· ἡ μὲν γὲ οὐθενὸς ἀντίληψιν οὐδὲ σύνεσιν ἔχει. *Nature hath not ſo much as any fancy in it; as intellection and knowledge is a thing ſuperior to fancy, ſo fancy is ſuperior to the impreſs of nature, for nature hath no apprehenſion nor conſcious perception of any thing.* In a word, nature is a thing, that hath no ſuch ſelf-perception or ſelf-injoyment in it, as animals have. *En.* 4. *L.* 4. *ſ.* 13. [Lib. II. de Dubitat. Animæ. p. 407.]

16. Now we are well aware, that this is a thing, which the narrow principles of ſome late philoſophers will not admit of, that there ſhould be any action diſtinct from local motion beſides expreſly conſcious cogitation. For they making the firſt general heads of all entity to be extenſion and cogitation, or extended being and cogitative; and then ſuppoſing, that the eſſence of cogitation conſiſts in expreſs conſciouſneſs, muſt needs by this means exclude ſuch a plaſtick life of nature, as we ſpeak of, that is ſuppoſed to act without animal fancy or expreſs conſciouſneſs. Wherefore we conceive, that the firſt heads of being ought rather to be expreſſed thus; reſiſting or antitypous extenſion, and life, (*i. e.* internal energy and ſelf-activity;) and then again, that life or internal ſelf-activity is to be ſubdivided into ſuch as either acts with expreſs conſciouſneſs and ſynæſtheſis, or ſuch as is without it; the latter of which is this plaſtick life of nature: ſo that there may be an action diſtinct from local motion, or a vital energy, which is not accompanied with that fancy, or conſciouſneſs, that is in the energies of the animal life; that is, there may be a ſimple internal energy or vital autokineſy, which is without that duplication, that is included in the nature of συναίσθησις, *con-ſenſe* and *conſciouſneſs*, which makes a being to be preſent with itſelf, attentive to its own actions, or animadverſive of them, to perceive itſelf to do or ſuffer, and to have a fruition or enjoyment of itſelf. And indeed it muſt be granted, that what moves matter or determines the motion of it vitally, muſt needs do it by ſome other energy of its own, as it is reaſonable alſo to conceive, that itſelf hath ſome vital ſympathy with that matter, which it acts upon. But we apprehend, that both theſe may be without clear and expreſs conſciouſneſs. Thus the philoſopher, πᾶσα ζωὴ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἡ φαύλη, ἐνέργεια δὲ, οὐχ ὡς τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς, κἂν μὴ αἴσθησίς τις παρῇ, κίνησίς τις οὐκ εἰκῆ. *Every life is energy, even the worſt of lives, and therefore that of nature. Whoſe energy is not like that of fire, but ſuch an energy, as though there be no ſenſe belonging to it, yet is it not temerarious or fortuitous, but orderly and regular.* *En* 3. *L.* 2. *c.* 16. [Lib. I. de Provid. p. 267.]

Wherefore this controverſy, whether the energy of the plaſtick nature be cogitation or no, ſeems to be but a logomachy, or contention about words. For if clear and expreſs conſciouſneſs be ſuppoſed to be included in cogitation, then it muſt needs be granted, that cogitation doth not belong to the plaſtick life of nature: but if the notion of that word be enlarged, ſo as to comprehend all action diſtinct from local motion, and to be of equal extent with life, then the energy of nature is cogitation.

Nevertheleſs, if any one think fit to attribute ſome obſcure and imperfect ſenſe or perception, different from that of animals, to the energy of nature, and will therefore call it a kind of drowſy, unawaken'd, or aſtoniſh'd cogitation, the philoſopher before mentioned will not very much gainſay it: Εἴτις βούληται σύνεσίν τινα ἢ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ διδόναι, οὐχ οἵαν λέγομεν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν σύνεσιν, ἀλλ' οἷον εἴτις τὴν τοῦ ὕπνου τῇ τοῦ ἐγρηγορότος προσεικάσειε. *If any will needs attribute ſome kind of apprehenſion or ſenſe to nature, then it muſt not be ſuch a ſenſe or apprehenſion, as is in animals, but ſomething that differs as much from it, as the ſenſe or cogitation of one in a profound ſleep differs from that of one who is awake.* And ſince it cannot be denied, but that the plaſtick nature hath a certain dull and obſcure idea of that, which it ſtamps and prints upon matter, the ſame philoſopher[1] himſelf ſticks not to call this idea of nature, θέαμα and θεώρημα, *a ſpectacle* and *contemplamen*, as likewiſe the energy of nature towards it, θεωρία ἄψοφος, *a ſilent contemplation*; nay, he allows, that nature may be ſaid to be, in ſome ſenſe, φιλοθεάμων, *a lover of ſpectacles or contemplation.*

En. 3. *Lib.* 8. *S.* 3. [Libro de Naturâ, contemplat. & uno, p. 345. ſ.]

17. However, that there may be ſome vital energy without clear and expreſs συναίσθησις, *con-ſenſe* and *conſciouſneſs*, *animadverſion*, *attention*, or *ſelf-perception*, ſeems reaſonable upon ſeveral accounts. For firſt, thoſe philoſophers themſelves, who make the eſſence of the ſoul to conſiſt in cogitation, and again the eſſence of cogitation in clear and expreſs conſciouſneſs, cannot render it any way probable, that the ſouls of men in all profound ſleeps, lethargies and apoplexies, as alſo of embryo's in the womb, from their very firſt arrival thither, are never ſo much as one moment without expreſly conſcious cogitations; which if they were, according to the principles of their philoſophy, they muſt, *ipſo facto*, ceaſe to have any being. Now if the ſouls of men and animals be at any time without conſciouſneſs and ſelf-perception, then it muſt needs be granted, that clear and expreſs conſciouſneſs is not eſſential to life. There is ſome appearance of life and vital ſympathy in certain vegetables and plants, which, however called ſenſitive-plants and plant-animals, cannot well be ſuppoſed to have animal ſenſe and fancy, or expreſs conſciouſneſs in them; although we are not ignorant in the mean time, how ſome endeavour to ſolve all thoſe phænomena mechanically. It is certain, that our human ſouls themſelves are not always conſcious of whatever they have in them; for even the ſleeping geometrician hath, at that time, all his geometrical theorems and knowledges ſome way in him; as alſo the ſleeping muſician, all his muſical ſkill and ſongs: and therefore why may it not be poſſible for the ſoul to have likewiſe ſome actual energy in it, which it is not expreſly conſcious of? We have all experience, of our doing many animal actions non-attendingly, which we reflect upon afterwards; as alſo that we often continue a long ſeries of bodily motions, by a mere virtual intention of our minds, and as it were by half a cogitation. That vital ſympathy, by which our ſoul is united and tied faſt, as it were with a knot, to the body, is a thing, that we have no direct conſciouſneſs of, but only in its effects. Nor can we tell, how we come to be ſo differently affected in our ſouls, from the many different motions made upon

[1] Ubi ſupra.

upon our bodies. As likewiſe we are not conſcious to ourſelves of that energy, whereby we impreſs variety of motions and figurations upon the animal ſpirits of our brain in our phantaſtick thoughts. For though the geometrician perceive himſelf to make lines, triangles and circles in the duſt with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all thoſe ſame figures firſt upon the corporeal ſpirits of his brain, from whence notwithſtanding, as from a glaſs, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by *Ariſtotle*[1] to be a weak and obſcure ſenſe. There is alſo another more interior kind of plaſtick power in the ſoul (if we may ſo call it) whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itſelf is not always conſcious of; as when, in ſleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory diſcourſes betwixt itſelf and other perſons, in a long ſeries, with coherent ſenſe and apt connections, in which oftentimes it ſeems to be ſurprized with unexpected anſwers and repartees, though itſelf were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our nictations for the moſt part when we are awake, but alſo our nocturnal volutations in ſleep, are performed with very little or no conſciouſneſs. Reſpiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muſcles which cauſes it (there being no ſufficient mechanical account of it) may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; ſince no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conſcious to himſelf of that energy of his ſoul, which does produce it when he is awake, much leſs when aſleep. And laſtly, The Carteſian[2] attempts to ſolve the motion of the heart mechanically ſeem to be abundantly confuted by autopſy and experiment, evincing the ſyſtole of the heart to be a muſcular conſtriction, cauſed by ſome vital principle, to make which nothing but a pulſifick corporeal quality in the ſubſtance of the heart itſelf, is very unphiloſophical and abſurd. Now, as we have no voluntary imperium at all upon the ſyſtole and diaſtole of the heart, ſo are we not conſcious to ourſelves of any energy of our own ſoul that cauſes them; and therefore we may reaſonably conclude from hence alſo, that there is ſome vital energy, without animal fancy or ſynæſtheſis, expreſs conſciouſneſs and ſelf-perception.

18. Wherefore the plaſtick nature, acting neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither elective nor hormetically, muſt be concluded to act fatally, magically and ſympathetically. And thus that curious and diligent inquirer into nature, before commended, reſolves; *Natura tanquam fato quodam, ſeu mandato ſecundùm leges operante, movet*; *Nature moveth as it were by a kind of fate or command, acting according to laws.* Fate, and the laws or commands of the Deity, concerning the mundane oeconomy (they being really the ſame thing) ought not to be looked upon, neither as verbal things, nor as mere will and cogitation in the mind of God, but as an energetical and effectual principle, conſtituted by the Deity, for the bringing of things decreed to paſs. The Aphrodiſian philoſopher[3], with others of the ancients, have concluded, that fate and nature are but two different names for one and the ſame thing; and that τότε εἱμαρμένον κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ τὸ *Harvey de Gen. An.*

[1] Lib. III. de animâ, Cap. III. IV. p. 45. ſ. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Vide Carteſ. Libr. de homine & de formatione fœtus, P. II. p. 195. ſ.

[3] Libr. de fato, § 6. p. 25. edit. Londin.

τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἱμαρμένον, *both that which is done fatally is done naturally, and also whatever is done naturally is done fatally:* but that, which we assert in this place, is only this, that the plastick nature may be said to be the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal world. Now, that which acts not by any knowledge or fancy, will or appetite of its own, but only fatally according to laws and impresses made upon it, (but differently in different cases) may be said also to act magically and sympathetically. Ἡ ἀληθινὴ μαγεία (saith the philosopher [1]) ἡ ἐν τῷ παντὶ φιλία καὶ νεῖκος, *The true magick is the friendship and discord, that is in the universe.* And again, magick is said to be founded, ἐν τῇ συμπαθείᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν δυνάμεων τῶν πολλῶν ποικιλίᾳ πρὸς ἓν ζῶον συντελούντων, *in the sympathy and variety of diverse powers conspiring together into one animal.* Of which passages though the principal meaning seem to be this, that the ground of magical fascinations is one vital unitive principle in the universe; yet they imply also, that there is a certain vital energy, not in the way of knowledge and fancy, will and animal appetite, but fatally sympathetical and magical. As indeed that mutual sympathy, which we have constant experience of, betwixt our soul and our body, (being not a material and mechanical, but vital thing) may be called also magical.

19. From what hath been hitherto declared concerning the plastick nature, it may appear, that though it be a thing, that acts for ends artificially, and which may be also called the divine art, and the fate of the corporeal world; yet for all that it is neither god nor goddess, but a low and imperfect creature. Forasmuch as it is not master of that reason and wisdom, according to which it acts, nor does it properly intend those ends, which it acts for; nor indeed is it expressly conscious of what it doth, it not knowing, but only doing, according to commands and laws impress upon it. Neither of which things ought to seem strange or incredible, since nature may as well act regularly and artificially, without any knowledge and consciousness of its own, as forms of letters compounded together may print coherent philosophick sense, though they understand nothing at all: and it may also act for the sake of those ends, that are not intended by itself but some higher being, as well as the saw or hatchet in the hand of the architect or mechanick doth, τὸ σκέπαρνον ἕνεκά τε πελεκᾶ, ἀλλ' οὐ προλογιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ τῷ προλογιζομένῳ ὑπηρετοῦν; *the ax cuts for the sake of something, though itself does not ratiocinate, nor intend or design any thing, but is only subservient to that which does so.* It is true, that our human actions are not governed by such exact reason, art, and wisdom, nor carried on with such constancy, evenness and uniformity, as the actions of nature are; notwithstanding which, since we act according to a knowledge of our own, and are masters of that wisdom, by which our actions are directed, since we do not act fatally only, but electively and intendingly, with consciousness and self-perception, the rational life that is in us ought to be accounted a much higher and more noble perfection than that plastick life of nature. Nay, this plastick nature is so far from being the first and highest life, that it is indeed the last and lowest of all lives, it being really the same thing with the vegetative,

Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. l. 2. [P. 33. edit. Græcæ.]

[1] Plotin. Lib. II. de dubit. Animæ, Ennead. IV. Lib. V. Cap. XL. p. 434.

tative, which is inferior to the ſenſitive. The difference betwixt nature and wiſdom was before obſerved, that wiſdom is the firſt and higheſt thing, but nature the laſt and loweſt; this latter being but an umbratile imitation of the former. And to this purpoſe, this plaſtick nature is further deſcribed by the ſame philoſopher, in theſe words: Ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἄκρατος νοῦς, οὐδ' αὐτονοῦς, οὐδέγε ψυχῆς καθαρᾶς τὸ γένος· ἠρτημένος δὲ ἐκείνης, καὶ οἷον ἔκλαμψις ἐξ ἀμφοῖν νοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ ψυχῆς κατὰ νοῦν διακειμένης γεννησάντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. *The ſpermatick reaſon or plaſtick nature is no pure mind or perfect intellect, nor any kind of pure ſoul neither; but ſomething which depends upon it, being as it were an effulgency or eradiation from both together, mind and ſoul, or ſoul affected according to mind, generating the ſame as a lower kind of life.* *En.* 3. *l.* 2. *c.* 16. [Libr. I. de Providentiâ, p. 267.]

And though this plaſtick nature contain no ſmall part of divine providence in it; yet, ſince it is a thing, that cannot act electively nor with diſcretion, it muſt needs be granted, that there is a higher and diviner providence than this, which alſo preſides over the corporeal world itſelf; which was a thing likewiſe inſiſted upon by that philoſopher: Γίνεται τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικοὺς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγους περιληπτικοὺς, καὶ τῶν προτέρων, ἢ κατὰ τοὺς τῶν σπερμολόγων λόγους, οὐ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς σπερματικοῖς λόγοις ἔνι, καὶ τῶν γενομένων, παρὰ τοὺς σπερματικοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους· *The things in the world are not adminiſtred merely by ſpermatick reaſons, but by perileptick, (that is, comprehenſive intellectual reaſons) which are in order of nature before the other, becauſe in the ſpermatick reaſons cannot be contained that which is contrary to them,* &c. Where, though this philoſopher may extend his ſpermatick reaſons further than we do our plaſtick nature in this place, (which is only confined to the motions of matter) yet he concludes, that there is a higher principle preſiding over the univerſe than this. So that it is not *ratio merſa & confuſa, a reaſon drowned in matter, and confounded with it,* which is the ſupreme governor of the world, but a providence perfectly intellectual, abſtract and releaſed. *En.* 4. *l.* 4. *c.* 39. [Libr. II. de dub. Animæ, p. 433.]

20. But though the plaſtick nature be the loweſt of all lives, nevertheleſs ſince it is a life, it muſt needs be incorporeal; all life being ſuch. For body being nothing but antitypous extenſion, or reſiſting bulk, nothing but mere outſide, *aliud extra aliud*, together with paſſive capability, hath no internal energy, ſelf-activity, or life belonging to it; it is not able ſo much as to move itſelf, and therefore much leſs can it artificially direct its own motion. Moreover, in the efformation of the bodies of animals, it is one and the ſelf-ſame thing that directs the whole. That, which contrives and frames the eye, cannot be a diſtinct thing from that which frames the ear; nor that which makes the hand, from that which makes the foot; the ſame thing, which delineates the veins, muſt alſo form the arteries; and that, which fabricates the nerves, muſt alſo project the muſcles and joints; it muſt be the ſame thing that deſigns and organizes the heart and brain, with ſuch communications betwixt them; one and the ſelf-ſame thing muſt needs have in it the entire idea, and the complete model or platform of the whole organick

organick body. For the ſeveral parts of matter diſtant from one another, acting alone by themſelves, without any common directrix, being not able to confer together, nor communicate with each other, could never poſſibly conſpire to make up one ſuch uniform and orderly ſyſtem or compages, as the body of every animal is. The ſame is to be ſaid likewiſe concerning the plaſtick nature of the whole corporeal univerſe, in which πάντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, *all things are ordered together conſpiringly into one.* It muſt be one and the ſame thing, which formeth the whole, or elſe it could never have fallen into ſuch an uniform order and harmony. Now that which is one and the ſame, acting upon ſeveral diſtant parts of matter, cannot be corporeal.

Indeed *Ariſtotle* is ſeverely cenſured by ſome learned men for this, that though he talk every where of ſuch a nature as acts regularly, artificially and methodically, in order to the beſt, yet he does no where poſitively declare, whether this nature of his be corporeal or incorporeal, ſubſtantial or accidental; which yet is the leſs to be wondered at in him, becauſe he does not clearly determine theſe ſame points concerning the rational ſoul neither, but ſeems to ſtagger uncertainly about them. In the mean time it cannot be denied, but that *Ariſtotle*'s followers do for the moſt part conclude this nature of his to be corporeal; whereas notwithſtanding, according to the principles of this philoſophy, it cannot poſſibly be ſuch: for there is nothing elſe attributed to body in it, beſides theſe three, matter, form and accidents; neither of which can be the Ariſtotelick nature. Firſt, it cannot be matter; becauſe nature, according to *Ariſtotle*, is ſuppoſed to be the principle of motion and activity, which matter in itſelf is devoid of. Moreover, *Ariſtotle* concludes[1], that they, who aſſign only a material cauſe, aſſign no cauſe at all τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ καλῶς, *of well and fit*, of that regular and artificial frame of things which is aſcribed to nature; upon both which accounts, it is determined by that philoſopher[2], that ἡ φύσις μᾶλλον ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, *nature is more a principle and cauſe than matter*; and therefore it cannot be one and the ſame thing with it. Again, it is as plain, that *Ariſtotle*'s nature cannot be the forms of particular bodies neither, as vulgar Peripateticks ſeem to conceive, theſe being all generated and produced by nature, and as well corruptible as generable. Whereas nature is ſuch a thing as is neither generated nor corrupted, it being the principle and cauſe of all generation and corruption. To make nature, and the material forms of bodies to be one and the ſelf-ſame thing, is all one, as if one ſhould make the ſeal (with the ſtamper too) to be one and the ſame thing with the ſignature upon the wax. And laſtly, *Ariſtotle*'s nature can leaſt of all be the accidents or qualities of bodies; becauſe theſe act only in virtue of their ſubſtance, neither can they exerciſe any active power over the ſubſtance itſelf in which they are; whereas the plaſtick nature is a thing, that domineers over the ſubſtance of the whole corporeal univerſe, and which, ſubordinately to the Deity, put both heaven and earth in this frame in which now it is. Wherefore ſince *Ariſtotle*'s

[1] Metaphyſ. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 266. 475. Tom. II. Oper. Tom. IV. Oper. Vide etiam Phyſicor. Lib. II. Cap. I. p. 462.

[2] De Partib. Animal. Lib. I Cap. I. p.

Ariſtotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it muſt be incorporeal.

21. Now if the plaſtick nature be incorporeal, then it muſt of neceſſity be either an inferior power or faculty of ſome ſoul, which is alſo conſcious, ſenſitive, or rational; or elſe a lower ſubſtantial life by itſelf, devoid of animal conſciouſneſs. The Platoniſts ſeem to affirm both theſe together, namely, that there is a plaſtick nature lodged in all particular ſouls of animals, brutes, and men, and alſo that there is a general plaſtick or ſpermatick principle of the whole univerſe diſtinct from their higher mundane ſoul, though ſubordinate to it, and dependent upon it [1], ἡ λεγομένη Φύσις γέννημα ψυχῆς προτέρας δυναλώτερον ζώσης, *That, which is called nature, is the off-ſpring of an higher ſoul, which hath a more powerful life in it.* And though *Ariſtotle* do not ſo clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and ſubſtantiality of ſouls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonick doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of ſome conſcious ſoul, or elſe an inferior kind of life by itſelf, depending upon a ſuperior ſoul.

And this we ſhall make to appear from his book *de partibus animalium*, after we have taken notice of ſome conſiderable preliminary paſſages in it in order thereunto. For having firſt declared, that beſides the material cauſe, there are other cauſes alſo of natural generations, namely theſe two, ἥτε οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, *that for whoſe ſake*, (or the final cauſe) *and that from which the principle of motion is*, (or the efficient cauſe;) he determines, that the former of theſe two is the principal, φαίνεται δὲ πρώτη ἣν λέγομεν ἕνεκά τινος. λόγος γὰρ οὗτος, ἀρχὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος, ὁμοίως, ἔντε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν. *The chiefeſt of theſe two cauſes ſeems to be the final or the intending cauſe; for this is reaſon, and reaſon is alike a principle in artificial and in natural things.* Nay, the philoſopher adds excellently, that there is more of reaſon and art in the things of nature, than there is in thoſe things that are artificially made by men, μᾶλλον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐν τοῖς φύσεως ἔργοις, ἢ ἐν τοῖς τῆς τέχνης· *There is more of final or intending cauſality, and of the reaſon of good, in the works of nature, than in thoſe of human art.* After which he greatly complains of the firſt and moſt ancient phyſiologers, meaning thereby *Anaximander*, and thoſe other Ionicks before *Anaxagoras*, that they conſidered only τὴν ὑλικὴν ἀρχὴν, *the material principle and cauſe of things*, without attending to thoſe two other cauſes, the principle of motion, and that which aims at ends; they talking only of fire, water, air, and earth, and generating the whole world from the fortuitous concourſe of theſe ſenſleſs bodies. But at length *Ariſtotle* falls upon *Democritus*, who being junior to thoſe others before mentioned, philoſophized after the ſame atheiſtical manner, but in a new way of his own, by atoms; acknowledging no other nature, neither in the univerſe, nor in the bodies of animals, than that of fortuitous mechaniſm, and ſuppoſing all things to ariſe from

L. 1. *c.* 1. [P. 470. f. Tom. II. Oper.]

[1] Plotin. Libr. de Naturâ, Contemplatione, & Uno, Ennead. III. Lib. VIII. Cap. III. p. 345. Oper.

from the different compoſitions of magnitudes, figures, ſites, and motions. Of which Democritick philoſophy he gives his cenſure in theſe following words: εἰ μὲν οὖν τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ χρώματι ἕκαστόν ἐστι, τῶν τε ζώων καὶ τῶν μορίων, ὀρθῶς ἂν Δημόκριτος λέγοι, &c. *If animals and their ſeveral parts did conſiſt of nothing but figure and colour, then indeed* Democritus *would be in the right: but a dead man hath the ſame form and figure of body, that he had before, and yet for all that he is not a man; neither is a brazen or wooden hand a hand, but only equivocally, as a painted phyſician, or pipes made of ſtone are ſo called. No member of a dead man's body is that, which it was before, when he was alive, neither eye, nor hand, nor foot. Wherefore this is but a rude way of philoſophizing, and juſt as if a carpenter ſhould talk of a wooden hand. For thus theſe phyſiologers declare the generations and cauſes of figures only, or the matter out of which things are made, as air and earth. Whereas no artificer would think it ſufficient to render ſuch a cauſe of any artificial fabrick, becauſe the inſtrument happened to fall ſo upon the timber, that therefore it was hollow here, and plain there; but rather becauſe himſelf made ſuch ſtrokes, and for ſuch ends,* &c.

De part. An. Lib. 1. cap. 1.

Now in the cloſe of all, this philoſopher at length declares, that there is another principle of corporeal things, beſides the material, and ſuch as is not only the cauſe of motion, but alſo acts artificially in order to ends, ἔστι τι τοιοῦτον ᾧ δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν φύσιν, *there is ſuch a thing as that which we call nature*; that is, not the fortuitous motion of ſenſleſs matter, but a plaſtick regular and artificial nature, ſuch as acts for ends and good; declaring, in the ſame place, what this nature is, namely that it is ψυχὴ, ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, *ſoul, or part of ſoul, or not without ſoul*; and from thence inferring, that it properly belongs to a phyſiologer, to treat concerning the ſoul alſo. But he concludes afterwards, οὐδὲ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, *that the whole ſoul is not nature*; whence it remains, that according to *Ariſtotle*'s ſenſe, nature is ἢ ψυχῆς μέρος, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, *either part of a ſoul, or not without ſoul*; that is, either a lower part or faculty of ſome conſcious ſoul; or elſe an inferior kind of life by itſelf, which is not without ſoul, but ſubordinate to it, and dependent on it.

22. As for the bodies of animals, *Ariſtotle*[1] firſt reſolves in general, that nature in them is either the whole ſoul, or elſe ſome part of it; φύσις ὡς ἡ κινοῦσα, καὶ ὡς τὸ τέλος τοῦ ζώου, ἤτοι πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ, ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς, *Nature as the moving principle, or as that which acts artificially for ends, (ſo far as concerns the bodies of animals) is either the whole ſoul, or elſe ſome part of it.* But afterward he determines more particularly, that the plaſtick nature is not the whole ſoul in animals, but only ſome part of it; οὐ πᾶσα ψυχὴ φύσις, ἀλλά τι μόριον αὐτῆς, that is, nature in animals, properly ſo called, is ſome lower power or faculty lodged in their reſpective ſouls, whether ſenſitive or rational.

And that there is plaſtick nature in the ſouls of animals, the ſame *Ariſtotle* elſewhere affirms and proves after this manner: τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τ' ἀναγλία φερόμενα, τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν· διαστασθήσεται γὰρ εἰ μήτι ἔσται τὸ κωλύσον, εἰδ' ἐστὶ, τοῦτ'

De An. l. 2. c. 4. [P. 26. f. Tom. II. Oper.]

[1] De Partib. Animal. Lib. I. Cap. I. p. 473.

τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι. *What is that, which in the bodies of animals holds together such things as of their own nature would otherwise move contrary ways, and fly asunder, as fire and earth, which would be distracted and dissipated, the one tending upwards, the other downwards, were there not something to hinder them. Now if there be any such thing, this must be the soul, which is also the cause of nourishment and augmentation.* Where the philosopher adds, that though some were of opinion, that fire was that, which was the cause of nourishment and augmentation in animals, yet this was indeed but συναίτιον πῶς, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ, *only the con-cause or instrument, and not simply the cause, but rather the soul.* And to the same purpose he philosophizeth elsewhere, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πέψις δι' ἧς ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται τοῖς ζώοις οὔτε ἄνευ ψυχῆς, οὔτε θερμότητός ἐστι, πυρὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεται πάντα· *Neither is concoction, by which nourishment is made in animals, done without the soul, nor without heat, for all things are done by fire.* *De Resp. c. 8.* [P. 141. Tom. II. Oper.]

And certainly it seems very agreeable to the phænomena, to acknowledge something in the bodies of animals superior to mechanism, as that may well be thought to be, which keeps the more fluid parts of them constantly in the same form and figure, so as not to be enormously altered in their growth by disproportionate nourishment; that, which restores flesh that was lost, consolidates dissolved continuities, incorporates the newly received nourishment, and joins it continuously with the pre-existent parts of flesh and bone; which regenerates and repairs veins consumed or cut off; which causes dentition in so regular a manner, and that not only in infants, but also adult persons; that which casts off excrements, and dischargeth superfluities; which makes things seem ungrateful to an interior sense, that were notwithstanding pleasing to the taste: that nature of *Hippocrates* [1], that is the curatrix of diseases, αἱ φύσιες τῶν νοσέων ἰήτροι, and that archeus of the chymists or Paracelsians, to which all medicaments are but subservient, as being able to effect nothing of themselves without it: I say, there seems to be such a principle as this in the bodies of animals, which is not mechanical but vital; and therefore since entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we may with *Aristotle* conclude it to be μέρος or μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, *a certain part of the soul* of those animals, or a lower inconscious power lodged in them.

23. Besides this plastick nature, which is in animals, forming their several bodies artificially, as so many microcosms or little worlds, there must be also a general plastick nature in the macrocosm, the whole corporeal universe, that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony. Concerning which plastick nature of the universe the author *de Mundo* [2] writes after this manner, καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διεκόσμησε μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις, *one power passing thorough all things ordered and formed the whole world.* Again, he calls the same [3] πνεῦμα, καὶ ἔμψυχον, καὶ γόνιμον οὐσίαν, *a spirit, and a living, and generative nature*; and plainly declares it to be a thing distinct from the Deity, but subordinate to it and dependent on it. But *Aristotle* himself in that genuine work of his

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1 Epidemicor. Lib. VI. Sect. V. p. 809. Tom. I. Oper. Edit. Vander Linden.

2 Cap. V. p 856. inter Aristot. Opera, Tom. I.

3 Ibid. Cap. IV. p. 852.

his before mentioned, ſpeaks clearly and poſitively concerning this plaſtick nature of the univerſe, as well as that of animals, in theſe words; Φαίνεται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τεχνασ-τοῖς ἡ τέχνη, ἅτως ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἄλλη τις ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τοιαύτη ἣν ἔχομεν, καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐκ τοῦ παυλός· διὸ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν ὅλον γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ ζῶα τὰ θνητά· τὸ γὰρ τελαγμένον καὶ ὡρισμένον πολὺ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ἐν τοῖς οὐρανίοις, ἢ περὶ ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε, περὶ τὰ θνητὰ μᾶλλον· οἱ δὲ τῶν μὲν ζώων ἕκασ-τον φύσει φασιν εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι· τὸν δ' οὐρανὸν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τῆ αὐτομάτη τοιοῦτον συσ-ῆναι, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἀταξίας οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν φαίνεται· *It ſeemeth, that as there is art in artificial things, ſo in the things of nature there is another ſuch like principle or cauſe, which we ourſelves partake of; in the ſame manner as we do of heat and cold, from the univerſe. Wherefore it is more probable, that the whole world was at firſt made by ſuch a cauſe as this (if at leaſt it were made) and that it is ſtill conſerved by the ſame, than that mortal animals ſhould be ſo: for there is much more of order and determinate regularity in the heavenly bodies than in ourſelves; but more of fortuitouſneſs and inconſtant irregularity among theſe mortal things. Notwithſtanding which, ſome there are, who, though they cannot but acknowledge, that the bodies of animals were all framed by an artificial nature, yet they will needs contend, that the ſyſtem of the heavens ſprung merely from fortune and chance; although there be not the leaſt appearance of fortuitouſneſs or temerity in it.* And then he ſums up all into this concluſion, ὥσ-τε εἶναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἔσ-ι τι τοιοῦτον ὃ δὴ καὶ καλοῦ-μεν φύσιν· *Wherefore it is manifeſt, that there is ſome ſuch thing as that which we call nature*; that is, that there is not only an artificial, methodical and plaſtick nature in animals, by which their reſpective bodies are framed and conſerved, but alſo that there is ſuch a general plaſtick nature likewiſe in the univerſe, by which the heavens and whole world are thus artificially ordered and diſpoſed.

De Part. An. lib. 1. *c.* 1. [P. 474.]

24. Now whereas *Ariſtotle*, in the forecited words, tells us, that we partake of life and underſtanding from that in the univerſe, after the ſame manner as we partake of heat and cold from that heat and cold that is in the univerſe; it is obſervable, that this was a notion borrowed from *Socrates*; (as we underſtand both from *Xenophon* and *Plato*) that philoſopher having uſed it as an argumentation to prove a Deity. And the ſenſe of it is repreſented after this manner by the Latin poet [1]:

Principio cœlum ac terram, campóſque liquentes,
Lucentémque globum lunæ, Titaniáque aſtra,
Spiritus intus alit, totóſque infuſa per artus,
Mens agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet.
Inde hominum pecudúmque genus, vitæque volantúm.

From whence it may be collected, that *Ariſtotle* did ſuppoſe this plaſtick nature of the univerſe to be ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, *either part of ſome mundane ſoul*, that was alſo conſcious and intellectual, (as that plaſtick nature

[1] Virgil. Æneid. Lib. VI. verſ. 724.

nature in animals is) *or at leaſt ſome inferior principle, depending on ſuch a ſoul.* And indeed whatever the doctrine of the modern Peripateticks be, we make no doubt at all but that *Ariſtotle* himſelf held the world's animation, or a mundane ſoul: foraſmuch as he plainly declares himſelf concerning it elſewhere in his book *de Cœlo*, after this manner; ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ὡς περὶ σωμάτων μόνον αὐτῶν, καὶ μονάδων, τάξιν μὲν ἐχόντων, ἀψύχων δὲ πάμπαν, διανοούμεθα· δεῖ δὲ ὡς μετεχόντων ὑπολαμβάνειν πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς· *But we commonly think of the heavens as nothing elſe but bodies and monads, having only a certain order, but altogether inanimate; whereas we ought, on the contrary, to conceive of them as partaking of life and action:* that is, as being indued with a rational or intellectual life. For ſo *Simplicius*[1] there rightly expounds the place; δεῖ δὲ ὡς περὶ ἐμψύχων αὐτῶν συλλογίζεσθαι, καὶ λογικὴν ἐχόντων ψυχὴν, ὡς καὶ πράξεως καὶ ζωῆς λογικῆς μετέχειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, τὸ δὲ πράττειν κυρίως κατὰ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν κατηγοροῦμεν· *But we ought to think of the heavens as animated with a rational ſoul, and thereby partaking of action and rational life. For* (ſaith he) *though* ποιεῖν *be affirmed not only of irrational ſouls, but alſo of inanimate bodies, yet the word* πράττειν *does only denominate rational beings.* But further, to take away all manner of ſcruple or doubt concerning this buſineſs, that philoſopher before, in the ſame book[2] ῥητῶς affirmeth, ὅτι ὁ οὐρανὸς ἔμψυχος, καὶ ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἔχει; *that the heaven is animated, and hath a principle of motion within itſelf:* where, by the heaven, as in many other places of *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, is to be underſtood the whole world.

Lib. 2. c. 12. [Pag. 656. Tom. I. Oper.]

There is indeed one paſſage in the ſame book *de Cœlo*, which, at firſt ſight, and ſlightly conſidered, may ſeem to contradict this again; and therefore probably is that, which hath led many into a contrary perſuaſion, that *Ariſtotle* denied the world's animation, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε ὑπὸ ψυχῆς εὔλογον ἀναγκάζεσθαι μένειν ἀΐδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ζωὴν ἄλυπον καὶ μακαρίαν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν μετὰ βίας οὖσαν, πεφυκότος τοῦ πρώτου σώματος ἄλλως καὶ κινεῖν συνεχῶς, ἄρρολον εἶναι, καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένην ῥᾳστώνης ἔμφρονος· εἴγε μηδ' ὥσπερ, τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ τῶν θνητῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἀνάπαυσις ἡ περὶ τὸν ὕπνον γινομένη τοῦ σώματος ἄνεσις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον Ἰξίονός τινος μοῖραν καλέσειν αὐτὴν ἀΐδιον καὶ ἄτρυτον· *But it is not reaſonable neither to think, that the heavens continue to eternity, moved by a ſoul neceſſitating, or violently compelling them. Nor indeed is it poſſible, that the life of ſuch a ſoul ſhould be pleaſurable or happy: foraſmuch as the continual violent motion of a body (naturally inclining to move another way) muſt needs be a very unquiet thing, and void of all mental repoſe, eſpecially when there is no ſuch relaxation as the ſouls of mortal animals have by ſleep; and therefore ſuch a ſoul of the world as this muſt of neceſſity be condemned to an eternal Ixionian fate.* But in theſe words *Ariſtotle* does not deny the heavens to be moved by a ſoul of their own, (which is poſitively affirmed by him elſewhere) but only by ſuch, a ſoul as ſhould violently and forcibly agitate, or drive them round, contrary to their own natural inclination, whereby, in the mean time, they tended downwards of themſelves towards the centre. And his ſenſe concerning the motion of the heavens is truly repreſented by *Simplicius*, in this manner: τὸ δὲ ὅλου φύσικον καὶ ἔμ-

L. 2. c. 12. [Pag. 640. Tom. I. Oper.]

[1] Comment. in Libr. de Cœlo, f. 126. [2] Ariſtot. de Cœlo, Lib. II. Cap. II. p. 642. Tom. I. Oper.

ἔμψυχον, ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κυρίως κινεῖται, διά μέσης τῆς φύσεως. *The whole world or heaven, being as well a natural, as an animaliſh body, is moved properly by ſoul; but yet by means of nature alſo, as an inſtrument, ſo that the motion of it is not violent.* But whereas *Ariſtotle* there inſinuates, as if *Plato* had held the heavens to be moved by a ſoul violently, contrary to their nature; *Simplicius*, though ſufficiently addicted to *Ariſtotle*, ingenuouſly acknowledges his error herein, and, vindicating *Plato* from that imputation, ſhews how he likewiſe held a plaſtick nature, as well as a mundane ſoul; and that amongſt his ten inſtances of motion *, the ninth is that of nature; τὴν ἕτερου ἀεὶ κινοῦσαν, καὶ μεταβαλλομένην ὑφ' ἑτέρου· *that which always moves another, being itſelf changed by ſomething elſe*; as the tenth, that of the mundane ſoul, τὴν ἑαυτὴν κινοῦσαν καὶ ἕτερα, *that which originally both moves itſelf and other things:* as if his meaning in that place were, that though nature be a life and internal energy, yet it acts ſubſerviently to a higher ſoul, as the firſt original mover.

* *De Leg. l.* 10.

But the grand objection againſt *Ariſtotle*'s holding the world's animation is ſtill behind; namely, from that in his Metaphyſicks [1], where he determines the higheſt ſtarry heaven to be moved by an immoveable mover, commonly ſuppoſed to be the Deity itſelf, and no ſoul of the world; and all the other ſpheres likewiſe to be moved by ſo many ſeparate intelligencies, and not by ſouls. To which we reply, that indeed *Ariſtotle*'s firſt immoveable mover is no mundane ſoul, but an abſtract intellect ſeparate from matter, and the very Deity itſelf; whoſe manner of moving the heavens is thus deſcribed by him [2], κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον, *it moveth only as being loved.* Wherefore, beſides this ſupreme unmoved mover, that philoſopher ſuppoſed another inferior moved mover alſo, that is, a mundane ſoul, as the proper and immediate efficient cauſe of the heavenly motions; of which he ſpeaks after this manner: κινούμενον δὲ τἄλλα κινεῖ, *that which itſelf being moved,* (objectively, or by appetite and deſire of the firſt good) *moveth other things.* And thus that ſafe and ſure-footed interpreter, *Alex. Aphrodiſius*, expounds his maſter's meaning, that the heaven being animated, and therefore indeed moved by an internal principle of its own, is notwithſtanding originally moved by a certain immoveable and ſeparate nature, which is above ſoul, τῷ νοεῖν τε αὐτὸ, καὶ ἔφεσιν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἔχειν τῆς ὁμοιώσεως αὐτοῦ, *both by its contemplating of it, and having an appetite and deſire of aſſimilating itſelf thereunto.* *Ariſtotle* ſeeming to have borrowed this notion from *Plato* [3], who makes the conſtant regular circumgyration of the heavens to be an imitation of the motion or energy of intellect. So that *Ariſtotle*'s firſt mover is not properly the efficient, but only the final and objective cauſe, of the heavenly motions, the immediate efficient cauſe thereof being ψυχὴ καὶ φύσις, *ſoul and nature.*

Quæſt. Nat. l. 1. c. 1.

Neither may this be confuted from thoſe other Ariſtotelick intelligences of the leſſer orbs; that philoſopher conceiving in like manner concerning them, that they were alſo the abſtract minds or intellects of certain other inferior ſouls,

[1] Lib. XIV. Cap. VII, VIII, IX. p. 476. f. Tom. IV. Oper.

[2] Metaphſ. Lib. XIV. Cap. VIII. p. 479.

[3] De Legibus, Lib. X. p. 669. & alias.

ſouls, which moved their ſeveral reſpective bodies or orbs, circularly and uniformly, in a kind of imitation of them. For this plainly appears from hence, in that he affirms of theſe his inferior intelligences likewiſe, as well as of the ſupreme mover, that they do κινεῖν ὡς τέλος, *move only as the end.*

Where it is evident, that though *Ariſtotle* did plainly ſuppoſe a mundane intellectual ſoul, ſuch as alſo contained, either in it, or under it, a plaſtick nature, yet he did not make either of theſe to be the ſupreme Deity; but reſolved the firſt principle of things to be one abſolutely perfect mind or intellect, ſeparate from matter, which was ἀκίνητος οὐσία [1], *an immoveable nature*, whoſe eſſence was his operation, and which moved only as being loved, or as the final cauſe: of which he pronounces in this manner, ὅτι ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις, *That upon ſuch a principle as this heaven and nature depends*; that is, the animated heaven, or mundane ſoul, together with the plaſtick nature of the univerſe, muſt of neceſſity depend upon ſuch an abſolutely perfect and immoveable mind or intellect. *Met. l.* 14. c. 7. [Pag. 479. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Having now declared the Ariſtotelick doctrine concerning the plaſtick nature of the univerſe, with which the Platonick alſo agrees, that it is, ἢ μέρος ψυχῆς, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ ψυχῆς, *either part of a mundane intellectual ſoul*, (that is, a lower power and faculty of it) *or elſe not without it, but ſome inferior thing depending on it*; we think fit to add in this place, that though there were no ſuch mundane ſoul, as both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* ſuppoſed, diſtinct from the ſupreme Deity, yet there might notwithſtanding be a plaſtick nature of the univerſe depending immediately upon the Deity itſelf. For the plaſtick nature eſſentially depends upon mind or intellect, and could not poſſibly be without it; according to thoſe words before cited, ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ἡ φύσις, *Nature depends upon ſuch an intellectual principle*; and for this cauſe that philoſopher does elſewhere join νοῦς and φύσις, *mind* and *nature* both together.

25. Beſides this general plaſtick nature of the univerſe, and thoſe particular plaſtick powers in the ſouls of animals, it is not impoſſible but that there may be other plaſtick natures alſo (as certain lower lives, or vegetative ſouls) in ſome greater parts of the univerſe; all of them depending, if not upon ſome higher conſcious ſoul, yet at leaſt upon a perfect intellect preſiding over the whole. As for example; though it be not reaſonable to think, that every plant, herb and pile of graſs, hath a particular plaſtick life, or vegetative ſoul of its own, diſtinct from the mechaniſm of the body, nor that the whole earth is an animal endued with a conſcious ſoul; yet there may poſſibly be, for aught we know, one plaſtick nature or life belonging to the whole terreſtrial (or terraqueous) globe, by which all plants and vegetables, continuous with it, may be differently formed, according to their different ſeeds, as alſo minerals and other bodies framed, and whatſoever elſe is above the power of fortuitous mechaniſm effected, as by the immediate cauſe, though always ſubordinate to other cauſes; the chief whereof

[1] Ariſtot. Metaphyſicor. Lib. XIV. Cap. VI. p. 477.

whereof is the Deity. And this perhaps may eaſe the minds of thoſe, who cannot but think it too much, to impoſe all upon one plaſtick nature of the univerſe.

26. And now we have finiſhed our firſt taſk, which was to give an account of the plaſtick nature, the ſum whereof briefly amounts to this; that it is a certain lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and artificially, according to the direction of mind and underſtanding, reaſon and wiſdom, for ends, or in order to good, though itſelf do not know the reaſon of what it does, nor is maſter of that wiſdom according to which it acts, but only a ſervant to it, and drudging executioner of the ſame; it operating fatally and ſympathetically, according to laws and commands preſcribed to it by a perfect intellect, and impreſt upon it; and which is either a lower faculty of ſome conſcious ſoul, or elſe an inferior kind of life or ſoul by itſelf; but eſſentially depending upon an higher intellect.

We proceed to our ſecond undertaking; which was to ſhew, how groſly thoſe two ſorts of Atheiſts before mentioned, the Stoical or Coſmo-plaſtick, and the Stratonical or Hylozoick, both of them acknowledging this plaſtick life of nature, do miſtake the notion of it, or pervert it, and abuſe it, to make a certain ſpurious and counterfeit God-almighty of it, (or a firſt principle of all things) thereby excluding the true omnipotent Deity, which is a perfect mind, or conſciouſly underſtanding nature, preſiding over the univerſe; they ſubſtituting this ſtupid plaſtick nature in the room of it.

Now the chief errors or miſtakes of theſe Atheiſts concerning the plaſtick nature, are theſe four following. Firſt, that they make that to be the firſt principle of all, and the higheſt thing in the univerſe, which is the laſt and loweſt of all lives; a thing eſſentially ſecondary, derivative, and dependent. For the plaſtick life of nature is but the mere umbrage of intellectuality, a faint and ſhadowy imitation of mind and underſtanding; upon which it doth as eſſentially depend, as the ſhadow doth upon the body, the image in the glaſs upon the face, or the echo upon the original voice. So that if there had been no perfect mind or intellect in the world, there could no more have been any plaſtick nature in it, than there could be an image in the glaſs without a face, or an echo without an original voice. If there be Φύσις, then there muſt be Νοῦς: if there be a plaſtick nature, that acts regularly and artificially in order to ends, and according to the beſt wiſdom, though itſelf not comprehending the reaſon of it, nor being clearly conſcious of what it doth; then there muſt of neceſſity be a perfect mind or intellect, that is, a Deity, upon which it depends. Wherefore *Ariſtotle* does like a philoſopher in joining Φύσις and Νοῦς, nature and mind both together; but theſe Atheiſts do very abſurdly and unphiloſophically, that would make a ſenſleſs and inconſcious plaſtick nature, and therefore without any mind or intellect, to be the firſt original of all things.

Secondly, theſe Atheiſts augment the former error, in ſuppoſing thoſe higher lives of ſenſe or animality, and of reaſon or underſtanding, to riſe both of them from that lower ſenſleſs life of nature, as the only original fundamental life. Which is a thing altogether as irrational and abſurd, as if one ſhould ſuppoſe the light, that is in the air or æther, to be the only original and fundamental light, and the light of the ſun and ſtars but a ſecondary and derivative thing from it, and nothing but the light of the air modificated and improved by condenſation: or as if one ſhould maintain, that the ſun and moon, and all the ſtars, were really nothing elſe, but the mere reflections of thoſe images, that we ſee in rivers and ponds of water. But this hath always been the ſottiſh humour and guiſe of Atheiſts, to invert the order of the univerſe, and hang the picture of the world, as of a man, with its heels upwards. Conſcious reaſon and underſtanding, being a far higher degree of life and perfection, than that dull plaſtick nature, which does only do, but not know, can never poſſibly emerge out of it; neither can the duplication of corporeal organs be ever able to advance that ſimple and ſtupid life of nature into redoubled conſciouſneſs or ſelf-perception; nor any triplication, or indeed milleclupation of them, improve the ſame into reaſon and underſtanding.

Thirdly; for the better colouring of the former errors, the Hylozoiſts adulterate the notion of the plaſtick life of nature, confounding it with wiſdom and underſtanding. And though themſelves acknowledge, that no animal-ſenſe, ſelf-preception and conſciouſneſs belongs to it, yet they will have it to be a thing perfectly wiſe, and conſequently every atom of ſenſleſs matter that is in the whole world, to be infallibly omniſcient, as to all its own capacities and congruities, or whatſoever itſelf can do or ſuffer; which is plainly contradictious. For though there may be ſuch a thing as the plaſtick nature, that, according to the former deſcription of it, can do without knowing, and is devoid of expreſs conſciouſneſs or ſelf-perception, yet perfect knowledge and underſtanding without conſciouſneſs is non-ſenſe and impoſſibility. Wherefore this muſt needs be condemned for a great piece of ſottiſhneſs in the Hylozoick Atheiſts, that they attribute perfect wiſdom and underſtanding to a ſtupid inconſcious nature, which is nothing but χειροτέχνης, the mere drudging inſtrument, or manuary opificer of a perfect mind.

Laſtly, theſe Atheiſts err in this, that they make this plaſtick life of nature to be a mere material or corporeal thing; whereas matter or body cannot move itſelf, much leſs therefore can it artificially order and diſpoſe its own motion. And though the plaſtick nature be indeed the loweſt of all lives, yet notwithſtanding ſince it is a life, or internal energy, and ſelf-activity, diſtinct from local motion, it muſt needs be incorporeal, all life being eſſentially ſuch. But the Hylozoiſts conceive groſly both of life and underſtanding, ſpreading them all over upon matter, juſt as butter is ſpread upon bread, or plaſter upon a wall, and accordingly ſlicing them out in different quantities

quantities and bulks, together with it; they contending, that they are but inadequate conceptions of body, as the only ſubſtance; and conſequently concluding, that the vulgarly received notion of God is nothing elſe but ſuch an inadequate conception of the matter of the whole corporeal univerſe, miſtaken for a complete and entire ſubſtance by itſelf, that is ſuppoſed to be the cauſe of all things: which fond dream or dotage of theirs will be further confuted in due place. But it is now time to put a period to this long (though neceſſary) digreſſion, concerning the plaſtick life of nature, or an artificial, orderly and methodical nature.

XXXVIII. *Plato* gives an account, why he judged it neceſſary in thoſe times, publickly to propoſe that atheiſtick hypotheſis, in order to a confutation, as alſo to produce rational arguments for the proof of a Deity, after this manner; Εἰ μὴ καλὲσπαρμένοι ἦσαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἀνθρώποις, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τῶν ἐπαμυνόντων λόγων, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη· *Had not theſe atheiſtick doctrines been publickly divulged, and made known in a manner to all, it would not have been needful to have confuted them, nor by reaſons to prove a Deity; but now it is neceſſary.* And we conceive, that the ſame neceſſity at this time will juſtify our preſent undertaking likewiſe; ſince theſe atheiſtick doctrines have been as boldly vented, and publickly aſſerted in this latter age of ours, as ever they could be in *Plato*'s time; when the ſeverity of the Athenian government muſt needs be a great check to ſuch deſigns, *Socrates* having been put to death upon a mere falſe and groundleſs accuſation of atheiſm, and *Protagoras*, (who doubtleſs was a real Atheiſt) having eſcaped the ſame puniſhment no otherwiſe than by flight, his books being notwithſtanding publickly burnt in the market-place at *Athens*, and himſelf condemned to perpetual exile, though there was nothing at that time proved againſt him, ſave only this one ſceptical paſſage, in the beginning of a book of his, περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, εἴθ' ὡς εἰσιν, εἴθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ, πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥτε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· *Concerning the gods, I have nothing at all to ſay, either that they be or be not; there being many things, that hinder the knowledge of this matter, both the obſcurity of the thing itſelf, and the ſhortneſs of human life.* Whereas atheiſm, in this latter age of ours, hath been impudently aſſerted, and moſt induſtriouſly promoted; that very atomick form, that was firſt introduced (a little before *Plato*'s time) by *Leucippus*, *Protagoras*, and *Democritus*, having been alſo revived amongſt us, and that with no ſmall pomp and oſtentation of wiſdom and philoſophy.

De Leg. lib. 10. [P. 666. Oper.]

Diog. La. in vita Prot. [Lib. IX. ſegm. 51. p. 576.]

It was before obſerved, that there were two ſeveral forms of atomical philoſophy; firſt, the moſt ancient and genuine, that was religious, called Moſchical (or if you will Moſaical) and Pythagorical; ſecondly, the adulterated atheiſtick atomology, called Leucippean or Democritical. Now accordingly, there have been in this latter age of ours two ſeveral ſucceſſive reſurrections or reſtitutions of thoſe two atomologies. For *Renatus Carteſius* firſt revived and reſtored the atomick philoſophy, agreeably, for the moſt part, to that ancient Moſchical and Pythagorick form; acknowledging beſides

ſides extended ſubſtance and corporeal atoms, another cogitative incorporeal ſubſtance, and joining metaphyſicks or theology, together with phyſiology, to make up one entire ſyſtem of philoſophy. Nor can it well be doubted, but that this phyſiology of his, as to the mechanick part of it, hath been elaborated by the ingenious author into an exactneſs at leaſt equal with the beſt atomologies of the ancients. Nevertheleſs, this Carteſian philoſophy is highly obnoxious to cenſure upon ſome accounts; the chief whereof is this, that deviating from that primitive Moſchical atomology, in rejecting all plaſtick nature, it derives the whole ſyſtem of the corporeal univerſe from the neceſſary motion of matter, only divided into particles inſenſibly ſmall, and turned round in a vortex, without the guidance or direction of any underſtanding nature. By means whereof, though it boaſt of ſolving all the corporeal phænomena by mere fortuitous mechaniſm, and without any final or mental cauſality, yet it gives no account at all of that, which is the grandeſt of all phænomena, the τὸ εὖ ἢ καλῶς, *the orderly regularity and harmony of the mundane ſyſtem.* The occaſion of which miſcarriage hath been already intimated, namely, from the acknowledging only two heads of being, extended and cogitative, and making the eſſence of cogitation to conſiſt in expreſs conſciouſneſs; from whence it follows, that there could be no plaſtick nature, and therefore either all things muſt be done by fortuitous mechaniſm, or elſe God himſelf be brought immediately upon the ſtage for the ſolving of all phænomena. Which latter abſurdity our philoſopher being over-careful to avoid, caſt himſelf upon the former, the baniſhing of all final and mental cauſality quite out of the world, and acknowledging no other philoſophick cauſes, beſide material and mechanical. It cannot be denied, but that even ſome of the ancient religious Atomiſts were alſo too much infected with this mechanizing humour; but *Renatus Carteſius* hath not only outdone them all herein, but even the very Atheiſts themſelves alſo, as ſhall be ſhewed afterward; and therefore as much as in him lies, has quite diſarmed the world of that grand argument for a Deity, taken from the regular frame and harmony of the univerſe. To which groſs miſcarriage of his there might be alſo another added, that he ſeems to make matter neceſſarily exiſtent, and eſſentially infinite and eternal. Notwithſtanding all which, we cannot entertain that uncharitable opinion of him, that he really deſigned atheiſm, the fundamental principles of his philoſophy being ſuch, as that no atheiſtick ſtructure can poſſibly be built upon them. But ſhortly after this *Carteſian* reſtitution of the primitive atomology, that acknowledgeth incorporeal ſubſtance, we have had our *Leucippus* and *Democritus* too, who alſo revived and brought again upon the ſtage that other atheiſtick atomology, that makes ἀρχὰς τῶν ὅλων ἀτόμους, *ſenſleſs and lifeleſs atoms to be the only principles of all things in the univerſe*; thereby neceſſarily excluding, beſides incorporeal ſubſtance and immortality of ſouls, a Deity and natural morality; as alſo making all actions and events materially and mechanically neceſſary.

Now there could be no ſatisfactory confutation of this atheiſtick hypotheſis, without a fair propoſal firſt made of the ſeveral grounds of it to their

beſt advantage, which we have therefore endeavoured in the former chapter. The anſwers to which atheiſtick arguments ought, according to the laws of method, to be reſerved for the laſt part of the whole treatiſe, where we are poſitively to determine the right intellectual ſyſtem of the univerſe; it being properly our work here, only to give an account of the three falſe hypotheſes of the mundane ſyſtem, together with their ſeveral grounds. Nevertheleſs, becauſe it might not only ſeem indecorous, for the anſwers to thoſe atheiſtick arguments to be ſo long deferred, and placed ſo far behind the arguments themſelves, but alſo prove otherwiſe really inconvenient, we ſhall therefore chuſe rather to break thoſe laws of method, (neglecting the ſcrupuloſity thereof) and ſubjoin them immediately in this place, craving the reader's pardon for this prepoſterouſneſs.

It is certain, that the ſource of all atheiſm is generally a dull and earthy diſbelief of the exiſtence of things beyond the reach of ſenſe; and it cannot be denied, but that there is ſomething of immorality in the temper of all Atheiſts, as all atheiſtick doctrine tends alſo to immorality. Notwithſtanding which, it muſt not be therefore concluded, that all dogmatick Atheiſts came to be ſuch merely by means of groſs intemperance, ſenſuality, and debauchery. *Plato* indeed deſcribes one ſort of Atheiſts in this manner; οἷς ἂν πρὸς τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα, ἀκράτειαι τε ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προσπέσωσι, μνῆμαί τε ἰσχυραὶ καὶ μαθήσεις ὀξεῖαι παρῶσι· *Such, who together with this opinion, that all things are void of gods, are acted alſo by intemperance of pleaſures and pains, and hurried away with violent luſts, being perſons otherwiſe endued with ſtrong memories, and quick wits.* And theſe are the debauched, ranting, and hectoring Atheiſts. But beſides theſe, that philoſopher tells us, that there is another ſort of Atheiſts alſo, οἷς μὴ νομίζουσι θεὸς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, ἤθει δὲ φύσει προσγίνεσθαι δίκαιον, μισοπόνηρός τε γίγνεσθαι τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν, ἅτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσιέναι πράττειν, τούς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγωσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους σέβωσιν· *Such, who though they think there be no gods at all, yet notwithſtanding being naturally diſpoſed to juſtice and moderation, as they will not do outragious and exorbitant things themſelves, ſo they will ſhun the converſation of wicked debauched perſons, and delight rather in the ſociety of thoſe that are fair and juſt.* And theſe are a ſort of externally honeſt or civilized Atheiſts. Now what that thing is, which, beſides groſs ſenſuality and debauchery, might tempt men to entertain atheiſtick opinions, the ſame philoſopher alſo declares; namely, that it is an affectation of ſingularity, or of ſeeming wiſer than the generality of mankind. For thus when *Clinias* had diſputed honeſtly againſt Atheiſts, from thoſe vulgar topicks of the regularity and harmony of the univerſe (obſervable in the courſes of ſun, moon, and ſtars, and the ſeaſons of the year) and of the common notions of mankind, in that both *Greeks* and *Barbarians* generally agreed in this, that there were gods, thinking he had thereby made a ſufficient confutation of atheiſm, the *Athenian Hoſpes* hereupon diſcovers a great fear and jealouſy, which he had, leſt he ſhould thereby but render himſelf an object of contempt to Atheiſts, as being a

De Leg. l. 10. p. 908.

Ibid.

conceited and ſcornful generation of men. ΑΘ. Φοβοῦμαί γε ὦ μακάριε τοὺς μοχθηρούς, μὴπως ὑμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἴστε αὐτῶν πέρι, τὴν τῆς διαφορᾶς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσθε ἀκρασίαν μόνον ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ βίον ὁρμᾶσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν, &c. *I am afraid of thoſe wicked men the Atheiſts, leſt they ſhould deſpiſe you: for you are ignorant concerning them, when you think the only cauſe of atheiſm to be intemperance of pleaſures and luſts, violently hurrying mens ſouls on to a wicked life.* Clin. *What other cauſe of atheiſm can there be beſides this?* Ath. *That which you are not aware of, who live remotely, namely,* Ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπὴ δοκοῦσα εἶναι μεγίστη φρόνησις· *a certain grievous ignorance, which yet notwithſtanding hath the appearance of the greateſt wiſdom.* And therefore afterwards, when that philoſopher goes about to propoſe the atheſtick hypotheſis, he calls it [1], τὸν παρὰ πολλοῖς δοξαζόμενον εἶναι σοφώτατον ἁπάντων λόγων, *that which to many ſeemeth to be the wiſeſt and profoundeſt of all doctrines.*

And we find the ſame thing at this very day, that Atheiſts make a great pretence to wiſdom and philoſophy; and that many are tempted to maintain atheiſtick opinions, that they may gain a reputation of wit by it. Which indeed was one reaſon, that the rather induced us, nakedly to reveal all the myſteries of atheiſm, becauſe we obſerved, that ſo long as theſe things are concealed and kept up in huggermugger, many will be the rather apt to ſuſpect, that there is ſome great depth and profoundity of wiſdom lodged in them; and that it is ſome noble and generous truth, which the bigotick religious endeavour to ſmoother and ſuppreſs.

Now the caſe being thus, it was pertinently ſuggeſted alſo by the forementioned philoſopher [2], ὃ σμικρόν γε τὸ διαφέρον, εἰ φανεῖεν οἱ λόγων ἁπτόμενοι ἀσεβῶν, ἄλλοις τε ἐξάρχοντες, μηδὲ εὖ τοῖς λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένως χρώμενοι, *That it muſt needs be a matter of no ſmall moment, for any one to make it appear, that they, who maintain wicked atheiſtical opinions, do none of them reaſon rightly, but groſly fumble in all their ratiocinations.* And we hope to effect this in our preſent undertaking, to make it evident, that Atheiſts are no ſuch conjurers, as (though they hold no ſpirits) they would be thought to be; no ſuch gigantick men of reaſon, nor profound philoſophers, but that notwithſtanding all their pretenſions to wit, their atheiſm is really nothing elſe, but ἀμαθία μάλα χαλεπὴ, *a moſt grievous ignorance*, ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity of mind in them.

Wherefore we ſhall, in the next place, conjure down all thoſe devils raiſed and diſplayed in their moſt formidable colours, in the precedent chapter; or rather we ſhall diſcover, that they are really nothing elſe, but what theſe Atheiſts pretend God and incorporeal ſpirits to be, mere phantaſtick ſpectres and impoſtures, vain imaginations of deluded minds, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. Neither ſhall we only confute thoſe atheiſtick arguments, and ſo ſtand upon our defenſive poſture, but we ſhall alſo aſſault atheiſm

[1] De Legib. L. X. p. 664. Oper. [2] Ibid. p. 667. ſ.

even with its own weapons, and plainly demonſtrate, that all forms of atheiſm are unintelligible nonſenſe and abſolute impoſſibility to human reaſon: as we ſhall likewiſe, over and above, occaſionally inſert ſome (as we think) undeniable arguments for a Deity.

The Digreſſion concerning the *Plaſtick Life of Nature*, or an *Artificial, Orderly* and *Methodical Nature*, N. 37. Chap. 3.

1. THAT neither the hylozoick nor coſmo-plaſtick Atheiſts are condemned for aſſerting an orderly and artificial plaſtick nature, as a life diſtinct from the animal, however this be a thing exploded, not only by the atomick Atheiſts, but alſo by ſome profeſſed Theiſts, who notwithſtanding might have an undiſcerned tang of the mechanically-atheiſtick humour hanging about them. 2. If there be no plaſtick artificial nature admitted, then it muſt be concluded, that either all things come to paſs by fortuitous mechaniſm, and material neceſſity (the motion of matter unguided) or elſe that God doth αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himſelf immediately and miraculouſly, framing the body of every gnat and fly, as it were with his own hands; ſince divine laws and commands cannot execute themſelves, nor be the proper efficient cauſes of things in nature. 3. To ſuppoſe all things to come to paſs fortuitouſly, or by the unguided motion of matter, a thing altogether as irrational as it is atheiſtical and impious; there being many phænomena, not only above the powers of mechaniſm, but alſo contrary to the laws of it. The mechanick Theiſts make God but an idle ſpectator of the fortuitous motions of matter, and render his wiſdom altogether uſeleſs and inſignificant. *Ariſtotle*'s judicious cenſure of the fortuitous Mechaniſts, with the ridiculouſneſs of that pretence, that material and mechanical reaſons are the only philoſophical. 4. That it ſeems neither decorous in reſpect of God, nor congruous to reaſon, that he ſhould αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, do all things himſelf immediately and miraculouſly, nature being quite ſuperſeded and made to ſignify nothing. The ſame further confuted by the ſlow and gradual proceſs of things in nature, as alſo by thoſe errors and bungles, that are committed, when the matter proves inept and contumacious, arguing the agent not to be irreſiſtible. 5. Reaſonably inferred, that there is a plaſtick nature in the univerſe, as a ſubordinate inſtrument of divine providence, in the orderly diſpoſal of matter; but yet ſo as not without a higher providence preſiding over it, foraſmuch as this plaſtick nature cannot act electively or with diſcretion. Thoſe laws of nature concerning motion, which the mechanick Theiſts themſelves ſuppoſe, really nothing elſe but a plaſtick nature. 6. The agreeableneſs of this doctrine with the ſentiments of the beſt philoſophers in all ages, *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, *Empedocles*, *Heraclitus*, *Hippocrates*, *Zeno*, and the Paracelſians. *Anaxagoras*, though a profeſſed Theiſt,

'Theiſt, ſeverely cenſur'd, both by *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, as an encourager 'of atheiſm, merely becauſe he uſed material and mechanical cauſes more 'than mental and final. Phyſiologers and aſtronomers why vulgarly ſuſ-'pected of atheiſm in *Plato*'s time. 7. The plaſtick nature no occult 'quality, but the only intelligible cauſe of that, which is the grandeſt of 'all phænomena, the orderly regularity and harmony of things, which 'the mechanick Theiſts, however pretending to ſolve all phænomena, can 'give no account at all of. A God, or infinite mind, aſſerted by them, 'in vain and to no purpoſe. 8. Two things here to be performed by 'us; firſt, to give an account of the plaſtick nature, and then to ſhew 'how the notion of it hath been miſtaken, and abuſed by Atheiſts. The 'firſt general account of this plaſtick nature, according to *Ariſtotle*, that it 'is to be conceived as art itſelf acting, inwardly and immediately, upon the 'matter; as if harmony living in the muſical inſtruments ſhould move 'the ſtrings of them without any external impulſe. 9. Two pre-eminences 'of the plaſtick nature above human art. Firſt, that whereas human art 'acts upon the matter from without cumberſomely and moliminouſly, with 'tumult and hurly-burly, nature acting on it from within more command-'ingly doth its work eaſily, cleverly and ſilently. Human art acts on 'the matter mechanically, but nature vitally and magically. 10. The ſe-'cond pre-eminence of nature above human art, that whereas human 'artiſts are often to ſeek and at a loſs, anxiouſly conſult and deliberate, 'and upon ſecond thoughts mend their former work, nature is never to 'ſeek, nor unreſolved what to do, nor doth ſhe ever repent afterwards of 'what ſhe hath done, changing her former courſe. Human artiſts them-'ſelves conſult not, as artiſts, but only for want of art; and therefore 'nature, though never conſulting, may act artificially. Concluded, that 'what is called nature is really the divine art. 11. Nevertheleſs, that na-'ture is not the divine art, pure and abſtract, but concreted and embodied 'in matter, *ratio merſa & confuſa*; not the divine art archetypal, but ec-'typal. Nature differs from the divine art, as the manuary opificer from 'the architect. 12. Two imperfections of the plaſtick nature, in reſpect 'whereof it falls ſhort even of human art; firſt, that though it act for ends 'artificially, yet itſelf neither intends thoſe ends, nor underſtands the rea-'ſon of what it doth, and therefore cannot act elective ly. The difference 'betwen the ſpermatick reaſons and knowledge. Nature doth but ape or 'mimick the divine art or wiſdom, being not maſter of that reaſon, ac-'cording to which it acts, but only a ſervant to it, and drudging execu-'tioner of it. 13. Proved that there may be ſuch a thing as acts artificially; 'though itſelf do not comprehend that art, by which its motions are go-'verned; firſt from muſical habits; the dancer reſembles the artificial life 'of nature. 14. The ſame further evinced from the inſtincts of brute-'animals, directing them to act rationally and artificially, in order to their 'own good and the good of the univerſe, without any reaſon of their own. 'The inſtincts in brutes but paſſive impreſſes of the divine wiſdom, and a 'kind of fate upon them. 15. The ſecond imperfection of the plaſtick 'nature, that it acts without animal fancy, συναίσθησις, expreſs con-ſenſe;

and

‘ and conſciouſneſs, and is devoid of ſelf-perception and ſelf-enjoyment.
‘ 16. Whether this energy of the plaſtick nature be to be called cogitation
‘ or no, but a logomachy or contention about words. Granted, that what
‘ moves matter vitally, muſt needs do it by ſome energy of its own, diſtinct
‘ from local motion; but that there may be a ſimple vital energy, without
‘ that duplicity, which is in ſynæſtheſis, or clear and expreſs conſciouſneſs.
‘ Nevertheleſs, that the energy of nature might be called a certain drouſy,
‘ unawakened, or aſtoniſh'd cogitation. 17. Inſtances, which render it pro-
‘ bable, that there may be a vital energy, without ſynæſtheſis, clear and ex-
‘ preſs con-ſenſe, or conſciouſneſs. 18. The plaſtick nature, acting nei-
‘ ther knowingly nor phantaſtically, acts fatally, magically and ſympathe-
‘ tically. The divine laws and fate, as to matter, not mere cogitation
‘ in the mind of God, but an energetick and effectual principle; and the
‘ plaſtick nature, the true and proper fate of matter, or the corporeal
‘ world. What magick is, and that nature, which acts fatally, acts alſo
‘ magically and ſympathetically. 19. That the plaſtick nature, though it
‘ be the divine art and fate, yet for all that, it is neither god nor goddeſs,
‘ but a low and imperfect creature; it acting artificially and rationally no
‘ otherwiſe, than compounded forms of letters, when printing coherent
‘ philoſophick ſenſe; nor for ends, than a ſaw or hatchet in the hands of a
‘ ſkilful mechanick. The plaſtick and vegetative life of nature the loweſt
‘ of all lives, and inferiour to the ſenſitive. A higher providence than that
‘ of the plaſtick nature governing the corporeal world itſelf. 20. Not-
‘ withſtanding which, foraſmuch as the plaſtick nature is a life, it muſt
‘ needs be incorporeal. One and the ſame thing, having in it an entire
‘ model and platform, and acting upon ſeveral diſtant parts of matter at
‘ once coherently, cannot be corporeal; and though *Ariſtotle* no where de-
‘ clares whether his nature be corporeal or incorporeal (which he neither
‘ doth clearly concerning the rational ſoul) and his followers conclude it to
‘ be corporeal, yet according to the very principles of that philoſophy it
‘ muſt needs be otherwiſe. 21. The plaſtick nature being incorporeal,
‘ muſt either be a lower power lodged in ſouls, that are alſo conſcious, ſen-
‘ ſitive or rational; or elſe a diſtinct ſubſtantial life by itſelf, and inferiour
‘ kind of ſoul. How the Platoniſts complicate both theſe together; with
‘ *Ariſtotle*'s agreeable determination, that nature is either part of a ſoul,
‘ or not without ſoul. 22. The plaſtick nature as to animals, according
‘ to *Ariſtotle*, a part or lower power of their reſpective ſouls. That
‘ the phænomena prove a plaſtick nature or archeus in animals, to make
‘ which a diſtinct thing from the ſoul, is to multiply entities without
‘ neceſſity. The ſoul endued with a plaſtick power, the chief forma-
‘ trix of its own body, the contribution of certain other cauſes not ex-
‘ cluded. 23. That beſides that plaſtick principle in particular ani-
‘ mals, forming them as ſo many little worlds, there is a general pla-
‘ ſtick nature in the whole corporeal univerſe, which likewiſe, accord-
‘ ing to *Ariſtotle*, is either a part and lower power of a conſcious mun-
‘ dane ſoul, or elſe ſomething depending on it. 24. That no leſs ac-
‘ cording to *Ariſtotle* than *Plato* and *Socrates*, our ſelves partake of life
‘ from the life of the univerſe, as well as we do of heat and cold,

‘ from

'from the heat and cold of the univerſe; from whence it appears, that '*Ariſtotle* alſo held the world's animation, with further undeniable proof 'thereof. An anſwer to two the moſt conſiderable places of that philoſo-'pher, that ſeem to imply the contrary. That *Ariſtotle*'s firſt immoveable 'mover was no ſoul, but a perfect intellect abſtract from matter; but that 'he ſuppoſed this to move only as a final cauſe, or as being loved, and be-'ſides it, a mundane ſoul and plaſtick nature, to move the heavens effici-'ently. Neither *Ariſtotle*'s nature, nor his mundane ſoul, the ſupreme 'Deity. However, though there be no ſuch mundane ſoul, as both *Plato* 'and *Ariſtotle* conceived, yet notwithſtanding there may be a plaſtick na-'ture depending upon a higher intellectual principle. 25. No impoſſi-'bility of ſome other particular plaſtick principles; and though it be not 'reaſonable to think, that every plant, herb, and pile of graſs, hath a 'plaſtick or vegetative ſoul of its own, nor that the earth is an animal; yet 'that there may poſſibly be one plaſtick inconſcious nature in the whole 'terraqueous globe, by which vegetables may be ſeverally organized and 'framed, and all things performed, which tranſcend the power of fortuitous 'mechaniſm. 26. Our ſecond undertaking, which was to ſhew how groſly 'thoſe Atheiſts (who acknowledge this plaſtick nature) miſunderſtand it 'and abuſe the notion, to make a counterfeit God-Almighty or Numen 'of it, to the excluſion of the true Deity. Firſt, in their ſuppoſing, that to 'be the firſt and higheſt principle of the univerſe, which is the laſt and 'loweſt of all lives, a thing as eſſentially derivative from, and dependent 'upon a higher intellectual principle, as the echo on the original voice. '27. Secondly, in their making ſenſe and reaſon in animals to emerge out 'of a ſenſleſs life of nature, by the mere modification and organization 'of matter. That no duplication of corporeal organs can ever make one 'ſingle inconſcious life to advance into redoubled conſciouſneſs and ſelf-'enjoyment. 28. Thirdly, in attributing perfect knowledge and under-'ſtanding to this life of nature, which yet themſelves ſuppoſe to be devoid 'of all animal ſenſe and conſciouſneſs. 29. Laſtly, in making the plaſtick 'life of nature to be merely corporeal; the Hylozoiſts contending, that it 'is but an inadequate conception of body, as the only ſubſtance; and fond-'ly dreaming, that the vulgar notion of God is nothing but ſuch an inade-'quate conception of the matter of the whole univerſe, miſtaken for a com-'plete and entire ſubſtance by itſelf, the cauſe of all things.'

THE

THE TRUE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. IV.

The idea of God declared, in way of anſwer to the firſt atheiſtick argument. The grand prejudice againſt the naturality of this idea, as eſſentially including unity or onelineſs in it, from the Pagan polytheiſm, removed. Proved that the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one ſupreme Deity. What their polytheiſm and idolatry was; with ſome account of Chriſtianity. 1. *The either ſtupid inſenſibility, or groſs impudence of Atheiſts, in denying the word* GOD *to have any ſignification, or that there is any other idea anſwering to it beſides the mere phantaſm of the ſound. The diſeaſe called by the philoſopher* ἀπολίθωσις τῦ νοητικῦ, *the petrification (or dead inſenſibility) of the mind.* 2. *That the Atheiſts themſelves muſt needs have an idea of God in their minds, or otherwiſe when they deny his exiſtence, they ſhould deny the exiſtence of nothing. And that they have alſo the ſame idea of him with Theiſts, they denying the very ſame thing which the others affirm.* 3. *A lemma, or preparatory propoſition to the idea of God, that though ſome things be made or generated, yet it is not poſſible, that all things ſhould be made, but ſomething muſt of neceſſity exiſt of itſelf from eternity unmade, and be the cauſe of thoſe other things that are made.* 4. *The two moſt oppoſite opinions, concerning that which was ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, or unmade, and the cauſe of all other things made: one, that it was nothing but ſenſleſs matter, the moſt imperfect of all things; the other, that it was ſomething moſt perfect, and therefore conſciouſly intellectual. The aſſerters of this*

latter opinion, Theists in a strict and proper sense; of the former, Atheists. So that the idea of God in general is a perfect consciously understanding being (or mind) self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. 5. *Observed, that the Atheists, who deny a God, according to the true idea of him, do often abuse the word, calling senseless matter by that name, and meaning nothing else thereby but a first principle, or self-existent unmade thing. That according to this notion of the word God, there can be no such thing as an Atheist, no man being able to persuade himself, that all things sprung from nothing.* 6. *In order to the more punctual declaration of the divine idea, the opinion of those taken notice of, who suppose two self-existent unmade principles, God and matter; and so God not to be the sole, but only the chief principle.* 7. *That these are but imperfect and mistaken Theists. Their idea of God declared, with its defectiveness. A latitude in theism. None to be condemned for absolute Atheists, but such as deny an eternal unmade mind, ruling over matter.* 8. *The most compendious idea of God, an absolutely perfect being. That this includes not only conscious intellectuality and necessary existence, but also omni-causality, omnipotence and infinite power: and therefore God the sole principle of all, and cause of matter. The true notion of infinite power. Pagans acknowledged the divine omnipotence. And that the Atheists supposed infinite power to be included in the idea of God, proved from* Lucretius. 9. *That absolute perfection implies something more than power and knowledge. A vaticination in mens minds of a higher good than either. That God is better than knowledge, according to* Aristotle: *and that there is morality in the nature of God, wherein his chief happiness consisteth. This borrowed from* Plato, *who makes the highest perfection, and supreme Deity, to be goodness itself, above knowledge and intellect. God, and the supreme good, according to the scripture, love. God no soft or fond love, but an impartial law, and the measure of all things. That the Atheists supposed goodness also to be included in the idea of God. The idea of God more explicate and unfolded, a being absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily existent; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things.* 10. *That this idea of God essentially includes unity or onelineſs in it; since there can be but one supreme, one cause of all things, one omnipotent, and one infinitely perfect. This unity or onelineſs of the Deity supposed also by* Epicurus *and* Lucretius, *who professedly denied a God, according to this idea.* 11. *The grand prejudice against the naturality of this idea of God, as it essentially includes unity and solitariety, from the polytheism of all nations formerly, besides the* Jews, *and of all the wisest men and philosophers: from whence it is inferred, that this idea of God is but artificial, and owes its original to laws and institution. An enquiry to be made concerning the true sense of the Pagan polytheism. That the objectors take it for granted, that the Pagan polytheists universally asserted many self-existent intellectual beings, and independent deities, as so many partial causes of the world.* 12. *First, the irrationality of this opinion, and its manifest repugnancy to the phænomena; which render it less probable to have been the belief of all the Pagan polytheists.* 13. *Secondly, that*

that no such thing at all appears, as that ever any intelligent Pagans asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, independent deities. The Hesiodian gods. The Valentinian Æons. The nearest approach made thereunto by the Manichean good and evil gods. This doctrine not generally asserted by the Greek *philosophers, as* Plutarch *affirmeth. Questioned whether the* Persian *evil Dæmon or* Arimanius *were a self-existent principle, essentially evil.* Aristotle's *confutation and explosion of many principles, or independent deities.* Faustus *the Manichean his conceit, that the Jews and Christians paganized, in the opinion of monarchy, with St.* Austin's *judgment, concerning the Pagans, thereupon.* 14. *Concluded that the Pagan polytheism must be understood according to another equivocation in the word gods, as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshipped. That the Pagans held both many gods and one God, (as* Onatus *the Pythagorean declares himself) in different senses: many inferior deities subordinate to one supreme.* 15. *Further evidence of this, that the intelligent Pagan polytheists held only a plurality of inferior deities, subordinate to one supreme: first, because after the emersion of Christianity, and its contest with Paganism, when occasion was offered, not only no Pagan asserted a multiplicity of independent deities, but also all universally disclaimed it, and professed to acknowledge one supreme God.* 16. *That this was no refinement or interpolation of Paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient Pagan theologers, and greatest promoters of Polytheism, was agreeable hereunto; which will be proved, not from suspected writings, (as of* Trismegist *and the* Sibyls) *but such as are indubitate. First, that* Zoroaster, *the chief promoter of polytheism in the eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from* Eubulus *in* Porphyry, *besides his own words cited by* Eusebius. 17. *That* Orpheus, *commonly called by the* Greeks *the Theologer, and the father of the Grecanick polytheism, clearly asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words, out of Pagan records.* 18. *That the* Ægyptians *themselves, the most polytheistical of all nations, had an acknowledgement amongst them of one supreme Deity.* 19. *That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the Pagan theology, and, by their fables of the gods, made it look more aristocratically, did themselves notwithstanding acknowledge a monarchy, one prince and father of gods. That famous passage of* Sophocles *not to be suspected, though not found in any of these tragedies now extant.* 20. *That all the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, universally asserted a mundane monarchy.* Pythagoras, *as much a Polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things, as well as numbers, a monad or unity.* Anaxagoras *his one mind ordering all things for good.* Xenophanes *his one and all, and his one God the greatest among the gods.* 21. Parmenides *his supreme God, one immoveable.* Empedocles *his both many gods junior to friendship and contention, and his one God, called* τὸ ἕν, *senior to them.* Zeno Eleates *his demonstration of one God, in* Aristotle. 22. Philolaus *his prince and governor of all God always one.* Euclides Megarensis *his God, called* ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, *one the very good.* Timæus Locrus *his mind and good, above the soul of the world.* Antisthenes *his one natural*

God. Onatus *his* Corypheus. 23. *Generally believed and true, that* Socrates *acknowledged one ſupreme God; but that he diſclaimed all the inferior gods of the Pagans, a vulgar error.* Plato *alſo a polytheiſt, and that paſſage, which ſome lay ſo great ſtreſs upon, (that he was ſerious when he began his epiſtles with God, but when with gods jocular) ſpurious and counterfeit; and yet he was notwithſtanding an undoubted Monotheiſt alſo in another ſenſe; an aſſerter of one God over all, of a maker of the world, of a firſt God, of a greateſt of the gods. The firſt hypoſtaſis of the Platonick trinity properly the king of all things, for whoſe ſake are all things; the father of the cauſe and prince of the world, that is, of the eternal intellect, or λόγος.* 24. Ariſtotle *an acknowledger of many gods (he accounting the ſtars ſuch) and yet an expreſs aſſerter of* εἷς κοίρανος, *one prince, one immoveable mover.* 25. Cleanthes *and* Chryſippus *Stoicks, though they filled the whole heaven, earth, air and ſea with gods, yet notwithſtanding they acknowledged only one God immortal,* Jupiter; *all the reſt being conſumed into him, in the ſucceſſive conflagrations, and afterwards made a-new by him.* Cleanthes *his excellent and devout hymn to the ſupreme God.* 26. *Endleſs to cite all the paſſages of the later Pagan writers and polytheiſts, in which one ſupreme God is aſſerted. Excellent diſcourſes in ſome of them concerning the Deity, particularly* Plotinus; *who, though he derived all things, even matter itſelf, from one ſupreme Deity, yet was a contender for many gods.* 27. *This not only the opinion of philoſophers and learned men, but alſo the general belief of the Pagan vulgar: that there was one ſupreme God, proved from* Maximus Tyrius. *The* Romans Deus optimus maximus. *The Pagans, when moſt ſerious, ſpake of God ſingularly.* Kyrie Eleeſon *part of the Pagans litany to the ſupreme God. The more civilized Pagans at this very day acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, the maker of the world.* 28. Plutarch's *teſtimony, that, notwithſtanding the variety of Paganick religions, and the different names of gods uſed in them, yet one reaſon, mind or providence ordering all things, and its inferior miniſters, were alike every where worſhipped.* 29. *Plain that the Pagan Theiſts muſt needs acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, becauſe they generally believed the whole world to be one animal, governed by one ſoul. Some Pagans made this ſoul of the world their ſupreme God; others an abſtract mind ſuperior to it.* 30. *The* Hebrew *doctors generally of this perſuaſion, that the Pagans worſhipped one ſupreme God, and that all their other gods were but mediators betwixt him and men.* 31. *Laſtly, this confirmed from ſcripture. The Pagans knew God.* Aratus *his* Jupiter, *and the* Athenians *unknown God, the true God.* 32. *In order to a fuller explication of the Pagan theology, and ſhewing the occaſion of its being miſunderſtood, three heads requiſite to be inſiſted on. Firſt, that the Pagans worſhipped one ſupreme God under many names: Secondly, that beſides this one God, they worſhipped alſo many gods, which were indeed inferior deities ſubordinate to him: Thirdly, that they worſhipped both the ſupreme and inferior gods in images, ſtatues and ſymbols, ſometimes abuſively called alſo gods. Firſt, that the ſupreme God amongſt the Pagans was polyonymous, and worſhipped under ſeveral perſonal names, according to his ſeveral attributes and the manifeſta-*

tions of them, his gifts and effects in the world. 33. *That upon the same account, things not substantial were personated and deified by the Pagans, and worshipped as so many several names and notions of one God.* 34. *That as the whole corporeal world animated was supposed by some of the Pagans to be the supreme God, so he was worshipped in the several parts and members of it (having personal names bestowed upon them) as it were by parcels and piece-meal, or by so many inadequate conceptions. That some of the Pagans made the corporeal world the temple of God only, but others the body of God.* 35. *The second head proposed, that besides the one supreme God, under several names, the Pagans acknowledged and worshipped also many gods;* θεοὺς γενητοὺς, made gods, *created intellectual beings superior to men.* 36. *The Pythagorick or Platonick trinity of divine hypostases. And the higher of the inferior deities, according to this hypothesis, Nous, Psyche, and the whole corporeal world; with particular Noes and Henades.* 37. *The other inferior deities acknowledged as well by the vulgar as philosophers, of three sorts. First, the sun, moon and stars, and other greater parts of the universe animated, called sensible gods.* 38. *Secondly, their inferior deities invisible, ethereal and aereal animals, called dæmons. These appointed by the supreme Deity to preside over kingdoms, cities, places, persons and things.* 39. *The last sort of the Pagan inferior deities, heroes and* ἀνθρωποι, *or* men-gods. Euemerus *taxed by* Plutarch, *for making all the Pagan gods nothing but dead men.* 40. *The third general head proposed, that the Pagans worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods in images, statues and symbols. That first of all, before images and temples, rude stones and pillars without sculpture were erected for religious monuments, and called* βαιτύλια, *or Bethels.* 41. *That afterwards images, statues and symbols were used, and housed in temples. These placed in the west-end of the temples to face the east; so that the Pagans entering, worshipped towards the west: one probable occasion of the ancient Christians praying towards the east. The golden calf made for a symbolick presence of the God of* Israel. 42. *All the parts of the entire Pagan religion represented together at once in* Plato. 43. *That some late writers, not well understanding the sense of Pagans, have confounded all their theology, by supposing them to worship the inanimate parts of the world as such, for gods; therefore distinguishing betwixt their animal and their natural gods. That no corporeal thing was worshipped by the Pagans otherwise, than either as being itself animated with a particular soul of its own, or as being part of the whole animated world, or as having dæmons presiding over it, to whom the worship was properly directed; or lastly, as being images or symbols of divine things.* 44. *That though the* Egyptians *be said to have worshipped brute animals, and were generally therefore condemned by the other Pagans; yet the wiser of them used them only as hieroglyphicks and symbols.* 45. *That the Pagans worshipped not only the supreme God, but also the inferior deities, by material sacrifices. Sacrifices or fire-offerings, in their first and general notion nothing else but gifts and signs of gratitude, and appendices of prayer. But that animal sacrifices had afterwards a particular notion also of expiation fastened on them, whether by divine direction, or human agreement, left undetermined.* 46. *The Pagans*

apology

apology for the three forementioned things. First, for worſhipping one ſupreme God under many perſonal names, and that not only according to his ſeveral attributes, but alſo his ſeveral manifeſtations, gifts and effects, in the viſible world. With an excuſe for thoſe corporeal Theiſts, who worſhipped the whole animated world as the ſupreme God, and the ſeveral parts of it under perſonal names, as living members of him. 47. *Their apology for worſhipping, beſides the one ſupreme God, many inferior Deities. That they worſhipping them only as inferior could not therefore be guilty of giving them that honour, which was proper to the ſupreme. That they honoured the ſupreme God incomparably above all. That they put a difference in their ſacrifices; and that material ſacrifices were not the proper worſhip of the ſupreme God, but rather below him.* 48. *Several reaſons of the Pagans, for giving religious worſhip to inferiour created beings. Firſt, that this honour, which is beſtowed upon them, does ultimately redound to the ſupreme God, and aggrandize his ſtate and majeſty, they being all his miniſters and attendants.* 49. *That as dæmons are mediators betwixt the Celeſtial gods and men, ſo thoſe celeſtial gods, and all the other inferior deities, are themſelves alſo mediators betwixt man and the ſupreme God, and as it were convenient ſteps, by which we ought with reverence to approach him.* 50. *That there is an honour in juſtice due to all thoſe excellent beings that are above us; and that the Pagans do but honour every thing as they ought, in that due rank and place, in which the ſupreme God hath ſet it.* 51. *That dæmons or angels being appointed to preſide over kingdoms, cities and perſons, and the ſeveral parts of the corporeal univerſe, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by ſacrifice.* 52. *That the inferior gods, dæmons and heroes, being all of them able to do us either good or hurt, and being alſo iraſcible, and therefore provokable by our neglect of them, it is as well our intereſt as our duty to pacify and appeaſe them by worſhip.* 53. *Laſtly, that it cannot be thought, that the ſupreme God will envy thoſe inferior gods that worſhip or honour, which is beſtowed upon them; nor ſuſpected, that any of thoſe inferior deities will factiouſly go about to ſet up themſelves againſt the ſupreme God.* 54. *That many of the Pagans worſhipped none but good dæmons, and that thoſe of them, who worſhipped evil ones, did it only in order to their appeaſement and mitigation, that ſo they might do them no hurt. None but magicians to be accounted properly devil-worſhippers, who honour evil dæmons, in order to the gratification of their revenge, luſt and ambition.* 55. *The Pagans plead, that thoſe dæmons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongſt them, muſt needs be good, ſince there cannot be a greater reproach to the ſupreme God, than to ſuppoſe him to appoint evil dæmons as preſidents and governours over the world, or to ſuffer them to have ſo great a ſway and ſhare of power in it. The faith of* Plato *in divine providence, that the good every where prevails over the bad, and that the Delphick* Apollo *was therefore a good dæmon.* 56. *The Pagans apology for worſhipping the ſupreme God in images, ſtatues and ſymbols. That theſe are only ſchetically worſhipped by them, the honour paſſing from them to the prototype. And that ſince we living in bodies cannot eaſily have a conception of any thing without*

without ſome corporeal image or phantaſm, thus much muſt be indulged to the infirmity of human nature (at leaſt in the vulgar) to the worſhip of God, corporeally in images, to prevent their running to atheiſm. 57. *That though it ſhould appear by this apology of the Pagans, that their caſe were not altogether ſo bad as is commonly ſuppoſed, yet they cannot be juſtified thereby in the three particulars above mentioned, but the ſcripture-condemnation of them is irrefragable, that knowing God, they did not glorify him as God, or ſanctify his name; that is, worſhip him according to his uncommon and incommunicable, his peerleſs and inſociable, tranſcendent and ſingular, incomparable and unreſemblable nature; but mingled, ſome way or other, creature-worſhip with the worſhip of the creator. Firſt, that the worſhipping of one God in his various gifts and effects, under ſeveral perſonal names, a thing in it ſelf abſurd, may alſo prove a great occaſion of atheiſm, when the things themſelves come to be called by thoſe names, as wine* Bacchus, *corn* Ceres. *The concluſion eaſily following from thence, that the good things of nature are the only deities. But to worſhip the corporeal world it ſelf animated, as the ſupreme God, and the parts of it as the members of God, plainly to confound God with the creature, and not to glorify him as creator, nor according to his ſeparate and ſpiritual nature.* 58. *To give religious worſhip to dæmons or angels, heroes or ſaints, or any other intellectual creatures, though not honouring them equally with the ſupreme God, is to deny God the honour of his holineſs, his ſingular, inſociable, and incommunicable nature, as he is the only ſelf-originated being, and the creator of all of; whom, through whom, and to whom are all things. As God is ſuch a being, that there is nothing like him, ſo ought the worſhip which is given him, to be ſuch as hath nothing like to it, a ſingular, ſeparate and incommunicate worſhip. They not to be religiouſly worſhipped, that worſhip.* 59. *That the religious worſhip of created ſpirits proceeded chiefly from a fear, that if they were not worſhipped, they would be provoked and do hurt, which is both highly injurious to good ſpirits, and a diſtruſt of the ſufficiency of God's power to protect his worſhippers. That all good ſpirits uninvok'd are of themſelves officiouſly ready to aſſiſt thoſe, who ſincerely worſhip and propitiate the ſupreme Deity, and therefore no need of the religious worſhip of them, which would be alſo offenſive to them.* 60. *That mens praying to images and ſtatues is much more ridiculous than children's talking to babies made of clouts, but not ſo innocent; they thereby debaſing both themſelves and God, not glorifying him according to his ſpiritual and unreſemblable nature, but changing the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeneſs of corruptible man or beaſt.* 61. *The miſtake of thoſe, who think, none can be guilty of idolatry, that believe one God the maker of the world.* 62. *That from the ſame ground of reaſon, that nothing ought to be religiouſly worſhipped beſides the ſupreme God, or whom he appoints to repreſent himſelf (becauſe he ought to be ſanctified, and dealt withal, according to his ſingular nature, as unlike to every thing) it follows, contrary to the opinion of ſome oppoſers of idolatry, that there ought alſo to be a diſcrimination made between things ſacred and prophane, and reverence uſed in divine worſhip. Idolatry and ſacrilege allied.* 63. *Another ſcripture-charge upon the Pagans, that they were devil-worſhippers; not as though they intended all their worſhip*

to

to evil dæmons or devils as such, but because their polytheism and idolatry (unacceptable to God and good spirits) was promoted by evil spirits delivering oracles and doing miracles for the confirmation of it, they also insinuating themselves into the temples and statues, therefore the worship was look'd upon, as done to them. The same thing said of others besides Pagans, that they worshipped Devils. 64. *Proved that they were evil demons, who delivered oracles, and did miracles amongst the Pagans, for the carrying on of that religion, from the many obscene rites and mysteries, not only not prohibited, but also enjoined by them.* 65. *The same thing further proved from other cruel and bloody rites, but especially that of man-sacrifices.* Plutarch's *clear acknowledgment, that both the obscene rites and man-sacrifices, amongst the Pagans owed their original to wicked dæmons.* 66. *That the God of* Israel *neither required nor accepted of man-sacrifices, against a modern Diatribist.* 67. *That what faith soever* Plato *might have in the Delphic* Apollo, *he was no other than an evil dæmon, or devil. An answer to the Pagans argument from divine providence.* 68. *That the Pagans religion, unsound in its foundation, was infinitely more corrupted and depraved by means of these four things; first, the superstition of the ignorant vulgar.* 69. *Secondly, the licentious figments of poets and fable-mongers, frequently condemn'd by* Plato *and other wiser Pagans.* 70. *Thirdly the craft of priests and politicians.* 71. *Lastly, the imposture of evil dæmons or devils. That by means of these four things, the pagan religion became a most foul and unclean thing. And as some were captivated by it under a most grievous yoke of superstition, so others strongly inclined to atheism.* 72. Plato *not insensible, that the Pagan religion stood in need of reformatian; nevertheless supposing many of those religious rites to have been introduced by visions, dreams, and oracles, he concluded, that no wise legislator would, of his own head, venture to make an alteration: implying, that this was a thing not to be effected otherwise than by divine revelation and miracles. The generally received opinion of the Pagans, that no man ought to trouble himself about religion, but content himself to worship God,* νόμῳ πόλεως, *according to the law of that country which he lived in.* 73. *Wherefore God Almighty, in great compassion to mankind, designed himself to reform the religion of the Pagan world, by introducing another religion of his own framing instead of it; after he had first made a præludium thereunto in one nation of the Israelites, where he expressly prohibited, by a voice out of the fire, in his first commandment, the Pagan polytheism, or the worshipping of other inferior deities besides himself; and in the second, their idolatry, or the worshipping of the supreme God in images, statues or symbols. Besides which, he restrained the use of sacrifices: as also successively gave predictions, of a* Messiah *to come, such as together with miracles might reasonably conciliate faith to him when he came.* 74. *That afterwards, in due time, God sent the promised* Messiah, *who was the eternal Word hypostatically united with a pure human soul and body, and so a true* θεάνθρωπος, *or God-man: designing him for a living temple and visible statue or image, in which the Deity should be represented and worshipped; as also after his death and resurrection, when he was to be invested with all power and authority, for a prince and king, a mediator and intercessor betwixt God*

God and men. 75. *That this* Θεάνθρωπος, *or God-man, was so far from intending to require men sacrifices of his worshippers, as the Pagan dæmons did, that he devoted himself to be a catharma and expiatory sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; and thereby also abolished all sacrifices or oblations by fire whatsoever, according to the divine prediction.* 76. *That the Christian trinity, though a mystery, is more agreeable to reason than the Platonick; and that there is no absurdity at all in supposing the pure soul and body of the Messiah to be made a living temple or Shechinah, image or statue of the Deity. That this religion of one God and one Mediator, or* Θεάνθρωπος, *God-man, preached to the Pagan world, and confirmed by miracles, did effectually destroy all the Pagan inferior deities, middle gods and mediators, dæmons and heroes, together with their statues and images.* 77. *That it is no way incongruous to suppose, that the divine Majesty, in prescribing a form of religion to the world, should graciously condescend to comply with human infirmity, in order to the removing of two such grand evils as polytheism and idolatry, and the bringing of men to worship God in spirit and in truth.* 78. *That dæmons and angels, heroes and saints, are but different names for the same things, which are made gods by being worshipped. And that the introducing of angel and saint-worship, together with image-worship, into Christianity, seems to be a defeating of one grand design of God Almighty in it, and the paganizing of that, which was intended for the unpaganizing of the world.* 79. *Another key for Christianity in the Scripture, not disagreeing with the former, that since the way of wisdom and knowledge proved ineffectual as to the generality of mankind, men might, by the contrivance of the gospel, be brought to God and a holy life (without profound knowledge) in the way of believing.* 80. *That according to the Scripture, there is a higher, more precious and diviner light, than that of theory and speculation.* 81. *That in Christianity, all the great, goodly, and most glorious things of this world, are slurred and disgraced, comparatively with the life of Christ.* 82. *And that there are all possible engines in it to bring men up to God, and engage them in a holy life.* 83. *Two errors here to be taken notice of; the first, of those, who make Christianity nothing but an Antinomian plot against real righteousness, and as it were a secret confederacy with the devil. The second, of those, who turn that into matter of mere notion and opinion, dispute and controversy, which was designed by God only as a contrivance, machine or engine, to bring men effectually to a holy and godly life.* 84. *That Christianity may be yet further illustrated, from the consideration of the adversary or Satanical power, which is in the world. This no Manichean substantial evil principle, but a polity of lapsed angels, with which the souls of wicked men are also incorporated, and may therefore be called the kingdom of darkness.* 85. *The history of the fallen angels in Scripture briefly explained.* 86. *The concurrent agreement of the Pagans concerning evil dæmons or devils, and their activity in the world.* 87. *That there is a perpetual war betwixt two polities or kingdoms in the world, the one of light, the other of darkness; and that our Saviour Christ, or the Messiah, is appointed the head or chieftain over the heavenly militia, or the forces of the kingdom of light.*

88. *That there will be at length a palpable and ſignal overthrow of the Satanical power, and whole kingdom of darkneſs, by* θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, *God appearing in an extraordinary and miraculous manner; and that this great affair is to be managed by our Saviour Chriſt, as God's vicegerent, and a viſible judge both of quick and dead.* 89. *That our Saviour Chriſt deſigned not to ſet up himſelf factiouſly againſt God-almighty, nor to be accounted* κύριος θεοῦ, *ſuperior to God, but that when he hath done his work, and put down all adverſary power, himſelf will then be ſubject to God, even the father, that ſo God may be all in all.* 90. *Laſtly, having ſpoken of three forms of religions, the Jewiſh, Chriſtian, and the Pagan, and there remaining only a fourth the Mahometan, in which the divine monarchy is zealouſly aſſerted, we may now conclude, that the idea of God (as eſſentially including unity in it) hath been entertained in all forms of religion. An account of that ſeemingly-ſtrange phænomenon of providence; the riſe, growth, and continuance of the Mahometan religion not to be attempted by us, at leaſt in this place.*

I. HAVING in the former chapter prepared the way, we ſhall now proceed (with the divine aſſiſtance) to anſwer and confute all thoſe atheiſtick arguments before propoſed. The firſt whereof was this, *That there is no idea of God, and therefore, either no ſuch thing exiſting in nature, or at leaſt no poſſible evidence of it.*

To affirm, that there is no idea of God, is all one as to affirm, that there is no conception of the mind anſwering to that word or name; and this the modern Atheiſts ſtick not to maintain, that the word God hath no ſignification, and that there is no other idea or conception in men's minds, anſwering thereunto, beſides the mere phantaſm of the ſound. Now for any one to go about ſoberly to confute this, and to prove, that God is not the only word without a ſignification, and that men do not every where pay all their religious devotions to the mere phantaſm of a tranſient ſound, expecting all good from it, might very well ſeem to all intelligent perſons a moſt abſurd and ridiculous undertaking; both becauſe the thing is ſo evident in itſelf, and becauſe the plaineſt things of all can leaſt be proved; for ὁ πάντα ἀπόδεικτα νενομικὼς, αὐτὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖ· *He that thinks all things to be demonſtrable, takes away demonſtration itſelf.* Wherefore we ſhall here only ſuggeſt thus much, that ſince there are different words for God in ſeveral languages, and men have the ſame notion or conception in their minds anſwering to them all, it muſt needs be granted, that they have ſome other idea or conception belonging to thoſe words, beſides the phantaſms of their ſeveral ſounds. And indeed it can be nothing elſe, but either monſtrous ſottiſhneſs and ſtupidity of mind, or elſe prodigious impudence, in theſe Atheiſts to deny, that there is any idea of God at all in the minds of men, or that the word hath any ſignification.

Procl. in Timæ. p. 176. [Edit. Græcæ Baſil. 1534. fol.]

It

It was heretofore observed by *Epictetus*, ἂν τις ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν ἐκφανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥάδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν λόγον, δι' οὗ μελαπείσει τις αὐτόν· τοῦτο δ' οὔτε παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνῳ γίνεσθαι δύναμιν, οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν· *That if any man will oppose or contradict the most evident truths, it will not be easy to find arguments wherewith to convince him. And yet this notwithstanding ought neither to be imputed to any inability in the teacher, nor to any strength of wit in the denier, but only to a certain dead insensibility in him.* Arria. l. 1 c. 5. [P. 95. Edit. Cantabr.] Whereupon he further adds, that there is a double ἀπονέκρωσις or ἀπολίθωσις, mortification or petrification of the soul; the one, when it is stupified and besotted in its intellectuals; the other, when it is bedeaded in its morals as to that pudor, that naturally should belong to a man. And he concludes, that either of these states (though it be not commonly so apprehended) is a condition little less deplorable, than that of bodily death; as also that such a person is not at all to be disputed with. For ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προστάγω, ἵν' αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται; αἰσθανόμενον δ' οὐ προσωποιεῖται; ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ, ἐκτέτμηται γὰρ τὸ αἰδήμον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἐντρέπτικον· *What sword can one bring, or what fire, by burning or flashing, to make such a one perceive that he is dead? But if he be sensible, and will not acknowledge it, then he is worse than dead, being castrated as to that pudor, that belongs to a man.* Moreover, that philosopher took notice, that in those times, when this denial of most evident truths proceeded rather from impudence than stupidity or sottishness, the vulgar would be apt to admire it for strength of wit and great learning; ἂν δέ τινος τὸ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν· *But if any man's pudor be deaded or mortified in him, we call this power and strength.*

Now as this was sometimes the case of the Academicks, so is it also commonly of the Atheists, that their minds are partly petrified and benumbed into a kind of sottish and stupid insensibility, so that they are not able to discern things that are most evident; and partly depudorated, or become so void of shame, as that though they do perceive, yet they will obstinately and impudently deny the plainest things that are, as this, that there is any idea answering to the word God, besides the phantasm of the sound. And we do the rather insist upon this prodigious monstrosity of Atheists in this place, because we shall have occasion afterwards more than once to take notice of it again in other instances, as when they affirm, that local motion and cogitation are really one and the self-same thing, and the like. And we conceive it to be unquestionably true, that it is many times nothing else, but either this shameless impudence, or sottish insensibility in Atheists, that is admired by the ignorant for profoundness of wit and learning [1], ἀλλὰ ταύτην δύναμιν εἴπω; μὴ γένοιτο· εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν Κιναίδων, καθ' ἣν πᾶν τὸ ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι. *But shall I call this power or wit, and commend it upon that account? no more than I will commend the impudence of the* Cinædi, *who stick not publickly to do and say any thing.*

[1] Epictet. apud Arrian. ubi supra, p. 96.

II. But whatever theſe Atheiſts deny in words, it is notwithſtanding evident, that even themſelves have an idea or conception in their minds anſwering to the word God, when they deny his exiſtence, becauſe otherwiſe they ſhould deny the exiſtence of nothing. Nor can it be at all doubted, but that they have alſo the ſame idea of God with Theiſts, they denying the exiſtence of no other thing than what theſe aſſert. And as in all other controverſies, when men diſpute together, the one affirming, the other denying, both parties muſt needs have the ſame idea in their minds of what they diſpute about, or otherwiſe their whole diſputation would be but a kind of *Babel* language and confuſion; ſo muſt it be likewiſe in this preſent controverſy betwixt Theiſts and Atheiſts. Neither indeed would there be any controverſy at all between them, did they not both by God mean one and the ſame thing; nor would the Atheiſts be any longer Atheiſts, did they not deny the exiſtence of that very ſame thing, which the Theiſts affirm, but of ſomething elſe.

III. Wherefore we ſhall in the next place declare what this idea of God is, or what is that thing, whoſe exiſtence they that affirm, are called Theiſts, and they who deny Atheiſts. In order whereunto, we muſt firſt lay down this lemma or preparatory propoſition, that as it is generally acknowledged, that all things did not exiſt from eternity, ſuch as they are, unmade, but that ſome things were made and generated or produced; ſo it is not poſſible that all things ſhould be made neither, but there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, and unmade; becauſe if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. The reaſon of which is ſo evident and irreſiſtible, that even the Atheiſts confeſs themſelves conquered by it, and readily acknowledge it for an indubitable truth, that there muſt be ſomething ἀγέννητον, *ſomething which was never made or produced*, and which therefore is the cauſe of thoſe other things that are made, ſomething αὐτόφυες and αὐθυπόστατον, that was *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-exiſting*, and which is as well ἀνώλεθρον and ἄφθαρτον, as ἀγέννητον, *incorruptible* and *undeſtroyable*, as *ingenerable*; whoſe exiſtence therefore muſt needs be neceſſary, becauſe if it were ſuppoſed to have happened by chance to exiſt from eternity, then it might as well happen again to ceaſe to be. Wherefore all the queſtion now is, what is this ἀγέννητον and ἀνώλεθρον, αὐτόφυες and αὐθυπόστατον, this *ingenerable* and *incorruptible*, *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-exiſtent* thing, which is the cauſe of all other things that are made.

IV. Now there are two grand opinions oppoſite to one another concerning it: for firſt, ſome contend, that the only ſelf-exiſtent, unmade and incorruptible thing, and firſt principle of all things, is ſenſleſs matter, that is, matter either perfectly dead and ſtupid, or at leaſt devoid of all animaliſh and conſcious life. But becauſe this is really the loweſt and moſt imperfect of all beings, others on the contrary judge it reaſonable, that the firſt principle and original of all things ſhould be that, which is moſt

perfect (as *Ariſtotle* [1] obſerves of *Pherecydes*, and his followers, τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον τιθέασι, *that they made the firſt cauſe and principle of generation to be the beſt*) and then apprehending, that to be endued with conſcious life and underſtanding is much a greater perfection than to be devoid of both, (as *Balbus* in *Cicero* declares upon this very occaſion, *Nec dubium quin quod animans ſit, habeátque mentem, & rationem, & ſenſum, id ſit melius quàm id quod his careat*) they therefore conclude, that the only unmade thing, which was the principle, cauſe and original of all other things, was not ſenſleſs matter, but a perfect conſcious underſtanding nature, or mind. And theſe are they, who are ſtrictly and properly called Theiſts, who affirm, that a perfectly conſcious underſtanding being, or mind, exiſting of itſelf from eternity, was the cauſe of all other things; and they on the contrary, who derive all things from ſenſleſs matter, as the firſt original, and deny that there is any conſcious underſtanding being ſelf-exiſtent or unmade, are thoſe that are properly called Atheiſts. Wherefore the true and genuine idea of God in general, is this, *A perfect conſcious underſtanding being (or mind) exiſting of itſelf from eternity, and the cauſe of all other things.*

De Nat. Deor. l. 2. [Cap. XVII. p. 2978. Tom. IX. Oper.]

V. But it is here obſervable, that thoſe Atheiſts, who deny a God, according to this true and genuine notion of him, which we have declared, do often abuſe the word, calling ſenſleſs matter by that name; partly perhaps as indeavouring thereby, to decline that odious and ignominious name of Atheiſts, and partly as conceiving, that whatſoever is the firſt principle of things, ingenerable and incorruptible, and the cauſe of all other things beſides itſelf, muſt therefore needs be the divineſt thing of all. Wherefore by the word God theſe mean nothing elſe, but that which is ἀγέννητον, unmade or ſelf-exiſtent, and the ἀρχὴ, or firſt principle of things. Thus it was before obſerved [2], that *Anaximander* called infinite matter, devoid of all manner of life, τὸ θεῖον, or God; and *Pliny*, the corporeal world, endued with nothing but a plaſtick unknowing nature, *Numen*; as alſo others in *Ariſtotle* [3], upon the ſame account, called the inanimate elements gods, as ſuppoſed firſt principles of things, θεοὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα, *for theſe are alſo Gods.* And indeed *Ariſtotle* himſelf ſeems to be guilty of this miſcarriage of abuſing the word God after this manner, when ſpeaking of love and chaos, as the two firſt principles of things, he muſt, according to the laws of grammar, be underſtood to call them both gods: τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι, περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶτος, ἐξῆς ἂν εἴη κρίνειν ὕστερον· *Concerning theſe two (gods) how they ought to be ranked, and which of them is to be placed firſt, whether love or chaos, is afterwards to be reſolved.* Which paſſage of *Ariſtotle*'s ſeems to agree with that of *Epicharmus* [4], Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι θεῶν, *But chaos is ſaid to have made the firſt of gods*; unleſs we ſhould rather underſtand him thus, *That chaos was ſaid to have been made before the gods.* And this abuſe of the word God is a thing, which

Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 4. [P. 267. Tom. IV. Oper.]

[1] Metaphyſicor. Lib. XII. Cap. IV. p. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.

[2] Chap. III. §. XX.

[3] This is a miſtake of Dr. *Cudworth*, for *Ariſtotle* does not ſpeak of thoſe philoſophers, who conſidered the elements as gods, but of *Empedocles*, and his well known principles of Νεῖκος and Φιλία. De Generatione & Corruptione, Cap. VI. p. 734. Tom. I. Oper.

[4] Apud Diogen. Laert. Lib. III. ſegm. 10. p. 171.

which the learned *Origen* took notice of in his book against *Celsus*, where he speaks of that religious care, which ought to be had about the use of words: *L. 1. p. 19. Cant.* ὁ τοίνυν μεγαλοφυέστερον, κἂν ὀλίγην τούτων περίνοιαν εἰληφὼς, εὐλαβηθήσεται, ἄλλα ἄλλοις ἐφαρμόζει ὀνόματα πράγμασι, μήποτε ὅμοιον πάθῃ τοῖς τὸ Θεὸς ὄνομα ἐσφαλμένως φέρουσιν, ἐπὶ ὕλην ἄψυχον· *He therefore, that hath but the least consideration of these things, will take a religious care, that he give not improper names to things, lest he should fall into a like miscarriage with those, who attribute the name of God to inanimate and sensless matter.* Now according to this false and spurious notion of the word of *God*, when it is taken for any supposed first principle, or self-existent unmade thing, whatsoever that be, there neither is nor can be any such thing as an Atheist; since whosoever hath but the least dram of reason, must needs acknowledge, that something or other existed from eternity unmade, and was the cause of those other things that are made. But that notion or idea of God, according to which some are Atheists and some Theists, is in the strictest sense of it, what we have already declared, *A perfect mind, or consciously understanding nature, self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things.* The genuine Theists being those, who make the first original of all things universally to be a consciously understanding nature (or perfect mind;) but the Atheists properly such, as derive all things from matter, either perfectly dead and stupid, or else devoid of all conscious and animalish life.

VI. But that we may more fully and punctually declare the true idea of God, we must here take notice of a certain opinion of some philosophers, who went as it were in a middle betwixt both the former, and neither made matter alone, nor God, the sole principle of all things; but joined them both together, and held two first principles or self-existent unmade beings, independent upon one another, God, and the matter. Amongst whom the Stoicks are to be reckoned, who, notwithstanding, because they held, that there was no other substance besides body, strangely confounded themselves, being by that means necessitated to make their two first principles, the active and the passive, to be both of them really but one and the self-same substance: their doctrine to this purpose being thus declared by *Cicero*[1]: *Naturam dividebant in res duas, ut altera esset efficiens, altera autem quasi huic se præbens, ex qua efficeretur aliquid. In eo, quod efficeret, vim esse censebant; in eo, quod efficeretur, materiam quandam; in utroque tamen utrumque. Neque enim materiam ipsam cohærere potuisse, si nullâ vi contineretur, neque vim sine aliqua materia; nihil est enim, quod non alicubi esse cogatur. The Stoicks divided nature into two things as the first principles, one whereof is the efficient or artificer, the other that which offers itself to him for things to be made out of it. In the efficient principle they took notice of active force in the patient of matter, but so as that in each of these were both together; forasmuch as neither the matter could cohere together, unless it were contained by some active force, nor the active force subsist of itself without matter, because that is nothing, which is*

1 Academ. Quæst. Lib. I. Cap. VI. p. 2231. Tom. VIII. Oper. But *Cicero* in this passage does not treat of the opinion of the Stoicks, but of that of *Plato* and his ancient followers, or the first Academicks.

is not somewhere. But besides these Stoicks, there were other philosophers, who admitting of incorporeal substance did suppose two first principles, as substances really distinct from one another, that were co-existent from eternity, an incorporeal Deity and matter; as for example, *Anaxagoras*, *Archelaus*, *Atticus*, and many more; insomuch that *Pythagoras* himself was reckoned amongst those by *Numenius*, and *Plato* by *Plutarch* and *Laertius*. See *Euseb. Præp. Ev. Lib. 7. c. 7.*

And we find it commonly taken for granted, that *Aristotle* also was of this persuasion, though it cannot be certainly concluded from thence (as some seem to suppose) because he asserted the eternity of the world; *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Jamblichus*, *Proclus* and *Simplicius* doing the like, and yet notwithstanding maintaining, that God was the sole principle of all things, and that matter also was derived from him. Neither will that passage of *Aristotle*'s in his Metaphysicks necessarily evince the contrary, Θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, *God seems to be a cause to all things, and a certain principle*; because this might be understood only of the forms of things. *L. 1. c. 1.* [P. 263. Tom. IV. Oper.]

But it is plain, that *Plutarch* was a maintainer of this doctrine from his discourse upon the Platonick psychogonia [1], (besides other places) βέλτιον ἦν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων, ὁ δὲ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτιῶν· τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην, ἐξ ἧς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην, ἀλλὰ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ, εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὐτῆς, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν, ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν παραχεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς, μηδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας, καὶ ἱματίου, καὶ ἀνδριάντος· *It is therefore better for us to follow* Plato (than *Heraclitus*) *and loudly to declare, that the world was made by God. For as the world is the best of all works, so is God the best of all causes. Nevertheless, the substance or matter, out of which the world was made, was not itself made; but always ready at hand, and subject to the artificer, to be ordered and disposed by him. For the making of the world, was not the production of it out of nothing, but out of an antecedent bad and disorderly state, like the making of an house, garment, or statue.*

It is also well known, that *Hermogenes* and other ancient pretenders to Christianity did in like manner assert the self-existence and improduction of the matter, for which cause they were commonly called *Materiarii*, or the Materiarian hereticks; they pretending by this means to give an account (as the Stoicks had done before them) of the original of evils, and to free God from the imputation of them. Their ratiocination to which purpose, is thus set down by *Tertullian*: *God made all things, either out of himself, or out of nothing, or out of matter. He could not make all things out of himself, because himself being always unmade, he should then really have been the maker of nothing: and he did not make all out of nothing, because being essentially good, he would have made* nihil non optimum, *every thing in the best manner, and so there could have been no evil in the world: but since there are evils, and these could not proceed from the will of God, they must needs arise from the fault of something, and therefore of the matter, out of which things were* *Adver. Hermog. p. 282. Reg.*

[1] Tom. II. Oper. p. 1014.

were made. Laſtly, it is ſufficiently known likewiſe, that ſome modern ſects of the Chriſtian profeſſion, at this day, do alſo aſſert the uncreatedneſs of the matter. But theſe ſuppoſe, in like manner as the Stoicks did, body to be the only ſubſtance.

VII. Now of all theſe, whoſoever they were, who thus maintained two ſelf-exiſtent principles, God and the matter, we may pronounce univerſally, that they were neither better nor worſe, than a kind of imperfect Theiſts.

They had a certain notion or idea of God, ſuch as it was, which ſeems to be the very ſame with that expreſſed in *Ariſtotle* [1], Ζῶον ἄριστον ἀΐδιον, *an animal the beſt, eternal*; and repreſented alſo by *Epicurus* in this manner [2], Ζῶον πᾶσαν ἔχον μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας· *an animal, that hath all happineſs with incorruptibility.*

Wherein it was acknowledged by them, that beſides ſenſleſs matter, there was alſo an animaliſh and conſcious or perceptive nature, ſelf-exiſtent from eternity; in oppoſition to Atheiſts, who made matter either devoid of all manner of life, or at leaſt of ſuch as is animaliſh and conſcious, to be the ſole principle of all things. For it hath been often obſerved, that ſome Atheiſts attributed a kind of plaſtick life or nature to that matter, which they made to be the only principle of the univerſe. And theſe two ſorts of atheiſms were long ſince taken notice of by *Seneca* in theſe words; *Univerſum, in quo nos quoque ſumus, expers eſſe conſilii, & aut ferri temeritate quadam, aut naturâ neſciente quid faciat. The Atheiſts make the univerſe, whereof our ſelves are part, to be devoid of counſel; and therefore either to be carried on temerariouſly and fortuitouſly, or elſe by ſuch a nature, as which (though it be orderly, regular and methodical) yet is notwithſtanding neſcient of what it doth.* But no Atheiſt ever acknowledged conſcious animality to be a firſt principle in the univerſe; nor that the whole was governed by any animaliſh, ſentient, and underſtanding nature, preſiding over it as the head of it; but as it was before declared, they concluded all animals and animality, all conſcious, ſentient, and ſelf-perceptive life, to be generated and corrupted, or educed out of nothing, and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, aſſerted animality and conſcious life to be a firſt principle or unmade thing in the univerſe, are to be accounted Theiſts. Thus *Balbus* in *Cicero* declares [3], that to be a Theiſt is to aſſert, *ab animantibus principiis mundum eſſe generatum, that the world was generated or produced at firſt from animant principles*; and that it is alſo ſtill governed by ſuch a nature; *res omnes ſubjectas eſſe naturæ ſentienti, that all things are ſubject to a ſentient and conſcious nature, ſteering and guiding of them.*

Nat. Qu. Præf. L. 1.

But to diſtinguiſh this divine animal from all others, theſe definers added, that it was ἄριστον and μακαριώτατον, *the beſt and moſt happy animal*; and accordingly, this difference is added to that generical nature of animality by

1 Metaphyſ. Lib. XIV. Cap. VIII. p. 479. Tom. IV. Oper.

2 Vide Diogen. Laert. Lib. X. Segm. 123. p. 655.

3 De Naturâ Deor. L. II. §. xxx. p. 2999. Tom. IX. Oper.

by *Balbus* the Stoick, to make up the idea or definition of God complete: *Talem esse deum certâ notione animi præsentimus; primùm, ut sit animans; deinde, ut in omni natura nihil illo sit præstantius. We presage concerning God, by a certain notion of our mind; first, that he is an animans, or consciously living being; and then secondly, that he is such an animans, as that there is nothing in the whole universe, or nature of things, more excellent than him.* *Cicero de Nat. D. l. 2.* [Cap. XVII. p. 2977. Tom. IX. Oper.]

Wherefore these Materiarian Theists acknowledged God to be a perfectly-understanding being, and such as had also power over the whole matter of the universe; which was utterly unable to move itself, or to produce any thing without him. And all of them, except the *Anaxagoreans*[1], concluded, that he was the creator of all the forms of inanimate bodies, and of the souls of animals. However, it was universally agreed upon amongst them, that he was at least the orderer and disposer of all; and that therefore he might upon that account well be called the δημιουργὸς, *the maker or framer of the world.*

Notwithstanding which, so long as they maintained matter to exist independently upon God, and sometimes also to be refractory and contumacious to him, and by that means to be the cause of evil, contrary to the divine will; it is plain, that they could not acknowledge the divine omnipotence, according to the full and proper sense of it: which may also further appear from these queries of *Seneca*[2] concerning God; *Quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an datâ utatur? Deus quicquid vult efficiat? an in multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, & à magno artifice pravè formentur multa, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id, in quo exercetur, sæpe inobsequens arti est? How far God's power does extend? whether he makes his own matter, or only use that which is offered him? whether he can do whatsoever he will? or the materials in many things frustrate and disappoint him, and by that means things come to be ill-framed by this great artificer, not because his art fails him, but because that, which it is exercised upon, proves stubborn and contumacious?* Wherefore, I think, we may well conclude, that those Materiarian Theists had not a right and genuine idea of God.

Nevertheless, it does not therefore follow, that they must needs be concluded absolute Atheists; for there may be a latitude allowed in Theism. And though in a strict and proper sense they be only Theists, who acknowledge one God perfectly omnipotent, the sole original of all things, and as well the cause of matter as of any thing else; yet it seems reasonable, that such consideration should be had of the infirmity of human understandings, as to extend the word further, that it may comprehend within it those also, who assert one intellectual principle self-existent from eternity, the framer and governor of the whole world, though not the creator of the matter; and that none should be condemned for absolute Atheists, merely because they hold eternal uncreated matter, unless they also deny an eternal

1 Vide Diogen. Laert. Lib. II. segm. 9. p. 85.

2 Præfat. Lib. I. Quæst. natur. Tom. II. Oper. p. 485.

unmade mind, ruling over the matter, and ſo make ſenſleſs matter the ſole original of all things. And this is certainly moſt agreeable to common apprehenſions; for *Democritus* and *Epicurus* would never have been condemned for Atheiſts merely for aſſerting eternal ſelf-exiſtent atoms, no more than *Anaxagoras* and *Archelaus* were, (who maintained the ſame thing) had they not alſo denied that other principle of theirs, a perfect mind, and concluded, that the world was made, μηδενὸς διατάτλοντος ἢ διαταξαμένου τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχοντος μακαριότητα μετ' ἀφθαρσίας, *without the ordering and diſpoſal of any underſtanding being, that had all happineſs with incorruptibility.*

VIII. The true and proper idea of God, in its moſt contracted form, is this, *a being abſolutely perfect*; for this is that alone, to which neceſſary exiſtence is eſſential, and of which it is demonſtrable. Now, as abſolute perfection includes in it all that belongs to the Deity, ſo does it not only comprehend (beſides neceſſary exiſtence) perfect knowledge or underſtanding, but alſo omni-cauſality and omnipotence (in the full extent of it;) otherwiſe called infinite power. God is not only ζῶον ἄριστον, and *animans quo nihil in omni natura præſtantius*, as the Materiarian Theiſts deſcribed him, *the beſt living being*; nor, as *Zeno Eleates*[1] called him, κράτιστον πάντων, *the moſt powerful of all things*; but he is alſo παντελὴς, and παντοκράτωρ, and παντεξούσιος, *abſolutely omnipotent*, and *infinitely powerful:* and therefore neither matter, nor any thing elſe, can exiſt of itſelf independently upon God; but he is the ſole principle and ſource, from which all things are derived.

But becauſe this infinite power is a thing, which the Atheiſts quarrel much withal, as if it were altogether unintelligible, and therefore impoſſible; we ſhall here briefly declare the ſenſe of it, and render it (as we think) eaſily intelligible or conceivable, in theſe two following ſteps: Firſt, that by infinite power is meant nothing elſe but perfect power, or elſe, as *Simplicius* calls it, ὅλη δύναμις, *a whole* and *entire power*, ſuch as hath no allay and mixture of impotency, nor any defect of power mingled with it. And then again, that this perfect power (which is alſo the ſame with infinite) is really nothing elſe but a power of producing and doing all whatſoever is conceivable, and which does not imply a contradiction; for conception is the only meaſure of power and its extent, as ſhall be ſhewed more fully in due place.

Now, here we think fit to obſerve, that the Pagan Theiſts did themſelves alſo vulgarly acknowledge omnipotence as an attribute of the Deity; which might be proved from ſundry paſſages of their writings:

Homer. Od. δ'[2].

——————— Θεὸς ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἄλλῳ
Ζεὺς ἀγαθόντε κακόντε διδοῖ, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

——— *Deus*

[1] Vide Ariſtot. Libro de Xenocrate, Zenone, & Gorgiâ, Cap. III. p. 84c. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Verſ. 226, 227.

——— *Deus aliud poſt aliud*
Jupiter, bonúmque malúmque dat, poteſt enim omnia.

And again, *Od.* ξ' [1].

——— Θεὸς τὸ μὲν δώσει, τὸ δ' ἐάσει,
Ὅτι κεν ᾧ θύμῳ ἐθέλει, δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.

——— *Deus autem hoc dabit, illud omittet,*
Quodcunque ei libitum fuerit, poteſt enim omnia.

To this purpoſe alſo, before *Homer*, *Linus* [2],

Ῥάδια πάντα θεῷ τελέσαι, κὴ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν·

And after him, *Callimachus* [3],

Δαίμονι ῥέξαι πᾶν δυνατόν·

All things are poſſible for God to do, and nothing tranſcends his power.

Thus alſo amongſt the *Latin* poets, *Virgil*, *Æn.* the firſt,

Sed pater omnipotens *ſpeluncis abdidit atris.*

Again, *Æn.* the ſecond,

At pater Anchiſes oculos ad ſydera lætus
Extulit, & cœlo palmas cum voce tetendit;
Jupiter omnipotens, *precibus ſi flecteris ullis*:

And, *Æn.* the fourth,

Talibus orantem dictis, aráſque tenentem
Audiit Omnipotens.

Ovid in like manner, *Metamorph.* 1.

Tum pater omnipotens *miſſo perfregit Olympum*
Fulmine, & excuſſit ſubjectum Pelion Oſſæ.

And to cite no more, *Agatho*, an ancient *Greek* poet, is commended by *Ariſtotle*, for affirming nothing to be exempted from the power of God but only this, that he cannot make that not to have been, which hath been; that is, do what implies a contradiction.

Μόνα γὰρ αὐτοῦ, κὴ Θεὸς ςερίσκεται,
Ἀγένητα ποιεῖν, ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα·

Hoc namque duntaxat negatum etiam Deo eſt,
Quæ facta ſunt, infecta poſſe reddere.

Eth. Nic. l. 4. *c.* 2. [P. 98. Tom. III. Oper.]

[1] Verſ. 432, 433.
[2] Apud Jamblichum in Vitâ Pythag. Cap. XXVIII. p. 117, 118.
[3] Apud Plutarch. de placitis Philoſophor. Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 880. Tom. II. Oper.

Laſtly, that the Atheiſts themſelves under Paganiſm look'd upon omnipotence and infinite power as an eſſential attribute of the Deity, appears plainly from *Lucretius*; when he tells us, that *Epicurus*, in order to the taking away of religion, ſet himſelf to confute infinite power.

Lib. 1. [Verſ. 75, &c.]

——— *Omne immenſum peragravit mente animóque,*
Unde refert nobis victor, quid poſſit oriri,
Quid nequeat: finita poteſtas *denique quoique*
Quanam ſit ratione, atque altè terminus hærens.
Quare relligio *pedibus ſubjecta viciſſim*
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo.

As if he ſhould have ſaid, *Epicurus*, by ſhewing that all power was finite, effectually deſtroyed religion; he thereby taking away the object of it, which is an omnipotent and infinitely powerful Deity. And this is a thing, which the ſame poet often harps upon again, that there is no infinite power, and conſequently no Deity, according to the true idea of it. But laſt of all, in his ſixth book, he condemns Religioniſts, as guilty of great folly, in aſſerting omnipotence or infinite power (that is, a Deity) after this manner:

Rurſus in antiquas referuntur relligiones,
Et dominos acres aſciſcunt, omnia poſſe,
Quos miſeri credunt, ignari quid queat eſſe,
Quid nequeat, finita poteſtas *denique quoique*,
Quanam ſit ratione, atque altè terminus hærens:
Quo magis errantes totâ regione feruntur.

Where though the poet, ſpeaking careleſly, after the manner of thoſe times, ſeems to attribute omnipotence and infinite power to gods plurally; yet, as it is evident in the thing itſelf, that this can only be the attribute of one ſupreme Deity; ſo it may be obſerved, that in thoſe paſſages of the poets before cited, it is accordingly always aſcribed to God ſingularly. Nevertheleſs, all the inferior Pagan deities were ſuppoſed by them to have their certain ſhares of this divine omnipotence, ſeverally diſpenſed and imparted to them.

IX. But we have not yet diſpatched all that belongs to the entire idea of God; for knowledge and power alone will not make a God. For God is generally conceived by all to be a moſt venerable and moſt deſirable being: whereas an omniſcient and omnipotent arbitrary Deity, that hath nothing either of benignity or morality in its nature to meaſure and regulate its will, as it could not be truly auguſt and venerable, according to that maxim, *ſine bonitate nulla majeſtas*; ſo neither could it be deſirable, it being that which could only be feared and dreaded, but not have any firm faith or confidence placed in it. *Plutarch*, in the life of *Ariſtides*[1], τὸ Θεῖον τρισὶ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀφθαρσίᾳ, καὶ δυνάμει, καὶ ἀρετῇ· ὧν σεμνότατόν ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ θειότατόν ἐστι.

[1] P. 322. Tom. I. Oper.

ἐστι· ἀφθάρτῳ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τῷ κενῷ, καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις συμβέβηκε· δύναμιν δὲ σεισμοὶ καὶ κέραυνοι, καὶ πνευμάτων ὁρμαί καὶ ῥευμάτων ἐπιφοραὶ μεγάλην ἔχουσι, &c. *God seems to excel in these three things, incorruptibility, power, and virtue; of all which the most divine and venerable is virtue: for vacuum and the senseless elements have incorruptibility, earthquakes and thunders, blustering winds and overflowing torrents, much of power and force. Wherefore the vulgar being affected three manner of ways towards the Deity, so as to admire its happiness, to fear it, and to honour it; they esteem the Deity happy for its incorruptibility, they fear it and stand in awe of it for its power, but they worship it, that is, love and honour it for its justice.* And indeed an omnipotent arbitrary Deity may seem to be in some sense a worse and more undesireable thing, than the Manichean evil god; forasmuch as the latter could be but finitely evil, whereas the former might be so infinitely. However, I think, it can be little doubted, but that the whole Manichean hypothesis, taken all together, is to be preferred before this of one omnipotent arbitrary Deity (devoid of goodness and morality) ruling all things; because there the evil principle is yoked with another principle essentially good, checking and controlling it; and it also seems less dishonourable to God, to impute defect of power than of goodness and justice to him.

Neither can power and knowledge alone make a being in itself completely happy; for we have all of us by nature μαντευμά τι (as both *Plato* and *Aristotle* call it) a certain divination, presage, and parturient vaticination in our minds, of some higher good and perfection than either power or knowledge. Knowledge is plainly to be preferred before power, as being that which guides and directs its blind force and impetus; but *Aristotle* himself declares, that there is λόγου τι κρεῖττον, which is λόγου ἀρχή, *something better than reason and knowledge, which is the principle and original of all.* For (saith he) λόγου ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλά τι κρεῖττον· *The principle of reason is not reason, but something better.* Where he also intimates this to be the proper and essential character of the Deity; τὶ οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης, πλὴν ὁ Θεός; *For what is there, that can be better than knowledge, but God?* Likewise the same philosopher elsewhere plainly determines, that there is morality in the nature of God; and that his happiness consisteth principally therein, and not in external things, and the exercise of his power: ὅτι μὲν ὃν ἑκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον, ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ὃς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν. *That every man hath so much of happiness, as he hath of virtue and wisdom, and of acting according to these, ought to be confessed and acknowledged by us, it being a thing, that may be proved from the nature of God, who is happy, but not from any external goods, but because he is himself (or that which he is) and in such a manner affected according to his nature*; that is, because he is essentially moral and virtuous.

Eth. Eudem. l. 7. c. 14. [P. 384. Tom. III. Oper.]

De Rep. l. 7. c. 1. [P. 569. Tom. III. Oper.]

Which doctrine of *Aristotle*'s seems to have been borrowed from *Plato*, who in his dialogues *de Republica*[1], discoursing about moral virtue, occasionally

[1] De Republicâ, Lib. VI. p. 477. Oper.

ſionally falls upon this diſpute concerning the *ſummum bonum*, or chiefeſt good; wherein he concludes, that it neither conſiſted in pleaſure as ſuch, according to the opinion of the vulgar, nor yet in mere knowledge and underſtanding, according to the conceit of others, who were more polite and ingenious. *Lib. 6.* Οἶσθα ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις· καὶ ὅτιδε οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἥτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι, μάλα γελοίως, ὀνειδίζοντες γὰρ, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι. *You know, that, to the vulgar, pleaſure ſeems to be the higheſt good; but to thoſe, who are more elegant and ingenuous, knowledge: but they, who entertain this latter opinion, can none of them declare what kind of knowledge it is, which is that higheſt and chiefeſt good, but are neceſſitated at laſt to ſay, that it is the knowledge of good, very ridiculouſly: foraſmuch as herein they do but run round in a circle, and upbraiding us for being ignorant of this higheſt good, they talk to us at the ſame time, as knowing what it is.* And thereupon he adds, Καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ κάλλιον ἔτι τοῦτο ἡγούμενῳ αὐτὸ, ὀρθῶς ἡγήσηται. Ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθὸν, ἥλιον δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ἀμφότερα ὀρθὸν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι μειζόνως τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕξιν τιμητέον. *That though knowledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet he that ſhall conclude the chief good to be ſomething which tranſcends them both, will not be miſtaken. For as light, and ſight, or the ſeeing faculty, may both of them rightly be ſaid to be ſoliform things, or of kin to the ſun, but neither of them to be the ſun itſelf; ſo knowledge and truth may likewiſe both of them be ſaid to be boniform things, and of kin to the chief good, but neither of them to be that chief good itſelf; but this is ſtill to be looked upon as a thing more auguſt and honourable.* In all which of *Plato*'s there ſeems to be little more, than what may be experimentally found within ourſelves; namely, that there is a certain life, or vital and moral diſpoſition of ſoul, which is much more inwardly and thoroughly ſatisfactory, not only than ſenſual pleaſure, but alſo than all knowledge and ſpeculation whatſoever.

Now whatever this chiefeſt good be, which is a perfection ſuperior to knowledge and underſtanding; that philoſopher [1] reſolves, that it muſt needs be firſt and principally in God, who is therefore called by him, Ἰδέα τ' ἀγαθοῦ, *the very idea or eſſence of good.* Wherein he trod in the footſteps of the Pythagoreans, and particularly of *Timæus Locrus* [2], who making two principles of the univerſe, mind and neceſſity, adds concerning the former, τετέων τὸν μὲν τᾶς τ' ἀγαθοῦ φύζιος εἶμεν, θεύντε ὀνυμαίνεθαι ἀρχάντε τῶν ἀρίστων· *the firſt of theſe two is of the nature of good, and it is called God, the principle of the beſt things.* Agreeably with which doctrine of theirs, the Hebrew Cabaliſts alſo make a *Sephirah* in the Deity, ſuperior both to *Binah* and *Chochmah*, (underſtanding and wiſdom) which they call *Chether*, or the crown. And ſome would ſuſpect this Cabaliſtick learning to have been very ancient among the Jews, and that *Parmenides* was imbued with it, he calling God in like manner στέφανον, or *the crown.* For

[1] Vide Platon. de Republicâ Lib. II. p. 431. & Philebum, p. 77, &c.

[2] Libro de Animâ Mundi, Cap. I. p. 543. inter Scriptores Mytholog. a Tho. Gale editos.

For which *Velleius* in *Cicero* [1], (repreſenting the ſeveral opinions of philoſophers concerning God) perſtringes him amongſt the reſt; *Parmenides commentitium quiddam coronæ ſimilitudine efficit, Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cælum, quem appellat deum.*

But all this while we ſeem to be to ſeek, what the chief and higheſt good ſuperior to knowledge is, in which the eſſence of the Deity principally conſiſts; and it cannot be denied, but that *Plato* ſometimes talks too metaphyſically and cloudily about it; for which cauſe, as he lay open to the laſh of *Ariſtotle*, ſo was he alſo vulgarly perſtringed for it, as appears by that of *Amphys* the Poet in *Laertius* [2]:

Τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὅ, τι ποτ' ἐστὶν, οὗ σὺ τυγχάνειν
Μέλλεις διὰ ταύτην, ἥττου οἶδα τοῦτ' ἐγὼ,
Ἢ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀγαθὸν.

What good that is, which you expect from hence, I confeſs, I leſs underſtand, than I do Plato's *good.* Nevertheleſs he plainly intimates theſe two things concerning it: firſt, that this nature of good, which is alſo the nature of God, includes benignity in it, when he gives this account [3] of God's both making the world, and after ſuch a manner; *Becauſe he was good, and that which is good hath no envy in it; and therefore he both made the world, and alſo made it as well, and as like to himſelf as was poſſible.* And ſecondly, that it comprehends eminently all virtue and juſtice, the divine nature being the firſt pattern hereof; for which cauſe virtue is defined to be, an aſſimilation to the Deity. Juſtice and honeſty are no factitious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and deſcend downward to us from the Deity.

But the holy ſcripture, without any metaphyſical pomp and obſcurity, tells us plainly, both what is that higheſt perfection of intellectual beings, which is κρεῖττον λόγου καὶ ἐπιστήμης, *better than reaſon and knowledge*, and which is alſo the ſource, life and ſoul of all morality, namely, that it is love or charity. *Though I ſpeak with the tongue of men and angels, and have not love, I am but* χαλκὸς ἠχῶν, ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον, *as ſounding braſs, or a tinkling cymbal*, which only makes a noiſe without any inward life. *And though I have prophecy, and underſtand all myſteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, ſo that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing*; that is, I have no inward ſatisfaction, peace, or true happineſs. *And though I beſtow all my goods to feed the poor, and give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing*; I am for all that utterly deſtitute of all true morality, virtue, and grace. And accordingly it tells us alſo, in the next place, what the nature of God is, that he is properly neither power nor knowledge, (though having the perfection of both in him) but love. And certainly whatever dark thoughts, concerning the Deity, ſome men in their cells may ſit brooding on, it can never reaſonably

[1] De Naturâ Deorum, Lib. I. Cap. X. p. 2895. Oper. Tom. IX.

[2] Lib. III. ſegm. 27. p. 181.

[3] Vide Platon. in Timæo, p. 527.

ably be conceived, that that which is ἱκανώταλου ἁπάντων καὶ αὐταρκέσταλου, *the moſt ſelf-ſufficient and ſelf-happy being*, ſhould have any narrow and ſelfiſh deſigns abroad, without itſelf, much leſs harbour any malignant and deſpightful ones towards its creatures. Nevertheleſs, becauſe ſo many are apt to abuſe the notion of the divine love and goodneſs, and to frame ſuch conceptions of it, as deſtroy that awful and reverential fear that ought to be had of the Deity, and make men preſumptuous and regardleſs of their lives; therefore we think fit here to ſuperadd alſo, that God is no ſoft nor fond and partial love, but that juſtice is an eſſential branch of this divine goodneſs; God being, as the writer *de Mundo* [1] well expreſſes it, νόμος ἰσοκλινὴς, *an impartial law*; and as *Plato* [2], μέτρον πάντων, *the meaſure of all things*. In imitation whereof, *Ariſtotle* concludes alſo, that a good man (in a lower and more imperfect ſenſe) is μέτρον too, *an impartial meaſure of things and actions*.

It is evident, that the Atheiſts themſelves, in thoſe former times of paganiſm, took it for granted, that goodneſs was an eſſential attribute of the Deity, whoſe exiſtence they oppoſed, (ſo that it was then generally acknowledged for ſuch, by the Pagan Theiſts) from thoſe argumentations of theirs before mentioned, the 12th and 13th, taken from the topick of evils, the pretended ill frame of things, and want of providence over human affairs. Which, if they were true, would not at all diſprove ſuch an arbitrary Deity (as is now fancied by ſome) made up of nothing but will and power, without any eſſential goodneſs and juſtice. But thoſe arguments of the Atheiſts are directly levelled againſt the Deity, according to the true notion or idea of it; and could they be made good, would do execution upon the ſame. For it cannot be denied, but that the natural conſequence of this doctrine, that there is a God eſſentially good, is this, that therefore the world is well made and governed. But we ſhall afterwards declare, that though there be evil in the parts of the world, yet there is none in the whole; and that moral evils are not imputable to the Deity.

And now we have propoſed the three principal attributes of the Deity. The firſt whereof is infinite goodneſs with fecundity; the ſecond infinite knowledge and wiſdom; and the laſt infinite active and perceptive power. From which divine attributes the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts ſeem to have framed their trinity of archical hypoſtaſes, ſuch as have the nature of principles in the univerſe, and which though they apprehended as ſeveral diſtinct ſubſtances, gradually ſubordinate to one another, yet they many times extend the τὸ Θεῖον ſo far, as to comprehend them all within it. Which Pythagorick trinity ſeems to be intimated by *Ariſtotle* in thoſe words, *De Cœl. l. 1. c. 1.* [P. 610. Tom. I. Oper.] καθάπερ γὰρ Φασι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρίσι διώρισται· *As the Pythagoreans alſo ſay, the univerſe, and all things, are determined and contained by three principles.* Of which Pythagorick trinity more afterwards. But now we may enlarge and fill up that compendious idea of God premiſed, of a being abſolutely perfect, by adding thereunto (to make it more particular)

[1] Cap. VI. p. 865. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtotelis. [2] De Legibus, Lib. IV. p. 601.

cular) *ſuch as infinitely good, wiſe, and powerful, neceſſarily exiſting, and not only the framer of the world, but alſo the cauſe of all things.* Which idea of the Deity is ſufficient, in order to our preſent undertaking.

Nevertheleſs, if we would not only attend to what is barely neceſſary for a dipute with Atheiſts, but alſo conſider the ſatisfaction of other free and devout minds, that are hearty and ſincere lovers of this moſt admirable and moſt glorious being, we might venture for their gratification, to propoſe yet a more full, free and copious deſcription of the Deity, after this manner. *God is a being abſolutely perfect, unmade or ſelf-originated, and neceſſarily exiſting; that hath an infinite fecundity in him, and virtually contains all things; as alſo an infinite benignity or overflowing love, uninvidiouſly diſplaying and communicating itſelf; together with an impartial rectitude, or nature of juſtice: who fully comprehends himſelf, and the extent of his own fecundity, and therefore all the poſſibilities of things, their ſeveral natures and reſpects, and the beſt frame or ſyſtem of the whole: who hath alſo infinite active and perceptive power: the fountain of all things, who made all that could be made, and was fit to be made, producing them according to his own nature (his eſſential goodneſs and wiſdom) and therefore according to the beſt pattern, and in the beſt manner poſſible, for the good of the whole; and reconciling all the variety and contrariety of things in the univerſe into one moſt admirable and lovely harmony. Laſtly, who contains and upholds all things, and governs them after the beſt manner alſo, and that without any force or violence, they being all naturally ſubject to his authority, and readily obeying his law.* And now we ſee, that God is ſuch a being, as that if he could be ſuppoſed not to be, there is nothing, whoſe exiſtence a good man could poſſibly more wiſh or deſire.

X. From the idea of God thus declared it evidently appears, that there can be but one ſuch being, and that Μόνωσις, *unity*, onelineſs or ſingularity is eſſential to it; foraſmuch as there cannot poſſibly be more than one ſupreme, more than one omnipotent or infinitely powerful being, and more than one cauſe of all things beſides itſelf. And however *Epicurus*, endeavouring to pervert and adulterate the notion of God, pretended to ſatisfy that natural prolepſis or anticipation in the minds of men, by a feigned and counterfeit aſſerting of a multiplicity of coordinate deities, independent upon one ſupreme, and ſuch as were alſo altogether unconcerned either in the frame or government of the world, yet himſelf notwithſtanding plainly took notice of this idea of God, which we have propoſed, including unity or onelineſs in it (he profeſſedly oppoſing the exiſtence of ſuch a Deity;) as may ſufficiently appear from that argumentation of his, in the words before cited.

Quis regere immenſi ſummam, quis habere profundi
Indu manu validas potis eſt moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter cœlos omnes convertere, & omnes
Ignibus ætheriis terras ſuffire feraces?
Omnibus inque locis eſſe omni tempore præſto?

Lib. 2. p. 198, Lamb.

Where he would conclude it to be a thing utterly impoſſible, for the Deity to animadvert, order and diſpoſe all things, and be preſent every where in all the diſtant places of the world at once; which could not be pretended of a multitude of coordinate gods, ſharing the government of the world amongſt them; and therefore it muſt needs be levelled againſt a divine monarchy, or one ſingle, ſolitary ſupreme Deity, ruling over all. As in like manner, when he purſues the ſame argument further in *Cicero*, to this purpoſe, that though ſuch a thing were ſuppoſed to be poſſible, yet it would be notwithſtanding abſolutely inconſiſtent with the happineſs of any being, he ſtill proceeds upon the ſame hypotheſis of one ſole and ſingle Deity:

De Nat. D. l. 1. [Cap. XX. p. 2909. Tom. IX. Oper.] *Sive ipſe mundus Deus eſt, quid poteſt eſſe minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermiſſo, verſari circum axem cæli admirabili celeritate? ſive in ipſo mundo Deus ineſt aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui curſus aſtrorum, mutationes temporum, hominum commoda vitâſque tueatur; næ ille eſt implicatus moleſtis negotiis & operoſis. Whether you will ſuppoſe the world itſelf to be a God, what can be more unquiet, than without intermiſſion perpetually to whirl round upon the axis of the heaven with ſuch admirable celerity? or whether you will imagine a God in the world diſtinct from it, who does govern and diſpoſe all things, keep up the courſes of the ſtars, the ſucceſſive changes of the ſeaſons, and orderly viciſſitudes of things, and contemplating lands and ſeas, conſerve the utilities and lives of men; certainly he muſt needs be involved in much ſolicitous trouble and employment.* For as *Epicurus* here ſpeaks ſingularly, ſo the trouble of this theocracy could not be thought ſo very great to a multitude of coordinate Deities, when parcelled out among them, but would rather ſeem to be but a ſportful and delightful divertiſement to each of them. Wherefore it is manifeſt, that ſuch an idea of God, as we have declared, including unity, onelineſs and ſingularity in it, is a thing, which the ancient Atheiſts, under the times of paganiſm, were not unacquainted with, but principally directed their force againſt. But this may ſeem to be anticipated in this place, becauſe it will fall in afterwards more opportunely to be diſcourſed of again.

XI. For this is that, which lies as the grand prejudice and objection againſt that idea of God, which we have propoſed, eſſentially including μόνωσιν, ſingularity or onelineſs in it, or the real exiſtence of ſuch a Deity, as is the ſole monarch of the univerſe; becauſe all the nations of the world heretofore (except a ſmall and inconſiderable handful of the Jews) together with their wiſeſt men, and greateſt philoſophers, were generally looked upon as polytheiſts, that is, ſuch as acknowledged and worſhipped a multiplicity of gods. Now one God, and many gods, being directly contradictious to one another, it is therefore concluded from hence, that this opinion of monarchy, or of one ſupreme God, the maker and governour of all, hath no foundation in nature, nor in the genuine idea's and prolepſes of men's minds, but is a mere artificial thing, owing its original wholly to private fancies and conceits, or to poſitive laws and inſtitutions, amongſt Jews, Chriſtians, and Mahometans.

For

For the aſſoiling of which difficulty (ſeeming ſo formidable at firſt ſight) it is neceſſary, that we ſhould make a diligent enquiry into the true and genuine ſenſe of this Pagan polytheiſm. For ſince it is impoſſible, that any man in his wits ſhould believe a multiplicity of gods, according to that idea of God before declared, that is, a multiplicity of ſupreme, omnipotent, or infinitely powerful beings; it is certain, that the Pagan polytheiſm, and multiplicity of gods, muſt be underſtood according to ſome other notion of the word gods, or ſome equivocation in the uſe of it. It hath been already obſerved, that there were ſometime amongſt the Pagans ſuch, who meaning nothing elſe by gods but underſtanding beings ſuperior to men, did ſuppoſe a multitude of ſuch Deities, which yet they conceived to be all (as well as men) native and mortal, generated ſucceſſively out of matter, and corrupted again into it, as *Democritus* his idols were. But theſe Theogoniſts, who thus generated all things whatſoever, and therefore the gods themſelves univerſally, out of night and chaos, the ocean or fluid matter, (notwithſtanding their uſing the name gods) are plainly condemned both by *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* for down-right Atheiſts, they making ſenſleſs matter the only ſelf-exiſtent thing, and the original of all things.

Wherefore there may be another notion of the word gods, as taken for underſtanding beings ſuperior to men, that are not only immortal, but alſo ſelf-exiſtent and unmade. And indeed the aſſertors of a multiplicity of ſuch gods as theſe, though they cannot be accounted Theiſts in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe (according to that idea of God before declared) yet they are not vulgarly reputed Atheiſts neither, but looked upon as a kind of middle thing betwixt both, and commonly called Polytheiſts. The reaſon whereof ſeems to be this, becauſe it is generally apprehended to be eſſential to atheiſm, to make ſenſleſs matter the ſole original of all things, and conſequently to ſuppoſe all conſcious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who on the contrary aſſert (not one but) many underſtanding beings unmade and ſelf-exiſtent, muſt needs be looked upon as thoſe, who of the two approach nearer to theiſm than to atheiſm, and ſo deſerve rather to be called Polytheiſts than Atheiſts.

And there is no queſtion to be made, but that the urgers of the forementioned objection againſt that idea of God, which includes onelineſs and ſingularity in it, from the Pagan polytheiſm, or multiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be underſtood of many unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities, independent upon one ſupreme, that are ſo many firſt principles in the univerſe, and partial cauſes of the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheiſts did univerſally acknowledge ſuch a multiplicity of unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, againſt the naturality of that idea of God

propoſed (eſſentially including ſingularity in it) might ſeem to have no ſmall force or validity in it.

XII. But firſt this opinion of many ſelf-exiſtent deities, independent upon one ſupreme, is both very irrational in itſelf, and alſo plainly repugnant to the phænomena. We ſay firſt, it is irrational in itſelf, becauſe ſelf-exiſtence and neceſſary exiſtence being eſſential to a perfect being, and to nothing elſe, it muſt needs be very irrational and abſurd to ſuppoſe a multitude of imperfect underſtanding beings ſelf-exiſtent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect underſtanding beings were imagined to exiſt of themſelves from eternity, there could not poſſibly be any reaſon given, why juſt ſo many of them ſhould exiſt, and neither more nor leſs, there being indeed no reaſon why any at all ſhould. But if it be ſuppoſed, that theſe many ſelf-exiſtent Deities happened only to exiſt thus from eternity, and their exiſtence notwithſtanding was not neceſſary, but contingent; the conſequence hereof will be, that they might as well happen again to ceaſe to be, and ſo could not be incorruptible. Again, if any one imperfect being whatſoever could exiſt of itſelf from eternity, then all might as well do ſo, not only matter, but alſo the ſouls of men, and other animals; and conſequently there could be no creation by any Deity, nor thoſe ſuppoſed deities therefore deſerve that name. Laſtly, we might alſo add, that there could not be a multitude of intellectual beings ſelf-exiſtent, becauſe it is a thing, which may be proved by reaſon, that all imperfect underſtanding beings or minds do partake of one perfect mind, and ſuppoſe alſo omnipotence or infinite power; were it not, that this is a conſideration too remote from vulgar apprehenſion, and therefore not ſo fit to be urged in this place.

Again, as this opinion of many ſelf-exiſtent deities is irrational in itſelf, ſo is it likewiſe plainly repugnant to the phænomena of the world. In which, as *Macrobius* writes [1], *omnia ſunt connexa, all things conſpire together into one harmony*, and are carried on peaceably and quietly, conſtantly and evenly, without any tumult or hurly-burly, confuſion or diſorder, or the leaſt appearance of ſchiſm and faction; which could not poſſibly be ſuppoſed, were the world made and governed by a rabble of ſelf-exiſtent Deities, coordinate, and independent upon one ſupreme. Wherefore this kind of polytheiſm was *obiter* thus confuted by *Origen*; πόσῳ οὖν βέλτιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων πειθόμενον τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἐυταξίαν τοῦ κόσμου σέβειν τὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος ἕνα, καὶ συμπνέοντος αὐτοῦ ὅλῳ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ δυναμένου ὑπὸ πολλῶν δημιουργῶν γεγονέναι, ὡς οὐδ' ὑπὸ πολλῶν ψυχῶν συνέχεσθαι ὅλον τὸν οὐρανὸν κινουμένων; *How much better is it, agreeably to what we ſee in the harmonious ſyſtem of the world, to worſhip one only maker of the world, which is one, and conſpiring throughout with its whole ſelf, and therefore could not be made by many artificers, as neither be contained by many ſouls, moving the whole heaven?* Now ſince this opinion is both irrational in itſelf, and repugnant to the phænomena, there is the leſs probability, that it ſhould have been received and entertained by all the more intelligent Pagans.

Contr. Celſ. l. 1. *p.* 18. [Edit. Cantabrig.]

[1] In Somn. Scip. Lib. I. Cap. XIV. p. 75.

XIII. Who,

XIII. Who, that they did not thus univerſally look upon all their gods as ſo many unmade ſelf-exiſtent beings, is unqueſtionably manifeſt from hence, becauſe ever ſince *Heſiod*'s and *Homer*'s time at leaſt, the Greekiſh Pagans generally acknowledged a theogonia, a generation, and temporary production of the gods; which yet is not to be underſtood univerſally neither, foraſmuch as he is no Theiſt, who does not acknowledge ſome ſelf-exiſtent Deity. Concerning this theogonia, *Herodotus* writeth after this manner: ὅθεν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν, εἴτε ἀεὶ ἦσαν πάντες, ὁκοῖοί τέ τινες τὰ εἴδεα, οὐκ ἠπίστατο μέχρι οὗ πρώην τε καὶ χθὲς, ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ καὶ Ὅμηρον ἡλικίην τετρακοσίοισι ἔτεσι δοκέω μευ πρεσβυτέρους γενέσθαι, καὶ οὐ πλέοσι. οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶ οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίαν Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες. *Euter. p.* 53. [Lib. II. Cap. LIII. p. 109. Edit. Gronov.] *Whence every one of the gods was generated, or whether they all of them ever were, and what are their forms, is a thing, that was not known till very lately; for* Heſiod *and* Homer *were (as I ſuppoſe) not above four hundred years my ſeniors. And theſe were they, who introduced the theogonia among the Greeks, and gave the gods their ſeveral names:* that is, ſettled the Pagan theology. Now, if before *Heſiod*'s and *Homer*'s time, it were a thing not known or determined amongſt the Greeks, whether their gods were generated, or all of them exiſted from eternity; then it was not univerſally concluded by them, that they were all unmade and ſelf-exiſtent. And though perhaps ſome might in thoſe ancient times believe one way, and ſome another, concerning the generation and eternity of their gods; yet it does not follow, that they, who thought them to be all eternal, muſt therefore needs ſuppoſe them to be alſo unmade or ſelf-exiſtent. For *Ariſtotle*, who aſſerted the eternity of the world, and conquently alſo of thoſe gods of his, the heavenly bodies, did not, for all that, ſuppoſe them to be ſelf-exiſtent or firſt principles, but all to depend upon one principle or original Deity. And indeed the true meaning of that queſtion in *Herodotus*, whether the gods were generated or exiſted all of them from eternity, is (as we ſuppoſe) really no other than that of *Plato*'s, εἰ γέγονεν ὁ κόσμος ἢ ἀγενής ἐστι· *Whether the world were made or unmade?* and whether it had a temporary beginning, or exiſted ſuch as it is from eternity; which will be more fully declared afterwards. But ever ſince *Heſiod*'s and *Homer*'s time, that the theogonia or generation of the gods was ſettled, and generally believed amongſt the Greeks, it is certain, that they could not poſſibly think all their gods eternal, and therefore much leſs unmade and ſelf-exiſtent.

But though we have thus clearly proved, that all the Pagan gods were not univerſally accounted by them ſo many unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deities, they acknowledging a theogonia, or a generation of gods; yet it may be ſuſpected notwithſtanding, that they might ſuppoſe a multitude of them alſo (and not only one) to have been unmade from eternity and ſelf-exiſtent. Wherefore we add, in the next place, that no ſuch thing does at all appear neither, as that the Pagans or any others did ever publickly or profeſſedly aſſert a multitude of unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities. For firſt, it is plain concerning the Heſiodian gods, which were all the gods of the Greekiſh Pagans, that

either there was but one of them only ſelf-exiſtent, or elſe none at all. Becauſe *Heſiod*'s gods were either all of them derived from chaos (or the floating water) love itſelf being generated likewiſe out of it (according to that Ariſtophanick tradition before mentioned;) or elſe love was ſuppoſed to be a diſtinct principle from chaos, namely the active principle of the univerſe, from whence, together with chaos, all the theogonia and coſmogonia was derived. Now if the former of theſe were true, that *Heſiod* ſuppoſed all his gods univerſally to have been generated and ſprung originally from chaos, or the ocean; then it is plain, that notwithſtanding all that rabble of gods muſtered up by him, he could be no other than one of thoſe atheiſtick Theogoniſts before mentioned, and really acknowledged no God at all, according to the true idea of him; he being not a Theiſt, who admits of no ſelf-exiſtent Deity. But if the latter be true, that *Heſiod* ſuppoſed love to be a principle diſtinct from chaos, namely the active principle of the univerſe, and derived all his other gods from thence, he was then a right paganick Theiſt, ſuch as acknowledged indeed many gods, but only one of them unmade and ſelf-exiſtent, all the reſt being generated or created by that one.
P. 116, 112. Indeed it appears from thoſe paſſages of *Ariſtotle* before cited by us, that that philoſopher had been ſometimes divided in his judgment concerning *Heſiod*, where he ſhould rank him, whether among the Atheiſts, or the Theiſts. For in his book *de Cœlo* he ranks him amongſt thoſe, who made all things to be generated and corrupted, beſides the bare ſubſtance of the matter, that is, amongſt the abſolute Atheiſts, and looked upon him as a ringleader of them; but in his Metaphyſicks, upon further thoughts, ſuſpects, that many of thoſe, who made love the chiefeſt of the gods, were Theiſts, they ſuppoſing it to be a firſt principle in the univerſe, or the active cauſe of things, and that not only *Parmenides*, but alſo *Heſiod* was ſuch. Which latter opinion of his is by far the more probable, and therefore embraced by *Plutarch*[1], who ſomewhere determines *Heſiod* to have aſſerted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον, or unmade Deity; as alſo by the ancient ſcholiaſt upon him, writing thus, that *Heſiod*'s love was ὁ οὐράνιος ἔρως, ὃς καὶ Θεός· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ Ἀφροδίτης νεώτερός ἐστιν· *The heavenly love, which is alſo God, that other love, that was born of* Venus, *being junior.* But *Joannes Diaconus*; ἔρωτα δὲ ἐνταῦθα νοητέον, οὐ τὸν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης παῖδα, πῶς γὰρ τῆς μήτρὸς μήπω γεγονύιας ὅτ' παράγεται; ἀλλ' ἄλλον τινα πρεσβυγενῆ ἔρωτα. οἶμαι δὲ τὴν ἐκαλέσ παρμένην φυσικῶς κινητικὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστων ὄντων. *By love here* (ſaith he) *we muſt not underſtand* Venus *her ſon, whoſe mother was as yet unborn, but another more ancient love, which I take to be the active cauſe or principle of motion, naturally inſerted into things.* Where though he do not ſeem to ſuppoſe this love to be God himſelf, yet he conceives it to be an active principle in the univerſe derived from God, and not from matter. But this opinion will be further confirmed afterward.

The next conſiderable appearance of a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent deities ſeems to be in the Valentinian thirty gods and æons, which have been taken by ſome for ſuch; but it is certain, that theſe were all of them, ſave one, generated

[1] De Placitis Philoſophor. Lib. I. Cap. VI. p. 880.

nerated; they being derived by that fantaſtick deviſer of them from one ſelf-originated deity, called *Bythus*. For thus *Epiphanius* informs us, τριάκοντα γὰρ καὶ οὗτος θεοὺς καὶ Αἰῶνας καὶ Οὐρανοὺς βούλεται παρεισάγειν, ὧν ὁ πρῶτός ἐστι Βυθός. *This* (Valentinus) *would alſo introduce thirty gods and æons, and heavens, the firſt of which is* Bythus; he meaning thereby an unfathomable depth and profundity; and therefore this *Bythus* was alſo called by him ὁ ἀνοήτω καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος πατὴρ, *the higheſt and ineffable Father.* *Hær.* 31. [Cap. II. p. 164. Tom. I. Oper.]

We do indeed acknowledge, that there have been ſome, who have really aſſerted a duplicity of gods, in the ſenſe declared, that is of animaliſh or perceptive beings ſelf-exiſtent; one as the principle of good, and the other of evil. And this ditheiſm of theirs ſeems to be the neareſt approach, that was ever really made to polytheiſm; unleſs we ſhould here give heed to *Plutarch*[1], who ſeems to make the ancient *Perſians*, beſides their two gods, the good and the evil, or *Oromaſdes* and *Arimanius*, to have aſſerted alſo a third middle deity, called by them *Mithras*; or to ſome eccleſiaſtick writers, who impute a trinity of gods to *Marcion*[2]; (though *Tertullian*[3] be yet more liberal, and encreaſe the number to an ennead.) For thoſe, that were commonly called Tritheiſts, being but miſtaken Chriſtians and Trinitarians, fall not under this conſideration. Now, as for that foremention-ed ditheiſm, or opinion of two gods, a good and an evil one, it is evident, that its original ſprung from nothing elſe, but firſt a firm perſuaſion of the eſſential goodneſs of the Deity, together with a conceit, that the evil that is in the world, was altogether inconſiſtent and unreconcilable with the ſame; and that therefore for the ſolving of this phænomenon, it was abſolutely neceſſary to ſuppoſe another animaliſh principle ſelf-exiſtent, or an evil god. Wherefore as theſe Ditheiſts, as to all that which is good in the world, held a monarchy, or one ſole principle and original; ſo it is plain, that had it not been for this buſineſs of evil (which they conceived could not be ſolved any other way) they would never have aſſerted any more principles or gods than one.

The chiefeſt and moſt eminent aſſertors of which ditheiſtick doctrine of two ſelf-exiſtent animaliſh principles in the univerſe, a good God and an evil dæmon, were the Marcionites and the Manicheans; both of which, though they made ſome ſlight pretences to Chriſtianity, yet were not by Chriſtians owned for ſuch. But it is certain, that beſides theſe, and before them too, ſome of the profeſſed Pagans alſo entertained the ſame opinion, that famous moraliſt *Plutarchus Chæronenſis* being an undoubted patron of it; which in his book *de Iſide & Oſiride* he repreſents, with ſome little difference, after this manner; μεμιγμένη γὰρ ἡ τῇδε τῇ κόσμου γένεζις καὶ σύσταζις ἐξ ἐναντίων, ἃ μὲν ἰσοδυνάμων δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστὶν ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντὸς, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα δυσμαχοῦσαν. *The generation and conſtitution of this world is mixt of contrary powers or principles* (*the one good, the other evil*) P. 371. *Par.*

[1] De Iſide & Oſiride, Tom. II. p. 369.

[2] Vide Euſeb. Hiſt. Eccleſ. Lib. V. Cap. XIII. p. 177. & auctores illos, quos Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius laudat ad Conſtit. Apoſt. p. 339. Tom. I. Patrum Apoſtol.

[3] Libro I. adverſus Marcionem, Cap. XVI. p. 237, 238.

evil) yet ſo as that they are not both of equal force, but the better of them more prevalent: notwithſtanding which, it is alſo abſolutely impoſſible for the worſer power or principle to be ever utterly deſtroyed, much of it being always intermingled in the ſoul, and much in the body of the univerſe, there perpetually tugging againſt the better principle.

Indeed learned men of later times have, for the moſt part, look'd upon *Plutarch* here, but either as a bare relater of the opinion of other philoſophers, or elſe as a follower only, and not a leader in it. Notwithſtanding which, it is evident, that *Plutarch* was himſelf heartily engaged in this opinion, he diſcovering no ſmall fondneſs for it, in ſundry of his other writings: as for example in his Platonick queſtions, where he thus declares himſelf concerning it, ἢ τὸ πολλάκις ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄνους ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον σῶμα, συνυπῆρχον ἀλλήλοις ἀεὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν γένεζιν ἔχειν οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν· *or elſe that which is often affirmed by us is true, that a mad irrational ſoul, and an unformed diſorderly body, did co-exiſt with one another from eternity, neither of them having any generation or beginning.* And in his *Timæan Pſychogonia* he does at large induſtriouſly maintain the ſame, there and elſewhere[1] endeavouring to eſtabliſh this doctrine, as much as poſſibly he could, upon rational foundations. As firſt, that nothing can be made or produced without a cauſe; and therefore there muſt of neceſſity be ſome cauſe of evil alſo, and that a poſitive one too; he repreſenting the opinion of thoſe as very ridiculous, who would make the nature of evil to be but ἐπεισόδιον, an *accidental appendix* to the world, and all that evil, which is in it, to have come in only by the by, and by conſequence, without any poſitive cauſe. Secondly, that God being eſſentially good could not poſſibly be the cauſe of evil, where he highly applauds *Plato* for removing God to the greateſt diſtance imaginable from being the cauſe of evil. Thirdly, that as God could not, ſo neither could ὕλη ἄποιος, *matter in itſelf devoid of all form* and quality, be the cauſe of evil, noting this to have been the ſubterfuge of the Stoicks. Upon which account he often condemns them, but uncertainly, ſometimes as ſuch, who aſſigned no cauſe at all of evils, and ſometimes again as thoſe, who made God the cauſe of them. For in his *Pſychogonia*[2] he concludes, that unleſs we acknowledge a ſubſtantial evil principle, αἱ Στοικαὶ καταλαμβάνεζιν ἡμᾶς ἀπορίαι, τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀναιτίας καὶ ἀγεννήτως ἐπεισάγουζες, ἐπεὶ τῶνδε ὄντων ἤτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἤτε τὸ ἄποιον, εἰκός ἐστιν οὐσίαν κακοῦ καὶ γένεζιν παραχεῖν· *The Stoical difficulties will of neceſſity overtake and involve us, who introduce evil into the world from nothing, or without a cauſe, ſince neither that which is eſſentially good (as God) nor yet that which is devoid of all quality (as matter) could poſſibly give being or generation to it.* But in his book againſt the Stoicks[3], he accuſes them as thoſe, who made God, eſſentially good, the cauſe of evil. Αὐτοὶ τὴν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄνλα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦζι, ἀ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ αὐτῆς παρέχηκεν, ἄποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς, ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιοῦντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχηκεν· ὥστε ἀναίκιον τὸ κακὸν, εἰ μὲν δι' οὐδὲν, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γέγονος ὑπάρχειν· *Themſelves make God being good the principle and cauſe of evil, ſince*

P. 1003. *Par.* [Tom. II. Oper.]

1 Libro de Iſide & Oſiride, p. 369. & Pſychogon. p. 1014, 1015. Tom. II. Oper.

2 P. 1015. Tom. II. Oper.

3 P. 1076. Tom. II. Oper.

ſince matter which is devoid of quality, and receives all its differences from the active principle that moves and forms it, could not poſſibly be the cauſe thereof. Wherefore evil muſt of neceſſity either come from nothing, or elſe it muſt come from the active and moving principle, which is God. Now from all theſe premiſes joined together *Plutarch* concludes, that the phænomenon of evil could no otherwiſe poſſibly be ſolved, than by ſuppoſing a ſubſtantial principle for it, and a certain irrational and maleficent ſoul or dæmon, unmade, and co-exiſting with God and matter from eternity, to have been the cauſe thereof. And accordingly he reſolves, that as whatſoever is good in the ſoul and body of the univerſe, and likewiſe in the ſouls of men and dæmons, is to be aſcribed to God as its only original; ſo whatſoever is evil, irregular and diſorderly in them, ought to be imputed to this other ſubſtantial principle, a ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακοποιὸς, *an irrational and maleficent ſoul or dæmon*, which inſinuating itſelf every where throughout the world, is all along intermingled with the better principle[1]: καὶ μὴ πᾶν εἶναι ἔργον τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν, *So that neither the ſoul of the univerſe, nor that of men and dæmons, was wholly the workmanſhip of God, but the lower, brutiſh and diſorderly part of them the effect of the evil principle.*

But beſides all this, it is evident, that *Plutarch* was alſo ſtrongly poſſeſſed with a conceit, that nothing ſubſtantial could be created (no not by divine power) out of nothing pre-exiſting; and therefore that all the ſubſtance of whatſoever is in the world did exiſt from eternity unmade: ſo that God was only the orderer or the methodizer and harmonizer thereof. Wherefore as he concluded, that the corporeal world was not created by God out of nothing, as to the ſubſtance of it, but only the pre-exiſting matter, which before moved diſorderly, was brought into this regular order and harmony by him; in like manner he reſolved, that the ſoul of the world (for ſuch a thing is always ſuppoſed by him) was not made by God out of nothing neither, nor out of any thing inanimate and ſoul-leſs pre-exiſting, but out of a pre-exiſting diſorderly ſoul was brought into an orderly and regular frame; ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, ἀκοσμία δὲ οὐκ ἀσώματον οὐδὲ ἀκίνητον, οὐδὲ ἄψυχον, ἀλλὰ ἄμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικὸν, ἔμπλημκτον δὲ καὶ ἄλογον τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δὲ ἦν ἀνάρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐχούσης λόγον· ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς οὔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, οὔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἁρμόνικον ἄνδρα, &c. *There was unformed matter before this orderly world was made, which matter was not incorporeal, nor unmoved or inanimate, but body diſcompoſed and acted by a furious and irrational mover, the deformity whereof was the diſharmony of a ſoul in it, devoid of reaſon. For God neither made body out of that which was no-body, nor ſoul out of no-ſoul. But as the muſician, who neither makes voice nor motion, does by ordering of them, notwithſtanding, produce harmony; ſo God, though he neither made the tangible and reſiſting ſubſtance of body, nor the phantaſtick and ſelf-moving power of ſoul, yet taking both thoſe principles pre-exiſting (the one of which was dark and obſcure, the other turbulent and irrational) and orderly diſpoſing and harmonizing of them, he did by that means produce this moſt beautiful and perfect animal of the world.* And further to the ſame purpoſe; οὐχὶ σώματος ἁπλῶς, οὐδὲ ὕλης καὶ ὕλης, ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας περὶ *De Pſyche.* p. 1014. *Par.*

[1] Plutarch. de Animæ Procreat. ex Timæo, p. 1027.

περὶ σῶμα καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὁμοιότητα, ἣν ὁ θεὸς παλαὶ καὶ δημιουργός· ταῦτα δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡς τὴν μὲν οὔτε ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γενομένην οὔτε κόσμα ψυχὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλά τινα φανταστικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς, ἀλόγου δὲ καὶ ἀτάκτου φορᾶς καὶ ὁρμῆς δύναμιν αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀεικίνητον· τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς διαρμοσάμενος, προσήκουσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ λόγοις, ἐκάλεσεν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ κόσμου γεγονότος γενητὴν οὖσαν. *God was not the cauſe or maker of body ſimply, that is, neither of bulk nor matter, but only of that ſymmetry and pulchritude which is in body, and that likeneſs which it hath to himſelf: which ſame ought to be concluded alſo concerning the ſoul of the world, that the ſubſtance of it was not made by God neither; nor yet that it was always the ſoul of this world, but at firſt a certain ſelf-moving ſubſtance, endowed with a phantaſtick power, irrational and diſorderly, exiſting ſuch of itſelf from eternity, which God by harmonizing, and introducing into it fitting numbers and proportions, made to be the ſoul and prince of this generated world.* According to which doctrine of *Plutarch*'s, in the ſuppoſed ſoul of the world, though it had a temporary beginning, yet was it never created out of nothing, but only that, which pre-exiſted diſorderly, being acted by the Deity, was brought into a regular frame. And therefore he concludes, ἡ ψυχὴ νῷ μεταλαβοῦσα καὶ λογισμῷ καὶ ἁρμονίας, οὐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος, οὐδ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν· *Soul partaking of mind, reaſon and harmony, is not only the work of God, but alſo a part of him; nor is it a thing ſo much made by him, as from him, and exiſting out of him.* And the ſame muſt he likewiſe affirm concerning all other ſouls, as thoſe of men and dæmons, that they are either all of them the ſubſtance of God himſelf, together with that of the evil dæmon; or elſe certain delibations from both, (if any one could underſtand it) blended and confounded together; he not allowing any new ſubſtance at all to be created by God out of nothing pre-exiſtent. It was obſerved in the beginning of this chapter, that *Plutarch* was an aſſertor of two αὐθυπόστατα or ſelf-exiſtent principles in the univerſe, God and matter; but now we underſtand, that he was an earneſt propugnor of another third principle (as himſelf calls it) beſides them both, *viz.* a ψυχὴ ἄνους καὶ κακοποιὸς, *a mad, irrational and maleficent ſoul or dæmon:* ſo that *Plutarch* was both a Triarchiſt and a Ditheiſt, an aſſertor of three principles, but of two gods; according to that forementioned notion of a God, as it is taken for an animaliſh or perceptive being ſelf-exiſtent.

We are not ignorant, that *Plutarch* endeavours with all his might to perſuade this to have been the conſtant belief of all the pagan nations, and of all the wiſeſt men and philoſophers that ever were amongſt them. *For this* (ſaith he, in his book *de Iſide & Oſiride*[1]) *is a moſt ancient opinion, that hath been delivered down from theologers and law-makers, all along to poets and philoſophers; and though the firſt author thereof be unknown, yet hath it been ſo firmly believed every where, that the footſteps of it have been imprinted upon the ſacrifices and myſteries or religious rites, both of Barbarians and Greeks; namely, that the world is neither wholly ungoverned by any mind or reaſon, as if all things floated in the ſtreams of chance and fortune, nor yet that there is any one principle ſteering and guiding all, without reſiſtance or control:*

[1] Tom. II. Oper. p. 369.

control; becauſe there is a confuſed mixture of good and evil in every thing, and nothing is produced by nature ſincere. Wherefore it is not one only diſpenſer of things, who as it were out of ſeveral veſſels diſtributeth thoſe ſeveral liquors of good and evil, mingling them together, and daſhing them as he pleaſeth; but there are two diſtinct and contrary powers or principles in the world, one of them always leading as it were to the right hand, but the other tugging a contrary way. Inſomuch that our whole life, and the whole world is a certain mixture and confuſion of theſe two: at leaſt this terreſtrial world below the moon is ſuch, all being every where full of irregularity and diſorder. For if nothing can be made without a cauſe, and that which is good cannot be the cauſe of evil, there muſt needs be a diſtinct principle in nature, for the production of evil as well as good. And this hath been the opinion of the moſt and wiſeſt men, ſome of them affirming θεοὺς εἶναι δυό καθάπερ ἀντιτέχνους, *that there are two gods as it were of contrary crafts and trades, one whereof is the maker of all good, and the other of all evil; but others calling the good principle only a God, and the evil principle a dæmon, as* Zoroaſter *the magician.* Beſides which *Zoroaſter* and the Perſian *Magi*, *Plutarch* pretends, that the footſteps of this opinion were to be found alſo in the aſtrology of the Chaldeans, and in the myſteries and religious rites, not only of the Egyptians, but alſo of the Grecians themſelves; and laſtly, he particularly imputes the ſame to all the moſt famous of the Greek philoſophers, as *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, *Heraclitus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*; though his chiefeſt endeavour of all be to prove, that *Plato* was an undoubted champion for it: Ἀλλὰ ταυτὸ Πλάτων οὐκ ἔπαθε τοῖς ὕστερον, οὐδὲ παριδὼν, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι, τὴν μεταξὺ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τρίτην ἀρχὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ὑπόμεινε τῶν λόγων τὸν ἀτοπώτατον, ἐπεισόδιον οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ποιοῦντα τῶν κακῶν φύσιν ἀπ' αὐτομάτου κατὰ σομβεβηκός. Ἐπικούρῳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀκαρὲς ἐγκλίναι τὴν ἄτομον συγχωροῦσιν, ὡς ἀναίτιον ἐπεισάγοντι κίνησιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, αὐτοὶ δὲ κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην, ἑτέρας τε περὶ σῶμα μυρίας ἀτοπίας καὶ δυσχερείας, αἰτίαν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς οὐκ ἐχούσας, κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν· ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐχ' οὕτως· ἀλλὰ τὴν ὕλην διαφορᾶς ἁπάσης ἀπαλλάττων, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν ἀπωτάτω τιθέμενος. *But* Plato *was not guilty of that miſcarriage of later philoſophers, in overlooking the third power, which is between the matter and God, and thereby falling into the groſſeſt of all abſurdities, that the nature of evils was but an accidental appendix to the world, and came into it merely by chance, no body knows how. So that thoſe very philoſophers, who will by no means allow to* Epicurus *the ſmalleſt declenſion of his atoms from the perpendicular, alledging, that this would be to introduce a motion without a cauſe, and to bring ſomething out of nothing, themſelves do, notwithſtanding, ſuppoſe all that vice and miſery, which is in the world, beſides innumerable other abſurdities and inconveniences about body, to have come into it, merely by accidental conſequence, and without having any cauſe in the firſt principles. But* Plato *did not ſo, but diveſting matter of all qualities and differences, by means whereof, it could not poſſibly be made the cauſe of evils, and then placing God at the greateſt diſtance from being the cauſe thereof, he conſequently reſolved it into a third unmade principle between God and the matter, an irrational ſoul or dæmon, moving the matter diſorderly.*

De Pſychog. p. 1015. Pa.

Now becauſe *Plutarch*'s authority paſſeth ſo uncontrolled, and his teſtimony in this particular ſeems to be of late generally received as an oracle, and conſequently the thing taken for an unqueſtionable truth, that the ditheiſtick doctrine of a good and evil principle was the catholick or univerſal doctrine of the Pagan Theiſts, and particularly that *Plato*, above all the reſt, was a profeſſed champion for the ſame; we ſhall therefore make bold to examine *Plutarch*'s grounds for this ſo confident aſſertion of his; and principally concerning *Plato*. And his grounds for imputing this opinion to *Plato* are only theſe three, which follow. Firſt, becauſe that philoſopher in his *Politicus*[1] ſpeaks of a neceſſary and innate appetite, that may ſometimes turn the heavens a contrary way, and by that means cauſe diſorder and confuſion: ſecondly, becauſe in his tenth *de Legibus* he ſpeaks of two kinds of ſouls, whereof one is beneficent, but the other contrary: and laſtly, becauſe in his *Timæus* he ſuppoſeth the matter to have been moved diſorderly before the world was made, which implies, that there was a diſorderly and irrational ſoul conſiſting with it as the mover of it, matter being unable to move itſelf. But as to the firſt of theſe allegations out of *Plato*'s *Politicus*, we ſhall only obſerve, that that philoſopher, as if it had been purpoſely to prevent ſuch an interpretation of his meaning there as this of *Plutarch*'s, inſerts theſe very words[2]; μήτ' αὖ δυό τινε θεώ, Φρονοῦντε ἐναντίοις ἐναντία στρέφειν αὐτόν. *Neither muſt any ſuch thing be ſuppoſed, as if there were two gods, contrarily minded to one another, turning the heavens ſometimes one way, and ſometimes another.* Which plain declaration of *Plato*'s ſenſe, being directly contrary to *Plutarch*'s interpretation, and this ditheiſtick opinion, might ſerve alſo for a ſufficient confutation of his ſecond ground from the tenth *de Legibus*[3], as if *Plato* had there affirmed, that there were two ſouls moving the heavens, the one beneficent, but the other contrary; becauſe this would be all one as to aſſert two gods, contrarily minded to one another. Notwithſtanding which, for a fuller anſwer thereunto, we ſhall further add, that this philoſopher did there, firſt, only diſtribute ſouls in general into good and evil, thoſe moral differences properly belonging to that rank of beings, called by him ſouls, and firſt emerging in them, according to this premiſed doctrine, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων· *Soul is the cauſe of good and evil, honeſt and diſhoneſt, juſt and unjuſt.* But then afterwards, making enquiry concerning the ſoul of the world or heaven, what kind of ſoul that was, he poſitively concludes, that it was no other than a ſoul endued with all virtue. ΑΘ. ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μέν ἐστιν ἡ περιάγουσα ἡμῖν πάντα, τὴν δὲ οὐρανοῦ περιφορὰν ἐξ ἀνάγκης περιάγειν φατέον, ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ κοσμοῦσαν, ἤτοι τὴν ἀρίστην ψυχὴν ἤτοι τὴν ἐναντίαν. Κλ. Ω ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά. Ath. Hoſp. *Since it is ſoul that moves all things, we muſt of neceſſity affirm, that the heaven or world is moved by ſome ſoul or other, adorning and diſpoſing of it, whether it be the beſt ſoul, or the contrary.* Clin. O Hoſpes, *it is certainly not holy nor pious to conclude otherwiſe, than that a ſoul endued with all virtue, one or more,*

P. 898. *Steph.*

[1] P. 176. Oper. [2] Ibid. p. 175. [3] P. 669. Oper.

more, moves the world. And as for the laſt thing urged by *Plutarch*, that before the world was made, the matter is ſaid by *Plato*[1] to have been moved diſorderly, we conceive, that that philoſopher did therein only adhere to that vulgarly received tradition, which was originally Moſaical, that the firſt beginning of the Coſmopœia was from a chaos, or matter confuſedly moved, afterward brought into order. And now we think it plainly appears, that there is no ſtrength at all in any of *Plutarch*'s forementioned allegations, nor any ſuch monſter to be found any where in *Plato*, as this ſubſtantial evil principle or god, a wicked ſoul or dæmon, unmade and ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, oppoſite and inimicous to the good God, ſharing the empire and dominion of the world with him. Which opinion is really nothing elſe but the deifying of the devil, or prince of evil ſpirits, making him a corrival with God, and entitling him to a right of receiving divine honour and worſhip.

And it is obſervable, that *Plutarch* himſelf confeſſeth this interpretation, which he makes of *Plato*, to be new and paradoxical, or an invention of his own, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ὑπεναντίου δόξαι δέομενον παραμυθίας, *ſuch as becauſe it was contrary to the generally received opinion of Platoniſts, himſelf thought to ſtand in need of ſome apology and defence.* To which purpoſe therefore he adds again, πρῶτον οὖν ἣν ἔχω περὶ τούτων διάνοιαν, ἐκθήσομαι πιστεύοντος τῷ εἰκότι, καὶ παραμυθουμένου, ὡς ἔνεστι, τὸ ἀληθὲς τοῦ λόγου, καὶ παράδοξον· *I will* (ſaith he) *declare mine own opinion firſt concerning theſe things, confirming it with probabilities, and, as much as poſſibly I can, aiding and aſſiſting the truth and paradoxicalneſs thereof.* Moreover, *Proclus* upon the *Timæus* takes notice of no other philoſophers, that ever imputed this doctrine to *Plato*, or indeed maintained any ſuch opinion of two ſubſtantial principles of good and evil, but only *Platarch* and *Atticus*; (though I confeſs *Chalcidius* cites *Numenius* alſo to the ſame purpoſe.) *Proclus* his words are theſe: οἱ μὲν περὶ Πλούταρχον τὸν Χερωνέα καὶ Ἀττικὸν προεῖναι φασὶ τὴν ἀκόσμητον ὕλην πρὸ τῆς γενέσεως, προεῖναι δὲ καὶ τὴν κακεργάτιν ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦτο κινοῦσαν, πόθεν γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἦν, ἢ ἀπὸ ψυχῆς; εἰ δὲ ἄτακτος ἡ κίνησις, ἀπὸ ἀτάκτου ψυχῆς. Plutarchus Cheronenſis *and* Atticus *maintain, that before the generation and formation of the world, there was unformed and diſorderly matter exiſting* (from eternity) *together with a maleficent ſoul: for whence, ſay they, could that motion of the matter, in* Plato's Timæus, *proceed but from a ſoul? and if it were a diſorderly motion, it muſt then needs come from a diſorderly ſoul.* And as *Proclus* tells us, that this opinion of theirs had been before confuted by *Porphyrius* and *Jamblichus*, as that which was both irrational and impious, ſo doth he there likewiſe himſelf briefly refel it in theſe two propoſitions; firſt, that πᾶσα ψυχὴ γέννημά ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, *every ſoul is the off-ſpring of God*, and there can be no ſoul, nor any thing elſe, beſides God ſelf-exiſting; and ſecondly, τὸ κακὸν διαιώνιον ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἄτοπον, οὐ γὰρ ὁμότιμον τῷ θείῳ τὸ ἄθεον, οὔτε ἐπίσης ἀγέννητον, οὔτε ὅλως ἀνιδιήγημένον· *It is abſurd to make evil alike eternal with good, for that which is godleſs cannot be of like honour with God, and equally unmade, nor indeed can there be any thing at all poſitively oppoſite to God.*

[1] In Timæo Cap. XIV. p. 527.

Psychog. p. 1012.

P. 1014.

P. 116.

But becauſe it may probably be here demanded, what account it was then poſſible for *Plato* to give of the original of evils, ſo as not to impute them to God himſelf, if he neither derived them from ὕλη ἄποιος, *unqualified matter*, (which *Plutarch* has plainly proved to be abſurd) nor yet from a ψυχὴ ἄλογος, *an irrational and maleficent ſoul of the world or dæmon*, ſelf-exiſtent from eternity; we ſhall therefore hereunto briefly reply, that though that philoſopher derived not the original of evils from unqualified matter, nor from a wicked ſoul, or dæmon unmade, yet did he not therefore impute them to God neither, but, as it ſeemeth, to the neceſſity of imperfect beings. For as *Timæus Locrus* had before *Plato* determined, that the world was made by God and neceſſity, ſo does *Plato* himſelf accordingly declare in his *Timæus* [1], ὅτι μεμιγμένη τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως, νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἄρχοντος· *That the generation of this world is mixt, and made up of a certain compoſition of mind and neceſſity both together, yet ſo as that mind doth alſo* (in ſome ſenſe) *rule over neceſſity.* Wherefore though, according to *Plato*, God be properly and directly the cauſe of nothing elſe but good, yet the neceſſity of theſe lower imperfect things does unavoidably give being and birth to evils. For firſt, as to moral evils, (which are the chiefeſt) there is a neceſſity, that there ſhould be higher and lower inclinations in all rational beings vitally united to bodies, and that as autexouſious or free-willed, they ſhould have a power of determining themſelves more or leſs either way; as there is alſo a neceſſity, that the ſame liberty of will, (eſſential to rational creatures) which makes them capable of praiſe and reward, ſhould likewiſe put them in a poſſibility of deſerving blame and puniſhment. Again, as to the evils of pain and inconvenience; there ſeems to be a neceſſity, that imperfect terreſtrial animals, which are capable of the ſenſe of pleaſure, ſhould in contrary circumſtances (which will alſo ſometimes happen, by reaſon of the inconſiſtency and incompoſſibility of things) be obnoxious to diſpleaſure and pain. And laſtly, for the evils of corruptions and diſſolutions; there is a plain neceſſity, that if there be natural generations in the world, there ſhould be alſo corruptions; according to that of *Lucretius* [2] before cited,

Quando alid ex alio reficit natura, nec ullam
Rem gigni patitur, niſi morte adjutam alienâ.

To all which may be added, according to the opinion of many, that there is a kind of neceſſity of ſome evils in the world for a condiment (as it were) to give a reliſh and haut-gouſt to good; ſince the nature of impefect animals is ſuch, that they are apt to have but a dull and ſluggiſh ſenſe, a flat and inſipid taſte of good, unleſs it be quickened and ſtimulated, heightned and invigorated, by being compared with the contrary evil. As alſo, that there ſeems to be a neceſſary uſe in the world of the κακὰ ἀκούσια, thoſe involuntary evils of pain and ſuffering, both for the exerciſe of virtue, and the quickning and exciting the activity of the world

[1] P. 533. Oper. [2] Lib. I. verſ. 264.

world, as alſo for the repreſſing, chaſtiſing and puniſhing of thoſe κακὰ ἑκάσια, thoſe *voluntary evils of vice and action.* Upon which ſeveral accounts, probably, *Plato* concluded, that evils could not be utterly deſtroyed, at leaſt in this lower world, which, according to him, is the region of lapſed ſouls: ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατὸν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, (ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη) οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τήνδε θνητὴν φύζιν, καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· διὸ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε, φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα· φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. *But it is neither poſſible* (O Theodorus) *that evils ſhould be quite deſtroyed (for there muſt be ſomething always contrary to good) nor yet that they ſhould be ſeated amongſt the gods, but they will of neceſſity infeſt this lower mortal region and nature. Wherefore we ought to endeavour to flee from hence with all poſſible ſpeed; and our flight from hence is this, to aſſimilate ourſelves to God as much as may be; which aſſimilation to God conſiſteth in being juſt and holy with wiſdom.* Thus, according to the ſenſe of *Plato*, though God be the original of all things, yet he is not to be accounted properly the cauſe of evils, at leaſt moral ones (they being only defects) but they are to be imputed to the neceſſity of imperfect beings, which is that ἀνάγκη πολλὰ τῷ θεῷ δυσμαχοῦσα καὶ ἀφηνιάζουσα, *that neceſſity, which doth often reſiſt God, and as it were ſhake off his bridle.* Rational creatures being, by means thereof, in a capability of acting contrary to God's will and law, as well as their own true nature and good; and other things hindred of that perfection, which the divine goodneſs would elſe have imparted to them. Notwithſtanding which, mind, that is, God, is ſaid alſo by *Plato* to rule over neceſſity, becauſe thoſe evils, occaſioned by the neceſſity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the divine art, wiſdom and providence, for good; *Typhon* and *Arimanius* (if we may uſe that language) being as it were outwitted by *Oſiris* and *Oromaſdes*, and the worſt of all evils made, in ſpight of their own nature, to contribute ſubſerviently to the good and perfection of the whole; καὶ τοῦτο μεγίστης τέχνης ἀγαθοποιεῖν τὰ κακὰ, *and this muſt needs be acknowledged to be the greateſt art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good.*

In Theæt. p. 176. *Steph.*

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that *Plutarch* had no ſufficient grounds to impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world, (one the cauſe of good, and the other of evil) to *Plato.* And as for the other *Greek* philoſophers, his pretences to make them aſſertors of the ſame doctrine ſeem to be yet more ſlight and frivolous. For he concludes the * Pythagoreans to have held two ſuch ſubſtantial principles of good and evil, merely becauſe they ſometimes talk'd of the ἐναντιότητες and συστοιχίαι, *the contrarieties* and *conjugations* of things, ſuch as finite and infinite, dextrous and ſiniſtrous, even and odd, and the like. As alſo, that *Heraclitus* entertained the ſame opinion, becauſe he ſpake of παλίντροπος ἁρμονία κόσμου, *a verſatile harmony of the world*, whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a bow is ſucceſſively intended and remitted; as likewiſe becauſe he affirmed all things to flow, and war to be the father and lord of all. Moreover, he reſolves [1], that *Empedocles* his

* Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ὕδαμοῦ τὸ κακὸν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς παρελάμβανον. *The Pythagoreans nowhere admitted evil amongſt the Principles.* Syrianus in Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. MS. p. 218.

[1] De Iſide & Oſiride, p. 370.

his friendſhip and contention could be no other than a good and evil god; though we have rendred it probable, that nothing elſe was underſtood thereby but an active ſpermatick power in this corporeal world, cauſing viciſſitudes of generation and corruption. Again; *Anaxagoras* is entitled by him to the ſame philoſophy, for no other reaſon, but only becauſe he made mind and infinite matter two principles of the univerſe. And laſtly, *Ariſtotle* himſelf cannot ſcape him from being made an aſſertor of a good and evil god too, merely becauſe he concluded form and privation to be two principles of natural bodies. Neither does *Plutarch* acquit himſelf any thing better, as to the ſenſe of whole nations, when this doctrine is therefore imputed by him to the *Chaldeans*, becauſe their aſtrologers ſuppoſed two of the planets to be beneficent, two maleficent, and three of a middle nature; and to the ancient *Greeks*, becauſe they ſacrificed not only to *Jupiter Olympius*, but alſo to *Hades* or *Pluto*, who was ſometimes called by them the infernal *Jupiter*. We confeſs, that his interpretation of the traditions and myſteries of the ancient Egyptians is ingenious, but yet there is no neceſſity for all that, that by their *Typhon* ſhould be underſtood a ſubſtantial evil principle, or God ſelf-exiſtent, as he contends. For it being the manner of the ancient Pagans, (as ſhall be more fully declared afterwards) to phyſiologize in their theology, and to perſonate all the ſeveral things in nature; it ſeems more likely, that theſe Egyptians did after that manner, only προσωποποιεῖν, *perſonate* that evil and confuſion, tumult and hurliburly, conſtant alternation and viciſſitude of generations and corruptions, which is in this lower world, (though not without a divine providence) by *Typhon*.

Wherefore, the only probability now left is that of the Perſian Magi, that they might indeed aſſert two ſuch active principles of good and evil, as *Plutarch* and the Manicheans afterwards did; and we muſt confeſs, that there is ſome probability of this, becauſe beſides *Plutarch*, *Laertius* [1] affirms the ſame of them, δύο κατ' αὐτὸς εἶναι ἀρχὰς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν, *that there are two principles according to the* Perſian *Magi, a good dæmon and an evil one*; he ſeeming to vouch it alſo from the authorities of *Hermippus*, *Eudoxus* and *Theopompus*. Notwithſtanding which, it may very well be queſtioned, whether the meaning of thoſe Magi were not herein miſunderſtood, they perhaps intending nothing more by their evil dæmon than ſuch a Satanical power as we acknowledge; that is, not a ſubſtantial evil principle, unmade and independent upon God, but only a polity of evil dæmons in the world, united together under one head or prince. And this not only becauſe *Theodorus* in *Photius* [2] calls the Perſian *Arimanius* by that very name, *Satanas*; but alſo becauſe thoſe very traditions of theirs, recorded by *Plutarch* himſelf, ſeem very much to favour this opinion, they running after this manner: ἔπεισι δὲ χρόνος εἱμαρμένος, ἐν ᾧ τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον λοιμὸν ἐπάγουσα καὶ λιμὸν, ὑπὸ τούτων ἀνάγκη φθαρῆναι παντάπασι καὶ ἀφανισθῆναι, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐπιπέδου καὶ ὁμαλοῦς γενομένης, ἕνα βίον καὶ μίαν πολιτείαν ἀνθρώπων μακαρίων καὶ ὁμογλώσσων ἁπάντων γενέσθαι· *That there is a fatal time at hand, in which* Arimanius

De Iſ. & O. fir. 370. *Par.*

[1] In Proœmio, ſegm. 8. p. 6. [2] Bibliothec. Cod. LXXXI. p. 199.

manius, *the introducer of plagues and famines, must of necessity be utterly destroyed, and when, the earth being made plain and equal, there shall be but one life, and one polity of men, all happy and speaking the same language.* Or else, as *Theopompus*[1] himself represented their sense, τέλος ἀπολείπεσθαι τὸν Ἅιδην, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους εὐδαίμονας ἔσεσθαι, μήτε τροφῆς δεομένους, μήτε σκίαν ποιοῦντας· τὸν δὲ ταῦτα μηχανησάμενον θεὸν ἠρεμεῖν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι χρόνῳ καλῶς μὲν οὐ πολὺν τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ κοιμωμένῳ μέτριον. *That in conclusion* Hades *shall be utterly abolished, and then men shall be perfectly happy, their bodies neither needing food, nor casting any shadow; that God, which contrived this whole scene of things, resting only for the present a certain season, which is not long to him, but like the intermission of sleep to men.* For since an unmade and self-existent evil dæmon, such as that of *Plutarch*'s and the Manicheans, could never be utterly abolished or destroyed; it seems rather probable, that these Persian Magi did, in their *Arimanius*, either προσωποποιεῖν, *personate evil* only, as we suppose the *Egyptians* to have done in *Typhon*; or else understand a satanical power by it: notwithstanding which, they might possibly sacrifice thereunto (as the *Greeks* did to evil dæmons) for its appeasement and mitigation; or else as worshipping the Deity itself, in the ministers of its wrath and vengeance.

However, from what hath been declared, we conceive it does sufficiently appear, that this ditheistick doctrine of a good and evil god, (or a good god and evil dæmon both self-existent) asserted by *Plutarch* and the Manicheans, was never so universally received amongst the Pagans as the same *Plutarch* pretendeth. Which thing may be yet further evidenced from hence, because the Manicheans professed themselves not to have derived this opinion from the Pagans, nor to be a subdivision under them, or schism from them, but a quite different sect by themselves. Thus, *Faustus* in St. *Augustin: Pagani bona & mala, tetra & splendida, perpetua & caduca, mutabilia & certa, corporalia & divina, unum habere principium dogmatizant. His ego valde contraria censeo, qui bonis omnibus principium fateor Deum, contrariis verò Hylen (sic enim mali principium & naturam theologus noster appellat.) The Pagans dogmatize, that good and evil things, foul and splendid, perishing and perpetual, corporeal and divine, do all alike proceed from the same principle. Whereas we think far otherwise, that God is the principle of all good, but* Hyle (*or the evil dæmon*) *of the contrary, which names our theologer (Manes) confounds together.* And afterwards *Faustus* there again determines, that there were indeed but two sects of religion in the world, really distinct from one another, *viz.* Paganism and Manicheism[2]. From whence it may be concluded, that this doctrine of two active principles of good and evil was not then look'd upon as the generally received doctrine of the Pagans. Wherefore it seems reasonable to think, that *Plutarch*'s imputing it so universally to them, was either out of design, thereby to gain the better countenance and authority to a conceit, which himself was fond of; or else because he being deeply tinctured, as it were, with the suffusions of it, every thing which he look'd upon

Contra Faust. Lib. 20. *c.* 3. [P. 237. Tom. VIII. Oper. Edit. Benedict.]

[1] Apud Plutarch. de Iside & Osiride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper. [2] Apud Augustin. ubi supra.

ſeemed to him coloured with it. And indeed, for aught we can yet learn, this *Plutarchus Chæronenſis*, *Numenius* and *Atticus*, were the only *Greek* philoſophers, who ever in publick writings poſitively aſſerted any ſuch opinion.

And probably St. *Athanaſius* is to be underſtood of theſe, when, in his oration *contra Gentes* [1], he writes thus concerning this opinion: Ἑλλήνων οὖν τινὲς πλανηθέντες τῆς ὁδοῦ, καὶ τὸν Χριστὸν οὐκ ἐγνωκότες, ἐν ὑποστάσει καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν ἀπεφήναντο· ἁμαρτάνοντες κατὰ δύο ταῦτα, ἢ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀποστεροῦντες τοῦ εἶναι ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ὅλων κύριος, εἴγε κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ κακία καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει καὶ οὐσίαν, ἢ πάλιν θέλοντες αὐτὸν ποιητὴν εἶναι τῶν ὅλων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ δώσειν εἶναι, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς οὖσιν καὶ τὸ κακὸν κατ' αὐτούς ἐστι. *Some of the* Greeks, *wandring out of the right way, and ignorant of Chriſt, have determined evil to be a real entity by itſelf, erring upon two accounts; becauſe they muſt of neceſſity either ſuppoſe God not to be the maker of all things, if evil have a nature and eſſence by itſelf, and yet be not made by him; or elſe that he is the maker and cauſe of evil: whereas it is impoſſible, that he, who is eſſentially good, ſhould produce the contrary.* After which that father ſpeaks alſo of ſome degenerate Chriſtians, who fell into the ſame error; οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἐκπεσόντες τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διδασκαλίας, καὶ περὶ τὴν πίστιν ναυαγήσαντες, καὶ οὗτοι μὲν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ κακοῦ παραφρονοῦσιν εἶναι· *Some hereticks, forſaking the eccleſiaſtical doctrine, and making ſhipwreck of the faith, have in like manner falſly attributed a real nature and eſſence to evil.* Of which hereticks there were ſeveral ſects before the Manicheans, ſometime taken notice of and cenſured by Pagan philoſophers themſelves; as by *Celſus* [2], where he charges Chriſtians with holding this opinion, that there is ἐναντίος τῷ μεγάλῳ θεῷ θεὸς καθηραμένος, *an execrable god contrary to the great God*; and by *Plotinus*, writing a whole book againſt ſuch Chriſtians, the 9th of his ſecond Ennead, which, by *Porphyrius* was inſcribed πρὸς τοὺς Γνωστικούς, *againſt the Gnoſticks.*

But if, notwithſtanding all that we have hitherto ſaid to the contrary, that which *Plutarch* ſo much contends for ſhould be granted to be true, that the Pagan theologers generally aſſerted two ſelf exiſtent principles (a good God, and an evil ſoul or dæmon) and no more, it would unavoidably follow from thence, that all thoſe other gods, which they worſhipped, were not look'd upon by them as ſo many unmade ſelf exiſtent beings, becauſe then they ſhould have acknowledged ſo many firſt principles. However, it is certain, that if *Plutarch* believed his own writings, he muſt of neceſſity take it for granted, that none of the Pagan gods (thoſe two principles of good and evil only excepted) were by their theologers accounted unmade or ſelf-exiſtent beings. And as to *Plutarch* himſelf, it is unqueſtionably manifeſt, that though he were a Pagan, and a worſhipper of all thoſe many gods of theirs, but eſpecially amongſt the reſt, of the *Delian Apollo*, (whoſe prieſt he declares himſelf to have been) yet he ſuppoſed them all (except only one good God, and another evil ſoul of the world) to be no ſelf-exiſtent deities, but θεοὶ γενητοὶ [3], *generated or created gods* only. And

[1] Tom. I. p. 6. Oper.
[2] Apud Origen. contra Celſum, Lib. VI. p. 303.
[3] Vide Rualdum in Vitâ Plutarchi, Cap. IX.

And the ſame is to be affirmed of all his Pagan followers, as alſo of the Manicheans, foraſmuch as they, beſides their good and evil god, (the only unmade ſelf-exiſtent beings acknowledged by them) worſhipped alſo innumerable other deities.

Hitherto we have not been able to find amongſt the Pagans any, who aſſerted a multitude of unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities; but, on the contrary, we ſhall now find one, who took notice of this opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, *many principles*, ſo far forth as to confute it; and that is *Ariſtotle*, who was not occaſioned to do that neither, becauſe it was a doctrine then generally received, but only becauſe he had a mind odiouſly to impute ſuch a thing to the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts, they making ideas (ſometimes called alſo numbers) in a certain ſenſe, the principles of things. Nevertheleſs, the opinion itſelf is well confuted by that philoſopher from the phænomena, after this manner: Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικόν, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν· &c. *They who ſay that mathematical number is the firſt, and ſuppoſe one principle of one thing, and another of another, would make the whole world to be like an incoherent and diſagreeing poem, where things do not all mutually contribute to one another, nor conſpire together to make up one ſenſe and harmony: but the contrary*, ſaith he, *is moſt evident in the world; and therefore there cannot be many principles, but only one.* From whence it is manifeſt, that though *Ariſtotle* were a worſhipper of many gods, as well as the other Pagans, (he ſomewhere repreſenting it as very abſurd to ſacrifice to none but *Jupiter*) yet he was no Polytheiſt, in the ſenſe before declared, of many unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities, nor indeed any Ditheiſt neither, no aſſertor of two underſtanding principles, a good and evil god, (as *Plutarch* pretended him to be) he not only here exploding that opinion of πολλαὶ ἀρχαὶ, *many principles*, but alſo expreſly deriving all from one; and in that very chapter affirming, that good is a principle, but not evil. But as for the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans there perſtringed by him, though it be true, that they made ideas in ſome ſenſe principles, as the paradigms of things; yet, according to *Ariſtotle*'s own confeſſion, even in that ſame chapter, they declared alſo, that there was ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα, *another principle more excellent* or *ſuperior*; which is indeed that, that was called by them the τὸ ἕν, or μονὰς, *unity itſelf*, or a *monad*, that is, one moſt ſimple deity.

Ariſt. Met. l. 14. c. 10. [Pag. 486. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Though we did before demonſtrate, that the Pagan gods were not all ſuppoſed by them to be unmade ſelf-exiſtent beings, becauſe they acknowledged a theogonia, a generation and temporary production of gods; yet, foraſmuch as it might be ſuſpected, that they held notwithſtanding a multitude of unmade deities, we have now made the beſt enquiry that we could concerning this: and the utmoſt that we have been able yet to diſcover, is, that ſome few of the profeſſed Pagans, as well as of pretended Chriſtians, have indeed aſſerted a duplicity of ſuch gods (*viz.* underſtanding beings unmade) one good, and the other evil, but no more. Whereas, on the contrary, we have found, that *Ariſtotle* did profeſſedly oppoſe this opinion

of many principles, or unmade gods, which certainly he durſt never have done, had it then been the generally received opinion of the Pagans. And though it be true, that ſeveral of the ancient Chriſtians, in their diſputes with Pagans, do confute that opinion of many unmade deities; yet we do not find for all that, that any of them ſeriouſly charge the Pagans with it, they only doing it occaſionally and *ex abundanti*. But we ſhould be the better enabled to make a clear judgment concerning this controverſy, whether there were not amongſt the Pagan deities a multitude of ſuppoſed unmade beings, if we did but a take a ſhort ſurvey of their religion, and conſider all the ſeveral kinds of gods worſhipped by them; which may, as we conceive, be reduced to theſe following heads. In the firſt place therefore it is certain, that many of the Pagan gods were nothing elſe but dead men (or the ſouls of men deceaſed) called by the *Greeks* Heroes, and the *Latins* Manes; ſuch as *Hercules*, *Liber*, *Æſculapius*, *Caſtor*, *Pollux*, *Quirinus*, and the like. Neither was this only true of the *Greeks* and *Romans*, but alſo of the *Ægyptians*, *Syrians* and *Babylonians*. For which cauſe the Pagan ſacrifices are, by way of contempt in the Scripture [1] called the *ſacrifices of the dead*; that is, not of dead or lifeleſs ſtatues, as ſome would put it off, but of dead men: which was the reaſon, why many of the religious rites and ſolemnities, obſerved by the Pagan prieſts, were mournful and funeral; accordingly as it is expreſſed in *Baruch* concerning the *Babylonians*, *Their prieſts ſit in their temples, having their clothes rent, and their heads and beards ſhaven, and nothing upon their heads; they roar and cry before their gods, as men do at the feaſt, when one is dead.* (Some of which rites are therefore thought to have been interdicted to the *Iſraelitiſh* prieſts.) And the ſame thing is noted likewiſe by the poet [2] concerning the *Egyptians*:

Chap. 6. *v.* 31.

Et quem tu plangens, hominem teſtaris, Oſirin:

and intimated by *Xenophanes* the Colophonian [3], when he reprehenſively admoniſhed the *Egyptians* after this manner: εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσι μὴ θεοὺς νομίζειν, *That if they thought thoſe to be gods, they ſhould not ſo lament them; but if they would lament them, they ſhould no longer think them gods.* Moreover, it is well known, that this humour of deifying men was afterwards carried on further, and that living men (as Emperors) had alſo temples and altars erected to them; nay, human polities and cities were alſo ſometimes deified by the Pagans, *Rome* itſelf being made a goddeſs. Now, no man can imagine, that thoſe men-gods and city-gods were look'd upon by them as ſo many unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities, they being not indeed ſo much as φύσει γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, *gods made or generated by nature*, but rather artificially made by human will and pleaſure. Again, another ſort of the Pagan deities were all the greater parts of the viſible mundane ſyſtem, or corporeal world, as ſuppoſed to be animated, the ſun, the moon, and the ſtars, and even

[1] Pſalm CVI. 28.
[2] Lucan. Pharſal. Lib. VIII. verſ. 133.
[3] Vide Plutarch. de Superſtit. p. 171. Tom. II. Oper. & Ariſtot. Rhetoric. Lib. II. Cap. XXIII. p. 789. Tom. III. Oper.

even the earth itſelf, under the names of *Veſta* and *Cybele*, *the mother of the gods*, and the like. Now it is certain alſo, that none of theſe could be taken for unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities neither, by thoſe, who ſuppoſed the whole world itſelf to have been generated, or had a beginning, which, as *Ariſtotle* tells us [1], was the generally received opinion before his time. There was alſo a third ſort of Pagan dieties, ethereal and aerial animals inviſible, called *Dæmons*, *Genii* and *Lares*, ſuperior indeed to men, but inferior to the celeſtial or mundane gods before-mentioned. Wherefore theſe muſt needs be look'd upon alſo by them but as γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, *generated or created gods*, they being but certain inferior parts of the whole generated world.

Beſides all theſe, the Pagans had yet another ſort of gods, that were nothing but mere accidents or affections of ſubſtances, which therefore could not be ſuppoſed by them to be ſelf-exiſtent deities, becauſe they could not ſo much as ſubſiſt by themſelves. Such as were virtue, piety, felicity, truth, faith, hope, juſtice, clemency, love, deſire, health, peace, honour, fame, liberty, memory, ſleep, night, and the like; all which had their temples or altars erected to them. Now this kind of Pagan gods cannot well be conceived to have been any thing elſe, but the ſeveral and various manifeſtations of that one divine force, power and providence, that runs through the whole world (as reſpecting the good and evil of men) fictitiouſly perſonated, and ſo repreſented as ſo many gods and goddeſſes.

Laſtly, there is ſtill another kind of Pagan gods behind, having ſubſtantial and perſonal names, which yet cannot be conceived neither to be ſo many underſtanding beings, unmade, and independent upon any ſupreme, were it for no other reaſon but only this, becauſe they have all of them their particular places and provinces, offices and functions ſeverally (as it were) aſſigned to them, and to which they are confined; ſo as not to interfere and claſh with one another, but agreeably to make up one orderly and harmonious ſyſtem of the whole; one of thoſe gods ruling only in the heavens, another in the air, another in the ſea, and another in the earth and hell; one being the god or goddeſs of learning and wiſdom, another of ſpeech and eloquence, another of juſtice and political order; one the god of war, another the god of pleaſure; one the god of corn, and another the god of wine, and the like. For how can it be conceived, that a multitude of underſtanding beings, ſelf-exiſtent and independent, could thus of themſelves have fallen into ſuch a uniform order and harmony, and without any claſhing, peaceably and quietly ſharing the government of the whole world amongſt them, ſhould carry it on with ſuch a conſtant regularity? For which cauſe we conclude alſo, that neither thoſe *dii majorum gentium*, whether the twenty *Selecti*, or the twelve *Conſentes*, nor yet that triumvirate of gods, amongſt whom *Homer* ſhares the government of the whole world, according to that of *Maximus Tyrius*, τριχθὰ Ὁμήρῳ δέδασται τὰ πάντα, Ποσειδῶν μὲν ἔλαχε, πολιὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ, Ἅιδης δὲ ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα, Ζεὺς δὲ οὐρανόν· *The ſea being aſſigned to* Neptune, *the dark and ſubterraneous parts to* Pluto, *but* *Diſſ.* 16.

[1] Lib. I. de Cœlo, Cap. X. p. 632. Tom. I. Oper.

but the heaven to Jupiter; which three are ſometimes called alſo the celeſtial, marine, and terreſtrial *Jupiter*; nor laſtly, that other Roman and Samothracian trinity of gods, worſhipped all together in the capitol, *Jupiter*, *Minerva*, and *Juno*; I ſay, that none of all theſe could reaſonably be thought by the Pagans themſelves, to be ſo many really diſtinct, unmade, and ſelf-exiſtent deities.

Wherefore the truth of this whole buſineſs ſeems to be this, that the ancient Pagans did phyſiologize in their theology; and whether looking upon the whole world animated, as the ſupreme God, and conſequently the ſeveral parts of it as his living members; or elſe, apprehending it at leaſt to be a mirror, or viſible image of the inviſible Deity, and conſequently all its ſeveral parts, and things of nature, but ſo many ſeveral manifeſtations of the divine power and providence, they pretended, that all their devotion towards the Deity ought not to be huddled up in one general and confuſed acknowledgment of a ſupreme inviſible Being, the creator and governor of all; but that all the ſeveral manifeſtations of the Deity in the world, conſidered ſingly and apart by themſelves, ſhould be made ſo many diſtinct objects of their devout veneration. And therefore in order hereunto did they προσωποποιεῖν, *ſpeak of the things in nature, and the parts of the world, as perſons*, and conſequently as ſo many gods and goddeſſes; yet ſo, as that the intelligent might eaſily underſtand the meaning, that theſe were all really nothing elſe but ſo many ſeveral names and notions of that one Numen, divine force and power, which runs through the whole world, multiformly diſplaying itſelf therein. To this purpoſe *Balbus* in *Cicero*[1]; *Videtiſne ut à phyſicis rebus tracta ratio ſit ad commentitios & fictos deos? See you not, how from the things of nature fictitious gods have been made?* And *Origen* ſeems to inſiſt upon this very thing, (where *Celſus* upbraids the Jews and Chriſtians for worſhipping one only God) ſhewing, that all that ſeeming multiplicity of pagan Gods could not be underſtood of ſo many diſtinct ſubſtantial independent Deities; *L. 1. p. 18. [Edit Cantab.]* δεικνύτω τοίνυν, πῶς αὐτὸς δύναται παραστῆσαι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν καθ' Ἕλληνας θεῶν, ἢ τοὺς λοίπους βαρβάρους· Δεικνύτω ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν Μνημοσύνης γεννώσης ἀπὸ Διὸς τὰς Μούσας, ἢ Θέμιδος τὰς Ὥρας, ἢ τὰς Χάριτας αἰεὶ γυμνὰς παραστητάτω δύνασθαι κατ' οὐσίαν ὑφεστηκέναι, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνήσεται τὰ Ἑλλένων ἀναπλάσματα (σωματοποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) δεικνύναι Θεούς. To this ſenſe; *Let* Celſus *therefore himſelf ſhew, how he is able to make out a multiplicity of Gods* (ſubſtantial and ſelf-exiſtent) *according to the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans; let him declare the eſſence and ſubſtantial perſonality of that Memory, which by* Jupiter *generated the muſes, or of that* Themis, *which brought forth the hours; or let him ſhew how the Graces, always naked, do ſubſiſt by themſelves. But he will never be able to do this, nor to make it appear, that thoſe figments of the Greeks (which ſeem to be really nothing elſe but the things of nature turned into perſons) are ſo many diſtinct (ſelf-exiſtent) deities.* Where the latter words are thus rendred in a late edition; *Sed nunquam poterit (Celſus) Græcorum figmenta, quæ validiora fieri videntur, ex rebus ipſis deos eſſe arguere*; which we confeſs we cannot underſtand; but we conceive

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVIII. p. 2995. Tom. IX. Oper.

conceive the word σωμαλοποιεῖσθαι, there turned *validiora fieri*, is here uſed by *Origen* in the ſame ſenſe with προσωποποιεῖσθαι: ſo that his meaning is, as we have declared, that thoſe figments of the Greeks and other Barbarian Pagans, (which are the ſame with *Balbus* his *commentitii & ficti Dii*) are really nothing elſe but the things of nature, figuratively and fictitiouſly perſonated, and conſequently not ſo many diſtinct ſubſtantial deities, but only ſeveral notions and conſiderations of one God, or ſupreme Numen, in the world.

Now this fictitious perſonating, and deifying of things, by the Pagan Theologers, was done two manner of ways; one, when thoſe things in nature were themſelves without any more ado, or change of names, ſpoken of as perſons, and ſo made gods and goddeſſes, as in the many inſtances before propoſed. Another, when there were diſtinct proper and perſonal names accommodated ſeverally to thoſe things, as of *Minerva* to wiſdom, of *Neptune* to the ſea, of *Ceres* to corn, and of *Bacchus* to wine. In which latter caſe, thoſe perſonal names properly ſignify the inviſible divine powers, ſuppoſed to preſide over thoſe ſeveral things in nature; and theſe are therefore properly thoſe gods and goddeſſes, which are δωλῆρες ἐάων [1], the *givers* and *diſpenſers of the good things*, and the removers of the contrary; but they are uſed improperly alſo for the things of nature themſelves, which therefore as manifeſtations of the divine power, goodneſs and providence perſonated, are ſometimes alſo abuſively called gods and goddeſſes. This myſtery of the Pagan polytheiſm, is thus fully declared by *Moſchopulus*: Ἰστέον ὅτι πάντα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἃ δύναμιν ἔχουσα ἑώρων, οὐκ ἄνευ ἐπιστασίας θεῶν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἐνεργεῖν ἐνόμιζον, ἑνὶ δὲ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπισταλοῦντα τῷτῳ θεὸν ὠνόμαζον· ὅθεν Ἥφαιστον ἐκάλων τότε διακονικὸν τοῦτο πῦρ, καὶ τὸν ἐπισταλοῦντα ταῖς διὰ τούτου ἐνεργουμέναις τέχναις, καὶ Δήμητραν τὸν σῖτον καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς, καὶ τὴν δωρουμένην τούτοις θεὸν, καὶ ἐπισταλοῦσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ τὴν ἔφορον τῆς φρονήσεως θεόν· καὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τὸν οἶνον καὶ τὸν διδόντα τοῦτον θεὸν· ὃν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διδόναι τὸν οἶνον ὁ Πλάτων παράγει, καὶ Διδοῦνυσον τοῦτον ποιεῖ εἶτα καὶ Διόνυσον· καὶ Εἰλειθύας τοὺς τόκους, καὶ τὰς ἐφορώσας τοὺς τόκους θεάς· καὶ Ἀφροδίτην τὴν συνουσίαν καὶ ἐπισταλοῦσαν ταύτῃ θεὸν· κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ Μούσας ἔλεγον τάστε λογικὰς τέχνας, οἷον ῥητορικὴν, ἀστρονομίαν, κωμωδίαν, τραγωδίαν, καὶ τὰς ἐφόρους καὶ παρόχους τούτων θεάς. *We muſt know, that whatſoever the Greeks (or Pagans) ſaw to have any power, virtue or ability in it, they looked upon it as not acting according to ſuch power, without the providence, preſidency, or influence of the gods; and they called both the thing itſelf, which hath the power, and the deity preſiding over it, by one and the ſame name: whence the miniſterial fire uſed in mechanick arts, and the god preſiding over thoſe arts that work by fire, were both alike called* Hephæſtus *or* Vulcan; *ſo the name* Demetra *or* Ceres *was given as well to corn and fruits, as to that goddeſs which beſtows them*; Athena *or* Minerva *did alike ſignify wiſdom and the goddeſs which is the diſpenſer of it*; Dionyſus *or* Bacchus, *wine, and the god that giveth wine*; *(whence* Plato *etymologizes the name from giving of wine.) In like manner, they called both the child-bearing of women, and the goddeſſes that ſuperintended over the ſame,* Eilithyia *or* Lucina; Coitus *or copulation, and the deity preſiding over it,* Aphrodite *or* Venus. *In Heſiod. p.* 1

[1] Heſiod. in Theogon. Verſ. 111.

Venus. *And laſtly, in the ſame manner, by the Muſes they ſignified both thoſe rational arts, rhetorick, aſtronomy, poetry, and the goddeſſes, which aſſiſt therein or promote the ſame.* Now, as the ſeveral things in nature and parts of the corporeal world are thus metonymically and catachreſtically called gods and goddeſſes, it is evident, that ſuch deities as theſe could not be ſuppoſed to be unmade or ſelf-exiſtent, by thoſe, who acknowledged the whole world to have been generated and had a beginning. But as theſe names were uſed more properly, to ſignify inviſible and underſtanding powers, preſiding over the things in nature, and diſpenſing of them, however they have an appearance of ſo many ſeveral diſtinct deities; yet they ſeem to have been all really nothing elſe, but as *Balbus* in *Cicero*[1] expreſſes it, *Deus pertinens per naturam cujuſque rei, God paſſing through, and acting in the nature of every thing*; and conſequently, but ſeveral names, or ſo many different notions and conſiderations of that one ſupreme Numen, that divine force, power, and providence, which runs through the whole world, as variouſly manifeſting it-ſelf therein.

Wherefore, ſince there were no other kinds of Gods amongſt the Pagans, beſides theſe already enumerated, unleſs their images, ſtatues and ſymbols ſhould be accounted ſuch (becauſe they were alſo ſometimes abuſively called gods) which could not be ſuppoſed by them to have been unmade or without a beginning, they being the workmanſhip of mens own hands; we conclude univerſally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan gods, which makes ſo great a ſhew and noiſe, was really either nothing but ſeveral names and notions of one ſupreme Deity, according to its different manifeſtations, gifts and effects in the world, perſonated; or elſe many inferior underſtanding beings, generated or created by one Supreme: ſo that one unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, (for of the ſottiſh vulgar no man can pretend to give an account, in any religion) and conſequently, the Pagan polytheiſm (or idolatry) conſiſted not in worſhipping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities and creators, ſelf-exiſtent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme; but in mingling and blending, ſome way or other, unduly, creature-worſhip with the worſhip of the Creator.

And that the ancient Pagan Theiſts thus acknowledged one ſupreme God, who was the only Θεὸς ἀγέννητος, *unmade* or *unproduced Deity*, (I ſay, Theiſts, becauſe thoſe amongſt the Pagans, who admitted of many gods, but none at all unmade, were abſolute Atheiſts) this may be undeniably concluded from what was before proved, that they acknowledged omnipotence or infinite power to be a divine attribute. Becauſe upon the hypotheſis of many unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities, it is plain, that there could be none omnipotent, and conſequently no ſuch thing as omnipotence *in rerum natura:* and therefore omnipotence was rightly and properly ſtyled by *Macrobius*[2], *ſummi Dei omnipotentia*, it being an attribute eſſentially peculiar to one ſupreme and ſole ſelf-exiſtent Deity. And *Simplicius*, likewiſe a Pagan,

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVIII. p. 2996. Tom. IX. Oper.

[2] In Somn. Scipion. Lib. I. Cap. XVII. p. 87.

Pagan, confuted the Manichean hypotheſis of two ſelf-exiſtent deities from hence alſo, becauſe it deſtroy'd omnipotence: ἀναγκάζονται δύο λέγοντες τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὰς (τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγόμενον Θεὸν, μηκέτι πάντων αἴτιον λέγειν, μηδὲ ὡς παντοκράτορα δικαίως ὑμνεῖν, μηδὲ δύναμιν αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ ὅλην ἀναθέναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς ὅλης δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο. *For they, who aſſert two principles of the univerſe (one good, the other evil) are neceſſitated to grant, that the good principle, called by them God, is not the cauſe of all things, neither can they praiſe it as omnipotent, nor aſcribe a perfect and whole entire power to it, but only the half of a whole power at moſt, if ſo much.* Over and beſides all which, it hath been alſo proved already, that the ancient Atheiſts under paganiſm directed themſelves principally againſt the opinion of monarchy, or of one ſupreme Deity ruling over all; from whence it plainly appears, that it was then aſſerted by the Pagan Theiſts. *In Epict. c. 4.* [Potius in Cap. XXXIV. p. 164. Edit. Salmaſ.]

And we think it here obſervable, that this was a thing ſo generally confeſſed and acknowledged, that *Fauſtus* the Manichean took up this conceit, that both the Chriſtians and Jews paganized in the opinion of monarchy, that is, derived this doctrine of one Diety, the ſole principle of all things, only by tradition from the Pagans, and by conſequence were no other than ſchiſms or ſubdivided ſects of paganiſm. *Vos deſciſcentes à gentibus* (ſaith he) *monarchiæ opinionem primò vobiſcum divulſiſtis, id eſt, ut omnia credatis ex deo. Eſtis ſanè ſchiſma, necnon & priores veſtri Judæi. De opinione monarchiæ, in nullo etiam ipſi diſſentiunt à paganis. Quare conſtat vos atque Judæos ſchiſma eſſe gentilitatis. Sectas autem ſi quæras, non plures erunt quàm duæ,* Gentium & noſtra. *You revolting from the Gentiles, broke off their opinion of monarchy, and carried it along with you, ſo as to believe all things to come from God. Wherefore you are really nothing but a ſchiſm of paganiſm, or a ſubdivided branch of it, and ſo are your predeceſſors the Jews; who differ nothing from Pagans neither in this opinion of monarchy. Whence it is manifeſt, that both Chriſtians and Jews are but ſchiſms of gentiliſm. But as for ſects of religion, really differing from another, there are but theſe two, that of the Pagans, and that of ours, who altogether diſſent from them.* Now though this be falſe and fooliſh, as to the Chriſtians and Jews deriving that opinion of monarchy, only by way of tradition, from the Pagans, which is a thing founded in the principles of nature; yet it ſufficiently ſhews this to have been the general ſenſe of the Pagans, that all their gods were derived from one ſole ſelf-exiſtent Deity; ſo that they neither acknowledged a multitude of unmade deities, nor yet that duplicity of them, which *Plutarch* contended for, (one good, and the other evil,) who accordingly denied God to be the cauſe of all things, writing thus in his defect of oracles [1], οἱ μὲν ἀδείως ἁπλῶς τὸν Θεὸν, οἱ δὲ ὁμῶς τι πάντων αἴτιον ποιοῦντες, ἀστοχοῦσι τοῦ μείζονος καὶ πρέποντος, *They are guilty of one extreme, who make God the cauſe of nothing, and they of another, who make him the cauſe of all things.* But this paradox was both late ſtarted amongſt the Greeks, and quickly cried down by the ſucceſſion of their philoſophers, and therefore prejudiceth not

S. Aug. contra Fauſt. l. 20. [Cap. IV. p. 237. Tom. VIII. Oper.]

[1] Tom. II. Oper. p. 414.

not the truth of *Fauſtus* his general aſſertion concerning the Pagans. Which is again fully confirmed by St. *Auſtin* in his reply; *Siquis ità dividat, ut dicat eorum, quæ aliquâ religione detinentur, aliis placere unum Deum colendum, aliis multos; per hanc differentiam & pagani à nobis remoti ſunt, & Manichæi cum paganis deputantur, nos autem cum Judæis. Hic ſortè dicatis, quòd multos deos veſtros ex una ſubſtantia perhibetis; quaſi pagani multos ſuos, non ex una aſſerant, quamvis diverſa illis officia, & opera, & poteſtates illis attribuant; ſicut etiam apud vos alius deus expugnat gentem tenebrarum, alius ex eâ captâ fabricat mundum,* &c. *If one ſhould make another diſtribution of Religioniſts into ſuch as worſhip either one God, or many gods; according to this diviſion, the Pagans will be removed from us Chriſtians, and joined with you Manicheans. But perhaps you will here ſay, that all your many gods are derived from one ſubſtance; as if the Pagans did not alſo derive all their gods from one, though attributing ſeveral offices, works and powers to them; in like manner as amongſt you, one God expugns the nation of darkneſs, another God makes a world out of it,* &c. And again afterwards he writes further to the ſame purpoſe; *Diſcat ergò* Fauſtus *monarchiæ opinionem non ex gentibus nos habere, ſed gentes non uſque adeò ad falſos deos eſſe dilapſas, ut opinionem amitterent unius veri dei, ex quo eſt omnis qualiſcunque natura: Let* Fauſtus *therefore know, that we Chriſtians have not derived the opinion of monarchy from the Pagans, but that the Pagans have not ſo far degenerated, ſinking down into the worſhip of falſe gods, as to have loſt the opinion of one true God, from whom is all whatſoever nature.*

L. 20. cap. 10. [P 241. Tom. VIII. Oper.]

S. Aug. contra Fauſt. l. 20. c. 19. [P. 246.]

XIV. It follows from what we have declared, that the Pagan polytheiſm or multiplicity of gods is not to be underſtood in the ſenſe before expreſſed, of many θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι καὶ αὐθυπόστατοι, *many unproduced and ſelf-exiſtent deities*, but according to ſome other notion or equivocation of the word gods. For God is τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, *one of thoſe words, that hath been uſed in many different ſenſes*, the Atheiſts themſelves acknowledging a God and gods, according to ſome private ſenſes of their own, (which yet they do not all agree in neither,) and Theiſts not always having the ſame notion of that word; foraſmuch as angels in Scripture are called gods in one ſenſe, that is, as underſtanding beings ſuperior to men, immortal, holy, and happy; and the word is again ſometimes carried down lower to princes and magiſtrates; and not only ſo, but alſo to good men as ſuch, when they are ſaid to be made partakers of the divine nature [1]. And thus that learned Philoſopher and Chriſtian *Boethius* [2], *Omnis beatus deus; ſed natura quidem unus, participatione verò nihil prohibet eſſe quamplurimos: Every good and happy man is a god, and though there be only one God by nature, yet nothing hinders but that there may be many by participation.* But then again, all men and angels are alike denied to be gods in other reſpects, and particularly, as to religious worſhip: *Thou ſhalt worſhip the Lord thy God, and him only ſhalt thou ſerve.* Now this is that, which ſeems to be eſſentially included in the Pagan notion of the word God or gods, when taken in general, namely, a reſpect to religious worſhip. Wherefore a God in general, according to the ſenſe

[1] 2 Peter I. 4. [2] De Conſolat. Philoſ. Lib. III. p. 72. f.

ſenſe of the Pagan Theiſts, may be thus defined, *An underſtanding Being ſuperior to men, not originally derived from ſenſleſs matter, and looked upon as an object for men's religious worſhip.* But this general notion of the word God is again reſtrained and limited by differences, in the diviſion of it. For ſuch a God as this may be either ἀγέννητος, *ingenerate* or *unproduced*, and conſequently ſelf-exiſtent; or elſe γεννητὸς, *generated* or *produced*, and dependent on ſome higher Being as its cauſe. In the former ſenſe, the intelligent Pagans, as we have declared, acknowledged only one God, who was therefore called by them ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχήν, according to that of *Thales* in *Laertius* [1], πρεσβύτατον τῶν ὄντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γάρ· *God is the oldeſt of all things, becauſe he is unmade or unproduced, and the only thing that is ſo:* but in the latter, they admitted of many gods, many underſtanding beings, which, though generated or produced, yet were ſuperior to men, and looked upon as objects for their religious worſhip. And thus the Pagan Theiſts were both Polytheiſts and Monotheiſts in different ſenſes, they acknowledged both many gods, and one God; that is, many inferior deities, ſubordinate to one ſupreme. Thus *Onatus* the Pythagorean in *Stobæus* declares himſelf, δοκεῖ δέ μοι, καὶ μὴ εἷς εἶ μέν ὁ θεὸς, ἀλλ' εἷς μὲν ὁ μέγιστος, καὶ καθ- *Ecl. Phyſ. l.* ὑπέρτερος, καὶ ὁ κρατέων τῶ παντός· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πολλοὶ διαφέροντες κατὰ δύναμιν, *1. p. 4.* βασιλεύει δὲ πάντων αὐτῶν ὁ καὶ κράτει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ ἀρετᾷ μείζων· ἔστω δὲ καὶ εἷς [Edit. Plan-ὁ περιέχων τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι οἱ θέοντες εἰσὶ κατ' ὐρανὸν σύν τε τῶ παντὸς περιαγήσει, κατὰ λόγον ὑποθέοντες τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ νοητῷ· *It ſeemeth to me, that there is not only one God, but that there is one the greateſt and higheſt God, that governeth the whole world, and that there are many other gods beſides him differing as to power, that one God reigning over them all, who ſurmounts them all in power, greatneſs, and virtue. That is that God, who contains and comprehends the whole world; but the other gods are thoſe, who together with the revolution of the univerſe orderly follow that firſt and intelligible God.* Where it is evident, that *Onatus* his πολλοὶ θεοὶ, or *many gods*, were only the heavenly bodies, or animated ſtars. And partly from thoſe words cited, but chiefly others, which follow after in the ſame place, (that will be produced elſewhere) it plainly appears, that in *Onatus* his time, there were ſome, who acknowledged one only God, denying all thoſe other gods, then commonly worſhipped, And indeed *Anaxagoras* ſeems to have been ſuch a one; foraſmuch as aſſerting one perfect mind ruling over all, (which is the true Deity) he effectually degraded all thoſe other Pagan gods, the ſun, moon, and ſtars from their godſhips, by making the ſun nothing but a globe of fire, and the moon earth and ſtones, and the like of the other ſtars and planets. And ſome ſuch there were alſo amongſt the ancient *Egyptians*, as ſhall be declared in due place. Moreover, *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus* *P. 206.* tells us, that there hath been always leſs doubt and controverſy in the world concerning the one God, than concerning the many gods. Wherefore *Onatus* here declares his own ſenſe, as to this particular, *viz.* that beſides the one ſupreme God, there were alſo many other inferior deities, that is, underſtanding beings, that ought to be religiouſly worſhipped.

[1] Lib. I. ſegm. 35. p. 21. f.

But becauſe it is not impoſſible, but that there might be imagined one ſupreme Deity, though there were many other θεοὶ ἀγέννητοι, unmade and ſelf-exiſtent gods beſides, as *Plutarch* ſuppoſed before, one ſupreme God, together with a ψυχὴ ἄλογος, *an irrational ſoul or dæmon unmade*, inferior in power to it; therefore we add in the next place, that the more intelligent Pagans did not only aſſert one God, that was ſupreme and κράτιστος πάντων, *the moſt powerful of all the gods*, but alſo, who being omnipotent was the principle and cauſe of all the reſt, and therefore the only θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐθυπόστατος, *the only unproduced and ſelf-exiſtent Deity*. *Maximus Tyrius* af-
Diſſ. 1. *p.* 5. [Edit. Lugd. 1631 in 8vo.] firms this to have been the general ſenſe of all the Pagans, that there was θεὸς εἷς πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ, θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ, *one God the king and father of all, and many gods, the ſons of God, reigning together with God*. Neither did the Poets imply any thing leſs, when Ζεὺς was ſo often called by the Greeks, and *Jupiter* by the Latins, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶντε, and *hominum pater atque deorum*, or *hominum ſatórque deorum*, and the like. And indeed the theogonia of the ancient Pagans before mentioned was commonly thus declared by them univerſally, γεννητὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι, *that the gods were generated*, or, as *Herodotus* [1] expreſſeth it, ὅτι ἕκαστος τῶν θεῶν ἐγένετο, *that every one of the gods was generated or produced*; which yet is not ſo to be underſtood, as if they had therefore ſuppoſed no God at all unmade or ſelf-exiſtent, (which is abſolute atheiſm) but that the οἱ θεοὶ *the gods*, as diſtinguiſhed from the ὁ θεὸς or τὸ θεῖον from God, or the ſupreme Deity, were all of them univerſally made or generated.

But to the end, that we may now render this buſineſs, yet ſomething more eaſy to be believed, that the intelligent Pagans did thus ſuppoſe all their gods ſave one to have been made or generated, and conſequently acknowledged only one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, *one unproduced and ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, we ſhall in this place further obſerve, that the theogonia of thoſe ancient Pagans, their geneſis and generation of gods, was really one and the ſame thing with the coſmogonia, the geneſis and generation of the world, and indeed both of them underſtood of a temporary production both of theſe gods, and the world. And this we ſhall firſt prove from *Plato* in his *Timæus*; where he being to treat of the coſmogonia, premiſeth this diſtinction concerning two heads of being; that ſome were eternal and never made, and ſome again made or generated, the former whereof he calls οὐσία or eſſence, the latter γένεσις or generation: adding alſo this difference betwixt them, that the eternal and immutable things were the proper objects of ſcience and demonſtration, but the other ge-
Pag. 29. nerated things of faith and opinion only; ὅ, τι γὰρ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια, *for what eſſence is to generation, the ſame is certainty of truth or knowledge to faith*. And thereupon he declares, that his reader was not to expect the ſame evidence and certainty of truth from him, where he was now to treat of things generated, (namely, the gods, and the viſible world) as if he had been to diſcourſe about things immutable
Pag. 29. and eternal, in theſe words, ἐὰν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων περὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως, &c. *If therefore, O* Socrates, *many things having been*

[1] Hiſtor. Lib. II. Cap. LIII. p. 109.

been spoken by many men, concerning the gods and the generation of the universe, we be not able to discourse demonstratively concerning the same, you ought not at all to wonder at it, or be displeased with us, but on the contrary to rest well satisfied with our performance, if upon this argument we do but deliver probabilities. Where the gods are by *Plato* plainly referred to γένεσις and not to οὐσία, to generation and not to eternal or immutable essence, as they are also joined with the generation of the world, as being but a part thereof. Neither is this at all to be wondered at in *Plato*, since first the whole visible world was no less to him, than it was to the other Pagans, a God; he calling it θεὸν εὐδαίμονα, *a happy God*, and before it was yet made, θεὸν ἐσόμενον, *a God about to be made*. Not as if *Plato* accounted the senseless matter of this corporeal world, whether as perfectly dead and stupid, or as endued with a plastick nature only, to be a God, (for no inanimate thing was a God to *Plato*) but because he supposed the world to be an animal, endued with an intellectual soul, and indeed the best of all animals compounded of soul and body, οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν· *Wherefore we are thus according to probability to conclude, that this world was really made by the providence of God an intellectual animal*; whence from an animal forthwith it became a God. So that here we are to take notice of two gods in *Plato*, very different from one another; one a generated God, this whole world animated, and another that God, by whose providence this world was generated, and thus made an animal and a God; which latter must needs be an unmade, self-existent Deity, and not belong to γένεσις but to οὐσία, not to generation, but to immutable essence. Again, those greater parts of the world, the sun, the moon, and the stars, (as supposed also to be animated with particular souls of their own) were as well accounted by *Plato*, as by the other Pagans, gods, he plainly calling them there ὁρατοὶ καὶ γενητοὶ θεοὶ, *visible and generated gods*. Besides which celestial gods, the earth itself also is supposed by him to be either a God or goddess, according to those ancient copies of the *Timæus* used both by *Cicero* and *Proclus*: Γῆν δὲ, τροφὸν μὲν ἡμετέραν, εἰλημένην δὲ περὶ τὸν διὰ παντὸς πόλον τεταμένον, φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, ἐμηχανήσαλο, πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασι. *God fabricated the earth also, which is our nurse, turning round upon the axis of the world, and thereby causing and maintaining the succession of day and night, the first and oldest of all the gods generated within the heavens.* Where since that philosopher seems the rather to make the earth an animal and a God, because of its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, we may conclude, that afterwards, when in his old age, (as *Plutarch* [1] records from *Theophrastus*) he gave entertainment also to that other part of the Pythagorick hypothesis, and attributed to the earth a planetary annual motion likewise about the sun, (from whence it would follow, that, as *Plotinus* [2] expresseth it, the earth was ἓν τῶν ἄστρων, *one of the stars*) he was therefore still so much the more inclined to think

Pag. 30.

[1] In Quæstion. Platonic. p. 1006. Oper. Vide etiam eundem in Vitâ Numæ, Tom. I. Oper. p. 312.

[2] Lib. II. de dub. Animæ, Ennead. IV. Lib. IV. Cap. XXII. p. 414.

think the earth to be a God as well as the other planets, or at least as the moon; that having been formerly represented in the Orphick tradition but as another habitable earth. For these verses of *Orpheus* are recorded by *Proclus* [1], to that purpose;

Μήσαλο δ' ἄλλην γαῖαν ἀπείρεσιον, ἣν τε Σελήνην
Ἀθάνατοι κλήζουσιν, ἐπιχθόνιοι δέ τε Μήνην,
Ἣ πόλλ' οὔρε' ἔχει, πόλλ' ἄστεα, πολλὰ μέλαθρα.

The sense whereof is this; *That God in the cosmogonia or cosmopœia, besides this earth of ours, fabricated also another vast earth, which the immortal gods call* Selene, *but mortal men* Mene, *or the moon; that hath many hills and vallies, many cities and houses in it.* From whence *Proclus*, though as it seems a stranger to the Pythagorick system, yet being much addicted to these Orphick traditions, concluded the moon to be, γῆν αἰθερίαν, *an ethereal earth.*

See Macrob. Som. Scip. l. 1. *c.* 11.

[P. 58.] After all this, *Plato*, that he might be thought to omit nothing in his *Timæan* cosmogonia, speaks also of the *genesis*, *ortus*, or generation of the poetick gods, under the name of dæmons, such as *Tethys* and *Phorcys*, *Saturn* and *Rhea*, *Jupiter* and *Juno*, and the like; which seem to be really nothing else, but the other inanimate parts of the world and things of nature θεοποιθέντα, that is, *fictitiously personated and deified* (as is elsewhere declared.) Which whole business was a thing set off by those Poets with much fiction and physiological allegory. And though *Plato*, out of a seeming compliance with the laws of his city, pretends here to give credit to this poetick theogonia, as tradition delivered down from the sons of the gods, who must not be supposed to have been ignorant of their parents; yet, as *Eusebius* [2] well observeth, he doth but all the while slily jeer it, plainly insinuating the fabulosity thereof, when he affirmeth it to have been introduced not only ἄνευ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων [3], *without necessary demonstrations*, but also ἄνευ εἰκότων, *without so much as probabilities.* Nevertheless *Proclus* [4] suspecting no such matter, but taking *Plato* in all this to have been in very good earnest, interprets these poetick gods or dæmons mentioned by him, to be the gods below the moon, (notwithstanding that the earth was mentioned before by *Plato*) calling them γενεσιούργους θεούς, *the gods that cause generation*, and seeming to understand thereby the animated elements; *Jupiter* being here not taken, as he is often elsewhere, for the supreme God, but only for the animated æther, as *Juno* for the animated air. And upon this occasion he runs out into a long dispute, to prove, that not only the stars were animated, but also all the other sublunary bodies or elements: εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεὸς εὐδαίμων, ἔστι δὲ ἔστι τῶν συμπληρούντων αὐτὸν μορίων ἄθεον, ἢ ἀπρονόητον, εἰ δὲ μὴ θεοῦ πάντα μετέχει καὶ προνοίας, θείαν ἔλαχε φύσιν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ οἰκεῖαι τάξεις θεῶν ἐφεστήκασιν αὐτοῖς, εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς διὰ μέσων ψυχῶν καὶ νόων μετέχει τῆς μιᾶς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς νοῦ, τί χρὴ περὶ τούτων οἴεσθαι τῶν στοιχείων· πῶς οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ταῦτα διὰ δή τινων μέσων θείων τάξεων μετείληχε τῆς μιᾶς τοῦ κόσμου θεότητος· *For if the whole world be a happy God, then none of the parts of it are*

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platonis Lib. IV. p. 283. Vide etiam Lib. V. p. 292. p. 75, 76.
[2] Præparat. Evangelic. Lib. II. Cap. VII.
[3] Plat. in Timæo Cap. XXVI. p. 249.
[4] In Timæum Platon. Lib. IV. p. 287.

are godleſs, or devoid of providence; but if all things partake of God and providence, then are they not unfurniſhed of the divine nature; and if ſo, there muſt be ſome peculiar orders of Gods preſiding over them. For if the heavens by reaſon of particular ſouls and minds partake of that one ſoul and one mind; why ſhould we not conclude the ſame concerning the elements, that they alſo by certain intermedious orders of gods, partake of that one divinity of the whole world? Wherefore a little before, the ſame *Proclus* highly condemns certain ancient phyſiologers, whom he ſuppoſeth *Ariſtotle* to have followed: πολλοῖς P. 285. τῶν Φυσιολόγων ἄψυχα εἰκῇ Φερόμενα, καὶ ἀπρονόητα ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα νενόμισται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐρανία διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τάξιν, νοῦν καὶ θεῶν μετέχειν ὡμολόγηνται, τὴν δὲ γένεσιν, ὡς πολυμεθόλον, καὶ ἀόριστον, καὶ ἀπρονόητον ἀπέλιπον, οἷα δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὕστερον ἐδόξασε, ταῖς οὐρανίαις περιφοραῖς μόνως ἐπιστήσας, τὰς ἀκινήτους αἰτίας· εἴτε ὀκτὼ εἶεν, εἴτε πλείους· ἄψυχα δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα καταλείπων· *The elements were thought by moſt of the ancient Phyſiologers to be inanimate, and to be moved fortuitouſly without providence. For though they acknowledged the heavenly bodies, by reaſon of that order that appears in them, to partake of mind and gods; yet they left this ſublunary world (or geneſis) to float up and down without providence. And theſe* Ariſtotle *afterwards followed, appointing immoveable intelligences to preſide over the celeſtial ſpheres only, (whether eight or more) but leaving all the lower elements dead and inanimate.*

Laſtly, beſides all thoſe other mundane gods before mentioned, as generated together with the world, though *Proclus* ſeems to be of another opinion, yet it is manifeſt, that *Plato* doth not there in his *Timæus* altogether forget thoſe properly called dæmons, (elſewhere ſo much inſiſted upon by him) but in the very next following words he plainly inſinuates them, after this manner; [1] ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, *the gods, which appear viſibly to us as often as they pleaſe, or which can appear and diſappear at pleaſure,* ſpeaking alſo of their geneſis or generation as part of the *coſmogonia*; and then again afterwards calling them νέοι θεοὶ, junior gods, he deſcribes them as thoſe, whoſe particular office it was to ſuperintend and preſide over human affairs, [2] καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τὸ θνητὸν διακυβερνᾶν ζῶον, ὅτι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γίγνοιτο αἴτιον, *and to govern this mortal animal, man, after the beſt manner poſſible, ſo that he ſhould no otherwiſe fail of doing well or being happy, than as he became a cauſe of evil and miſery to himſelf, by the abuſe of his own liberty.*

And thus much out of *Plato*'s *Timæus*; but the ſame thing might be proved alſo out of his other writings, as particularly from that paſſage in his tenth book of laws [3], where he takes notice again of the theogonia of the ancients, and that as it had been depraved and corrupted by a great mixture of impious and immoral fables. Εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἐν γράμμασι λόγοι κείμενοι, Οἱ μὲν ἔν τισι μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων· λέγοντες περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότατοι, ὡς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐρανοῦ τῶν τε ἄλλων· προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολὺ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γενόμενοί τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλοις ὡμίλησαν· *There are,* ſaith he, *extant amongſt us* Athenians, *certain ſtories and traditions, very ancient, concerning the gods, written partly in metre, and partly in proſe, declaring how the heaven, and the other gods were at firſt made, or generated, and then carrying on their*

[1] In Timæo Cap. XXVI. p. 248 [2] Ibid. Cap. XXIX. p. 252. [3] P. 664.

their fabulous theogonia farther, how theſe generated gods afterward converſed with one another, and ingendering after the manner of men, begat other gods. Where that philoſopher taking off his vizard, plainly diſcovers his great diſlike of that whole fabulous theogonia (however he acknowledges elſewhere; that it did contain ὑπονοίας [1], that is, phyſiological allegories under it) as a thing, that was deſtructive of all piety and virtue, by reaſon of its attributing all human paſſions and vices to the gods. However, it plainly appears from hence, that the theogonia and the coſmogonia were one and the ſame thing, the generation of the gods being here the generation of the heaven, and of the ſun, moon, and ſtars, and the like.

Moreover, this ſame thing is ſufficiently manifeſt alſo even from *Heſiod*'s own Theogonia, which doubtleſs was that, which *Plato* principally aimed at; and if it were not abſolutely the firſt, yet is it the moſt ancient writing now extant, in that kind. For there in the beginning of that poem, *Heſiod* [2] invokes his muſes after this manner;

Χαίρετε, τέκνα Διὸς, δότε δὲ ἱμερόεσσαν ἀοιδήν·
Κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
Οἳ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανῦ ἀστερόεντος,
Νυκτός δὲ δυσφερῆς, οὓς Θ' ἁλμυρὸς ἔτρεφε Πόντος.
Εἴπατε δ', ὡς τὰ πρῶτα Θεοὶ καὶ Γαῖα γένοντο,
Καὶ Ποταμοί, καὶ Πόντος ἀπείριτος οἰδματι θύων,
Ἀστρά τε λαμπετόωντα, καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν,
Οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων.

Salvete natæ Jovis, *date verò amabilem cantilenam:*
Celebrate quoque immortalium divinum genus ſemper exiſtentium,
Qui tellure prognati ſunt, cælo ſtellato,
Noctéque caliginosâ, quos item ſalſus nutrivit pontus.
Dicite inſuper, ut primùm dii & terræ facti fuerint,
Et flumina, & pontus immenſus æſtu fervens,
Aſtraque fulgentia, & cælum latum ſupernè,
Et qui ex his nati ſunt, dii, datores bonorum.

Where we ſee plainly, that the generation of the gods is the generation of the earth, heaven, ſtars, ſeas, rivers, and other things begotten from them (as probably amongſt the reſt dæmons and nymphs, which the ſame *Heſiod* ſpeaks of elſewhere.) But immediately after this invocation of the muſes, the Poet begins with Chaos, and Tartara, and Love, as the firſt principles, and then proceeds to the production of the earth, and of night out of chaos; of the æther, and of day from night; of the ſtarry heavens, mountains, and ſeas, *&c.* All which geneſis or generation of gods is really nothing but a poetical deſcription of the coſmogonia; as throughout the ſequel of that whole poem all ſeems to be phyſiology, veiled under fiction and allegories. And thus the ancient ſcholia upon that book begin, ἰστέον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τῆς Θεογονίας λόγος Φυσικὴν διήγησιν τῶν ὄντων ὑπαγορεύει, *we muſt know, that the whole doctrine of the theogonia contains under it, in way of allegory, a phyſiological declaration of things*; *Heſiod*'s gods being not only the animated parts of the world, but alſo

[1] Vide Platon. de Republ. Lib. II. p. 430. [2] Theogon. verſ. 104.

alſo all the other things of nature, fictitiouſly perſonated and deified, or abuſively called gods and goddeſſes.

Neither was this only the doctrine of the *Greeks*, that the world was thus made or generated, and that the generation of the world was a Theogonia, or a generation of gods, (the world itſelf and its ſeveral parts being accounted ſuch by them) but alſo in like manner of the other Barbarian pagans. For *Diogenes Laertius* hath recorded concerning the *Perſian* Magi, ἀποφαίνεσθαι περί τε ὑσίας θεῶν καὶ γενέσεως, ὃς καὶ πῦρ εἶναι καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ[1]· *That they did both aſſert the being and generation of gods, and alſo that theſe gods were fire, and earth and water*; that is, that the animated elements were gods, (as *Proclus* alſo before declared) and that theſe, together with the world, were generated, or had a beginning. And both *Laertius* and *Diodorus* repreſent it as the opinion of the ancient *Egyptians*, that the world was generated, or had a temporary production; as alſo, that the ſun and moon, and other parts of the world, were gods. But whereas the ſame *Diodorus* writes of certain *Egyptian* gods, οἱ γένεσιν ἀΐδιον ἐσχηκότες, *which had an eternal generation*; he ſeems to mean thereby only the celeſtial gods, the ſun, moon and ſtars, as diſtinct from thoſe other heroes and men-gods, which are again thus deſcribed by him: οἱ θνητοὶ ὑπάρξαντες, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν, τετυχηκότες τῆς ἀθανασίας: *who, though naturally mortal, yet, by reaſon of their wiſdom, virtue and beneficence toward mankind, had been advanced to immortality.*

In Proœm. p. 2.

In the Perſian Sacrifices, μάγος ἀνὴρ παρεσεως ἐπαειδει θεογονίην, *one of the Magi ſtanding by ſung the Theogonia, (i. e.* the Coſmogonia.) *Herod. in Clio. n.* 132. [Lib. I. p. 55.]

And by this time we think it doth ſufficiently appear, that the Theogonia of the ancients is not to be underſtood merely of their heroes and men-gods, or of all their gods, as ſuppoſed to have been nothing elſe but mortal men, *(Dii mortalibus nati matribus*, as *Cotta* in *Cicero*[2] ſpeaks) who, according to the more vulgar ſignification of the word, had been generated, *(humano more)* as ſome, otherwiſe learned men, have ſeemed to ſuppoſe; but that it extends to all the inferior Pagan gods, ſome whereof were parts of the viſible world animated, as the ſun, moon, ſtars and earth: ſo that their Theogonia was the very ſame thing with the Coſmogonia, or at leaſt a part thereof. Notwithſtanding which, we deny not, but that there was alſo in the paganick fables of the gods a certain mixture of hiſtory and herology interſerted, and complicated all along together with phyſiology.

We are, in the next place, to obſerve, that both this Theogonia and Coſmogonia of the ancient Pagans, their generation of the world and gods, is to be underſtood of a temporary production of them, whereby they were made ἐκ μὴ ὄντων, or from an antecedent non-exiſtence brought into being. For this was the general tradition amongſt the Pagans, that the world was made out of an antecedent chaos, as ſhall be afterwards further declared. And *Ariſtotle*[3] affirmeth, that before his time, this geneſis and temporary production of the world had been univerſally entertained by all, and particularly

[1] Vide etiam Herodot. Hiſt. Lib. I. Cap. CXXXI. p. 55.

[2] De Natur. Deor. Lib. III. Cap. XVIII.

[3] De Cœlo, Lib. I. Cap. X. p. 632, Tom. I. p. 307. Tom. IX. Oper.

ticularly, that *Plato* was an assertor of the same. Nevertheless, the generality of the latter Platonists [1] endeavour, with all their might, to force a contrary sense upon his *Timæus:* which is a thing, that *Plutarch* long since observed after this manner; οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν χρωμένων Πλάτωνι, φοβούμενοι, καὶ παραλυπούμενοι, πάντα μηχανῶνται, καὶ παραβιάζονται καὶ στρέφουσιν, ὥς τι δεινὸν καὶ ἄῤῥητον οἰόμενοι δεῖν περικαλύπτειν καὶ ἀρνεῖσθαι, τὴν τε τοῦ κόσμου τήν τε τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ γένεσιν καὶ σύστασιν, ἐκ ἐξ ἀϊδίου συνεστώτων, οὐδὲ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον οὕτως ἐχόντων. *The most of* Plato's *followers, being infinitely troubled and perplexed in their minds, turn themselves every way, using all manner of arts, and offering all kind of violence to his text, as conceiving, that they ought by all means possible to hide and conceal that opinion (as infand and detestable) of the generation of the world, and of the soul of it, so as not to have continued from eternity, or through a succession of infinite time.* Notwithstanding which, we conceive it to be undeniably evident, that *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, doth assert the genesis of the world in this sense, to wit, of a temporary production of it, and as not having existed from eternity, or without beginning. First, because in the entrance of that discourse [2] he opposeth these two things to one another, τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, *that which always is*, and τὸ γέννεσιν ἔχον, *that which is generated or made*; and therefore, in affirming the world to have been generated, he must needs deny the eternity thereof. Again, the question is so punctually stated by him afterwards, as that there is no possibility of any subterfuge left, πότερον ἦν ἀεὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος; *Whether the world always were, having no beginning or generation, or whether it was made or generated, having commenced from a certain epocha?* To which the answer is, γέγονεν, *that it was made, or had a beginning.* Moreover, this philosopher there plainly affirms also [3], that time itself was made, or had a beginning; χρόνος δ' οὖν μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν, ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες, ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, ἄν ποτε λύσις τις αὐτῶν γένηται. *Time was made together with the heaven, that being both generated together, they might be both dissolved together likewise, if at least there should ever be any dissolution of them.* Besides which, he plainly declares, that before this orderly world was produced, the matter of it did move disorderly [4]; πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν, παραλαβὼν, οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. *God taking all that matter, which was, (not then resting, but moving confusedly and disorderly) he brought it into order out of confusion.* Which is no more than if he should have said, God made this world out of an antecedent chaos; which, as we said before, was the constant tradition of the ancient Pagans. Now, as to authority, we may well conclude, that *Aristotle* was better able to understand both *Plato*'s philosophy and *Greek*, than any of those junior Platonists, who lived hundreds of years after. And yet we are not quite destitute of other suffrages besides *Aristotle*'s neither, not only *Philo* the Jew [5], but also *Plutarch* [6] and *Atticus* [7], who were both of them Platonick Pagans, voting on this side, besides *Alexander Aphrodisius* [8], a judicious Peripatetick.

De Psychog. Plat. p. 1013. P.

The

[1] Vide Proclum in Timæum Platon.
[2] Cap. XII. p. 235.
[3] Cap. XX. p. 245.
[4] Timæi Cap. XIV. p. 237.
[5] In Libro, quod mundus sit incorruptibilis, p. 941. Oper.
[6] In Libro de animæ procreat. p. 1013, 1014. Tom. II. Oper.
[7] Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. Lib. XV. Cap. VI. p. 801.
[8] Comment. in Libros Metaphys. Aristot. p. 181. Ed. Latin. Paris. 1506. fol.

The only objection conſiderable is from what *Plato* himſelf writes in his third and ſixth book of Laws; in the former whereof *Clinias* and the *Athenian Hoſpes* diſcourſe together after this manner, concerning the original or firſt beginning of commonwealths: Πολιτείας δ' ἀρχὴν τίνα ποτὲ φῶμεν γε- *P. 676. Steph.*
γονέναι; ΚΛ. Λέγεις δὲ πόθεν; ΑΘ. Οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας, καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ. ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις; ΑΘ. Φέρε, ἀφ' ὅ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε καλανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέγονεν; ΚΛ. Οὔκουν ῥᾴδιόν γε εὐθαμῶς. ΑΘ. Τὸ δέ γε ὡς ἄπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη. ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε. ΑΘ. Μῶν οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόναζι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους λόγον, οὐκ ἐλάττως ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκάστοτε; καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλατόνων, μείζους, τοῖς δὲ ἐκ μειζόνων, ἐλάττους· καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόναζι, καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων. Ath. *What beginning ſhall we ſay there was of commonwealths?* Cl. *Whence would yourſelf derive them?* Ath. *I ſuppoſe from a great length and infinity of time, through ſucceſſive changes.* Cl. *I underſtand not well what you mean.* Ath. *Thus therefore, do you think, that you are able to determine what length or quantity of time there hath been ſince cities and polities of men firſt began?* Cl. *This is by no means eaſy to be done.* Ath. *Wherefore there is a kind of infinity and ineſtimability of this time.* Cl. *It is very true.* Ath. *Have there not then been innumerable cities conſtituted within this time, and as many again deſtroyed, of all ſeveral forms; they being changed from greater to leſſer, and from leſſer to greater, from better to worſer, and from worſer to better?* Now, we ſay, that if *Plato* intended here to aſſert an abſolute infinity of time paſt, then it muſt needs be granted, that in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, he changed his opinion from what it was before when he wrote his *Timæus*; and if ſo, he ought in all reaſon to have retracted the ſame, which he does not here do. But in very truth, the meaning of this philoſopher, in thoſe words cited, ſeems to be this; not that there was an abſolute infinity of time paſt, (as *Proclus* contends, taking advantage of that word ἀπειρία) but only that the world had laſted ſuch a length of time, as was in a manner ineſtimable to us, or uncomputable by us; there having happened, as he addeth, in the mean time, ſeveral ſucceſſive deſtructions and conſumptions of mankind, by means of various accidents, as particularly one moſt remarkable deluge and inundation of waters. The latter place, in his ſixth book of Laws, runs thus; ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένεζις ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν ἔληχεν, οὐδ' *P. 781.*
ἕξει ποτέ γε τελευτήν· ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πάντως· ἢ μῆκός τι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν, ἀμήχανον ἂν χρόνου ὅσου γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη. *Either the generation of men had no beginning at all, and will have no end, but always was and always will be; or elſe there has been an ineſtimable length of time from the beginning of it.* Which place affordeth ſtill more light to the former; for we may well conclude, that by ἄπειρόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον there was not meant an abſolute infinity of time, but only ſuch as had a very remote or diſtant beginning, becauſe ἀμήχανον here is plainly taken in that ſenſe. We conceive therefore, that this was *Plato*'s opinion in his old age, when he wrote his book of Laws, that though the world had a beginning, yet it had continued a very long time not computable by us; or at leaſt he thought fit to declare himſelf after that manner, perhaps by reaſon of the

clamours of *Ariſtotle*, or ſome others againſt his *Timæus*, that ſo he might thereby ſomewhat mollify that opinion of the novity of the world, by removing the epocha and date thereof to ſo great a diſtance.

Now, it is very true, what we have ſeveral times before ſuggeſted, that there have been amongſt the Pagans both Theogoniſts and Coſmogoniſts too, that were Atheiſts; they abuſing the word gods ſeveral ways; ſome of them, as *Anaximander*, underſtanding thereby inanimate worlds ſucceſſively generated out of ſenſleſs matter, and corrupted again into it; others, as *Anaximenes* and *Democritus*, allowing, that there were certain animals and underſtanding being ſuperior to men, but ſuch only as were native and mortal, in like manner as men, and calling theſe by the name of gods. Of the former of which two philoſophers, St. *Auſtin*[1] gives us this account: Anaximenes *omnes rerum cauſas infinito aëri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit, non tamen ab ipſis aërem factum, ſed ipſos ex aëre ortos credidit:* Anaximenes *made infinite air to be the firſt original and cauſe of all things; and yet was he not therefore ſilent concerning the gods, much leſs did he deny them; nevertheleſs he did not believe the air to have been made by the gods, but the gods to have been all generated out of the air.* Theſe were therefore ſuch Theogoniſts, as ſuppoſed all the gods without exception to be generable and corruptible, and acknowledged no θεὸν ἀγέννητον at all, no underſtanding being unmade and ſelf-exiſtent; but concluded ſenſleſs matter to be the only ἀγέννητον and original of all things, which is abſolute atheiſm. Notwithſtanding which, it is certain, that all the Pagan Theogoniſts were not Atheiſts, (no more than all their Coſmogoniſts Theiſts) but that there was another ſort of Theogoniſts amongſt them, who ſuppoſed indeed all the inferior mundane gods to have been made or generated in one ſenſe or other; but aſſerted one θεὸν ἀγέννητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, *one ſupreme unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, who was the cauſe of them all: which Theogoniſts, for diſtinction ſake from thoſe other atheiſtick ones, may be called divine.

And that *Plato* was ſuch a divine Theogoniſt, is a thing, as we conceive, out of queſtion: but if there had been any doubt concerning it, it would have been ſufficiently removed from thoſe paſſages before cited out of his *Timæus*. To which nevertheleſs, for fuller ſatisfaction ſake, may be added theſe two following: the firſt, *pag.* 34. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ὄντως ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ, περὶ τὸν ποτὲ ἐσόμενον θεὸν λογισθείς· For thus it ought to be read ὄντως, as it is alſo in *Aldus* his edition; and not ὄντως, as in *Stephens*, following an error in that of *Ficinus*. And accordingly the words are thus rendred by *Cicero: Hæc Deus is, qui ſemper erat, de aliquando futuro deo cogitans, lævem eum effecit, & undique æquabilem, &c. This was the ratiocination or reſolution of that God, which always is, concerning that god, which was ſometime about to be made, that he ſhould be ſmooth and ſpherical*, &c. Where again, it preſently follows in *Cicero*'s verſion, *Sic Deus ille æternus hunc perfectè beatum deum procreavit; thus that eternal God procreated this perfectly happy god the world.* Where there is plainly mention made of two gods, one a generated,

[1] De Civitate Dei, Lib. VIII. Cap. II. p. 147. Tom. VII. Oper.

generated god, the animated world, called elſewhere in *Plato* θεῖον γενητὸν; and another eternal and unmade God, *innatus & infectus Deus*, who was the cauſe of the world's generation or production; or, to keep cloſe to *Plato*'s own language, one God who belonged to geneſis, or that head of being, which he calls generation, and therefore muſt needs have an antecedent cauſe of his exiſtence, ſince nothing can be made without a cauſe; and another God, that was truly and properly οὐσία, *immutable eſſence*, who was the cauſe of that generated god the univerſe, and therefore of all things. The other paſſage of *Plato*'s is, *pag.* 41. of his *Timæus*, ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς, καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοὶ, γένεσιν ἔσχον, λέγει πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, τάδε, Θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ δημιουργὸς, παλήρ τε ἔργων, ἃ δι' ἐμοῦ γενόμενα· *When therefore all the gods, both thoſe which move viſibly about the heavens, and thoſe which appear to us as often as they pleaſe*, (that is, both the ſtars and dæmons) *were generated or created, that God, which made this whole univerſe, beſpake theſe generated gods after this manner*; *Ye gods of gods (whom I myſelf am the maker and father of) attend.* Where the words θεοὶ θεῶν, notwithſtanding *Proclus* his other differing conjectures, ſeem to have been very well rendred by *Cicero*; *Dii, qui deorum ſatu orti eſtis, Ye gods, which are the progeny or off-ſpring of the gods.* And the gods, whoſe off-ſpring theſe generated gods (the animated ſtars and dæmons) are ſaid to be, muſt needs be thoſe ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ, *thoſe eternal gods*, elſewhere mentioned in the ſame *Timæus*, as where the philoſopher calls the world [1], τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα, *a generated or created image of the eternal gods*; as *Cicero* alſo is to be underſtood of theſe, when he ſpeaks of the world's being made by the gods, and by the counſel of the gods. Now, theſe eternal gods of *Plato*, called by his followers θεοὶ ὑπερκόσμιοι, *the ſupramundane gods*, though, according to that ſtricter notion of the word γένεσις, as it is uſed both in *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* for a temporary production of things ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, they were indeed all ἀγέννητοι, becauſe they never were not, and had no beginning of their exiſtence; yet, notwithſtanding were they not therefore ſuppoſed by that philoſopher to be all αὐτόγονοι and αὐθυπόστατοι, ſo many *ſelf-originated* and *ſelf-ſubſiſtent beings*, or firſt principles, but only one of them ſuch, and the reſt derived from that one: it being very true, as we conceive, what *Proclus* affirms, ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐπὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἀνάγει πάντα, *that* Plato *reduces all things to one principle*, even matter itſelf; but unqueſtionable, that he deriveth all his gods from one. Wherefore all thoſe eternal gods of *Plato*, (one only excepted) though they were not γέννητοι, or generated in one ſenſe, that is, κατὰ χρόνον, as to a temporary beginning, yet were they notwithſtanding, as *Proclus* diſtinguiſheth, γέννητοι ἀπ' αἰτίας, generated in another ſenſe, as produced from a ſuperior cauſe, there being only one ſuch ἀγέννητος, one ingenerate or unproduced Deity. Thus, according to *Plato*, there were two ſorts of ſecondary or inferior and derivative gods; firſt, the θεοὶ ἐγκόσμιοι, or *mundane gods*, ſuch as had all of them a temporary generation with the world, and of whom *Plato*'s Theogonia and γενέσεις θεῶν is properly to be underſtood; and ſecondly, the ὑπερκόσμιοι and ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ, the *ſupramundane and eternal gods*, which were all of them alſo, ſave only one, produced from that one, and dependent on it as their cauſe.

In Timæ. p. 116.

[1] Timæi, Cap. XXI. p. 245. ſ.

cauſe. But of theſe inferior eternal gods of the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans we are to ſpeak again afterwards. In the mean time it is evident, that in that paſſage of *Plato*'s before cited, there is plain mention made both of θεοὶ γένεσιν ἔχοντες, of *dii orti*, *gods who were made or generated* with the world, and of ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, *of one God, who was the maker of them*, and of the whole univerſe, who therefore is himſelf every way ἀγέννητος, *unmade* or *unproduced*. And accordingly he afterwards ſubjoins, καὶ ὁ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα πάντα διατάξας, ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει· μένοντος δὲ νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς τάξιν, ἐπείθοντο αὐτῇ. which *Cicero* thus renders; *Atque is quidem (Deus) qui cuncta compoſuit, conſtanter in ſuo manebat ſtatu; qui autem erant ab eo creati (dii) cùm parentis ordinem cognoviſſent, hunc ſequebantur, &c. Then that God, who framed all things, remained conſtantly in his former ſtate; and his ſons, or the gods that were created by him, obſerved his order and appointment.*

Neither was *Plato* ſingular in this, but the generality of the other Pagan Theiſts, who were more intelligent, all along agreed with him herein, as to the generation of the mundane gods; and ſo were both Theiſts and Theogoniſts, they indeed underſtanding nothing elſe by their Theogonia, or generation of gods, than a divine Coſmogonia, or creation of the world by God; foraſmuch as they ſuppoſed the world itſelf as animated, and its ſeveral parts to be gods. So that they aſſerted theſe three things; firſt, a Coſmogonia, the generation of the world, that it was not from eternity, but had a novity or beginning; ſecondly, that this Coſmogonia, or generation of the world, was alſo a Theogonia, or generation of gods, the world itſelf and ſeveral of its parts animated being eſteemed ſuch; and laſtly, that both theſe gods and the world were made and produced by one θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ αὐτογενής, one *unproduced and ſelf-orginated Deity*. All which particulars we may here briefly exemplify in *P. Ovidius Naſo*, whoſe paganity ſufficiently appears from his *Faſtorum* and all his other writings, and who alſo went off the ſtage before Chriſtianity appeared on it, and may well be preſumed to repreſent the then generally received doctrine of the pagans. Firſt therefore, as for the generation and novity of the world, and its firſt production out of a chaos, we have it fully acknowledged by him in theſe following verſes:

Metam. l. 1. [Verſ. 5.]

Ante mare & terras, &, quod tegit omnia, cœlum,
Unus erat toto naturæ vultus in orbe,
Quem dixere chaos, rudis indigeſtaque moles,
Nec quicquam niſi pondus iners, congeſtaque eodem
Non benè junctarum diſcordia ſemina rerum.
Nullus adhuc mundo præbebat lumina Titan,
Nec nova creſcendo reparabat cornua Phœbe,
Nec circumfuſo pendebat in aëre tellus,
Ponderibus librata ſuis; nec brachia longo
Margine terrarum porrexerat Amphitrite.
Quaque erat & tellus, &c.

Which in Mr. *Sandys* his *Engliſh*, with ſome little alteration, ſpeaks thus:

Before

Before that ſea, and earth, and heaven was fram'd,
One face had nature, which they chaos nam'd.
No Titan *yet the world with light adorns,*
Nor waxing Phebe *fills her wained horns;*
Nor hung the ſelf-poiz'd earth in thin air plac'd,
Nor Amphitrite *the vaſt ſhore embrac'd;*
Earth, air, and ſea confounded, &c.

In the next place, when there was a world made out of this chaos, that this Coſmogonia, or generation of the world, was alſo a Theogonia, or generation of gods, is plainly intimated in theſe verſes:

Neu regio foret ulla ſuis animalibus orba,
Aſtra tenent cæleſte ſolum, formæqne deorum.

To this ſenſe,

That nought of animals might unfurniſh'd lie,
The gods, in form of ſtars, poſſeſs the ſky.

And that all this was effected, and this orderly mundane ſyſtem produced out of a diſorderly confuſed chaos, not by a fortuitous motion of matter, or the jumbling of atoms, but by the providence and command of one unmade Deity, which was alſo that, that furniſhed all the ſeveral parts of the world with reſpective animals, the ſea with fiſhes, the earth with men, and the heaven with gods; is thus declared alſo by the poet:

Hanc Deus & melior litem natura diremit,
Nam cælo terras, & terris abſcidit undas:
Et liquidum ſpiſſo ſecrevit ab aëre cælum, &c.
Sic ubi diſpoſitam, quiſquis fuit ille deorum,
Congeriem ſecuit, ſectámque in membra redegit;
Principio terram, nè non æqualis ab omni
Parte foret, magni ſpeciem glomeravit in orbis:
Tum freta diffudit, rapidiſque tumeſcere ventis
Juſſit, &c.
Sic onus incluſum numero diſtinxit eodem
Cura Dei, &c.

This ſtrife (with better nature) God decides,
He earth from heaven, the ſea from earth divides:
He æther pure extracts from groſſer air.
All which unfolded by his prudent care,
From that blind maſs; the happily disjoin'd
With ſtrifeleſs peace, he to their ſeats confin'd, &c.
What God ſoever this diviſion wrought,
And every part to due proportion brought,
Firſt, leſt the earth unequal ſhould appear,
He turn'd it round in figure of a ſphere.
Then ſeas diffus'd, commanding them to roar
With ruffling winds, and give the land a ſhore.

To thoſe he added ſprings, ponds, lakes immenſe,
And rivers whom their winding borders fence.

Where though that learned paraphraſt ſuppoſed (and not without ſome probability neither) that *Deus & melior natura, God and the better nature*, were one and the ſelf-ſame thing, yet we rather conceived them to be diſtinct, but one of them ſubordinate to the other as its inſtrument, God and the plaſtick nature; accordingly as *Ariſtotle* writes in his Phyſicks, Νοῦς καὶ Φύσις αἴτιον τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, *That mind and nature were both together the cauſe of this univerſe.*

Nevertheleſs, we cannot but obſerve in this place, that though that poet ſpeaks more than once of God ſingularly, as alſo calls him *mundi fabricator*, and *ille opifex rerum*, and *mundi melioris origo*; yet notwithſtanding, where he writes of the making of man, Pagan-like, he affirms him, though to have been made by God, yet according to the image or likeneſs of the gods, which govern all things.

Sanctius his animal, mentiſque capacius altæ,
Deerat adhuc, & quod dominari in cætera poſſet;
Natus homo eſt: ſive hunc divino ſemine fecit,
Ille opifex rerum, mundi melioris origo:
Sive recens tellus, ſeductáque nuper ab alto
Æthere, cognati retinebat ſemina cœli.
Quam ſatus Iapeto, miſtam fluvialibus undis,
Finxit in effigiem moderantûm cuncta deorum.

The nobler being, with a mind poſſeſt,
Was wanting yet, that ſhould command the reſt.
That maker, the beſt world's original,
Either him fram'd of ſeed celeſtial;
Or earth, which late he did from heaven divide,
Some ſacred ſeeds retain'd to heaven allied:
Which with the living ſtream Prometheus *mixt,*
And in that artificial ſtructure fixt
The form of all the all-ruling deities.

And becauſe ſome may probably be puzzled with this ſeeming contradiction, that one God ſhould be ſaid to be the maker of the whole world and of man, and yet the government of all ſhould be attributed to gods plurally, and man ſaid to be made in the image and likeneſs of the gods; we ſhall therefore add here, that according to the tenor of the Pagan theology, the inferior and minor gods were ſuppoſed alſo to have all of them their ſeveral ſhare in the government of things below them: for which cauſe they are called not only by *Maximus Tyrius* [1] συνάρχοντες θεῷ, *co-rulers with God*, but alſo by *Plato* himſelf, τῷ μεγίστῳ δαίμονι συνάρχοντες, *the co-governors and co-reigners with the ſupreme God.* So that the government of this inferior world was by the Pagans often attributed to them jointly, the ſupreme and inferior gods both together, under that one general name of gods. But the chief of thoſe inferior deities, in whoſe image man is alſo ſaid to have been made, as well as in the likeneſs of the ſupreme, were either thoſe celeſtial gods and animated ſtars before mentioned by the poet, or elſe the eternal gods of *Plato*, which were look'd upon likewiſe as co-makers of the world ſubordinate. Beſides

[1] Diſſertat. I. p. 5. Edit. Lugd. 1631. 8vo.

Beſides *Ovid*, we might inſtance here in many more of the pagan Theogoniſts clearly acknowledging in like manner one unmade Deity, which generated both the world and all the other gods in it; as for example, *Strabo*, who affirming that the world was τῆς φύσεως ἅμα καὶ τῆς προνοίας ἔργον, *the joint work both of nature and providence*, as it was before aſcribed by *Ovid* to *Deus & melior natura*, adds concerning providence or the Deity in this manner; Τὸ δὲ τῆς προνοίας, ὅτι βεβούληται καὶ αὐτὴ ποικιλοτέρα τις ὖσα, καὶ μυρίων ἔργων δημιουργὸς, ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ζῶα γεννᾷν, ὡς πολὺ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ τούτων τὰ κράτιστα Θεούς, τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὧν ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συνέστηκε. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν Θεοῖς ἀπέδειξε τὸν οὐρανὸν, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις τὴν γῆν· *That having a multiform fecundity in it, and delighting in variety of works, it deſigned principally to make animals as the moſt excellent things, and amongſt them chiefly thoſe two nobleſt kinds of animals, gods and men; for whoſe ſakes the other things were made; and then aſſigned heaven to the gods, and earth to men, the two extreme parts of the world for their reſpective habitations.* Thus alſo *Seneca* in *Lactantius* [1], ſpeaking concerning God; *Hic cùm prima fundamenta molis pulcherrimæ jaceret, & hoc ordiretur, quo neque majus quicquam novit natura nec melius; ut omnia ſub ducibus irent, quamvis ipſe per totum ſe corpus intenderat, tamen miniſtros regni ſui deos genuit. God, when he laid the foundations of this moſt beautiful fabrick, and began to erect that ſtructure, than which nature knows nothing greater or more excellent; to the end that all things might be carried on under their reſpective governors orderly, though he intended himſelf through the whole, as to preſide in chief over all, yet did he generate gods alſo, as ſubordinate miniſters of his kingdom under him.* We ſhall forbear to mention the teſtimonies of others here, becauſe they may be more oportunely inſerted elſewhere; only we ſhall add, as to *Heſiod* and *Homer*, that though they ſeem to have been ſometimes ſuſpected, both by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, for atheiſtick Theogoniſts, yet as *Ariſtotle* did upon maturer thoughts afterwards change his opinion concerning both of them, ſo is it moſt probable, that they were no Atheiſts but divine Theogoniſts, ſuch as ſuppoſed indeed many generated gods, but one ſupreme unmade Deity, the Maker both of the world and them. And this not only for the grounds before alledged concerning *Heſiod*, and becauſe both of them do every where affirm even their generated gods to be immortal, (which no Atheiſts did) but alſo for ſundry other reaſons, ſome of which may be more conveniently inſerted elſewhere. Moreover it hath been already intimated, that the generated gods of *Heſiod* and *Homer* extend farther than thoſe of *Plato*'s, they being not only the animated parts of the world, but alſo all the other things of nature fictitiouſly perſonated, and improperly or abuſively called gods and goddeſſes; whereof a farther account will be afterwards given.

L. 17. *p.* 809.

Neither ought it at all to be wondered at, if theſe divine Theogoniſts amongſt the Pagans did many times, as well as thoſe other atheiſtick ones, make Chaos and the Ocean ſenior to the gods, and Night the mother of them. The former of theſe being not only done by *Heſiod* and *Homer*, but

[1] Divin. Inſtitut. Lib. I. Cap. V. p. 40.

alſo by the generality of the ancient pagan Theiſts in *Epicharmus* [1]; and the latter by *Orpheus* [2] an undoubted Theiſt, in his hymn of the Night,

Νύκτα θεῶν γενέτειραν, ἀείσομαι, ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν·

Noctem concelebro genetricem hominúmque deúmque.

They not underſtanding this abſolutely and univerſally of all the gods without exception, as the other atheiſtick Theogoniſts did, as if there had been no unmade Deity at all, but Chaos and Night, (that is, ſenſeleſs matter blindly and fortuitouſly moved) had been the ſole original of all things, but only of the οἱ Θεοὶ, *the gods*, ſo called by way of diſtinction from God or the ſupreme Deity, that is, the inferior mundane gods generated together with the world. The reaſon whereof was, becauſe it was a moſt ancient, and in a manner univerſally received tradition amongſt the Pagans, as hath been often intimated, that the coſmogonia or generation of the world took its firſt beginning from a chaos, (the divine Coſmogoniſts agreeing herein with the atheiſtick ones;) this tradition having been delivered down from *Orpheus* and *Linus* (amongſt the Greeks) by *Heſiod* and *Homer*, and others; acknowledged by *Epicharmus*; and embraced by *Thales*, *Anaxagoras*, *Plato*, and other philoſophers, who were Theiſts: the antiquity whereof was thus declared by *Euripides* [3];

Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα,
Ὡς οὐρανός τε γαῖα τ' ἦν μορφὴ μία,
Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων δίχα,
Τίκτουσι πάντα, κἀνέδωκαν εἰς φάος,
Τά τ' δένδρα, πτηνά, θῆρας, οὓς θ' ἅλμη τρέφει,
Γένος τε θνητῶν·

Non hic meus, ſed matris eſt ſermo meæ,
Figura ut una fuerit & cæli & ſoli,
Secreta quæ mox ut receperunt ſtatum,
Cuncta ediderunt hæc in oras luminis;
Feras, volucres, arbores, ponti gregem,
Homines quoque ipſos.

Neither can it reaſonably be doubted, but that it was originally Moſaical, and indeed at firſt a divine revelation, ſince no man could otherwiſe pretend to know what was done before mankind had any being. Wherefore thoſe pagan Coſmogoniſts, who were Theiſts, being Polytheiſts and Theogoniſts alſo, and aſſerting, beſides the one ſupreme unmade Deity, other inferior mundane gods, generated together with the world (the chief whereof were the animated ſtars) they muſt needs, according to the tenor of that tradition, ſuppoſe them as to their corporeal parts at leaſt, to have been juniors to Night and Chaos, and the off-ſpring of them, becauſe they were all made out of an antecedent dark chaos. Τὴν μυγαλὴν ἐκτεθειάθαι λέγουσιν (ſaith *Plutarch*) ὑπὸ Αἰγυπτίων τυφλὴν οὖσαν, ὅτι τὸ σκότος τοῦ φώτος ἡγοῦντο πρεσβύτερον· *The-*

Sympoſ. L. 4. Qu. 5. [p. 670. Tom. II. Oper.]

[1] Apud Diog. Laert. Lib. III. Segm. 10. p. 170.

[2] P. 99. Oper. Vide etiam eundem in Argonautic. verſ. 339. p. 24. & Proclum in Timæum Platonis, Lib. 2. p 63.

[3] In Menalippe apud Diodor. Sicul. Lib. I. Cap. IV. & Euſebium Præparat. Evangel. Lib. I. Cap. V. p. 20.

The mus araneus *being blind, is ſaid to have been deified by the* Egyptians, *becauſe they thought, that Darkneſs was older than Light.* And the caſe was the ſame concerning their dæmons likewiſe, they being conceived to have their corporeal vehicula alſo; for which cauſe, as *Porphyrius*[1] from *Numenius* writeth, the ancient *Egyptians* pictured them in ſhips or boats floating upon the water: τὺς δὲ Αἰγυπτίυς διὰ τῦτο τὺς δαίμονας ἅπαντας ὐκ ἑςάναι ἐπὶ ςερεῦ, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐπὶ πλοίυ· *The* Egyptians *therefore repreſented all their dæmons, as not ſtanding upon firm land, but in ſhips upon the water.* But as for the incorporeal part or ſouls of thoſe inferior gods, though theſe divine Theogoniſts could not derive their original from Chaos or matter, but rather from that other principle called Love, as being divinely created, and ſo having God for their father, yet might they notwithſtanding, in another ſenſe, fancy Night to have been their mother too, inaſmuch as they were all made ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων, *from an antecedent non-exiſtence* or *nothing*, brought forth into being. For which cauſe there ſeems to have been in *Orpheus* a dialogue betwixt the Maker of the world and Night[2]. For that this ancient cabala, which derived the coſmogonia from Chaos and Love, was at firſt religious and not atheiſtical, and Love underſtood in it not to be the off-ſpring of Chaos, may be concluded from hence, becauſe this Love as well as Chaos was of a Moſaical extraction alſo, and plainly derived from that ſpirit of God, which is ſaid in Scripture to have moved upon the waters, that is, upon the chaos; whether by this ſpirit be to be meant God himſelf, as acting immediately upon the matter, or ſome other active principle derived from God and not from matter, (as a mundane ſoul or plaſtick nature.) From whence alſo it came, that as *Porphyrius* teſtifieth, the ancient Pagans thought the water to be divinely inſpired; ἡγῦντο γὰρ προσιζάνειν τῷ ὕδατι τὰς ψυχὰς θεοπνόῳ ὄντι ὥς φησιν ὁ Νυμήνιος διὰ τῦτο λέγων ϗ τὸν προφήτην εἰρηκέναι, ἐμφέρεσθαι ἐπάνω τῦ ὕδατος θεῦ πνεῦμα· *They thought, that ſouls attended upon the water or reſorted thereunto, as being divinely inſpired, as* Numenius *writeth, adding the prophet alſo therefore to have ſaid, that the ſpirit of God moved upon the water.* *De Ant. Nymph. p. 256.*

And that this cabala was thus underſtood by ſome of the ancient pagan Coſmogoniſts themſelves, appears plainly, not only from *Simmias Rhodius* and *Parmenides*, but alſo from theſe following verſes of *Orpheus*, or whoever was the writer of thoſe Argonauticks, undoubtedly ancient, where Chaos and Love are thus brought in together;

Πρῶτα μὲν ἀρχαίυ Χάεος μελιήφατον ὕμνον,
Ὡς ἐπάμειψε φύσεις, ὡς τ' ὐρανὸς εἰς πέρας ἦλθε,
Γῆς τ' εὐρυςέρνυ γένεσιν, πυθμενά τε θαλάσσης,
Πρεσβύτατόν τε ϗ αὐτοτελῆ πολύμητιν Ἔρωτα,
Ὅσσα τ' ἔφυκεν ἅπαντα, διέκρινε δ' ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλυ·

P. 17. Ed. Steph.

To this ſenſe; *We will firſt ſing a pleaſant and delightful ſong concerning the ancient Chaos, how heaven, earth and ſeas were framed out of it; as alſo concerning that much-wiſe and ſagacious Love, the oldeſt of all, and ſelf-perfect, which actively produced all theſe things, ſeparating one thing from another.*

 Where

[1] De Antro Nymphar. p. 56. Edit. Cantab. [2] Apud Proclum & alios.

Where this Love is not only called πολύμηλις, of *much-counſel* or *ſagaciouſneſs*, which implies it to have been a ſubſtantial and intellectual thing, but alſo πρεσβύταλος, *the oldeſt of all*, and therefore ſenior to Chaos, as likewiſe, αὐτοτελὴς, *ſelf-perfect* or *ſelf-originated*. From whence it is manifeſt, that according to the Orphick tradition, this Love, which the Coſmogonia was derived from, was no other than the eternal unmade Deity (or an active principle depending on it) which produced this whole orderly world, and all the generated gods in it, as to their material part, out of Chaos and Night. Accordingly, as *Ariſtotle* determines in his Metaphyſicks, not only in the place before cited, but alſo afterward; ἕτεροι δέ τινες, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ὅσοι ἢ Νῦν ἢ Ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν· *Others, beſides the material cauſe of the world, aſſign an efficient, or cauſe of motion, namely, whoſoever make either Mind* (and Intellect) *or Love a principle.* Wherefore we conclude, that that other atheiſtick cabala, or Ariſtophanick tradition before mentioned, which accordingly, as *Ariſtotle* alſo elſewhere declareth concerning it, did ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννᾶν, *generate all things whatſoever*, even the gods themſelves univerſally out of Night and Chaos, making Love itſelf likewiſe to have been produced from an egg of the Night: I ſay, that this was nothing elſe but a mere depravation of the ancient Moſaick cabala, as alſo an abſolutely impoſſible hypotheſis, it deriving all things whatſoever in the univerſe, beſides the bare ſubſtance of ſenſeleſs matter, in another ſenſe than that before mentioned, out of non-entity or nothing; as ſhall be alſo farther manifeſted afterwards.

L. 1. *c.* 6. *p.* 849.

We have now repreſented the ſenſe and generally received doctrine of the ancient pagan Theologers, that there was indeed a multiplicity of gods, but yet ſo that one of them only was ἀγέννητος, *ingenerate* or *unmade*, by whom all the other gods, together with the world, were made, ſo as to have had a novity of being or a temporary beginning of their exiſtence: *Plato* and the Pythagoreans here only differing from the reſt in this, that though they acknowledged the world and all the mundane gods to have been generated together in time, yet they ſuppoſed certain other intelligible and ſupramundane gods alſo, which however produced from one original Deity, were nevertheleſs eternal or without beginning. But now we muſt acknowledge, that there were amongſt the pagan Theiſts ſome of a different perſuaſion from the reſt, who therefore did not admit of any theogonia in the ſenſe before declared, that is, any temporary generation of gods, becauſe they acknowledged no coſmogonia, no temporary production of the world, but concluded it to have been from eternity.

That *Ariſtotle* was one of theſe is ſufficiently known, whoſe inferior gods therefore, the ſun, moon and ſtars, muſt needs be ἀγένητοι, or *ingenerate*, in this ſenſe, ſo as to have had no temporary production, becauſe the whole world to him was ſuch. And if that philoſopher [1] be to be believed, himſelf was the very firſt, at leaſt of all the Greeks, who aſſerted this ingenerateneſs or eternity of the world, he affirming, that all before him did γεννᾶν τὸν κόσμον, and κοσμοποιεῖν, *generate or make the world*; that is, attribute

[1] De Cœlo, Lib. I. Cap. X. p. 623. Tom. I. Oper.

bute a temporary production to it, and conſequently to all thoſe gods alſo, which were a part thereof. Notwithſtanding which, the writer *de Placitis Philoſophorum* [1], and *Stobæus* [2], impute this dogma of the world's eternity to certain others of the Greek philoſophers before *Ariſtotle*, (beſides *Ocellus Lucanus* [3], who is alſo acknowledged by *Philo*, to have been an aſſertor thereof.) And indeed *Epicharmus*, though a Theiſt, ſeems plainly to have been of this perſuaſion, that the world was unmade, as alſo that there was no Theogonia, nor temporary production of the inferior gods, from theſe verſes of his [4], according to *Grotius* his correction:

Excerp. p. 478.

Ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοὶ θεοὶ παρῆταν, ὑπέλιπον δ' ὰ πώποκα·
Τάδε δ' ἀεὶ πάρεσθ' ὁμοια, διὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεί.
Ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὲν χάος πρᾶτον γένεσθαι τῶν θεῶν·
Πῶς δὲ; ἀμάχανον γ' ἀπὸ μηδέ τινος ὅ, τι πρᾶτον μόλοι·
Οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμολε πρᾶτον ὐδὲν, ὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον,
Τῶν δέ γ' ὧν ἄμμες νῦν λέγομεν ὧδ' εἶναι μέλλει τάδε.

Nempe Dî ſemper fuerunt, atque nunquam intercident:
Hæc quæ dico ſemper nobis rebus in iiſdem ſe exhibent.
Extitiſſe ſed deorum primum perhibetur chaos:
Quînam verò? nam de nihilo nîl pote primum exiſtere.
Ergo nec primum profectò quicquam, nec fuit alterum:
Sed quæ nunc ſic appellantur, alia fient poſtmodum.

Where, though he acknowledges this to have been the general tradition of the ancient Theiſts, that Chaos was before the gods, and that the inferior mundane gods had a temporary generation, or production with the world; yet notwithſtanding does he conclude againſt it, from this ground of reaſon, becauſe nothing could proceed from nothing, and therefore, both the gods, and indeed whatſoever elſe is ſubſtantial in the world, was from eternity unmade, only the faſhion of things having been altered.

Moreover, *Diodorus Siculus* affirms the *Chaldeans* likewiſe to have aſſerted this dogma of the world's eternity, οἱ δ' ὖν Χαλδαῖοι τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἀΐδιόν φασιν εἶναι, καὶ μήτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, μήθ' ὕστερον φθορὰν ἐπιδέξεσθαι· *The* Chaldeans *affirm the nature of the world to be eternal, and that it was neither generated from any beginning, nor will ever admit corruption.* Who, that they were not Atheiſts for all that (no more than *Ariſtotle*) appears from thoſe following words of that hiſtoriographer; τήν τε τῶν ὅλων τάξιν τε καὶ διακόσμησιν, θείᾳ τινι προνοίᾳ γεγονέναι, καὶ νῦν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ γινομένων, οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλ' ὡρισμένῃ τινὶ καὶ βεβαίως κεκυρωμένῃ θεῶν κρίσει, συντελεῖσθαι· *They believe alſo, that the order and diſpoſition of the world is by a certain divine providence, and that every one of thoſe things, which come to paſs in the heavens, happens not by chance, but by a certain determinate and firmly ratified judgment of the gods.* However, it is a thing known to all, that the generality of the later Platoniſts ſtiffly adhered to *Ariſtotle* in this; neither did they only aſſert the corporeal world, with all the inferior mundane gods in it, to

L. 2. p. 82.

[1] Lib. II. Cap. IV. p. 886.
[2] Eclog. Phyſic. Lib. I. Cap. XXIV. p. 44.
[3] De Mundi Æternitate, inter Scriptor. Mythолog. à Tho. Gale editos.
[4] Apud Diogen. Laert. Lib. III. ſegm. XI. p. 170.

to be ἀγεννήτους, or *ingenerate*, and to have exiſted from eternity, but alſo maintained the ſame concerning the ſouls of men, and all other animals, (they concluding that no ſouls were younger than body or the world;) and becauſe they would not ſeem to depart from their maſter *Plato*, therefore did they endeavour violently to force this ſame ſenſe upon *Plato*'s words alſo.

Notwithſtanding which, concerning theſe latter Platoniſts, it is here obſervable, that though they thus aſſerted the world, and all inferior gods and ſouls to have been ἀγενήτους, according to that ſtricter ſenſe of the word declared, that is, to have had no temporary generation or beginning, but to have exiſted from eternity; yet by no means did they therefore conceive them to be αὐτογενεῖς καὶ αὐθυποστάτους, *ſelf-originated, and ſelf-exiſting*, but concluded them to have been all derived from one ſole ſelf-exiſtent Deity as their cauſe, which therefore, though not in order of time, yet of nature was before them. To this purpoſe *Plotinus*, νοῦν πρὸ αὐτοῦ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς χρόνῳ πρότερον αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι παρὰ νοῦ ἐστι καὶ φύσει πρότερον ἐκεῖνον, καὶ αἴτιον τούτου, ἀρχετυπον οἷον καὶ παράδειγμα εἰκόνος· καὶ δὶ ἐκεῖνον ὄντος καὶ ὑποστάντος ἀεὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· *Mind or God was before the world, not as if it exiſted before it in time, but becauſe the world proceeded from it, and that was in order of nature firſt as the cauſe thereof, and its archetype or paradigm; the world alſo always ſubſiſting by it and from it.* And again elſewhere to the ſame purpoſe, οὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐγίνετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γεννητὰ λέγεται, οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἔχει εἰς ἄ· *The things, which are ſaid to have been made or generated, were not ſo made, as that they ever had a beginning of their exiſtence, but yet they were made, and will be always made, (in another ſenſe;) nor will they ever be deſtroyed otherwiſe than as being diſſolved into thoſe ſimple principles, out of which ſome of them were compounded.* Where though the world be ſaid never to have been made as to a temporary beginning, yet in another ſenſe, is it ſaid to be always made, as depending upon God perpetually as the emanative cauſe thereof. Agreeably whereunto, the manner of the world's production from God is thus declared by that philoſopher; οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἱ φθείροντες καὶ γεννῶντιν αὐτὸν, ὅστις γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ποιήσεως ταύτης, οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συνιέναι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν, ὅτι ὅσον ἐκεῖνα ἐλλάμπει, οὐ μήπω τὰ ἄλλα ἐλλείπει. *They do not rightly, who corrupt and generate the world, for they will not underſtand what manner of making or production the world had, to wit, by way of effulgency or eradiation from the Deity. From whence it follows, that the world muſt needs have been ſo long as there was a God, as the light was coeve with the ſun.* So likewiſe *Proclus* [1] concludes, that the world was ἀεὶ γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐλλαμπόμενος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος, *always generated or eradiated from God*, and therefore muſt needs be eternal, God being ſo. Wherefore theſe latter Platoniſts ſuppoſed the ſame thing concerning the corporeal world, and the lower mundane gods, which their maſter *Plato* did concerning his higher eternal gods; that though they had no temporary production, yet they all depended no leſs upon one ſupreme Deity, than if they had been made out of nothing by him. From whence it is manifeſt, that none of theſe philoſophers

En. 3. *l.* 2. *c.* 1.

En. 2. *l.* 9. *c.* 3.

En. 5. *l.* 8. *c.* 12.

[1] There are ſtill extant eighteen arguments of his, wherein he attacks the Chriſtian Doctrine of the world's being created by God in time; in anſwer to which, *John Philoponus*, wrote the ſame number of books againſt the eternity of the world. Vide Jo. Alberti Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. Lib. V. Cap. XXVI. §. XIII. p. 522.

philoſophers apprehended any repugnancy at all betwixt theſe two things; exiſtence from eternity, and being cauſed or produced by another. Nor can we make any great doubt, but that if the latter Platoniſts had been fully convinced of any contradictious inconſiſtency here, they would readily have diſclaimed that their ſo beloved hypotheſis of the world's eternity; it being ſo far from truth what ſome have ſuppoſed, that the Aſſertors of the world's eternity were all Atheiſts, that theſe latter Platoniſts were led into this opinion no otherwiſe than from the ſole conſideration of the Deity; to wit, its ἀγαθοειδὴς βέλησις, καὶ γόνιμος δύναμις, *its eſſential goodneſs, and generative power, or emanative fecundity*, as *Proclus* plainly declares upon the *Timæus*. Pag. 116.

Now, though *Ariſtotle* were not acted with any ſuch divine enthuſiaſm as theſe Platoniſts ſeem to have been, yet did he notwithſtanding, after his ſober manner, really maintain the ſame thing; that though the world, and inferior mundane gods had no temporary generation, yet were they nevertheleſs all produced from one ſupreme Deity as their cauſe. Thus *Simplicius* repreſents that philoſopher's ſenſe, Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν γίνεσθαι ἀξιοῖ τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ παράγεσθαι· Ariſtotle *would not have the world to have been made*, (ſo as to have had a beginning) *but yet nevertheleſs to have been produced from God after ſome other manner*. And again afterwards; Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀϊδίου κινήσεως αὐτοῦ Θεὸν λέγων, ὅμως ἀγένητον αὐτὸν ἀποδείκνυσι. Ariſtotle, *though making God the cauſe of the heaven and its eternal motion, yet concludes it notwithſtanding to have been ingenerate or unmade*; that is, without beginning. However, we think fit here to obſerve, that though *Ariſtotle* do for the moſt part expreſs a great deal of zeal and confidence for that opinion of the world's eternity, yet doth he ſometimes for all that ſeem to flag a little, and ſpeak more languidly and ſceptically about it; as for example, in his book *de Partibus Animalium*, where he treats concerning an artificial nature, μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ὑπὸ τοιαύτης αἰτίας, εἰ γέγονε, καὶ εἶναι διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶα τὰ θνητά· *It is more likely, that the heaven was made by ſuch a cauſe as this, (if it were made) and that it is maintained by ſuch a cauſe, than that mortal animals ſhould be ſo; which yet is a thing more generally acknowledged.* Now it was before declared, that *Ariſtotle*'s artificial nature was nothing but the mere executioner or opificer of a perfect mind, that is, of the Deity; which two therefore he ſometimes joins together in the Coſmopœia, affirming that Mind and Nature, that is, God and Nature were the cauſe of this univerſe.

In Ariſt. Phyſ. l. 8. [P. 320. b. Edit. Aldi.]

L. 1. c. 1. [P. 474. Tom. II. Oper.]

And now we ſee plainly, that though there was a real controverſy amongſt the Pagan theologers, (eſpecially from *Ariſtotle*'s time downward) concerning the Coſmogonia and Theogonia, according to the ſtricter notion of thoſe words, the temporary generation or production of the world and inferior gods, or whether they had any beginning or no; yet was there no controverſy at all concerning the ſelf-exiſtency of them, but it was univerſally agreed upon amongſt them, that the world and the inferior gods, however ſuppoſed by ſome to have exiſted from eternity, yet were nevertheleſs all derived from one ſole ſelf-exiſtent Deity as their cauſe; ὑπὸ Θεοῦ παραγόμενοι ἢ ἐλλαμπόμενοι, *being either eradiated or produced from God.* Wherefore

it is obſervable, that theſe pagan Theiſts, who aſſerted the world's eternity, did themſelves diſtinguiſh concerning the word γενητὸν *ortum, natum, & factum*, as that which was equivocal; and though in one ſenſe of it, they denied, that the world and inferior gods were γενητοὶ, yet notwithſtanding did they in another ſenſe clearly affirm the ſame. For the word γενητὸν (ſay they) ſtrictly and properly taken, is τὸ ἐν μέρει χρόνου τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάροδον λαχόν, *that which in reſpect of time paſſed out non-exiſtence into being*, or ὃ τὸ πρότερον μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον δὲ ὄν, *that which being not before, afterwards was.* Nevertheleſs they acknowledge, that in a larger ſenſe, this word γενητὸν may be taken alſo for τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἀπ' αἰτίας ὑφιστάμενον, *that which doth any way depend upon a ſuperior Being as its cauſe.* And there muſt needs be the ſame equivocation in the word ἀγένητον, ſo that this in like manner may be taken alſo, either χρονικῶς, for that which is ingenerate in reſpect of time, as having no temporary beginning; or elſe for that which is ἀπ' αἰτίας ἀγένητον, *ingenerate or unproduced from any cauſe:* in which latter ſenſe, that word ἀγένητον, or unmade, is of equal force and extent with αὐθυπόστατον or αὐτόγενες, *that which is ſelf-ſubſiſtent or ſelf-originated*; and accordingly it was uſed by thoſe pagan Theiſts, who concluded ὅτι ὕλη ἀγένητος i. e. *that matter was unmade*, that is, not only exiſted from eternity without beginning, but alſo was ſelf-exiſtent, and independent upon any ſuperior cauſe. Now, as to the former of theſe two ſenſes of thoſe words, γενητὸν and ἀγένητον, the generality of the ancient Pagans, and together with them *Plato*, affirmed the world, and all the inferior gods to be γενητὸς, *to have been made in time*, or to have had a beginning; (for whatever the latter Platoniſts pretend, this was undoubtedly *Plato*'s notion of that word, and no other, when he concluded the world to be γενητὸν, foraſmuch as himſelf expreſly oppoſes it to ἀΐδιον, *that which is eternal.*) But on the contrary, *Ariſtotle*, and the latter Platoniſts, determined the world, and all the inferior gods, to be in this ſenſe ἀγενήτους, *ſuch as had no temporary beginning*, but were from eternity. However, according to the latter ſenſe of thoſe words, all the pagan Theologers agreed together, that the world, and all the inferior gods, whether having a beginning, or exiſting from eternity, were notwithſtanding γενητοὶ ἀπ' αἰτίας, *produced or derived from a ſuperior cauſe*; and that thus there was only one θεὸς ἀγένητος, *one unproduced and ſelf-exiſtent Deity*, who is ſaid by them to be αἰτίας κρείττων καὶ πρεσβύτερος, *ſuperior to a cauſe, and older than any cauſe*, he being the cauſe of all things beſides himſelf. Thus *Cran-*

Simplic. in Ariſt. Phyſ. fol. 265.

In Timæ. pag. 85. [Vide etiam eundem in Introductione in Theologiam Platonicam; Lib. I. Cap. XXVIII p. 66, and p. 68. & Lib. VI. Cap. II. P. 341.]

tor, and his followers in *Proclus*, zealous aſſertors of the world's eternity, determined, γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον, καὶ ἅμα ὕλα αὐτόγονον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον· *that the world* (*with all the inferior mundane gods in it*) notwithſtanding their being from eternity, *might be ſaid to be* γενητοὶ, *that is* orti *or made, as being produced from another cauſe, and not ſelf-originated or ſelf-exiſting.* In like manner *Proclus* himſelf, that grand champion for the world's eternity, plainly acknowledged, notwithſtanding, the generation of the gods and world in this ſenſe, as being produced from a ſuperior cauſe, λέγομεν θεῶν γενέσεις, τὴν ἀῤῥήτου αὐτῶν πρόοδον ἐνδεικνύμενοι, καὶ τὴν τῶν δευτέρων ἑτερότητα, πρὸς τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν· *We call it the generations of the gods, meaning thereby, not any temporary production of them, but*

their ineffable procession from a superior first cause. Thus also *Salustius*, in his book *de diis & mundo* [1], where he contends the world to have been from eternity, or without beginning, yet concludes both it and the other inferior gods to have been made by one supreme deity, who is called by him, ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς, *the first God.* For, saith he, μεγίστης τῆς δυνάμεως ὕστης, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἔδει καὶ ζῶα μόνα ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ θεούς τε καὶ δαίμονας. *God, or the first cause, having the greatest power, or being omnipotent, ought therefore to make not only men, and other animals, but also gods and dæmons.* And accordingly this is the title of his 13th chapter, πῶς τὰ ἀΐδια λέγεται γίγνεσθαι, *How eternal things may be said to be made or generated.* It is true indeed (as we have often declared) that some of the pagan Theists asserted God not to be the only ἀγένητον καὶ αὐθυπόστατον, *the only unmade and self-existent being*, but that matter also was such; nevertheless, this opinion was not so generally received amongst them, as is commonly supposed: and though some of the ancient fathers confidently impute it to *Plato*, yet there seems to be no sufficient ground for their so doing; and *Porphyrius*, *Jamblichus*, *Proclus*, and other Platonists, do not only professedly oppose the same as false, but also as that which was dissonant from *Plato*'s principles. Wherefore, according to that larger notion of the word ἀγένητον, as taken synonymously with αὐτόγενες and αὐθυπόστατον, there were very many of the Pagan Theologers, who agreed with Christians in this, ὅτι αὐτὸ ἀγένητον ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις ἡ ἀγεννησία, *That God is the only ungenerate or unmade being, and that his very essence is ingenerability or innascibility*; all other things, even matter itself, being made by him. But all the rest of them (only a few Ditheists excepted) though they supposed matter to be self-existent, yet did they conclude, that there was only, εἷς Θεὸς ἀγέννητος, only *one unmade or unproduced God*, and that all their other gods were γενητοὶ, in one sense or other, if not as made in time, yet at least as produced from a superior cause.

Nothing now remaineth, but only that we shew, how the Pagans did distinguish, and put a difference, betwixt the one supreme unmade Deity, and all their other inferior generated gods. Which we are the rather concerned to do, because it is notorious, that they did many times also confound them together, attributing the government of the whole world to the gods promiscuously, and without putting any due discrimination betwixt the supreme and inferior (the true reason whereof seems to have been this, because they supposed the supreme God, not to do all immediately, in the government of the world, but to permit much to his inferior ministers) one instance of which we had before in *Ovid*, and innumerable such others might be cited out of their most sober writers. As for example, *Cicero*, in his first book of laws [2], *Deorum immortalium vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine, natura omnis regitur*; *The whole nature, or universe, is governed by the force, reason, power, mind, and divinity of the immortal Gods.* And again in his second book [3], *Deos esse dominos ac moderatores omnium rerum, eáque quæ geruntur, eorum geri judicio atque numine; eosdémque optimè de genere hominum*

[1] Cap. XIII. p. 269. inter Scriptor. Mythologic. à Tho. Gale editos.

[2] Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 3303. Oper. Tom. IX.

[3] Lib. II. Cap. VII. p. 3343.

mereri, & qualis quisque sit, quid agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pietate religiones colat, intueri; priorúmque & impiorum habere rationem; à principio civibus suasum esse debet: The minds of citizens ought to be first of all embued with a firm persuasion, that the gods are the lords and moderators of all things, and that the conduct and management of the whole world is directed and over-ruled by their judgment and divine power; that they deserve the best of mankind, that they behold and consider what every man is, what he doth and takes upon himself, with what mind, piety and sincerity he observes the duties of religion; and lastly, that these gods have a very different regard to the pious and the impious. Now such passages as these, abounding every where in Pagan writings, it is no wonder, if many, considering their theology but slightly and superficially, have been led into an error, and occasioned thereby to conclude the Pagans not to have asserted a divine monarchy, but to have imputed both the making and governing of the world to an aristocracy or democracy of co-ordinate gods, not only all eternal, but also self-existent and unmade. The contrary whereunto, though it be already sufficiently proved, yet it will not be amiss for us here in the close, to shew how the Pagans, who sometimes jumble and confound the supreme and inferior gods all together, do notwithstanding at other times many ways distinguish between the one supreme God, and their other many inferior gods.

First therefore, as the Pagans had many proper names for one and the same supreme God, according to several particular considerations of him, in respect of his several different manifestations and effects in the world; which are oftentimes mistaken for so many distinct deities (some supposing them independent, others subordinate) so had they also, besides these, other proper names of God, according to that more full and comprehensive notion of him, as the maker of the whole world, and its supreme governor, or the sole monarch of the universe. For thus the Greeks called him Ζεὺς and Ζὴν, &c. the Latins *Jupiter* and *Jovis*, the Babylonians *Belus* and *Bel*, the Persians *Mithras* and *Oromasdes*, the Egyptians and Scythians (according to *Herodotus*) *Ammoun* and *Pappæus*. And *Celsus in Origen* concludes it to be a matter of pure indifferency, to call the supreme God by any of all these names, either Ζεὺς, or *Ammoun*, or *Pappæus*, or the like; Κέλσος οἴεται μηδὲν διαφέρειν, Δία Ὕψιστον, καλεῖν ἢ Ζῆνα, ἢ Αδωναῖον, ἢ Σαβαὼθ ἢ (ὡς Αἰγύπτιοι) Ἄμμων ἢ (ὡς Σκῦθαι) Παππαῖον. Celsus *thinks it to be a matter of no moment, whether we call the highest and supreme God*, Adonai *and* Sabaoth, *as the Jews do; or* Dia *and* Zena, *as the Greeks; or, as the Egyptians*, Ammoun; *or, as the Scythians*, Pappæus. Notwithstanding which, that pious and jealous father expresseth a great deal of zeal against Christians then using any of those Pagan names. *But we will rather endure any torment* (saith he) *than confess* Zeus (*or* Jupiter) *to be God; being well assured, that the Greeks often really worship, under that name, an evil dæmon, who is an enemy both to God and men. And we will rather suffer death, than call the supreme God* Ammoun, *whom the Egyptian enchanters thus invoke*; λεγέτωσαν δὲ καὶ Σκύθαι τὸν Παππαῖον Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ πεισόμεθα, τιθέντες μὲν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ὡς δὲ φίλον τῷ λαχόντι τὴν Σκυθῶν ἐρημίαν, καὶ τὸ ἔθνος αὐτῶν καὶ διάλεκτον, οὐκ ὀνομάζοντες τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς κυρίῳ ὀνόματι τῷ Παππαῖον. Σκυθιστὶ γὰρ τὸ προση-

Lib. 5. C. Celsum. [P. 261.]

προσηγορικὸν τὸν Θεὸν, κὰν Αἰγυπτίστι, καὶ πάσῃ διαλέκτῳ ἕκαστος ἐντέθραπται, ὀνομάζων, οὐκ ἁμαρτήσεται. *And though the Scythians call the supreme God* Pappæus, *yet we acknowledging a supreme God, will never be perſuaded to call him by that name, which it pleaſed that dæmon (who ruled over the Scythian deſert, people and language) to impoſe. Nevertheleſs, he that ſhall uſe the appellative name for God, either in the Scythian, Egyptian, or any other language which he hath been brought up in, will not offend.* Where *Origen* plainly affirms the Scythians to have acknowledged one ſupreme God, called by them *Pappæus*, and intimates, that the Egyptians did the like, calling him *Ammoun*. Neither could it poſſibly be his intent to deny the ſame of the Greeks and their *Zeus*, however his great jealouſy made him to call him here a dæmon; it being true in a certain ſenſe, which ſhall be declared afterward, that the Pagans did oftentimes really worſhip an evil dæmon, under thoſe very names of *Zeus* and *Jupiter*, as they did likewiſe under thoſe of *Hammon* and *Pappæus*. L. 5. p. 262.

In the mean time we deny not, but that both the Greeks uſed that word *Zeus*, and the Latins *Jupiter*, ſometimes φυσικῶς, for the æther, fire or air, ſome accordingly etymologizing Ζεὺς from Ζέω, others Δεὺς from δεύω: whence came thoſe forms of ſpeech, *ſub Jove*, and *ſub Dio*. And thus *Cicero*, Jovem Ennius *nuncupat ità dicens.*

De Nat. D. l. 2. 223. Lamb. [Cap. XXV. p. 2992. Tom IX. Oper.]

Aſpice hoc ſublime candens, quem invocant omnes Jovem.

Hunc etiam augures noſtri cùm dicunt, Jove fulgente, Jove tonante; dicunt enim in cælo fulgente, tonante, &c. The reaſon of which ſpeeches ſeems to have been this, becauſe in ancient times ſome had ſuppoſed the animated heaven, æther and air, to be the ſupreme deity. We grant moreover, that the ſame words have been ſometimes uſed ἱστορικῶς alſo, for an hero or deified man, ſaid by ſome to have been born in *Crete*, by others in *Arcadia*. And *Callimachus* [1], though he were very angry with the Cretians for affirming *Jupiter*'s ſepulchral monument to have been with them in *Crete*, as thereby making him mortal:

Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται, καὶ γὰρ τάφον, ὦ ἄνα, σεῖο,
Κρῆτες ἐτεκτήναντο· σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες, ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί·

Cretes *ſemper mendaces, tuum enim, rex, ſepulchrum*
Extruxerunt: tu verò non es mortuus, ſemper enim es.

Himſelf nevertheleſs (as *Athenagoras* [2] and *Origen* [3] obſerve) attributed the beginning of death to him, when he affirmed him to have been born in *Arcadia*; ἀρχὴ γὰρ θανάτου ἡ ἐπὶ γῆς γένεσις, *becauſe a terrene nativity is the beginning of death.* Wherefore this may paſs for a general obſervation here, that the Pagan theology was all along confounded with a certain mixture of phyſiology and herology or hiſtory blended together. Nevertheleſs it is unqueſtionable, that the more intelligent of the Greekiſh Pagans did frequently

[1] Hymno in Jovem, verſ. 8, 9. p. 121.
[2] In Legation. pro Chriſtianis, Cap. XXVI. [3] Contra Celſum, Lib. III. p. 137.

quently underſtand by *Zeus* that ſupreme unmade Deity, who was the maker of the world, and of all the inferior gods. *Porphyrius* in *Euſebius* thus declares their ſenſe, τὸν Δία, τὸν Νῶν κόσμα ὑπολαμβάνσιν, ὃς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδημιόργησεν, ἔχων τὸν κόσμον. *By* Zeus *the Greeks underſtand that mind of the world, which framed all things in it, and containeth the whole world.* Agreeable whereunto is that of *Maximus Tyrius* [1], Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία, νῶν πρεσβύτατον, καὶ ἀρχικώτατον, ᾧ πάντα ἕπεται καὶ πειθαρχεῖ· *By* Jupiter *you are to underſtand that moſt ancient and princely mind, which all things follow and obey.* And *Euſebius* himſelf, though not forward to grant any more than needs he muſt to Pagans, concludes with this acknowledgment hereof, ἔστω ὁ Ζεὺς μηκέθ' ἡ πυρώδης καὶ αἰθέριος οὐσία, ὥσπερ τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐνομίζετο, κατὰ τὸν Πλούταρχον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνωτάτω Νοῦς, ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργός· *Let* Jupiter *therefore be no longer that fiery and ethereal ſubſtance, which the ancient Pagans, according to* Plutarch, *ſuppoſed him to be; but that higheſt mind, which was the maker of all things.* But *Phornutus* [2] by *Jupiter* underſtands the ſoul of the world, he writing thus concerning him; ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικούμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτόν, καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεύς, αἰτία οὖσα τοῖς ζῶσι τοῦ ζῆν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βασιλεύειν ὁ Ζεὺς λέγεται τῶν ὅλων. *As we ourſelves are governed by a ſoul, ſo hath the world in like manner a ſoul, that containeth it; and this is called* Zeus, *being the cauſe of life to all things that live; and therefore* Zeus *or* Jupiter *is ſaid to reign over all things.* However, though theſe were two different conceptions amongſt the Pagans concerning God, ſome apprehending him to be an abſtract mind ſeparate from the world and matter, but others to be a ſoul of the world only; yet nevertheleſs they all agreed in this, that Ζεὺς or *Jupiter* was the ſupreme moderator or governor of all. And accordingly *Plato*, in his *Cratylus*, taking theſe two words, Ζῆνα and Δία, both together, etymologizeth them as one, after this manner: συντιθέμενα εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πασῖν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων· συμβαίνει ἓν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὕτως, τῷ Θεὸς εἶναι δι' ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει, διείληπται δὲ δίχα (ὥσπερ λέγω) ἓν ὂν τὸ ὄνομα, τῷ Διὶ καὶ Ζηνί. *Theſe two words compounded together declare the nature of God; for there is nothing, which is more the cauſe of life both to ourſelves and all other animals, than he, who is the prince and king of all things; ſo that God is rightly thus called, he being that by whom all things live. And theſe are really but one name of God, though divided into two words.* But becauſe it was very obvious then to object againſt this poſition of *Plato*'s, that *Zeus* or *Jupiter* could not be the prince of all things, and firſt original of life, from the Theogonia of *Heſiod* and other ancient Pagans, in which himſelf was made to have been the ſon of Κρόνος, or *Saturn*; therefore this objection is thus preoccupated by *Plato*, τοῦτον δὲ, Κρόνου υἱόν, ὑβριστικὸν μέν ἄν τινι δόξειεν εἶναι ἀκούσαντι ἐξαίφνης· *Whoſoever ſhall hear this* (ſaith he) *will preſently conclude it to be contumelious to this* Zeus *or* Jupiter (*as he hath been deſcribed by us*) *to be accounted the ſon of* Cronos *or* Saturn. And in anſwer hereunto, that philoſopher ſtretcheth his wits to ſalve that poetick Theogonia, and reconcile it with his own theological hypotheſis; and thereupon he interprets, that *Heſiodian* Ζεὺς or *Jupiter* into a compliance

Præp. Ev. L. 3. [Cap. IX. p. 100.]

Præp. Ev. L. 3. *c.* 13. [p. 119.]

P. 396. *Edit. Steph.*

[1] Differt. XXIX. p. 290.

[2] Libro de Naturâ Deor. Cap. II. inter Scriptores Mythologicos à Tho. Gale editos.

compliance with the third hypoſtaſis of his divine triad, ſo as properly to ſignify the ſuperior ſoul of the world; εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία. Κρόνος γὰρ τὸ καθαρὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἀκήραλον τὸν Νοῦν· ἔστι δὲ ὅτος Οὐρανοῦ υἱὸς, ὡς λόγος· *Nevertheleſs it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe* Zeus *or* Jupiter *to be the offſpring of ſome great mind*; *and* Chronos *or* Saturn *ſignifieth a pure and perfect mind eternal*; *who again is ſaid to be the ſon of* Uranus *or* Cœlius. Where it is manifeſt, that *Plato* endeavours to accommodate this poetick trinity of gods, *Uranus*, *Chronos* and *Zeus*, or *Cœlius*, *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, to his own trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, τἀγαθὸν, νοῦς and ψυχὴ, the *firſt good*, a *perfect intellect*, and the *higheſt ſoul*. Which accommodation is accordingly further purſued by *Plotinus* in ſeveral places, as *Enn.* 5. *l.* 1. *c.* 4. and *Enn.* 5. *l.* 8. *c.* 13. Nevertheleſs, theſe three archical hypoſtaſes of the Platonick trinity, though look'd upon as ſubſtances diſtinct from each other, and ſubordinate, yet are they frequently taken all together by them for the whole ſupreme deity. However the word Ζεὺς is by *Plato* ſeverally attributed to each of them; which *Proclus* thus obſerved upon the *Timæus*: λέγωμεν ὅτι πολλαὶ μέν εἰσι τάξεις καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι τοῦ Διός· Ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ δημιουργὸς Ζεὺς, ὡς ἐν Κρατύλῳ γέγραπται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Πρῶτος τῆς Κρονίας τριάδος, ὡς ἐν Γοργίᾳ λέγεται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ἀπόλυτος, ὡς ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ παραδίδοται, καὶ ἄλλος ὁ ὑρανίος, εἴτε ἐπὶ τῆ ἀπλανεῖ εἴτε ὁ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ περιόδῳ· *We ſay therefore, that there are ſeveral orders, ranks or degrees of* Zeus *or* Jupiter *in* Plato; *for ſometimes he is taken for the* Demiurgus *or opificer of the world, as in* Cratylus; *ſometimes for the firſt of the Saturnian triad, as in* Gorgias; *ſometimes for the ſuperior ſoul of the world, as in* Phædrus; *and laſtly, ſometimes for the lower ſoul of the heaven.* Though, by *Proclus* his leave, that *Zeus* or *Jupiter* which is mentioned in *Plato*'s *Cratylus* (being plainly the ſuperior pſyche or ſoul of the world) is not properly the *Demiurgus* or opificer, according to him; that title rather belonging to νοῦς or intellect, which is the ſecond hypoſtaſis in his trinity. P. 298.

As for the vulgar of the Greekiſh Pagans, whether they apprehended God to be τοῦν ἐξηρημένου τοῦ κόσμου, *a mind or intellect ſeparate from the world*, or elſe to be a *ſoul of the world only*; it cannot be doubted, but that by the word *Zeus* they commonly underſtood the ſupreme Deity in one or other of thoſe ſenſes, the father and king of gods; he being frequently thus ſtyled in their ſolemn nuncupations of vows, Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ζεῦ ἄνα, *O* Jupiter *father*, and *O* Jupiter *king*. As he was invoked alſo Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ in that excellent prayer of an ancient poet, not without cauſe commended in *Plato*'s *Alcibiades* 1;

Ζεῦ Βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις
Ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δεινὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν·

O Jupiter *king, give us good things, whether we pray or pray not for them; but with-hold evil things from us, though we ſhould pray never ſo earneſtly for them.* But the inſtances of this kind being innumerable, we ſhall forbear to mention any more of them. Only we ſhall obſerve, that *Zeus Sabazius* was a name

[1] In Alcibiad. ſecundo, ſive de Precatione, p. 46.

name for the supreme God, sometime introduced amongst the Greeks, and derived in all probability from the Hebrew *Sabaoth*, or *Adonai Tsebaoth*, *the Lord of hosts* (that is, of the heavenly hosts) or the supreme governor of the world. Which therefore *Aristophanes* took notice of as a strange and foreign god, lately crept in amongst them, that ought to be banish'd out of *Greece*; these several names of God being then vulgarly spoken of as so many distinct deities, as shall be more fully declared afterwards. We shall likewise elsewhere shew, that besides Ζεὺς, Πὰν also was used by the Greeks as a name for that God, who is the supreme moderator and governor of the whole world.

That the Latins did in like manner, by *Jupiter* and *Jovis*, frequently denote the supreme Deity, and monarch of the universe, is a thing unquestionable; and which does sufficiently appear from those epithets, that were commonly given to him, of *optimus* and *maximus*, the *best and the greatest*; as also of *omnipotens*, frequently bestowed upon him by *Virgil* and others. Which word *Jupiter* or *Jovis*, though *Cicero*[1] etymologize it *à juvando*, or from *juvans pater*, as not knowing how to do it otherwise; yet we may rather conclude it to have been of an Hebraical extraction, and derived from that Tetragrammaton, or name of God, consisting of four consonants; whose vowels (which it was to be pronounced with) though they be not now certainly known, yet must it needs have some such sound as this, either *Jovah*, or *Javoh*, or Ἰεύω or Ἰάω, or the like; and the abbreviation of this name was *Jah*. For as the Pagan nations had, besides appellatives, their several proper names for God, so also had the Hebrews theirs, and such as being given by God himself, was most expressive of his nature, it signifying eternal and necessary existence.

But, in the next place, we shall suggest, that the Pagans did not only signify the supreme God, by these proper names, but also frequently by the appellatives themselves, when used not for a God in general, but for the God, or God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, and by way of eminency. And thus ὁ θεὸς and θεὸς are often taken by the Greeks, not for θεῶν τις, *a God*, or *one of the Gods*, but for God, or the supreme Deity. We have several examples hereof in passages before-cited occasionally in this very chapter, as in that of *Aristotle*'s, τί οὖν ἂν κρεῖττον καὶ ἐπιστήμης πλὴν ὁ θεὸς; *What is there therefore, that can be better than knowledge, but only God?* As also that other of his, that happiness consisteth principally in virtue, ἔστω συνωμολογομένον ἡμῖν μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρομένοις, *it is a thing, that ought to be acknowledged by us from the nature of God.* So likewise in that of *Thales*, πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγένητον γὰρ· *God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade:* and that of *Maximus Tyrius*, πολλοὶ θεοὶ παῖδες θεοῦ καὶ συνάρχοντες θεῷ, *Many gods, the sons of God, and coreigners together with God.* Besides which, there have been others also mentioned, which we shall not here repeat. And innumerable more instances of this kind might be added; as that of *Antiphanes*[2], θεὸς οὐδενὶ ἔοικεν, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται, *God is like to nothing, for which cause he cannot be learnt by any, from an image:* This of *Socrates*[3], εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τῷ θεῷ ταύτῃ γινέσθω,

[1] De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXV. p. 2992. Tom. IX. Oper.

[2] Apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Tragic. & Comicor. p. 632.

[3] Apud Platon. in Critone, p. 370.

γινέσθω, *If God will have it so, let it be so.* And that of *Epictetus* [1], σὺ μόνον μέμνησο τῶν καθολικῶν, τί ἐμὸν, τὶ οὐκ ἐμὸν; τί θέλει με ποιεῖν ὁ Θεὸς νῦν; *Do thou only remember these catholick and universal principles, what is mine, and what is not mine? what would God have me now to do? and what would he have me not to do?* But we shall mention no more of these, because they occur so frequently in all manner of Greek writers, both metrical and prosaical.

Wherefore we shall here only add, that as the singular Θεὸς was thus often used by the Greeks for God κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or *in way of eminency*, that is, for the supreme Deity; so was likewise the plural Θεοὶ frequently used by them for the inferior gods, by way of distinction from the supreme. As in that usual form of prayer and exclamation, ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοὶ, *O* Jupiter *and the gods*; and that form of obtestation, πρὸς Διὸς καὶ Θεῶν, *By* Jupiter *and the gods*. So in this of *Euripedes* [2]:

Ἀλλ' ἔστιν, ἔστι· κἄν τις ἐγγελᾷ λογῷ,
Ζεὺς καὶ Θεοὶ, βρότεια λεύσσοντες πάθη·

Est, (sint licèt qui rideant) est Jupiter,
Superíque, casus qui vident mortalium.

In which passages, as *Jupiter* is put for the supreme God, so is Θεοὶ likewise put for the inferior gods, in way of distinction from him. Thus also, Θεὸς and Θεοὶ are taken both together in *Plato*'s Phædo, Θεὸς for the supreme, unmade and incorruptible Deity, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only, ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς (οἶμαι) ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθείη, μεδὲ ποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νὴ Δί' (ἔφη) ἀνθρώπων γε, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, παρὰ Θεῶν. *I suppose, said* Socrates, *that God, and the very species, essence or idea of life will be granted by all to be incorruptible. Doubtless by all men (said* Cebes) *but much more, as I conceive, by the gods.* But a further instance will be propounded afterwards of the word Θεοὶ, thus used, by way of distinction, for the inferior gods only; as it was before declared, that the theogonia or generation of gods was accordingly understood by the Greeks universally of the οἱ Θεοὶ, that is, the *inferior gods*.

P. 106.

Moreover, as the word Θεὸς was taken κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or *by way of eminency*, for the supreme God, so was Δαίμων likewise. As for example, in this passage of *Callimachus*, before cited imperfectly [3]:

——————Εἰ Θεὸν οἶσθα,
Ἴσθ' ὅτι καὶ ῥέξαι Δαίμονι πᾶν δυνατόν·

——————*Si Deus est tibi notus,*
Hoc etiam noris, omnia posse Deum.

Where Θεὸς and Δαίμων are used both alike *signanter*, for the supreme God. And thus also in that famous passage of another poet:

—Τοῖς

οὐκ ὑπὸ θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν, εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι Θεῷ. *He will never be neglected of the Gods, who endeavours, as much as it is possible for a man, to be like to God.* p. 613.

[1] Apud Arrian. in Epictet. Lib. IV. p. 385. Edit. Cantabrig.

[2] Vide Grotii Excerpta veter. Tragicor. & Comicor. p. 417.

[3] Vide Fragmenta Callimachi à Rich. Bentleio collecta, p. 372.

——————Τοῖς γὰρ ἀλίτροις,
Εἰν ἁλὶ καὶ γαίᾳ, κακὰ μύρια θήκατο Δαίμων.

Homer likewise, in one and the same place [1], seems to use Θεὸς and Δαίμων both together, after the same manner, for the supreme God:

Ὅπποτ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει πρὸς δαίμονα φωτὶ μάκεσθαι,
Ὅν κε θεὸς τιμᾷ, τάχα οἱ μέγα πῆμα κυλίσθη.

Quoties homo vult, adverso numine, cum viro pugnare,
Quem Deus honorat, mox in eum magna clades devolvitur.

Again we conceive, that *Jupiter*, or the supreme God, was sometimes signified amongst the Pagans by that expression, θεὸς αὐτος, *Deus ipse*, as in that of *Homer*'s ninth Iliad [2]:

————Οὐδ' εἴ κέν μοι ὑποσταίη Θεὸς αὐτὸς,
Γῆρας ἀποξύσας θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα.

————*Neque si mihi promitteret Deus ipse,*
Senectutem abradens, effecturum me juvenem pubescentem.

Contra Jul. L. 1. [p. 27. Edit. Spanh.] So *Justin. Mart. ad Græ. coh. p. p.* 22. [Ed. Colon.]

And thus St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria* interprets *Homer* here, οὐ γάρ που φησὶν, εἰ καὶ Θεῶν τις ὑπόσχοιτό μοι τοῦ μὲν γήρος ἀπεμπολὴν, παλινάγρετον δὲ τὴν νεότητα, τετήρηκε δὲ ὁ χρῆμα μόνῳ τῷ ἐπὶ πάντας θεῷ, &c. τὸ γάρ τοι Θεὸς αὐτὸς, οὐκ ἐφ' ἕνα τῶν ἐν μύθοις πεπλασμένων τινὰ, αὐτὸν δὲ δὴ μόνον κατασημηνύειεν ἂν τὸν ἀληθῶς ὄντα Θεόν· Homer *doth not say, if any of the gods would promise me freedom from old age, and restitution of youth, but he reserves the matter only to the supreme God; neither doth he refer it to any of the fictitious poetick gods, but to the true God alone.* The same language was also spoken in the laws of the twelve tables [3]: *Deos adeunto caste, opes amovento: si secus faxint, Deus ipse vindex erit. Let the Gods be worshipp'd chastly, superfluity of riches and pomp being removed: if men do otherwise, God himself will be the avenger.* Where, though the word *gods* be used generally, so as to comprehend both the supreme and inferior gods under it, yet *Deus ipse, God himself*, denotes the supreme God only. In like manner, ὁ δαίμων αὐτὸς also seems to be taken for the supreme God, in that of *Euripedes* [4]:

Λύσει με ὁ Δαίμων αὐτὸς, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω,

which was thus rendred by *Horace*:

————*Ipse Deus, simulatque volet, me solvet.*

Notwithstanding which, Δαίμων and Δαίμονες are often distinguished from Θεὸς and Θεοὶ, they being put for an inferior rank of beings below the gods vulgarly called demons; which word in a large sense comprehends also

[1] Iliad, Lib. I. vers. 98.
[2] Vers. 448.
[3] Vide Ciceron. de Legibus, Lib. II. Cap. VIII. p. 3345. Tom. IX. Oper.
[4] In Bacchis, vers. 497.

alſo heroes under it. For though theſe dæmons be ſometimes called gods too, yet were they rather accounted Ἡμίθεοι, *demi-gods*, than gods. And thus Θεοὶ καὶ Δαίμονες, *gods and dæmons*, are frequently joined together, as things diſtinct from one another; which notion of the word *Plato* refers to, when he concludes love not to be a god, but a dæmon only. But of theſe dæmons we are to ſpeak more afterwards.

Furthermore, the pagan writers frequently underſtand the ſupreme God by the τὸ Θεῖον, when the word is uſed ſubſtantively. As for example, in this of *Epicharmus* [1];

Οὐδὲν διαφεύγει τὸ θεῖον· τοῦτο γινώσκειν σε δεῖ·
Αὐτὸς ἐσθ' ἡμῶν ἐπόπτης· ἀδυνατεῖ δ' οὐδὲν Θεῷ.

Res nulla eſt Deum quæ lateat, ſcire quod te convenit:
Ipſe eſt noſter introſpector, tum Deus nil non poteſt.

So likewiſe in this of *Plato*'s [2], πόρρω ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον, *God is far removed both from pleaſure and grief.* And *Plotinus* calls the ſupreme God, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, *the Divinity that is in the univerſe.* But becauſe the inſtances hereof are alſo innumerable, we ſhall decline the mentioning of any more, and inſtead of them, only ſet down the judgment of that diligent and impartial obſerver of the force of words, *Henricus Stephanus* [3], concerning it; *Redditur etiam* τὸ θεῖον *ſæpe Deus, ſed ita tamen, ut intelligendum ſit, non de quolibet Deo ab ipſis etiam profanis ſcriptoribus dici, verùm de eo quem intelligerent, cùm* Θεὸν *dicebant quaſi* κατ' ἐξοχήν *ad differentiam eorum, qui multi appellatione* Θεῶν *includebantur, ſummum videlicet ſupremúmque Numen, & quaſi dicas* Θεὸν Θεῶν ὕπατον καὶ ἄριστον, *ut loquitur de* Jove Homerus.

Laſtly, as τὸ Θεῖον ſo likewiſe was τὸ δαιμόνιον uſed by the Greeks for the ſupreme Numen, or that Divinity, which governs the whole world. Thus whereas it was commonly ſaid, (according to *Herodotus* [4]) ὅτι τὸ Θεῖον φθόνερον, *that God was envious*; the meaning whereof was, that he did not commonly ſuffer any great human proſperity to continue long, without ſome check or counterbuff; the ſame proverbial ſpeech is expreſſed in *Ariſtotle*, φθόνερον τὸ δαιμόνιον. And in this ſenſe the word ſeems to be uſed in *Iſocrates ad Demonicum*, τίμα τὸ δαιμόνιον ἀεὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ μετὰ τῆς πόλεως, *worſhip God always, but eſpecially with the city, in her publick ſacrifices.* And doubtleſs it was thus taken by *Epictetus* in this paſſage of his, μία ὁδὸς ἐπὶ εὐροιαν, τοῦτο καὶ ὄρθρου, καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ἔστω πρόχειρον, ἀπόταξις τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, τὸ μηδὲν ἴδιον ἡγεῖσθαι, τὸ παραδοῦναι πάντα τῷ δαιμονίῳ, καὶ τῇ τύχῃ. *There is but one way to tranquillity of mind and happineſs: let this therefore be always ready at hand with thee, both when thou wakeſt early in the morning, and all the day long, and when thou goeſt late to ſleep; to account no external things thine own, but to commit all theſe to God and fortune.* And there is a very remarkable paſſage in *Demoſthenes* [5] (obſerved by *Budæus*) that muſt not be here *Arr. Lib.* 4. *c.* 4. *p.* 387. [Edit. Cantab.]

[1] Apud Clement. Alexandrin. Stromat. Lib. V. p. 708. The Tranſlation is by *Grotius* in *Excerpt. veter. Tragicor. & Comicor.* p. 481.

[2] Epiſt. III. p. 708.

[3] In Theſauro Græcæ Linguæ, Tom. 1. p. 1534.

[4] Lib. III. Cap. XLI. p. 176. He cites this from an Epiſtle of *Amaſis* to the Tyrant *Polycrates.*

[5] Orat. περὶ παραπρεσβείας, p. 266. Edit. Græc. Baſil. 1532. fol.

here omitted; in which we have οἱ θεοὶ plainly for the *inferior* or *minor gods* only, and τὸ δαιμόνιον for *the ſupreme God*, both together; εἴσονται οἱ θεοὶ καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸν μὴ τὰ δίκαια ψηφισάμενον. *The gods and the Deity will know or take notice of him that gives not a righteous ſentence*; that is, both the inferior gods and the ſupreme God himſelf. Wherefore we ſee, that the word δαιμόνιον, as to its grammatical form, is not a diminutive, as ſome have conceived, but an adjective ſubſtantiv'd; as well as τὸ θεῖον is. Nevertheleſs in pagan writings, δαιμόνιον alſo, as well as δαίμων, from whence it is derived, is often uſed for an inferior rank of beings below the gods, though ſometimes called gods too; and ſuch was *Socrates* his δαιμόνιον ſo commonly known. But the grammar of this word, and its proper ſignification in pagan writers, cannot better be manifeſted, than by citing that paſſage of *Socrates* his own, in his Apology, as written by *Plato*; who though generally ſuppoſed to have had a dæmon, was notwithſtanding by *Melitus* accuſed of atheiſm; ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλιτε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἢ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα, &c. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτῳ ἀπόκριναι, ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματα εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἕν δαιμόνια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ καὶ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πόλλη ἀνάγκη νομίζειν με εἶναι. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα εἶναι, ἢ θεῶν παῖδας, &c. *Is there any one, O* Melitus, *who acknowledging, that there are human things, can yet deny, that there are any men? or confeſſing that there are equine things, can nevertheleſs deny, that there are any horſes? If this cannot be, then no man, who acknowledges dæmonial things, can deny dæmons. Wherefore I being confeſſed to aſſert* δαιμόνια, *muſt needs be granted to hold* δαίμονας *alſo. Now do we not all think, that dæmons are either gods, or at leaſt ſons of the gods? Wherefore for any one to conceive, that there are dæmons, and yet no gods, is altogether as abſurd, as if any ſhould think, that there are mules, but yet neither horſes nor aſſes.* However, in the New Teſtament, according to the judgments of *Origen*, *Euſebius*, and others of the ancient fathers, both thoſe words δαίμονας and δαιμόνια are alike taken, always in a worſer ſenſe, for evil and impure ſpirits only.

P. 27. Steph. [There are ſeveral omiſſions in this quotation from *Plato*, and ſome alterations.]

But over and beſides all this, the Pagans do often characterize the ſupreme God by ſuch titles, epithets, and deſcriptions, as are incommunicably proper to him; thereby plainly diſtinguiſhing him from all other inferior gods. He being ſometimes called by them ὁ Δημιουργὸς, *the opifex, architect or maker of the world*; ὁ Ἡγεμὼν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ Ἀρχηγέτης, *the prince and chief ruler of the univerſe*; ὁ Πρῶτος and ὁ Πρώτιστος θεὸς (by the Greeks) and (by the Latins) *Primus Deus, the Firſt God*; ὁ Πρῶτος Νοῦς, *the Firſt Mind*; ὁ μέγας Θεὸς, *the Great God*; ὁ μέγιστος δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, *the greateſt God*, and *the greateſt of the gods*; ὁ Ὕψιστος, *the Higheſt*; and ὁ Ὕπατος θεῶν, *the Supreme of the gods*; ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς, *the uppermoſt, or moſt tranſcendent God*; *Princeps ille Deus, that chief or principal God*; Θεὸς θεῶν, *the God of gods*; and Ἀρχὴ Ἀρχῶν, *the Principle of principles*; Τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, *the Firſt Cauſe*; Ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας, *he that generated or created this whole univerſe*; ὁ κρατέων τοῦ παντὸς, *he that ruleth over the whole world*; *Summus Rector & Dominus, the ſupreme Governor and Lord of all*; ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶζι θεὸς,

Θεὸς, *the God over all*; ὁ Θεὸς ἀγένητος, αὐτογενὴς, αὐτοφυὴς, αὐθυπόστατος, *the ingenerate or unmade, self-originated and self-subsisting Deity*; Μονὰς, *a Monad*; Τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτο ἀγαθὸν, *Unity and Goodness itself*; Τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, and τὸ ὑπερούσιον, *that which is above essence or super-essential*; Τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ, *that which is above mind and understanding*; *Summum illud & Æternum, neque mutabile neque interiturum, that Supreme and Eternal Being, which is immutable and can never perish*; Ἀρχὴ, καὶ τέλος, καὶ μέσον ἁπάντων, *the Beginning, and End, and Middle of all things*; Ἓν καὶ πάντα, *One and all things*; *Deus Unus & Omnes, One God and All Gods:* and lastly, to name no more, ἡ Πρόνοια, or *Providence*, as distinguished from Φύσις, *Nature*, is often used by them also as a name for the supreme God, which because it is of the feminine gender, the impious and atheistical Epicureans therefore took occasion to call God, ridiculously and jeeringly, *Anum fatidicam Pronœan*[1]. Now all these, and other such like expressions, being found in the writings of professed Pagans (as we are able to shew) and some of them very frequently, it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did put a manifest difference betwixt the supreme God, and all other inferior gods.

XV. What hath been now declared, might, as we conceive, be judged sufficient, in order to our present undertaking; which is to prove, that the more intelligent of the ancient Pagans, notwithstanding that multiplicity of gods worshipped by them, did generally acknowledge one supreme, omnipotent, and only unmade Deity. Nevertheless, since men are commonly so much prepossessed with a contrary persuasion, (the reason whereof seems to be no other than this, that because the notion of the word *God*, which is now generally received amongst us Christians, is such as does essentially include self-existence in it, they are therefore apt to conceit, that it must needs do so likewise amongst the Pagans;) we shall endeavour to produce yet some further evidence for the truth of our assertion. And first, we conceive this to be no small confirmation thereof, because after the publication of Christianity, and all along during that tugging and contest, which was betwixt it and Paganism, none of the professed champions for paganism and antagonists of Christianity, (when occasion was now offered them) did ever assert any such thing as a multiplicity of understanding deities unmade (or creators) but on the contrary, they all generally disclaimed it, professing to acknowledge one supreme self-existent Deity, the maker of the whole universe.

It is a thing highly probable, if not unquestionable, that *Apollonius Tyanæus*, shortly after the publication of the gospel to the world, was a person made choice of by the policy, and assisted by the powers of the kingdom of darkness, for the doing of some things extraordinary, merely out of design to derogate from the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to enable paganism the better to bear up against the assaults of Christianity. For amongst the many writers of this philosopher's life, some, and particularly *Philostratus*, seem to have had no other aim in this their whole undertaking, than only to dress up *Apollonius* in such a garb and manner, as might make him best seem to be a fit corrival with our Saviour Christ, both in respect of sanctity

[1] Vide Ciceron. de Natur. Deor. Lib. I. Cap. VIII. p. 2890. Tom. IX. Oper.

and miracles. *Eunapius* [1] therefore telling us, that he miſ-titled his book, and that inſtead of Ἀπολλωνίου βίου, *the life of* Apollonius, he ſhould have called it Θεοῦ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίαν, *the coming down, and converſe of God with men*; foraſmuch as this *Apollonius* (ſaith he) was not a bare philoſopher or man, ἀλλά τι θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπου μέσον, *but a certain middle thing betwixt the gods and men.* And that this was the uſe commonly made by the Pagans of this hiſtory of *Apollonius*, namely to ſet him up in way of oppoſition and rivalry to our Saviour Chriſt, appears ſundry ways. *Marcellinus*, in an Epiſtle of his to St. *Auſtin* [2], declares this as the grand objection of the Pagans againſt Chriſtianity, (therefore deſiring St. *Auſtin*'s anſwer to the ſame;) *Nihil aliud Dominum, quàm alii homines facere potuerunt, feciſſe vel egiſſe mentiuntur*; Apollonium *ſiquidem ſuum nobis*, & Apuleium, *alióſque magicæ artis homines, in medium proferunt, quorum majora contendunt extitiſſe miracula. The Pagans pretend, that our Saviour Chriſt did no more than what other men have been able to do, they producing their* Apollonius *and* Apuleius, *and other magicians, whom they contend to have done greater miracles.* And it is well known, that *Hierocles*, to whom *Euſebius* gives the commendation of a very learned man, wrote a book againſt the Chriſtians (entitled, Φιλαλήθης, or Λόγοι φιλαλήθεις) the chief deſign whereof was to compare this *Apollonius Tyanæus* with, and prefer him before our Saviour Chriſt: Ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλλοῦσι, σεμνύνοντες τὸν Ἰησοῦν, ὡς τυφλοῖς ἀναβλέψαι τε παραχρῆμα, καί τινα τοιαῦτα δράσαντα θαυμάσια· They are *Hierocles* his own words in *Euſebius*: *The Chriſtians* (ſaith he) *keep a great deal of ſtir, crying up of one Jeſus, for reſtoring ſight to the blind, and doing ſome ſuch other wonders.* And then mentioning the Thaumaturgi or wonder-workers amongſt the Pagans, but eſpecially *Apollonius Tyanæus*, and inſiſting largely upon his miracles, he adds in the cloſe of all, τίνος ἕνεκα τούτων ἐμνήσθην; ἵνα ἐξῇ συγκρίνειν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀκριβῆ καὶ βεβαίαν ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ κρίσιν, καὶ τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν κουφότητα· εἴπερ ἡμεῖς μὲν τὸν τοιαῦτα πεποιηκότα, οὐ θεὸν, ἀλλὰ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένον ἄνδρα ἡγούμεθα· οἱ δὲ δι' ὀλίγας τερατείας τινὰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν Θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσι. *To what purpoſe now have we mentioned all theſe things? but only that the ſolid judgment of us* [Pagans] *might be compared with the levity of the Chriſtians; foraſmuch as we do not account him a god who did all theſe miracles, but only a perſon beloved of the gods; whilſt they declare Jeſus to be a God, merely for doing a few wonders.* Where, becauſe *Euſebius* is ſilent, we cannot but ſubjoin an anſwer out of *Lactantius* (which indeed he ſeems to have directed againſt thoſe very words of *Hierocles*, though not naming of him) it being both pertinent and full;

De Juſti. l. 5. c. 3. *Apparet nos ſapientiores eſſe, qui mirabilibus factis non ſtatim fidem divitatis adjunximus, quàm vos, qui ob exigua portenta Deum credidiſtis——— Diſce igitur, ſi quid tibi cordis eſt, non ſolùm idcirco à nobis Deum creditum Chriſtum, quia mirabilia fecit, ſed quia vidimus in eo facta eſſe omnia, quæ nobis annunciata ſunt, vaticinia prophetarum. Fecit mirabilia; magum putaſſemus, ut & vos nuncupatis; & Judæi tunc putaverunt; ſi non illa ipſa facturum Chriſtum, prophetæ omnes uno ſpiritu prædicaſſent. Itaque Deum credimus, non magis ex factis, operibúſque mirandis; quàm ex illa ipſa cruce, quam vos ſicut canes lambitis; quoniam ſimul & illa prædicta eſt. Non igitur ſuo teſtimonio*

[1] In Vitis Sophiſtarum, Proœm. p. 6, 7. Edit. Plantin.

[2] Inter Epiſtol. Auguſtin. Epiſt. CXXXVI. Tom. II. Oper. p. 304. Edit. Benedict.

teſtimonio, (cui enim de ſe dicenti poteſt credi?) ſed prophetarum teſtimonio, qui omnia quæ fecit ac paſſus eſt, multo antè cecinerunt; fidem divinitatis accepit; quod neque Apollonio *neque* Apuleio *neque cuiquam magorum poteſt aliquando contingere. It is manifeſt, that we Chriſtians are wiſer than yon Pagans, in that we do not preſently attribute divinity to a perſon merely becauſe of his wonders; whereas a few portentous things, or extraordinary actions, will be enough with you to make you deify the doer of them*; (and ſo indeed did ſome of them, however *Hierocles* denies it, deify *Apollonius.) Let this writer againſt Chriſtianity therefore learn, (if he have any underſtanding or ſenſe in him) that Chriſt was not therefore believed to be a God by us Chriſtians, merely becauſe of his miracles, but becauſe we ſaw all thoſe things done by, and accompliſhed in him, which were long before predicted to us by the prophets. He did miracles, and we ſhould therefore have ſuſpected him for a magician (as you now call him, and as the* Jews *then ſuppoſed him to be) had not all the prophets with one voice foretold, that he ſhould do ſuch things. We believe him therefore to be God, no more for his miracles than from that very croſs of his, which you ſo much quarrel with, becauſe that was likewiſe foretold. So that our belief of Chriſt's divinity is not founded upon his own teſtimony (for who can be believed concerning himſelf?) but upon the teſtimony of the prophets, who ſang long before of all thoſe things, which he both did and ſuffered. Which is ſuch a peculiar advantage and privilege of his, as that neither* Apollonius *nor* Apuleius, *nor any other magician, could ever ſhare therein.* Now, as for the life and morals of this *Apollonius Tyanæus*, as it was a thing abſolutely neceſſary for the carrying on of ſuch a diabolical deſign, that the perſon made uſe of for an inſtrument ſhould have ſome colourable and plauſible pretence to virtue; ſo did *Apollonius* accordingly take upon him the profeſſion of a Pythagorean; and indeed act that part externally ſo well, that even *Sidonius Apollinaris* [1], though a Chriſtian, was ſo dazzled with the glittering ſhew and luſtre of his counterfeit virtues, as if he had been inchanted by this magician ſo long after his death. Nevertheleſs, whoſoever is not very dim-ſighted in ſuch matters as theſe, or partially affected, may eaſily perceive, that this *Apollonius* was ſo far from having any thing of that divine ſpirit which manifeſted itſelf in our Saviour Chriſt, (tranſcending all the philoſophers that ever were) that he fell far ſhort of the better moralized Pagans; as for example *Socrates*, there being a plain appearance of much pride and vain-glory (beſides other foolery) diſcoverable both in his words and actions. And this *Euſebius* [2] undertakes to evince from *Philoſtratus* his own hiſtory (though containing many falſhoods in it) ὡδ' ἐν ἐπιεικέσι καὶ μετρίοις ἀνδράσιν ἄξιον ἐγκρίνειν, ὡς ὅπως τῷ σωτῆρι ἡμῶν Χριστῷ παρατιθέναι τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, *That* Apollonius *was ſo far from deſerving to be compared with our Saviour Chriſt, that he was not fit to be ranked amongſt the moderately and indifferently honeſt men.* Wherefore, as to his reputed miracle, if credit be to be given to thoſe relations, and ſuch things were really done by him, it muſt for this reaſon alſo be concluded, that they were done no otherwiſe than by magick and necromancy; and that this *Apollonius* was but an Archimago or grand Magician. Neither ought this to be ſuſpected for a mere ſlander caſt upon him by partially

[1] Epiſtolar. Lib. VIII. Epiſt. III. p. 462, 463. [2] Adverſ. Hieroclem, Cap. IV. p. 431.

tially affected Chriſtians only, ſince, during his life-time, he was generally reputed, even amongſt the Pagans themſelves, for no other than a γόης [1], or *infamous inchanter*, and accuſed of that very crime before *Domitian* the emperor [2]: as he was alſo repreſented ſuch by one of the Pagan writers of his life, *Mœragenes*, ſenior to *Philoſtratus*, as we learn from *Origen*: περὶ μαγείας Φαμέν, ὅτι ὁ βελόμενος ἐξετάσαι, πότερόν ποτε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἄλωτοί εἰσιν αὐτῇ, εἰ μὴ, ἀναγνώτω τὰ γεγραμμένα Μοιραγένει τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως μάγου καὶ φιλοσόφου ἀπομνημονευμάτων. ἐν οἷς ὁ μὴ Χριστιανὸς, ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφος, ἔφησεν ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν Ἀπολλωνίῳ μαγείας, καί τινας φιλοσόφους, ὡς πρὸς γόητα αὐτὸν εἰσελθόντας. ἐν οἷς, οἶμαι, καὶ περὶ Εὐφράτου πάνυ διηγήσαλο, καί τινος Ἐπικουρείου. *As concerning the infamous and diabolical magick, he that would know whether or no a philoſopher be temptable by it, or illaqueable into it, let him read the writings of* Mœragenes *concerning the memorable things of* Apollonius Tyanæus *the magician and philoſopher*; *in which he that was no Chriſtian, but a Pagan philoſopher himſelf, affirmeth ſome not ignoble philoſophers to have been taken with* Apollonius *his magick, including (as I ſuppoſe) in that number* Euphrates *and a certain Epicurean.* And no doubt but this was the reaſon, why *Philoſtratus* [3] derogates ſo much from the authority of this *Mœragenes*, affirming him to have been ignorant of many things concerning *Apollonius* (ὁ γὰρ Μοιραγένει τε προσεκλέον, &c.) Becauſe *Mœragenes* had thus repreſented *Apollonius* in his true colours as a magician; whereas *Philoſtratus* his whole buſineſs and deſign was, on the contrary, to vindicate him from that imputation: the truth whereof notwithſtanding, may be ſufficiently evinced, even from thoſe very things, that are recorded by *Philoſtratus* himſelf. And here by the way we ſhall obſerve, that it is reported by good hiſtorians, that miracles were alſo done by *Veſpaſian* at *Alexandria*, *Per eos menſes* (they are the words of *Tacitus*) *multa miracula evenere, quîs cœleſtis favor, & quædam in* Veſpaſianum *inclinatio numinum oſtenderetur. Ex plebe Alexandrinâ quidam, oculorum tabe notus, genua ejus advolvitur, remedium cæcitatis expoſcens gemitu; monitu* Serapidis *dei, quem dedita ſuperſtitionibus gens ante alios colit; precabatúrque principem, ut genas & oculorum orbes dignaretur reſpergere oris excremento. Alius manu æger, eodem deo auctore, ut pede ac veſtigio* Cæſaris *calcaretur orabat. At that time many miracles happened at* Alexandria, *by which was manifeſted the heavenly favour and inclination of the divine powers towards* Veſpaſian. *A plebeian Alexandrian, that had been known to be blind, caſts himſelf at the feet of* Veſpaſian, *begging with tears from him a remedy for his ſight, (and that according to the ſuggeſtion of the god* Serapis) *that he would deign but to ſpit upon his eyes and face. Another having a lame hand (directed by the ſame oracle) beſeeches him but to tread upon it with his foot.* And after ſome debate concerning this buſineſs, both theſe things being done by *Veſpaſian*, *ſtatim converſa ad uſum manus, & cæco reluxit dies; the lame hand preſently was reſtored to its former uſefulneſs, and the blind man recovered his ſight: both which things (ſaith the hiſtorian) ſome who were eye-witneſſes do to this very day teſtify, when it can be no advantage to any one to lye concerning it.* And that there ſeems to be ſome reaſon to ſuſpect, that our archimago *Apollonius Tyanæus* might have ſome finger

Con. Cel. l. 6. p. 302.

Hiſt. l. 4. p. 111.

[1] This is related by *Philoſtratus* in Vitâ Apollonii, Lib. II. Cap. XVIII. p. 156.

[2] Philoſtrat. ubi ſupra, Lib. VIII. Cap. VII. p. 327.

[3] Ibid. Lib. I. Cap. III. p. 5, 6.

finger in this business also, because he was not only familiarly and intimately acquainted with *Vespasian*, but also at that very time (as *Philostratus* [1] informeth us) present with him at *Alexandria*, where he also did many miracles himself. However, we may here take notice of another stratagem and policy of the devil in this, both to obscure the miracles of our Saviour Christ, and to weaken mens faith in the Messiah, and baffle the notion of it; that whereas a fame of prophecies had gone abroad every where, that a king was to come out of *Judea* and rule over the whole world, (by which was understood no other than the Messiah) by reason of these miracles done by *Vespasian*, this oracle or prediction might the rather seem to have its accomplishment in him, who was first proclaimed emperor in *Judea*, and to whom *Josephus* [2] himself basely and flatteringly had applied it. And since this business was started and suggested by the god *Serapis*, that is, by the devil (of whose counsel probably *Apollonius* also was;) this makes it still more strongly suspicable, that it was really a design or policy of the devil, by imitating the miracles of our Saviour Christ, both in *Apollonius* and *Vespasian*, to counter-work God Almighty in the plot of Christianity, and to keep up or conserve his own usurped tyranny in the pagan world still. Nevertheless, we shall here show *Apollonius* all the favour we can; and therefore suppose him not to have been one of those more foul and black magicians, of the common sort, such as are not only grosly sunk and debauched in their lives, but also knowingly do homage to evil spirits as such, for the gratification of their lusts; but rather one of those more refined ones, who have been called by themselves Theurgists, such as being in some measure freed from the grosser vices, and thinking to have to do only with good spirits; nevertheless, being proud and vain-glorious, and affecting wonders, and to transcend the generality of mankind, are, by a divine nemesis, justly exposed to the illusions of the devil or evil spirits, cunningly insinuating here, and aptly accommodating themselves to them. However, concerning this *Apollonius*, it is undeniable, that he was a zealous upholder of the Pagan polytheism, and a stout champion for the gods, he professing to have been taught by the Samian *Pythagoras* his ghost, how to worship these gods, invisible as well as visible [3], and to have converse with them. For which cause he is styled by *Vopiscus* [4], *amicus verus deorum, a true friend of the gods*; that is, a hearty and sincere friend to that old Pagan religion, now assaulted by Christianity, in which not one only true God, but a multiplicity of gods were worshipped. But notwithstanding all this, *Apollonius* himself was a clear and undoubted assertor of one supreme Deity; as is evident from his apologetick oration in *Philostratus* [5], prepared for *Domitian:* in which he calls him, τὸν τῶν ὅλων, and τὸν πάντων δημιουργὸν θεὸν, *that God, who is the maker of the whole universe, and of all things.* And, as he elsewhere in *Philostratus* declares both the Indians and Egyptians to have agreed in this theology, insomuch that though the Egyptians condemned the Indians for many other of their opinions, yet did they highly applaud this doctrine of theirs, τῆς μὲν ὅλων γενέσεως

[1] Ubi supra, Lib. V. Cap. XXVII. p. 209. & Lib VIII. Cap. VII. Sect. II. p 329.

[2] De Bello Judaico, Lib. V. Cap. V. Sect. IV. p. 300. Tom. II. Oper.

[3] Vide Philostrat. ubi supra, Lib. I. Cap. XXXII. p. 40.

[4] In Vitâ Aureliani, Cap. XXIV. p. 578. Edit. Obrechti.

[5] Ubi supra, Lib. VIII. Cap. VII. Sect. VII. p. 337.

νέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας θεὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τῦδε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ταῦτα, αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν, *that God was the maker both of the generation and eſſence of all things, and that the cauſe of his making them was his eſſential goodneſs:* ſo doth he himſelf very much commend this philoſophy of *Jarchas* the Indian Brachman, *viz.* that the whole world was but one great animal, and might be reſembled to a vaſt ſhip, wherein there are many inferior ſurbordinate governors, under one ſupreme, the oldeſt and wiſeſt; as alſo expert mariners of ſeveral ſorts, ſome to attend upon the deck, and others to climb the maſts and order the ſails, ἐν ᾗ τὴν μὲν πρώτην καὶ τελεωτάτην ἕδραν ἀποδοτέον θεῷ γενέτορι τῦδε τῦ ζώε, τὴν δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνη, θεοῖς οἱ τὰ μέρη αὐτῦ κυβερνῶζι· καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα, ἐπειδὴ πολλὰς μὲν φάσκωζιν ἐν τῷ ὐρανῷ θεὰς εἶναι, πολλὰς δὲ ἐν θαλάτῃ, πολλὰς δὲ ἐν πήγαις τε καὶ νάμαζι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ περὶ γῆν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν τινας· *In which the firſt and higheſt ſeat is to be given to that God, who is the generator or creator of this great animal; and the next under it to thoſe gods, that govern the ſeveral parts of it reſpectively: ſo that the poets were to be approved of here, when they affirm, that there are many gods in the heavens, many in the ſeas, many in the rivers and fountains, many alſo upon the earth, and ſome under the earth.* Wherein we have a true repreſentation of the old paganick theology, which both Indians, and Egyptians, and European poets, (Greek and Latin) all agree in; that there is one ſupreme God, the maker of the univerſe, and under him many inferior generated gods, or underſtanding beings (ſuperior to men) appointed to govern and preſide over the ſeveral parts thereof, who were alſo to be religiouſly honoured and worſhipped by men. And thus much for *Apollonius Tyanæus.*

Philoſ. p. 142. [Lib. III. Cap. XXXV.]

The firſt pagan writer againſt Chriſtianity was *Celſus*, who lived in the times of *Adrian*, and was ſo profeſt a Polytheiſt, that he taxes the *Jews* for having been ſeduced, by the frauds of *Moſes* into this opinion of one God; ὅτι τῷ ἡγησαμένῳ σφῶν ἑπόμενοι Μωϋζῇ αἰπόλοι καὶ ποίμενες, ἀγροίκοις ἀπάταις ψυχαγωγηθέντες, ἕνα ἐνόμιζαν εἶναι Θεόν· *Thoſe ſilly ſhepherds and herdſmen, following* Moſes *their leader, and being ſeduced by his ruſtick frauds, came to entertain this belief, that there was but one only God.* Nevertheleſs, this *Celſus* himſelf plainly acknowledged, amongſt his many gods, one ſupreme, whom ſometimes calls τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν, *the firſt God*; ſometimes τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν, *the greateſt God*; and ſometimes τὸν ὑπερκόσμιον θεὸν, *the ſuperceleſtial God*, and the like: and he doth ſo zealouſly aſſert the divine omnipotence, that he caſts an imputation upon the Chriſtians of derogating from the ſame, in that their hypotheſis of an adverſary power; σφάλλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἄτλα, καὶ περὶ τήνδε τὴν μεγίστην ἄγνοιαν ὁμοίως ἀπὸ θείων αἰνιγμάτων πεπλανημένην, ποιοῦντες τῷ θεῷ ἐναντίον τινα, διάβολον τε καὶ γλώττῃ Ἑβραΐα Σαλανᾶν ὀνομάζοντες τὸν αὐτόν. ἄλλως μὲν ἓν παντελῶς θεμιτὰ ταῦτα, καὶ ὑπ' ὅσια λέγειν, ὅτι δὲ ὁ μέγιστος Θεὸς, βουλόμενός τι ἀνθρώποις ὠφελῆσαι, τὸν ἀνθιπράσσοντα ἔχει, καὶ ἀδυνατεῖ. *The Chriſtians are erroneouſly led into moſt wicked opinions concerning God, by reaſon of their great ignorance of the divine enigms; whilſt they make a certain adverſary to God, whom they call the devil, and in the* Hebrew *language Satan: and affirm, contrary to all piety, that the greateſt God, having a mind to do good*

Orig. p. 17, 18.

Orig. l. 6. *p.* 303.

to

to men, is disabled or withstood by an adversary resisting him. Lastly, where he pleads most for the worship of dæmons, he concludes thus concerning the supreme God; Θεῷ δὲ ἀδαμῆ ἀδαμῶς ἀπολειπτέον, ὅτε μεθ' ἡμέραν, ὅτε νύκτωρ, ὅτ' ἐς κοινὸν, ὅτ' ἰδίᾳ, λόγῳ τε ἐν παυλῇ καὶ ἔργῳ διηνεκῶς, ἀλλά γε καὶ μετὰ τῶνδε, καὶ χωρὶς, ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τετάσθω πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν· *But God is by no means any where to be laid aside, or left out; neither by day nor by night, neither in publick nor in private, either in our words or actions; but in every thing our mind ought constantly to be directed towards God.* A saying, that might very well become a Christian. *Orig. con. Cels. l. 8. p. 419*

The next and greatest champion for the Pagan cause in books and writings was that famous Tyrian philosopher *Malchus*, called by the Greeks *Porphyrius*; who published a voluminous and elaborate treatise (containing fifteen books) against the Christians; and yet he notwithstanding was plainly as zealous an assertor of one supreme Deity, and one only ἀγένητον, unmade or self-existent principle of all things, as any of the Christians themselves could be; he strenuously opposing that forementioned doctrine of *Plutarch* and *Atticus* concerning three unmade principles, a good God, an evil soul or dæmon, and the matter, and endeavouring to demonstrate, that all things whatsoever, even matter itself, was derived from one perfect understanding Being, or self-originated Deity. The sum of whose argumentation to which purpose we have represented by *Proclus* upon the *Timæus*, page 119.

After *Porphyrius*, the next eminent antagonist of Christianity, and champion for paganism, was *Hierocles*, the writer of that book, entitled (in *Eusebius*) Φιλαλήθης, or *a lover of the truth*; which is noted to have been a modester inscription, than that of *Celsus* his ἀληθὴς λόγος, or *true oration*. For if *Eusebius Pamphili* were the writer of that answer to this *Philalethes*, now extant, as we both read in our copies, and as *Photius* also read; then must it needs be granted, that *Hierocles* the author of it was either contemporary with *Porphyrius*, or else but little his junior. Moreover, this *Hierocles* seems plainly to be the person intended by *Lactantius*, in these following words; *Alius eandem materiam mordaciùs scripsit; qui erat tum è numero judicum, & qui auctor in primis faciendæ persecutionis fuit: quo scelere non contentus, etiam scriptis eos quos afflixerat, insecutus est. Composuit enim libellos duos, non contrà Christianos, nè inimicè insectari videretur, sed ad Christianos, ut humanè ac benignè consulere videretur. In quibus ita falsitatem scripturæ sacræ arguere conatus est, tanquam sibi esset tota contraria.——Præcipuè tamen* Paulum Petrúmque *laceravit, cæterósque discipulos, tanquam fallaciæ seminatores; quos eosdem tamen rudes & indoctos fuisse testatus est. Another hath handled the same matter more smartly, who was first himself one of the judges, and a chief author of the persecution; but being not contented with that wickedness, he added this afterwards, to persecute the Christians also with his pen; he composing two books, not inscribed against the Christians, (lest he should seem plainly to act the part of an enemy) but to the Christians, (that he might be thought to counsel them humanely and benignly:) in which he so charges the holy scripture with falshood, as if it were all nothing else but contradictions: but he chiefly lashes* Paul *and* Peter, *as divulgers of lyes and deceits, whom not-* *De Just. l. 3. c. 2. [P. 358.]*

withſtanding he declares to have been rude and illiterate perſons. I ſay, though *Hierocles*, for ſome cauſe or other, be not named here by *Lactantius* in theſe cited words, or that which follows, yet it cannot be doubted, but that he was the perſon intended by him, for theſe two reaſons: Firſt, becauſe he tells us afterward, that the main buſineſs of that *Chriſtiano-maſtix* was to compare *Apollonius* with our Saviour Chriſt. *Cùm facta Chriſti mirabilia deſtrueret, nec tamen negaret, voluit oſtendere,* Apollonium *vel paria, vel etiam majora feciſſe. Mirum quòd* Apuleium *prætermiſerit, cujus ſolent & multa & mira memorari. Et ex hoc inſolentiam Chriſti voluit arguere, quòd deum ſe conſtituerit: ut ille verecundior fuiſſe videretur, qui cùm majora faceret (ut hic putat) tamen id ſibi non arrogaverit. That he might obſcure the miracles of our Saviour Chriſt, which he could not deny, he would undertake to ſhow, that equal or greater miracles were done by* Apollonius. *And it was a wonder he did not mention* Apuleius *too; of whoſe many and wonderful things the Pagans uſe to brag likewiſe. Moreover, he condemns our Saviour Chriſt of inſolency, for making himſelf a god, affirming* Apollonius *to have been the modeſter perſon, who, though he did (as he ſuppoſes) greater miracles, yet arrogated no ſuch thing to himſelf.* The ſecond reaſon is, becauſe *Lactantius* alſo expreſly mentions the very title of *Hierocles* his book, *viz. Philalethes. Cùm talia ignorantiæ ſuæ deliramenta fudiſſet, cúmque veritatem penitùs excidere connixus eſt, auſus eſt libros ſuos nefarios, ac dei hoſtes,* φιλαλήθεις *annotare: Though pouring out ſo much folly and madneſs, profeſſedly fighting againſt the truth, yet he preſumed to call theſe his wicked books, and enemies of God,* Philaletheis, *or friends to truth.* From which words of *Lactantius*, and thoſe foregoing, where he affirms this *Chriſtiano-maſtix* to have written two books, the learned prefacer to the late edition of *Hierocles*, probably concludes, that the whole title of *Hierocles* his book was this, λόγοι φιλαλήθεις πρὸς Χριστιανούς· And I conceive, that the firſt of thoſe two books of *Hierocles* inſiſted upon ſuch things as *Porphyrius* had before urged againſt the Chriſtians; but then in the ſecond, he added this *de novo* of his own, to compare *Apollonius* with our Saviour Chriſt: which *Euſebius* only takes notice of. Wherefore *Epiphanius* telling us [1], that there was one *Hierocles* a prefect or governor of *Alexandria*, in thoſe perſecuting times of *Diocletian*, we may probably conclude, that this was the very perſon deſcribed in *Lactantius*, who is ſaid to have been firſt of the number of the judges, and a principal actor in the perſecution; and then afterwards to have written this *Philalethes* againſt the Chriſtians, wherein, beſides other things, he ventured to compare *Apollonius Tyanæus* with our Saviour Chriſt. Now, if this *Hierocles*, who wrote the *Philalethes* in defence of the Pagan gods againſt the Chriſtians, were the author of thoſe two other philoſophick books, the Commentary upon the golden verſes, and that *De Fato & Providentia*, it might be eaſily evinced from both of them, that he was notwithſtanding an aſſerter of one ſupreme Deity. But *Photius* [2] tells us, that that *Hierocles*, who wrote the book concerning fate and providence, did therein make mention of *Jamblichus*, and his junior *Plutarchus Athenienſis:* from whence *Jonſius* taking it for granted, that it was one and the ſame *Hierocles*, who wrote againſt the Chriſtians, and *de Fato*, infers, that it could not be *Euſebius Pamphili*, who anſwered the *Philalethes*,

Dr. Pearſon, Bp. of Cheſter.

[1] Hæreſ. LXVIII. Meletian. §. II. Tom. I. Oper. p. 717. [2] Biblioth. Cod. CCXIV. p. 554.

lethes, but that it muſt needs be ſome other *Euſebius* much junior. But we finding *Hierocles* his *Philalethes* in *Lactantius*, muſt needs conclude on the contrary, that *Hierocles*, the famous *Chriſtiano-maſtix*, was not the ſame with that *Hierocles*, who wrote *de Fato*. Which is further evident from *Ænæas Gazeus* in his *Theophraſtus*; where firſt he mentions one *Hierocles* an Alexandrian, that had been his maſter, whom he highly extols, ἀλλ' P. 7. εἰπέ μοι, ἔτι παρ' ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας δεικνύντες τὰς τελετὰς, οἷος ἦν Ἱεροκλῆς [Edit. Barth.] ὁ διδάσκαλος; *But tell me, I pray you, are there yet left amongſt you in* Ægypt *any ſuch expounders of the arcane myſteries of philoſophy, as* Hierocles *our maſter was?* And this we ſuppoſe to be that *Hierocles*, who wrote concerning fate and providence, (if not alſo upon the golden verſes.) But afterward upon occaſion of *Apollonius* the Cappadocian, or Tyanæan, he mentions another *Hierocles* diſtinct from the former; namely him, who had ſo boaſted of *Apollonius* his miracles, in theſe words, ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος τὰ ψευδῆ λέγων P. 24. ἐλέγχεται. Ἱεροκλῆς δὲ οὐκ ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ' ὁ προσαλλόμενος τὰ θαυμάζια, ἄπιστον τοῦτο προσέθηκεν· *Thus* Apollonius *is convinced of falſhood; but* Hierocles (*not our maſter*) *but he that boaſts of the miracles* (*of* Apollonius) *adds another incredible thing.* And though it be probable, that one of theſe was the author of that commentary upon the golden verſes, (for that it ſhould be written by a Chriſtian, is but a dream) yet we cannot certainly determine, which of them it was. However, that this *Hierocles*, who was the maſtix of Chriſtianity, and champion for the gods, was notwithſtanding a profeſſed aſſerter of one ſupreme Deity, is clearly manifeſt alſo from *Lactantius*, in theſe following words; *Quam tandem nobis attuliſti veritatem? niſi quod aſſertor deorum eos ipſos ad ultimum prodidiſti: proſecutus enim ſummi dei laudes, quem regem, quem maximum, quem opificem rerum, quem fontem bonorum, quem parentem omnium, quem factorem altorémque viventium confeſſus es, ademiſti* Jovi *tuo regnum; eúmque ſumma poteſtate depulſum in miniſtrorum numerum redigiſti. Epilogus ergo te tuus arguit ſtultitiæ, vanitatis, erroris. Affirmas deos eſſe; & illos tamen ſubjicis & mancipas ei deo, cujus religionem conaris evertere. Though you have entitled your book* Philalethes, *yet what truth have you brought us therein, unleſs only this, that being an aſſerter of the gods, (contradicting yourſelf) you have at laſt betrayed thoſe very gods? For in the cloſe of your book, proſecuting the praiſes of the ſupreme God, and confeſſing him to be the king, the greateſt, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, the maker and conſerver of all living Beings, you have by this means dethroned your* Jupiter, *and degrading him from his ſovereign power, reduced him into the rank of inferior miniſters. Wherefore your epilogue argues you guilty of folly, vanity and error, in that you both aſſert gods, and yet ſubject and mancipate them under that one God, whoſe religion you endeavour to overthrow.* Where we muſt confeſs we underſtand not well *Lactantius* his logick; foraſmuch as *Hierocles* his *Zeus*, or *Jupiter*, was one and the ſame with his ſupreme God, (as is alſo here intimated;) and though he acknowledged all the other gods to be but his inferior miniſters, yet nevertheleſs did he contend, that theſe ought to be religiouſly worſhipped, which was the thing that *Lactantius* ſhould have confuted. But that, which we here take notice of, is this, that *Hierocles*, a grand perſecutor of the Chriſtians, and the author of that bitter invective againſt them, called *Philalethes*, though

he were ſo ſtrenuous an aſſerter of polytheiſm, and champion for the gods, yet did he nevertheleſs at the ſame time clearly acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, calling him the king, (that is, the monarch of the univerſe) the greateſt, the opifex of the world, the fountain of good, the parent of all things, and the maker and conſerver of all life.

But the greateſt oppoſer of Chriſtianity every way was *Julian* the emperor, who cannot reaſonably be ſuſpected to have diſguiſed or blanched paganiſm, becauſe he was an emperor, and had ſo great an animoſity againſt Chriſtianity, and was ſo ſuperſtitiouſly or bigotically zealous for the worſhip of the gods; and yet this very *Julian*, notwithſtanding, was an unqueſtionable aſſertor of one ſupreme Deity. In his book written againſt the Chriſtians, he declares the general ſenſe of the Pagans, after this manner: οἱ γὰρ ἡμέτεροι φασὶν, τὸν δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων μὲν εἶναι κοινὸν πατέρα καὶ βασιλέα, νενεμῆσθαι δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐθνάρχαις καὶ πολιούχοις θεοῖς, ὧν ἕκαστος ἐπιτροπεύει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λῆξιν οἰκείως αὐτῷ· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ πατρὶ πάντα τέλεια, καὶ ἓν πάντα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεριστοῖς, ἄλλη παρ' ἄλλῳ κρατεῖ δύναμις, &c. *Our theologers affirm the maker of all to be a common father and king; but that the nations, as to particular things, are diſtributed by him to other inferior gods, that are appointed to be governors over countries and cities, every one of which adminiſters in his own province agreeably to himſelf. For whereas in the common father all things are perfect, and one is all, in the particular or partial deities one excels in one power, and another in another.* Afterwards, in the ſame book he contends, that the Pagans did entertain righter opinions concerning the ſupreme God, than the Jews themſelves; ὡς εἰ μὲν ὁ προσεχὴς εἴη τῷ κόσμῳ δημιουργὸς ὁ κηρυττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Μωσέως, ἡμεῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ βελτίους ἴσχομεν δόξας, οἱ κοινὸν μὲν ἐκεῖνον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἁπάντων δεσπότην, ἐθνάρχας δὲ ἄλλους, οἳ τυγχάνουσι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκεῖνον, εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ ὕπαρχοι βασιλέως, ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ διαφερόντως ἐπανορθούμενος Φροντίδα, καὶ ὃ καθίσαμεν αὐτὸν, οὐδὲ ἀνθιμερίτην τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν θεῶν καθισαμένων· *If that God, who is ſo much ſpoken of by* Moſes, *be the immediate opificer of the whole world, we Pagans entertain better opinions of him, who ſuppoſe him to be the common Lord of all; but that there are other governors of nations and countries under him, as prefects or preſidents appointed by a king; we not ranking him amongſt thoſe partial governors of particular countries and cities, as the Jews do.* From both which places it is evident, that, according to *Julian*'s theology, all thoſe other gods, whoſe worſhip he contended ſo much for, were but the ſubordinate miniſters of that one ſupreme God, the maker of all.

Cyril. cont. Jul. 4. *p.* 115. [Edit. Spanhem.]

P. 146. [P. 148. Edit. Spanhem.

The ſame thing might be further manifeſted from *Julian*'s oration made in praiſe of the ſun, as a great God in this viſible world; he therein plainly acknowledging another far more glorious Deity, which was the cauſe of all things; εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί. *There is one God the maker of all things; but beſides him there are many other demiurgical gods moving round the heavens,* in the midſt of which is the ſun. Where we have a clear acknowledgement of one ſupreme God, and of many inferior deities, both together. Moreover, in the ſame oration,

P. 262. [Edit. Petav. Spanhemii vero p. 140.]

tion [1], he declareth, that the ancient poets, making the ſun to have been the off-ſpring of *Hyperion*, did by this *Hyperion* underſtand nothing elſe but the ſupreme Deity; τὸν πάντων ὑπερέχοντα, πάντων ἐπέκεινα, περὶ ὃν πάντα, καὶ δι' ἕνεκα πάντα ἐστίν, *him who is above all things, and about whom, and for whoſe ſake, are all things.* Which ſupreme Deity is thus more largely deſcribed by him in the ſame oration, (where he calls him the king of all things;) ἔστω τοίνυν, εἴτε τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ καλεῖν αὐτὸν θέμις· εἴτε ἰδέαν τῶν ὅλων ὁ δὴ φημὶ τὸ νοητὸν σύμπαν· εἴτε, ἐν ἐπειδὴ πάντων τὸ ἓν δοκεῖ ὡς πρεσβύταλον· εἴτε ὃ Πλάτων εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν τὸ ἀγαθόν· αὕτη δὲ ἓν ἡ μονοειδὴς τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, πᾶζι τοῖς οὖσιν ἐξηγημένη κάλλους τε, καὶ τελειότητος, ἑνώσεως τε, καὶ δυνάμεως ἀμηχάνου· κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῇ μένουσα προϋπάρχον οὖσίν, ἥλιον θεὸν μέγιστον ἀνέφηνεν, &c. *This God, whether he ought to be called that, which is above mind and underſtanding, or the idea of all things, or the one (ſince unity ſeems to be the oldeſt of all things) or elſe, as* Plato *was wont to call him, the good; I ſay, this uniform cauſe of all things, which is the original of all pulchritude and perfection, unity and power, produced from himſelf a certain intelligible ſun, every way like himſelf, of which the ſenſible ſun is but an image.* For thus *Dionyſius Petavius* rightly declares the ſenſe of *Julian* in this oration; *Vaniſſimæ hujus & loquaciſſimæ diſputationis myſterium eſt; à principe ac primario Deo, νοητὸν quendam & archetypum ſolem editum fuiſſe; qui eandem prorſus χέσιν & τάξιν in genere τῶν νοητῶν habeat, quam in αἰσθητοῖς ille, quem videmus, ſolaris globus obtinet. Tria itaque diſcernenda ſunt, princeps ille Deus, qui τἀγαθὸν à Platone dicitur, ὁ νοητὸς ἥλιος, ὁ φαινόμενος δίσκος. The myſtery of this moſt vain and loquacious diſputation is this, that from the firſt and chief Deity was produced a certain intelligible and archetypal ſun, which hath the ſame place or order in the rank of intelligible things, that the ſenſible ſun hath in the rank of ſenſibles. So that here are three things to be diſtinguiſhed from one another; firſt, the ſupreme Deity, which* Plato *calls the good; ſecondly, the intelligible ſun, or eternal intellect; and laſtly, the corporeal or ſenſible ſun (animated.)* Where, notwithſtanding, we may take notice, how near this Pagan philoſopher and emperor, *Julian*, approached to Chriſtianity, though ſo much oppoſed by him, in that he alſo ſuppoſed an eternal mind or intellect, as the immediate off-ſpring of the firſt fountain of all things; which ſeems to differ but a little from the Chriſtian λόγος. However, it is plain, that this devout reſtorer of paganiſm, and zealous contender for the worſhip of the gods, aſſerted no multiplicity of independent ſelf-exiſtent deities, but derived all his gods from one.

P. 248. [P. 132. Edit. Spanhem.]

P. 274.

As for thoſe other philoſophers and learned men, who, in thoſe latter times of the declining of paganiſm, after *Conſtantine*, ſtill ſtood out in oppoſition againſt Chriſtianity; ſuch as *Jamblichus*, *Syrianus*, *Proclus*, *Simplicius*, and many others, it is unqueſtionably evident concerning them all,* that they clearly acknowledged one ſupreme Deity as the original of all things. *Maximus Madaurenſis*, a confident and reſolved Pagan in St. *Auſtin*'s time, expreſſed both his own and the general ſenſe of Pagans, after this manner*: *Equidem unum eſſe Deum ſummum, ſine initio, naturæ ceu patrem magnum*

* *Ep.* 43. [Inter Auguſt. Epiſtol. Epiſt. XVI. p. 15. Tom. II. Oper. Edit. Benedict.]

[1] P. 136. Edit. Spanhem.

magnum atque magnificum, quis tam demens, tam mente captus neget eſſe certiſſimum? Hujus nos virtutes per mundanum opus diffuſas multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus cuncti proprium videlicet ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quaſi quædam membra carptim variis ſupplicationibus proſequimur, totum colere profectò videamur. Truly that there is one ſupreme God, without beginning, as the great and magnificent father of nature; who is ſo mad or devoid of ſenſe as not to acknowledge it to be moſt certain? His virtues diffuſed throughout the whole world, (becauſe we know not what his proper name is) we invoke under many different names. Whence it comes to paſs, that whilſt we proſecute, with our ſupplications, his, as it were, divided members ſeverally, we muſt needs be judged to worſhip the whole Deity. And then he concludes his epiſtle thus; *Dii te ſervent, per quos & eorum, atque cunctorum mortalium, communem patrem, univerſi mortales, quos terra ſuſtinet, mille modis, concordi diſcordia venerantur. The gods keep thee, by and through whom, we Pagans, diſperſed over the whole world, do worſhip the common father, both of thoſe gods, and all mortals, after a thouſand different manners, nevertheleſs with an agreeing diſcord. Longinianus* likewiſe, another more modeſt Pagan philoſopher, upon the requeſt of the ſame St. *Auſtin*, declares his ſenſe concerning the way of worſhipping God, and arriving to happineſs, to this purpoſe. *Per minores deos perveniri ad ſummum Deum non ſine ſacris purificatoriis*[a]; *That we are to come to the ſupreme God, by the minor or inferior gods, and that not without purifying rites and expiations:* he ſuppoſing that beſides a virtuous and holy life, certain religious rites and purifications were neceſſary to be obſerved in order to that end. In which epiſtle, the ſupreme God is alſo ſtyled by him, *unus, univerſus, incomprehenſibilis, ineffabilis & infatigabilis Creator.*

Ep. 21. [Inter Epiſt. Auguſtin. Epiſt. CCXXXIV. p. 647.]

Moreover, that the Pagans generally diſclaimed this opinion of many unmade ſelf-exiſtent deities, appeareth plainly from *Arnobius*, where he brings them in complaining, that they were falſly and maliciouſly accuſed by ſome Chriſtians as guilty thereof, after this manner: *Fruſtrà nos falſo & calumnioſo inceſſitis & appetitis crimine, tanquam inficias eamus Deum eſſe majorem; cùm à nobis &* Jupiter *nominetur, & optimus habeatur & maximus: cúmque illi auguſtiſſimas ſedes, & Capitolia conſtituerimus immania. In vain do you Chriſtians calumniate us, Pagans, and accuſe us, as if we denied one ſupreme omnipotent God; though we both call him* Jupiter, *and account him the beſt and the greateſt, having dedicated the moſt auguſt ſeats to him, the vaſt Capitols.* Where *Arnobius*, in way of oppoſition, ſhows firſt, how perplexed and intangled a thing the Pagans theology was, their poetick fables of the gods nonſenſically confounding herology together with theology; and that it was impoſſible, that that *Jupiter* of theirs, which had a father and a mother, a grand-father and a grand-mother, ſhould be the omnipotent God. *Nam Deus omnipotens, mente una omnium, & communi mortalitatis aſſenſu, neque genitus ſcitur, neque novam in lucem aliquando eſſe prolatus; nec ex aliquo tempore cœpiſſe eſſe, vel ſæculo. Ipſe enim eſt fons rerum, ſator ſæculorum*

Lib. 1. *p.* 19.

[a] Theſe words are not *Longinianus*'s, but the argument of the epiſtle prefixed to it.

culorum ac temporum. Non enim ipſa per ſe ſunt, ſed ex ejus perpetuitate perpetua, & infinita ſemper continuatione procedunt. At verò Jupiter (*ut vos fertis*) *& patrem habet & matrem, avos & avias, nunc nuper in utero matris ſuæ formatus*, &c. *You Pagans confound yourſelves with contradictions; for the omnipotent God, according to the natural ſenſe of all mankind, was neither begotten or made, nor ever had a beginning in time, he being the fountain and original of all things. But* Jupiter (*as you ſay*) *had both father and mother, grand-fathers and grand-mothers, and was but lately formed in the womb; and therefore he cannot be the eternal omnipotent God.* Nevertheleſs, *Arnobius* afterwards conſidering (as we ſuppoſe) that theſe poetick fables were by the wiſer Pagans either totally rejected, or elſe ſome way or other allegorized, he candidly diſmiſſeth this advantage, which he had againſt them, and grants their *Jupiter* to be the true omnipotent Deity, and conſequently that ſame God, which the Chriſtians worſhipped; but from thence infers, that the Pagans therefore muſt needs be highly guilty, whilſt worſhipping the ſame God with the Chriſtians, they did hate and perſecute them after that manner. *Sed ſint, ut vultis, unum, nec in aliquo, vi numinis, & majeſtate diſtantes; ecquid ergò injuſtis perſequimini nos odiis? Quid, ut ominis peſſimi, noſtri nominis inhorreſcitis mentione, ſi, quem Deum colitis, eum & nos? aut quid in eadem cauſa vobis eſſe contenditis familiares Deos, inimicos atque infeſtiſſimos nobis? etenim, ſi una religio eſt nobis vobiſque communis, ceſſat ira cœleſtium. But let it be granted, that* (*as you affirm*) *your* Jupiter, *and the eternal omnipotent God are one and the ſame; why then do you proſecute us with unjuſt hatreds, abominating the very mention of our names, if the ſame God that you worſhip be worſhipped by us? Or if your religion and ours be the ſame, why do you pretend, that the gods are propitious to you, but moſt highly provoked and incenſed againſt us?* Where the Pagan defence and reply is, *Sed non idcirco Dii vobis infeſti ſunt, quòd omnipotentem colatis Deum; ſed quod hominem natum, & quod perſonis infame eſt vilibus, crucis ſupplicio interemptum, & Deum fuiſſe contenditis, & ſupereſſe adhuc creditis, & quotidianis ſupplicationibus adoratis: But we do not ſay, that the gods are therefore diſpleaſed with you Chriſtians, becauſe you worſhip the omnipotent God; but becauſe you contend him to be a God, who was not only born a mortal man, but alſo died an ignominious death, ſuffering as a malefactor; believing him ſtill to ſurvive, and adoring him with your daily prayers.* To which *Arnobius* retorts in this manner: *Tell us now, I pray you, who theſe gods are, who take it as ſo great an injury and indignity done to themſelves, that Chriſt ſhould be worſhipped? Are they not* Janus *and* Saturn, Æſculapius *and* Liber, Mercurius *the ſon of* Maia, *and the Theban or Tyrian* Hercules, Caſtor *and* Pollux, *and the like? Hice ergo Chriſtum coli, & à nobis accipi, & exiſtimari pro numine, vulneratis accipiunt auribus? & obliti paulo ante ſortis & conditionis ſuæ, id, quod ſibi conceſſum eſt, impertiri alteri nolunt? hæc eſt juſtitia cœlitum? hoc deorum judicium ſanctum? Nonne iſtud livoris eſt & avaritiæ genus? non obtrectatio quædam ſordens, ſuas eminere ſolummodo velle ſortunas, aliorum res premi & in contempta humilitate calcari? natum hominem colimus; quid enim, vos hominem nullum colitis natum? non unum & alium? non innumeros alios? quinimo*

quinimo non omnes quos jam templis habetis veſtris, mortalium ſuſtuliſtis ex numero, & cælo ſideribúſque donaſtis? Concedamus interdum manum veſtris opinationibus dantes, unum Chriſtum fuiſſe de nobis, mentis, animæ, corporis, fragilitatis & conditionis unius; nonne dignus à nobis eſt tantorum ob munerum gratiam, Deus dici, Deuſque ſentiri? Si enim vos Liberum, *quòd reperit uſum vini; ſi quòd panis,* Cererem; *ſi* Æſculapium, *quòd herbarum; ſi* Minervam, *quòd oleæ; ſi* Triptolemum, *quòd aratri; ſi denique* Herculem, *quòd feras, quòd fures, quòd multiplicium capitum ſuperavit compeſcuitque natrices, divorum retuliſtis in cælum: honoribus quantis afficiendus eſt nobis, qui ab erroribus nos magnis inſinuatá veritate traduxit?* &c. *Are theſe the gods, who are ſo much offended with Chriſt's being worſhipped, and accounted a God by us? they, who being forgetful of their former condition, would not have the ſame beſtowed upon another, which hath been granted to themſelves? Is this the juſtice of the heavenly powers? this the righteous judgment of gods? or is it not rather baſe envy and covetouſneſs, for them thus to ingroſs all to themſelves? We worſhip indeed one, that was born a man: what then? do you worſhip no ſuch? not one, and another, and innumerable? and are not almoſt all your gods ſuch as were taken from out of the rank of men, and placed among the ſtars? and will you account that damnable in us, which yourſelves practiſe? Let us for the preſent yield thus much to your infidelity, and grant, that Chriſt was but an ordinary man of the ſame rank and condition with other mortals; yet might we not for all that (according to your principles) think him worthy, by reaſon of the great benefits we received from him, to be accounted a God? For if you have advanced into the number of your* Divi, Bacchus *or* Liber *for inventing the uſe of wine,* Ceres *of corn,* Æſculapius *of herbs,* Minerva *of the olive,* Triptolemus *of the plow, and* Hercules *for ſubduing beaſts, thieves, and monſters; with how great honours ought he to be affected by us, who by the inſinuation of divine truth hath delivered us from ſuch great errors of mind?* &c. Which argumentation of *Arnobius*, though it were good enough *ad homines*, to ſtop the mouths of the Pagans, there being more reaſon, that Chriſt ſhould be made a god, for the benefits that mankind receive from him, than that *Bacchus*, or *Ceres*, or *Hercules* ſhould be ſo; yet as the ſame *Arnobius* himſelf ſeems to intimate, it is not ſufficient without ſomething elſe ſuperadded to it, for the juſtification of Chriſtianity. Neither indeed was that the chief quarrel, which the Pagans had with the Chriſtians, that they had deified one, who was crucified, (though the croſs of Chriſt was alſo a great offence to them) but that they condemning the Pagans, for worſhipping others beſides the ſupreme omnipotent God, and decrying all thoſe gods of theirs, did themſelves notwithſtanding worſhip one mortal man for a God. This

Lib. 8. p. 385. *Celſus* urges in *Origen*, εἰ μὲν δὴ μηδένα ἄλλον ἐθεράπευον ἢ τοι πλὴν ἕνα Θεὸν, ἦν ἄν τις αὐτοῖς ἴσως πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀτενὴς λόγῳ. νυνὶ δὲ τὸν ἔναγχος φανέντα τοῦτον ὑπερθρηςκεύσι, καὶ ὅμως οὐδὲν πλημμελεῖν νομίζουσι περὶ τὸν Θεὸν, εἰ μὴ ὑπηρέτης αὐτῷ θεραπευθήσεται· *If theſe Chriſtians themſelves worſhipped no other but one God, or the pure divinity, then might they perhaps ſeem to have ſome juſt pretence of cenſuring us; but now they themſelves give divine honour to one that lately roſe up, and yet they perſuade themſelves, that they do not at all offend God in worſhipping that*

that supposed minister of his. Which, as *Origen* makes there a reply to it, so shall it be further considered by us afterwards.

As for the judgment of the Fathers in this particular, *Clemens Alexandrinus* was not only of this opinion, that the Pagans (at least the Greekish) did worship the true God, and the same God with the Christians, (though not after a right manner) but also endeavours to confirm it from the authority of St. *Peter: That the* Greeks *knew God*, Peter *intimates in his predication. There is one God, saith he, who made the beginning of all things, and hath power over their end*, &c. *Worship this God, not as the* Greeks *do. Wherein he seemeth to suppose the* Greeks *to worship the same God with us, though not according to the right tradition received by his Son. He does not enjoin us not to worship that God, which the* Greeks *worship, but to worship him otherwise than they do; altering only the manner of the worship, but not the object, or preaching another God. And what that is, not to worship God as the* Greeks *do, the same* Peter *intimated in those words; They worship him in images of wood and stone, brass and iron, gold and silver, and sacrifice to the dead also, as to gods.* Where he adds further out of St. *Peter*'s predication, *Neither worship God as the* Jews *do*, &c. *The one and only God (saith* Clemens) *is worshipped by the* Greeks *paganically, by the* Jews *Judaically, but by us newly and spiritually. For the same God, who gave the two testaments to the Jews and Christians, gave philosophy to the* Greeks, δι' ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ' Ἕλλησι δοξάζεται, *by which the omnipotent God is glorified amongst the* Greeks. *Strom. 6. p.* 635. [Cap. V. p. 759. Edit. Potteri.]

Lactantius Firmianus also, in many places, affirms the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity; *Summum Deum & philosophi & poetæ, & ipsi denique, qui deos colunt, sæpè fatentur: That there is one supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar worshippers of the gods themselves, frequently acknowledge.* From whence he concludes, that all the other Pagan gods were nothing but the ministers of this one supreme, and creatures made by him, (he then only blaming them for calling them gods, and giving them religious worship) *Lib.* 1. When he had declared, that it was altogether as absurd to suppose the world to be governed by many independent gods, as to suppose the body of a man to be governed by many minds or souls independent; he adds: *Quòd quia intelligunt isti assertores deorum, ita eos præesse singulis rebus ac partibus dicunt, ut tantùm unus sit rector eximius. Jam ergo cæteri non dii erunt, sed satellites ac ministri, quos ille unus, maximus & potens omnium, officiis his præfecit, ut ipsi ejus imperio & nutibus serviant. Si universi pares non sunt, non igitur dii omnes sunt. Nec enim potest hoc idem esse, quod servit & quod dominatur. Nam si Deus est nomen summæ potestatis, incorruptibilis esse debet, perfectus, impassibilis, nulli rei subjectus. Ergo dii non sunt, quos parere uni maximo Deo necessitas cogit. Which because the assertors of gods well understand, they affirm these gods of theirs so to preside over the several parts of the world, as that there is only one chief rector or governor. Whence it follows, that all their other gods can be no other thing than ministers and officers,* *De Ira Dei, p.* 727. [Cap. XI. p. 934.] *Lib.* 1. *p.* 16. [Cap. III. p. 25.]

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officers, which one greateſt God, who is omnipotent, hath variouſly appointed and conſtituted, ſo as to ſerve his command and beck. Now, if all the Pagan gods be not equal, then can they not be all gods; ſince that which ruleth, and that which ſerveth, cannot be the ſame. God is a name of abſolute power, and implies incorruptibility, perfection, impaſſibility and ſubjection to nothing.

Pag. 28. [Cap. V. P. 40.] *Wherefore theſe ought not to be called gods, whom neceſſity compels to obey one greateſt God.* Again, in the ſame book, *Nunc ſatìs eſt demonſtrare, ſummo ingenio viros attigiſſe veritatem ac propè tenuiſſe; niſi eos retrorſum infatuata pravis opinionibus conſuetudo rapuiſſet, qua & deos alios eſſe opinabantur, & ea, quæ in uſum hominis Deus fecit, tanquam ſenſu prædita eſſent, pro diis habenda & colenda credebant. It is now ſufficient to have ſhown, that the more ingenious and intelligent Pagans came very near to the truth, and would have fully reached it, had not a certain cuſtomary infatuation of evil opinions ſnatched them away to an acknowledgment of other gods, and to a belief, that thoſe things, which God made for the uſe of men, as endued with ſenſe (or animated) ought to be accounted gods and worſhipped; namely, the ſtars.* And

Pag. 39. [Cap. VII. P. 51.] afterward, *Quòd ſi cultores deorum eos ipſos ſe colere putant, quos ſummi Dei miniſtros appellamus, nihil eſt quod nobis faciant invidiam, qui unum Deum dicamus, multos negemus. If the worſhippers of the gods think, that they worſhip no other than the miniſters of the one ſupreme God, then there is no cauſe, why they ſhould render us as hateful, who ſay, that there is one God, and deny many gods.*

Præp Evang. Lib. 3. *c.* 13. [P. 121.] *Euſebius Cæſarienſis* likewiſe gives us this account of the Pagans creed, or the tenor of their theology, as it was then held forth by them; ἕνα γὰρ ὅλα θεὸν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι, τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπισταλεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὅλα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα· καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φάσι· *The Pagans declare themſelves in this manner, that there is one God, who with his various powers filleth all things, and paſſeth through all things, and preſideth over all things; but being incorporeally and inviſibly preſent in all things, and pervading them, he is reaſonably worſhipped by or in thoſe things, that are manifeſt and viſible.* Which paſſage of *Euſebius* will be further conſidered afterward, when we come to give a more particular account of paganiſm.

What St. *Auſtin*'s ſenſe was[1] concerning the theology of the Pagans, hath been already declared; namely, *That they had not ſo far degenerated as to have loſt the knowledge of one ſupreme God, from whom is all whatſoever nature; and that they derived all their gods from one.* We ſhall now, in the laſt place, conclude with the judgment of *Paulus Oroſius*, who was his contemporary; *Philoſophi dum intento mentis ſtudio quærunt ſcrutàntúrque omnia, unum Deum authorem omnium repererunt, ad quem unum omnia referrentur; unde etiam nunc Pagani, quos jam declarata veritas de contumaciâ magis quàm de ignorantiâ convincit, cùm à nobis diſcutiuntur, non ſe plures ſequi, ſed ſub uno Deo magno, plures miniſtros venerari fatentur. Reſtat igitur de intelligentia veri Dei, per multas intelligendi ſuſpiciones, confuſa diſſenſio, quia de uno Deo omnium penè una eſt opinio. The philoſophers of the* Gentiles, *whilſt with*

Hiſt. l. 6. *c.* 1. [P. 416. Edit. Fabricii.]

[1] Lib. XX. contra Fauſtum Manich. Cap. XIX. p. 246. Tom. VI. Oper.

with intent ſtudy of mind they enquired and ſearched after things, found, that there was one God, the author of all things, and to which one all things ſhould be referred. Whence alſo the Pagans at this very day, whom the declared truth rather convinceth of contumacy than of ignorance, when they are urged by us, confeſs themſelves not to follow many gods, but only under one God to worſhip many miniſters. So that there remaineth only a confuſed diſſenſion concerning the manner of underſtanding the true God, becauſe about one God there is almoſt one and the ſame opinion of all.

And by this time we think it is ſufficiently evident, that the Pagans, (at leaſt after Chriſtianity) though they aſſerted many gods, they calling all underſtanding beings ſuperior to men by that name, (according to that of St. *Jerom, Deum quicquid ſupra ſe eſſet, Gentiles putabant*;) yet they acknowledged one ſupreme omnipotent, and only unmade Deity.

XVI. But becauſe it's very poſſible, that ſome may ſtill ſuſpect all this to have been nothing elſe but a refinement and interpolation of Paganiſm, after that Chriſtianity had appeared upon the ſtage; or a kind of mangonization of it, to render it more vendible and plauſible, the better able to defend itſelf, and bear up again the aſſaults of Chriſtianity; whilſt in the mean time the genuine doctrine of the ancient Pagans was far otherwiſe: although the contrary hereunto might ſufficiently appear from what hath been already declared, yet however, for the fuller ſatisfaction of the more ſtrongly prejudiced, we ſhall by an hiſtorical deduction made from the moſt ancient times all along downwards, demonſtrate, that the doctrine of the greateſt Pagan Polytheiſts, as well before Chriſtianity as after it, was always the ſame, that beſides their many gods, there was one ſupreme, omnipotent and only unmade Deity.

And this we ſhall perform, not as ſome [1] have done, by laying the chief ſtreſs upon the Sibylline oracles, and thoſe reputed writings of *Hermes Triſmegiſt*, the authority whereof hath been of late ſo much decried by learned men; nor yet upon ſuch oracles of the Pagan deities [2], as may be ſuſpected to have been counterfeited by Chriſtians; but upon ſuch monuments of Pagan antiquity, as are altogether unſuſpected and indubitate. As for the Sibylline oracles, there may (as we conceive) be two extremes concerning them; one, in ſwallowing down all that is now extant under that title, as genuine and ſincere, whereas nothing can be more manifeſt, than that there is much counterfeit and ſuppoſititious ſtuff in this Sibylline farrago, which now we have. From whence, beſides other inſtances of the like kind, it appears too evidently to be denied, that ſome pretended Chriſtians of former times have been for pious and religious frauds, and endeavoured to uphold the truth of Chriſtianity by figments and forgeries of their own deviſing. Which, as it was a thing ignoble and unworthy in itſelf, and argued that thoſe very defenders of Chriſtianity did themſelves diſtruſt their own cauſe; ſo may it well be thought, that there was a policy of the devil in it alſo, there being no other more effectual way than this, to render all Chriſtianity (at leaſt in after-ages) to be ſuſpected. Inſomuch

[1] Auguſtinus Eugubinus, Mutius Panſa, and others.

[2] Theſe Oracles are produced by *Juſtin Martyr*, in Orat. ad Græcos, & Euſebius in Præpar. Evang. and others.

that it might perhaps be queſtioned, whether the truth and divinity of Chriſtianity appear more in having prevailed againſt the open force and oppoſition of its profeſſed enemies, or in not being at laſt ſmothered and oppreſſed by theſe frauds and forgeries of its ſeeming friends and defenders. The other extreme may be, in concluding the whole buſineſs of the Sibylline oracles (as any ways relating to Chriſtianity) to have been a mere cheat and figment; and that there never was any thing in thoſe Sibylline books, which were under the cuſtody of the *Quindecimviri*, that did in the leaſt predict our Saviour Chriſt, or the times of Chriſtianity. For notwithſtanding all that the learned *Blondel*[a] hath written, it ſeems to be undeniably evident from *Virgil*'s fourth Idyllium, that the Cumean Sibyl was then ſuppoſed to have predicted a new flouriſhing kingdom or monarchy, together with a happy ſtate of juſtice or righteouſneſs to ſucceed in the latter age of the world:

Ultima Cumæi venit jam carminis ætas,
Magnus ab integro ſeclorum naſcitur ordo.
Jam redit & virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna,
Jam nova progenies cœlo delabitur alto, &c.

Moreover, it is certain, that in *Cicero*'s time the Sibylline prophecies were interpreted by ſome in favour of *Cæſar*, as predicting a monarchy; *Sibyllæ verſus obſervamus, quos illa furens fudiſſe dicitur. Quorum interpres nuper falſa quadam hominum fama dicturus in ſenatu putabatur, eum, quem revera regem habebamus, appellandum quoque eſſe regem, ſi ſalvi eſſe vellemus. We take notice of the verſes of the Sibyl, which ſhe is ſaid to have poured out in a fury or prophetick frenzy, the interpreter whereof was lately thought to have been about to declare in the ſenate-houſe, that if we would be ſafe, we ſhould acknowledge him for a king, who really was ſo.* Which interpretation of the Sibylline oracles (after *Cæſar*'s death) *Cicero* was ſo much offended with, (he alſo looking upon a Roman monarchy, as a thing no leſs impoſſible than undeſirable) that upon this occaſion he quarrels with thoſe very Sibylline oracles themſelves, as well as the readers and expounders of them, after this manner; *Hoc ſi eſt in libris, in quem hominem, & in quod tempus eſt? Callidè enim, qui illa compoſuit, perfecit, ut, quodcunque accidiſſet, prædictum videretur, hominum & temporum definitione ſublatâ. Adhibuit etiam latebram obſcuritatis, ut iidem verſus aliàs in aliam rem poſſe accommodari viderentur. Non eſſe autem illud carmen furentis, tum ipſum poema declarat, (eſt enim magis artis & diligentiæ quàm incitationis & motus) tum verò ea quæ ἀκροστιχὶς dicitur, cum deinceps ex primis verſuum literis aliquid connectitur. Quamobrem Sibyllam quidem ſepoſitam & conditam habeamus, ut, id, quod proditum eſt à majoribus, injuſſu ſenatûs nè legantur quidem libri. If there be any ſuch thing contained in the Sibylline books, then we demand, concerning what man is it ſpoken, and of what time? For whoever framed thoſe Sibylline verſes, he craftily contrived, that whatſoever ſhould come to paſs, might ſeem to have been predicted in them, by taking away all diſtinction of perſons and times. He alſo purpoſely affected obſcurity, that the*

Cic. Div. l. 2. [Cap. LIV. pag. 3238. Tom. IX. Oper.]

L. Cotta Quindecimvir.

De Div. l. 2. [Ubi ſupra.]

[a] In his Treatiſe of the *Sibyls*, printed in *French* at *Paris* 1649, in 4to.

the ſame verſes might be accommodated ſometime to one thing, and ſometime to another. But that they proceeded not from fury and prophetick rage, but rather from art and contrivance, doth no leſs appear otherwiſe, than from the acroſtick in them. Wherefore let us ſhut up the Sibyl, and keep her cloſe, that according to the decree of our anceſtors, her verſes may not be read without the expreſs command of the ſenate. And laſtly, he addeth, *Cum antiſtitibus agamus, ut quidvis potius ex illis libris quàm regem proferant, quem Romæ poſthac nec dii nec homines eſſe patientur: Let us alſo deal with the Quindecimviri and interpreters of the Sibylline books, that they would rather produce any thing out of them, than a king; whom neither gods nor men will hereafter ſuffer at* Rome. Where, though *Cicero* were miſtaken as to the event of the Roman government, and there were doubtleſs ſome predictions in theſe Sibylline books of a new kingdom or monarchy to be ſet up in the world; yet that the Roman empire was not the thing intended in them, doth manifeſtly appear from that deſcription in *Virgil*'s forementioned eclogue; wherein there is accordingly another completion of them expected, though flatteringly applied to *Saloninus*. Wherefore we conclude, that the kingdom, and happy ſtate, or golden age, predicted in the Sibylline oracles, was no other than that of the Meſſiah, or our Saviour Chriſt, and the times of Chriſtianity. Laſtly, in that other paſſage of *Cicero*'s, concerning the Sibylline oracles; *Valeant ad deponendas potiùs quàm ad ſuſcipiendas religiones; let them be made uſe of rather for the extinguiſhing, than the begetting of religions and ſuperſtitions*; there ſeems to be an intimation, as if, of themſelves, they rather tended to the leſſening than increaſing of the pagan ſuperſtitions; and therefore may probably be thought to have predicted a change of that pagan religion, by the worſhip of one ſole Deity to be introduced. Neither ought it to ſeem a jot more ſtrange, that our Saviour Chriſt ſhould be foretold by the pagan Sibyl, than that he was ſo clearly predicted by *Balaam* the Aramitick ſorcerer. However, thoſe things in the Sibylline verſes might have been derived, ſome way or other, from the Scripture-prophecies; which there is indeed the more probability of, becauſe that Sibylline prophet made uſe of thoſe very ſame figures and allegories in deſcribing the future happy ſtate, that are found in the Scripture. As for example:

[a] ——— *Nec magnos metuent armenta leones;*
Occidet & ſerpens, &c.

Now, as *Cicero* ſeems to complain, that in his time theſe Sibylline oracles were too much expoſed to view, ſo is it very probable, that notwithſtanding they were to be kept under the guard of the *Quindecimviri*, yet many of them might be copied out, and get abroad; and thereby an occaſion be offered to the ignorantly zealous Chriſtians, who were for officious lyes and pious frauds, to add a great deal more of their own forging to them. Neither indeed is it imaginable, how any ſuch cheat as this ſhould either at firſt have been attempted, or afterwards have proved ſucceſsful, had there not been ſome foundation of truth to ſupport and countenance it. Beſides which it is obſervable, that *Celſus*, who would have had the Chriſtians rather to have made the *Sibyl* than

[a] Virgil. Eclog. IV. verſ. 22, 24.

than our Saviour Chriſt a God; taking notice of their uſing of thoſe Sibylline teſtimonies againſt the Pagans, did not tax them for counterfeiting the whole buſineſs of theſe Sibylline oracles, but only for inſerting many things of their own into them; ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶν Σίβυλλαν, ἤ χρῶνταί τινες ὑμῶν, εἰκότως ἂν μᾶλλον προσήκατε, ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ παῖδα, νῦν δὲ παρεγγράφειν μὲν εἰς τὰ ἐκείνης, πολλὰ καὶ βλάσφημα εἰκῇ δύνασθε· *You Chriſtians might much rather have acknowledged even the* Sibyl *for the off-ſpring of God; but now you can boldly inſert into her verſes many, and thoſe maledicent things of your own.* Where *Origen*, that he might vindicate, as well as he could, the honour of Chriſtians, pleads in their defence, that *Celſus*, for all that, could not ſhew what they had foiſted into thoſe Sibylline verſes; becauſe, if he had been able to have produced more ancient and incorrupt copies, in which ſuch things were not found, he would certainly have done it. Notwithſtanding which, it is likely, that there were other ancient copies then to be found, and that *Celſus* might have met with them too, and that from thence he took occaſion to write as he did. However, this would not juſtify the preſent Sibylline books, in which there are forgeries plainly diſcoverable without copies. Nevertheleſs it ſeems, that all the ancient Chriſtians did not agree in making uſe of theſe Sibylline teſtimonies, thus much being intimated by *Celſus* himſelf, in the fore-cited words, ἤ χρῶνταί τινες ὑμῶν, *which ſome of you make uſe of*; as they did not all acknowledge the *Sibyl* to have been a propheteſs neither: ſince, upon *Celſus*[1] mentioning a ſect of Chriſtians called Sibyllifts, *Origen* tells us, that theſe were ſuch as uſing the Sibylline teſtimonies were called ſo in way of diſgrace by other Chriſtians, who would not allow the *Sibyl* to have been a propheteſs; they perhaps conceiving it derogatory to the Scriptures. But though there may be ſome of the ancient Sibylline verſes ſtill left in that farrago which we now have, yet it being impoſſible for us to prove which are ſuch, we ſhall not inſiſt upon any teſtimonies at all from thence, to evince, that the ancient Pagans acknowledged one ſupreme Deity. Notwithſtanding which, we ſhall not omit one Sibylline paſſage, which we find recorded in *Pauſanias*[2], (from whence, by the way, it appears alſo, that the Sibylline verſes were not kept up ſo cloſe, but that ſome of them got abroad) he telling us, that the defeat of the Athenians at *Ægos Potamos* was predicted by the *Sibyl* in theſe words (amongſt others:)

Καὶ τότ' Ἀθηναίοισι βαρύστονα κήδεα θήσει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὅπερ κράτος ἐστὶ μέγιστον, &c.

Ac tum Cecropidis luctum gemitúſque ciebit
Jupiter altitonans, rerum cui ſumma poteſtas, &c.

Whereto might be added alſo that of another ancient Peliadean propheteſs, in the ſame writer[3], wherein the divine eternity and immutability is plainly declared:

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεύς ἐστι, Ζεὺς ἔσσεται, ὦ μεγάλε Ζεῦ.

Jupiter eſt, fuit, atque erit: O bone Jupiter alme.

Beſides

[1] Orig. contra Celſum Lib. V. p. 272. Edit. Kuhnii.
[2] In Phocicis, Lib. X. Cap. IX. p. 820. [3] Ibid. Cap. XII. p. 828.

Beſides theſe Sibylline prophecies, there are alſo other oracles of the pagan deities themſelves, in which there was a clear acknowledgment of one ſupreme and greateſt God. But as for ſuch of them, as are ſaid to have been deliveredſince the times of Chriſtianity, when the pagan oracles began to fail, and ſuch as are now extant only in Chriſtian writings, however divers of them are cited out of *Porphyrius* his book of oracles; becauſe they may be ſuſpected, we ſhall not here mention any of them. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall take notice of one oracle of the Clarian *Apollo*, that is recorded by *Macrobius* [1], in which one ſupreme Deity is not only aſſerted, but is alſo called by that Hebrew name (or Tetragrammaton) *Jao:*

Φράζεο τὸν πάντων ὕπαλον θεὸν ἔμμεν Ἰάω.

You are to call the higheſt and ſupreme of all the gods, Jao: though it be very true, that that Clarian devil there cunningly endeavoured to divert this to the ſun, as if that were the only ſupreme Deity and true *Jao.* To which might be added another ancient oracle (that now occurs) of the Dodonean *Jupiter* [2], together with the interpretation of *Themiſtocles*, to whom it was delivered; wherein he was commanded πρὸς τὸν ὁμώνυμον τῷ θεῷ βαδίζειν, *to repair to him, who was called by the ſame name with God*; which *Themiſtocles* apprehended to be the king of *Perſia*, μεγάλης γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι τε καὶ λέγεσθαι βασιλέας, *becauſe both he and God were alike called* (though in different reſpects and degrees) *the great king or monarch.*

But as for thoſe writings, commonly imputed to *Hermes Triſmegiſt*, that have been generally condemned by the learned of this latter age, as wholly counterfeit and ſuppoſititious, and yet on the contrary are aſſerted by *Athanaſius Kircherus* [3] for ſincere and genuine; we ſhall have occaſion to declare our ſenſe concerning them more opportunely afterward.

The moſt ancient theologers, and moſt eminent aſſertors of polytheiſm amongſt the Pagans, were *Zoroaſter* in the eaſtern parts, and *Orpheus* amongſt the Greeks. The former of which was of ſo great antiquity, that writers cannot well agree about his age. But that he was a Polytheiſt is acknowledged by all, ſome affirming it to be ſignified in his very name, as given him after his death; it being interpreted by them a worſhipper of the ſtars [4]. Neither is it to be doubted, but that *Ster* or *Eſter* in the Perſian language, did ſignify a ſtar, as it hath been obſerved alſo by learned men concerning ſundry other words, now familiar in theſe European languages, that they derived their original from the Perſian. Notwithſtanding which, it may be ſuſpected, that this was here but a Greek termination; the word being not only in the oriental languages written *Zertooſt* and *Zaraduſt*, but alſo in *Agathias*, *Zarades.* However, *Zoroaſter*'s polytheiſm is intimated by *Plato* [5]; where his magick is defined to have been nothing elſe but θεῶν θεραπεία, *the worſhip*

[1] Saturnal. Lib. I. Cap. XVIII. p. 290.

[2] Apud Plutarch. in Vitâ Themiſtocl. Tom. I. Oper. p. 225.

[3] In Oedipo Ægyptiaco, & Obeliſco Pamphilio, p. 35.

[4] Thus it was explained by *Dinon* and *Hermodorus*, as we are informed by *Laertius* in his proem. ſegm. 8. p. 6. of which opinion is likewiſe *Scaliger*, with others of the moderns.

[5] In Alcibiade I. Oper. p. 32.

worſhip of the gods. Whence by the way we learn alſo, that the word μαγεία, or *magick*, was firſt taken in a good ſenſe, which is confirmed by *Porphyrius*, παράγε μὴν τοῖς Πέρσαις, οἱ περὶ τὸ θεῖον σοφοὶ καὶ τότε θεραπευταὶ, Μάγοι μὲν προσαγορεύονται· *Amongſt the Perſians, thoſe, who were ſkilful in the knowledge of the Deity, and religious worſhippers of the ſame, were called Magi.* And as magick is commonly conceived to be founded in a certain vital ſympathy that is in the univerſe, ſo did theſe ancient Perſian Magi and Chaldeans (as *Pſellus* tells us[1]) ſuppoſe συμπαθῆ εἶναι τὰ ἄνω τοῖς κάτω, *that there was a ſympathy betwixt the ſuperior and inferior beings*; but it ſeems the only way at firſt by them approved, of attracting the influence and aſſiſtance of thoſe ſuperior inviſible powers, was by piety, devotion, and religious rites. Nevertheleſs, their devotion was not carried out only to one omnipotent God, but alſo to many gods; neither is it to be queſtioned but that this divine magick of *Zoroaſter* ſhortly after degenerated in many of his followers into the theurgical magick, and at length into γοητεία, *downright ſorcery and witchcraft*; the only thing, which is now vulgarly called magick. But how many gods ſoever this *Zoroaſter* worſhipped, that he acknowledged notwithſtanding one ſupreme Deity, appeareth from the teſtimony of *Eubulus*, cited by *Porphyrius* in his *De Antro Nympharum*, πρῶτα μὲν, ὡς ἔφη Εὔβουλος, Ζωροάστρης αὐτοφυὲς σπήλαιον ἐν τοῖς πλησίον ὄρεσι τῆς Περσίδος, ἀνθηρὸν καὶ πηγὰς ἔχον ἀνιερώσαντος, εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ πάντων ποιητοῦ καὶ πατρὸς Μίθρα, εἰκόνα φέρουσι τοῦ κόσμου, ὃν ὁ Μίθρας ἐδημιούργησε· Zoroaſter *firſt of all, as* Eubulus *teſtifieth, in the mountains adjoining to* Perſis, *conſecrated a native orbicular cave, adorned with flowers, and watered with fountains, to the honour of* Mithras, *the maker and father of all things*; *this cave being an image or ſymbol to him of the whole world, which was made by* Mithras. Which teſtimony of *Eubulus* is the more to be valued, becauſe, as *Porphyrius* elſewhere[2] informeth us, he wrote the hiſtory of *Mithras* at large in many books, from whence it may be preſumed, that he had thoroughly furniſhed himſelf with the knowledge of what belonged to the Perſian religion. Wherefore, from the authority of *Eubulus*, we may well conclude alſo, that notwithſtanding the ſun was generally worſhipped by the Perſians as a God, yet *Zoroaſter*, and the ancient *Magi*, who were beſt initiated in the Mithraick myſteries, aſſerted * another Deity, ſuperior to the ſun, for the true *Mithras*, ſuch as was πάντων ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ, *the maker and father of all things, or of the whole world*, whereof the ſun is a part. However, theſe alſo looked upon the ſun as the moſt lively image of this Deity, in which it was worſhipped by them; as they likewiſe worſhipped the ſame Deity ſymbolically in fire, as *Maximus Tyrius* informeth us[3]; agreeable to which is that in the magick oracles[4],

De Abſt. l. 4. p. 165.

Pag. 254.

* That *Mithras*, which was called, ὁ κρύφιος θεὸς, *the hidden God*, was not the viſible Sun.

——— πάντα πυρὸς ἐνὸς ἐκγεγαῶτα.

All things are the off-ſpring of one fire; that is, *of one ſupreme Deity*. And *Julian* the emperor was ſuch a devout ſun-worſhipper as this, who acknowledged, beſides the ſun, another incorporeal Deity, tranſcendent to it. Nevertheleſs, we deny not, but that others amongſt the Perſians, who were not

[1] In brevi dogmat. Chaldaicorum declaratione, publiſhed at the end of *Servatius Gallæus*'s Edition of the *Sibylline* Oracles, *Amſt.* 1689, in 4to.

[2] De Abſtin. Lib. IV. Sect. XVI. p. 165.

[3] Vide Diſſertat. XXXVIII. p. 371.

[4] Commonly aſcribed to *Zoroaſter*, Sect. II. verſ. 29. in *Stanley*'s *Hiſtory of Philoſophy*.

not able to conceive of any thing incorporeal, might, as well as *Heraclitus*, *Hippocrates*, and the Stoicks amongst the *Greeks*, look upon the firy substance of the whole world (and especially the sun) as animated and intellectual, to be the supreme Deity, and the only *Mithras*, according to that inscription [1], *Deo Soli Invicto* Mithræ. However, *Mithras*, whether supposed to be corporeal or incorporeal, was unquestionably taken by the *Persians* for the supreme Deity, according to that of *Hesychius*, Μίθρας, ὁ πρῶτος ἐν Πέρσαις θεὸς, Mithras, *the first God among the* Persians; who was therefore called in the inscription [2] Omnipotent, *Omnipotenti Deo* Mithræ. Which first, supreme and omnipotent God was acknowledged by *Artabanus* the *Persian*, in his conference with *Themistocles*, in these words; ἡμῖν δὲ πολλῶν νόμων καὶ καλῶν ὄντων, κάλλιστος οὗτός ἐστι τὸ τιμᾶν βασιλέα, καὶ προσκυνεῖν εἰκόνα θεοῦ τοῦ τὰ πάντα σώζοντος· *Amongst those many excellent laws of ours, the most excellent is this, that the king is to be honoured and worshipped religiously, as the image of that God, which conserveth all things.* *Scaliger* [3] with some others (though we know not upon what certain grounds) affirm, that *Mither* in the Persian language signified *great*, and *Mithra*, *greater* or *greatest*; according to which, *Mithras* would be all one with *Deus major* or *maximus* [4], *the greatest God.* Wherefore we conclude, that either *Herodotus* was mistaken, in making the Persian *Mithras* the same with *Mylitta* or *Venus*, (and perhaps such a mistake might be occasion'd from hence, because the word *Mader* or *Mether* in the Persian Language signified *Mother*, as *Mylitta* in the Syrian did;) or else rather, that this *Venus* of his is to be understood of the Ἀφροδίτη οὐρανία, *the heavenly* Venus *or* Love; and thus indeed is she there called in *Herodotus*, *Urania*; by which though some would understand nothing else but the moon, yet we conceive the supreme Deity, true heavenly Love (the mother and nurse of all things) to have been primarily signified therein.

Plut. Themist.

מטרתא

Genitrix.

But *Zoroaster* and the ancient *Magi* are said to have called the supreme God also by another name, *viz. Oromasdes* or *Ormisdas*; however *Oromasdes*, according to *Plato* [5], seems to have been the father of *Zoroaster*. Thus, besides *Plutarch* and others, *Porphyrius*, in the life of *Pythagoras*, παρήνει μάλιστα δ' ἀληθεύειν, τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον δύνασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖν θεῷ παραπλησίους, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τῶν Μάγων ἐπυνθάνετο, ὃν Ὠρομάζην καλοῦσιν ἐκεῖνοι, ἐοικέναι τὸ μὲν σῶμα φωτί· τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀληθείᾳ. Which we would understand thus: Pythagoras *exhorted men chiefly to the love of truth, as being that alone, which could make them resemble God, he having learned from the* Magi, *that God, whom they call* Oromasdes, *was as to corporeals most like to light, and as to incorporeals to truth.* Though perhaps some would interpret these words otherwise, so as to signify *Oromasdes* to have been really compounded of soul and body, and therefore nothing else but the animated sun, as *Mithras* is commonly supposed also to have been. But the contrary hereunto is plainly implied in those Zoroastrian traditions or fables concerning *Oromasdes*, recorded in *Plutarch* [6], ὅτι ἀπέστησε τοῦ ἡλίου τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ὁ ἥλιος τῆς γῆς ἀφέστηκε, *that* Oromasdes *was as far removed from the sun, as the sun was*

P. 191. [P. 41. Edit. Kuster.]

 from

[1] Vide Anton. Van Dale Dissert. IX. ad Antiquit. & Marmora, p. 16.
[2] Apud Gruter. Thesaur. Inscrip. p. 34. n. 5.
[3] De Emendat. Temporum, Lib. VI. Cap. de Hebdom. Daniel, p. 588.
[4] Hist. Lib. I. Cap. CXXXI. p. 55.
[5] In Alcibiade, Tom. I. Oper. p. 32.
[6] De Iside & Osir. p. 370. Tom. II. Oper.

from the earth. Wherefore *Oromasdes* was, according to the *Persians*, a Deity superiour to the sun; God properly as the fountain of light and original of good, and the same with *Plato*'s τἀγαθὸν or *first good.* From whom the Persians, as *Scaliger* informs us, called the first day of every month *Ormasda*, probably because he was the beginning of all things. And thus *Zoroaster* and the ancient *Magi* acknowledged one and the same supreme Deity, under the different names of *Mithras* and *Oromasdes.*

But it is here observable, that the Persian *Mithras* was commonly called Τριπλάζιος, *threefold* or *treble.* Thus *Dionysius* [1] the Pseudo-Areopagite, ᾗ ἐστὶ Μάγοι τὰ μνημόσυνα τῆ Τριπλαζίᾳ Μίθρᾳ τελοῦσιν· *The Persian* Magi *to this very day celebrate a festival solemnity in honour of the Triplasian* (that is, the threefold or triplicated) Mithras. And something very like to this is recorded in *Plutarch* [2] concerning *Oromasdes* also, ὁ μὲν Ὡρομάζης τρὶς ἑαυτὸν αὐξήσας, Oromasdes *thrice augmented or triplicated himself*; from whence it further appears, that *Mithras* and *Oromasdes* were really one and the same Numen. Now the Scholiasts upon *Dionysius* pretend to give a reason of this denomination of the Persian *Mithras*, *Triplasios*, or *threefold*, from the miracle done in *Hezekiah*'s time, when the day was increased, and almost triplicated; as if the *Magi* then observing the same had thereupon given the name of Τριπλάζιος, or *threefold*, to their god *Mithras*, that is, the sun, and appointed an anniversary solemnity for a memorial thereof. But learned men have already shewed the foolery of this conceit; and therefore it cannot well be otherwise concluded, but that here is a manifest indication of a higher mystery, *viz.* a Trinity in the Persian theology; which *Gerardus I. Vossius* [3] would willingly understand, according to the Christian hypothesis, of a divine Triunity, or three hypostases in one and the same Deity, whose distinctive characters are goodness, wisdom, and power. But the magical or Zoroastrian oracles seem to represent this Persian trinity more agreeably to that Pythagorick or Platonick hypothesis, of three distinct substances subordinate one to another, the two first whereof are thus expressed in the following verses [4];

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ, ᾗ νῷ παρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κλητίζεσθαι ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν.

To this sense: *The Father, or first Deity, perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, who is that, whom the nations of men commonly take for the first.* Which oracle *Psellus* [5] thus glosseth upon; τὴν πᾶσαν κλῆσιν δημιουργήσας ὁ τῆς τριάδος πρῶτος πατὴρ, παρέδωκε ταύτην τῷ νῷ· ὄντινα νοῦν τὸ ξύμπαν γένος τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες τὴν πατρικὴν ὑπεροχὴν πατρὸς, Θεὸν πρῶτον καλοῦσι· *The first Father of the Trinity having produced this whole creation, delivered it to Mind or Intellect: which Mind, the whole generation of mankind, being ignorant of the paternal transcendency, commonly call the first God.* After which, *Psellus* takes notice of the difference here betwixt this Magical or Chaldaick Theology, and that

[1] Epistol. VII. ad Polycarpum, p. 91. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] De Iside & Osiride, p. 370. Tom. II. Oper.

[3] De Orig. & Progressu Idololat. Lib. II. Cap. IX. p. 131.

[4] In Oraculis Zoroastri adscriptis, Sect. II. vers. 27, 28. apud Stanley, ubi supra.

[5] He and *Pletho* wrote Commentaries on the Oracles of *Zoroaster.*

that of Chriſtians: Πλὴν τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν δόγμα ἐναντίως ἔχει, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ μεγάλου πατρὸς, τὴν κτίσιν πᾶσαν ἐδημιούργησεν, &c. *But our Chriſtian doctrine is contrary hereunto, namely thus; that the firſt Mind or Intellect, being the Son of the great Father, made the whole creation. For the Father, in the Moſaick writings, ſpeaks to his Son, the idea of the creation; but the Son is the immediate opifex thereof.* His meaning is, that according to this Perſian or Chaldaick theology, the firſt hypoſtaſis of the divine Triad was the δημιουργὸς or *immediate architect* of the world; whereas, according to the Chriſtian as well as Platonick doctrine, he is the ſecond. For which cauſe, *Pletho* framed another interpretation of that Magick oracle, to render it more conformable both to the Chriſtian and Platonick doctrine; ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ ἅπαντα ἐξετέλεσε, τὰ νοητὰ δηλαδὴ εἴδη (ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τὰ ἐκτετελεσμένα τε καὶ τέλεια) καὶ τῷ μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέρῳ θεῷ παρέδωκεν, ἄρχειν δηλαδὴ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, &c. *The Father perfected all things, that is, the intelligible ideas (for theſe are thoſe things, which are complete and perfect) and delivered them to the ſecond God, to rule over them. Wherefore whatſoever is produced by this God, according to its own exemplar and the intelligible eſſence, muſt needs owe its original alſo to the higheſt Father. Which ſecond God the generations of men commonly take for the firſt, they looking up no higher than to the immediate architect of the world.* According to which interpretation of *Pletho*'s (the more probable of the two) the ſecond hypoſtaſis in the Magick (or Perſian) Trinity, as well as in the Platonick and Chriſtian, is the immediate opifex or architect of the world; and this ſeems to be properly that, which was called *Mithras* in *Eubulus*.

But beſides theſe two hypoſtaſes, there is alſo a third mentioned in a certain other Magick or Chaldaick oracle, cited by *Proclus*, under the name of *Pſyche*, or the mundane ſoul;

——————Μετὰ δὲ Πατρικὰς Διανοίας,
Ψυχὴ ἐγὼ ναίω.

After (or next below) the paternal Mind, I Pſyche *dwell.* Now the paternal Mind, as *Pſellus* informs us, is the ſecond hypoſtaſis before mentioned; ὁ πατρικὸς νοῦς, ὁ δευτερὸς δηλαδὴ Θεὸς, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς προσεχὴς δημιουργὸς· *The paternal Mind is the ſecond God, and the immediate demiurgus or opifex of the ſoul.* Wherefore though both thoſe names, *Oromaſdes* and *Mithras*, were frequently uſed by the Magi for the τὸ θεῖον, or whole Deity in general, yet this being triplaſian or threefold, according to their theology, as containing three hypoſtaſes in it; the firſt of thoſe three ſeems to have been that which was moſt properly called *Oromaſdes*, and the ſecond *Mithras*. And this is not only confirmed by *Pletho*, but alſo with this further ſuperaddition to it, that the third hypoſtaſis of that Perſian Trinity was that, which they called *Arimanius*; he gathering as much even from *Plutarch*[1] himſelf: Φασὶ περὶ Ζωροάστρου, ὡς τριχῇ τὰ ὄντα διέλοι· καὶ τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ αὐτῶν μοίρᾳ, Ὡρομάζην ἐφιστῶν· τοῦτον δ' εἶναι, τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων πατέρα καλούμενον· τῇδε ἐχάτῃ Ἀρειμάνην· Μίθραν δὲ τῇ μέσῃ, καὶ τοῦτον δ' ἂν εἶναι τὸν Δεύτερον Νοῦν καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λογίων. *They ſay, that* Zoroaſter *made a threefold diſtribution of things, and that he aſſigned the firſt and higheſt rank of them to* Oromaſdes, *who in the oracles is*

called

[1] De Iſide & Oſir. p. 370.

called the Father; *the loweſt to* Arimanes; *and the middle to* Mithras, *who in the ſame oracles is likewiſe called the ſecond Mind.* Whereupon he obſerves, how great an agreement there was betwixt the Zoroaſtrian and the Platonick Trinity, they differing in a manner only in words. And the middle of theſe, namely, the eternal Intellect, that contains the ideas of all things, being, according to the Platonick *hypotheſis*, the immediate δημιεργὸς and architect of the world, this probably was that *Mithras*, as we have already intimated, who is called in *Eubulus*, the Demiurgus of the world, and the maker and father of all things. Now, if that third hypoſtaſis of the Magick or Chaldaick oracles be the ſame with that which the Perſians call *Arimanius*, then muſt it be upon ſuch an account as this, becauſe this lower world (wherein are ſouls vitally united to bodies, and lapſable) is the region, where all manner of evils, wickedneſs, pains, corruption and mortality reign. And herewith *Heſychius* ſeemeth to agree: Ἀρειμάνης (ſaith he) ὁ Ἅιδης παρὰ Πέρσαις, Arimanius *among the Perſians is* Hades, that is, either *Orcus* or *Pluto*; wherein he did but follow *Theopompus*, who in *Plutarch* calls *Arimanius* likewiſe *Hades* or *Pluto:* which it ſeems was as well the third in the Perſian trinity (or Triplaſian Deity) as it was in the Homerican. And this was that *Arimanius*, whom the Perſian king in *Plutarch*, upon *Themiſtocles* his flight, addreſſed his devotion to; *In vit. Them.* [P. 326.] κατευξάμενος ἀεὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις, τοιαύτας φρένας διδόναι τὸν Ἀρειμάνιον, ὅπως ἐλαύνωσι τὰς ἀρίστας τῶν ἑαυτῶν, *he prayed, that* Arimanius *would always give ſuch a mind to his enemies, as thus to baniſh and drive away their beſt men from them.* And indeed from that which *Plutarch* affirms, διὸ καὶ Μίθρην Πέρσαι τὸν Μεσίτην ὀνομάζουσι, *that the* Perſians *from their God* Mithras, *called any mediator, or middle betwixt two,* Mithras; it may be more reaſonably concluded, that *Mithras*, according to the Perſian theology, was properly the middle hypoſtaſis of that triplaſian or triplicated Deity of theirs, than that he ſhould be a middle ſelf-exiſtent god or mediator betwixt two adverſary gods unmade, one good, and the other evil, as *Plutarch* would ſuppoſe.

Notwithſtanding which, if that, which the ſame *Plutarch* and others do ſo confidently affirm, ſhould be true, that *Zoroaſter* and the ancient Magi made good and evil, light and darkneſs, the two ſubſtantial principles of the univerſe; that is, aſſerted an evil dæmon co-eternal with God, and independent on him, in the very ſame manner that *Plutarch* himſelf and the Manicheans afterward did; yet however it is plain, that in this way alſo *Zoroaſter* and the Magi acknowledged one only fountain and original of all good, and nothing to be independent upon that one good principle or God, but only that, which is ſo contrary to his nature and perfection, as that it could not proceed from him, namely, evil. But we have already diſcovered a ſuſpicion, that the meaning of thoſe ancient Magi might poſſibly be otherwiſe; they philoſophizing only concerning a certain mixture of evil and darkneſs, together with good and light, that was in the compoſition of this lower world, and perſonating the ſame; as alſo perhaps taking notice eſpecially therein of evil dæmons (who are acknowledged likewiſe in the Magick oracles, and called θῆρες χθονὸς, *beaſts of the earth*, and χθόνιοι κύνες, *terreſtrial dogs*;) the head of which might be ſometimes called alſo emphatically ὁ πονηρὸς δαίμων Περσῶν, *the evil dæmon of the* Perſians, as being the very ſame

ſame with the devil: all which was under the immediate preſidency or government of that God, called by them *Arimanius*, *Hades* or *Pluto*, the third hypoſtaſis in the Triplaſian Deity of the Perſians. Which ſuſpicion may be yet further confirmed from hence, becauſe the Perſian Theologers, as appears by the inſcriptions, expreſly acknowledged the divine omnipotence, which they could not poſſibly have done, had they admitted of a Manichean ſubſtantial evil principle, coeternal with God, and independent on him. Beſides which it is obſervable, that whereas the Gnoſticks in *Plotinus*'s time aſſerted this world to have been made, not ſo much from a principle eſſentially evil and eternal, as from a lapſed ſoul, to weigh down the authority of *Plato*, that was againſt them, did put *Zoroaſter* in the other ſcale, producing a book entitled, ἀποκαλύψεις Ζωροάστρου, *or the Revelations of* Zoroaſter, *Porphyrius* tells us [1], that himſelf wrote purpoſely to diſprove thoſe Zoroaſtrian Revelations, as new and counterfeit, and forged by thoſe Gnoſticks themſelves; therein implying alſo the doctrine of the ancient *Zoroaſter* no way to have countenanced or favoured that Gnoſtick hereſy. Moreover, the tenents of theſe ancient *Magi*, concerning that duplicity of principles, are by writers repreſented with great variety and uncertainty. That account, which *Theodorus* in *Photius* [2] (treating of the Perſian magick) gives thereof, as alſo that other of *Eudemus* in *Damaſcius* [3], are both of them ſo nonſenſical, that we ſhall not here trouble the reader with them; however, neither of them ſuppoſe the Perſian *Arimanius*, or *Satanas*, to be an unmade ſelf-exiſting dæmon. But the Arabians, writing of this *Altanawiah*, or Perſian duplicity of good and evil principles, affirm, that according to the moſt approved *Magi*, light was *Kadiman*, the moſt ancient and firſt God, and that darkneſs was but a created God; they expreſly denying the principle of evil and darkneſs to be coeve with God, or the principle of good and light. And *Abulfeda* repreſents the Zoroaſtrian doctrine (as the doctrine of the *Magi* reformed) after this manner; *That God was older than darkneſs and light, and the creator of them, ſo that he was a ſolitary being, without companion or corrival; and that good and evil, virtue and vice, did ariſe from a certain commixture of light and darkneſs together, without which this lower world could never have been produced; which mixture was ſtill to continue in it, till at length light ſhould overcome darkneſs: and then light and darkneſs ſhall each of them have their ſeparate and diſtinct worlds, apart from one another.* *Pocock Spec. Hiſt. Ar. p.* 146, 147, 148.

If it were now needful, we might ſtill make it further evident, that *Zoroaſter*, notwithſtanding the multiplicity of gods worſhipped by him, was an aſſerter of one ſupreme, from his own deſcription of God, extant in *Euſebius*. Θεός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος ἄφθαρτος, ἄϊδιος, ἀγένητος, ἀμερής, ἀνομοιότατος, ἠνίοχος παντὸς καλοῦ, ἀδωροδόκητος, ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθώτατος, φρονίμων φρονιμώτατος, ἔστι δὲ καὶ πατὴρ εὐνομίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, αὐτοδίδακτος, τέλειος, καὶ ἱερᾶς φυσικῆς μόνος ἐυρετής· *God is the firſt incorruptible, eternal, unmade, indiviſible, moſt unlike to every thing, the head or leader of all good, unbribable, the beſt of the good, the wiſeſt of the wiſe; he is alſo the father of law and juſtice; ſelf-taught, perfect, and the* *Præp. Ev. l.* 1. [Cap. X. p. 42.]

[1] In Vitâ Plotini Cap. XVI. p. 119. Edit. Fabricii.

[2] Biblioth. Cod. LXXXI. p. 199.

[3] περὶ τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν, a work never yet printed.

the only inventor of the natural holy. Which *Eusebius* tells us, that this Zoroastrian description of God was contained *verbatim* in a book entitled, *A holy collection of the Persian monuments*; as also that *Ostanes* (himself a famous magician, and admirer of *Zoroaster*) had recorded the very fame of him in his *Octateuchon.*

Now we having, in this discourse concerning *Zoroaster* and the *Magi*, cited the oracles, called by some magical, and imputed to *Zoroaster*, but by others Chaldaical; we conceive it not improper to give some account of them here. And indeed if there could be any assurance of the antiquity and sincerity of those reputed oracles, there would then need no other testimony to prove, that either *Zoroaster* and the Persian *Magi*, or else at least the Chaldeans, asserted not only a divine monarchy, or one supreme Deity the original of all things, but also a trinity consistently with the same.

And it is certain, that those oracles are not such novel things as some would suspect, they being cited by *Synesius*[1], as then venerable, and of great authority, under the name of ἱερὰ λόγια, *holy oracles*; and there being, of this number, some produced by him, that are not to be found in the copies of *Psellus* and *Pletho*; from whence it may be concluded, that we have only some fragments of these oracles now left. And that they were not forged by Christians, as some of the Sibylline oracles undoubtedly were, seems probable from hence, because so many Pagan philosophers make use of their testimonies, laying no small stress upon them; as for example *Damascius*, out of whom *Patritius* hath made a considerable collection of such of these oracles as are wanting in *Psellus* and *Pletho*'s copies. And we learn from *Photius*[2], that whereas *Hierocles* his book of fate and providence was divided into seven parts, the drift of the fourth of them was this, τὰ λεγόμενα λόγια, εἰς συμφωνίαν συνάγειν, οἷς Πλάτων ἐδογμάτισε, *to reconcile the reputed oracles with* Plato's *doctrines.* Where it is not to be doubted, but that those reputed oracles of *Hierocles* were the same with these Magick or Chaldaick oracles; because these are frequently cited by philosophers under that name of λόγια or *oracles.* *Proclus* upon the *Timæus*, ὑπό τε Πλάτωνος, καὶ Ὀρφέως, καὶ Λογίων, ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ ὑμνεῖται τῷ παντὶ, πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· γεννῶν μὲν τὰ πλήθη τῶν θεῶν, ψυχὰς δὲ πέμπων εἰς γενέσεις ἀνδρῶν· *The maker of the universe is celebrated both by* Plato, *and* Orpheus, *and the oracles, as the father of gods and men, who both produceth multitudes of gods, and sends down souls for the generations of men.* And as there are other fragments of these cited by *Proclus* elsewhere under the name of λόγια or *oracles*, so doth he sometimes give them that higher title of θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, and μυσαγωγία, *the theology that was of divine tradition or revelation.* Which magnificent encomium was bestowed in like manner upon *Pythagoras* his philosophy by *Jamblichus*[3], that being thought to have been derived in great part from the Chaldeans and the Magi; ἐκ θεῶν αὐτῆς παραδοθείσης τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς· *This philosophy of* Pythagoras *having been first divinely delivered, or revealed by the gods, ought not to be handled by us without a religious invocation of them.* And that *Porphyrius* was not unacquainted with these oracles neither,

Pag. 97.

[1] De Insomniis, passim.
[2] Biblioth. Cod. CCXIV. p. 553.
[3] In Vitâ Pythag. Cap. I. p. 1, 2. Ed. Kusteri.

neither, may be concluded from that book of his, intitled, περὶ τῆς ἐκ λογίων φιλοσοφίας, *concerning the philoſophy from oracles*; which conſiſting of more parts, one of them was called, τὰ τῶν Χαλδαίων λόγια, *the oracles of the Chaldeans:* which, that they were the very ſame with thoſe we now ſpeak of, ſhall be further proved afterward. Now, though *Pſellus* affirms, that the Chaldean dogmata contained in thoſe oracles were ſome of them admitted both by *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*; yet does he not pretend theſe very Greek verſes themſelves to have been ſo ancient. But it ſeems probable from *Suidas*, that *Julian* a Chaldean and Theurgiſt, the ſon of *Julian* a philoſopher, (who wrote concerning Dæmons and Teleſiurgicks) was the firſt, that turned thoſe Chaldee or Magick oracles into *Greek* verſe; Ἰουλιανός, ἐπὶ Μάρκου Ἀντωνίνου τοῦ βασιλέως, ἔγραψε θεύργικα, τελέστικα, λόγια δι' ἐπῶν· Julian, *in the time of* Marcus Antoninus *the emperor, wrote the theurgick and teleſtick oracles in verſe.* For that there is ſomething of the theurgical magick mixed together with myſtical theology in theſe oracles, is a thing ſo manifeſt from that operation about the Hecatine circle, and other paſſages in them, that it cannot be denied; which renders it ſtill more unlikely that they ſhould have been forged by Chriſtians. Nevertheleſs, they carry along with them (as hath been already obſerved) a clear acknowledgment of a divine monarch, or one ſupreme Deity, the original of all things; which is called in them the father, and the paternal principle, and that intelligible, [1] ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόῳ ἄνθει, *that cannot be apprehended otherwiſe than by the flower of the mind*; as alſo that [2] *one fire, from whence all things ſpring: Pſellus*, thus gloſſing upon that oracle, *all things were the off-ſpring of one fire*, πάντα τὰ ὄντα τότε νοητὰ, καὶ αἰσθητὰ, ἀπὸ μόνου θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔλαβον, καὶ πρὸς μόνον θεὸν ἐπέστραπται, &c. ἁπλούστερον ἦν τὸ λόγιον, καὶ πλῆρες τοῦ ἡμετέρου δόγματος· *All things, whether intelligible or ſenſible, receive their eſſence from God alone, and return back again only to him; ſo that this oracle is irreprehenſible, and full of our doctrine.* And it is very obſervable, that theſe very ſame oracles expreſly determined alſo that matter was not ἀγέννητον, *unmade* or *ſelf-exiſtent*, but derived in like manner from the Deity. Which we learn from *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus*, where, when he had poſitively aſſerted, that there is ἓν πάντων αἴτιον, *one thing the cauſe of all things*; and τἀγαθὸν πάντων αἴτιον ὄν, εἶναι καὶ ὕλης αἴτιον, *that the ſupreme good, being the cauſe of all things, is alſo the cauſe of matter:* he confirms this aſſertion of his from the authority of the oracles, ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τὰ λόγια παράγει τὴν πολυποίκιλον ὕλην, ἔνθεν ἄρδην θρώσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης· *From this order alſo do the oracles deduce the generation of the matter, in theſe words*; *from thence* (that is, from one ſupreme Deity) *altogether proceeds the geneſis of the multivarious matter.* Which unqueſtionably was one of thoſe very Magick or Chaldee oracles [3]; and it may be further proved from hence, becauſe it was by *Porphyrius* ſet down amongſt them, as appears from *Æneas Gazeus* in his *Theophraſtus* [4]: ἡ γὰρ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἄναρχος οὐδὲ ἄναρχος ἡ ὕλη, τοῦτό σε καὶ Χαλδαῖοι διδάζκουσι, καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος· ἐπιγράφει δὲ καθόλου τοῦ βιβλίου ὃ εἰς μέζου προάγει, τῶν Χαλδαίων τὰ λόγια, ἐν οἷς γεγονέναι τὴν ὕλην ἰσχυρίζεται· *Neither was matter void of generation or beginning, which the* Chaldeans *and* Porphyrius *teach thee*; *he making* Pag. 118.

[1] Oraculor. Sect. III. verſ. 58. [2] Sect. II. verſ. 59. [3] Sect. I. verſ. 20. [4] P. 56.

making this the title of a whole book publiſhed by him, The Oracles of the Chaldeans; *in which it is confirmed that matter was made.*

Moreover, that there was alſo in theſe Magick or Chaldee oracles a clear ſignification of a divine triad, hath been already declared. But we ſhall here produce *Proclus*[1] his teſtimony for it too; ἔτω δὲ καὶ ἡ θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, φησὶ συμπεπληρῶθαι τὸν κόζμον, ἐκ τῶνδε τῶν Τριῶν λέγει γᾶν ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τᾶ Διὸς ἐπέκεινα τᾶ δημιεργήσαντος τὸ πᾶν· *Thus the divinely delivered (or inſpired) theology affirmeth the whole world to have been compleated from theſe three*; Pſyche, *or the mundane ſoul, therein ſpeaking concerning that* Zeus *or* Jupiter, *who was above the maker of the world, in this manner*, &c. For we have already declared, that *Proclus* his θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, *his theology of divine tradition* or *revelation*, is one and the ſame thing with the λόγια, or *oracles*. To which teſtimony of *Proclus* we might alſo ſuperadd that oracle cited out of *Damaſcius* by *Patritius*;

παντὶ γὰρ ἐν κόζμῳ λάμπει Τριὰς, ἧς Μόνας ἄρχει.

In the whole world ſhineth forth a triad or trinity, the head whereof is a monad or perfect unity; than which nothing can be plainer.

G. I. Voſſius D. Ar. Po. c. 13.

XVII. And now we paſs out of *Aſia* into *Europe*, from *Zoroaſter* to *Orpheus*. It is the opinion of ſome eminent philologers of latter times, that there never was any ſuch man as *Orpheus*, but only in *Fairy-land*; and that the whole hiſtory of *Orpheus* was nothing but a mere romantick allegory, utterly devoid of all truth and reality. But there is nothing alledged for this opinion from antiquity, ſave only this one paſſage of *Cicero*'s concerning *Ariſtotle*; Orpheum *poetam docet* Ariſtoteles *nunquam fuiſſe*, Ariſtotle *teacheth, that there never was any ſuch man as* Orpheus *the poet:* in which notwithſtanding *Ariſtotle* ſeems to have meant no more than this, that there was no ſuch poet as *Orpheus* ſenior to *Homer*, or that the verſes vulgarly called Orphical were not written by *Orpheus*. However, if it ſhould be granted, that *Ariſtotle* had denied the exiſtence of ſuch a man, there ſeems to be no reaſon at all, why his ſingle teſtimony ſhould here preponderate againſt that univerſal conſent of all antiquity, which is for one *Orpheus* the ſon of *Oeager*, by birth a Thracian, the father or chief founder of the mythical and allegorical theology amongſt the *Greeks*, and of all their moſt arcane religious rites and myſteries; who is commonly ſuppoſed to have lived before the *Trojan* war, (that is, in the time of the Iſraelitiſh judges) or at leaſt to have been ſenior both to *Heſiod* and *Homer*; and alſo to have died a violent death, moſt affirming him to have been torn in pieces by women. For which cauſe, in that viſion of *Herus Pamphylius* in *Plato*, *Orpheus* his ſoul being come down again into another body, is ſaid to have choſen rather that of a ſwan (a reputed muſical animal) than to be born again of a woman, by reaſon of that great hatred, which he had conceived of all woman-kind, for his ſuffering ſuch a violent death from them. And the hiſtorick truth of *Orpheus* was not only acknowledged by *Plato*, but alſo by *Iſocrates*, ſenior to *Ariſtotle* likewiſe (in his oration in the praiſe of *Buſiris*[2];) and

De Nat. D. l. 1. p. 211.

De Rep. l. 10. lib. 4. p. 162.

[1] Comment. in Timæum Plat. p. 116. [2] P. 452.

and confirmed by that ſober hiſtoriographer *Diodorus Siculus*[1], he giving this account of *Orpheus*, *That he was a man, who diligently applied himſelf to literature, and having learned* τὰ μυθολογέμενα, *or the mythical part of theology, travelled into* Egypt, *where he attain'd to further knowledge, and became the greateſt of all the* Greeks *in the myſterious rites of religion, theological ſkill, and poetry.* To which *Pauſanias* addeth, that he gained great authority, οἷα πιστευόμενος εὑρηκέναι ἔργων ἀνοζίων καθαρμὰς, νόσων τε ἰάματα, καὶ τροπὰς μηνιμάτων θείων· *as being believed to have found out expiations for wicked actions, remedies for diſeaſes, and appeaſements of the divine diſpleaſure.* Lib. 9. p. 586. Neither was this hiſtory of *Orpheus* contradicted by *Origen*[2], when *Celſus* gave him ſo fit an occaſion, and ſo ſtrong a provocation to do it, by his preferring *Orpheus* before our Saviour Chriſt. To all which may be added, in the laſt place, that it being commonly concluded from the Greek word θρησκεία, that the Greeks derived their *Teletæ* and myſteries of religion from the Thracians, it is not ſo reaſonable to think with the learned *Voſſius*[3], that *Xamolxis* was the founder of them, (and not *Orpheus*) this *Xamolxis* being by moſt reported to have been *Pythagoras* his ſervant, and conſequently too much a junior; and though *Herodotus*[4] attribute more antiquity to him, yet did he conceive him to have been no other than a dæmon, who appearing to the Thracians, was worſhipped by them; whereas in the mean time, the general tradition of the *Greeks* derived the Thracian religious rites and myſteries from *Orpheus* and no other, according to this of *Suidas*; λέγεται ὡς Ὀρφεὺς Θρᾷξ, πρῶτος ἐτεχνολόγησε τὰ Ἑλλήνων μυστήρια, καὶ τὸ τιμᾶν θεὸν θρησκεύειν ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς Θρακίας οὔσης τῆς εὑρέσεως. *It is commonly ſaid, that* Orpheus *the Thracian was the firſt inventor of the religious myſteries of the Greeks, and that religion was from thence called* Threſkeia, *as being a Thracian invention.* Wherefore though it may well be granted, that by reaſon of *Orpheus* his great antiquity, there have been many fabulous and romantick things intermingled with this hiſtory; yet there appears no reaſon at all, why we ſhould diſbelieve the exiſtence of ſuch a man.

But though there were ſuch a man as *Orpheus*, yet may it very well be queſtion'd for all that, whether any of thoſe poems, commonly entitled to him, and called *Orphical*, were ſo ancient, and indeed written by him. And this the rather, becauſe *Herodotus* declares it as his own opinion, that *Heſiod* and *Homer* were the ancienteſt of all the Greek poets, οἱ δὲ πρότερον ποιηταὶ λεγόμενοι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν γενέσθαι ὕστερον ἐγένοντο, *and that thoſe other poets, ſaid to have been before them, were indeed juniors to them*; meaning hereby, in all probability, *Orpheus*, *Muſæus* and *Linus*. As alſo becauſe *Ariſtotle* ſeems plainly to have followed *Herodotus* in this, he mentioning the Orphick poems (in his book *of the ſoul*) after this manner, τὰ Ὀρφικα καλούμενα ἔπη, *the verſes that are called Orphical.* Beſides which, *Cicero*[5] tells us, that ſome imputed all the Orphick Poems to *Cercops* a Pythagorean; and it is well known, that many have attributed the ſame to another of that ſchool, *Onomacritus*, who lived in the times of the *Piſiſtratidæ:* wherefore we read

L. 2. p. 53. [Cap. LIII. p. 109.]

L. 1. c. 7. §. 7.

[1] Lib. IV. Cap. XXV. p. 221.
[2] Adverſ. Celſ. Lib. VII. p. 368.
[3] De Artis Poetic. Natur. Cap. XIII.
[4] Hiſt. Lib. IV. Cap. XCVI. p. 252, 253.
[5] De Natur. Deor. Lib. I. Cap. XXXVIII. p. 2940. Tom. IX. Oper.

more than once in *Sextus Empiricus* of Ὀνομάκριτος ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς, Onamacritus *in the Orphicks*. *Suidas* alſo reports, that ſome of the Orphick poems were anciently aſcribed to *Theognetus*, others to *Timocles*, others to *Zopyrus*, *Proleg. in Flor. & Stob.* &c. From all which *Grotius* ſeems to have made up this concluſion, *That the Pythagoricks entitled their own books to* Orpheus *and* Linus, *juſt in the ſame manner as ancient Chriſtians entitled theirs, ſome to the* Sibyls, *and others to* Hermes Triſmegiſt. Implying therein, that both the Orphick poems and doctrine owed their very being and firſt original only to the *Pythagoreans*. But on the other ſide, *Clemens Alexandrinus* [1] affirmeth, that *Heraclitus* the philoſopher borrowed many things from the Orphick poems. And it is certain, that *Plato* [2] does not only very much commend the Orphick hymns for their ſuavity and deliciouſneſs, but alſo produce ſome verſes out of them, without making any ſcruple concerning their author. *De N. De. L. p. 201. Lamb.* *Cicero* himſelf, notwithſtanding what he cites out of *Ariſtotle* to the contrary, ſeems to acknowledge *Orpheus* for the moſt ancient poet, he writing thus of *Cleanthes*; *In ſecundo libro de natura deorum, vult* Orphei, Muſæi, Heſiodi, Homerique *fabellas accommodare ad ea, quæ ipſe de diis immortalibus ſcripſerat, ut etiam veterrimi poetæ, qui hæc ne ſuſpicati quidem ſint, Stoici fuiſſe videantur.* Cleanthes, *in his ſecond book of the nature of the gods, endeavours to accommodate the fables of* Orpheus, Muſæus, Heſiod *and* Homer, *to thoſe very things, which himſelf had written concerning them; ſo that the moſt ancient poets, who never dream'd of any ſuch matter, are made by him to have been Stoicks. Diodorus Siculus* [3] affirmeth *Orpheus* to have been the author of a moſt excellent poem: and *Juſtin Martyr* [4], *Clemens Alexandrinus* [5], *Athenagoras* [6], and others, take it for granted, that *Homer* borrowed many paſſages of his poems from the Orphick verſes, and particularly that very beginning of his Iliad;

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεὰ——————

Laſtly, *Jamblichus* teſtifieth, that by moſt writers *Orpheus* was repreſented as the ancienteſt of all the poets; adding moreover, what dialect he wrote *De V. Pyth. c. 34. [P. 195, 196.]* in, αἱ πλείους τῶν ἱστοριῶν ἀποφαίνουσι, κεχρῆσθαι τῇ Δωρικῇ διαλέκτῳ τὸν Ὀρφέα, πρεσβύτερον ὄντα τῶν ποιητῶν. *Moſt of the hiſtoriographers declare, that* Orpheus, *who was the ancienteſt of all the poets, wrote in the Dorick dialect.* Which, if it be true, then thoſe Orphick fragments, that now we have, (preſerved in the writings of ſuch as did not Dorize) muſt have been transformed by them out of their native idiom. Now as concerning *Herodotus*, who ſuppoſing *Homer* and *Heſiod* to have been the ancienteſt of all the Greek poets, ſeemed therefore to conclude the Orphick poems to have been pſeudepigraphous; himſelf intimates, that this was but a ſingular opinion, and as it were paradox, of his own, the contrary thereunto being then generally received. However *Ariſtotle* probably might therefore be the more inclinable to follow *Herodotus* in this, becauſe he had no great kindneſs for the Pythagorick or Orphick philoſophy. But it is altogether irrational and abſurd to think, that the Pythagoricks would entitle their books to *Orpheus*, as

[1] Stromat. Lib. VI. Cap. II. p. 752.
[2] Vide Plat. de Legib. L. VIII. p. 663. & Cratylum, p. 265. Io, p. 144. & in Convivio, p. 318.
[3] Lib. IV. Cap. XXV. p. 221.
[4] Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 17. Oper.
[5] Stromat. Lib. VI. Cap. II. p. 738, & 751.
[6] Legat. pro Chriſtianis, Cap. XV. p. 64, 65.

as deſigning to gain credit and authority to them thereby, had there been no ſuch doctrine before, either contained in ſome ancient monument of *Orpheus*, or at leaſt tranſmitted down by oral tradition from him. Wherefore the Pythagoricks themſelves conſtantly maintain, that before *Pythagoras* his time, there was not only an Orphick cabala extant, but alſo Orphick poems. The former was declared in that ancient book called Ἱερὸς λόγος, or, *the holy oration*, if we may believe *Proclus* upon the *Timæus*. Πυθαγόρειος ὢν ὁ Τίμαιος, ἕπεται ταῖς Πυθαγορείων ἀρχαῖς· αὗται δὲ εἰσὶν αἱ Ὀρφικαὶ παραδόσεις· Ἃ γὰρ Ὀρφεὺς δι' ἀπορρήτων λόγων μυστικῶς παραδέδωκε, ταῦτα Πυθαγόρας ἐξέμαθεν ὀργιασθεὶς ἐν Λεβήθροις τοῖς Θρακίοις, Ἀγλαοφήμῳ τελέσματα μεταδιδόντος· Ταῦτα γάρ φησιν ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐν τῷ Ἱερῷ λόγῳ. Timæus *being a Pythagorean, follows the Pythagorick principles, and theſe are the Orphick traditions; for what things* Orpheus *deliver'd myſtically, (or in arcane allegories,) theſe* Pythagoras *learn'd when he was initiated by* Aglaophemus *in the Orphick myſteries*, Pythagoras *himſelf affirming as much in his book called, The Holy Oration.* Where *Proclus*, without any doubt or ſcruple, entitles the book inſcribed Ἱερὸς λόγος, or *the holy oration*, to *Pythagoras* himſelf. Indeed ſeveral of the ancients have reſolved *Pythagoras* to have written nothing at all, as *Fla. Joſephus*, *Plutarch*, *Lucian* and *Porphyrius*; and *Epigenes* in *Clemens Alex.* affirms, that the Ἱερὸς λόγος, or *holy Oration*, was written by *Cercops* a Pythagorean. Nevertheleſs, *Diogenes Laertius* thinks them not to be in good earneſt, who deny *Pythagoras* to have written any thing; and he tells us, that *Heraclides* acknowledged this Ἱερὸς λόγος, or *holy oration*, for a genuine and indubitate fœtus of *Pythagoras*. *Jamblichus* is alſo of the ſame opinion, as the moſt received; though confeſſing ſome to have attributed that book to *Telauges Pythagoras* his ſon. But whoever was the writer of this *Hieros Logos*, whether *Pythagoras* himſelf, or *Telauges*, or *Cercops*, it muſt needs be granted to be of great antiquity, according to the teſtimony whereof, *Pythagoras* derived much of his Theology from the Orphick traditions. Moreover, *Ion Chius* in his *Trigrammi* teſtified, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* informeth us, that *Pythagoras* himſelf referred ſome poems to *Orpheus* as their author; which is alſo the general ſenſe of Platoniſts as well as Pythagoreans. Wherefore upon all accounts it ſeems moſt probable, that either *Orpheus* himſelf wrote ſome philoſophick or theologick poems, though certain other poems might be alſo father'd on him, becauſe written in the ſame ſtrain of myſtical and allegorical Theology, and as it were in the ſame ſpirit, with which this Thracian prophet was inſpired; or at leaſt, that the Orphick doctrine was firſt convey'd down by oral cabala or tradition from him, and afterwards, for its better preſervation, expreſſed in verſes, that were imputed to *Orpheus*, after the ſame manner, as the golden verſes written by *Lyſis* were to *Pythagoras*. And *Philoponus*[1] intimates this latter to have been *Ariſtotle*'s opinion concerning the Orphick verſes; he gloſſing thus upon thoſe words of *Ariſtotle* before cited: καλεμένοις εἶπε, ὅτι μὴ δοκεῖ Ὀρφέως τὰ ἔπη, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ Φιλοσοφίας λέγει. Αὐτῷ γὰρ εἰσὶ τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δή φασιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι καταθεῖναι. Ariſtotle *calls them the reputed Orphick verſes, becauſe they ſeem not to have been written by* Orpheus *himſelf, as the ſame* Ariſtotle *affirmeth in his book of philoſophy. The doctrine and opinions of them indeed*

p. 291.

Strom. L. I. p. 333. [P. 397. Edit. Potteri.]

[1] Comment. in Ariſtot. Libr. III. de Animâ, fol. 2. Edit. Græcæ, Venet. 1553. fol.

were his, but Onomacritus *is ſaid to have put them into verſe.* However, there can be no doubt at all made, but that the Orphic verſes, by whomſoever written, were ſome of them of great antiquity (they being much older than either *Ariſtotle*, *Plato* or *Herodotus*) as they were alſo had in great eſteem amongſt the Pagans; and therefore we may very well make a judgment of the theology of the ancient Pagans from them.

Now that *Orpheus*, the Orphick doctrine, and poems, were polytheiſtical, is a thing acknowledged by all. *Juſtin Martyr* [1] affirms, that *Orpheus* aſſerted three hundred and ſixty gods; he alſo beſtows upon him this honourable title (if it may be ſo accounted) of πολυθεότητος πατὴρ καὶ πρῶτος διδάσκαλος, *the father and firſt teacher of polytheiſm amongſt the* Greeks; he ſuppoſing [2], that *Homer* derived his polytheiſm from him; Ὅμηρος τῆς πολυθεότητος Ὀρφέως ζηλώσας δόξαν, μυθωδῶς μὲν πλειόνων θεῶν μέμνηται, ἵνα μὴ δόξῃ τῆς Ὀρφέως ἀπᾴδειν ποιήσεως· Homer *emulating* Orpheus *his polytheiſm, did himſelf therefore fabulouſly write of many gods, that he might not ſeem to diſſent from his poems, whom he had ſo great a veneration for.* With which alſo agreeth the teſtimony of *Athenagoras* [3]; Ὀρφεὺς καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα θεῶν πρῶτος ἐξευρεν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις διεξῆλθε, καὶ ὅσα ἑκάστοις πέπρακται εἶπε, ᾧ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ θεῶν μάλιστα ἕπεται· Orpheus *firſt invented the very names of the gods, declaring their generations, and what was done by each of them*; *and* Homer *for the moſt part follows him therein.* Indeed the whole mythical theology, or fables of the gods, together with the religious rites amongſt the Greeks, are commonly ſuppoſed to have owed their firſt original to no other but *Orpheus*. In which Orphick fables, not only the things of nature, and parts of the world, were all theologized, but alſo all manner of human paſſions, imperfections, and vices (according to the literal ſenſe) attributed to the gods. Inſomuch that divers of the Pagans themſelves took great offence at them; as for example *Iſocrates*, who concludes that a divine *Nemeſis* or vengeance was inflicted upon *Orpheus* for this impiety, Ὀρφεὺς ὁ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἁψάμενος, διασπασθεὶς τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησε, Orpheus, *who was moſt of all guilty in this kind, died a violent death.* Alſo *Diog. Laertius* for this cauſe made a queſtion, whether he ſhould reckon *Orpheus* amongſt the philoſophers or no: and others have concluded, that *Plato* ought to have baniſh'd *Orpheus* likewiſe out of his commonwealth, for the ſame reaſon that he did *Homer* [4]; which is thus expreſſed, *for not lying well concerning the gods.* And here we may take notice of the monſtroſity and extravagancy of *Orpheus* his fancy, from what *Damaſcius* [5] and others tell us, that he made one of his principles to be δράκοντα κεφαλὰς ἔχοντα προσπεφυκυίας ταύρου καὶ λέοντος, ἐν μέσῳ δὲ θεοῦ πρόσωπον, καὶ ἐπὶ ὤμων πτερὰ, *a Dragon, having the heads both of a bull and a lion, and in the midſt the face of a god, with golden wings upon his ſhoulders*; which forſooth muſt be an incorporeal deity and *Hercules*, with which Nature (called *Ananche* and *Adraſtea*) was aſſociated. Nevertheleſs the generality of the Greekiſh Pagans, looking upon this *Orpheus*, not as a mere fanciful poet and fabulator, but as a ſerious and profound philoſopher, or myſtical theologer, a perſon tranſcendently holy and wiſe; they ſuppoſed all

In Lau. Buſir. [P. 452.]

[1] Apolog. II. pro Chriſtianis, p. 104.
[2] Cohort. ad Græcor. p. 17.
[3] Apolog. pro Chriſtian. Cap. XV. p. 64.
[4] De Legibus, Lib II. p. 420.
[5] περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν, a MS. cited above.

all his fables of the gods to be deep myſteries and allegories, which had ſome arcane and recondite ſenſe under them; and therefore had a high veneration for him, as one who did ἀληθέστερον θεολογεῖν (as *Athenagoras* writes[1]) *more truly theologize than the reſt*, and was indeed divinely inſpired. Inſomuch, that *Celſus* would rather have had the Chriſtians to have taken *Orpheus* for a god, than our Saviour Chriſt, ἄνδρα ὁμολογουμένως ὁσίῳ χρησάμενον πνεύματι, καὶ αὐτὸν βιαίως ἀποθανόντα, *as being a man unqueſtionably endued with a holy ſpirit, and one, who alſo* (as well as the Chriſtians Jeſus) *died a violent death.* C. Celſ. l. 7. p. 367.

But that *Orpheus*, notwithſtanding all his polytheiſm or multiplicity of gods, acknowledged one ſupreme unmade Deity, as the original of all things, may be firſt preſumed from hence, becauſe thoſe two moſt religious philoſophick ſects, the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts, not only had *Orpheus* in great eſteem, he being commonly called by them ὁ Θεολόγος, *the theologer*, but were alſo thought in great meaſure to have owed their theology and philoſophy to him, as deriving the ſame from his principles and traditions. This hath been already intimated, and might be further proved. *Pythagoras*, as we are informed by *Porphyrius* and *Jamblichus*[2], learned ſomething from all theſe four, from the Egyptians, from the Perſian Magi, from the Chaldeans, and from *Orpheus*, or his followers. Accordingly, *Syrianus* makes Ὀρφικαὶ καὶ Πυθαγορικαὶ ἀρχαὶ, *the orphick and pythagorick principles to be one and the ſame.* And as we underſtand from *Suidas*[3], the ſame *Syrianus* wrote a book entitled, Συμφωνία Ὀρφέως, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος, *The harmony of* Orpheus, Pythagoras *and* Plato. *Proclus*, beſides the place before cited, frequently inſiſts upon this elſewhere, in his commentary upon the *Timæus*, as p. 289. Πυθαγόρειον δὲ καὶ τὸ ταῖς Ὀρφικαῖς ἕπεσθαι γενεαλογίαις. Ἄνωθεν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Ὀρφικῆς παραδόσεως διὰ Πυθαγόρου καὶ εἰς Ἕλληνας ἡ περὶ θεῶν ἐπιστήμη προῆλθεν· *It is Pythagorical to follow the Orphick genealogies. For from the Orphick tradition downward by* Pythagoras *was the knowledge of the gods derived to the Greeks.* And that the Orphick philoſophy did really agree and ſymbolize with that, which afterward was called Pythagorick and Platonick, and was of the ſame ſtrain with it, may be gathered from that of *Plato* in his *Cratylus*, where he ſpeaks concerning the etymology of the Greek word σῶμα· δοκοῦσι μέντοι μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα, ὡς δίκην διδόσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτον δὲ παρίβολον ἔχειν ἵνα σώζηται, δεσμωτηρίῳ εἰκόνα· εἶναι οὖν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἕως ἂν ἐκτίσῃ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τὸ σῶμα· Orpheus *and his followers ſeem to me to have given the beſt etymology of this word* σῶμα (*from* σώζεσθαι) *that the ſoul is here in a ſtate of puniſhment, its body being a priſon to it, wherein it is kept in cuſtody, till its debts or faults be expiated, and is therefore called* σῶμα. Now theſe three philoſophies, the Platonick, Pythagorick, and Orphick, ſymbolizing ſo much together, it is probable, that as the Platonick and Pythagorick, ſo the Orphick likewiſe derived all their gods from one ſelf-exiſtent Deity. MS. Coll. Caj. Cant. p. 14. [In Comment. ad Lib. III. XIII. XIV. Metaphyſ. Ariſtot. fol. 59.] P. 400. teph.

Which may be further manifeſted from that epitome of the Orphick doctrine, made long ſince by *Timotheus* the chronographer in his *Coſmopœia*, ſtill

[1] Apol. pro Chriſtian. Cap. XV. p. 64.
[2] De Vitâ Pythag. Cap. XXVIII. p. 122.
[3] Voce Συριανός, Tom. III. Lexic. p. 410. Edit. Kuſteri.

ſtill extant in *Cedrenus*[1] and *Euſebii Chronica*, and imperfectly ſet down by *Suidas* (upon the word *Orpheus*) as his own, or without mentioning the author's name:——Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνεδείχθη τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ αἰθὴρ, ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργηθείς· *Firſt of all the æther was made by God, and after the æther a Chaos; a dark and dreadful night then covering all under the whole æther.* Σημαίνων τὴν νύκτα προλεγεσθαι, Orpheus *hereby ſignifying* (ſaith *Timotheus*) *that Night was ſenior to Day*, or that the world had a beginning; Εἰρηκὼς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐκθέσει, ἀκατάληπτόν τινα καὶ πάντων ὑπέρτατον εἶναι, προγενέστερόν τε καὶ δημιουργὸν ἁπάντων, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αἰθέρος, καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν αἰθέρα· *He having declared alſo in his explication, that there was a certain incomprehenſible Being, which was the higheſt and oldeſt of all things, and the maker of every thing, even of the æther itſelf, and all things under the æther. But the earth being then inviſible by reaſon of the darkneſs, a light breaking out through the æther illuminated the whole creation; this light being ſaid by him, to be that higheſt of all Beings, (before mentioned) which is called alſo counſel and life.* Ταῦτα τὰ τρία ὀνόματα (to uſe *Suidas* his words here) μίαν δύναμιν ἀπεφήνατο, καὶ ἓν κράτος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ πάντων Θεοῦ, τοῦ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παραγαγόντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι· *Theſe three names in* Orpheus (*light, counſel and life*) *declaring one and the ſame force and power of that God, who is the maker of all, and who produceth all out of nothing into being, whether viſible or inviſible.* To conclude with *Timotheus*: Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς, Ὀρφεὺς, ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ βίβλῳ συνέταξεν, ὅτι διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὀνομάτων μιᾶς θεότητος, τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι τὰ πάντα· *And the ſame* Orpheus *in his book declared, that all things were made by one Godhead in three names, and that this God is all things.*

But that *Orpheus* aſſerted one ſupreme Deity, as the original of all things, is unqueſtionably evident from the Orphick verſes themſelves; of which notwithſtanding, before we mention any in way of proof, we ſhall premiſe this obſervation, or rather ſuſpicion of our own, that there ſeem to be ſome Orphick verſes ſuppoſititious, as well as there were Sibylline; they being counterfeited either by Chriſtians or Jews. For we muſt freely profeſs for our own part, that we cannot believe all that to be genuine, which is produced by ancient fathers as Orphical; that is, either to have been written by *Orpheus* himſelf, or elſe by *Onomacritus*, or any other Pagan of that antiquity, according to the Orphick cabala or tradition.

As for example, this concerning *Moſes*[2];

Ὡς λόγος ἀρχαίων, ὡς ὑδρογενὴς διέταξεν,
Ἐκ θεόθεν γνώμαισι λαβὼν κατὰ δίπλακα θεσμόν·

Ut habet ſermo antiquorum, ut ex-aqua-ortus deſcripſit,
Acceptâ divinitùs lege, quæ duplicia præcepta continet.

And this that is commonly underſtood of *Abraham*,

Οὐ γὰρ κέν τις ἴδοι θνητῶν, μερόπων κραίνοντα,
Εἰ μὴ μυηθεὶς τις ἀπόῤῥωξ φύλα ἄνωθεν
Χαλδαίων, ἴδρις γὰρ ἔην ἀστροίο πορείης.

Non

[1] In Chronograph. fol. 46.
[2] Apud Euſeb. Præparat. Evangel. Lib. XIII. Cap. XII. p. 664, 665.

Non enim quiſpiam mortalium videre poſſet eum, qui hominibus imperat,
Niſi Unigenitus quidam profectus ab antiqua origine gentis
Chaldæorum; ſciebat enim aſtri curſum.

The manifeſt forgery of which might make one ſuſpect alſo ſome other paſſages, ſuch as this concerning the divine Logos;

Εἰς δὲ λόγου θεῖον βλέψας, τούτῳ προσέδευε,
Ἰθύνων κραδίης νοερὰν κύτος.

Wherefore it being not ingenuous to lay ſtreſs upon that for the proof of any thing, which ourſelves believe not to be ſincere and genuine; we ſhall here cite no Orphick verſes for the acknowledgment of one ſupreme Deity, but only ſuch as we find atteſted in Pagan writings. As firſt of all that copy produced by *Proclus* upon the *Timæus:* *Pag.* 95.

Τοὔνεκα σὺν τῷ παντὶ Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη,
Αἰθέρος εὐρείης ἠδ' ἄρουρ' ἄγλαον ὕψος,
Πόντου τ' ἀτρυγέτου, γαίης τ' ἐρικυδέος εὖρη·
Ὠκεανός τε μέγας, καὶ νείατα τάρταρα γαίης,
Καὶ πόλαμοὶ, καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος, ἄλλά τε πάντα,
Πάντες τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ, ἠδὲ θέαιναι,
Ὅσσα τ' ἔην γεγαῶτα, καὶ ὕστερον ὁππόσ' ἔμελλεν
Ἐγένετο· Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύρρα πεφύκει.

To this ſenſe: *Wherefore, together with the univerſe, were made within* Jupiter *the heighth of the ethereal heaven, the breadth of the earth and ſea, the great ocean, the profound* Tartara, *the rivers and fountains, and all the other things, all the immortal gods, and goddeſſes. Whatſoever hath been, or ſhall be, was at once contained in the womb of* Jupiter.

Proclus underſtands this of the idea's of all things being in God, before the world was produced, that is, in order of nature only, he ſuppoſing them in time coeve. However, it is plain, that all things are ſaid to be contained in the womb and fecundity of one ſelf-originated Deity, not only all the other gods and goddeſſes, but every thing elſe whatſoever.

Again *Proclus*, in the ſame place, uſhers in another copy of Orphick verſes (which are alſo found in the writer *de Mundo*) after this manner: τῶν δὲ Ἰδεῶν πλήρης ὤν, διὰ τούτων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιείληφε, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁ λόγος ἐπάγαγε· *The* Demiurgus, *or maker of the world, being full of ideas, did by theſe comprehend all things within himſelf, as that theologer alſo declareth in theſe following verſes:*

Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένετο, Ζεὺς ὕστατος ἀρχικέραυνος·
Ζεὺς κεφαλὴ, Ζεὺς μέσσα· Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται·
Ζεὺς ἄρρην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη·
Ζεὺς πνοιὴν γαίης τε καὶ ἀστερόεντος·

Ζεὺς πυοίη πάντων· Ζεὺς ἀκαμάτη πυρὸς ὁρμή·
Ζεὺς πόντε ῥίζα· Ζεὺς ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη·
Ζεὺς βασιλεύς· Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἁπάντων ἀρχιγένεθλος·
Ἓν κράτος, εἷς Δαίμων γένετο, μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων.

Which likewise in plain prose is this: *The high-thundering* Jove *is both the first and the last*; Jove *is both the head and middle of all things*; *all things were made out of* Jupiter; Jove *is both a man and an immortal maid*; Jove *is the profundity of the earth and starry heaven*; Jove *is the breath of all things*; Jove *is the force of the untameable fire*; Jove *the bottom of the sea*; Jove *is sun, moon, and stars*; Jove *is both the original, and king of all things: there is one power, and one God, and one great ruler over all.*

Where though there be many strange expressions, yet this seems to be the strangest of them all, that *Jupiter* should be said to be both a man and an immortal maid. But this is nothing but a poetick description of ἀῤῥενόθηλυς, *male and female together.* And it was a thing very familiar with all the mystical theologers amongst the Pagans, to call God ἀῤῥενόθηλυν, *male and female together*; they signifying thereby emphatically, *the divine fecundity*, or *the generative and creative power of the Deity*; that God was able from himself alone to produce all things. Thus *Damascius* the philosopher [1], writing of this very Orphick theology, expounds it, ἀρσενόθηλυν αὐτὴν ὑπεσήσατο, πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς πάντων γεννητικῆς οὐσίας· *the Orphick theology calls the first principle hermaphroditick, or male and female together*; *thereby denoting that essence, that is generative or productive of all things.* And that learned and pious Christian bishop, *Synesius*, it seems, thought the expression so harmless, that he scrupled not himself to make use of it, in those elegant and devout hymns of his to God Almighty:

Σὺ πατὴρ, Σὺ δ' ἐσσὶ μάτηρ,
Σὺ δ' ἄῤῥην, Σὺ δὲ θῆλυς.

Tu Pater, Tu es Mater,
Tu Mas, Tu Fœmina.

Besides these, there are also certain other Orphick verses, scattered up and down in *Proclus*, but cited altogether in *Eusebius* out of *Porphyrius*, in which the whole world is represented as one great animal, God being the soul thereof.

Ἓν δὲ δέμας βασιλεῖον ἐν ᾧ τάδε πάντα κυκλεῖται,
Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ γαῖα, καὶ αἰθὴρ, νὺξ τε καὶ ἦμαρ·
Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτος γενέτωρ, καὶ Ἔρως πολυτερπής·
Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται·
Τῷ δήτοι κεφαλὴν μὲν ἰδεῖν, καὶ καλὰ πρόσωπα,
Οὐρανὸς αἰγλήεις οἱ χρύσεαι ἀμφὶς ἔθειραι
Ἀστρων μαρμαρέων περικαλλέες ἠερέθονται, &c.

Omnia

[1] Vide Wolfii Excerpta ex Damascio περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν in Anecdotis Græcis Tom. III. p. 254.

Omnia regali sunt hæc in corpore clausa,
Ignis, & unda, & terra, æther cum nocte dieque;
(Consilium, primus genitor, cum numine amoris:)
Juppiter immenso sub corpore cuncta coërcet:
En hujus caput eximium, vultúsque decoros
Undique resplendens cœlum, cui pendula circum
Aurea Cæsaries astrorum lumina fundit:
Sunt oculi Phœbus, Phœboque adversa recurrens
Cynthia, &c.

Where probably that one verse,

Καὶ Μῆτις, πρῶτ© γενέτωρ, κ᾽ Ἔρως πολυτερπής,

though truly Orphical, and indeed divine, (it signifying, that Mind and Love were the first begetters and original of all things) was notwithstanding clap'd in unduly out of some other place. But from all these citations it plainly appears, that according to the Orphick theology, though there were many gods and goddesses too admitted, yet there was one original and king of them all, one supreme Deity acknowledged. We are not ignorant, that some of the ancient and learned fathers [1], conceiving it contradictious, for *Orpheus* at the same time to assert both many gods and one God, apprehended this to be a convenient salvo for this difficulty, to suppose, that *Orpheus* had by fits and turns been of different humours and persuasions; first a rank polytheist, asserting three hundred gods and more; and then afterwards a converted monotheist, they being the rather led into this opinion, by reason of certain counterfeit Orphick verses in *Aristobulus*, made probably by some ignorant Jew; wherein *Orpheus* is made to sing a palinodia or recantation, for his former error and polytheism. But we must crave leave, with all due respect, to dissent from reverend antiquity in this; it plainly appearing from that first Orphick excerption in *Proclus*, that *Orpheus* at the same time acknowledged both one unmade Deity (the original of all things) and many generated gods and goddesses, that were all contained in it.

Having now made it sufficiently evident from such Orphick fragments, as have been acknowledged by Pagan writers, and by them cited out of *Orpheus* his hymns and rhapsodies, that the opinion of monarchy or one self-existent Deity, the original of all things, was an essential part of the Orphick theology or cabala; we shall here further observe, that besides this opinion of monarchy, (but consistently with the same) a trinity also of divine hypostases subordinate was another part of this Orphick cabala. *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus*, making an inquiry into *Plato*'s demiurgus or opifex of the world, gives us an account, amongst other Platonists, of the doctrine of *Amelius* (who was contemporary with *Plotinus*, and who is said to have taken notice of what St. *John* the evangelist had written concerning the *Logos*, as agreeing with the Platonick and Pythagorick hypothesis [2]) after this manner: Ἀμέλι© δὲ τρίτου ποιεῖ, τὸν Δημιουργὸν, κ᾽ Νῶς τρεῖς, Βασιλεῖς τρεῖς, τὸν Ὄν⌈α, τὸν Ἔχον⌈α, τὸν Ὁρῶντα· διαφέρε⌈ δὲ ἕτοι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν *p.* 93.

[1] Justin. Martyr in Cohortat. ad Græcos, p. 15. & Apol. II. pro Christian. p. 104. Clemens Alexandr. in Protreptico, Cap. VII. p. 63. & Cyrillus Alexandr. Lib. I. adversf. Julian. p. 25.

[2] Vide Euseb. Præparat. Evang. Lib. XI. Cap. XVIII, XIX. p. 540.

ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Νοῦς, οὕτως ἐστὶν ὁ ἔστιν· ὁ δὲ δεύτερος, ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ νοητὸν, ἔχει δὲ τὸ πρὸ αὑτοῦ, καὶ μετέχει πάντως ἐκείνου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεύτερος· Ὁ δὲ τρίτος, ἔστι μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅτος νοητόν· (πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς τῷ συζυγοῦντι νοητῷ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν) ἔχει δὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ· καὶ ὁρᾷ τὸ πρῶτον· ὅσῳ γὰρ πλείῳ ἡ ἀπόστασις, τοσοῦτῳ τὸ ἔχον ἀμοιρότερον. This paſſage being very remarkable, we thought fit to ſet it down at large, and ſhall here tranſlate it. Amelius *makes a threefold demiurgus or opifex of the world, three minds and three kings; him that is, him that hath, and him that beholds. Which three minds differ thus, in that the firſt is eſſentially that, which he is (or all perfection:) the ſecond is its own intelligible, but hath the firſt (as ſomething diſtinct from it) and indeed partakes thereof, and therefore is ſecond. The third is alſo that intelligible of its own, (for every mind is the ſame thing with its correſpondent intelligible) but hath that which is in the ſecond, and beholds the firſt. For how much ſoever every being departs from the firſt, ſo much the obſcurer is it.* After which *Proclus* immediately ſubjoins, τούτους οὖν τοὺς τρεῖς νόας καὶ δημιουργοὺς ὑποληπτέον, καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι, τρεῖς βασιλέας, καὶ τοὺς παρ' Ὀρφεῖ τρεῖς, Φάνητα, καὶ Οὐρανὸν, καὶ Κρόνον, καὶ ὁ μάλιστα παρ' αὐτῷ δημιουργὸς ὁ Φάνης ἐστίν· Amelius *therefore ſuppoſeth theſe three minds and demiurgick principles of his to be both the ſame with* Plato's *three kings, and with* Orpheus *his trinity of* Phanes, Uranus, *and* Chronus; *but* Phanes *is ſuppoſed by him to be principally the* Demiurgus. Where tho' *Proclus* (who had ſome peculiar fancies and whimſies of his own, and was indeed a confounder of the Platonick theology, and a mingler of much unintelligible ſtuff with it) does himſelf aſſert a monad or unity, ſuperior to this whole trinity; yet does he ſeem nevertheleſs rightly to contend againſt *Amelius*, that it was not the firſt hypoſtaſis neither in the Platonick nor Orphick trinity, that was chiefly and properly the demiurgus or opifex of the world, but the ſecond. And thus *Proclus* his maſter *Syrianus* [1] had before determined, that in the Orphick theology, the title of *Opifex* did properly belong to *Orpheus* his πρωτόγονος θεὸς, *or firſt-begotten God*, which was the ſame with *Plato*'s Νοῦς or *divine Intellect*. Agreeably whereunto *Proclus* his concluſion is, τίς μὲν οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι Νοῦς θεῖος τῆς ὅλης ποιήσεως αἴτιος, εἰρήσθω διὰ τούτων· καὶ ὅπως ὑπότε Ὀρφέως καὶ Πλάτωνος, ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνυμνεῖται δημιουργὸς Ζεύς, ἀπὸ τούτων ὑπεμνήσθω· *Thus much may ſuffice to have declared, who is the demiurgus of the world, namely, that it is the divine Intellect, which is the proper and immediate cauſe of the whole creation; and that it is one and the ſame demiurgical* Jupiter, *that is praiſed both by* Orpheus *and* Plato. Now beſides this, it is obſervable, that *Damaſcius* in his book περὶ ἀρχῶν [2], or *concerning the principles* (not yet publiſhed) giving an account of the Orphick theology, tells us, amongſt other things, that *Orpheus* introduced τρίμορφον θεὸν, *a triform deity*. To all which may be added what was before cited out of *Timotheus* the chronographer, that God had three names, *light*, *counſel*, and *life*; and that all things were made by one Deity under theſe three ſeveral names. Where *Cedrenus*, the preſerver of that excellent fragment of antiquity, concludes in this manner; ταῦτα Τιμόθεος συνεγράψατο ὁ χρονογράφος, λέγων τὸν Ὀρφέα πρὸ τοσούτων χρόνων εἰπόντα, Τριάδα ὁμοούσιον δημιουργῆσαι

[1] Comment. in Libr. aliquot Metaphyſ. Ariſtot. p. 33.

[2] Vide Wolfii Excerpta ex hoc Opere Damaſcii, §. XIII. in Anecdot. Græcis, Tom. III. p. 252, 253.

γῆσαι τὰ πάντα· *These things* Timotheus *the chronographer wrote, affirming* Orpheus, *so long ago, to have declared, that all things were made by a coessential or consubstantial Trinity.* Which, though otherwise it might be looked upon suspiciously, because that *Timotheus* was a Christian (especially in regard of that word ὁμοούσιον) yet by comparing it with what we have before alledged out of pagan writers, it appears, that so far as concerns an Orphick trinity, it was not altogether vainly written, or without ground by him.

But we have not yet done with *Orpheus* and the Orphick theology, before we have made one further reflection upon it, so as to take notice of that strong and rank haut-goust, which was in it, of making God to be all. As for example, if we may repeat the forecited passages, and put in the name of God, instead of Ζεὺς or *Jupiter*; Διὸς πάλιν ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη, *this universe, and all things belonging to it, were made within God.* Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύρρα πεφύκει, *all things were contained together in the womb of God:* Ζεὺς κεφαλή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, *God is the head and middle of all things:* Ζεὺς πύθμην γαίης, &c. *God is the basis of the earth and heaven; God is the depth of the sea; God is the breath of all,* (or the air that we breathe;) *God is the force of the untameable fire; God is sun, moon, and stars.* Ἕν τε δέμας βασιλεῖον, *there is one kingly* (*or divine*) *body*; and

Πάντα γὰρ ἐν μεγάλῳ Ζηνὸς τάδε σώματι κεῖται,

For all these things lie in the great body of God. And thus was the Orphick theology before represented also by *Timotheus*[1] the chronographer, διὰ τῆς θεότητος πάντα ἐγένετο, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι πάντα, *All things were made by God, and himself is all things.*

But further to prove, that the ancient Greekish Pagans were indeed of such a religious humour as this, to resolve all things into God, and to make God all, we shall here cite a remarkable testimony of *Plutarch*'s, out of his *defect of oracles:* δύο πάσης γενέσεως αἰτίας ἔχόσης, οἱ μὲν σφόδρα παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ ποιηταὶ, τῇ κρείττονι μόνου τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν εἴλοντο, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι πᾶσι πράγμασι, P. 436.

Ζεὺς ἀρχή, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα πέλονται·

ταῖς δ' ἀναγκαίαις καὶ φυσικαῖς, οὐκ ἔτι προσῆσαν αἰτίαις· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι τούτων καὶ φυσικοὶ προσαγορευόμενοι, ταυτίον ἐκείνοις, τῆς καλῆς καὶ θείας ἀποπλανηθέντες ἀρχῆς, ἐν σώμασι καὶ πάθεσι σωμάτων, πληγαῖς τε καὶ μεταβολαῖς καὶ κράσεσι τίθενται τὸ σύμπαν. *Whereas there are two causes of all generation* (*the divine and the natural*) *the most ancient theologers and poets attended only to the more excellent of these two* (*the divine cause*) *resolving all things into God, and pronouncing this of them universally, that God was both the beginning, and middle, and that all things were out of God. Insomuch that these had no regard at all to the other natural and necessary causes of things. But on the contrary their juniors, who were called* Physici (*or naturalists*) *straying from this most excellent and divine principle, placed all in bodies, their passions, collisions, mutations and commixtures together.* Where by the most ancient theologers

[1] Apud Cedren. & Malalam, in Histor. Chron. Tom. I. p. 92.

and poets, *Plutarch* plainly meant *Orpheus* and his followers, it being an Orphick verſe, that is here cited by him, whereby he gives alſo an acknowledgment of their antiquity. But by their juniors, who are called *Phyſici*, he could underſtand no other than thoſe firſt Ionick philoſophers, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Hippo*, and the reſt, whom thoſe degenerate Italicks afterward followed, atomizing atheiſtically, *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus*. So that here we have another confirmation alſo of what was before aſſerted by us, that the Ionick philoſophers after *Thales*, and before *Anaxagoras*, were generally atheiſtical. And indeed from them the word Φυσικοὶ, or *Naturaliſts*, came to be often uſed as ſynonymous with ἄθεοι or *Atheiſts*. Now theſe two are here condemned by *Plutarch* for two contrary extremes; the one, who reſolved all into natural and neceſſary cauſes, that is, into matter, motion, and qualities of bodies, leaving out the divine cauſe, as guilty of atheiſm; the other, who altogether neglecting the natural and neceſſary cauſes of things, reſolved all into the divine cauſe, as it were ſwallowing up all into God, as guilty of a kind of fanaticiſm. And thus we ſee plainly, that this was one grand arcanum of the Orphick cabala, and the ancient Greekiſh theology, that God is all things.

Some fanaticks of latter times [1] have made God to be all, in a groſs ſenſe, ſo as to take away all real diſtinction betwixt God and the creature, and indeed to allow no other being beſides God; they ſuppoſing the ſubſtance of every thing, and even of all inanimate bodies, to be the very ſubſtance of God himſelf, and all the variety of things, that is in the world, to be nothing but God under ſeveral forms, appearances and diſguiſes. The Stoicks anciently made God to be all, and all to be God, in ſomewhat a different way; they conceiving God properly to be the active principle of the whole corporeal univerſe, which yet (becauſe they admitted of no incorporeal ſubſtance) they ſuppoſed, together with the paſſive or the matter, to make up but one and the ſame complete ſubſtance. And others, who acknowledged God to be an incorporeal ſubſtance, diſtinct from the matter, have notwithſtanding made all to be God alſo, in a certain ſenſe; they ſuppoſing God to be nothing but a ſoul of the world, which, together with the matter, made up all into one entire divine animal. Now the Orphick theologers cannot be charged with making God all, in that firſt and groſly fanatick ſenſe; as if they took away all real diſtinction betwixt God and the creature, they ſo aſſerting God to be all, as that notwithſtanding they allowed other things to have diſtinct beings of their own. Thus much appearing from that riddle, which in the Orphick verſes was propoſed by the maker of the world, to Night;

Proclus in [Lib. II. p. 112.]

Πῶς δέμοι ἕν τι τὰ παντ' ἔςαι, καὶ χῶρις ἕκαςον;

How can all things be one, and yet every thing have a diſtinct being of its own? Where Ἕν τι τὰ πάντα, *all things one*, or *one all things*, ſeems to be the ſupreme Deity, or divine Intellect, as *Proclus* alſo interprets it, τὰ ὅλα περιέχων ὡ Ζεὺς καὶ πάντα μοναδικῶς καὶ νοερῶς, κατὰ τούτους χρήζμους, μετὰ

[1] *Rob. Fludd* M.D. in the Preface to his *Philoſophia Moſaica*; and *Jacob Behmen*.

μετὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ὑφίστητι, καὶ πάντα τὰ εἰκόσμια θεῶν, καὶ τὰς μοίρας τῶ παντὸς· Jupiter, *who containeth the universe, and all things within himself, unitively and intellectually, according to these Orphick oracles, gives a particular subsistence of their own also to all the mundane gods, and other parts of the universe.* And this is χωρὶς ἕκαστον, in that fore-cited Orphick verse, *Every thing apart by itself*, the whole produced or created universe, with all its variety of things in it; which yet are Orphically said to be God also in a certain other sense, that shall be declared afterward. Nor can the Orphick theologers be charged with making God all in the second Stoical sense, as if they denied all incorporeal substance, they plainly asserting, as *Damascius* and others particularly note, θεὸν ἀτώματον, *an incorporeal Deity.* But as for the third way, it is very true, that the Orphick theologers did frequently call the world, the body of God, and its several parts his members, making the whole universe to be one divine animal; notwithstanding which, they supposed not this animated world to be the first and highest God, but either δεύτερον θεὸν, as the Hermaick or Trismegistick writers call it, *the second God*; or else, as *Numenius* and others of the Platonists speak, τρίτον θεὸν, *the third God*; the soul thereof being as well in the Orphick, as it was in the Pythagorick and Platonick trinity, but the third hypostasis; they supposing two other divine hypostases superior thereunto, which were perfectly secrete from matter. Wherefore, as to the supreme Deity, these Orphick theologers made him to be all things, chiefly upon the two following accounts: first, because all things coming from God, they inferred, that therefore they were all contained in him, and consequently were in a certain sense himself; thus much being declared in those Orphick verses cited by *Proclus* [1] and others,

Πάντα τάδε κρύψας, αὖθις φάος ἐς πολυγηθές·
Μέλλεν ἀπὸ κραδίης προφέρειν, πολυθέσκελα ῥέζων.

Which *Apuleius* [2] thus renders,

Namque sinu occultans, dulces in luminis oras
Cuncta tulit; sacro versans sub pectore curas.

The sense whereof is plainly this; *That God at first hiding or occultly containing all things within himself, did from thence display them, and bring them forth into light, or distinct beings of their own, and so make the world.* The second is, because the world produced by God, and really existing without him, is not therefore quite cut off from him, nor subsists alone by itself as a dead thing, but is still livingly united to him, essentially dependent on him, always supported and upheld, quickned and enlivened, acted and pervaded by him; according to that Orphick passage [3], Ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περιπίσσεται——*God passes through and intimately pervades all things.*

Now it is very true, that some Christian theologers also have made God to be all, according to these latter senses; as when they affirm the whole world

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 95.

[2] Libro de Mundo p. 25.

[3] Apud Justin. Martyr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, & in Apol. II. & apud Clement. Alexandrin. Euseb. &c.

world to be nothing else but *Deum explicatum*, *God expanded or unfolded*, and when they call the creatures, as St. *Jerom* and others often do, *radios Deitatis*, *the rays of the Deity*. Nay, the scripture itself may seem to give some countenance also hereunto, when it tells us, that of him, and through him, and to him are all things; which in the Orphick theology was thus expressed; *Col.* 1. 16. *God is the beginning, and middle, and end of all things*; that ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ *Col.* 1. 17. πάντα, *all things were made in him*, as in the Orphick verses, —Διὸς ἐντὸς ἐτύχθη; that τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε, *all things consist in him*; that, *in him we live* 1 *Tim.* 6. 13. *and move, and have our being*; that God doth ζωοποιεῖν πάντα, *quicken all things*, 1 *Cor.* 15. 28. and that he ought to be made, πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, *all in all*; which supposeth him in some sense to be so. Notwithstanding which, this is a very ticklish point, and easily liable to mistake and abuse: and, as we conceive it was the mistake and abuse of this one thing, which was the chief ground and original of the both seeming and real polytheism, not only of the Greekish and European, but also of the Egyptian and other Pagans, as will be more particularly declared afterwards; they concluding, that because God was all things, and consequently all things God, that therefore God ought to be worshipped in all things, that is, in all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, but especially in those animated intellectual beings, which are superior to men. Consentaneously whereunto, they did both θεολογεῖν ἅπαντα, *theologize or deify all things*, looking upon every thing as having ὑπερφύσικόν τι, *something supernatural*, or a kind of divinity in it; and also bestow several names upon God, according to all the several parts of the world, and things of nature, calling him in the starry heaven and æther, *Jupiter*; in the air, *Juno*; in the winds, *Æolus*; in the sea, *Neptune*; in the earth and subterraneous parts, *Pluto*; in learning, knowledge, and invention, *Minerva* and the *Muses*; in war, *Mars*; in pleasure, *Venus*; in corn, *Ceres*; in wine, *Bacchus*; and the like.

However, it is unquestionably evident from hence, that *Orpheus* with his followers, that is, the generality of the Greekish Pagans, acknowledged one universal and all-comprehending Deity, one that was all; and consequently could not admit of many self-existent and independent deities.

XVIII. Having treated largely concerning the two most eminent Polytheists amongst the ancient Pagans, *Zoroaster* and *Orpheus*, and clearly proved, that they asserted one supreme Deity; we shall in the next place observe, that the Egyptians themselves also, notwithstanding their multifarious polytheism and idolatry, had an acknowledgment amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen.

There hath been some controversy amongst learned men, whether polytheism and idolatry had their first rise from the Egyptians, or the Chaldeans, because the Pagan writers for the most part give the precedency here to the Egyptians; *Lucian* himself, who was by birth a Syrian, and a diligent enquirer into the antiquities of his own country, affirming that the Syrians and Assyrians received their religion and gods first from the Egyptians: and

Dea Syria *p.* 1059. [Tom. II. Oper. p. 656, 657.]

before

before *Lucian*, *Herodotus* [1], the father of hiſtory, reporting likewiſe, that the Egyptians were the firſt, that erected temples and ſtatues to the Gods. But whether the Egyptians or Chaldeans were the firſt Polytheiſts and Idolaters, there is no queſtion to be made, but that the Greeks and Europeans generally derived their polytheiſm and idolatry from the Egyptians. *Herodotus* affirms in one place [2], that the Greeks received their twelve gods from thence; and in another [3], that σχέδον τὰ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν θεῶν ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ἐληλυθεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, *almoſt all the names of the gods came firſt out of Egypt into Greece.* In what ſenſe this might be true of Ζεὺς itſelf, though the word be originally Greekiſh, ſhall be declared afterwards: but it is probable, that *Herodotus* had here a further meaning, that the very names of many of the Greekiſh gods were originally Egyptian. In order to the confirmation of which, we ſhall here propound a conjecture concerning one of them, *viz.* Ἀθηνᾶ, called otherwiſe by the Greeks *Pallas*, and by the Latins *Minerva.* For firſt, the Greek etymologies of this word ſeem to be all of them either trifling and frivolous, or violent and forced. *Plato* in his *Cratylus* [4] having obſerved, that according to the ancient allegorical interpreters of *Homer*, Ἀθηνᾶ was nothing elſe but νοῦς or διάνοια, *Mind or Underſtanding*, perſonated and deified, conceived, that the firſt impoſers of that name, intending to ſignify thereby divine wiſdom, called it Ἀθηνᾶ, as θεοῦ νόησιν, *the Underſtanding of God*, or *the Knowledge of divine things*; as if the word had been at firſt Θεονόη, and thence afterward transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ. But being not fully ſatisfied himſelf with this etymology, he afterwards attempts another, deriving the word from νόησις ἐν τῷ ἤθει, *knowledge concerning manners, or practical knowledge*; as if it had been at firſt Ἠθονόη, and from thence changed into Ἀθηνᾶ. Others of the Greeks have deduced this word ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀθρεῖν, becauſe it is the property of wiſdom, to collect all into one, ſuppoſing that it was at firſt Ἀθρηνᾶ. Others would fetch it from θῆλυς and *Alpha* privative, becauſe *Minerva* or wiſdom, though ſhe be a goddeſs, yet hath nothing of feminine imperfection in her. Others again would etymologize it, ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ πεφυκέναι θήλεσθαι καὶ ὑποτάττεσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν, *becauſe virtue or wiſdom is of ſuch a noble and generous temper, as that it ſcorns to ſubject itſelf to any baſe and unworthy ſervitude.* Laſtly, others would derive it, ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρος, affirming it to have been at firſt Αἰθερουσία [5]. From all which uncertainty of the Greeks concerning the etymon of this word Ἀθηνᾶ, and from the frivolouſneſs or forcedneſs of theſe conjectures, we may rather conclude, that it was not originally Greekiſh, but exotical, and probably, according to *Herodotus*, Egyptian. Wherefore let us try, whether or no we can find any Egyptian word, from whence this Ἀθηνᾶ might be derived. *Plato* in his *Timæus* [6], making mention of *Sais*, a city in Egypt, where *Solon* ſometimes ſojourned, tells us, ὅτι τῆς πόλεως θεὸς ἀρχηγός ἐστιν, Αἰγύπτιστι μὲν τοὔνομα Νῆιθ, Ἑλλήνιστι δὲ, ὡς ὁ ἐνεῦθεν λόγος, Ἀθηνᾶ, *that the preſident or tutelar God of that city was called in the Egyptian language* Neith, *but in the Greek, as the ſame Egyptians affirm*, Ἀθηνᾶ. Now, why might not this very Egyptian word *Neith*, by an eaſy

[1] Lib. II. Cap. IV. p. 90.
[2] Ibid. & Lib. IV. Cap. L. p. 103.
[3] Lib. IV. Cap. L. p. 103.
[4] P. 267.
[5] Vide Phornut. in Libro de Natur. Deor. Cap. XX. p. 185. inter Scriptor. Mytholog. à Tho. Gale editos.
[6] P. 524. Oper.

eaſy inverſion have been at firſt turned into *Thien*, or Θὴν, (men commonly pronouncing exotick words ill-favouredly) and then by additional *Alpha's* at the beginning and end, transformed into Ἀθηνᾶ? This ſeems much more probable than either *Plato*'s Θεονόη, or Ἠθονόη, or any other of thoſe Greek etymologies before-mentioned. And as the Greeks thus derived the names of many of their gods from the Egyptians, ſo do the Latins ſeem to have done the like, from this one inſtance of the word *Neptune*; which though *Varro*[1] would deduce *à nubendo*, as if it had been *Nuptunus*, becauſe the ſea covers and hides the land, and *Scaliger* with others, ἀπὸ τῦ νίπλειν, *from waſhing*, this being the chief uſe of water; yet as the learned *Bochart*[2] hath obſerved, it may with greater probability be derived from the Egyptian word *Nephthus*, *Plutarch* telling us[3], ὅτι Νέφθυν καλῦσι τῆς γῆς τὰ ἔσχατα καὶ παράκτια καὶ ψαύοντα τῆς θαλάσσης, *That the Egyptians called the maritime parts of land, or ſuch as border upon the ſea*, Nephthus. Which conjecture may be further confirmed from what the ſame *Plutarch* elſewhere[4] writes, that as *Iſis* was the wife of *Oſiris*, ſo the wife of *Typhon* was called *Nephthus*. From whence one might collect, that as *Iſis* was taken ſometimes for the earth, or the goddeſs preſiding over it, ſo *Nephthus* was the goddeſs of the ſea. To which may be further added out of the ſame writer, that *Nephthus* was ſometimes called by the Egyptians Ἀφροδίτη, or *Venus*, probably becauſe *Venus* is ſaid to have riſen out of the ſea. But whatever may be thought of theſe etymological conjectures, certain it is, that no nation in the world was ever accounted by the Pagans more devout, religious and ſuperſtitious, than the Egyptians, and conſequently none was more polytheiſtical and idolatrous. *Iſocrates*, in his praiſe of *Buſiris*, gives them a high encomium for their ſanctity; and *Herodotus*[5] affirmeth of them, that they were θεοσεβέες περισσῶς μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων, *Exceedingly more religious and more devout worſhippers of the Deity, than all other mortals.* Wherefore they were highly celebrated by *Apollo*'s oracle, (recorded by *Porphyrius*) and preferred before all other nations for teaching rightly αἰπεῖην ὁδὸν μακάρων, *that hard and difficult way, that leadeth to God and happineſs.* But in the ſcripture[6], *Egypt* is famous for her idols, and for her ſpiritual whoredoms and fornications; to denote the uncleanneſs whereof ſhe is ſometimes joined with *Sodom*. For the Egyptians, beſides all thoſe other gods, that were worſhipped by the Greeks and other Barbarians; beſides the ſtars, dæmons and heroes; and thoſe artificial gods, which they boaſted ſo much of their power of making, *viz.* animated ſtatues; and this peculiar intoxication of their own, which rendered them infamous and ridiculous even amongſt all the other Pagans, that they worſhipped brute animals alſo, in one ſenſe or other;

Euſeb. Pr. Ev. l. 9. c. 10. [P. 412.]

Juv. Sat. 15.

Quis neſcit, Voluſi Bithynice, qualia demens
Ægyptus portenta colat? Crocodilon adorat
Pars hæc, illa pavet ſaturam ſerpentibus Ibin.

Lib. 3. p. 121. Concerning which *Origen* againſt *Celſus* thus writeth; παρ' οἷς προσιόντι μὲν ἐστὶ λαμπρὰ τεμένη, καὶ ἄλση, καὶ προπυλαίων μεγέθη τε καὶ κάλλη καὶ νεῶ θαυμάσιοι, καὶ σκηναὶ πέριξ

[These words are not *Origen*'s, but *Celſus*'s.]

[1] Vide Voſſium de Origine & Progreſſu Idololatriæ Lib II. Cap. LXXVII. p. 259.
[2] In Phaleg. Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 9, 10. & Lib. IV. Cap. XXX. p. 283.
[3] De Iſide & Oſiride p. 366.
[4] Ibid. p. 355.
[5] Lib. II. Cap. XXXVII. p. 102.
[6] Revelat. XI. 8.

πέριξ ὑπερήφανοι, καὶ θρήσκειαι, μάλα δεισιδαίμονες καὶ μυστηριώτιδες· ἤδη δὲ εἰσιόντι, καὶ ἐνδοτέρω γενομένῳ, θεωρεῖται προσκυνούμενος αἴλυρος, ἢ πίθηκος, ἢ κροκόδειλος, ἢ τράγος, ἢ κύων· *To him, that cometh to be a spectator of the Egyptian worship, there first offer themselves to his view most splendid and stately temples, sumptuously adorned together with solemn groves, and many pompous rites and mystical ceremonies; but as soon as he enters in, he perceives, that it was either a cat, or an ape, a crocodile, or a goat, or a dog, that was the object of this religious worship.*

But notwithstanding this multifarious polytheism and idolatry of these Egyptians, that they did nevertheless acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, may first be probably collected from that fame, which they had anciently over the whole world for their wisdom. The Egyptians are called by the *Elei* in *Herodotus* [1], σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, *the wisest of men*; and it is a commendation, that is given to one [2] in the same writer, *that he excelled the Egyptians in wisdom, who excelled all other mortals.* Thus is it set down in the scripture for *Moses* his encomium, *that he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians* [3]; and the transcendency of *Solomon*'s wisdom is likewise thus expressed by the writer of the book of *Kings* [4], that it excelled *the wisdom of all the children of the east-country, and all the wisdom of* Egypt. Where by the children of the east are chiefly meant the Persian Magi, and the Chaldeans; and there seems to be a climax here, that *Solomon*'s wisdom did not only excel the wisdom of the Magi, and of the Chaldeans, but also that of the Egyptians themselves. From whence it appears, that in *Solomon*'s time Egypt was the chief school of literature in the whole world, and that the Greeks were then but little or not at all taken notice of, nor had any considerable fame for learning. For which cause, we can by no means give credit to that of *Philo*, in the life of *Moses* [5], that besides the Egyptian priests, learned men were sent for by *Pharaoh*'s daughter out of *Greece* to instruct *Moses*. Whereas it is manifest from the Greekish monuments themselves, that for many ages after *Solomon*'s time, the most famous of the Greeks travelled into *Egypt* to receive culture and literature, as *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Thales*, and many others, amongst whom were *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Concerning the former of which *Isocrates* writes [6], that coming into Egypt, and being there instructed by the priests, he was the first, that brought philosophy into *Greece*; and the latter of them is perstringed by *Xenophon* [7], because Αἰγύπτῳ ἠράσθη καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τερατώδους σοφίας, not contented with that simple philosophy of *Socrates*, (which was little else besides morality) *he was in love with* Egypt, *and that monstrous wisdom of* Pythagoras. Now, as it is not probable, that the Egyptians, who were so famous for wisdom and learning, should be ignorant of one supreme Deity, so is it no small argument to the contrary, that they were had in so great esteem by those two divine philosophers, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. We grant indeed, that after the Greeks began to flourish in all manner of literature, the fame of the Egyptians was not only much eclipsed, (so that we hear no more of Greeks travelling

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[1] Lib. II. Cap. CLX. p. 151.
[2] *Ramsinitus* king of Egypt. Herod. Lib. II. Cap. CXXI p. 135.
[3] Acts VII. vers. 22.
[4] 1 Kings IV. 29.
[5] Lib. I. p. 605.
[6] In Encomio Busiridis p. 450.
[7] In fragmento Epistolæ ad Æschinem, apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. Lib. XIV. Cap. XII. p. 745.

velling into *Egypt* upon the former account) but alſo that their ardour towards the liberal ſciences did by degrees languiſh and abate; ſo that *Strabo*[1] in his time could find little more in *Egypt*, beſides the empty houſes and palaces, in which prieſts, formerly famous for aſtronomy and philoſophy, had dwelt. Nevertheleſs, their arcane theology remained more or leſs amongſt them unextinct to the laſt, as appears from what *Origen*, *Porphyrius*, and *Jamblichus* have written concerning them.

The learning of the Egyptians was either hiſtorical, or philoſophical, or theological. Firſt the Egyptians were famous for their hiſtorick learning and knowledge of antiquity, they being confeſſed in *Plato*[2] to have had ſo much ancienter records of time than the Greeks, that the Greeks were but children or infants compared with them. They pretended to a continued and uninterrupted ſeries of hiſtory from the beginning of the world downward, and therefore ſeem to have had the cleareſt and ſtrongeſt perſuaſions of the Coſmogonia. Indeed it cannot be denied, but that this tradition of the world's beginning was at firſt in a manner univerſal among all nations. For concerning the Greeks and Perſians we have already manifeſted the ſame; and as *Sanchoniathon* teſtifieth the like concerning the Phænicians, ſo does
L. 15. 715. *Strabo* likewiſe of the Indian *Brachmans*, affirming, that they did agree with the Greeks in many things, and particularly in this, ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς, *that the world was both made, and ſhould be deſtroyed.* And though *Diodorus*[3] affirm the contrary of the Chaldeans, yet we ought in
Euſeb. Chron. p. 6. reaſon to aſſent rather to *Beroſus*[4], in reſpect of his greater antiquity, who repreſents the ſenſe of the ancient Chaldeans after this manner, γενέσθαι χρόνον ἐν ᾧ τὸ πᾶν σκότος καὶ ὕδωρ—— τὸν δὲ Βῆλον, ὃν Δία μεθερμηνεύουσι, μέσον τεμόντα τὸ σκότος, χωρίσαι γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, καὶ διαλάξαι τὸν κόσμον—ἀποτελέσαι δὲ τὸν Βῆλον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς πέντε πλανήτας· *That there was a time, when all was darkneſs and water, but* Bell (*who is interpreted* Jupiter) *cutting the darkneſs in the middle, ſeparated the earth and heaven from one another, and ſo framed the world; this* Bell *alſo producing the ſtars, the ſun, and the moon, and the five planets.* From which teſtimony of *Beroſus*, according to the verſion of *Alexander Polyhiſtor*, by the way it appears alſo, that the ancient Chaldeans acknowledged one ſupreme Deity, the maker of the whole world, as they are alſo celebrated for this in that oracle of *Apollo*, which is cited out of *Porphyry* by *Euſebius*,

Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 9. *c.* 10.

Μοῦνοι Χαλδαῖοι σοφίην λάχον, ἠδ' ἀρ' Ἑβραῖοι,
Αὐτογένεθλον ἄνακτα σεβαζόμενοι θεὸν ἀγνῶς.

Where the Chaldeans are joined with the Hebrews, as worſhipping likewiſe in a holy manner one ſelf-exiſtent Deity. Wherefore, if *Diodorus* were not altogether miſtaken, it muſt be concluded, that in the latter times, the Chaldeans (then perhaps receiving the doctrine of *Ariſtotle*) did deſert and abandon the tradition of their anceſtors concerning the Coſmogonia. But the Egyptians, however they attributed more antiquity to the world than they ought, yet ſeem to have had a conſtant perſuaſion of the beginning of it,

[1] Lib XVII. p. 764.
[2] In Timæo. p. 524.
[3] Lib. II. p. 83. Edit. Hanov. 1604.
[4] Apud Georg. Syncell. in Chronico p. 29

it, and the firmest of all other nations: they (as *Kircher* tells us[t]) therefore picturing *Horus*, or the world, as a young man beardless, not only to signify its constant youthful and flourishing vigour, but also the youngness and newness of its duration. Neither ought it to be suspected, that though the Egyptians held the world to have had a beginning, yet they conceived it to be made by chance without a God, as *Anaximander*, *Democritus*, and *Epicurus* afterwards did; the contrary thereunto being so confessed a thing, that *Simplicius*, a zealous contender for the world's eternity, affirms the Mosaick history of its creation by God to have been nothing else but μύθοι Αἰγύπλιοι, *Egyptian fables.* The place is so considerable, that I shall here set it down in the author's own language; Εἰ δὲ τὸν τῶν Ἰουδαίων νομοθέτην ἐνδείκνυλαι λέγουλα, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν· ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκαλασκεύαστος· καὶ σκότος ἐπάνω τῆς ἀβύσσου, καὶ πνεῦμα θεῦ ἐπεφέρελο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδαλος. εἶτα ποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ φῶς, καὶ διαχωρίσαντος ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ σκότους, ἐπήγαγε, καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ φῶς ἡμέραν, καὶ τὸ σκότος νύκλα· καὶ ἐγένελο ἑσπέρα καὶ ἐγένελο πρωὶ ἡμέρα μία· εἰ δὴ ταύτην τὴν χρόνου νομίζει γένεσιν τὴν ἀπὸ χρόνου, ἐννοείτω ὅτι μυθικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἡ παράδοσις, καὶ ἀπὸ μύθων Αἰγυπλίων εἱλκυσμένη. *If* Grammaticus *here mean the lawgiver of the* Jews, *writing thus*, [In the beginning God made heaven and earth, and the earth was invisible and unadorned, and darkness was upon the deep, and the spirit of God moved upon the water;] *and then afterward when he had made light, and separated the light from the darkness, adding*, [And God called the light day, and the darkness night, and the evening and the morning were the first day:] *I say, if* Grammaticus *think this to have been the first generation and beginning of time; I would have him to know, that all this is but a fabulous tradition, and wholly drawn from Egyptian fables.* *Simpl. in Arist. Phys. l. 8. fol. 268. col. 1.*

As for the philosophy of the Egyptians, that besides their physiology, and the pure and mixed mathematicks, (arithmetick, geometry, and astronomy) they had another higher kind of philosophy also concerning incorporeal substances, appears from hence, because they were the first asserters of the immortality of souls, their pre-existence and transmigration, from whence their incorporeity is necessarily inferred. Thus *Herodotus*; πρῶτοι τόνδε τὸν λόγον Αἰγύπλιοι εἰσὶ εἰπόνλες, ὡς ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι· τοῦ σώματος δὲ καταφθίνουλος, ἐς ἄλλο ζῶον ἀεὶ γινόμενον εἰσδύεσθαι, &c. *The Egyptians were the first asserters of the soul's immortality, and of its transmigration, after the death and corruption of this body, into the bodies of other animals successively,* viz. *until it have run round through the whole circuit of terrestrial, marine and volatile animals, after which (they say) it is to return again into a humane body; they supposing this revolution or apocatastasis of souls to be made in no less space than that of three thousand years.* But whether *Herodotus* were rightly catechized and instructed in the Egyptian doctrine as to this particular or no, may very well be questioned; because the Pythagoreans, whom he there tacitly reprehends for arrogating the first invention of this to themselves, when they had borrowed it from the Egyptians, did represent it otherwise; namely, that the descent of human souls into these earthy bodies was first in way of punishment, and that their sinking lower afterwards into the bodies of brutes, was only to some a further punishment for their further degeneracy; but *Euterp.* 123.

[t] In Oedipo Ægyptiaco.

the virtuous and pious souls should after this life enjoy a state of happiness in celestial or spiritual bodies. And the Egyptian doctrine is represented after the same manner by *Porphyrius* in *Stobæus* [1], as also in the Hermetick or Trismegistick writings. Moreover, *Chalcidius* reports, that *Hermes Trismegist*, when he was about to die, made an oration to this purpose; *That he had here lived in this earthly body but an exile and stranger, and was now returning home to his own country; so that his death ought not to be lamented, this life being rather to be accounted death.* Which persuasion the Indian *Brachmans* also were embued withal, whether they received it from the Egyptians (as they did some other things) or no; τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, *That this life here is but the life of embryo's, and that death [to good men] is a generation or birth into true life.* And this may the better be believed to have been the Egyptian doctrine, because *Diodorus* himself hath some passages sounding that way; as that the Egyptians lamented not the death of good men, but applauded their happiness, ὡς τὸν αἰῶνα διατρίβειν μέλλοντες καθ' ᾅδὸ μετὰ τῶν εὐσεβῶν, *as being to live ever in the other world with the pious.* However, it being certain from this Egyptian doctrine of pre-existence and transmigration, that the Egyptians did assert the soul's incorporeity, it cannot reasonably be doubted, but that they acknowledged also an incorporeal Deity. The objection against which, from what *Porphyrius* writeth concerning *Chæremon*, will be answered afterwards.

Strabo l. 15. *p.* 715.

Domicilia Viventium Diversoria appellant. Diod.

We come in the last place to the theology of the Egyptians. Now it is certain, that the Egyptians besides their vulgar and fabulous theology (which is for the most part that which *Diodorus Sicules* [2] describes) had another ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία, *arcane and recondite theology*, that was concealed from the vulgar, and communicated only to the kings, and such priests and others, as were thought capable thereof; these two theologies of theirs differing, as *Aristotle*'s Exotericks and Acroamaticks. Thus much is plainly declared by *Origen*, whose very name was Egyptian, it being interpreted *Horo-genitus*, (which *Horus* was an Egyptian God) upon occasion of *Celsus* his boasting, that he thoroughly understood all that belonged to Christianity: *Celsus* (saith he) *seemeth here to me to do just as if a man travelling into* Egypt, *where the wise men of the Egyptians, according to their country-learning, philosophize much about those things, that are accounted by them divine, whilst the idiots in the mean time hearing only certain fables, which they know not the meaning of, are very much pleased therewith*: Celsus, *I say, doth as if such a sojourner in* Egypt, *who had conversed only with those idiots, and not been at all instructed by any of the priests in their arcane and recondite mysteries, should boast, that he knew all that belonged to the Egyptian theology.* Where the same *Origen* also adds, that this was not a thing proper neither to the Egyptians only to have such an arcane and true theology, distinct from their vulgar and fabulous one, but common with them to the Persians, Syrians, and other Barbarian Pagans; ὃ δὲ εἶπον περὶ Αἰγυπτίων σοφῶν τε καὶ ἰδιωτῶν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ Περσῶν, &c. *What we have now affirmed* (saith he) *concerning the difference betwixt the wise men and the idiots amongst the Egyptians, the same may be said also of the Persians, amongst whom the religious rites are performed rationally by those, that are*

L. 1. *p.* 11.

[1] Eclog. Phys. Lib. II. Cap. VII. p. 200.

[2] Lib. I. p. 33.

are ingenious, whilſt the ſuperficial vulgar look no further in the obſervation of them, than the external ſymbol or ceremony. And the ſame is true likewiſe concerning the Syrians and Indians, and all thoſe other nations, who have, beſides their religious fables, a learning and doctrine. Neither can it be diſſembled, that *Origen* in this place plainly intimates the ſame alſo concerning Chriſtianity itſelf; namely, that beſides the outſide and exterior cortex of it (in which notwithſtanding there is nothing fabulous) communicated to all, there was a more arcane and recondite doctrine belonging thereunto, which all were not alike capable of; he elſewhere obſerving this to be that wiſdom, that St. *Paul* ſpake *amongſt the perfect.* From whence he concludes, that *Celſus* vainly boaſted, πάντα γὰρ οἶδα, *For I know all things belonging to Chriſtianity*, when he was acquainted only with the exterior ſurface of it. But concerning the Egyptians, this was a thing moſt notorious and obſerved by ſundry other writers; as for example *Clemens* of *Alexandria*, a man alſo well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt; Αἰγύπτιοι δ' τοῖς ἐπιλυχνίζι τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀνείθενλο μυστήρια, δὲ μὴν βεβήλοις τὴν τῶν θείων εἴδησιν ἐξέφερον, ἀλλ' ἢ μόνοις γε τοῖς μέλλεσιν ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν προιέναι, καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τοῖς κριθεῖσιν εἶναι δοκιμωτάτοις, ἀπό τε τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τῆς παιδείας, καὶ τοῦ γένους. *Strom. l. 5. p. 508.* *The Egyptians do not reveal their religious myſteries promiſcuouſly to all, nor communicate the knowledge of divine things to the profane, but only to thoſe, who are to ſucceed in the kingdom, and to ſuch of the prieſts, as are judged moſt fitly qualified for the ſame, upon account both of their birth and education.* With which agreeth alſo the teſtimony of *Plutarch*, he adding a further confirmation thereof from the Egyptian *Sphinges*, ὁ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγμένος [βασιλεὺς] εὐθὺς ἐγίνετο τῶν ἱερέων, καὶ μετεῖχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπικεκρυμμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις, ἀμυδρὰς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἔχουσιν· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ παραδηλοῦσιν αὐτοὶ πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἐπιεικῶς ἱστάντες, ὡς αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν τῆς θεολογίας αὐτῶν ἐχούσης. *De Iſ. & Oſ. 354.* *When amongſt the Egyptians there is any king choſen out of the military order, he is forthwith brought to the prieſts, and by them inſtructed in that arcane theology, which conceals myſterious truths under obſcure fables and allegories. Wherefore they place Sphinges before their temples, to ſignify, that their theology contained a certain arcane and enigmatical wiſdom in it.* And this meaning of the *Sphinges* in the Egyptian temples is confirmed likewiſe by *Clemens Alexandrinus* [1], διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι πρὸ τῶν ἱερῶν τὰς σφίγγας ἱδρύονται, ὡς αἰνιγματώδους τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἀσαφοῦς ὄντος· *Therefore do the Egyptians place* Sphinges *before their temples, to declare thereby, that the doctrine concerning God is enigmatical and obſcure.* Notwithſtanding which, we acknowledge, that the ſame *Clemens* gives another interpretation alſo of theſe *Sphinges*, or conjecture concerning them, which may not be unworthy to be here read; τάχα δὲ καὶ ὅτι φιλεῖν τε δεῖ καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ θεῖον· ἀγαπᾶν μὲν ὡς προσηνῆ καὶ εὐμενές τοις ὁσίοις, δεδιέναι δὲ ὡς ἀπαραιτήτως δίκαιον τοῖς ἀνοσίοις, θηρίῳ γὰρ ὅμοι καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἡ σφὶγξ αἰνίσσεται τὴν εἰκόνα· *But perhaps the meaning of thoſe Egyptian* Sphinges *might be alſo to ſignify, that the Deity ought both to be loved and feared; to be loved as benign and propitious to the holy, but to be feared as inexorably juſt to the impious, the Sphinx being made up of the image both of a man and a lion.* Moreover, beſides theſe *Sphinges*, the Egyptians had

[1] Stromat. Lib. V. Cap. IV. p. 664.

had alſo *Harpocrates* and *Sigalions* in their temples, which are thus deſcribed by the poet [1],

Quique premunt vocem, digitóque ſilentia ſuadent.

they being the ſtatues of young men preſſing their lips with their finger.

De Iſ. & Oſir. The meaning of which *Harpocrates* is thus expreſſed by *Plutarch*, τὸν δὲ Ἁρποκράτην, ὡ θεὸν ἀτελῆ καὶ νήπιον, ἀλλὰ τῶ περὶ θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις λόγω νεαρῶ καὶ ἀτηλῆ καὶ ἀδιαρθρώτω πρὸς ἀτην καὶ σωφρονίστην, διὸ τῷ στόματι τὴν δάκτυλον ἔχει προσκείμενον, ἐχεμυθίας καὶ σιωπῆς σύμβολον. *The* Harpocrates *of the Egyptians is not to be taken for an imperfect and infant God, but for the preſident of men's ſpeech concerning the gods, that is but imperfect, balbutient and inarticulate, and the regulator or corrector of the ſame; his finger upon his mouth being a ſymbol of ſilence and taciturnity.* It is very true, that ſome Chriſtians have made another interpretation of this Egyptian *Harpocrates*, as if the meaning of it had been this; that the gods of the Egyptians had been all of them really nothing elſe but mortal men, but that this was a ſecret, that was to be concealed from the vulgar. Which conceit, however it be witty, yet it is devoid of truth; and doubtleſs the meaning of thoſe Egyptian *Harpocrates* was no other than this, that either the ſupreme and incomprehenſible Deity was to be adored with ſilence, or not ſpoken of without much caution and circumſpection; or elſe that the arcane myſteries of theology were not to be promiſcuouſly communicated, but concealed from the profane vulgar. Which ſame thing ſeems to have been alſo ſignified by that yearly feaſt kept by the Egyptians in honour of *Thoth* or *Hermes*, when the prieſts eating honey and figs pronounced thoſe words, γλυκὺ ἡ ἀλήθεια, *Truth is ſweet*; as alſo by that amulet, which *Iſis* was fabled to have worn about her, the interpretation whereof was φώνη ἀληθὴς [2], *True ſpeech.*

This ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία, this arcane and recondite theology of the Egyptians, was concealed from the vulgar two manner of ways, by fables of allegories, and by ſymbols or hieroglyphicks. *Euſebius* informs us, that *Porphyrius* wrote a book Περὶ τῆς ἀλληγορημένης Ἑλλήνων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων θεολογίας, *concerning the allegorical theology both of the Greeks and Egyptians.* And here by the way we may obſerve, that this buſineſs of allegorizing in matters of religion had not its firſt and only riſe amongſt the Chriſtians, but was a thing very much in uſe among the Pagan theologers alſo: and therefore *Celſus* in *Origen* [3] commends ſome of the Chriſtians for this, that they could allegorize ingeniouſly and handſomely. It is well known, how both *Plutarch* [4] and *Syneſius* [5] allegorized thoſe Egyptian fables of *Iſis* and *Oſiris*, the one to a philoſophical, the other to a political ſenſe. And the Egyptian hieroglyphicks, which were figures not anſwering to ſounds or words, but immediately repreſenting the objects and conceptions of the mind, were chiefly made uſe of by them to this purpoſe, to expreſs the myſteries of their religion and theology, ſo as that they might be concealed from the prophane vulgar. For which cauſe the hieroglyphick learning of the Egyptians is commonly taken for one and the ſame thing with their arcane theology, or

[1] Ovid. Metam. Lib. IX.
[2] De Iſide & Oſiride, p. 378.
[3] Lib. I. p. 14. Edit. Cantab.
[4] De Iſide & Oſiride.
[5] De Providentiâ, p. 89. Oper.

or metaphyſicks. And this the author of the queſtions and anſwers *ad Orthodoxos* [1] tells us was anciently had in much greater eſteem amongſt the Egyptians, than all their other learning; and that therefore *Moſes* was as well inſtructed in this hieroglyphick learning and metaphyſical theology of theirs, as in their mathematicks. And for our parts, we doubt not, but that the *Menſa Iſiaca* lately publiſhed, containing ſo many ſtrange and uncouth hieroglyphicks in it, was ſomething of this ἀπόῤῥητον θεολογίαν, this *arcane theology* of the Egyptians, and not mere hiſtory, as ſome imagine; though the late confident *Oedipus* ſeems to arrogate too much to himſelf, in pretending to ſuch a certain and exact interpretation of it. Now as it is reaſonable to think, that in all thoſe Pagan nations, where there was another theology beſides the vulgar, the principal part thereof was the doctrine of one ſupreme and univerſal Deity, the Maker of the whole world; ſo can it not well be conceived, what this ἄῤῥητον and ἀπόῤῥητον and αἰνιγματώδης θεολογία, this *arcane* and *myſterious* and *enigmatick theology* of the Egyptians, ſo much talked of, ſhould be other than a kind of metaphyſicks concerning God, as one perfect incorporeal Being, the original of all things.

We know nothing of any moment, that can be objected againſt this, ſave only that, which *Porphyrius*, in his epiſtle to *Anebo* an Egyptian prieſt, writeth concerning *Chæremon* [2], Χαιρήμων μὲν γὰρ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι πρὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων κόσμων ἡγεῖται ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγων τιθέμενοι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων, οὐδ' ἄλλους θεούς, πλὴν τῶν πλανητῶν λεγομένων, καὶ τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸν ζωδιακὸν, &c. Chæremon *and others acknowledge nothing before this viſible and corporeal world, alledging for the countenance of their opinion ſuch of the Egyptians, as talk of no other gods, but the planets and thoſe ſtars, that fill up the Zodiack, or riſe together with them, their decans, and horoſcopes, and robuſt princes, as they call them; whoſe names are alſo inſerted into their almanacks or ephemerides, together with the times of their riſings and ſettings, and the prognoſticks or ſignifications of future events for them. For he obſerved, that thoſe Egyptians, who made the ſun the Demiurgus or architect of the world, interpreted the ſtories of* Iſis *and* Oſiris, *and all thoſe other religious fables, into nothing but ſtars, and planets, and the river* Nile, καὶ ὅλως πάντα εἰς τὰ φυσικὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἀσωμάτους καὶ ζώσας οὐσίας ἑρμηνεύειν, *and referred all things univerſally into natural or inanimate, nothing into incorporeal and living ſubſtances.* Which paſſage of *Porphyrius* concerning *Chæremon*, we confeſs, *Euſebius* lays great ſtreſs upon, endeavouring to make advantage of it, firſt againſt the Egyptians, and then againſt the Greeks and other Pagans, as deriving their religion and theology from them: *It is manifeſt from hence*, ſaith he, *that the very arcane theology of the Egyptians deified nothing but ſtars and planets, and acknowledged no incorporeal principal or demiurgick reaſon as the cauſe of this univerſe, but only the viſible ſun.* And then he concludes in this manner, *See now what is become of this arcane theology of the Egyptians, that deifies nothing but ſenſeleſs matter or dead inanimate bodies.* But it is well known, that *Euſebius* took all advantages poſſible, to repreſent the Pagans to the worſt, and render their theology ridiculous and abſurd; nevertheleſs what he here urgeth againſt the Egyptians *Pr.Ev.Lib.3. c. 4.*

[1] Inter Juſtini Martyris Opera, Quæſtion. & Reſpon. XXV. p. 406.

[2] This Epiſtle is prefix'd to *Jamblichus de Myſteriis Ægyptior.* publiſh'd at *Oxford* by Dr. *Tho. Gale.*

tians, is the leſs valuable, becauſe himſelf plainly contradicts it elſewhere, declaring, that the Egyptians acknowledged a demiurgick reaſon and intellectual architect of the world, which conſequently was the maker of the ſun; and confeſſing the ſame of the other Pagans alſo. Now to affirm, that the Egyptians acknowledged no other deity than inanimate matter and the ſenſeleſs corporeal world, is not only to deny that they had any ἀπόῤῥητος θεολογία, any arcane theology at all (which yet hath been ſufficiently proved) but alſo to render them abſolute Atheiſts. For if this be not atheiſm, to acknowledge no other deity beſides dead and ſenſeleſs matter, then the word hath no ſignification. *Chæremon* indeed ſeems to impute this opinion (not to all the Egyptians) but to ſome of them; and it is very poſſible, that there might be ſome Atheiſts amongſt the Egyptians alſo, as well as amongſt the Greeks and their philoſophers. And doubtleſs this *Chæremon* himſelf was a kind of aſtrological Atheiſt; for which cauſe we conclude, that it was not *Chæremon* the Stoick, from whom notwithſtanding *Porphyrius* in his book of abſtinence citeth certain other things concerning the Egyptians, but either that *Chæremon*, whom *Strabo* made uſe of in Egypt, or elſe ſome other of that name. But that there ever was or can be any ſuch religious Atheiſts, as *Euſebius* with ſome others imagine, who though acknowledging no Deity, beſides dead and ſenſeleſs matter, notwithſtanding devoutly court and worſhip the ſame, conſtantly invoking it and imploring its aſſiſtance, as expecting great benefit to themſelves thereby; this we confeſs is ſuch a thing, as we have not faith enough to believe, it being a ſottiſhneſs and contradictious nonſenſe, that is not incident to human nature. Neither can we doubt, but that all the devout Pagans acknowledged ſome living and underſtanding deities or other; nor eaſily believe, that they ever worſhipped any inanimate or ſenſeleſs bodies, otherwiſe than as ſome way referring to the ſame, or as images and ſymbols of them. But as for that paſſage in *Porphyrius* his epiſtle concerning *Chæremon*, where he only propounds doubts to *Anebo* the Egyptian prieſt, as deſiring further information from him concerning them, *Jamblichus* hath given us a full anſwer to it, under the perſon of *Abammo* another Egyptian prieſt, which notwithſtanding hath not hitherto been at all taken notice of, becauſe *Ficinus* and *Scutellius* not underſtanding the word *Chæremon* to be a proper name, ridiculouſly turn'd it in their tranſlations, *optarem* and *gauderem*, thereby alſo perverting the whole ſenſe. The words in the Greek MS. (now in the hands of my learned friend Mr. *Gale*) run thus [1]; Χαιρήμων δὲ καὶ οἵτινες ἄλλοι, τῶν περὶ τὸν κόσμον ἅπτονται πρώτων αἰτίων, τὰς τελευταίας ἀρχὰς ἐξηγῆνται, ὅσοι τε τὰς πλανήτας, καὶ τὸν Ζῳδιακὸν, τὰς δὲ δεκανὰς, καὶ ὡροσκόπους, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας κραταίας ἡγεμόνας παραδίδωσι, τὰς μεριστὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν διανομὰς ἀναφαίνει· τάτε ἐν τοῖς ἀλμενικιακοῖς μέρος τι βραχύτατον περιέχει τῶν Ἑρμαϊκῶν διατάξεων, καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀστέρων ἢ φάσεων, ἢ κρύψεων, ἢ σελήνης αὐξήσεων, ἢ μειώσεων ἐν τοῖς ἑκάστοις εἶχε τὴν ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις αἰτιολογίαν· Φυσικά τε ἃ λέγουσιν εἶναι πάντα Αἰγύπτιοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν νοερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως διακρίνουσιν· οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶ παντὸς μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, νῦν τε καὶ λόγον προσηπάμενοι καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ὄντας, ὅτως δημιουργεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα. *But* Chæremon *and thoſe others, who pretend to write of the firſt cauſes of the world, declare only the laſt and loweſt*

[1] Jamblich. de Myſter. Ægyptior. Sect. VIII. Cap. IV. p. 160.

loweſt principles, as likewiſe they who treat of the planets, the zodiack, the decans, the horoſcopes, and the robuſt princes. And thoſe things, that are in the Egyptian almanack (or ephemerides) contain the leaſt part of the Hermaical inſtitutions, namely the phaſes and occultations of the ſtars, the increaſe and decreaſe of the moon, and the like aſtrological matters; which things have the loweſt place in the Egyptian ætiology. Nor do the Egyptians reſolve all things into (ſenſleſs) nature, but they diſtinguiſh both the life of the ſoul, and the intellectual life from that of nature, and that not only in ourſelves, but alſo in the univerſe; they determining mind and reaſon firſt to have exiſted of themſelves, and ſo this whole world to have been made. Wherefore they acknowledge before the heaven, and in the heaven a living power, and place pure mind above the world, as the Demiurgus *and architect thereof.* From which teſtimony of *Jamblichus*, who was but little junior to *Porphyrius*, and contemporary with *Euſebius*, and who had made it his buſineſs to inform himſelf thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, it plainly appears, that the Egyptians did not generally ſuppoſe (as *Chæremon* pretended concerning ſome of them) a ſenſleſs inanimate nature to be the firſt original of all things, but that as well in the world as in ourſelves, they acknowledged ſoul ſuperior to nature, and mind or intellect ſuperior to ſoul, this being the *Demiurgus* of the world. But we ſhall have afterwards occaſion more opportunely to cite other paſſages out of this *Jamblichus* his Egyptian myſteries to the ſame purpoſe.

Wherefore there is no pretence at all to ſuſpect, that the Egyptians were univerſally Atheiſts and Anarchiſts, ſuch as ſuppoſed no living underſtanding Deity, but reſolved all into ſenſleſs matter, as the firſt and higheſt principle; but all the queſtion is, whether they were not Polyarchiſts, ſuch as aſſerted a multitude of underſtanding deities ſelf-exiſtent or unmade. Now, that monarchy was an eſſential part of the arcane and true theology of the Egyptians *A. Steuchus Eugubinus*, and many other learned men, have thought to be unqueſtionably evident from the Hermetick or Triſmegiſtick writings, they taking it for granted, that theſe are all genuine and ſincere. Whereas there is too much cauſe to ſuſpect, that there have been ſome pious frauds practiſed upon theſe Triſmegiſtick writings, as well as there were upon the Sibylline; and that either whole books of them have been counterfeited by pretended Chriſtians, or at leaſt ſeveral ſpurious and ſuppoſititious paſſages here and there inſerted into ſome of them. *Iſaac Caſaubon*[a], who was the firſt diſcoverer, has taken notice of many ſuch in that firſt Hermetick book, entitled, *Pæmander*; ſome alſo in the fourth book, inſcribed *Crater*, and ſome in the thirteenth called the *ſermon in the mount concerning regeneration*; which may juſtly render thoſe three whole books, or at leaſt the firſt and laſt of them, to be ſuſpected. We ſhall here repeat none of *Caſaubon*'s condemned paſſages, but add one more to them out of the thirteenth book, or *ſermon in the mount*, which, however omitted by him, ſeems to be more rankly Chriſtian than any other; λέγε μοί τοῦτο, τίς ἐστι γενεζιεργὸς τῆς παλιγγενεζίας; ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς, ἄνθρωπος εἷς, θελήματι θεοῦ· *Tell me this alſo, who is the cauſe or worker of regeneration? The ſon of God, one man by the will of God.*

[a] Exercitat. I. in Baron. Num. XVIII. p. 54.

Wherefore, though *Ath. Kircherus*[1] contend with much zeal for the ſincerity of all theſe Triſmegiſtick books; yet we muſt needs pronounce of the three forementioned, at leaſt the *Pœmander* properly ſo called, and *the ſermon in the mount*, that they were either wholly forged and counterfeited by ſome pretended Chriſtians, or elſe had many ſpurious paſſages inſerted into them. Wherefore, it cannot be ſolidly proved from the Triſmegiſtick books after this manner, as ſuppoſed to be all alike genuine and ſincere, that the Egyptian Pagans acknowledged one ſupreme and univerſal Numen: much leſs can the ſame be evinced from that pretended Ariſtotelick book, *De ſecretiore parte divinæ ſapientiæ ſecundùm Ægyptios*, greedily ſwallowed down alſo by *Kircherus*, but unqueſtionably pſeudepigraphous.

Notwithſtanding which, we conceive, that though all the Triſmegiſtick books, that now are or have been formerly extant, had been forged by ſome pretended Chriſtians, as that book of the arcane Egyptian wiſdom was by ſome philoſopher, and imputed to *Ariſtotle*; yet would they for all that, upon another account, afford no inconſiderable argument to prove, that the Egyptian Pagans aſſerted one ſupreme Deity, *viz.* becauſe every cheat and impoſture muſt needs have ſome baſis or foundation of truth to ſtand upon; there muſt have been ſomething truly Egyptian in ſuch counterfeit Egyptian writings, (and therefore this at leaſt of one ſupreme Deity) or elſe they could never have obtained credit at firſt, or afterwards have maintained the ſame. The rather, becauſe theſe Triſmegiſtick books were diſperſed in thoſe ancient times, before the Egyptian paganiſm and their ſucceſſion of prieſts were yet extinct; and therefore had that, which is ſo much inſiſted upon in them, been diſſonant from the Egyptian theology, they muſt needs have been preſently exploded as meer lyes and forgeries. Wherefore, we ſay again, that if all the Hermaick or Triſmegiſtick books, that are now extant, and thoſe to boot, which being mentioned in ancient Fathers have been loſt, as the τὰ γενικὰ, and the τὰ διεξοδικὰ, and the like, had been nothing but the pious frauds and cheats of Chriſtians, yet muſt there needs have been ſome truth at the bottom to give ſubſiſtence to them; this at leaſt, that *Hermes Triſmegiſt*, or the Egyptian prieſts, in their arcane and true theology, really acknowledged one ſupreme and univeral Numen.

But it does not at all follow, that, becauſe ſome of theſe Hermaick or Triſmegiſtick books now extant were counterfeit or ſuppoſititious, that therefore all of them muſt needs be ſuch; and not only ſo, but thoſe alſo, that are mentioned in the writings of ancient Fathers, which are now loſt. Wherefore, the learned *Caſaubon* ſeems not to have reckoned or concluded well, when from the detection of forgery in two or three of thoſe Triſmegiſtick books at moſt, he pronounces of them all univerſally, that they were nothing but Chriſtian cheats and impoſtures. And probably he was led into this miſtake, by reaſon of his too ſecurely following that vulgar error, (which yet had been confuted by *Patricius*) that all that was publiſhed by *Ficinus* under the name of *Hermes Triſmegiſt*, was but one and the ſame book *Pœmander*, conſiſting of ſeveral chapters; whereas they are all indeed ſo many

[1] In Obeliſco Pamphylio p. 35. & in Oedipo Ægyptiaco Claſs. XII. Cap. III.

many diſtinct and independent books, whereof *Pœmander* is only placed firſt. However, there was no ſhadow of reaſon, why the *Aſclepius* ſhould have fallen under the ſame condemnation, nor ſeveral other books ſuperadded by *Patricius*, they being unqueſtionably diſtinct from the *Pœmander*, and no ſigns of ſpuriouſneſs or baſtardy diſcovered in them. Much leſs ought thoſe Triſmegiſtick books cited by the Fathers, and now loſt, have been condemned alſo unſeen. Wherefore, notwithſtanding all that *Caſaubon* has written, there may very well be ſome Hermetick or Triſmegiſtick books genuine, though all of them be not ſuch; that is, according to our after-declaration, there may be ſuch books, as were really Egyptian, and not counterfeited by any Chriſtian, though perhaps not written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, nor in the Egyptian language. And as it cannot well be conceived, how there ſhould have been any counterfeit Egyptian books, had there been none at all real; ſo that there were ſome real and genuine, will perhaps be rendered probable by theſe following conſiderations.

That there was anciently, amongſt the Egyptians ſuch a man as *Thoth*, *Theuth*, or *Taut*, who, together with letters, was the firſt inventor of arts and ſciences, as arithmetick, geometry, aſtronomy, and of the hieroglyphick learning, (therefore called by the Greeks *Hermes*, and by the Latins *Mercurius*) cannot reaſonably be denied; it being a thing confirmed by general fame in all ages, and by the teſtimonies not only of *Sanchoniathon* [1] a Phenician hiſtoriographer, who lived about the times of the Trojan war, and wrote a book concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and *Manetho*'s *Sebennyta* [2] an Egyptian prieſt, contemporary with *Ptol. Philadelphus*; but alſo of that grave philoſopher *Plato*, who is ſaid to have ſojourned thirteen years in *Egypt*, that in his *Philebus* [3] ſpeaks of him as the firſt inventor of letters, (who diſtinguiſhed betwixt vowels and conſonants determining their ſeveral numbers) there calling him either a God or divine man; but in his *Phædrus* [4] attributeth to him alſo the invention of arithmetick, geometry and aſtronomy, together with ſome ludicrous recreations, making him either a God or dæmon, ἤκουσα περὶ Ναύκρατιν τὴν Αἰγύπτιν, γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον τὸ ἱερὸν ὃ καλεῖσθαι Ἶβιν, αὐτῷ δὲ ὄνομα τῷ δαίμονι εἶναι Θεῦθ· *I have heard* (ſaith he) *that about* Naucratis *in* Egypt, *there was one of the ancient Egyptian gods, to whom the bird* Ibis *was ſacred, as his ſymbol or hieroglyphick; the name of which dæmon was* Theuth. In which place the philoſopher ſubjoins alſo an ingenious diſpute betwixt this *Theuth*, and *Thamus* then king of *Egypt*, concerning the convenience and inconvenience of letters; the former boaſting of that invention ὡς μνήμης καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον, *as a remedy for memory, and great help to wiſdom*, but the latter contending, that it would rather beget oblivion, by the neglect of memory, and therefore was not ſo properly μνήμης as ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον, *a remedy for memory, as reminiſcence, or the recovery of things forgotten:* adding, that it would alſo weaken and enervate mens natural faculties by ſlugging them, and rather beget δόξαν σοφίας, than ἀλήθειαν, *a puffy conceit and opinion*

[1] Apud Euſeb. Præpar. Evang. Lib. I. Cap. IX. p. 31, 32.
[2] Apud Georg. Syncellum in Chron. p. 40.
[3] P. 75.
[4] P. 356.

of knowledge, by a multifarious rabble of indigeſted notions, than the truth thereof. Moreover, ſince it is certain, that the Egyptians were famous for literature before the Greeks, they muſt of neceſſity have ſome one or more founders of learning amongſt them, as the Greeks had; and *Thoth* is the only or firſt perſon celebrated amongſt them upon this account, in remembrance of whom the firſt month of the year was called by that name. Which *Thoth* is generally ſuppoſed to have lived in the times of the Patriarchs, or conſiderably before *Moſes*; *Moſes* himſelf being ſaid to have been inſtructed in that learning, which owed its original to him.

Again, beſides this *Thoth* or *Theuth*, who was called the firſt *Hermes*, the Egyptians had alſo afterwards another eminent advancer or reſtorer of learning, who was called δεύτερος Ἑρμῆς, *the ſecond* Hermes; they perhaps ſuppoſing the ſoul of *Thoth*, or the firſt *Hermes*, to have come into him by tranſmigration, but his proper Egyptian name was *Siphoas*, as *Syncellus* [1] out of *Manetho* informs us: Σιφωὰς, ὁ καὶ Ἑρμῆς, υἱὸς Ἡφαίστου, Siphoas, (*who is alſo* Hermes) *the ſon of* Vulcan. This is he, who is ſaid to have been the father of *Tat*, and to have been ſurnamed Τρισμέγιστος, *Ter Maximus*, (he being ſo ſtyled by *Manetho*, *Jamblichus*, and others.) And he is placed by *Euſebius* [2] in the fiftieth year after the Iſraelitiſh *Exitus*, though probably ſomewhat too early. The former of theſe two *Hermes* was the inventor of arts and ſciences; the latter, the reſtorer and advancer of them: the firſt wrote in Hieroglyphicks upon pillars, ἐν τῇ Συριγλικῇ γῇ, (as the learned *Valeſius* [3] conjectures it ſhould be read, inſtead of Σηριαδικῇ) which *Syringes* what they were, *Am. Marcellinus* [4] will inſtruct us. The ſecond interpreted and tranſlated thoſe Hieroglyphicks, compoſing many books in ſeveral arts and ſciences; the number whereof ſet down by *Jamblichus* [5] muſt needs be fabulous, unleſs it be underſtood of paragraphs or verſes. Which Triſmegiſtick or Hermetick books were ſaid to be carefully preſerved by the prieſts, in the interior receſſes of their temples.

But beſides the Hieroglyphicks written by the firſt *Hermes*, and the books compoſed by the ſecond, (who was called alſo *Triſmegiſt*) it cannot be doubted, but that there were many other books written by the Egyptian prieſts ſucceſſively in ſeveral ages. And *Jamblichus* informs us, in the beginning of his myſteries, *That* Hermes, *the God of eloquence, and preſident or patron of all true knowledge concerning the gods, was formerly accounted common to all the prieſts, inſomuch, that* τὰ αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας εὑρήματα αὐτῷ ἀνετίθεσαν, Ἑρμῇ πάντα τὰ οἰκεῖα συγγράμματα ἐπονομάζοντες, *they dedicated the inventions of their wiſdom to him, entitling their own books to* Hermes Triſmegiſt. Now though one reaſon hereof might probably have been thought to have been this, becauſe thoſe books were ſuppoſed to have been written according to the tenour of the old Hermetick or Triſmegiſtick doctrine; yet *Jamblichus* here acquaints us with the chief ground of it, namely this, that though *Hermes* was once a mortal man, yet he was afterward deified by the Egyptians, (which is teſtified alſo by *Plato*) and made

[1] In Chron. p. 124.
[2] In Chronico, p. 556.
[3] Not. ad Ammian. Marcellin. Lib. XXII. p. 339.
[4] Hiſt. Lib. XXII. Cap. XV. p. 339.
[5] De Myſter. Ægyptior. Sect. VIII. Cap. I. p. 157.

made to be the tutelar God, and fautor of all arts and ſciences, but eſpecially theology; by whoſe inſpiration therefore all ſuch books were conceived to have been written. Nay further, we may obſerve, that in ſome of the Hermaick or Triſmegiſtick books now extant, *Hermes* is ſometimes put for the divine wiſdom or underſtanding itſelf. And now we ſee the true reaſon, why there have been many books called Hermetical and Triſmegiſtical; ſome of which, notwithſtanding, cannot poſſibly be conceived to have been of ſuch great antiquity, nor written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, *viz.* becauſe it was cuſtomary with the Egyptian prieſts to intitle their own philoſophick and theologick books to *Hermes*. Moreover, it is very probable, that ſeveral of the books of the Egyptian prieſts of latter times were not originally written in the Egyptian language, but the Greek; becauſe, at leaſt from the Ptolemaick kings downward, Greek was become very familiar to all the learned Egyptians, and in a manner vulgarly ſpoken, as may appear from thoſe very words, *Hermes*, *Triſmegiſt*, and the like, ſo commonly uſed by them, together with the proper names of places; and becauſe the Coptick language to this very day hath more of Greek than Egyptian words in it; nay, *Plutarch* ventures to etymologize thoſe old Egyptian names, *Iſis*, *Oſiris*, *Horus* and *Typhon*, from the Greek, as if the Egyptians had been anciently well acquainted with that language.

Now, that ſome of thoſe ancient Hermaick books, written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, or believed to be ſuch by the Egyptians, and kept in the cuſtody of their prieſts, were ſtill in being and extant amongſt them, after the times of Chriſtianity, ſeems to be unqueſtionable from the teſtimony of that pious and learned father *Clemens Alexandrinus*, he giving this particular account of them, after the mentioning of their opinion concerning the tranſmigration of ſouls: *The Egyptians follow a certain peculiar philoſophy of their own, which may be beſt declared by ſetting down the order of their religious proceſſion. Firſt, therefore, goes the Precentor, carrying two of* Hermes *his books along with him; the one of which contains the hymns of the gods, the other directions for the kingly office. After him follows the Horoſcopus, who is particularly inſtructed in* Hermes *his aſtrological books, which are four. Then ſucceeds the Hierogrammateus or ſacred ſcribe, with feathers upon his head, and a book and rule in his hands, to whom it belongeth to be thoroughly acquainted with the hieroglyphicks, as alſo with coſmography, geography, the order of the ſun and moon and five planets, the chorography of* Egypt, *and deſcription of* Nile. *In the next place cometh the Stoliſtes, who is to be thoroughly inſtructed in thoſe ten books, which treat concerning the honour of the gods, the Egyptian worſhip, ſacrifices, firſt-fruits, prayers, pomps, and feſtivals. And laſt of all marcheth the prophet, who is preſident of the temple and ſacred things, and ought to be thoroughly verſed in thoſe other ten books called ſacerdotal, concerning laws, the gods, and the whole diſcipline of the prieſts. Wherefore, amongſt the books of* Hermes, *there are forty two accounted moſt neceſſary; of which thirty ſix, containing all the Egyptian philoſophy, were to be learned by thoſe particular orders before mentioned;*

Strom. 6. *p.* 633. [Cap. IV. p. 757. Edit. Potteri.]

tioned; but the other ſix, treating of medicinal things, by the Paſtophori. From which place we underſtand, that at leaſt forty two books of the ancient *Hermes Triſmegiſt*, or ſuch reputed by the Egyptians, were ſtill extant in the time of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, about two hundred years after the Chriſtian epocha.

Furthermore, that there were certain Books really Egyptian, and called Hermaical or Triſmegiſtical, (whether written by the ancient *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, or by other Egyptian prieſts of latter times, according to the tenor of his doctrine, and only intitled to him) which, after the times of Chriſtianity, began to be taken notice of by other nations, the Greeks and Latins, ſeems probable from hence, becauſe ſuch books are not only mentioned and acknowledged by Chriſtian writers and fathers, but alſo by Pagans and philoſophers. In *Plutarch*'s diſcourſe *de Iſide & Oſiride*, we read thus of them: Pag. 374. [F. 375.] Ἐν δὲ ταῖς Ἑρμᾶ λεγομέναις βίβλοις, ἱστορῦσι γεγράφθαι, περὶ τῶν ἱερῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου περιφορᾶς τεταγμένην δύναμιν, Ὧρον, Ἕλληνες δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα καλοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, οἱ μὲν Ὄσιριν, οἱ δὲ Σάραπιν, οἱ δὲ Σωθὶ Αἰγυπτίῳ. *In the books called* Hermes's, *or Hermaical, it is reported to have been written concerning ſacred names, that the power appointed to preſide over the motion of the ſun is called by the Egyptians* Horus *(as by the Greeks* Apollo*) and that, which preſides over the air and wind, is called by ſome* Oſiris, *by others* Sarapis, *and by others* Sothi, *in the Egyptian language.* Now theſe ſacred names in *Plutarch* ſeem to be ſeveral names of God; and therefore, whether theſe Hermaick books of his were the ſame with thoſe in *Clemens Alexandrinus*, ſuch as were ſuppoſed by the Egyptians to have been written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, or other books written by Egyptian prieſts, according to the tenor of this doctrine; we may by the way obſerve, that, according to the Hermaical or Triſmegiſtick doctrine, one and the ſame Deity was worſhipped under ſeveral names and notions, according to its ſeveral powers and virtues, manifeſted in the world; which is a thing afterwards more to be inſiſted on. Moreover, it hath been generally believed, that *L. Apuleius Madaurenſis*, an eminent Platonick philoſopher, and zealous aſſertor of paganiſm, was the tranſlator of the Aſclepian dialogue of *Hermes Triſmegiſt* out of Greek into Latin; which therefore hath been accordingly publiſhed with *Apuleius* his works. And *Barthius* affirms, that St. *Auſtin* does ſomewhere expreſly impute this verſion to *Apuleius*; but we confeſs we have not yet met with the place. However, there ſeems to be no ſufficient reaſon, why *Colvius* ſhould call this into queſtion from the ſtyle and Latin. Again, it is certain, that *Jamblichus* doth not only mention theſe Hermaick books, under the name of τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, *the books that are carried up and down as* Hermes's, or *vulgarly imputed to him*; but alſo vindicate them from the imputation of impoſture. Not as if there were any ſuſpicion at all of that, which *Caſaubon* is ſo confident of, that theſe Hermaick books were all forged by Chriſtians; but becauſe ſome might then poſſibly imagine them to have been counterfeited by philoſophers; wherefore it will be convenient here to ſet down the whole paſſage of *Jamblichus*[z] concerning it, as it is in the Greek MS. διευκρινηθέ-

[z] Sect. VIII. Cap. IV. p. 160. Edit. Gale.

τῶν ἓν τέτων ἔτως, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν οἷς λέγει ἐπιτετυχηκέναι, σαφὴς ἐστὶν ἡ διάλυσις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, Ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ πολλάκις χρῆται· μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας ἐκ ἀπείρως ἐχόντων. Χαιρήμων δὲ, &c. *These things being thus discussed and determined, the solution of that difficulty, from those books which* Porphyrius *saith he met withal, (namely the Hermaicks, and those writings of* Chæremon) *will be clear and easy. For the books vulgarly imputed to* Hermes *do really contain the Hermaick opinions and doctrines in them, although they often speak the language of philosophers; the reason whereof is, because they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy. But* Chæremon *and those others*, &c. Where it is first observable, that *Jamblichus* doth not affirm these Hermaick books to have been written by *Hermes Trismegist* himself, he calling them only τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, *the books that were carried about as* Hermes's. But that which he affirmeth of them is this, *that they did really contain the Hermaical opinions, and derive their original from* Egypt. Again, whereas some might then possibly suspect, that these Hermaick books had been counterfeited by Greek philosophers, and contained nothing but the Greek learning in them, because they speak so much the philosophick language; *Jamblichus* gives an account of this also, that the reason hereof was, *because they were translated out of the Egyptian language by men skilled in the Greek philosophy*, who therefore added something of their own phrase and notion to them. It is true indeed, that most of these Hermaick books, which now we have, seem to have been written originally in Greek; notwithstanding which, others of them, and particularly those that are now lost, as τὰ Γενικὰ, and the like, might, as *Jamblichus* here affirmeth, have been translated out of the Egyptian tongue, but by their translators disguised with philosophick language and other Grecanick things intermixed with them. Moreover, from the forecited passage of *Jamblichus* we may clearly collect, that *Porphyrius* in his epistle to *Anebo* the Egyptian priest (of which epistle there are only some small fragments left [1]) did also make mention of these Hermaick writings; and whereas he found the writings of *Chæremon* to be contradictious to them, therefore desired to be resolved by that Egyptian priest, whether the doctrine of those Hermaick books were genuine and truly Egyptian, or no. Now, *Jamblichus* in his answer here affirmeth, that the doctrine of the ancient *Hermes*, or the Egyptian theology, was as to the substance truly represented in those books, (vulgarly imputed to *Hermes*) but not so by *Chæremon*. Lastly, St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria* informs us, that there was an edition of these Hermaick or Trismegistick books (compiled together) formerly made at *Athens*, under this title, Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία, *fifteen Hermaick books*. Which Hermaicks, *Casaubon* [2], conceiving them to have been published before *Jamblichus* his time, took them for those *Salaminiaca*, which he found in the Latin translations of *Jamblichus*, made by *Ficinus* and *Scutellius*; whereas, indeed, he was here abused by those translators, there being no such thing to be found in the Greek copy. But the word ἁλμενιακὰ, (not understood by

Contra Julian, lib. 1. [P. 31. Edit. Spanhem.]

[1] These fragments are prefixed to Dr. *Gale*'s Edition of *Jamblichus de Myst. Ægyptior.*

[2] Exercit. I. in Baronii Annal. p. 55.

by them) being turned into *Salaminiaca*, *Caſaubon* therefore conjectured them to have been thoſe Hermaick books publiſhed at *Athens*, becauſe *Salamin* was not far diſtant from thence. Now, it cannot be doubted, but that this edition of Hermaick books at *Athens* was made by ſome philoſopher or Pagans, and not by Chriſtians; this appearing alſo from the words of St. *Cyril* himſelf, where, having ſpoken of *Moſes* and the agreement of *Hermes* with him, he adds, πεποίηται δὲ καὶ τούτου μνήμην, ἐν ἰδίαις συγγραφαῖς, ὁ συντεθεικὼς Ἀθήνησι, τὰ ἐπίκλην Ἑρμαϊκὰ πεντεκαίδεκα βιβλία· *Of which* Moſes *he alſo, who compiled and publiſhed the fifteen Hermaick books at* Athens, *makes mention in his own diſcourſe*, (annexed thereunto.) For thus we conceive that place is to be underſtood, that the Pagan publiſher of the Hermaick books himſelf took notice of ſome agreement, that was betwixt *Moſes* and *Hermes*. But here it is to be noted, that becauſe *Hermes* and the Hermaick books were in ſuch great credit, not only among the Chriſtians, but alſo the Greek and Latin Pagans, therefore were there ſome counterfeit writings obtruded alſo under that ſpecious title; ſuch as that ancient botanick book mentioned by *Galen*, and thoſe Chriſtian forgeries of later times, the *Pœmander* and *Sermon on the Mount*; which being not cited by any ancient father or writer, were both of them doubtleſs later than *Jamblichus*, who diſcovers no ſuſpicion of any Chriſtian forgeries in this kind.

But *Caſaubon*, who contends, that all the theologick books imputed to *Hermes Triſmegiſt* were counterfeited by Chriſtians, affirms all the philoſophy, doctrine and learning of them (excepting what only is Chriſtian in them) to be merely Platonical and Grecanical, but not at all Egyptian; thence concluding, that theſe books were forged by ſuch Chriſtians, as were ſkilled in the Platonick or Grecanick learning. But firſt, it is here conſiderable, that ſince Pythagoriſm, Platoniſm and the Greek learning in general was in great part derived from the Egyptians, it cannot be concluded, that whatſoever is Platonical or Grecanical, therefore was not Egyptian. The only inſtance, that *Caſaubon* inſiſts upon, is this dogma in the Triſmegiſtick books, *That nothing in the world periſheth, and that death is not the deſtruction, but change and tranſlation of things only:* which, becauſe he finds amongſt ſome of the Greek philoſophers, he reſolves to be peculiar to them only, and not common with the Egyptians. But ſince the chief deſign and tendency of that dogma was plainly to maintain the immortality, pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration of ſouls, which doctrine was unqueſtionably derived from the Egyptians; there is little reaſon to doubt but that this dogma was itſelf Egyptian alſo. And *Pythagoras*, who was the chief propagator of this doctrine amongſt the Greeks, οὐδὲν οὐδὲ γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, *that no real entity* (in generations and corruptions) *was made or deſtroyed*, according to thoſe Ovidian verſes before cited,

> *Nec perit in toto quicquam, mihi credite, mundo,*
> *Sed variat faciemque novat. Naſcique vocatur*
> *Incipere eſſe aliud*, &c.

did in all probability derive it, together with its ſuperſtructure, (the Pre-

pre-exiſtence and tranſmigration of ſouls,) at once from the Egyptians. But it is obſervable, that the Egyptians had alſo a peculiar ground of their own for this *Dogma* (which we do not find inſiſted upon by the Greek philoſophers) and it is thus expreſſed in the eighth of *Ficinus* his Hermetick books or chapters; εἰ δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, καὶ ζῶον ἀθάνατον, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ ἀθανάτῳ ζῶῳ μέρος τι ἀποθανεῖν· πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ μέρη ἐστὶ τοῦ κόσμου, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον· *If the world be a ſecond god and an immortal animal, then is it impoſſible, that any part of this immortal animal ſhould periſh or come to nothing; but all things in the world are parts of this great mundane animal, and chiefly man, who is a rational animal.* Which ſame notion we find alſo inſiſted on in the Aſclepian dialogue; *Secundum deum hunc crede, ô* Aſclepi, *omnia gubernantem, omniaque mundana illuſtrantem animalia. Si enim animal, mundus, vivens, ſemper & fuit & eſt & erit, nihil in mundo mortale eſt: viventis enim uniuſcujuſque partis, quæ in ipſo mundo, ſicut in uno eodemque animale ſemper vivente, nullus eſt mortalitatis locus.* Where though the Latin be a little imperfect, yet the ſenſe is this; *You are to believe the world, ô* Aſclepius, *to be a ſecond god governing all things, and illuſtrating all mundane animals. Now if the world be a living animal, and immortal; then there is nothing mortal in it, there being no place for mortality as to any living part or member of that mundane animal, that always liveth.* Notwithſtanding which, we deny not, but that though *Pythagoras* firſt derived this notion from the Egyptians, yet he and his followers might probably improve the ſame farther (as *Plato* tells us, that the Greeks generally did what they received from the Barbarians) namely to the taking away the qualities and forms of bodies, and reſolving all corporeal things into magnitude, figure and motion. But that there is indeed ſome of the old Egyptian learning, contained in theſe Triſmegiſtick books now extant, ſhall be clearly proved afterwards, when we come to ſpeak of that grand myſtery of the Egyptian theology (derived by *Orpheus* from them) *that God is all.* To conclude, *Jamblichus* his judgment in this caſe ought without controverſy to be far preferred before *Caſaubon*'s, both by reaſon of his great antiquity, and his being much better skilled, not only in the Greek, but alſo the Egyptian learning; that the books imputed to *Hermes Triſmegiſt* did Ἑρμαϊκὰς περέχειν δόξας, *really contain the Hermaick opinions*, though they ſpake ſometimes the language of the Greek philoſophers.

Wherefore, upon all theſe conſiderations, we conceive it reaſonable to conclude, that though there have been ſome Hermaick books counterfeited by Chriſtians, ſince *Jamblichus* his time, as namely the *Pœmander* and *the ſermon in the mount concerning regeneration*, neither of which are found cited by any ancient father; yet there were other Hermaick books, which though not written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, nor all of them in the Egyptian language, but ſome of them in Greek, were truly Egyptian, and did, for the ſubſtance of them, contain the Hermaick doctrine. Such probably were thoſe mentioned by the ancient fathers, but ſince loſt, as the τὰ Γενικὰ, which ſeems to have been a diſcourſe concerning the Coſmogonia, and the τὰ διεξοδικὰ, and the like. And ſuch alſo may ſome of theſe Hermaick

books be, that are ſtill extant; as to inſtance particularly, the Aſclepian dialogue, entitled in the Greek ὁ τέλειος λόγος, *the perfect oration*, and in all probability tranſlated into Latin by *Apuleius*. For it can hardly be imagined, that he who was ſo devout a Pagan, ſo learned a philoſopher, and ſo witty a man, ſhould be ſo far impoſed upon by a counterfeit Triſmegiſtick book, and mere Chriſtian cheat, as to beſtow tranſlating upon it, and recommend it to the world, as that which was genuinely Pagan. But however, whether *Apuleius* were the tranſlator of this Aſclepian dialogue or no, it is evident, that the ſpirit of it is not at all Chriſtian, but rankly Pagan; one inſtance whereof we have, in its glorying of a power, that men have of making gods, upon which account St. *Auſtin* [1] thought fit to concern himſelf in the confutation of it. Moreover, it being extant and vulgarly known before *Jamblichus* his time, it muſt needs be included in his τὰ φερόμενα ὡς Ἑρμοῦ, and conſequently receive this atteſtation from him, that it did contain not merely the Greekiſh, but the Hermaical and Egyptian doctrine.

Pag. 607. *Col.* There are indeed ſome objections made againſt this, as firſt from what we read in this dialogue, concerning the purgation of the world partly by water, and partly by fire; *Tunc ille Dominus & pater Deus, primipotens, & unus gubernator mundi, intuens in mores factaque hominum, voluntate ſua (quæ eſt dei benignitas) vitiis reſiſtens, & corruptelæ errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel al'uvione diluens, vel igne conſumens, ad antiquam faciem mundum revocabit. When the world becomes thus degenerate, then that Lord and Father, the ſupreme God, and the only governor of the world, beholding the manners and deeds of men, by his will (which is his benignity) always reſiſting vice, and reſtoring things from their degeneracy, will either waſh away the malignity of the world by water, or elſe conſume it by fire, and reſtore it to its ancient form again:* But ſince we find in *Julius Firmicus* [2], that there was a tradition amongſt the Egyptians, concerning the Apocataſtaſis of the world, *partim per* κατακλυζμὸν, *partim per* ἐκπύρωζιν, *partly by inundation and partly by conflagration*, this objection can ſignify nothing. Wherefore there is another objection, that hath ſome more plauſibility, from that prophecy, which we find in this *Aſclepius*, concerning the overthrow of the Egyptian paganiſm (uſhered in with much lamentation) in theſe words; *Tunc terra iſta, ſanctiſſima ſedes delubrorum, ſepulchrorum erit mortuorumque pleniſſima; then this land of* Egypt, *formerly the moſt holy ſeat of the religious temples of the gods, ſhall be every where full of the ſepulchers of dead men.* The ſenſe whereo is thus expreſſed by St. *Auſtin*; *Hoc videtur dolere, quod memoriæ martyrum noſtrorum templis eorum delubriſque ſuccederent; ut viz. qui hæc legunt, animo à nobis averſo atque perverſo, putent à Paganis deos cultos fuiſſe in templis, à nobis autem coli mortuos in ſepulchris: He ſeems to lament this, that the memorials of our martyrs ſhould ſucceed in the place of their temples, that ſo they, who read this with a perverſe mind, might think, that by the Pagans the gods were worſhipped in temples, but by us* (Chriſtians) *dead men in ſepulchers.* Notwithſtanding which, this very thing ſeems to have had its accompliſhment too ſoon after, as may be gathered from

Civ. D. L. 8. *c.* 26. [p. 166. Tom. VII. Oper.]

[1] De Civitate Dei Lib. VIII. cap. XXIII. p. 162. Tom. VII. Oper.
[2] Matheſeos Lib. III. cap. I. p. 34.

from these passages of *Theodoret*, ἡ γὰρ αὐτῶν τῶν καλουμένων θεῶν τὴν μνήμην, ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐξήλειψαν (οἱ μάρτυρες) διανοίας· *Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men the memory of those, who were, formerly called gods.* And again, τοὺς γὰρ οἰκείους νεκροὺς ὁ δεσπότης, ἀντεισῆξε τοῖς ὑμετέροις θεοῖς, καὶ τοὺς μὲν φράδας ἀπέφηνε τούτοις δὲ τὸ ἐκείνων ἀπένειμε γέρας, &c. *Our Lord hath now brought his dead* (that is, his martyrs) *into the room and place* (that is, the temples) *of the gods; whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now instead of the festivals of* Jupiter *and* Bacchus, *are celebrated those of* Peter *and* Paul, Thomas *and* Sergius, *and other holy martyrs.* Wherefore this being so shrewd and plain a description in the Asclepian dialogue of what really happened in the Christian world, it may seem suspicious, that it was rather a history, written after the event, than a prophecy before it, as it pretends to be: it very much resembling that complaint of *Eunapius Sardianus* in the life of *Ædesius* [1], when the Christians had demolished the temple of *Serapis* in *Egypt*, seizing upon its riches and treasure, that instead of the gods, the monks then gave divine honour to certain vile and flagitious persons deceased, called by the name of martyrs. Now if this be granted, this book must needs be counterfeit and supposititious. Nevertheless, St. *Austin* entertained no such suspicion concerning this Asclepian passage, as if it had been a history written after the fact, that is, after the sepulchers and memorials of the martyrs came to be so frequented; he supposing this book to be unquestionably of greater antiquity. Wherefore he concludes it to be a prophecy or prediction made *instinctu fallacis spiritûs, by the instinct or suggestion of some evil spirit*; they sadly then presaging the ruin of their own empire. Neither was this Asclepian dialogue only ancienter than St. *Austin*, but it is cited by *Lactantius Firmianus* [2] also under the name of ὁ τέλειος λόγος, *the perfect oration*, as was said before, and that as a thing then reputed of great antiquity. Wherefore, in all probability, this Asclepian passage was written before that described event had its accomplishment. And indeed if *Antoninus* the philosopher (as the forementioned *Eunapius* [3] writes) did predict the very same thing, that after his decease, that magnificent temple of *Serapis* in *Ægypt*, together with the rest, should be demolished, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάφους γενήσεσθαι, *and the temples of the gods turned into sepulchers*; why might not this Egyptian or Trismegistick writer receive the like inspiration or tradition? or at least make the same conjecture?

De Cur. G. A. L. 8. [p. 544. Tom. II. Oper.]

But there is yet another objection made against the sincerity of this Asclepian dialogue, from *Lactantius* his citing a passage out of it for the second person in the Trinity, the Son of God; Hermes *in eo libro* (saith *Lactantius*) *qui* ὁ τέλειος λόγος *inscribitur, his usus est verbis,* ὁ κύριος καὶ ὁ πάντων ποιητὴς, ὃν θεὸν καλεῖν νενομίκαμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε θεὸν, ὁρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν (αἰσθητὸν δέ φημι ὰ διὰ τὸ αἰσθέσθαι αὐτὸν, περὶ γὰρ τούτου ἂν εἴη πότερον αὐτὸς αἰσθοιτο, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰς αἴσθησιν ὑποπέμπει καὶ εἰς νοῦν) ἐπεὶ τοῦτον ἐποίησε, πρῶτον, καὶ μόνον, καὶ ἕνα, καλὸς ἦ ἐφάνη αὐτῷ, καὶ πλήρης ἦν πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίλησεν

Lib. 4. cap. 6. [Divin. Instit. p. 419.]

[1] In Vitis Sophistarum p. 84, 85. Edit. Plantin.

[2] Divinar. Institt. Lib. IV. cap. VI. p. 418.

[3] Ubi supra, p. 76.

ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον· Which we find in *Apuleius* his Latin tranſlation thus rendered; *Dominus & omnium conformator, quem rectè Deum dicimus, à ſe ſecundum deum fecit, qui videri & ſentiri poſſit; quem ſecundum* [*deum*] *ſenſibilem ita dixerim, non ideo quod ipſe ſentiat* (*de hoc enim an ipſe ſentiat annon alio dicemus tempore*) *ſed eo quod videntium ſenſus incurrit:*) *quoniam ergo hunc fecit ex ſe primum, & à ſe ſecundum, viſuſque eſt ei pulcher, utpote qui eſt omnium bonitate pleniſſimus, amavit eum ut divinitatis ſuæ prolem,* (for ſo it ought to be read, and not *patrem*, it being τόκον in the Greek.) *The lord and maker of all, whom we rightly call God, when he had made a ſecond god, viſible and ſenſible* (*I ſay, ſenſible, not actively, becauſe himſelf hath ſenſe, for concerning this, whether he have ſenſe or no, we ſhall ſpeak elſewhere, but paſſively, becauſe he incurs into our ſenſes*) *this being his firſt and only production, ſeemed both beautiful to him, and moſt full of all good, and therefore he loved him dearly as his own offspring.* Which *Lactantius*, and after him St. *Auſtin*[1], underſtanding of the perfect Word of God or eternal Λόγος, made uſe of it as a teſtimony againſt the Pagans for the confirmation of Chriſtianity; they taking it for granted, that this Hermaick book was genuinely Egyptian, and did repreſent the doctrine of the ancient *Hermes Triſmegiſt*. But *Dionyſius Petavius*[2] and other later writers, underſtanding this place in the ſame ſenſe with *Lactantius* and St. *Auſtin*, have made a quite different uſe of it, namely, to infer from thence, that this book was ſpurious and counterfeited by ſome Chriſtian. To which we reply, firſt, that if this Hermaick writer had acknowledged an eternal λόγος or *Word of God*, and called it *a ſecond God* and *the Son of God*, he had done no more in this, than *Philo* the Jew did, who ſpeaking of this ſame λόγος, expreſly calls it δεύτερον θεὸν and πρωτόγονον υἱὸν θεοῦ, *the ſecond God* and *the firſt-begotten Son of God*. Notwithſtanding which, thoſe writings of *Philo*'s are not at all ſuſpected. And *Origen* affirms, that ſome of the ancient philoſophers did the like; *Multi philoſophorum veterum, unum eſſe deum, qui cuncta crearit, dixerunt; atque in hoc conſentiunt legi. Aliquanti autem hoc adjiciunt, quod Deus cuncta per verbum ſuum fecerit & regat, & verbum Dei ſit, quo cuncta moderentur; in hoc non ſolùm legi, ſed & evangelio quoque conſona ſcribunt. Many of the old philoſophers* (that is, all beſides a few atheiſtick ones) *have ſaid, that there is one God who created all things, and theſe agree with the law: but ſome add further, that God made all things by his Word, and that it is the Word of God, by which all things are governed; and theſe write conſonantly not only to the law, but alſo to the goſpel.* But whether *Philo*[3] derived this doctrine from the Greek philoſophers, or from Egyptians and *Hermes Triſmegiſt*, he being an Alexandrian, may well be a queſtion. For St. *Cyril* doth indeed cite ſeveral paſſages out of Hermaick writings then extant, to this very purpoſe. We ſhall only ſet down one of them here; ὁ κοσμος ἔχει ἀρχοντα ἐπικείμενον δημιουργὸν λόγον τῶ πάντων δεσπότῃ, ὃς μετ' ἐκεῖνον πρώτη δύναμις, ἀγένητος, ἀπέραντος, ἐξ ἐκείνῳ προκύψασα, καὶ ἐπίκειται, καὶ ἄρχει τῶν

Colv. p. 588.

In Gen. Hom. 14.

Cyr. Jul. lib. I. *p.* 33.

[1] Vide Librum contra quinque Hæreſes cap. III. p. 3. Tom. VIII. Oper. Append.

[2] Dogmat. Theol. Tom. II. Lib. II. de Trinit. cap. II. §. V. p. 20.

[3] Vide Joan. Clerici Comment. in XVIII. priora Commata Evangel. Joannis in Hammondi Nov. Teſt. Tom. I. p. 396. & Epiſt. Critic. VIII. p. 223.

τῶν δὶ αὐτῦ δημιυργηθέντων· ἔστι δὲ τῦ παντελείυ πρόγονος καὶ τέλειος καὶ γόιιμος υἱός. *The world hath a governour set over it, that Word of the Lord of all, which was the maker of it; this is the first power after himself, uncreated, infinite, looking out from him, and ruling over all things that were made by him; this is the perfect and genuine son of the first omniperfect Being.* Nevertheless the Author of the τέλειος λόγος, or *Asclepian Dialogue*, in that forecited passage of his, by his second God, the son of the first, meant no such thing at all as the Christian Logos, or second person of the Trinity, but only the visible world. Which is so plain from the words themselves, that it is a wonder how *Lactantius* and St. *Austin* could interpret them otherwise, he making therein a question, whether this second God were [actively] sensible or no. But the same is farther manifested from other places of that dialogue, as this for example, *Æternitatis Dominus Deus primus est, secundus est mundus*; *The Lord of eternity is the first God, but the second God is the world.* And again, *Summus qui dicitur Deus rector gubernatorque sensibilis Dei, ejus qui in se complectitur omnem locum, omnemque rerum substantiam*; *The supreme God is the governour of that sensible god, which contains in it all place and all the substance of things.* And that this was indeed a part of the Hermaick or Egyptian theology, that the visible world animated was a second God, and the son of the first God, appears also from those Hermaick books published by *Ficinus*, and vulgarly called *Pœmander*, though that be only the first of them. There hath been one passage already cited out of the eighth book, δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος, *the world is a second God.* After which followeth more to the same purpose; πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ὄντως, ἀΐδιος καὶ ἀγένητος, καὶ δημιυργὸς τῶν ὅλων θεός. δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτῦ ὑπ' αὐτῦ γενόμενος καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ τρεφόμενος καὶ ἀθανατιζόμενος ὡς ὑπ' ἰδίυ πατρός· *The first God is that eternal unmade maker of all things; the second is he that is made according to the image of the first, which is contained, cherished or nourished and immortalized by him, as by his own parent, by whom it is made an immortal animal.* So again in the ninth book, πατὴρ ὁ θεὸς τῦ κόσμυ, καὶ ὁ μὲν κόσμος υἱὸς τῦ θεῦ, *God is the father of the world, and the world is the son of God.* And in the twelfth, ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος ἕτος ὁ μέγας θεὸς καὶ τῦ μείζονος εἰκών, *this whole world is a great God and the image of a greater.*

As for the other Hermetick or Trismegistick books, published partly by *Ficinus* and partly by *Patricius*, we cannot confidently condemn any of them for Christian cheats or impostures, save only the *Pœmander*, and *the Sermon in the mount concerning regeneration*, the first and thirteenth of *Ficinus* his chapters or books. Neither of which books are cited by any of the ancient fathers, and therefore may be presumed not to have been extant in *Jamblichus* his time, but more lately forged; and that probably by one and the self-same hand, since the writer of the latter (*the sermon in the mount*) makes mention of the former (that is, the *Pœmander*) in the close of it. For that, which *Casaubon* objects against the fourth of *Ficinus* his books or chapters (entitled the *Crater*,) seems not very considerable, itbeing questionable, whether by the *Crater* any such thing were there meant, as the Christian *Baptisterion*. Wherefore, as for all the rest of those Hermaick books, especially such of them

them as being cited by ancient fathers, may be preſumed to have been extant before *Jamblichus* his time; we know no reaſon why we ſhould not concur with that learned philoſopher in his judgment concerning them, that though they often ſpeak the language of philoſophers, and were not written by *Hermes Triſmegiſt* himſelf, yet they do really contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς, *Hermaical opinions*, or the *Egyptian doctrine.* The ninth of *Ficinus* his books mentions the Aſclepian dialogue, under the *Greek* title of ὁ τέλειος λόγος, pretending to have been written by the ſame hand; χθὲς ὦ Ἀσκλήπιε, τὸν τέλειον ἀποδέδωκα Λόγον, νῦν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι ἀκόλουθον, ἐκείνῳ, καὶ τὸν περὶ αἰσθήσεως λόγον διεξελθεῖν. The meaning of which place (not underſtood by the tranſlator) is this; *I lately publiſhed* (*O* Aſclepius) *the book entitled* ὁ Τέλειος λόγος (or the perfect oration) *and now I judge it neceſſary, in purſuit of the ſame, to diſcourſe concerning ſenſe.* Which book, as well as the perfect oration, is cited by *Lactantius* [1]. As is alſo the tenth of *Ficinus*, called the *Clavis*, which does not only pretend to be of kin to the ninth, and conſequently to the *Aſclepius* likewiſe, but alſo to contain in it an epitome of that Hermaick book called τὰ γενικὰ, mentioned in *Euſebius* his *Chronicon* [2], τὸν χθὲς λόγον, ὦ Ἀσκλήπιέ, σοι ἀνέθηκα, τὸν δὲ σήμερον δίκαιόν ἐστι τῷ Τατ. ἀναθεῖναι ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν Γενικῶν Λόγων, τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν λελαλημένων ἔστιν ἐπιτομή. *My former diſcourſe was dedicated to thee, O* Aſclepius, *but this to* Tatius, *it being an epitome of thoſe* Genica *that were delivered to him.* Which Γενικὰ are thus again afterwards mentioned in the ſame book, οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γενικοῖς, ὅτι ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντὸς πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσιν; *Have you not heard in the* Genica, *that all ſouls are derived from one ſoul of the univerſe?* Neither of which two places were underſtood by *Ficinus.* But doubtleſs this latter Hermaick book had ſomething foiſted into it, becauſe there is a manifeſt contradiction found therein; foraſmuch as that tranſmigration of human ſouls into brutes, which in the former part thereof is aſſerted after the Egyptian way, ὡς καταδίκη ψυχῆς κακῆς, *as the juſt puniſhment of the wicked*, is afterwards cried down and condemned in it, as the greateſt error. And the eleventh and twelfth following books ſeem to us to be as Egyptian as any of the reſt; as alſo does that long book entitled, κόρη κόσμου, the thirteenth in *Patricius.* Nay, it is obſervable, that even thoſe very books themſelves, that are ſo juſtly ſuſpected and condemned for Chriſtian forgeries, have ſomething of the Hermaical or Egyptian philoſophy, here and there interſperſed in them. As for example, when in the *Pœmander* God is twice call ἀῤῥενόθηλυς, *male and female together*, this ſeems to have been Egyptian (and derived from thence by *Orpheus*) according to that elegant paſſage in the Aſclepian dialogue concerning God; *Hic ergo, qui ſolus eſt omnia, utriuſque ſexûs fœcunditate pleniſſimus, ſemper voluntatis ſuæ pregnans, parit ſemper quicquid voluerit procreare: He therefore, who alone is all things, and moſt full of the fecundity of both ſexes, being always pregnant of his own will, always produceth whatſoever he pleaſeth.* Again, when death is thus deſcribed in it, παραδιδόναι τὸ σῶμα εἰς ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὃ εἶχες, εἰς ἀφανὲς γίνεσθαι, *to be nothing elſe but the change of the body, and the form or life's paſſing into the inviſible:* this agreeth with that in the eleventh book or chapter, τὴν μεταβολὴν θάνατον εἶναι, διὰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλύεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν: *That death is nothing but a change, it being*

[1] Vide Divin. Inſtit. Lib. II. cap. XV. p. 254. [2] Vide Scalig. ad Græca Euſebii, p. 409.

being only the diſſolution of the body, and the life or ſoul's paſſing into the inviſible or inconſpicuous. In which book it is alſo affirmed of the world, γίνεσθαι μέρος αὐτοῦ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ, *that every day ſome part or other of it goes into the inviſible, or into Hades*; that is, does not utterly periſh, but only diſappears to our ſight, it being either tranſlated into ſome other place, or changed into another form. And accordingly it is ſaid of animals, in the twelfth book, διαλύεται, οὐχ ἵνα ἀπόληται, ἀλλ' ἵνα νέα γένηται, *that they are diſſolved by death, not that they might be deſtroyed, but made again anew.* As it is alſo there affirmed of the world, that it doth πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν, *make all things out of itſelf, and again unmake them into itſelf*; καὶ διαλύων πάντα ἀνανεοῖ, *and that diſſolving all things it doth perpetually renew them.* For that nothing in the whole world utterly periſheth, as it is often declared elſewhere in theſe Triſmegiſtick writings, ſo particularly in this twelfth book of *Ficinus*, σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος, τὰ δὲ μέρη αὐτοῦ πάντα μεταβλητά, οὐδὲν δὲ φθαρτὸν ἢ ἀπολλύμενον· *The whole world is unchangeable, only the parts of it being alterable; and this ſo, as that none of theſe neither utterly periſheth, or is abſolutely deſtroyed*; πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολέσαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ; *For how can any part of that be corrupted, which is incorruptible, or any thing of God periſh or go to nothing?* all which, by *Caſaubon*'s leave, we take to have been originally Egyptian doctrine, and thence in part afterwards tranſplanted into Greece. Moreover, when in the *Pœmander*, God is ſtyled more than once, φῶς καὶ ζωή, *light and life*, this ſeems to have been Egyptian alſo, becauſe it was Orphical. In like manner the appendix to the ſermon in the mount, called ὑμνωδία κρυπτή, or the *occult cantion*, hath ſome ſtrains of the Egyptian theology in it, which will be afterwards mentioned.

The reſult of our preſent diſcourſe is this, that though ſome of the Triſmegiſtick books were either wholly counterfeited, or elſe had certain ſuppoſititious paſſages inſerted into them by ſome Chriſtian hand, yet there being others of them originally Egyptian, or which, as to the ſubſtance of them, do contain Hermaical or Egyptian doctrines (in all which one ſupreme Deity is every where aſſerted) we may well conclude from hence, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongſt them of one ſupreme Deity. And herein ſeveral of the ancient fathers have gone before us; as firſt of all *Juſtin Martyr* [1], Ἄμμων πάνκρυφον τὸν θεὸν ὀνομάζει, Ἑρμῆς δὲ σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς λέγει, θεὸν νοῆσαι μέν ἐστι χαλεπὸν φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον· Ammon *in his books calleth God moſt hidden, and* Hermes *plainly declareth, that it is hard to conceive God, but impoſſible to expreſs him.* Neither doth it follow that this latter paſſage is counterfeit, as *Caſaubon* concludes, becauſe there is ſomething like it in *Plato*'s *Timæus*, there being doubtleſs a very great agreement betwixt Platoniſm and the ancient Egyptian doctrine. Thus again St. *Cyprian*; Hermes *quoque* Triſmegiſtus *unum Deum loquitur, eumque ineffabilem & inæſtimabilem confitetur*; Hermes Triſmegiſt *alſo acknowledgeth one God, confeſſing him to be ineffable and ineſtimable*; which paſſage is alſo cited by St. *Auſtin* [2]. *Lactantius* likewiſe; Thoth *antiquiſſimus & inſtructiſſimus omni genere*

De Idol. van. [p. 226. Oper.]

Lib. I. *pag.* 30. [Divin. Inſtit. cap. VI. p. 42.]

[1] Col. or at. ad Græcos, p. 37. Oper.

[2] De Baptiſmo contra Donatiſtas, Lib. VI. §. LXXXVII. p. 126. Tom. IX. Oper.

nere Doctrinæ, adeò ei in multarum rerum & artium scientia Trismegisti *cognomen imponeret; hic scripsit libros & quidem multos, ad cognitionem divinarum rerum pertinentes, in quibus majestatem summi & singularis Dei asserit, iisdemque nominibus appellat, quibus nos, Deum & patrem. Ac nè quis nomen ejus requireret;* ἀνωνυμον *esse dixit.* Thoth (that is *Hermes*) *the most ancient and most instructed in all kind of learning (for which he was called* Trismegist) *wrote books, and those many, belonging to the knowledge of divine things, wherein he asserts the majesty of one supreme Deity, calling him by the same names that we do, God and Father; but (lest any one should require a proper name of him) affirming him to be anonymous.* Lastly, St. *Cyril*[1] hath much more to the same purpose also: and we must confess, that we have the rather here insisted so much upon these Hermaick or Trismegistick writings, that in this particular we might vindicate these ancient fathers, from the imputation either of fraud and imposture, or of simplicity and folly.

But that the Egyptians acknowledged, besides their many gods, one supreme and all-comprehending Deity, needs not to be proved from these Trismegistick writings (concerning which we leave others to judge as they find cause) it otherwise appearing, not only because *Orpheus* (who was an undoubted asserter of monarchy, or one first principle of all things) is generally affirmed to have derived his doctrine from the Egyptians; but also from plain and express testimonies. For besides *Apollonius Tyanæus* his af-
Pag. 269. firmation concerning both Indians and Egyptians, before cited, *Plutarch* throughout his whole book *de Iside & Osiride*, supposes the Egyptians thus to have asserted one supreme Deity, they commonly calling him τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν, *the first God.* Thus in the beginning of that book he tells us, that the end of all the religious rites and mysteries of that Egyptian goddess *Isis*, was, ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ κυρίου, καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις, ὃν ἡ θεὸς παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα· *The knowledge of that first God, who is the Lord of all things, and only intelligible by the mind, whom this goddess exhorteth men to seek, in her communion.* After which he declareth, that this first God of the Egyptians was accounted by them an obscure and hidden Deity, and accordingly he gives the reason, why they made the crocodile to be a symbol
Pag. 381. of him; μόνου δέ φασιν ἐν ὑγρῷ διαιτουμένου, τὰς ὄψεις ὑμένα λεῖον καὶ διαφανῆ παρακαλύπτειν, ἐκ τοῦ μετώπου κατερχόμενον, ὥστε βλέπειν μὴ βλεπόμενον. ὅ τῷ πρώτῳ θεῷ συμβέβηκεν· *Because they say the crocodile is the only animal, which living in the water, hath his eyes covered by a thin transparent membrane, falling down over them, by reason whereof it sees and is not seen; which is a thing, that belongs to the first God, to see all things, himself being not seen.* Though *Plutarch* in that place gives also another reason why the Egyptians made the crocodile a symbol of the Deity; οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ κροκόδειλος αἰτίας πιθάνης ἀμοιροῦσαν ἔσχηκε τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ μίμημα θεοῦ λέγεται γεγονέναι μόνος μὲν ἄγλωσσος ὤν, φωνῆς γὰρ ὁ θεῖος λόγος ἀπροσδεής ἐστι, καὶ δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου καὶ δίκης τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην· *Neither were the Egyptians without a plausible reason for worshipping God symbolically in the crocodile, that being said to be an imitation of God, in that it is the only animal without a tongue. For the divine* λόγος, *or reason, standing not*

[1] Contra Julianum, Lib. 1. p. 31.

not in need of speech, and going on through a silent path of justice in the world, does without noise righteously govern and dispense all human affairs. In like manner *Horus Apollo* in his Hieroglyphicks [1] tells us, that the Egyptians acknowledging a παντοκράτωρ and κοσμοκράτωρ, *an omnipotent being that was the governour of the whole world,* did symbolically represent him by a serpent, ἐν μέσῳ αὑτῆ οἶκον μέγαν δεικνύοντες, ὁ γὰρ βασίλειος οἶκος αὐτῆ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, *they picturing also a great house or palace within its circumference, because the world is the royal palace of the deity.* Which writer also gives us another reason, why the serpent was made to be the hieroglyphick of the Deity; τὸ ὡς τροφῇ χρῆσθαι τῷ ἑαυτῆ σώματι, σημαίνει, τὸ πάντα ὅσα ἐκ τῆς θείας προνοίας ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γεννᾶται, ταῦτα πάλιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν εἰς αὐτὸν λαμβάνειν. *Because the serpent feeding as it were upon its own body, doth aptly signify, that all things generated in the world by divine providence are again resolved into him.* And *Philo Byblius* [2], from *Sanchoniathon,* gives the same reason why the serpent was deified by *Taut* or the Egyptian *Hermes,* ὅτι ἀθάνατον καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλύεται, *because it is immortal, and resolved into itself.* Though sometimes the Egyptians added to the serpent also a hawk, thus complicating the hieroglyphick of the Deity; according to that of a famous Egyptian priest in *Eusebius* [3], τὸ πρῶτον ὂν θειότατον, ὅφις ἐστὶ ἱέρακος ἔχων μόρφην, *that the first and divinest being of all is symbolically represented by a serpent having the head of an hawk.* And that a hawk was also sometimes used alone for a hieroglyphick of the Deity, appeareth from that of *Plutarch* [4], that in the porch of an Egyptian temple at *Sais,* were ingraven these three hieroglyphicks, a young man, an old man, and an hawk; to make up this sentence, *that both the beginning and end of human life dependeth upon God, or Providence.* But we have two more remarkable passages in the forementioned *Horus Apollo* [5], concerning the Egyptian theology, which must not be pretermitted; the first this, παρ' αὐτοῖς τῆ παντὸς κόσμῳ τὸ διῆκον ἐστὶ πνεῦμα, *that according to them, there is a spirit passing through the whole world, to wit, God.* And again, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστᾶναι, *it seemeth to the Egyptians, that nothing at all consists without God.* In the next place, *Jamblichus* was a person, who had made it his business to inform himself thoroughly concerning the theology of the Egyptians, and who undertakes to give an account thereof, in his answer to *Porphyrius* his epistle to *Anebo* an Egyptian priest; whose testimony therefore may well seem to deserve credit. And he first gives us a summary account of their theology after this manner [6]; χωριστὸς, ἐξηρημένος, μετέωρος, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑπερηπλωμένος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ δυνάμεων τε καὶ στοιχείων, ὁ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ φύσεως ὅλης, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς στοιχείοις δυνάμεων πασῶν, αἴτιος θεός· ἅτε δὴ ὑπερέχων τούτων, ἄϋλος, καὶ ἀσώματος, καὶ ὑπερφυὴς, ἀγένητός τε καὶ ἀμέριστος, ὅλος ἐξ ἑαυτῆ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀναφανεὶς, προηγεῖται πάντων τούτων, καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ ὅλα περιέχει, καὶ διότι μὲν συνείληφε πάντα, καὶ μεταδίδωσιν· *That God, who is the cause of generation and the whole nature, and of all the powers in the elements themselves, is separate, exempt, elevated above, and expanded*

[1] Lib I. cap LXI. p. 75.
[2] Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evangel. Lib. I. cap X. p. 41.
[3] Præpar. Evan. Lib. I. cap. X. p. 41.
[4] De Iside & Osiride, p. 363.
[5] Lib. I. cap. LXIV. p. 77. & Lib. I. cap. XIII. p. 27.
[6] Jamblich. de Myster. Ægyptior. Sect. VII. cap. II p. 151.

Lib. I. *c.* 2. [p. 5.]

panded over, all the powers and elements in the world. For being above the world, and tranſcending the ſame, immaterial, and incorporeal, ſupernatural, unmade, indiviſible, manifeſted wholly from himſelf, and in himſelf, he ruleth over all things and in himſelf containeth all things. And becauſe he virtually comprehends all things, therefore does he impart and diſplay the ſame from himſelf. According to which excellent deſcription of the Deity, it is plain, that the Egyptians aſſerting one God that comprehends all things, could not poſſibly ſuppoſe a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent Deities. In which place alſo the ſame *Jamblichus* [1] tells us, that as the Egyptian hieroglyphick for material and corporeal things was mud or floating water, ſo they pictur'd God, *in loto arbore ſedentem ſuper lutum; ſitting upon the lote-tree above the watery mud. Quod innuit Dei eminentiam altiſſimam, qua fit ut nullo modo attingat lutum ipſum. Demonſtratque Dei imperium intellectuale, quia loti arboris omnia ſunt rotunda tam frondes quàm fructus, &c. Which ſignifies the tranſcendent eminency of the Deity above the matter, and its intellectual empire over the world; becauſe both the leaves and fruit of that tree are round, repreſenting the motion of intellect.* Again, he there adds alſo, that the Egyptians ſometimes pictured God ſit-

Seq. S. *c.* 1. ting at the helm of a ſhip. But afterward in the ſame book, he ſums up the queries, which *Porphyrius* had propounded to the Egyptian prieſt, to be reſolved concerning them, in this manner; βέλει σοι δηλωθῆναι, τί τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον ἡγοῦνται εἶναι Αἰγύπτιοι; πότερον νοῦν ἢ ὑπὲρ νοῦν; καὶ μόνου ἢ μετ' ἄλλων ἢ ἄλλων; καὶ πότερον ἀσώματον ἢ σωματικὸν, καὶ εἰ τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ; καὶ εἰ ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ ὕλην ἴσασιν ἢ σώματα ποιὰ πρῶτον; καὶ εἰ ἀγένητον ὕλην ἢ γενητήν; *You deſire to be reſolved, what the Egyptians think to be the firſt cauſe of all; whether intellect or ſomething above intellect? and that whether alone or with ſome other? whether incorporeal or corporeal? whether the firſt principle be the ſame with the demiurgus and architect of the world, or before him? whether all things proceed from one or many? whether they ſuppoſe matter, or qualified bodies, to be the firſt? and if they admit a firſt matter, whether they aſſert it to be unmade or made?* In anſwer to which Porphyrian queries, *Jamblichus* thus begins; καὶ πρῶτον μὲν, ὃ πρῶτον ἠρώτησας, περὶ τούτου ἄκουε· πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἔστι θεὸς εἷς· πρῶτος, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος· ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι· *I ſhall firſt reply to that you firſt demand, that, according to the Egyptians, before all entities and principles there is one God, who is in order of nature before (him that is commonly called) the firſt god and king; immoveable; and always remaining in the ſolitariety of his own unity, there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing elſe complicated with him, &c.* In which words *Jamblichus*, and thoſe others that follow after, though there be ſome obſcurity (and we may perhaps have occaſion further to conſider the meaning of them elſewhere) yet he plainly declares, that according to the Egyptians, the firſt original of all things was a perfect unity above intellect; but intimating withal, that beſides this firſt unity, they did admit of certain other divine hypoſtaſes (as a perfect intellect, and mundane ſoul) ſubordinate thereunto, and dependent on it, concerning which he thus writeth afterwards; [2] τὴν πρὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ζωτικὴν δύναμιν γινώσκουσι, καθαρόν τε νοῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον προτιθέασι· *The Egyptians*

[1] Ibid. p. 151. [2] Cap. IV. p. 160.

gyptians acknowledge, before the heaven, and in the heaven, a living power (or ſoul) and again they place a pure mind or intellect above the world. But that they did not acknowledge a plurality of coordinate and independent principles is further declared by him after this manner; [1] καὶ ἔτως ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν Αἰγυπτίοις πραγματεία, ἀφ' ἑνὸς ἄρχεται, καὶ προέισιν εἰς πλῆθος, τῶν πολλῶν αὖθις ἀφ' ἑνὸς διακυβερνωμένων, καὶ πανταχῆ τὲ ἀορίστε φύσεος ἐπικρατεμένης ὑπό τίνος ὡρισμένε μέτρε, καὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω ἑνιαίκς πάντων αἰτίας. *And thus the Egyptian philoſophy, from firſt to laſt, begins from unity; and thence deſcends to multitude; the many being always governed by the one; and the infinite or undeterminate nature every where maſtered and conquered by ſome finite and determined meaſure; and all ultimately, by that higheſt unity, that is the firſt cauſe of all things.* Moreover, in anſwer to the laſt Porphyrian queſtion concerning matter, whether the Egyptians thought it to be unmade and ſelf-exiſtent or made, *Jamblichus* thus replies, ὕλην δὲ παρήγαγεν ὁ θεὸς ἀπὸ ἀσιότητος ὑποχωθείσης ὑλότητος. *That according to* Hermes *and the Egyptians, matter was alſo made or produced by God; ab eſſentialitate ſucciſâ ac ſubſciſſâ materialitate,* as *Scutellius* turns it. Which paſſage of *Jamblichus*, *Proclus* upon the *Timæus* (where he aſſerts that God was ἄῤῥητος αἰτία τῆς ὕλης, *the uneffable cauſe of matter)* takes notice of in this manner; καὶ ἡ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων παράδοσις τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ αὐτῆς φησιν· ὁ γέ τοι θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος ἱστόρησεν, ὅτι καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐκ τῆς ἀσιότητος τὴν ὑλότητα παράγεσθαι βέλεται, καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰκὸς κἀκ τέτε τὸν Πλάτωνα τὴν τοιαύτην περὶ τῆς ὕλης δόξαν ἔχειν. *And the tradition of the Egyptians agreeth herewith, that matter was not unmade or ſelf-exiſtent, but produced by the Deity: for the divine* Jamblichus *has recorded, that* Hermes *would have materiality to have been produced from eſſentiality,* (that is, the paſſive principle of matter from that active principle of the Deity:) *and it is very probable from hence, that* Plato *was alſo of the ſame opinion concerning matter; viz.* becauſe he is ſuppoſed to have followed *Hermes* and the Egyptians. Which indeed is the more likely, if that be true, which the ſame *Proclus* affirmeth concerning *Orpheus*, ὥς τε καὶ Ὀρφεὺς κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης τῶν νοητῶν ὑποστάσεως παράγει τὴν ὕλην, *that* Orpheus *alſo did, after the ſame manner, deduce or derive matter from the firſt hypoſtaſis of intelligibles,* that is, from the ſupreme Deity. We ſhall conclude here in the laſt place with the teſtimony of *Damaſcius*, in his book of Principles [2], writing after this manner concerning the Egyptians, Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος ἀδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξηνέγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις· ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτὸς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνημένη, καὶ τῆτο τρὶς ἀναφωνήμενον ἔτως. Eudemus *hath given us no exact account of the Egyptians; but the Egyptian philoſophers, that have been in our times, have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in certain Egyptian writings, that there was, according to them, one principle of all things, praiſed under the name of the unknown darkneſs, and that thrice repeated:* which unknown darkneſs is a deſcription of that ſupreme Deity, that is incomprehenſible.

Pag. 117.

But that the Egyptians amongſt their many gods did acknowledge one ſupreme, may ſufficiently appear alſo, even from their vulgar religion and theology; in which they had firſt a peculiar and proper name for him as

 ſuch.

[1] Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 159.

[2] Vide Wolfii Anecdot. Græc. Tom. III. p. 260.

ſuch. For as the Greeks called the ſupreme God Ζεὺς, the Latins *Jupiter* or *Jovis*, ſo did the Egyptians call him *Hammon* or *Ammon*, according to *Herodotus* [1], whoſe teſtimony to this purpoſe hath been already cited, and confirmed by *Origen* [2], who was an Egyptian born. Thus alſo *Plutarch* in his book *de Iſide* [3], τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόντων, ἴδιον παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις ὄνομα τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι, τὸν Ἀμοῦν, ὃ παράγοντες ἡμεῖς Ἄμμωνα λέγομεν· *It is ſuppoſed by moſt, that the proper name of* Zeus *or* Jupiter (*that is, the ſupreme Deity*) *amongſt the Egyptians is* Amous, *which we Greeks pronounce* Hammon. To the ſame purpoſe *Heſychius*, Ἄμμᾶς ὁ Ζεύς, Ἀριστοτέλης, Ammous, *according to* Ariſtotle, *is the ſame with* Zeus. Whence it came to paſs, that by the Latin writers *Hammon* was vulgarly called *Jupiter Hammon*. Which *Hammon* was not only uſed as a proper name for the ſupreme Deity by the Egyptians, but alſo by the Arabians and all the Africans, according to that of *Lucan* [4],

Quamvis Æthiopum populis Arabumque beatis
Gentibus, atque Indis, unus ſit Jupiter Ammon.

Wherefore not only *Marmarica* (which is a part of *Africa*, wherein was that moſt famous temple of this *Ammon*) was from thence denominated *Ammonia*, but even all *Africa*, as *Stephanus* informs us, was ſometimes called *Ammonis* from this god *Ammon*, who hath been therefore ſtyled Ζεὺς Λίβυκος, *the Lybian* Jupiter [5].

Indeed it is very probable [6], that this word *Hammon* or *Ammon* was firſt derived from *Ham* or *Cham* the ſon of *Noah*, whoſe poſterity was chiefly ſeated in theſe African parts, and from whom *Egypt* was called, not only in the Scripture, *the land of Ham*, but alſo by the Egyptians themſelves, as *Plutarch* teſtifieth, Χημεία or *Chemia*, and as St. *Jerome*, *Ham*; and the Coptites alſo to this very day call it Chemi. Nevertheleſs this will not hinder, but that the word *Hammon*, for all that, might be uſed afterwards by the Egyptians, as a name for the ſupreme God, becauſe, amongſt the Greeks Ζεὺς in like manner was ſuppoſed to have been at firſt the name of a man or hero, but yet afterwards applied to ſignify the ſupreme God. And there might be ſuch a mixture of herology or hiſtory, together with theology, as well amongſt the Egyptians, as there was amongſt the Greeks. Nay, ſome learned men [7] conjecture, and not without probability, that the *Zeus* of the Greeks alſo was really the very ſame with that *Ham* or *Cham* the ſon of *Noah*, whom the Egyptians firſt worſhipped as an hero or deified man; there being ſeveral conſiderable agreements and correſpondencies between the poetick fables of *Saturn* and *Jupiter*, and the true ſcripture-ſtory of *Noah* and *Cham*; as there is likewiſe a great affinity betwixt the words themſelves, for as *Cham* ſignifies heat or fervour, ſo is Ζεὺς derived by the Greek Grammarians from ζέω. And thus will that forementioned teſtimony of *Herodotus* in ſome ſenſe be verified, that the Greeks received the names of moſt of their gods, even of Ζεὺς himſelf, from the Egyptians.

Perhaps

[1] Lib II. cap. XLII. p. 105.
[2] Or rather Celſus in Origen *contra Celſum*, Lib. V. p. 261.
[3] Tom. II. Oper. p. 354.
[4] Lib. IX. ver. 517, 518.
[5] Vide Voſſ. de Idolatr. Lib. II. c. XI. p. 134, 135. & Sam. Bochart. in Phaleg. Lib. I. cap. I. p. 6, 7.
[6] Vide Bochart. ubi ſupra Lib. IV. cap. I. p. 204, 205. & Lib I. cap. I. p. 6, 7. & Marſham. in Canon. Chron. Sæcul. I. p. 30.
[7] Vide Bochart, ubi ſupra, Lib. I. cap. I. p. 7, 8.

Perhaps it may be granted also, that the sun was sometime worshipped by the Egyptians, under the name of *Hammon*; it having been in like manner sometimes worshipped by the Greeks under the name of *Zeus*. And the word very well agreeth herewith, חמה in the Hebrew language signifying not only heat, but the sun; from whence חמנים *Chamanim* also was derived. Nevertheless, it will not follow from hence, that therefore the visible sun was generally accounted by the Egyptians the supreme Deity, no more than he was amongst the Greeks: but, as we have often occasion to observe, there was in the Pagan religion a confused jumble of herology, physiology, and theology all together. And that the notion of this Egyptian god *Ammon* was neither confined by them to the sun, nor yet the whole corporeal world or nature of the universe (as some have conceived) is evident from hence, because the Egyptians themselves interpreted it, according to their own language, to signify that which was hidden and obscure, as both *Manetho* an ancient Egyptian priest, and *Hecatæus* (who wrote concerning the philosophy of the Egyptians) in *Plutarch* agree [1]: Μανεθὼς μὲν ὁ Σεβεννύτης τὸ κεκρυμμένον οἴεται καὶ τὴν κρύψιν ὑπὸ ταύτης δηλοῦσθαι τῆς φωνῆς· Ἑκαταῖος δὲ Ἀβδηρίτης φησὶ τέτῳ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ ῥήματι χρῆσθαι τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους, ὅταν τινὰ προσκαλῶνται, προσκλητικὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φωνήν· διὸ τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν ὡς ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον ὄντα, προσκαλούμενοι καὶ παρακαλοῦντες, ἐμφανῆ γενέσθαι καὶ δῆλον αὐτοῖς, Ἄμουν λέγουσι· Manetho Sebennites *conceives the word* Amoun *to signify that which is hidden; and* Hecatæus *affirmeth, that the Egyptians use this word, when they call any one to them that was distant or absent from them: wherefore the first God, because he is invisible and hidden, they, as it were inviting him to approach near, and to make himself manifest and conspicuous to them, call him* Amoun. And agreeably hereunto, *Jamblichus* [2] gives us this account of the true notion of this Egyptian God *Ammon*, ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφία ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐπὶ γένεζιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἄμουν καλὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται· *The demiurgical intellect, and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and produceth into light the secret and invisible powers of the hidden reasons, is, according to the Egyptian language, called* Hammon. Wherefore we may conclude, that *Hammon*, amongst the Egyptians, was not only the name of the supreme Deity, but also of such a one as was hidden, invisible and incorporeal.

And here it may be worth our observing, that this Egyptian *Hammon* was in all probability taken notice of in scripture, though vulgar interpreters have not been aware thereof. For thus we understand that of *Jeremy* xlvi. 25. *The Lord of hosts, the God of Israel saith, behold I will* אמון מנא (that is, not *the multitude of Noe*, but) *Ammon* (the God) *of* Noe, *and* Pharaoh *and* Egypt *with her* (*other*) *gods and kings, and all that trust in him; I will deliver them into the hands of those that seek their lives, and into the hands of* Nebuchadnezzar *king of* Babylon. For the understanding of which place, we must observe, that according to the language of those ancient Pagans, when every country or city had their peculiar and proper names, for the gods presiding over them or worshipped by them, the several

[1] De Iside & Osiride p. 354. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] De Myster. Ægypt. Sect. VIII. c. III. p. 159.

veral nations and places were themſelves commonly denoted and ſignified by the names of thoſe their reſpective gods. With which kind of language the ſcripture it ſelf alſo complieth; as when the Moabites are called in it, *the people of Chemoſh*, Numbers xxi. and when *the gods of Damaſcus are ſaid to have ſmitten Ahaz*, becauſe the Syrians ſmote him, 2 *Chron.* xxviii. Accordingly whereunto alſo, whatſoever was done or attempted againſt the ſeveral nations or countries, is ſaid to have been done or attempted againſt their gods. Thus *Moab*'s captivity is deſcribed, *Jeremy* xlviii. *Thou ſhalt be taken, and Chemoſh ſhall go into captivity.* And the overthrow of *Babylon* is predicted after the ſame manner, in the prophecy of *Iſaiah*, chap. xlvi. Bell *boweth down*, Nebo *ſtoopeth, themſelves are gone into captivity.* And alſo the ſame is threatened in that of *Jeremy*, ch. li. *I will viſit* Bell *in* Babylon, *and will bring out of his mouth that which he hath ſwallowed up, and the nations ſhall not flow unto him any more, for the wall of* Babylon *ſhall be broken down.* Now *Bell*, according to *Herodotus* [1], was a name for the ſupreme God amongſt the Babylonians, as well as *Ammon* was amongſt the Egyptians; who notwithſtanding by both of them was worſhipped after an idolatrous manner. And therefore as in theſe latter places, by the viſiting and puniſhing of the Babylonians, ſo in that former place of *Jeremy*, by the viſiting of *Ammon*, and the gods of *Egypt*, is underſtood the viſiting of the Egyptians themſelves; accordingly as it is there alſo expreſſed. *No* was, it ſeems, the metropolis of all Egypt; and therefore *Ammon* the chief god of thoſe ancient Egyptians, and of that city, was called *Ammon of No.* As likewiſe the city *No* is denominated from this god *Ammon* in the ſcripture, and called both *No-Ammon* and *Ammon-No.* The former in the prophecy of *Nahum*, chap. iii. *Art thou better than No-Ammon?* or that *No* in which the god *Ammon* is worſhipped? Which is not to be underſtood of the oracle of *Ammon* in *Marmarica*, as ſome have imagined [2] (they taking *No* for an appellative, and ſo to ſignify habitation;) it being unqueſtionably the proper name of a city in *Egypt.* The latter in that of *Ezekiel*, chap. xxx. *I will pour out my fury upon* Sin, *the ſtrength of* Egypt, *and will cut off* Hammon-No. In which place as by *Sin* is meant *Peluſium*, ſo *Hammon-No*, by the Seventy, is interpreted *Dioſpolis*, the city of *Jupiter*; that is, the Egyptian *Jupiter*, *Hammon.* Which *Dioſpolis* was otherwiſe called the Egyptian *Thebes*, (anciently the metropolis of all *Fgypt*) but whoſe proper name, in the Egyptian language, ſeems to have been *No*; which from the chief god there worſhipped was called both *No-Ammon* and *Hammon-No*; as that god himſelf was alſo denominated from the city, *Ammon of No.* And this is the rather probable, becauſe *Plato* tells us expreſly, that *Ammon* was anciently the proper or chief god of the Egyptian *Thebes* or *Dioſpolis*, where he ſpeaks of *Theuth* or *Thoth* the Egyptian *Hermes*, in theſe words; βασιλέως δ' αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἰγύπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦς, περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τῆς ἄνω τόπου, ἣν οἱ Ἕλληνες Αἰγυπτίας Θήβας καλοῦσι καὶ τῶν θεὸν Ἄμμωνα· Thamus *was then king over all* Egypt, *reigning in that great city (the metropolis thereof) which the Greeks call the Egyptian* Thebes, *and whoſe God was* Ammon. But whereas the prophet *Nahum* (who ſeems to have written after the completion of that judgment

In Phædro, [p. 356. Oper.]

[1] This ſeems to be a miſtake for *Diodorus Siculus*, who mentions it, Lib II. p. 69.

[2] Voſſ. de Idol. Lib. I. cap. XXXII. p. 89.

judgment upon *No*, predicted both by *Jeremy* and *Ezekiel*) describes the place, as situate among the rivers, and having the sea for its wall and rampart; whence many learned men [1] have concluded, that this was rather to be understood of *Alexandria* than *Diospolis*, (notwithstanding that *Alexandria* was not then in being, nor built till a long while after, in *Alexander* the Great's time:) This may very well, as we conceive, be understood of *Egypt* in general, whose metropolis this *No* was; that it was situate amongst the rivers, and had the seas for its wall and rampart, the *Red* and *Mediterranean*. And thus much for the *Egyptian Jupiter*, or their supreme Deity, called by them *Hammon*.

There is an excellent monument of *Egyptian* antiquity preserved by *Plutarch* [2] and others, from whence it may be made yet further evident, that the *Egyptians* did not suppose a multitude of unmade, self-existent deities, but acknowledged one supreme, universal and all-comprehending Numen. And it is that inscription upon the temple at *Sais*; Ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδείς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυψεν, *I am all that hath been, is, and shall be, and my* peplum *or veil no mortal hath ever yet uncovered.* Which though perhaps some would understand thus, as if that Deity therein described were nothing but the senseless matter of the whole corporeal universe, according to that opinion of *Chæremon* before mentioned and confuted; yet it is plain, that this could not be the meaning of this inscription: first, because the God here described is not a mere congeries of disunited matter, or aggregation of divided atoms, but it is some one thing, which was all: according to that other inscription upon an altar dedicated to the goddess *Isis*, which we shall also afterward make use of, *Tibi, una, quæ es omnia*; *To thee, who being one, art all things.* Again, in the Deity here described, there is both a veil or outside, and also something hidden and recondite; the sense seeming to be this, I am all that was, is, and shall be; and the whole world is nothing but my self veiled; but my naked and unveiled brightness no mortal could ever yet behold or comprehend. Which is just as if the sun should say, I am all the colours of the rainr-bow (whose mild and gentle light may easily be beheld) and they are nothing but my simple and uniform lustre, variously refracted and abated; but my immediate splendour and the brightness of my face no mortal can contemplate, without being either blinded or dazzled by it. Wherefore this description of the Deity may seem not a little to resemble that description, which God makes of himself to *Moses*, *Thou shalt see my back-parts, but my face shall not be seen.* Where there is also something exterior and visible in the Deity, and something hidden and recondite, invisible and incomprehensible to mortals. And *Philo* thus glosseth upon those words, αὔταρκες ἐστι σοφῷ, τὰ ἀκόλουθα καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τὸν Θεὸν γνῶναι, τὴν δὲ ἡγεμονικὴν οὐσίαν ὁ ἐκλόμενος καταθεάσασθαι, τῷ περιαυγεῖ τῶν ἀκλίνων πρὶν ἰδεῖν πηρὸς εἶναι· *It is sufficient for a wise man to know God* à posteriori, *or from his effects; but whosoever will needs behold the naked essence of the Deity, will be blinded with the transcendent radiancy and splendour of his beams.* Whereas, according to *Philo*, the works of God, as manifesting the attributes of

[2] Ἀφανὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐμφανής· *Proclus* of this *Egyptian* God, that it was both *invisible and manifest. In Timæ. p.* 30.

P. 474. [Libro de Profugis.]

[1] The Chaldean Interpreter, St. Jerom, Drusius, and many others. Vid. Voss. ubi supra.

[2] De Iside & Osir. p. 354. Tom. II. Oper.

of his power, goodneſs and wiſdom, are called the back-parts of the Deity; ſo are they here in this inſcription called the *peplum*, the veil and exterior garment of it, or elſe God himſelf veiled. Wherefore it is plain, that the Deity here deſcribed cannot be the mere viſible and corporeal world as ſenſleſs and inanimate, that being all outſide and expoſed to the view of ſenſe, and having nothing hidden or veiled in it. But thirdly, this will yet be more evident, if we do but take notice of the name of this God, which was here deſcribed, and to whom that temple was dedicated; and that was in the *Egyptian* Language *Neith*, the ſame with Ἀθηνᾶ amongſt the *Greeks*, and *Minerva* amongſt the *Latins*; by which is meant wiſdom or underſtanding: from whence it is plain, that the inſcription is to be underſtood not of ſuch a god as was merely ſenſleſs matter (which is the god of the Atheiſts) but a mind. *Athenagoras*[1] tells us, that the *Pagan* Theologers interpreted τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, or *Minerva*, to be τὴν φρόνησιν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν, *wiſdom or mind paſſing and diffuſing it ſelf through all things*; than which there cannot be a better commentary on this inſcription. Wherefore it may be here obſerved, that thoſe *Pagans*, who acknowledged God to be a mind, and incorporeal being ſecrete from matter, did notwithſtanding frequently conſider him, not abſtractly by himſelf alone, but concretely together with the reſult of his whole fecundity, or as diſplaying the world from himſelf, and diffuſing himſelf through all things, and being in a manner all things. Accordingly, we learn'd before from *Horus Apollo*, that the *Egyptians* by God meant a ſpirit diffuſing it ſelf through the world, and intimately pervading all things; and that they ſuppoſed that nothing at all could conſiſt without God. And after this manner, *Jamblichus* in his Myſteries[2] interprets the meaning of this Egyptyian inſcription: for when he had declared that the Egyptians did, both in their doctrine and their prieſtly hierurgies, exhort men to aſcend above matter, to an incorporeal Deity the maker of all, he adds, ὑφηγήσατο δὲ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν ὁ Ἑρμῆς, ἡρμήνευσε δὲ Βίθυς προφήτης Ἄμμωνι βασιλεῖ, ἐν ἀδύτοις εὑρὼν ἀναγεγραμμένην, ἐν ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασι κατὰ Σάϊν τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, τότε τῷ Θεῷ ὄνομα παρέδωκε τὸ δῖκον διὰ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου· Hermes *alſo propounded this method, and* Bythis *the prophet interpreted the ſame to king* Ammon, *having found it written in hieroglyphick letters in the temple of* Sais *in* Egypt; *as he alſo there declared the name of that God, who extends or diffuſes himſelf through the whole world.* And this was *Neith*, or *Athena*, that god thus deſcribed, *I am all that was, is, and ſhall be, and my* peplum *or veil no mortal could ever uncover.* Where we cannot but take notice alſo that whereas the *Athena* of the *Greeks* was derived from the *Egyptian Neith*, that ſhe alſo was famous for her *peplum* too, as well as the *Egyptian* Goddeſs. *Peplum* (ſaith *Servius*) *eſt propriè palla picta fœminea*, Minervæ *conſecrata*; Peplum *is properly a womaniſh pall or veil, embroidered all over, and conſecrated to* Minerva. Which rite was performed at *Athens*, in the great Panathenaicks, with much ſolemnity, when the ſtatue of this goddeſs was alſo by thoſe noble virgins of the city, who embroidered this veil, cloathed all over therewith. From whence we may probably conclude, that the ſtatue of the *Egyptian Neith* alſo, in the

Νεῖθας, in *Procl.* upon *Plato's Tim.* p. 30.

Μίαν τῶν δύο πόλεων ἔφορον τῆς τε Σάεως καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν· Sais *and* Athens *had one and the ſame Tutelar God, Procl. in Tim. p.* 30. Where alſo *Theopompus* affirmeth the *Athenians* to have been a Colony of the *Saites*.

[1] Legat. pro Chriſtianis, cap. XIX. p. 86.

[2] De Myſter. Ægypt. Sect. VIII. cap. V. p. 161.

the temple of *Sais*, had likewiſe, agreeably to its inſcription, ſuch a peplum or veil caſt over it, as *Minerva* or *Arthemis* at *Athens* had; this hieroglyphically to ſignify, that the Deity was inviſible and incomprehenſible to mortals, but had veiled it ſelf in this viſible corporeal world, which is, as it were, the peplum, the exteriour variegated or embroidered veſtment of the Deity. To all which conſiderations may be added, in the laſt place, what *Proclus* hath recorded, that there was ſomething more belonging to this Egyptian inſcription, than what is mentioned by *Plutarch*; namely theſe words, ἡ δὲ ἔτεκον κάρπον, ἥλιον ἐγένετο, *and the ſun was the fruit or offſpring, which I produced*; from whence it is manifeſt, that according to the Egyptians, the ſun was not the ſupreme Deity, and that the God here deſcribed, was, as *Proclus* alſo obſerveth, δημιουργικὴ θεὸς, *a demiurgical deity*, the creator of the whole world, and of the ſun. Which ſupreme incorporeal deity was notwithſtanding, in their theology, ſaid to be all things, becauſe it diffuſed it ſelf thorough all. *In Timæ. p.* 30.

Wherefore, whereas *Plutarch*[1] cites this paſſage out of *Hecatæus*, concerning the Egyptians, τὸν πρῶτον θεὸν τῷ Παντὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νομίζουσιν, *that they take the firſt God, and the univerſe, for one and the ſame thing*; the meaning of it cannot be, as if the firſt or ſupreme God of the Egyptians were the ſenſeleſs corporeal world, *Plutarch* himſelf in the very next words declaring him to be ἀφανῆ καὶ κεκρυμμένον, *inviſible and hidden*; whom therefore the Egyptians, as inviting him to manifeſt himſelf to them, called *Hammon*; as he elſewhere affirmeth, *That the Egyptians firſt God, or ſupreme Deity, did ſee all things, himſelf being not ſeen.* But the forementioned paſſage muſt needs be underſtood thus, that according to the Egyptians, the firſt God, and τὸ Πᾶν or the univerſe, were ſynonymous expreſſions, often uſed to ſignify the very ſame thing; becauſe the firſt ſupreme Deity is that, which contains all things, and diffuſeth it ſelf through all things. And this doctrine was from the Egyptians derived to the Greeks, *Orpheus* declaring, ἓν τι τὰ πάντα, *that all things were one*; and after him *Parmenides* and other philoſophers, ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, *that one was the univerſe or all*, and that τὸ πᾶν was ἀκίνητον, *that the univerſe was immoveable*; they meaning nothing elſe hereby, but that the firſt ſupreme Deity, was both one and all things, and immovable. And thus much is plainly intimated by *Ariſtotle in theſe words*, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς ἓν μιᾶς ὄσης φύσεως ἀπεφήναντο· *There are ſome, who pronounced concerning the whole univerſe, as being but one nature*; that is, who called the ſupreme Deity τὸ πᾶν or *the univerſe*, becauſe that virtually contained all things in it. *Metaph. L.* 1. [Cap. V. p. 270. Tom. IV. Oper.

Nevertheleſs τὸ πᾶν, or *the univerſe*, was frequently taken by the Pagan theologers alſo, as we have already intimated, in a more comprehenſive ſenſe, for the Deity, together with all the extent of its fecundity, God as diſplaying himſelf in the world; or, for God and the world both together; the latter being look'd upon as nothing but an *emanation* or *efflux* from the former. And thus was the word taken by *Empedocles* in *Plutarch*[2], when he affirmed, οὐ τὸ πᾶν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον τι τοῦ παντὸς μέρος, *that*

[1] De Iſide & Oſir. p. 354. Tom. II. Oper. [2] De Placit. Philoſ. Lib. I. cap. 5. p. 879.

the world was not the univerſe, but only a ſmall part thereof. And according to this ſenſe was the god *Pan* underſtood both by the Arcadians and other Greeks, not for the mere corporeal world as ſenſeleſs and inanimate, nor as endued with a plaſtick nature only (though this was partly included in the notion of *Pan* alſo) but as proceeding from a rational and intellectual principle, diffuſing it ſelf through all; or for the whole ſyſtem of things, God and the world together, as one deity. For that the Arcadick *Pan* was not the corporeal world alone, but chiefly the intellectual ruler and governour of the ſame, appears from this teſtimony of *Macrobius* [1]; *Hunc Deum Arcades colunt, appellantes* τὸν τῆς ὕλης κύριον, *non ſylvarum dominum, ſed univerſæ ſubſtantiæ materialis dominatorem: The Arcadians worſhip this god* Pan *(as their moſt ancient and honourable god) calling him the lord of* Hyle, *that is, not the lord of the woods, but the lord or dominator over all material ſubſtance.* And thus does *Phornutus* [2] likewiſe deſcribe the *Pan* of the other Greeks, not as the mere corporeal world, ſenſeleſs and inanimate; but as having a rational and intellectual principle for the head of it, and preſiding over it; that is, for God and the world both together, as one ſyſtem; the world being but the efflux and emanation of their Deity. *The lower parts of* Pan (ſaith he) *were rough and goatiſh, becauſe of the aſperity of the earth; but his upper parts of a human form, becauſe the æther being rational and intellectual, is the Hegemonick of the world:* adding hereunto, *that* Pan *was feigned to be luſtful or laſcivious, becauſe of the multitude of ſpermatick reaſons contained in the world, and the continual mixtures and generations of things; to be cloathed with the ſkin of a libbard, becauſe of the beſpangled heavens, and the beautiful variety of things in the world; to live in a deſart, becauſe of the ſingularity of the world; and laſtly, to be a good dæmon, by reaſon of the* πρόεσις αὐτῆ λόγου, *that ſupreme mind, reaſon, and underſtanding, that governs all in it.* *Pan* therefore was not the mere corporeal world ſenſeleſs and inanimate, but the Deity as diſplaying itſelf therein, and pervading all things. Agreeable to which, *Diodorus Siculus* [3] determines, that Πὰν and Ζεὺς were but two ſeveral names for one and the ſame deity, (as it is well known, that the whole univerſe was frequently called by the Pagans *Jupiter*, as well as *Pan.*) And *Socrates* himſelf in *Plato* [4] directs his prayer, in a moſt devout and ſerious manner, to this *Pan*; that is, not the corporeal world or ſenſeleſs matter, but an intellectual principle ruling over all, or the ſupreme Deity diffuſing it ſelf through all; he therefore diſtinguiſhing him from the inferiour gods: Ὦ φίλε Πὰν, καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇδε θεοί, δοίητέ μοι καλῷ γενέσθαι τἄνδοθεν, τὰ ἐξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια· *O good* (or gracious) Pan, *and ye other gods, who preſide over this place, grant that I may be beautiful or fair within, and that thoſe external things, which I have, may be ſuch as may beſt agree with a right internal diſpoſition of mind, and that I may account him to be rich, that is wiſe and juſt.* The matter of which prayer, though it be excellent, yet it is paganically directed to *Pan* (that is, the ſupreme god) and the inferiour gods both together. Thus we ſee that as well, according to

[1] Saturnal. Lib. I. cap. XXII. p. 307.
[2] Libro de Natura Deor. cap. XXVII. p. 203. inter Scriptor. Mythol. à Tho. Gale editos.
[3] Lib. I. p. 7.
[4] In Phædro p. 358. Oper.

to the Greeks, as the Egyptians, the firſt or ſupreme God, and τὸ πᾶν or the univerſe, were really the ſame thing.

And here we cannot but by the way take notice of that famous and remarkable ſtory of *Plutarch*'s in his Defect of Oracles, concerning dæmons lamenting the death of the great *Pan*. In the time of *Tiberius* (ſaith he) certain perſons embarking from *Aſia* for *Italy*, towards the evening ſailed by the *Echinades*, where being becalmed, they heard from thence a loud voice calling one *Thamous*, an Egyptian mariner amongſt them, and after the third time commanding him, when he came to the *Palodes*, to declare, that the great *Pan* was dead. He with the advice of his company reſolved, that if they had a quick gale, when they came to the *Palodes*, he would paſs by ſilently; but if they ſhould find themſelves there becalmed, he would then perform what the voice had commanded: but when the ſhip arrived thither, there neither was any gale of wind nor agitation of water. Whereupon *Thamous* looking out of the hinder deck towards the *Palodes*, pronounced theſe words with a loud voice, ὁ μέγας Πὰν τέθνηκε, *the great* Pan *is dead*; which he had no ſooner done, but he was anſwered with a choir of many voices, making a great howling and lamentation, not without a certain mixture of admiration. *Plutarch*, who gives much credit to this relation, adds, how ſollicitous *Tiberius* the emperor was, firſt concerning the truth thereof, and afterwards, when he had ſatisfied himſelf therein, concerning the interpretation; he making great enquiry amongſt his learned men, who this *Pan* ſhould be. But the only uſe, which that philoſopher makes of this ſtory, is this, to prove that dæmons having bodies as well as men, (though of a different kind from them, and much more longeve) yet were notwithſtanding mortal; he endeavouring from thence to ſolve that phænomenon of the defect of oracles, becauſe the dæmons, who had formerly haunted thoſe places, were now dead. But this being an idle fancy of *Plutarch*'s, it is much more probably concluded by Chriſtian writers, that this thing coming to paſs in the reign of *Tiberius*, when our Saviour Chriſt was crucified, was no other than a lamentation of evil dæmons (not without a mixture of admiration) upon account of our Saviour's death, happening at that very time; they not mourning out of love for him that was dead, but as ſadly preſaging evil to themſelves from thence, as that which would threaten danger to their kingdom of darkneſs, and a period to that tyranny and domination which they had ſo long exerciſed over mankind; according to ſuch paſſages of ſcripture as theſe, *Now is the prince of this world judged*; and *having ſpoiled principalities and powers* (by his death upon the croſs) *he triumphed over them in it*. Now our Saviour Chriſt could not be called *Pan*, according to that notion of the word, as taken for nothing but the corporeal word devoid of all manner of life, or elſe as endued only with a plaſtick nature; but this appellation might very well agree to him, as *Pan* was taken for the λόγος προες-ὼς τᾶ κόσμᾳ, *that reaſon and underſtanding, by which all things were made, and by which they are all governed, or for* Φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, *that divine wiſdom, which diffuſeth itſelf through all*

things. Moreover, *Pan* being uſed not ſo much for the naked and abſtract Deity, as the Deity as it were embodied in this viſible corporeal world, might therefore the better ſignify God manifeſted in the fleſh, and cloathed with a particular human body, (in which reſpect alone, he was capable of dying.) Neither indeed was there any other name, in all the theology of the Pagans, that could ſo well befit our Saviour Chriſt as this.

We have now made it manifeſt, that according to the ancient Egyptian theology, (from whence the Greekiſh and European was derived) there was one intellectual Deity, one mind or wiſdom, which as it did produce all things from it ſelf, ſo doth περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, *contain and comprehend the whole*, and is it ſelf in a manner all things. We think fit in the next place to obſerve, how this point of the old Egyptian theology, *viz.* God's being all things, is every where inſiſted upon throughout the Hermaick or Trifmegiſtick writings. We ſhall begin with the Aſclepian dialogue or the τέλειος λόγος, tranſlated into Latin by *Apuleius*; in the entrance of which, the writer having declared, *Omnia unius eſſe, & unum eſſe omnia, that all things were of one, and that one was all things*, he afterwards adds this explication thereof; *Nonne hoc dixi*, Omnia unum eſſe, & unum omnia, *utpote quia in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creâſſet omnia? Nec immeritò unus eſt dictus omnia, cujus membra ſunt omnia. Hujus itaque, qui eſt* unus omnia, *vel ipſe eſt Creator omnium, in tota hac diſputatione curato meminiſſe. Have we not already declared, that all things are one, and one all things? foraſmuch as all things exiſted in the Creator, before they were made; neither is he improperly ſaid to be all things, whoſe members all things are. Be thou therefore mindful in this whole diſputation of him, who is one and all things, or was the creator of all.* And thus afterwards does he declare, that all created things were in the Deity before they were made; *Idcirco non erant quando nata non erant, ſed in eo jam tunc erant unde naſci habuerunt; they did not properly then exiſt before they were made, and yet at that very time were they in him, from whom they were afterwards produced.* Again, he writes thus concerning God, *Non ſpero totius majeſtatis effectorem, omnium rerum patrem vel dominum, uno poſſe quamvis è multis compoſito nomine nuncupari. Hunc voca potius omni nomine, ſiquidem ſit* unus & omnia; *ut neceſſe ſit aut omnia ipſius nomine, aut ipſum omnium nomine nuncupari. Hic ergo ſolus omnia, &c. I cannot hope ſufficiently to expreſs the author of majeſty, and the father and lord of all things, by any one name, though compounded of never ſo many names. Call him therefore by every name, foraſmuch as he is one and all things; ſo that of neceſſity, either all things muſt be called by his name, or he by the names of all things.* And
P. 612. *Colv.* when he had ſpoken of the mutability of created things, he adds, *Solus deus ipſe in ſe, & à ſe, & circum ſe, totus eſt plenus atque perfectus, iſque ſua firma ſtabilitas eſt; nec alicujus impulſu, nec loco moveri poteſt, cum in eo ſint omnia, & in omnibus ipſe eſt ſolus. God alone in himſelf, and from himſelf, and about himſelf, is altogether perfect; and himſelf is his own ſtability. Neither can he be moved or changed, by the impulſe of any thing, ſince all things are in him, and he alone is in all things.* Laſtly, to omit other places,
P. 617. *Hic ſenſibilis mundus receptaculum eſt omnium ſenſibilium ſpecierum, qualitatum, vel*

vel corporum; quæ omnia ſine Deo vegetari non poſſunt: Omnia *enim* Deus, *& à Deo omnia, & ſine hoc, nec fuit aliquid, nec eſt, nec erit; omnia enim ab eo, & in ipſo, & per ipſum———Si totum animadvertes, vera ratione perdiſces, mundum ipſum ſenſibilem, & quæ in eo ſunt omnia, à ſuperiore illo mundo, quaſi veſtimento, eſſe contecta. This ſenſible world is the receptacle of all forms, qualities, and bodies, all which cannot be vegetated and quickened without God; for God is all things, and all things are from God, and all things the effect of his will; and without God there neither was any thing, nor is nor ſhall be; but all things are from him, and in him, and by him———And if you will conſider things after a right manner, you ſhall learn, that this ſenſible world, and all the things therein, are covered all over with that ſuperior world* (or Deity) *as it were with a garment.* As for the other Triſmegiſtick books of *Ficinus* his edition, the third of them called ἱερὸς λόγος, is thus concluded; τὸ γὰρ θεῖον ἡ πᾶσα κοσμικὴ σύγκρασις, φύσει ἀναθεωρεμένη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θείῳ καὶ ἡ φύσις συγκαθέστηκεν· *The divinity is the whole mundane compages, or conſtitution; for nature is alſo placed in the Deity.* In the fifth book written upon this argument, ὅτι ἀφανὴς θεὸς φανερώταλός ἐστι, *that the inviſible God is moſt manifeſt*, we read thus, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστιν ἐν παντὶ ἐκείνῳ, ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸς, ἐστιν οὖν ὄντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὸς ἐφανέρωσε· τάδε μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ· *For there is nothing in the whole world, which he is not; he is both the things that are, and the things that are not; for the things that are, he hath manifeſted; but the things that are not, he contains within himſelf.* And again, ἕτος ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ ὁ πολυσώματος· μᾶλλον δὲ παντὸς σώματος οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἕτος οὐκ ἔστι· πάντα γὰρ ἃ ἐστι, καὶ ἕτός ἐστι· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸς ὀνόματα ἔχει πάντα, ὅτι ἑνός ἐστι παντός· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ. *He is both incorporeal and omnicorporeal, for there is nothing of any body, which he is not; he is all things that are, and therefore he hath all names, becauſe all things are from one father; and therefore he hath no name, becauſe he is the father of all things.* And in the cloſe of the ſame book, ὑπὲρ τίνος σε ὑμνήσω, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐποίησας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐκ ἐποίησας; ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐφανέρωσας, ἢ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἔκρυψας; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ ὑμνήσω σε; ὡς ἐμαυτοῦ ὤν; ὡς ἔχων τι ἴδιον, ὡς ἄλλος ὤν; σὺ εἶ γὰρ ὃ ἐὰν ὦ· σὺ εἶ ὃ ἂν ποιῶ· σὺ εἶ ὃ ἂν λέγω· σὺ γὰρ πάντα εἶ, τὸ ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ μὴ εἶ· σὺ πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον, σὺ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον· *For what ſhall I praiſe thee? for thoſe things which thou haſt made? or for thoſe things which thou haſt not made? for thoſe things which thou haſt manifeſted, or for thoſe things which thou haſt hidden and concealed within thy ſelf? And for what cauſe ſhall I praiſe thee? becauſe I am my own, as having ſomething proper, and diſtinct from thee? thou art whatſoever I am; thou art whatſoever I do, or ſay, for thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not; thou art that which is made, and thou art that which is unmade.* Where it is obſervable, that before things were made, God is ſaid κρύπτειν, *to hide them within himſelf*; but when they are made, φανερῶν, *to manifeſt and reveal them from himſelf.* Book the Eighth, νόησον ὅτι ὁ μὲν κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ περιοχὴ καὶ σύγκρασις πάντων ὁ θεός· *Underſtand that the whole world is from God, and in God; for God is the beginning, comprehenſion and conſtitution of all things.* Book the ninth, μᾶλλον δὲ λέγω ὅτι οὐκ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποφαίνομαι, αὐτὸς ἁπλᾶ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἔξωθεν αὐτὰ προσλαμβάνων, ἔξω δὲ ἐπιδιδούς· *I would not ſay, that God hath all things, but rather declare the truth, and ſay that he is all things; not as receiving them from without, but as ſending them forth*

forth from himſelf. Again, afterwards in the ſame book, οὐ μὴ ἔσται πότε χρόνος, ὅτε ἀπολειρθήσεταί τι τῶν ὄντων· ὅταν δὲ λέγω τῶν ὅλων, λέγω τῷ θεῷ· τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὁ θεὸς ἔχει, οὐ μὴ ἄτε αὐτῷ ἀδὲν ἐκτὸς, ἄτε αὐτὸς ἀδενός· *There ſhall never be a time, when any thing that is, ſhall ceaſe to be; for when I ſay any thing that is, I ſay any thing of God; for God hath all things in him, and there is neither any thing without God, nor God without any thing.* Book the tenth, τί γὰρ ἐστι θεὸς, οὐ πατὴρ, οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, ἢ τὸ τῶν πάντων εἶναι ἐκ ἔτι ὄντων· ἀλλὰ ὕπαρξις αὐτὴ τῶν ὄντων; *What is God, but the very being of all things that yet are not, and the ſubſiſtence of things that are?* And again, ὁ θεὸς, οὐ πατὴρ οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, τῷ εἶναι τὰ πάντα, *God is both the father and good, becauſe he is all things.* Book the eleventh, αὐτεργὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀεὶ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ, αὐτὸς ὢν ὃ ποιεῖ· εἰ γὰρ χωριθείη αὐτῆ, πάντα μὲν συμπεσεῖθαι, πάντα δὲ τεθνήξεθαι ἀνάγκη· *God acting immediately from himſelf is always in his own work, himſelf being that which he makes; for if that were never ſo little ſeparated from him, all would of neceſſity fall to nothing and die.* Again, πάντα ἐστιν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ κείμενα, *all things are in God, but not as lying in a place.* And further, ſince our own ſoul can by cogitation and fancy become what it will, and where it will, any thing, or in any place, τῆτον ἓν τὸν τρόπον ἰόησον τὸν θεὸν, ὥσπερ νοήματα πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχειν, τὸν κόζμον αὐτὸν ὅλον· *You may conſider God in the ſame manner, as containing the whole world within himſelf, as his own conceptions and cogitations.* And in the cloſe of that chapter, that, which is alſo thence cited by St. *Cyril*[1], is to the ſame purpoſe; ἀόρατος ὁ θεός; εὐφήμησον οὐ τίς αὐτῆ φανερώτερος· διὰ αὐτὸ τῆτο πάντα ἐποίησεν, ἵνα διὰ πάντων αὐτὸν βλέπῃς· τῆτό ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῆ θεῆ· τῆτο δὲ αὐτῆ ἀρέτη, τὸ αὐτὸν φαίνεθαι διὰ πάντων· *Is God inviſible? ſpeak worthily of him, for who is more manifeſt than he? for this very reaſon did he make all things, that thou mighteſt ſee him through all things: this is the vertue and goodneſs of the Deity, to be ſeen through all things. The mind is ſeen in thinking, but God in working or making.* Book the twelfth, ἤκεσα τῆ ἀγαθῆ δαίμονος λέγοντος (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μόνος, ὦ τέκνον, ἀληθῶς ὡς πρωτόγονος θεὸς, τὰ πάντα καθίδων, θείᾳς λόγᾳς ἐφθέγξατο) ἤκεσα γᾶν αὐτῆ ποτὲ λέγοντος, ὅτι ἕν ἐστι τὰ πάντα· *I have heard the good dæmon (for he alone, as the firſt begotten god, beholding all things, ſpake divine words) I have heard him ſometimes ſaying, that one is all things.* Again in the ſame chapter, ὁ δὲ σύμπας κόσμος ἅτος ἡνωμένος ἐκείνῳ, οὐ συσώζων τὴν τάξιν, οὐ βάλησιν τῆ παντὸς, πλήρωμά ἐστι τῆς ζωῆς· οὐ ἀδέν ἐστιν ἐν τύτῳ διὰ παντὸς τῆ αἰῶνος, ἄτε τῆ παντὸς, ἄτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ὃ ἀχὶ ζῇ, νεκρὸν γὰρ ἀδὲ ἕν, ἄτε γέγονεν, ἄτε ἐστὶν, ἄτε ἔσται ἐν κόζμῳ· *This whole world is intimately united to him, and obſerving the order and will of its father, hath the fulneſs of life in it; and there is nothing in it through eternity (neither whole nor part) which does not live; for there neither is, nor hath been, nor ſhall be, any thing dead in the world.* The meaning is, that all things vitally depend upon the Deity, who is ſaid in ſcripture to quicken and enliven all things. τῆτό ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς, τὸ πᾶν· ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ, ἀδέν ἐστιν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· ὅθεν ἄτε μέγεθος, ἄτε τόπος, ἄτε ποιότης, ἄτε σχῆμα, ἄτε χρόνος περὶ τὸν θεόν ἐστι· πᾶν γὰρ ἐστι, τὸ δὲ πᾶν διὰ πάντων οὐ περὶ πάντα· *This is God, the univerſe or all. And in this univerſe there is nothing which he is not: wherefore there is neither magnitude, nor place, nor quality, nor figure, nor time about*

[1] Adverſ. Julian. Lib. II. p. 52. Edit. Spanhem.

about God, for he is all or the whole, (but thoſe things belong to parts.) And the *Arcane Cantion*, though that thirteenth book, to which it is ſubjoined, be ſuppoſititious, yet harps much upon this point of the *Egyptian* theology, that God is all: ὑμνεῖν μέλλω τὸν τῆς κτίσεως κύριον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ ἕν· *I am about to praiſe the Lord of the creation, the all and the one.* And again, *All the powers, that are in me, praiſe the one and the all.* Book the fifteenth, ἐαν τις ἐπιχειρήση τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἓν χορίσαι, τὸ πᾶν, τῷ ἑνὸς λύσας ἀπολέσει τὸ πᾶν, πάντα γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ· *If any one go about to ſeparate the all from the one, he will deſtroy the all, or the univerſe, for all ought to be one.* Book the ſixteenth, ἄρξομαι τῷ λόγῳ ἔνθεν, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεσάμενος, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δεσπότην, καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα, καὶ περίβολον, καὶ πάντα ὄντα τὸν ἕνα, καὶ ἕνα ὄντα τὰ πάντα· τὸ πάντων γὰρ τὸ πλήρωμα ἓν ἐστι, καὶ ἐν ἑνί, *I will begin with a prayer to him, who is the Lord and maker and father and bound of all things; and who being all things, is one; and being one, is all things; for the fulneſs of all things is one and in one.* And agan, μόρια τοῦ Θεοῦ πάντα ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μόρια, πάντα ἄρα ὁ Θεὸς· πάντα ἓν ποιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ· *All things are parts of God, but if all things be parts of God, then God is all things; wherefore he making all things, doth, as it were, make himſelf.*

Now, by all this we ſee, how well theſe Triſmegiſtick books agree with that ancient Egyptian inſcription in the temple of *Sais*, that *God is all, that was, is, and ſhall be.* Wherefore the Egyptian theology thus undoubtedly aſſerting *one God that was all things*; it is altogether impoſſible, that it ſhould acknowledge a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent and independent deities.

Hitherto we have taken notice of two ſeveral Egyptian names for one and the ſame ſupreme Deity; *Hammon* and *Neith:* but we ſhall find, that, beſides theſe, the ſupreme God was ſometimes worſhipped by the Egyptians under other names and notions alſo; as of *Iſis*, *Oſiris*, and *Serapis*. For firſt, though *Iſis* have been taken by ſome for the moon, by others for the whole earth, by others for *Ceres* or corn, by others for the land of *Egypt*, (which things, in what ſenſe they were deified by the Egyptians, will be elſewhere declared) yet was ſhe undoubtedly taken alſo ſometimes for an univerſal and all-comprehending *Numen*. For *Plutarch* [z] affirms, that *Iſis* and *Neith* were really one and the ſame god among the Egyptians, and therefore the temple of *Neith* or *Minerva* at *Sais*, where the forementioned inſcription was found, is called by him the temple of *Iſis*; ſo that *Iſis*, as well as *Neith* or *Minerva* among the Egyptians, was there deſcribed, as that God, who is *all that was, is, and ſhall be*, and whoſe veil no mortal hath ever uncovered; that is, not a particular God, but an univerſal and all-comprehending *Numen*. And this may be yet further confirmed from that ancient inſcription and dedication to the goddeſs *Iſis*, ſtill extant at *Capua:*

TIBI.
VNA. QVÆ.
ES. OMNIA.
DEA. ISIS.

Where

[z] De Iſide & Oſir. p. 354, Tom. II. Oper.

Where the goddess *Isis* is plainly declared to be ἓν καὶ πάντα, *one and all things*, that is, a universal and all comprehending Deity. And with this agreeth also that oration of this Goddess *Isis* in *Apuleius*; *En adsum tuis commota, Lûci, precibus, rerum natura parens, elementorum omnium domina, seculorum progenies initialis: summa numinum, regina marium, prima cœlitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis; quæ cœli luminosa culmina, maris salubria flamina, inferorum deplorata silentia, nutibus meis dispenso. Cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis. Behold here am I, moved by thy prayers,* Lucius, *that nature, which was the parent of things; the mistress of all the elements; the beginning and original of ages; the sum of all the divine powers; the queen of the seas; the first of the celestial inhabitants; the uniform face of gods and goddesses; which with my becks dispense the luminous heights of the heavens, the wholesome blasts of the sea, and the deplorable silences of hell; whose only divine power the whole world worships and adores, in a multiform manner, and under different rites and names.* From which words it is plain, that this goddess *Isis* was not the mere animated moon (which was rather a symbol of her) but that she was an universal Deity, comprehensive of the whole nature of things; the one supreme God, worshipped by the Pagans, under several names, and with different rites. And this is the plain meaning of those last words, *Numen unicum, &c. that the whole world worshippeth one and the same supreme God, in a multiform manner, with various rites and under many different names.* For, besides the several names of the other Pagans there mentioned, the Egyptians worshipped it under the names of *Hammon, Neith,* and others that shall be afterwards declared. And thus was *Isis* again worshipped and invok'd, as the *unicum numen*, or only divine power, by *Apuleius* himself, in these following words [1]; *Tu sancta humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, dulcem matris affectionem miseris tribuis, fatorum inextricabiliter contorta retractas litia, fortunæ tempestates mitigas, & stellarum noxios meatus cohibes: Te superi colunt, observant inferi. Tu rotas orbem, luminas solem, regis mundum, calcas Tartarum. Tibi respondent sydera, gaudent numina, serviunt elementa: tuo nutu spirant flamina, &c. Thou holy and perpetual saviour of mankind, that art always bountiful in cherishing mortals, and dost manifest the dear affections of a mother to them in their calamities, thou extricatest the involved threads of fate, mitigatest the tempests of fortune, and restrainest the noxious influences of the stars; the cœlestial gods worship thee, the infernal powers obey thee; thou rollest round the heavens, enlightenest the sun, governest the world, treadest upon* Tartarus, *or hell; the stars obey thee, the elements serve thee, at thy beck the winds blow,* &c. Where *Isis* is plainly supposed to be an universal *Numen* and supreme monarch of the world. Neither may this hinder, that she was called a goddess, as *Neith* also was; these Pagans making their Deities to be indifferently of either sex, male or female. But much more was *Osiris* taken for the supreme deity, whose name was sometimes said to have signified in the Egyptian language, πολυόφθαλμον, *that which had many eyes*; sometimes κρατοῦν ἐνεργὲν καὶ ἀγαθοποιὸν, *an active and beneficent force*; (and whose hieroglyphick was an eye and a scepter;) the former signifying providence and wisdom,

Metam. l. 12. [Lib. XI. p. 243.]

[1] Lib. XI. p. 254.

wisdom, and the latter power and majesty (as *Plutarch* tells us [1]) who also is thus described in *Apuleius*, *Deus deorum magnorum potior, & majorum summus, & summorum maximus, & maximorum regnator*, Osiris: *That God who is the chiefest of the greater Gods, and the greatest of the chiefest, and which reigneth over the greatest.* Wherefore the same *Apuleius* [2] also tells us, that *Isis* and *Osiris* were really one and the same supreme Numen, though considered under different notions, and worshipped with different rites, in these words; [3] *Quanquam connexa, imo vero unica, ratio Numinis, religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum: Though* Isis *and* Osiris *be really one and the same divine power, yet are their rites and ceremonies very different.* The proper notion of *Osiris* being thus declared by *Plutarch*, [4] τὸ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτατον πάντων, ὃ τἀγαθῷ ταὐτόν ἐστι, *that first and highest of all beings, which is the same with good.* Agreeably whereunto, *Jamblichus* [5] affirmeth, ἀγαθῶν ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, *that God, as the cause of all good, is called* Osiris *by the Egyptians.* Lastly, as for *Serapis*, though *Origen* [6] tells us, that this was a new upstart Deity, set up by *Ptolemy* in *Alexandria*, yet this God in his oracle [7] to *Nicocrion* the King of *Cyprus*, declares himself also to be a universal Numen, comprehending the whole world, in these words, οὐράνιος κόσμος κεφαλή, *&c.* to this sense; *The starry heaven is my head, the sea my belly, my ears are in the æther, and the bright light of the sun is my clear piercing eye.* And doubtless he was worshipped by many under this notion. For as *Philarchus* [8] wrote thus concerning him, Σάραπις ὄνομα τοῦ τὸ πᾶν κοσμοῦντος, *That* Serapis *was the name of that God, which orders and governs the whole world*; so doth *Plutarch* [9] himself conclude, that *Osiris* and *Serapis* were ἄμφω ἑνὸς θεοῦ καὶ μιᾶς δυνάμεως, *both of them names of one God, and the same divine power.* Accordingly whereunto *Diodorus Siculus* [10] determines, that these three, *Hammon, Osiris* and *Serapis*, were but different names for one and the same Deity, or supreme God. Notwithstanding which, *Porphyrius* [11], it seems, had a very ill conceit of that power which manifested it self in the temple of this god *Serapis*, above all the other Pagan gods, he suspecting it to be no other than the very prince of evil demons or devils: Τὰς δὴ πονηρὰς δαίμονας ἐκ εἰκῆ ὑπὸ τὸν Σαράπιν ὑποπτεύομεν· ἀδ' ἐκ τῶν συμβόλων μόνον ἀναπειθέντες, *&c. We do not vainly or without ground suspect and conjecture, that the evil dæmons are under* Serapis *as their prince and head: this appearing* (saith he) *not only from those rites of appeasement used in the worship of this God, but also from the symbol of him, which was a three-headed dog, signifying that evil dæmon, which ruleth in those three elements, water, earth and air.* Neither indeed can it be doubted, but that it was an evil dæmon or devil, that delivered oracles in this temple of *Serapis* as well as elsewhere among the Pagans, however he affected to be worshipped as the supreme God.

[1] De Iside & Osiride, p. 354, & p. 371. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] Metamorphos. Lib. XI. p. 258.
[3] Ibid. p. 256.
[4] De Iside & Osir. p. 372.
[5] De Myster. Ægypt. Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 159.
[6] Adversus Celsum Lib. V. p. 257. Ed. Cantabr.
[7] Apud Macrobium Saturnal. Lib. I. cap. XX. p. 299.
[8] De Iside & Osir. p. 362.
[9] Ibid. p. 361, 362.
[10] Vide Lib. I. cap. XXV. p. 21.
[11] Libro de Philosophia & Oraculis apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. Lib. IV. cap. XXIII. p. 175.

Beſides all this, *Euſebius* himſelf from *Porphyrius* informs us, that the Egyptians acknowledged one intellectual Demiurgus, or maker of the world, under the name of *Cneph*, whom they worſhipped in a ſtatue of human form, and a blackiſh ſky-colourd complexion; holding in his hand a girdle and a ſcepter, and wearing upon his head a princely plume, and thruſting forth an egg out of his mouth. The reaſon of which hieroglyphick is thus given, ὅτι λόγῳ δυσεύρετῳ καὶ κεκρυμμένῳ, καὶ ὑ φανὸς, καὶ ὅτι ζωοποιὸς, καὶ ὅτι βασιλεὺς, καὶ ὅτι νοερῶς κινεῖται· διὸ ἡ τῦ ἱερᾶ φύσις ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ κεῖται· *Becauſe that wiſdom and reaſon, by which the world was made, is not eaſy to be found out, but hidden and obſcure. And becauſe this is the fountain of life and king of all things; and becauſe it is intellectually moved, ſignified by the feathers upon his head. Moreover, by the egg thruſt out of the mouth of this God, was meant the world, created by the eternal* λόγος, *and from this* Cneph *was ſaid to be generated or produced another God, whom the Egyptians call* Phtha, *and the Greeks* Vulcan; of which *Phtha* more afterwards. That the Egyptians were the moſt eminent aſſerters of the Coſmogonia, or temporary beginning of the world, hath been already declared; for which cauſe the ſcholiaſt upon *Ptolemy* thus perſtringeth them, περιττῶς εἰώθασι λέγειν γένεσιν Αἰγύπτιοι κόσμυ, *the Egyptians were wont to talk perpetually of the geneſis or creation of the world.* And *Aſclepius*, an ancient Egyptian writer, in his *Myriogeneſis*, affirms, that according to the Egyptian tradition, the ſun was made in *Libra*. But that the Egyptians did not ſuppoſe the world to have been made by chance, as *Epicurus* and other atheiſtical philoſophers did, but by an intellectual Demiurgus called by them *Cneph*, is evident from this teſtimony of *Porphyrius*. Which *Cneph* was look'd upon by them as an unmade and eternal Deity, and for this very cauſe the inhabitants of *Thebais* refuſed to worſhip any other God beſides him, as *Plutarch* informs us in theſe words; εἰς δὲ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν τιμωμένων ζώων, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συντεταγμένα τελεῖν, μόνας δὲ μὴ διδόναι τὰς Θηβαΐδα κατοικᾶνλας, ὡς θνητὸν θεὸν ὐδένα νομίζοντες, ἀλλὰ ὃν καλᾶσιν αὐτοὶ Κνὴφ, ἀγένητον ὄντα καὶ ἀθάνατον· *Whilſt the other Egyptians paid their proportion of tax impoſed upon them, for the nouriſhment of thoſe ſacred animals, worſhipped by them, the inhabitants of* Thebais *only refuſed, becauſe they would acknowledge no mortal God, and worſhipped him only, whom they call* Cneph, *an unmade and eternal Deity.*

Prep. l. 3. c. 11. p. 115.

Scal. Emend. Temp. l. 5. de condit. mundi.

De Iſ. & Oſir. [p. 357.]

Having now made it undeniably manifeſt, that the Egyptians had an acknowledgment amongſt them of one ſupreme univerſal and unmade Deity, we ſhall conclude this whole diſcourſe with the two following obſervations; firſt, that a great part of the Egyptian Polytheiſm was really nothing elſe but the worſhipping of one and the ſame ſupreme God, under many different names and notions, as of *Hammon*, *Neith*, *Iſis*, *Oſiris*, *Serapis*, *Kneph*, to which may be added *Phtha*, and thoſe other names in *Jamblichus*, of *Eicton* and *Emeph*. And that the Pagans univerſally over the whole world did the like, was affirmed alſo by *Apuleius*, in that forecited paſſage of his, *Numen unicum, multiformi ſpecie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo, totus venera-*

veneratur orbis, the whole world worſhippeth one only ſupreme Numen *in a multiform manner, under different names, and with different rites.* Which different names for one and the ſame ſupreme God might therefore be miſtaken by ſome of the ſottiſh vulgar amongſt the Pagans, as well as they have been by learned men of theſe later times, for ſo many diſtinct, unmade and ſelf-exiſtent deities.

Nevertheleſs, here may well be a queſtion ſtarted, whether amongſt thoſe ſeveral Egyptian names of God, ſome might not ſignify diſtinct divine hypoſtaſes ſubordinate; and particularly, whether there were not ſome footſteps of a trinity to be found in the old Egyptian theology? For ſince *Orpheus*, *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who all of them aſſerted a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, unqueſtionably derived much of their doctrine from the Egyptians, it may reaſonably be ſuſpected, that theſe Egyptians did the like before them. And indeed *Athanaſius Kircherus* makes no doubt at all hereof, but tells us that, in the Pamphylian obeliſk, that firſt hieroglyphick of a winged globe, with a ſerpent coming out of it, was the Egyptian hieroglyphick of a triform Deity, or trinity of divine hypoſtaſes; he confirming the ſame, from the teſtimony of *Abenephius* an Arabian writer, and a Chaldaick fragment imputed to *Sanchoniathon*; the globe being ſaid to ſignify the firſt incomprehenſible Deity, without beginning or end, ſelf-exiſtent; the ſerpent the divine wiſdom and creative virtue; and laſtly, the wings that active ſpirit, that cheriſheth, quickneth, and enliveneth all things. How far credit is to be given to this, we leave others to judge; but the cleareſt footſteps that we can find any where of an *Egyptian* trinity is in *Jamblichus* his book, written concerning their myſteries; which whole place therefore is worth the ſetting down: Κατ' ἄλλην δὲ τάξιν προστάτλει [Ἑρμῆς] θεὸν τὸν Ἥμηφ, τῶν ἐπουρανίων θεῶν ἡγέμενον, ὃν φησὶν νῦν εἶναι αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν νοοῦντα, καὶ τὰς νοήσεις εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφοντα. Τάτῳ δὲ ἓν ἄμερες, καὶ ὃ φησι τὸ πρῶτον μάγευμα προτάτλι, ὃν καὶ Εἰκτὼν ἐπονομάζει, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πρῶτον ἐστι νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ιοητὸν, ὃ δὴ καὶ διὰ σιγῆς μόνης θεραπεύεται. Ἐπὶ δὲ τάτοις———— ὁ δημιόργικός νῦς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας προστάτης, καὶ σοφίᾳ ἐρχόμενος μὲν ἐστι γένεσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπλίων γλώσσαν λέγεται, συλελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς μετ' ἀληθείας Φθᾶ, Ἕλληνες δὲ εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνσι τὸν Φθᾶ, τῷ τεκνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει. *According to another order or method,* Hermes *places the god* Emeph *, as the prince and ruler over all the celeſtial gods, whom he affirmeth to be a mind underſtanding himſelf, and converting his cogitations or intellections into himſelf. Before which* Emeph *, he placeth one indiviſible, whom he calleth* Eicton, *in which is the firſt intelligible, and which is worſhipped only by ſilence. After which two,* Eicton *and* Emeph *, the demiurgick mind and preſident of truth as with wiſdom it proceedeth to generations, and bringeth forth the hidden powers of the occult reaſons into light, is called in the Egyptian language* Ammon; *as it artificially affects all things with truth,* Ptha (*which* Ptha, *the Greeks attending only to the artificialneſs thereof, call* Hepheſtus *or* Vulcan) *as it is productive of good,* Oſiris, *beſides other names that it hath, according to its other*

* or *Cneph.*

* or *Cneph.*

* or *Cneph.*

powers and energies. In which paſſage of *Jamblichus*[1] we have plainly three divine hypoſtaſes, or univerſal principles ſubordinate, according to the Hermaick theology; firſt, an indiviſible unity called *Eicton*; ſecondly, a perfect mind, converting its intellections into it ſelf, called *Emeph* or *Hemphta*; and thirdly, the immediate principle of generation, called by ſeveral names, according to its ſeveral powers, as *Phtha*, *Ammon*, *Oſiris*, and the like: ſo that theſe three names with others, according to *Jamblichus*, did in the Egyptian theology ſignify, one and the ſame third divine hypoſtaſis. How well theſe three divine hypoſtaſes of the Egyptians agree with the Pythagorick or Platonick trinity, of firſt, τὸ ἓν or ταγαθὸν, *unity and goodneſs* it ſelf, ſecondly, νοῦς, *mind*, and thirdly ψυχὴ, *ſoul*, I need not here declare. Only we ſhall call to mind what hath been already intimated, that that reaſon or wiſdom, which was the *Demiurgus* of the world, and is properly the ſecond of the forementioned hypoſtaſes, was called alſo among the Egyptians, by another name, *Cneph*; from whom was ſaid to have been produced or begotten the god *Phtha*, the third hypoſtaſis of the Egyptian trinity; ſo that *Cneph* and *Emeph* are all one. Wherefore we have here plainly an Egyptian trinity of divine hypoſtaſis ſubordinate, *Eicton*, *Emeph* (or *Cneph*) and *Phtha*. We know not what to add more to this of *Jamblichus*, concerning an Egyptian trinity, unleſs we ſhould inſiſt upon thoſe paſſages, which have been cited by ſome of the fathers to this purpoſe out of Hermaick or Triſmegiſtick books, whereof there was one before ſet down out of St. *Cyril*; or unleſs we ſhould again call to mind that citation out of *Damaſcius*[2], μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ σκότος ἄγνωστον ὑμνεμένη καὶ τοῦτο τρὶς ἀναφωνέμενον ἔτως, *that according to the Egyptians, there is one principle of all things praiſed under the name of the unknown darkneſs, and this thrice repeated.* Agreeably to which, *Auguſtinus Steuchus* produces another paſſage out of the ſame philoſophick writer; that the Egyptians made, πρώτην ἀρχὴν σκότῳ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν, σκότος ἄγνωστον, τρὶς τοῦτο ἐπιφημίζοντες, *the firſt principle of all, to be darkneſs above all knowledge and underſtanding (or unknown darkneſs) they thrice repeating the ſame.* Which the forementioned *Steuchus* takes to be a clear acknowledgment of a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes in the Egyptian theology.

Our ſecond obſervation is this, that the Egyptian theology as well as the Orphick (which was derived from it) aſſerting one incorporeal Deity, that is *all things*; as it is evident, that it could not admit a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent and independent deities, ſo did the ſeeming polytheiſm of theſe Egyptians proceed alſo in great meaſure from this principle of theirs not rightly underſtood; they being led thereby, in a certain ſenſe, θεοποιεῖν, *to perſonate and deify* the ſeveral parts of the world, and things of nature, beſtowing the names of gods and goddeſſes upon them. Not that they therefore worſhipped the inanimate parts of the world as ſuch, much leſs things not ſubſtantial, but mere accidents, for ſo many real, diſtinct, perſonal deities; but becauſe conceiving that God, who was all things, ought to be worſhipped in all things (ſuch eſpecially as were moſt beneficial to mankind) they did, according to that Aſclepian and Triſmegiſtick doctrine before-mentioned, call God

[1] De Myſter. Ægypt. Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 158, 159.
[2] Vide Wolfii Anecdot. Græca p. 260.

God by the name of every thing, or every thing by the name of God. And that the wiſer of them very well underſtood, that it was really one and the ſame ſimple Deity, that was thus worſhipped amongſt them by piece-meal, in the ſeveral parts of the world, and things of nature, and under different names and notions, with different ceremonies, is thus declared by *Plutarch*; *De Iſ. & Oſ.* 351.

Ἑλληνικὸν ἡ Ἶσις ἐστι, καὶ ὁ Τυφὼν πολέμιος τῇ θεῷ, καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἀπάτην τετυφωμένος, καὶ διασπῶν καὶ ἀφανίζων τὸν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἡ θεὸς συνάγει καὶ συντίθησι, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς τελουμένοις θειώσεως· Iſis *is a Greek word, which ſignifies knowledge; and* Typhon *is the enemy to this goddeſs; who being puffed up by ignorance and error, doth diſtract and diſcerp the holy doctrine (of the ſimple Deity) which* Iſis *collects together again, and makes up into one, and thus delivers it to thoſe who are initiated into her ſacred myſteries, in order to deification.* In which words, *Plutarch* intimates, that the Egyptian fable, of *Oſiris* being mangled and cut in pieces by *Typhon*, did allegorically ſignify the diſcerption and diſtraction of the ſimple Deity, by reaſon of the weakneſs and ignorance of vulgar minds (not able to comprehend it altogether at once) into ſeveral names and partial notions, which yet true knowledge and underſtanding, that is, *Iſis*, makes up whole again, and unites into one.

XIX. It is well known, that the poets, though they were the prophets of the Pagans, and pretending to a kind of divine inſpiration, did otherwiſe embue the minds of the vulgar with a certain ſenſe of religion, and the notions of morality, yet theſe notwithſtanding were the grand depravers and adulterators of the Pagan theology. For this they were guilty of upon ſeveral accounts. As firſt, their attributing to the gods, in their fables concerning them, all manner of human imperfections, paſſions and vices. Which abuſe of theirs the wiſer of the Pagans were in all ages highly ſenſible of and offended with, as partly appears from theſe free paſſages vented upon the ſtage;

——Καὶ γὰρ ὅστις ὢν βροτῶν
Κακὸς πεφύκει, ζημιοῦσθαι δεῖ θεούς·
Πῶς οὖν δίκαιον, τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βροτοῖς
Γράψαντας, αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;

——*Si quis eſt mortalium*
Qui ſcelera patrat, exigunt pœnam dei:
At nonne iniquum eſt, vos, ſuas leges quibus
Gens debet hominum, jure nullo vivere?

Eurip. in Ione, [Ex Florilegio Stobæi apud Hugon. Grotium in Excerpt veterum Comicor. & Tragicor. p. 334]

To this ſenſe: *Since mortal men are puniſhed by the gods for tranſgreſſing their laws, is it not unjuſt, that ye Gods, who write theſe laws, ſhould yourſelves live without law?* And again,

——Οὐκέτ' ἀνθρώπους κακῶς
Λέγειν δίκαιον, εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν κακὰ
Μιμούμεθ', ἀλλὰ τοὺς διδάσκοντας τάδε.

——*Nulla*

———*Nulla nos poſthac notet*
Cenſura, ſiquando iſta, quæ ſuperos decent,
Imitamur homines. Culpa ad auctores redit.

Let men no longer be blamed for imitating the evil actions of the gods; for they can only be juſtly blamed, who teach men to do ſuch things by their examples.

Secondly, the poets were further guilty of depraving the religion and theology of the Pagans, by their ſo frequently perſonating and deifying all the things of nature and parts of the world, and calling them by the names of thoſe gods, that were ſuppos'd to preſide over them; that is, of the ſeveral divine powers manifeſted in them. This *Plutarch*[1] taxes the poets with, where giving directions for young mens reading of their writings, he thus ſeaſonably cautions againſt the danger of it; τοῦτο δὲ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλοιμεν ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφεληθήσεσθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι, τὸ γινώσκειν πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται.——χρῶνται δὲ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι οἱ ποιηταὶ, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπτόμενοι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὰς, ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δωτῆρές εἰσι καὶ καθηγεμόνες, ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες· *It is very profitable and neceſſary, if we would receive good from the writings of the poets, and not hurt, that we ſhould underſtand how they uſe the names of the gods in different ſenſes. Wherefore the poets ſometimes uſe the names of the gods properly, as intending to ſignify thereby the gods themſelves, and ſometimes again they uſe them improperly and equivocally, for thoſe powers which the gods are the givers and diſpenſers of, or the things which they preſide over.* As for example, *Vulcan* is ſometimes uſed by the poets for that God or divine power, which preſides over fire and the arts that operate by fire, and ſometimes again the word is taken by them for fire it ſelf. So *Mars*, in like manner, is ſometimes uſed for the God, which preſides over military affairs, and ſometimes again it ſignifies nothing elſe but war. An inſtance whereof is there given by *Plutarch* out of *Sophocles*:

Τυφλὸς γὰρ, ὦ γυναῖκες, ὡσ' ὁρῶν Ἄρης,
Συὸς προσώπῳ, πάντα τυρβάζει κακά·

Mars (*O Mulieres*) *cæcus hirſuto ſuis*
Velut ore frendens, cuncta commiſcet mala.

And we might give this other inſtance of the ſame from *Virgil*,

———*Furit toto Mars impius orbe.*

For the God of war, that is, the divine providence that preſides over military affairs, could not be called impious or wicked, but it is war it ſelf that is there ſo ſtyled.

Indeed we ſhall afterwards make it appear, that the firſt original of this buſineſs, proceeded from a certain philoſophick opinion amongſt the Pagans,

[1] De audiendis Poetis p. 22. Tom. II. Oper.

Pagans, that God was diffuſed throughout the whole world, and was himſelf in a manner all things, and therefore ought to be worſhipped in all things: but the poets were principally the men, who carried it on thus far, by perſonating the ſeveral inanimate parts of the world and things of nature, to make ſuch a multitude of diſtinct gods and goddeſſes of them. Which humour, though it were chiefly indulged by them, ψυχαγωγίας ἕνεκεν, *only for the delight and pleaſure of the reader*, beſides gratifying their own poetick fancies; yet was it a matter of dangerous conſequence, as the ſame *Plutarch* gravely and ſoberly adviſes, in his book *de Iſide*, it begetting in ſome groſs and irrational ſuperſtition (that is, in our Chriſtian language, idolatry) and carrying others on to downright impiety and atheiſm. But this will be afterwards alſo again inſiſted on.

Wherefore, in the next place, we ſhall obſerve, that the poets did alſo otherwiſe deprave the theology of the Pagans, ſo as to make it look ſomewhat more Ariſtocratically, and this principally two manner of ways; firſt, by their ſpeaking ſo much of the gods in general and without diſtinction, and attributing the government of the whole world to them in common, ſo as if it were managed and carried on, *communi conſilio deorum*, *by a common-council and republick of gods*, wherein all things were determined by a majority of votes, and as if their *Jupiter*, or ſupreme god, were no more amongſt them, than a ſpeaker of a houſe of lords or commons, or the chairman of a committee. In which they did indeed attribute more to their inferior deities, than, according to their own principles, they ought.

And ſecondly, (which is the laſt depravation of the Pagan theology by theſe poets) by their making thoſe, that were really nothing elſe but ſeveral names and notions of one and the ſame ſupreme Deity, according to its ſeveral powers manifeſted in the world, or the different effects produced by it, to be ſo many really diſtinct perſons and gods; inſomuch as ſometimes to be at odds and variance with one another, and even with *Jupiter* himſelf. This St. *Baſil* ſeems to take notice of, in his oration, *how young men may be profited by the writings of the Greeks* [1]; πάντων δὲ ἥκιστα περὶ Θεῶν τι διαλεγομένοις (ποιηταῖς) προσέξομεν, καὶ μάλιστ' ὅταν, ὡς περὶ πολλῶν τε αὐτῶν διεξίωσι, καὶ τούτων οὐδὲ ὁμονοούντων· *But leaſt of all will we give credit to the poets, where they diſcourſe concerning the gods, and ſpeak of them as many (diſtinct and independent) perſons, and that not agreeing amongſt themſelves neither, but ſiding ſeveral ways, and perpetually quarrelling with one another.*

Notwithſtanding all which extravagancies and miſcarriages of the poets, we ſhall now make it plainly to appear, that they really aſſerted, not a multitude of ſelf-exiſtent and independent deities, but one only unmade Deity, and all the other, generated or created gods. This hath been already proved concerning *Orpheus*, from ſuch fragments of the Orphick poems, as have been owned and atteſted by Pagan writers: but it would be further evident, might we give credit to any of thoſe other Orphick verſes, that are found cited by

[1] P. 16. Edit. Oxon. Joh. Potteri.

by Chriſtians and Jews only (and we cannot reaſonably conclude all theſe to be counterfeit and ſuppoſititious) amongſt which we have this for one [1],

Εἷς ἐς' αὐτογενὴς, ἑνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα τέτυκται,

There is one only unmade God, and all other gods and things are the off-ſpring of this one. Moreover, when God, in the ſame Orphick fragments, is ſtyled Μητρο-πάτωρ, *both father and mother of all things* (accordingly as it was obſerved before) that both the Orphick and Egyptian theology made the ſupreme Deity eſpecially, to be ἀῤῥηνόθηλυν, *hermaphroditical*, or *male and female together*; this, as *Clemens Alexandrinus* [2] rightly interprets the meaning of it, was to ſignify, τὴν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γένεσιν, *the production of things out of nothing*, or from the Deity alone, without any pre-exiſtent or ſelf-exiſtent matter.

But we ſhall paſs from *Orpheus* to *Homer*. Now it is certain, that *Homer*'s Gods were not all eternal, unmade and ſelf-exiſtent, he plainly declaring the contrary concerning the gods in general; that they had a *Geneſis*, that is, a temporary production, as in that forecited verſe of his [3],

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, &c.

The ocean from whence the gods were generated; where, by gods are meant all the animated parts of the world ſuperior to men, but principally (as *Euſtathius* obſerves) the ſtars, θεῶν ἀντὶ ἀστέρων, *gods* (ſaith he) *are here put for ſtars*. And as the ſame philologer further adds, the gods or ſtars do by a ſynechdoche ſignify all things, or the whole world, ἀντὶ τοῦ πάντων ὡς ἀπὸ μέρους, *a part being put for the whole*, accordingly as the ſame poet elſewhere [4] declares his ſenſe, ſpeaking likewiſe of the ocean,

——— Ὅς γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται,

Which was the original of all things, or from whence (not only the gods, but alſo) all other things were generated. Wherefore the full meaning of *Homer* was this, that the gods or ſtars, together with this whole viſible world, had a temporary production, and were at firſt made out of the ocean, that is, out of the watry chaos. So that *Homer's Theogonia*, as well as *Heſiod*'s, was one and the ſame thing with the *Coſmogonia*; his generation of gods the ſame with the generation or creation of the world, both of them having, in all probability, derived it from the Moſaick *Cabala*, or tradition. And *Euſtathius* tells us, that, according to the ancients, *Homer*'s ἀσπιδοποιία, deſcribed *Il.* σ. was αἴνιγμα τῆς κοσμογενείας, *an obſcure ſignification of the* Coſmogenia, *or* Coſmogonia.

Nevertheleſs

[1] Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes Cap. VII. p. 64. Vide etiam Euſeb. Præpar. Evangel. Lib. XIII. cap. XII. & Theodoret. de curandis Græcorum affect. ſerm. I. Tom. II. Oper. p. 475.

[2] Stromatum Lib. V. p. 724.

[3] Ibid. ver. 201 & 202.

[4] Ibid. ver. 246.

thus generated from the ocean or watry chaos, yet this is to be underſtood only of the inferiour Gods, and he is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from them, who in the ſame poet is frequently called, ὁ θεὸς κατ' ἐξοχήν, *God by way of eminency*, (to whom he plainly aſcribes omnipotence) and Ζεὺς, or *Jupiter*, whom he ſtyleth κάρτιστον ἁπάντων, *the moſt powerful of all*, and πρῶτα θεῶν, *the firſt and chiefeſt of the gods, and* ὕπατον θεῶν and κρειόντων, *the higheſt of gods and governours*, and whom he affirmeth infinitely to tranſcend the gods, *Il.* θ.[1]

Τόσσον ἐγὼ περί τ' εἰμὶ θεῶν, περί τ' εἶμ' ἀνθρώπων.

And to reign as well over gods as men, *Il.* α.[2]

——ὅς τε θεοῖσι κὴ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀνάσσει.

Laſtly, whom he maketh to be πατέρα θεῶν, *the father of the Gods as well as men*; that is, nothing leſs than the creator of them and the whole world. He therefore, who thus produced the gods and ſtars out of the ocean or watry chaos, muſt needs be excluded out of that number of gods, ſo as not to have been himſelf generated or made out of it. Thus have we before obſerved, that οἱ θεοὶ, or *the gods* in general, are frequently taken, both by *Homer* and other Greek writers, in way of diſtinction from ὁ θεὸς, or *Jupiter*, that is, for the inferiour gods only.

It is true indeed, that others of the Pagan gods, beſides *Jupiter*, were by the Latins in their ſolemn rites and prayers ſtyled *patres*, *fathers*; and as *Jupiter* is nothing elſe but *Jovis pater*, contracted into one word, ſo was *Mars* called by them *Marſpiter*, and *Saturnus*, *Janus*, *Neptunus* and *Liber* had the like addition alſo made to their names, *Saturnuſpater*, *Januſpater*, *Neptunuſpater*, *Liberpater*: and not only ſo, but even their very heroes alſo (as for example, *Quirinus*) had this honourable title of father beſtowed on them; all which appeareth from thoſe verſes of *Lucilius*,[3]

Ut nemo ſit noſtrum, quin aut pater optimus divûm,
Aut Neptunus pater, Liber, Saturnus pater, Mars,
Janus, Quirinus pater nomen dicatur ad unum.

Notwithſtanding which, here is a great difference to be obſerved, that though thoſe other gods were called Fathers, yet none of them was ever called, either by the Greeks πατὴρ θεῶν, or by the Latins, *pater optimus divûm*, ſave only Ζεὺς or *Jupiter*, the ſupreme Deity.

And that *Homer* was thus generally underſtood by the Pagans themſelves to have aſſerted a divine monarchy, or one ſupreme Deity ruling over all, may further appear from theſe following citations. *Plutarch* in his Platonick queſtions, [4] κὴ Ξενοκράτης Δία Ὕπατον καλεῖ, πρότερον δὲ Ὅμηρος τὸν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντα θεὸν, ὕπατον κρειόντων προσεῖπε· Zenocrates *called* Jupiter, Hypaton, *or the higheſt*; *but before him* Homer *ſtyled that God, who is the prince*

[1] Verſ. 20.
[2] Verſ. 281.

[3] Apud Lactant. Divin. Inſtit. Lib. IV. cap. III. p. 408.
[4] P. 1007. Tom. II. Oper.

of all princes, ὕπατον κρειόντων, *the higheſt of rules or governours.* Again,
P. 371. the ſame *Plutarch de Iſide & Oſiride*, Τὸν δὲ Ὄσιριν αὖ πάλιν ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ σκήπτρῳ γράφουσι, ὧν τὸ μὲν τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐμφαίνει, τὸ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν· ὡς Ὁμηρος τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλεύοντα πάντων Ζῆν ὕπατον καὶ μήστωρα καλῶν, ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ὑπάτῳ τὸ κρατὸς αὐτῷ, τῷ δὲ μήστωρι τὴν εὐβουλίαν καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν σημαίνειν· *The Egyptians, when they deſcribed* Oſiris *by thoſe hieroglyphicks of an eye and a ſcepter, did by the former of them ſignify Providence, and by the latter Power*; *as* Homer, *when he calls that* Ζεὺς *or* Jupiter, *who ruleth and reigneth over all things,* ὕπατον and μήστωρα, *ſeems by the word* ὕπατον *to denote his power and ſovereignty, but*
P. 96. [Lib. II. in Timæum Platon.] *by* μήστωρα *his wiſdom and knowledge.* To *Plutarch* may be added *Proclus*, who, upon *Plato*'s *Timæus*, having proved that, according to that philoſopher, there was τοῦ κόσμου παντὸς εἷς καὶ ὅλος δημιουργὸς, *one only maker of the whole world*, affirms the ſame likewiſe of that divine poet *Homer*, (as he there ſtyles him) ὃς καὶ διὰ πάσης ποιήσεως ὕπατον κρειόντων καὶ πατέρα ἀνδρῶν καὶ θεῶν αὐτὸν ἀνυμνεῖ, καὶ πᾶσιν εὐφημεῖ τοῖς δημιουργικοῖς νοήμασιν· *That he alſo throughout all his poeſy praiſes* Jupiter, *as the higheſt of all rulers, and the father both of gods and men, and attributes all demiurgical notions to him.* Whereupon he concludes in this manner, οὕτω τοίνυν σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θεολογίαν ἀπεφήναμεν, τῷ Διὶ τὴν ὅλην δημιουργίαν ἀπονέμουσαν· *And thus we have made it manifeſt, that all the Greekiſh theology univerſally aſcribes to* Ζεὺς, *or* Jupiter, *the making of all things.* Laſtly, *Ariſtotle* himſelf confirmeth the ſame with his teſtimony, where he writes of the paternal authority after this manner,
De Rep. L. I. c. 12. [p. 412. Tom. III. Oper.] τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλικὴ· διὸ καλῶς Ὁμηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπών,

——— Πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε,

τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἁπάντων· φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον, καὶ ὁ γεννήτας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον· *The paternal power or authority over children is a kingly authority: wherefore* Homer, *when he intended to ſet forth* Jupiter's *kingly power over all, very well called him the father of men and gods. For he, that is king by nature, ought both to differ from thoſe that he reigneth over, and alſo to be of the ſame kind with them*; *as the ſenior is to the junior, and he that begetteth to his off-ſpring.* Where *Ariſtotle*'s ſenſe ſeems to be this, that *Jupiter* had therefore a natural and not acquired kingly power over all the Gods, becauſe they were all his off-ſpring and begotten by him, as well as men. In which paſſage therefore *Ariſtotle* plainly acquits and frees *Homer* from all ſuſpicion of atheiſm.

As for *Heſiod*, if we had not already ſufficiently prov'd from his *Theogonia*, that all his Gods (that is, his inferiour deities) were generated and made, as well as men, it might be made unqueſtionably evident from this verſe of his in his *Opera*,[1]

Ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι.

When the Gods and mortal men, were both together, alike made or generated. Where the word ὁμόθεν is thus interpreted by the Greek ſcholiaſts, ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς

[1] Verſ. 108, 109, 110.

αὐτῆς ῥίζης and ἐκ τᾶ αὐτᾶ γένας, i. e. *the Gods and men, were both alike made from the ſame root or ſtock.* And though it followeth immediately after,

Χρύσεον μὲν πρώτιστα γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες,

That firſt of all a golden age of men was made by the immortal Gods; yet *Moſchopulus* there notes, Ἀθάνατοι ποίησαν, ὁ Ζεὺς μόνος ἐποίησεν, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων φάνερον γίνεται· λέγει δὲ πάντας τὰς θεὰς, τὸ τᾶ ἑνὸς ἔργον ἐπὶ πάντας τὰς ὁμοειδεῖς ἀναφέρων· *The immortal gods made*; *the true meaning* (ſaith he) *is, that* Jupiter *alone made this firſt golden age of men*; *as may be proved from other places in the ſame poet*; *and though he ſpeak of the gods in general, yet doth he but transfer that, which was the work of one upon all of the like kind. And there are ſeveral other inſtances of this poet's uſing* θεοὶ *for* θεὸς, *gods for god.* But it is poſſible, that *Heſiod*'s meaning might be the ſame with *Plato*'s [1], that though the inferiour mundane gods were all made at firſt by the ſupreme God, as well as men, yet they being made ſomething ſooner than men, did afterwards contribute alſo to the making of men.

But *Heſiod*'s *Theogonia*, or generation of gods, is not to be underſtood univerſally neither, but only of the inferiour gods, that Ζεὺς or *Jupiter* being to be excepted out of the number of them, whom the ſame *Heſiod*, as well as *Homer*, makes to be the father of gods, as alſo the king of them, in theſe words [2],

Αὐτὸς γὰρ πάντων βασιλεὺς καὶ κοίρανος ἐστὶν
Ἀθανάτων.

And attributes the creation of all things to him, as *Proclus* writeth upon this place,

[3] Οὗ τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὅμως, &c.

By whom all mortal men are, δι' οὗ πάντα, καὶ οὐκ αὐτομάτως· πάντα τῷ Διὶ προσαναπλάττει, *by whom all things are, and not by chance*; *the poet, by a ſynecdoche, here aſcribing the making of all to* Jupiter. Wherefore *Heſiod*'s *Theogonia* is to be underſtood of the inferiour Gods only, and not of Ζεὺς or *Jupiter*, who was the father and maker of them (though out of a watery chaos) and himſelf therefore αὐτοφυὴς, *ſelf-exiſtent* or unmade.

In like manner, that *Pindar*'s gods were not eternal, but made or generated, is plainly declared by him in theſe words;

Ἓν ἀνδρῶν, ἓν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ
Μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν
Μητρὸς ἀμφότεροι. *Nem. Od. 6.* [p. 120. Edit. Schmidii.]

[1] In Timæo, p. 530. Oper.
[2] Apud Clement. Alexandr. in Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. VII, p. 63. Tom. I. Edit. Potteri.
[3] Heſiodi Opera & Dies, verſ. 3.

Unum Hominum, unum Deorum genus,
Et ex una ſpiramus
Matre utrique.

There is one kind both of gods and men, and we both breathe from the ſame mother, or ſpring from the ſame original. Where by the common mother both of gods and men, the ſcholiaſt underſtands the earth and chaos, taking the gods here for the inferiour deities only, and principally the ſtars. [1]

This of *Pindar*'s therefore is to be underſtood of all the other gods, that they were made as well as men out of the earth or chaos, but not of that ſupreme Deity, whom the ſame *Pindar* elſewhere calls θεῶν κράτιſτον, *the moſt powerful of the Gods*, and τὸν πάντων κύριον, *the lord of all things*, and παντὶ αἴτιον, *the cauſe of every thing*, and ἀριſτοτέχνην θεὸν, *that God who is the beſt artificer*, or was *the framer of the whole world*, and as *Clemens Alexandrinus* tells us, [2] τὸ πᾶν, or *the univerſe*. Which God alſo, according to *Pindar*, *Chiron* inſtructed *Achilles* to worſhip principally, above all the other gods.

Pyth. Od. 6. [p. 260]
——μάλιſτα μὲν Κρονίδαν
Βαρυόπαν, ſτεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν,
Θεῶν σέβεſαι·

The ſenſe of which words is thus declared by the ſcholiaſt, ἐξαιρέτως τὸν μεγαλόφωνον ἀſτραπῶν καὶ κεκραυνῶν δεσπότην τὸν Δία, παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας θεὰς τιμᾶν καὶ σέβεσθαι. *That he ſhould honour and worſhip the loud-ſounding* Jupiter, *the lord of thunder and lightning, tranſcendently above all the other gods.* Which by the way confutes the opinion of thoſe, who contend, that the ſupreme God, as ſuch, was not at all worſhipped by the Pagans.

However, this is certain concerning theſe three, *Homer*, *Heſiod*, and *Pindar*, that they muſt of neceſſity either have been all abſolute Atheiſts, in acknowledging no eternal Deity at all, but making ſenſeleſs Chaos, Night and the Ocean, the original of all their gods without exception, and therefore of *Jupiter* himſelf too, that king and father of them; or elſe aſſert one only eternal unmade ſelf-exiſtent deity, ſo as that all the other gods were generated or created by that one. Which latter doubtleſs was their genuine ſenſe; and the only reaſon, why *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* might poſſibly ſometime have a ſuſpicion of the contrary, ſeems to have been this, their not underſtanding that Moſaick Cabala, which both *Heſiod* and *Homer* followed, of the world's, that is, both heaven and earth's, being made at firſt out of a watry chaos; for thus is the tradition declared by St. *Peter*, ep. II. ch. 3.

There might be ſeveral remarkable paſſages to the ſame purpoſe, produced out of thoſe two tragick poets, *Æſchylus* and *Sophocles*; which yet, becauſe they have been already cited by *Juſtin Martyr*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*,

[1] Vide Clement. Alexand. Stromat. Lib. V. p. 710. [2] Ibid. p. 726.

drinus, and others; to avoid unneceſſary tediouſneſs, we ſhall here paſs by. Only we think fit to obſerve concerning that one famous paſſage of *Sophocles* [1],

Εἷς ταῖς ἀληθείαισιν, εἷς ἐστὶν Θεὸς,
Ὃς οὐρανόν τ' ἔτευξε καὶ γαῖαν μακρὰν,
Πόντου τε χάροπον οἴδμα, κἀνέμων βίαν, &c.

Unus profectò, unus eſt tantùm Deus,
Cœli ſolique machinam qui condidit,
Vadumque ponti cærulum, & vim ſpiritus, &c.

There is in truth one only God, who made heaven and earth, the ſea, air, and winds, &c. After which followeth alſo ſomething againſt image-worſhip; that though this be ſuch as might well become a Chriſtian, and be no where now to be found in thoſe extant tragedies of this poet (many whereof have been loſt) yet the ſincerity thereof cannot reaſonably be at all ſuſpected by us, it having been cited by ſo many of the ancient fathers in their writings againſt the Pagans, as particularly *Athenagoras*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Juſtin Martyr*, *Euſebius*, *Cyril* and *Theodoret*; of which number *Clemens* tells us [2], that it was atteſted likewiſe by that ancient Pagan hiſtoriographer *Hecatæus*. But there are ſo many places to our purpoſe in *Euripides*, that we cannot omit them all in his *Supplices* we have this, wherein all men's abſolute dependence upon *Jupiter*, or one ſupreme Deity, is fully acknowledged [3].

Ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς
Φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα,
Δρῶμεν τε τοιαῦτ', ἂν σύ τυγχάνῃς θέλων.

Miſeros quid homines, O deûm rex & pater,
Sapere arbitramur? Pendet è nutu tuo
Res noſtra, facimuſque illa quæ viſum tibi.

We have alſo this excellent prayer to the ſupreme governour of heaven and earth, cited out of the ſame tragedian [4]:

Σοὶ τῶν πάντων μεδεόντι χοὴν,
Πέλανον τε φέρω Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος σὺ γὰρ ἐν τε θεοῖς τοῖς ἀρχαίοις,
Σκῆπτρον τὸ Διὸς μεταχειρίζων,
Χθονίων θ' Ἅιδη μετέχεις ἀρχῆς·
Πέμψον μὲν φῶς ψυχαῖς ἀνέρων
Ταῖς βουλομέναις ἄθλως προμαθεῖν
Πόθεν ἔβλαστον, τίς ῥίζα κακῶν,
Τίνι δεῖ μακάρων εὖ θυσαμένους
Εὑρεῖν μόχθων ἀνάπαυλαν·

Tibi

[1] Ex Stobœi Eclog. apud Hugon. Grot. in Excerpt. veter. Comicor. & Tragic. p. 148.
[2] Stromat. Lib. V. p. 717.
[3] Ver 734, 735, 736.
[4] Apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. Lib. V. p. 688. Vide Hug. Grotii Excerpta, p. 431.

Tibi (cunctorum domino) vinum,
Salſamque molam fero, ſeu Ditis,
Tu ſive Jovis *nomine gaudes :*
Tu namque deos ſuperos inter
Sceptrum tractas ſublime Jovis ;
Idem regnum terreſtre tenes.
Te lucem animis infunde virûm,
Qui ſcire volunt, quo fata mentis
Luctа ſit ortu, quæ cauſa mali ;
Cui cœlicolûm rite litando
Requiem ſit habere laborum.

Where we may obſerve that Ζεὺς and Ἅιδης, *Jupiter* and *Pluto*, are both of them ſuppoſed to be names equally belonging to one and the ſame ſupreme God. And the ſum of the prayer is this, *That God would infuſe light into the ſouls of men, whereby they might be enabled to know, what is the root, from whence all their evils ſpring, and by what means they may avoid them.*

Laſtly, there is another devotional paſſage, cited out of *Euripides* [1], which contains alſo a clear acknowledgment of one ſelf-exiſtent being, that comprehends and governs the whole world :

Σὲ τὸν Αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
Ῥόμβῳ, πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ',
Οὗ πέρι μὲν φῶς, πέριδ' ὀρφναία
Νὺξ αἰολόχρως· ἄκριτός τ' ἄστρων
Ὄχλος ἐνδιλεχῶς· ἀμφιχορεύει·

Thou ſelf-ſprung being, that doſt all enfold,
And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabrick hold!
Who art encircled with reſplendent light,
And yet ly'ſt mantled o'er in ſhady night!
About whom, the exultant ſtarry fires
Dance nimbly round in everlaſting gyres.

For this ſenſe of the third and fourth verſes, which we think the words will bear, and which agrees with that Orphick paſſage

——·——Περὶ γὰρ νέφος ἐστήρικται,

That God being in himſelf a moſt bright and dazzling light, is reſpectively to us, and, by reaſon of the weakneſs of our underſtanding, *covered over with a thick cloud* ; as alſo with that in the ſcripture, *clouds and darkneſs are round about him :* I ſay, this ſenſe we choſe rather to follow, as more rich and auguſt, than that other vulgar one, though grammatically and poetically good alſo ; *That ſucceſſive day and night, together with a numberleſs multitude of ſtars, perpetually dance round about the Deity.*

Ariſtophanes in the very beginning of his *Plutus* diſtinguiſheth betwixt Ζεὺς and θεοὶ, Jupiter *and the gods* ;

Ὡς

[1] Apud Clement. Alexand. ubi ſupra, p. 717.

Ὡς ἀργαλέον πρᾶγμ' ἐστὶ ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ Θεοί, &c.

And we have this clear testimony of *Terpander*, cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus* [1], Ζεῦ πάντων ἀρχὰ, Ζεῦ πάντων ἀγήτωρ, *Thou* Jupiter, *who art the original of all things, thou* Jupiter *who art the governour of all.* And these following verses are attributed to *Menander* [2];

Τὸν ὄντα πάντων κύριον γενικώτατον
Καὶ πατέρα, τοῦτον διατέλει τιμᾶν μόνον,
Ἀγαθῶν τοιούτων εὑρέτην καὶ κλίστορα·

Rerum universarum imperatorem & patrem,
Solum perpetuo colere suppliciter decet,
Artificem tantæ & largitorem copiæ.

Where men are exhorted to worship the supreme God only, as the sole author of all good, or at least transcendently above all the other gods. There are also two remarkable testimonies, one of *Hermesianax* an ancient Greek poet, and another of *Aratus*, to the same purpose; which shall both be reserved for other places.

Wherefore we pass from the Greek to the Latin poets, where *Ennius* first appears deriving the Gods in general (who were all the inferiour deities) from *Erebus* and Night, as supposing them all to have been made or generated out of Chaos, nevertheless acknowledging one, who was

——*Divûmque hominumque pater, rex,*

both father and king of gods and men, that is, the maker or creator of the whole world, who therefore made those gods together with the world out of Chaos, himself being unmade.

Plautus in like manner sometimes distinguisheth betwixt *Jupiter* and the gods, and plainly acknowledgeth one omniscient Deity, *Cap. Act. 2. Sc. 2.*

Est profecto Deus, qui quæ nos gerimus, auditque & videt.

Which passage very much resembles that of *Manlius Torquatus* in *Livy*, *Est cœleste numen, es magne* Jupiter; a strong asseveration of one supreme and universal Deity. And the same *Plautus* in his *Rudens* clearly asserts one supreme monarch and emperor over all, whom the inferiour Gods are subservient to;

Qui gentes omnes mariaque & terras movet,
Ejus sum civis civitate cœlitum;
Qui est imperator divûm atque hominum Jupiter,
Is nos per gentes alium aliâ disparat,
Hominum qui facta, mores, pietatem & fidem
Noscamus.——

Qui

[1] Stromat. Lib. VI. p. 784.

[2] Apud Eusеb. Justinum Martyr. & Clement. Alexan. Which last ascribes them to *Diphilus.*

Qui falsas lites falsis testimoniis
Petunt, quique in jure abjurant pecuniam,
Eorum referimus nomina exscripta ad Jovem.
Cotidie Ille *scit, quis hic quærat malum.*
Iterum Ille *eam rem judicatam judicat.*
Bonos in aliis tabulis exscriptos habet.
Atque hoc scelesti illi in animum inducunt suum
Jovem *se placare posse donis, hostiis;*
Sed operam & sumptum perdunt, quia
Nihil Ei *acceptum est à perjuris supplicii.*

Where *Jupiter*, the supreme monarch of gods and men, *is said to appoint other inferiour gods under him, over all the parts of the earth, to observe the actions, manners and behaviours of men every where; and to return the names both of bad and good to him. Which* Jupiter *judges over again all unjust judgments, rendring a righteous retribution to all. And though wicked men conceit, that he may be bribed with sacrifices, yet no worship is acceptable to him from the perjurious.* Notwithstanding which, this poet afterwards jumbles the supreme and inferiour gods all together, after the usual manner, under that one general name of gods, because they are all supposed to be co-governours of thw rld;

Facilius, siqui pius est, à Diis supplicans,
Quam qui scelestus est, inveniet veniam sibi.

Pœn. Act. 5. Sc. 4. Again the same poet elsewhere brings in *Hanno* the Carthaginian with this form of prayer addressing himself to *Jupiter* or the supreme god;

Jupiter, *qui genus colis aliisque hominum, per quem vivimus*
Vitale ævum; quem penes spes vitæque sunt hominum omnium,
Da diem hunc sospitem, quæso, rebus meis agundis.

In the next place, we have these verses of *Valerius Soranus*, an ancient and eminent poet, full to the purpose, recorded by *Varro*[1];

Jupiter *omnipotens, regum rex ipse deúmque,*
Progenitor genitrixque deúm, Deus UNUS & OMNIS.

To this sense: *Omnipotent* Jupiter, *the king of kings and gods, and the progenitor and genitrix, the both father and mother of those gods; one God and all gods.* Where the supreme and omnipotent Deity is styled *progenitor & genitrix deorum*, after the same manner as he was called in the Orphic theology μητροπάτωρ and ἀῤῥενόθηλυς, that expression denoting the gods and all other things to have been produced from him alone, and without any pre-existent matter. Moreover, according to the tenour of this Ethnick theology, that one God was all gods and every god, the Pagans supposed, that when ever any inferiour deity was worshipped by them, the supreme was therein also at once worshipped and honoured.

Though

[1] De Linguâ Latinâ, p. 71. Edit. 1581. in 8vo.

Though the ſenſe of *Ovid* hath been ſufficiently declared before, yet we cannot well omit ſome other paſſages of his, as that grateful and ſenſible acknowledgment,

> [1] *Quod loquor & ſpiro, cœlumque & lumina ſolis*
> *Aſpicio (poſſumne ingratus & immemor eſſe?)*
> *Ipſe dedit.*

And this in the third of his *Metamorph.*

> *Ille pater rectorque deûm, cui dextra triſulcis*
> *Ignibus armata eſt, qui nutu concutit orbem.*

Virgil's theology alſo may ſufficiently appear from his frequent acknowledgment of an omnipotent Deity, and from thoſe verſes of his before cited out of *Æn.* 6. wherein he plainly aſſerts one God to be the original of all things, at leaſt as a ſoul of the world; *Servius Honoratus* there paraphraſing thus, *Deus eſt quidam divinus ſpiritus, qui per quatuor fuſus elementa gignit univerſa; God is a certain ſpirit, which, infuſed through the four elements, begetteth all things.* Nevertheleſs, we ſhall add from him this alſo of *Venus* her prayer to *Jupiter*, *Æn.* 1.

> ———*O qui res hominumque deûmque*
> *Æternis regis imperiis, & fulmine terres!*

Which *Venus* again, *Æn.* 10. beſpeaks the ſame *Jupiter* after this manner,

> *O pater, O hominum divûmque æterna poteſtas!*

Where we have this annotation of *Servius*, *divûmque æterna poteſtas, propter aliorum numinum diſcretionem*; Jupiter *is here called the eternal power of the gods, to diſtinguiſh him from all the other gods*, that were not eternal, but made or generated from him.

Neither ought *Horace* to be left out, in whom we read to the ſame purpoſe, *Lib.* 1. *Od.* 12.

> *Quid prius dicam ſolitis parentis*
> *Laudibus? qui res hominum & deorum,*
> *Qui mare & terras, variiſque mundum*
> *Temperat horis.*
>
> *Unde nil majus generatur ipſo,*
> *Nec viget quicquam ſimile aut ſecundum:*
> *Proximos illi tamen occupavit*
> *Pallas honores:*

And again, 3. *Lib. Od.* 4.

> *Qui terram inertem, qui mare temperat*

Ventoſum

[1] Metamorph. Lib. XIV. verſ. 172.

Ventoſum, & urbes, regnaque triſtia;
Divoſque, mortaleſque turmas,
Imperio regit UNUS æquo

Where from thoſe words of *Horace*, *ſolitis parentis laudibus*, it appears, that the one ſupreme Deity, the parent and maker of all things, was then wont to be celebrated by the Pagans as ſuch, above all the other gods. And whereas thoſe Pagans vulgarly aſcribed the government of the ſeas particularly to *Neptune*, of the earth and *Hades* or *Inferi* (which are here called *triſtia Regna*) to *Pluto*, theſe being here attributed by *Horace* to one and the ſame ſupreme and univerſal Deity; it may well be concluded from thence, that *Jupiter*, *Neptune* and *Pluto*, were but three ſeveral names or notions of one ſupreme *Numen*, whoſe ſovereignty notwithſtanding was chiefly ſignified by *Jupiter*. Which ſame is to be ſaid of *Pallas* or *Minerva* too, that ſignifying the eternal wiſdom, that it was but another name of God alſo, though look'd upon as inferiour to that of *Jupiter* and next in dignity to it; unleſs we ſhould conclude it to be a ſecond divine hypoſtaſis, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans and Platoniſts (probably not unknown to *Horace*) as alſo to that Scripture *Cabala*, *I was ſet up from everlaſting, or ever the earth was; when there were no depths, I was brought forth, &c.* But of this more afterward.

Laſtly, we ſhall conclude with *Manilius*, who lived in the ſame Auguſtean age, and was a zealous oppoſer of that atheiſtical hypotheſis of *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, as appears from theſe verſes of his;

[1] *Quis credat tantas operum ſine numine moles,*
Ex minimis cæcoque creatum fœdere mundum?

Wherefore he alſo plainly aſſerts one ſupreme Deity, the framer and governour of the whole world, in this manner, lib. 2.

[2] *Namque canam tacitâ naturam mente potentem,*
Infuſumque Deum cœlo, terriſque, fretoque,
Ingentem æquali moderantem fœdere molem,
Totumque alterno conſenſu vivere mundum,
Et rationis agi motu; quum SPIRITUS UNUS
Per cunctas habitet partes, atque irriget orbem,
Omnia pervolitans, corpuſque animale figuret, &c.

And again,

Hoc opus immenſi conſtructum corpore mundi
Vis animæ divina regit, ſacroque meatu
Conſpirat Deus & tacita ratione gubernat.

And lib. 4. [3]

——— *Faciem cœli non invidet orbi*
Ipſe Deus, vultuſque ſuos, corpuſque recludit,

Semper

[1] Lib. I. verſ. 492, 493.
[2] Verſ. 61, &c.
[3] Ver. 915.

Semper volvendo, seque ipsum inculcat & offert;
Ut bene cognosci possit, monstretque videndo,
Qualis eat, doceatque suas attendere leges.
Ipse vocat nostros animos ad sydera mundus,
Nec patitur, quia non condit, sua jura latere.

Where notwithstanding, we confess, that the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, is, according to the Stoical doctrine, made by *Manilius* to be the supreme Numen.

XX. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer [1] concerning the religion of the Gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, *That even all the minor gods of the pagans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same.* But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of *Aristotle* and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the Pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted, (such as *Plutarch* and *Atticus*,) who, out of a certain softness and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputation of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or dæmon also in the world self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.

And indeed *Epicurus* is the only person, that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded,

Naturam rerum, haud divinâ mente coortam; *Lucret. l. 3. [vers. 15.]*

That there was no God the δημιουργὸς *or framer of the world.* But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabrick of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto, could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does *Origen* declare the doctrine

[1] Sir *Edward Herbert*, de religione Gentilium, Cap. XIV. p. 228.

of *Epicurus*, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he muſt have held it, had he really aſſerted any gods at all, οἱ τὰ Ἐπικούρου θεοὶ, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνουσες, καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ συστάσει ἀνάλυτοὶ, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιὰς ἀτόμας ἀποστίεσθαι; Epicurus *his gods being compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very conſtitution corruptible, are in continual labour and toil, ſtruggling with their corruptive principles.* Neverthéleſs if *Epicurus* had in good earneſt aſſerted ſuch a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible; ſo long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wiſdom (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongſt the Theiſts, but Atheiſts.

Lib 4. cont. Cell p. 169.

Thales the Mileſian was one of the moſt ancient Greek philoſophers, who that he admitted a plurality of gods in ſome ſenſe, is evident from that ſaying of his cited by *Ariſtotle* [1], πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, *all things are full of gods.* But that notwithſtanding he aſſerted one ſupreme and only unmade or ſelf-exiſtent Deity, is alſo manifeſt from that other apothegm of his in *Laertius* [2], πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγένητον γάρ· *God is the oldeſt of all things, becauſe he is unmade.* From whence it may be concluded, that all *Thales* his other gods were generated, and the off-ſpring of one ſole unmade Deity.

Pherecydes Syrus was *Thales* his contemporary, of whom *Ariſtotle* in his *Metaphyſicks* [3] hath recorded, that he affirmed τὸ γενῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον, that the firſt principle, from whence all other things were generated, was the beſt or an abſolutely perfect being; ſo as that in the ſcale of nature, things did not aſcend upwards from the moſt imperfect to the more perfect beings, but on the contrary deſcend downwards from the moſt perfect to the leſs perfect. Moreover, *Laertius* informs us [4], that this was the beginning of one of *Pherecydes* his books, Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἶς ἀεὶ, καὶ χθὼν ἦν· Jupiter, *and Time, and the Earth always were.* Where notwithſtanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon *Jupiter*; though ſome reading κρόνος here inſtead of χρόνος, ſeem to underſtand him thus, that *Jupiter* and *Saturn*, really one and the ſame Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in theſe words an acknowledgment of one ſingle and eternal Deity.

Pythagoras was the moſt eminent of all the ancient philoſophers, who, that he was a Polytheiſt as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the golden verſes (though not written by him,)

Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεὺς νόμῳ, ὡς διάκειται,
Τίμα, καὶ σέβου ὅρκον· ἔπειθ' ἥρωας ἀγαυούς·
Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥίζων.

Wherein men are exhorted in the firſt place to worſhip the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and laſt of all the terreſtrial dæmons. And accordingly *Laertius*

[1] De Animâ, lib. I. cap. VIII. p. 17. Tom II. Oper.
[2] Lib. I. ſegm. 35. p. 21.
[3] Lib. XII. cap. IV. p. 446. Tom. IV. Oper.
[4] Lib. I. ſegm. 119. p. 76.

Laertius [1] gives this account of *Pythagoras* his piety; τιμὰς θεοῖς δεῖν νομίζειν καὶ ἥρωσιν, μὴ τὰς ἴσας. *That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour.* And who these gods of *Pythagoras* were, the same writer also declareth [2], ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς. *That they were*, in part at least, *the sun, and moon, and stars.*

Notwithstanding which, that *Pythagoras* acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the golden verses, which, whether written by *Philolaus* or *Lysis*, or some other follower of *Pythagoras*, were undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἢ πολλῶν τε κακῶν λύσειας ἅπαντας·
Εἰ πᾶσιν δείξαις οἵῳ τῷ δαίμονι χρῶνται·

Salmas. Præf. in Tab. Ceb. Arab.

Jupiter *alme, malis jubeas vel solvier omnes:*
Omnibus utantur vel quonam dæmone monstra.

Upon which *Hierocles* [3] thus writeth, τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τῷ τε Διὸς καὶ Σηνὸς, ὀνόματι σεμνύνειν· διὰ ὃν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῆν, τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, τοῦτον δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας ὀνομάζεσθαι. *It was the manner of the Pythagoreans to honour the maker and father of this whole universe with the name of* Dis *and* Zen, *it being just, that he, who giveth being and life to all, should be denominated from thence.* And again afterwards, τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰκὼν ἐν φωνῇ δημιουργικῆς οὐσίας, τῷ τοὺς πρώτους θεμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ σοφίας ὑπερβολὴν, ὥσπερ τινας ἀγαλματοποιοὺς ἀρίστους, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς δι' εἰκόνων, ἐμφανίσαι αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις. *This very name* Zeus *is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they, who first gave names to things, were by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuaries; they by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things.* Moreover, that this Pythagorick prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and king of gods, *Jamblichus* thus declares in his *Protrepticks* [4], ἐν δὴ τούτοις μία μὲν ἀρίστη παράκλησις εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ μεμιγμένη ταῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀνακλήσεσι τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διός. *Here is an excellent exhortation of these golden verses to the pursuit of divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that* Jupiter, *who is the king of them.* Moreover, the same might further appear from those Pythagorick fragments [5], that are still extant; as that of *Ocellus Lucanus*, and others, who were Moralists, in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity, which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagorick philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle,

[1] Lib. VIII. segm. 33. p. 514. Vide etiam segm. 23. p. 506.
[2] Segm. 27. p. 509.
[3] Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p. 200. Edit. Needhami.
[4] Cap. III. p. 10. Edit. Arcerii.
[5] These are publish'd by Dr. *Tho. Gale* in his Opuscula Veter. Moral. & Mytholog. Amsterd. 1688. in 8vo.

ciple. It is true indeed, that the writer *de Placitis Philoſophorum* doth affirm *Pythagoras* to have aſſerted two ſubſtantial principles ſelf-exiſtent, a Monad and a Dyad; by the former of which, as God is confeſſed to have been meant, ſo the latter of them is declared with ſome uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a dæmon, or a principle of evil; [1] Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν, καὶ ταγαθὸν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα δαίμονα, καὶ τὸ κακόν, &c. Pythagoras *his firſt principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a dæmon or evil.* But in another place expounded to be matter, πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἴδικον, (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεὸς) ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος·) Pythagoras *his principles were a monad and infinite duality: the former of them an active principle, Mind or God; the latter paſſive and matter.* And *Plutarch* in ſome other writings of his declares, that the firſt matter did not exiſt alone by it ſelf dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational ſoul; and that both theſe together made up that wicked dæmon of his. And doubtleſs, this book *de Placitis Philoſophorum* was either written by *Plutarch* himſelf, or elſe by ſome diſciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagorick doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of *Plutarch*'s, that God and a wicked dæmon, or elſe matter, together with an irrational ſoul, ſelf-exiſtent, were the firſt principles of the univerſe. Though we do acknowledge that others alſo, beſides *Plutarch*, have ſuppoſed *Pythagoras* to have made two ſelf-exiſtent principles, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as *Plutarch* ſuppoſed, with any irrational or wicked ſoul.

Lib. I. *cap.* 3. [*p.* 876. *Tom.* II. *Oper.*]

Notwithſtanding which, it may well be made a queſtion, whether *Pythagoras* by his Dyad meant matter or no; becauſe *Malchus* or *Porphyrius*, in the life of *Pythagoras*, thus interprets thoſe two Pythagorick principles of unity and duality; τὸ αἴτιον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας, καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ὅλων τὸ κατὰ ταυτὰ καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχοντος, ἓν προσεγόρευσαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, ἡνωμένου τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ σύμπνευ, κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· τὸν δὲ τῆς ἑτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ πλανοῦς τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσεγόρευσαν· *The cauſe of that ſympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and of the conſervation of the whole, which is always the ſame and like it ſelf, was by* Pythagoras *called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themſelves, being but a participation of the firſt cauſe:) but the reaſon of alterity, inequality and unconſtant irregularity in things, was by him called a Dyad.* Thus, according to *Porphyrius*, by the Pythagorick Dyad is not ſo much meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the paſſive capability of things. So that the Monad and Dyad of *Pythagoras* ſeem to have been the ſame with *Plato*'s πέρας and ἄπειρον, his *finite* and *infinite* in his *Philebus*; the former of which two only is ſubſtantial, that firſt moſt ſimple being, the cauſe of all unity, and the meaſure of all things.

P. 203.

How-

[1] De Placit. Philoſoph. Lib. I. cap. VII. p. 881.

However, if *Pythagoras* his Dyad be to be underſtood of a ſubſtantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he ſuppoſed matter to be ſelf exiſtent and independent upon the Deity, ſince, according to the beſt and moſt ancient writers, his Dyad was no primary but a ſecondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the ſole original of all things. Thus *Diogenes Laertius* tells us [1], that *Alexander*, who wrote the ſucceſſions of philoſophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagorick Commentaries, ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἁπάντων, μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος, ἀόριστον δυάδα, ὡς ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι· *That a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cauſe.* With which agreeth *Hermias* [2], affirming this to be one of the greateſt of all the Pythagorick myſteries, that a Monad was the ſole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites this paſſage [3] out of *Thearidas*, an ancient Pythagorean, in his book concerning nature, Ἀ ἀρχὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ, μία· Κεῖνα γὰρ ἐν ἀρχᾷ τέ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ μόνον, *The true principle of all things was only one; for this was in the beginning one alone.* Which words alſo ſeem to imply the world to have had a novity of exiſtence or beginning of duration. And indeed, however *Ocellus Lucanus* writes, yet that *Pythagoras* himſelf did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what *Porphyrius* [4] records of him, where he gives an account of that his ſuperſtitious abſtinence from beans; ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταραττομένης, καὶ πολλῶν ἅμα συννενεγμένων καὶ συσπειρομένων καὶ συσσηπομένων ἐν τῇ γῇ, κατ' ὀλίγον γένεσις καὶ διάκρισις συνέστη, ζώων τε ὁμοῦ γενομένων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀναδιδομένων, τότε δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς σηπεδόνος, ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι καὶ κυάμους βλαστῆναι· *That at the beginning things being confounded and mingled together, the generation and ſecretion of them afterwards proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time alſo, from the ſame putrified matter, ſprung up both men and beans.*

Strom. 5. p. 611. [p. 728. Edit. Potteri.]

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes: and therefore when St. *Cyril* [5] affirmeth *Pythagoras* to have called God ψύχωσιν τῶν ὅλων κύκλων, καὶ πάντων κίνησιν, *the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things*; adding, that God was not, as ſome ſuppoſed, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ, *without the fabrick of the world, but whole in the whole*, this ſeems properly to be underſtood of that third divine hypoſtaſis of the Pythagorick trinity, namely the *eternal Pſyche*. Again, when God is called in *Plutarch* [6], according to *Pythagoras*, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, *mind it ſelf*, this ſeems to be meant properly of his ſecond hypoſtaſis; the ſupreme Deity, according to him, being ſomething above Mind or Intellect. In like manner when in *Cicero* [7], *Pythagoras* his opinion concerning the Deity is thus repreſented, *Deum eſſe animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum & commeantem, ex quo animi noſtri carperentur*; 'That God was a mind paſſing through the whole nature of things, *from whom our ſouls were, as it were, decerped or cut*

[1] Lib. VIII. Segm. 25. p. 507.
[2] Irriſione philoſ. Gentilis, §. XVI. p. 225.
[3] Dr. *Cudworth* does not cite this Paſſage as it is in *Clemens Alexandr.* but as it is given by *Euſeb.* Præparat. Evangel. lib. V. cap. XXIV.
[4] In vitâ Pythag. p. 43. Edit. Kuſteri.
[5] Contra Julian. Lib. I. p. 30.
[6] De Placit. Philoſoph. lib. I. cap. VII. p. 881.
[7] De Natur. Deor. lib. I. cap. XI. p. 2895 Tom. IX. Oper.

cut out; and again, *ex univerſa mente divina delibato eſſe animos noſtros*; this in all probability was to be underſtood alſo either of the third or ſecond divine hypoſtaſis, and not of the firſt, which was properly called by him τὸ ἓν and μόνας, *a Unity* and *Monad*; and alſo, as *Plutarch* [1] tells us, τὸ ἀγαθὸν, *goodneſs it ſelf*. *Ariſtotle* plainly affirmeth, that ſome of the ancient theologers amongſt the Pagans made ἔρωτα or *love* to be the firſt principle of all things, that is, the ſupreme Deity; and we have already ſhewed, that *Orpheus* was one of theſe. For when ἔρως πολυτερπὴς and πολύμητις, *delightful Love, and that, which is not blind, but full of wiſdom and counſel*, is made by him to be αὐτοτελὴς and πρεσβύτατον, *ſelf-perfect* and *the oldeſt of all things*, it is plain, that he ſuppoſed it to be nothing leſs than the ſupreme Deity. Wherefore ſince *Pythagoras* is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphick principles, we may from hence preſume, that he did it in this alſo. Though it be very true, that *Plato*, who called the ſupreme Deity τἀγαθὸν, as well as *Pythagoras*, did diſſent from the Orphick theology in this, and would not acknowledge *Love* for a name of the ſupreme Deity; as when in his *Sympoſion* in the perſon of *Agatho* he ſpeaks thus: Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν, τοῦτο ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ φημὶ νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ νέον· *Though I ſhould readily grant to* Phædrus *many other things, yet I cannot conſent to him in this, that* Love *was older than* Saturn *and* Iapet; *but on the contrary I do affirm him to be the youngeſt of the gods, as he is always youthful.* They, who made *Love* older than *Saturn* as well as *Iapet*, ſuppoſed it to be the ſupreme Deity: wherefore *Plato* here on the contrary affirms *Love* not to be the ſupreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior God, or indeed, as he afterwards adds, not ſo much a god as a dæmon, it being a thing, which plainly implies imperfection in it. *Love* (ſaith he) *is a philoſopher, whereas* θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἔστι γὰρ, *no god philoſophizeth, nor deſires to be made wiſe, becauſe he is ſo already.* Agreeably with which doctrine of his, *Plotinus* [2] determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called ſouls; πᾶσα ψυχὴ, ἀφροδίτη· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος· ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος καλὴ πρὸς καλὸν ἄνδρα· ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα, οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἀρξαμένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημία πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται, &c. *Every Soul is a* Venus, *which is alſo intimated by* Venus *her nativity, and Love's being begotten with her: wherefore the ſoul being in its right natural ſtate loves God, deſiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love; but when it deſcends to generation, being courted with theſe amorous allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its divine and heavenly love for another mortal one: but if it again ſhake off theſe laſcivious and wanton loves, and keep it ſelf chaſte from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought.* But the reaſon of this difference betwixt the Orpheiſts and *Plato*, that the former made *Love* to be the oldeſt of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or dæmon, proceeded only from an equivocation in the word Love. For *Plato*'s *Love* was the daughter of *Penia*, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of Πόρος or *riches*; and being ſo as it were compounded

Met. L. 1. c. 6. [p. 267. Tom. IV. Oper.]

[1] De Placit. Philoſ. Lib. I. cap. VI. p. 881.

[2] Libro de bono vel uno, Ennead. VI. Lib. IX. cap. XII. p. 708.

pounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of deſire, which, as *Ariſtotle* affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, *accompanied with grief and pain.* But that Orphick and Pythagorick love was nothing elſe but πόρος and εὐπορία, *infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulneſs, delighting to communicate itſelf*, which was therefore ſaid to be the oldeſt of all things and the moſt perfect, that is, the ſupreme Deity; according to which notion alſo, in the Scripture it ſelf, God ſeems to be called love, though the word be not there ἔρως, but ἀγάπη. But to ſay the truth, *Parmenides* his love (however made a principle ſomewhere by *Ariſtotle* [1]) ſeems to be neither exactly the ſame with the Orphick, nor yet with the Platonick love, it being not the ſupreme Deity, and yet the firſt of the created gods; which appears from *Simplicius* [2] his connecting theſe two verſes of his together in this manner:

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τάτων δαίμων ὃς πάντα κυβερνᾷ,

ταύτην γὰρ θεῶν αἰτίαν εἶναί φησι, λέγων,

Πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων.

In the midſt of theſe elements is that God, which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides *affirmeth to be the cauſe of gods, writing thus; God firſt of all created Love, before the other gods.* Wherefore by this love of *Parmenides* is underſtood nothing elſe, but the lower ſoul of the world, together with a plaſtick nature, which though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a ſecondary or created god; before whoſe production, neceſſity is ſaid by thoſe Ethnick theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof ſeems to be this, that before that divine ſpirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly ſyſtem, there was nothing but the neceſſity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wiſdom or method for good (that is, by love) in that confuſed and floating chaos.

But *Pythagoras*, it ſeemeth, did not only call the ſupreme Deity a Monad, but alſo a Tetrad or Tetractys; for it is generally affirmed, that *Pythagoras* himſelf was wont to ſwear hereby: though *Porphyrius* and *Jamblichus* and others write, that the diſciples of *Pythagoras* ſwore by *Pythagoras*, who had delivered to them the doctrine or *Cabala* of this Tetractys. Which Tetractys alſo in the golden verſes is called πηγὴ ἀενάου φύσεως, *the fountain of the eternal nature*, an expreſſion, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the ſupreme Deity. And thus *Hierocles* [3], οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετράκτυος, ὡς ῥίζης, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἑστηκὸς. ἔστι γὰρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων, καὶ αἰτία ἡ Τέτρας, θεὸς νοητὸς, αἰτίᾳ τῷ οὐρανίῳ, καὶ αἰσθητῷ θεῷ. *There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already ſaid, the maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cauſe of the heavenly and ſenſible God*, that is, of the animated world or heaven. Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platoniſts endeavour to give reaſons, why God ſhould be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain myſteries in that number four, as

[1] Phyſicor. Lib. I. cap. II. III. p. 446. Tom. I. Oper. Adde Metaph. Lib. I. cap. V. p. 269.

[2] Commentar. in Ariſtot. Phyſ. p. 152. Edit. Græc. Aldin.

[3] Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythag. p. 170, 171.

for example; Firſt, becauſe the Tetrad is δύναμις δεκάδος, *the power of the Decad*, it virtually containing the whole Decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this myſtery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, becauſe the Tetrad is an arithmetical mediety betwixt the Monad and the Hebdomad; which Monad and Hebdomad are ſaid to agree in this, that as the Monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, ſo is the Hebdomad ſaid to be, not only παρθένος, but ἀμήτωρ, *a motherleſs*, as well as *virgin number*. Wherefore the Tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit Monad, and the motherleſs virgin Hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, ſay they, muſt needs be a very myſterious number, and fitly repreſent the Deity. Whereas indeed it was therefore unfit to repreſent the Deity, becauſe it is begotten by the multiplication of another number; as the Hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly ſymbolize with it neither, becauſe it is barren or begets nothing at all within the Decad, for which cauſe it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the Tetrad fitly reſembles that, which is ſolid, becauſe, as a point anſwers to a Monad, and a line to a Dyad, and a ſuperficies to a Triad, (the firſt and moſt ſimple figure being a triangle;) ſo the Tetrad properly repreſents the ſolid, the firſt pyramid being found in it. But upon this conſideration, the Tetrad could not be ſo fit a ſymbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore theſe things being all ſo trifling, ſlight and phantaſtical, and it being really abſurd for *Pythagoras* to call his Monad a Tetrad; the late conjecture of ſome learned men amongſt us[1] ſeems to be much more probable, that *Pythagoras* his *Tetractys* was really nothing elſe but the *Tetragrammaton*, or that proper name of the ſupreme God amongſt the Hebrews, conſiſting of four letters or conſonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that *Pythagoras* (who beſides his travelling into *Egypt*, *Perſia* and *Chaldea*, and his ſojourning at *Sidon*, is affirmed by *Joſephus*, *Porphyrius* and others, to have converſed with the Hebrews alſo) ſhould be ſo well acquainted with the Hebrew *Tetragrammaton*, ſince it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their *Jove* being certainly nothing elſe. And indeed it is the opinion of ſome philologers, that even in the *Golden Verſes* themſelves, notwithſtanding the ſeeming repugnancy of the ſyntax, it is not *Pythagoras*, that is ſworn by, but this *Tetractys* or *Tetragrammaton*; that is, *Jova* or *Jehovah*, the name of God, being put for God himſelf, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews שמו הוא והוא ושמו, *that God and his name were all one*; as if the meaning of thoſe words,

Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα Τετρακτὺν
Πάγαν ἀενάου φύσεως.———

were this; *By the* Tetragrammaton *or* Jovah, *who hath communicated* [himſelf or] *the fountain of the eternal nature* to our human ſouls; for theſe, according to the Pythagorick doctrine, were ſaid to be[2] *ex mente divina carptæ & delibatæ*, *i. e.* nothing but derivative ſtreams from that firſt fountain of the divine mind. Wherefore

[1] Selden de Diis Syris Syntagm. II. cap. I. p. 209, 210. & *Theophilus Gale* in his *Court of the Gentiles*, Part II. Lib. II. cap. VIII. p. 147. Edit. Oxon. 1672. in quarto.

[2] Cicer. de Natur. Deor. Lib. I. cap. XI. p. 2895. Oper.

Wherefore we ſhall now ſum up all concerning *Pythagoras* in this concluſion of St. *Cyril*'s; ἰδὲ δὴ σαφῶς, ἕνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν, καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν ἐργάτην τε τῶν αὐτῷ δυνάμεων, φωσ-τῆρα καὶ ψύχωσιν, ἤτοι ζωοποίησιν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντ-ος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται· *Behold we ſee clearly, that* Pythagoras *held there was one God of the whole univerſe, the principle and cauſe of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of non-entity into being.* *Con. Jul. l. 1.* [p. 30.]

Next to *Pythagoras* in order of time, was *Xenophanes* the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatick ſect of philoſophers, who, that he was an aſſertor both of many gods and one God, ſufficiently appears from that verſe of his before cited, and atteſted both by *Clemens Alexandrinus* [1], and *Sextus* the philoſopher.

Εἷς Θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,

There is one God, the greateſt both amongſt gods and men. Concerning which greateſt God, this other verſe of *Xenophanes* is alſo vouched;

Καὶ ἀπάνευθε πονοῖο νόου, φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει·

That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind. Beſides which, *Cicero* [2] and others tell us, that this *Xenophanes* philoſophizing concerning the ſupreme Deity, was wont to call it ἓν καὶ πᾶν, *one and all*, as being one moſt ſimple Being, that virtually containeth all things. But *Xenophanes* his Theoſophy, or divine philoſophy, is moſt fully declared by *Simplicius* out of *Theophraſtus* in this manner; Μίαν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἤτοι ἓν τὸ ὂν καὶ πᾶν, καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον, οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἠρεμοῦν, Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαί φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστ-ος· ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας, τὴν μνήμην τῆς τότε δόξης. τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ πᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· οὗ ἕνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλειόνων γάρ φησιν ὄντων, ὁμοίως ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον, Θεός· ἀγένητον δὲ ἐδείκνυεν——καὶ οὔτε δὲ ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι· διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον μήτε μέσον μήτε τέλος· περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἠρεμίαν· ἀκίνητον μὲν, &c. Theophraſtus *affirmeth, that* Xenophanes *the Colophonian*, Parmenides *his maſter, made one principle of all things, he calling it one and all, and determining it to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain ſenſe) and neither moving nor reſting. Which* Theophraſtus *alſo declares, that* Xenophanes *in this did not write as a natural philoſopher or phyſiologer, but as a metaphyſician or theologer only;* Xenophanes *his one and all being nothing elſe but God. Whom he proved to be one ſolitary being from hence, becauſe God is the beſt and moſt powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of entity, there muſt needs be ſomething ſupreme to rule over all. Which beſt and moſt powerful being can be but one. He alſo did demonſtrate it to be unmade, as likewiſe to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain ſenſe;) as he removed both motion and reſt from God. Wherefore, when he* *In Ariſtot. Phyſ. P. 5. & 6.*

[1] Stromat. Lib. V. p. 714.
[2] In Acad. Quæſt. Lib. IV. cap. XXXVII. p. 2315. Tom. VIII. Oper.

ſaith, that God always remaineth or reſteth the ſame, he underſtands not this of that reſt which is oppoſite to motion, and which belongs to ſuch things as may be moved; but of a certain other reſt, which is both above that motion and its contrary. From whence it is evident, that *Xenophanes* ſuppoſed (as *Sextus* the philoſopher alſo affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we underſtand, that *Ariſtotle* [1] dealt not ingenuouſly with *Xenophanes*, when from that expreſſion of his, that God was σφαιροειδὴς, or *ſphery-form*, he would infer, that *Xenophanes* made God to be a body, and nothing elſe but the round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant alſo to another phyſical hypotheſis of this ſame *Xenophanes*, ἀπείρους ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, *that there were infinite ſuns and moons*; by which moons he underſtood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as *Cicero* tells us [2]. Wherefore, as *Simplicius* reſolves, God was ſaid to be σφαιροειδὴς, or *ſphery-form*, by *Xenophanes*, only in this ſenſe, as being παντοχόθεν ὅμοιος, *every way like and uniform*. However, it is plain, that *Xenophanes* aſſerting one God, who was all, or the univerſe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, ſelf-exiſtent Deities.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philoſopher (he being neither a good naturaliſt nor metaphyſician) and therefore it is very hard, or rather impoſſible, to reconcile his ſeveral opinions with one another. Which is a thing the leſs to be wondred at, becauſe, amongſt the reſt of his opinions, this alſo is ſaid to have been one, that contradictories may be true; and his writings were accordingly, as *Plato* intimates, ſtuffed with unintelligible, myſterious nonſenſe. For firſt, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other ſubſtance beſides body, and to have maintained [4], that all things did flow, and nothing ſtand, or remain the ſame; and yet in his epiſtles (according to the common opinion of philoſophers at that time) doth he ſuppoſe the præ and poſt-exiſtence of human ſouls in theſe words [5], τάχα καὶ ψυχὴ μαντεύεται ἀπόλυσιν ἑαυτῆς ἤδη ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου τούτου· καὶ σειομένη τῷ σώματος ἐκκύπτουσα, ἀναμιμνήσκεται τὰ πάτρια χωρία, ἔνθεν καταθεῖσα περιεβάλετο ῥέον σῶμα τεθνειὸς τοῦτο, ὃ δοκεῖ, &c. *My ſoul ſeemeth to vaticinate and preſage its approaching diſmiſſion and freedom from this its priſon; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and cranies of this body, to remember thoſe its native regions or countries, from whence deſcending it was cloathed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and conſtipated of phlegm, choler, ſerum, blood, nerves, bones and fleſh.* And not only ſo, but he alſo there acknowledgeth the ſoul's immortality, which Stoicks, allowing its permanency after death, for ſome time at leaſt, and to the next conflagration, did deny; δύσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸ εἱμαρμένον, ἀλλὰ ὁ ψυχὴ δύσεται· ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον ὂν χρῆμα, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσεται μετάρσιον· δέξονται δέ με αἰθέριοι δόμοι, καὶ πολιτεύσομαι οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἐν θεοῖς. *This body ſhall be fatally changed to ſomething elſe; but my ſoul ſhall not die or periſh, but being an immortal thing, ſhall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; thoſe etherial houſes ſhall receive me, and I ſhall no longer*

[1] Vid. Libr. de Xenophane, Zenone & Gorgiâ, cap. IV. p. 843, 844.
[2] Vid. Acad. Quæſt. Lib. IV. cap. XXXIX. p. 2319. Tom. VIII. Oper.
[3] Vide Sext. Empiric. Hypotypoſ. Lib. I. cap. XXIX. p. 53.
[4] Vide Platon. in Convivio, p. 321.
[5] Vide Epiſtol. Græcas ab Eilhardo Lubino editas. Heidelberg. 1601. in octavo. p. 54, 55.

longer converse with men but gods. Again, though *Heraclitus* asserted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoicks, who followed him in this and other things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to *Hermodorus* [1], κἀμοιγε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἆθλοι κατώρθωνται· νενίκηκα ἡδονάς, νενίκηκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, κατεπάλαισα δειλίαν, κατεπάλαισα κολακείαν· οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι φόβος, οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι μέθη· φοβεῖταί με λύπη, φοβεῖταί με ὀργή· κατὰ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστεφάνωμαι, ἐμαυτῷ ἐπιτάττων, οὐχ ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως· *I have also had my difficult labours and conflicts as well as* Hercules; *I have conquer'd pleasures, I have conquer'd riches, I have conquer'd ambition; I have subdued cowardise and flattery; neither fear nor intemperance can controul me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the victories, for which I am crowned, not by* Eurystheus, *but as being made master of my self.* Lastly, though *Heraclitus* made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religionist, he supposing, that fiery matter of the whole universe *animantem esse & Deum, to be an animal and God.* And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which *Aristotle* [2] recordeth of him, that when some passing by had espied him sitting in a smoky cottage, he bespake them after this manner, *Introite, nam & hic dii sunt, Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also*; he supposing all places to be full of gods, dæmons and souls: so was he an undoubted asserter of one supreme Numen, that governs all things, and that such as could neither be represented by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by *Euthycles*, he writes to *Hermodorus* in this manner [3]; ἀλλ', ὦ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἐστιν ὁ θεός, ποῦ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεός; ἐν τοῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλεισμένος; εὐσεβεῖς γε, οἳ ἐν σκότει τὸν θεὸν ἱδρύετε——ἀπαίδευτοι, οὐκ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς· χειροκμητος, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἔχει ἕνα περίβολον· ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι, ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἄστροις πεποικιλμένος· *But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accusing me of impiety: tell us where God is? Is he shut up within the walls of temples? is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a stony God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no basis or fulcrum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals and stars being his temple?* And again, ἆρ' οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβὴς, Εὐθύκλεις, ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεὸν; ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἱδρυθῇ θεοῦ βωμὸς, οὐκ ἔστι θεός; ἐὰν δὲ ἱδρυθῇ μὴ θεοῦ, θεός ἐστιν; ὥστε λίθοι θεῶν μάρτυρες· ἔργα δεῖ μαρτυρεῖν, οἷα ἡλίου· νὺξ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡμέρα μαρτυροῦσιν· ὧραι αὐτῷ μάρτυρες, γῆ ὅλη καρποφοροῦσα, μάρτυς· σελήνης ὁ κύκλος, ἐκείνου ἔργον, οὐρανιος μαρτυρία· *Am I impious, O* Euthycles, *who alone know what God is? is there no God without altars? or are stones the only witnesses of him? No, his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun; night and day bear witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him.*

In the next place, *Anaxagoras* the Clazomenian philosopher comes to be considered, whose predecessors of the Ionick order (after *Thales*) as *Anaximander*,

[1] Apud Lubinum, ubi supra, p. 50. 481. Tom. II. Oper.
[2] De Partib. Animal. Lib. I. cap. V. p. [3] Apud Lubin. ubi supra, p. 50.

mander, *Anaximenes* and *Hippo*, were (as hath been already obſerved) Materialiſts and Atheiſts; they acknowledging no other ſubſtance beſides body, and reſolving all things into the motions, paſſions, and affections of it. Whence was that cautious advice given by *Jamblichus*, πρετίμα τὴν Ἰταλικὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν τὰ ἀτώματα καθ' αὐτὰ θεωρῶσαν, τῆς Ἰονικῆς τῆς τὰ σώματα προηγεμένως ἐπισκοπεμένης· *Prefer the Italick philoſophy, which contemplates incorporeal ſubſtances by themſelves, before the Ionick, which principally conſiders bodies.* And *Anaxagoras* was the firſt of theſe Ionicks, who went out of that road; for ſeeing a neceſſity of ſome other cauſe, beſides the material (matter being not able ſo much as to move it ſelf, and much leſs if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring it ſelf into an orderly ſyſtem and compages;) he therefore introduced Mind into the Coſmopœia, as the principal cauſe of the univerſe; which Mind is the ſame with God. Thus *Themiſtius*, ſpeaking of *Anaxagoras*, νῦν καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιΐᾳ, καὶ ὃ πάντα ἀνάψας τῆς φύσεως τῶν σωμάτων· *He was the firſt* (that is, amongſt the Ionick philoſophers) *who brought in Mind and God to the Coſmopœia, and did not derive all things from ſenſeleſs bodies.* And to the ſame purpoſe *Plutarch* in the life of *Pericles*[1], τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος ὁ τύχην καὶ ἀνάγκην, διακοσμήσεως ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον· *The other Ionick philoſophers before* Anaxagoras *made fortune and blind neceſſity, that is, the fortuitous and neceſſary motions of the matter, to be the only original of the world; but* Anaxagoras *was the firſt, who affirmed a pure and ſincere Mind to preſide over all.* *Anaxagoras* therefore ſuppoſed two ſubſtantial ſelf-exiſtent principles of the univerſe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, ſuch as thoſe of *Empedocles* and *Democritus*, which was the moſt ancient and genuine atomology; but ſimilar, ſuch as were ſeverally endued with all manner of qualities and forms, which phyſiology of his therefore was a ſpurious kind of atomiſm. *Anaxagoras* indeed did not ſuppoſe God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was κινήσεως ἀρχὴ, *the principle of its motion*, and alſo τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτία, *the regulator of this motion for good*, and conſequently the cauſe of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony of the world: for which reaſon this divine principle was called alſo by him, not only mind, but good; it being that, which acts for the ſake of good. Wherefore, according to *Anaxagoras*, firſt, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of ſimilar and qualified atoms, ſelf-exiſtent, without either order or motion: ſecondly, the world was not afterwards made by chance, but by Mind or God, firſt moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it ſo, as to bring it into this orderly ſyſtem and compages. So that νοῦς was κοσμοποιὸς, *Mind, the firſt maker of the world, and* νοῦς βασιλεὺς ἁπάντων τε καὶ γῆς, *Mind, that which ſtill governs the ſame, the king and ſovereign monarch of heaven and earth.* Thirdly, *Anaxagoras* his Mind and God was purely incorporeal; to which purpoſe his words recorded by *Simplicius* are very remarkable; Νοῦς μέμικται ὁτῳοῦν χρήματι· ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τέῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτο τέῳ· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς

Symb. 26. *p.* 159. [potius in Orat. protrept. ad philoſoph. p. 159. Edit. Arcerii.]

Orat. 15 [p. 317. Edit. Harduini.]

In Ariſt. Phyſ. l. 1. *Fol.* 33. *c.* 2.

[1] P. 154. Tom. I. Oper.

τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμοὶ λέλεκται; καὶ ἀνεκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ· ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ καθαρώτατον· καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει· καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον· *Mind is mingled with nothing, but is alone by it self and separate; for if it were not by it self secrete from matter, but mingled therewith, it would then partake of all things, becauſe there is ſomething of all in every thing; which things mingled together with it, would hinder it, ſo that it could not maſter or conquer any thing, as if alone by it ſelf: for Mind is the moſt ſubtile of all things, and the moſt pure, and has the knowledge of all things, together with an abſolute power over all.* Laſtly, *Anaxagoras* did not ſuppoſe a multitude of unmade minds, coexiſtent from eternity, as ſo many partial cauſes and governours of the world, but only one infinite Mind or God, ruling over all.

Indeed it may well be made a queſtion, whether or no, beſides this ſupreme and univerſal Deity, *Anaxagoras* did acknowledge any of thoſe other inferiour gods, then worſhipped by the Pagans? becauſe it is certain, that though he aſſerted infinite Mind to be the maker and governour of the whole world, yet he was accuſed by the Athenians for Atheiſm, and beſides a mulct impoſed upon him, baniſhed for the ſame; the true ground whereof was no other than this, becauſe he affirmed the ſun to be nothing but a maſs of fire, and the moon an earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houſes in it; and probably concluded the ſame of all the other ſtars and planets, that they were either fires, as the ſun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, ſuppoſing them not to be animated, he did conſequently deny them to be gods. Which his ungodding of the ſun, moon and ſtars, was then look'd upon by the vulgar as nothing leſs than abſolute atheiſm; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men, and if the ſun, moon, and ſtars were not ſuch, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned *Anaxagoras* for this, but even thoſe two grave philoſophers *Socrates* and *Plato* did the like; the firſt [1] in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of *Anaxagoras* abſurd; the ſecond in his book of laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into atheiſm, in this manner: ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέροντες, ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν ὡς θεὸς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν, ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα· *When you and I, endeavouring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, ſpeak of the ſun and moon, ſtars and earth, as gods and divine things, our young men preſently, being principled by theſe new philoſophers, will reply; that theſe are nothing but earth and ſtones* (ſenſeleſs and inanimate bodies) *which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs.* Where we may obſerve theſe two things; firſt, that nothing was accounted truly and properly a god amongſt the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and underſtanding. Secondly, that the taking away of thoſe inferiour Gods of the Pagans, the ſun, moon, and ſtars, by denying them to be animated, or to

De Leg. L. 10 *p.* 886.

[1] Or rather *Plato*, p. 362.

to have life and underſtanding in them, was, according to *Plato*'s judgment, then the moſt ready and effectual way to introduce abſolute atheiſm.

Moreover, it is true, that though this *Anaxagoras* were a profeſſed Theiſt, he aſſerting an infinite ſelf-exiſtent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was ſeverely taxed alſo by *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, as one not thorough-paced in theiſm, and who did not ſo fully, as he ought, adhere to his own principles. For whereas, to aſſert Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to aſſert final cauſality for things in nature, as alſo that they were made after the beſt manner; *Anaxagoras*, when he was to give his particular account of the phænomena, did commonly betake himſelf to material cauſes only, and hardly ever make uſe of the mental or final cauſe, but when he was to ſeek and at a loſs; then only bringing in God upon the ſtage. *Socrates* his diſcourſe concerning this in *Plato*'s *Phædo* is very well worth our taking notice of: *Hearing one ſometime read* (ſaith he) *out of a book of* Anaxagoras, ὡς νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, *that Mind was the order and cauſe of all things, I was exceedingly pleaſed herewith, concluding, that it muſt needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and diſpoſed of as they ſhould, and after the beſt manner poſſible; and therefore the cauſes even of the things in nature* (*or at leaſt the grand ſtrokes of them*) *ought to be fetched from the* τὸ βέλτιστον, *that which is abſolutely the beſt. But when afterwards I took* Anaxagoras *his book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly diſappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other cauſes aſſigned, but only from airs, and æthers, and waters, and ſuch like phyſical and material things. And he ſeemed to me to deal, juſt as if one having affirmed, that* Socrates *did all by mind, reaſon and underſtanding, afterward undertaking to declare the cauſes of all my actions, as particularly of my ſitting here at this time, ſhould render it after this manner; becauſe, forſooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones being ſolid, have joints in them at certain diſtances, and nerves of ſuch a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves ſome of them intended and ſome remitted, was the cauſe of the bending of my body, and of my ſitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cauſe hereof, which was no other than this; becauſe it ſeemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as alſo to my ſelf moſt juſt, rather to ſubmit to their cenſure and undergo their puniſhment, than by flight to eſcape it; for certainly otherwiſe theſe nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this poſture, but amongſt the Megarenſians and Bœotians, carried thither* ὑπὸ δόξης τοῦ βελτίστου, *by the opinion of the beſt; had I not thought it better to ſubmit to the ſentence of the city, than to eſcape the ſame by flight. Which kind of philoſophers* (ſaith he) *do not ſeem to me, to diſtinguiſh betwixt the true and proper cauſe of things, and the cauſe* ſine qua non, *that without which they could not have been effected. And ſuch are they, who deviſe many odd phyſical reaſons for the firm ſettlement of the earth, without any regard to that power, which orders all things for the beſt,* (*as having* δαιμονίαν ἰσχύν, *a divine force in*

P. 97. Steph.

in it;) *but thinking to find out an* Atlas *far more ſtrong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together*; τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, δὲν ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν· *Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing.*

From which paſſage of *Plato*'s we may conclude, that though *Anaxagoras* was ſo far convinced of Theiſm, as in profeſſion to make one infinite Mind the cauſe of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithſtanding too great a tang of that old material and atheiſtical philoſophy of his predeceſſors, ſtill hanging about him, who reſolved all the phænomena of nature into phyſical, and nothing into mental or final cauſes. And we have the rather told this long ſtory of him, becauſe it is ſo exact a parallel with the philoſophick humour of ſome in this preſent age, who pretending to aſſert a God, do notwithſtanding diſcard all mental and final cauſality from having any thing to do with the fabrick of the world; and reſolve all into material neceſſity and mechaniſm, into vortices, globuli and ſtriate particles, and the like. Of which Chriſtian philoſophers we muſt needs pronounce, that they are not near ſo good Theiſts as *Anaxagoras* himſelf was, though ſo much condemned by *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*; foraſmuch as he did not only aſſert God to be the cauſe of motion, but alſo the governour, regulator and methodizer of the ſame, for the production of this harmonious ſyſtem of the world, and therefore τῶ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, *the cauſe of well and fit.* Whereas theſe utterly reject the latter, and only admitting the former, will needs ſuppoſe heaven and earth, plants and animals, and all things whatſoever in this orderly compages of the world, to have reſulted meerly from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at firſt impreſſed upon the matter, and determin'd to vortex.

XXXI. The chronology of the old philoſophers having ſome uncertainty in it, we ſhall not ſcrupulouſly concern ourſelves therein, but in the next place conſider *Parmenides*, *Xenophanes* his auditor, and a philoſophick poet likewiſe, but who converſing much with two Pythagoreans, *Amenias* and *Diochætes*, was therefore look'd upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagorick ſect. That this *Parmenides* acknowledged many Gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithſtanding which, he plainly aſſerted alſo one ſupreme, making him, as *Simplicius* tells us, αἰτίαν θεῶν, *the cauſe of all thoſe other gods*, of which Love is ſaid to have been firſt produced. Which ſupreme Deity *Parmenides*, as well as *Xenophanes*, called, ἓν τὸ πᾶν, *one that was all*, or the univerſe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was alſo ἀκίνητον, *immovable.*

Now though it be true, that *Parmenides* his writings being not without obſcurity, ſome of the ancients, who were leſs acquainted with metaphyſical ſpeculations, underſtood him phyſically; as if he had aſſerted the whole corporeal univerſe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby deſtroying, together with the diverſity of things, all motion, mutation and action; which was plainly to make *Parmenides* not to have been a philoſopher, but a mad man: yet *Simplicius*, a man well acquainted with the

opinions of ancient philoſophers, and who had by him a copy of *Parmenides* his poems, (then ſcarce, but ſince loſt) aſſures us, that *Parmenides* dreamt of no ſuch matter, and that he wrote ὁ περὶ τῦ φυσικῦ στοιχείυ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῦ ὄντως ὄντος, or περὶ τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς, *not concerning a phyſical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens, or the divine tranſcendency:* adding, that though ſome of thoſe ancient philoſophers did not diſtinguiſh τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπό τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν, *natural things from ſupernatural*; yet the Pythagoreans, and *Xenophanes*, and *Parmenides*, and *Empedocles*, and *Anaxagoras*, did all διακρίνειν, handle theſe two diſtinctly; καίπερ τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τὰς πολλὰς, *however, by reaſon of their obſcurity, it was not perceived by many*; for which cauſe they have been moſt of them miſrepreſented, not only by Pagans, but alſo by Chriſtian writers. For, as the ſame *Simplicius* informs us, *Parmenides* propounded two ſeveral doctrines, one after another; the firſt concerning theological and metaphyſical things, called by him ἀλήθειαν, *truth*; the ſecond concerning phyſical and corporeal things, which he called δόξαν, *opinion.* The tranſition betwixt which was contained in theſe verſes of his;

Ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
Ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τῦδε βροτείυς
Μάνθανε· κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.

In the former of which doctrines, *Parmenides* aſſerted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He ſpeaking of ſouls alſo as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming that God did τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τῦ ἐμφανῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδὲς, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, *ſometimes ſend and tranſlate ſouls from the viſible to the inviſible regions, and ſometimes again, on the contrary, from the inviſible to the viſible.* From whence it is plain, that when *Parmenides* aſſerted his one and all immoveable, he ſpake not as a phyſiologer, but as a metaphyſician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing ſo evident, that *Ariſtotle* [1] himſelf, though he had a mind to obſcure *Parmenides* his ſenſe, that he might have a fling at him in his *Phyſicks*, yet could not altogether diſſemble it. For when he thus begins, *There muſt of neceſſity be either one principle or many*; *and if there be but one, then muſt it either be immoveable, as* Parmenides *and* Meliſſus *affirm, or elſe moveable,* ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ, *as the Naturaliſts or Phyſiologers*; he therein plainly intimates, that when *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus* made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as Phyſiologers. And afterwards he confeſſes, that this controverſy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philoſophy, but to ſome other ſcience. But this is more plainly declared by him elſewhere [2], writing concerning *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus* after this manner; εἰ καὶ τ' ἄλλα λέγυσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' ὁ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίζειν λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄτλα τῶν ὄντων ἀγένητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα, μᾶλλον, ἔστιν ἑτέρας καὶ πρoτέρας, ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐπισκέψεως· *Though it be granted, that* Parmenides *and* Meliſſus *otherwiſe ſaid well, yet we muſt not imagine them to have ſpoken phyſically. For this, that there-*

[1] Phyſicæ Auſcultat. Lib. I. cap. II p. 446. [2] De Cœlo, Lib. III. cap. I p. 668.

there is ſomething unmade and immoveable, does not ſo properly belong to phyſicks, as to a certain other ſcience, which is before it.

Wherefore *Parmenides*, as well as *Xenophanes* his maſter, by his one and all, meant nothing elſe but the ſupreme Deity, he calling it alſo immoveable. For the ſupreme Deity was by theſe ancient philoſophers ſtyled, firſt τὸ ἓν and μονὰς, *a unity and monad*, becauſe they conceived, that the firſt and moſt perfect being, and the beginning of all things, muſt needs be the moſt ſimple. Thus *Eudorus* in *Simplicius* [1] declares their ſenſe; ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάντων τὸ ἓν, ὡς καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὅλων πάντων, ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὸν ὑπεράνω θεὸν· *Theſe ancients affirmed, that the one, or unity, was the firſt principle of all; matter itſelf, as well as other things, being derived from it; they meaning by this one that higheſt or ſupreme God, who is over all.* And *Syrianus* to the ſame purpoſe [2], οἱ θεῖοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄνδρες, τὸ ἓν Θεὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἑνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἴτιον, καὶ παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πάσης ζωῆς· *Thoſe divine men called God the One, as being the cauſe of unity to all things, as likewiſe he was of being and life.* And *Simplicius* concludes, that *Parmenides* his ἓν ὄν, *one Ens*, was a certain divine principle, ſuperior to mind or intellect, and more ſimple. λείπεται ἓν τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἴτιον, οὗ ὁ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καὶ ἀπὸ μίαν ἕνωσιν συνηρημένως κατείληπται, καὶ ἡνωμένως, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ Παρμενίδειον ἓν ὄν· *It remaineth therefore, that that intelligible, which is the cauſe of all things, and therefore of mind and underſtanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiouſly and in a way of unity, I ſay, that this was* Parmenides *his one Ens or Being.* *F.* 31 *Gr.* [Comment. in Phyſic. Ariſtotel.]

In the next place, *Parmenides*, with the others of thoſe ancients, called alſo his ἓν ὄν, τὸ πᾶν, *his one Ens or firſt moſt ſimple Being, all, or the univerſe*; becauſe it virtually contained all things, and, as *Simplicius* writes, πάντα διακεκριμένως ἐμφαίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, *all things are from this one, diſtinctly diſplayed.* For which cauſe, in *Plato*'s *Parmenides*, this one is ſaid to be, ἐπὶ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα νενεμημένον, *diſtributed into all things, that are many.* But that *Parmenides* by his ἓν τὸ πᾶν, *one and all*, or *the univerſe*, did not underſtand the corporeal world, is evident from hence, becauſe he called it ἀδιαίρετον, or *indiviſible*, and, as *Simplicius* obſerves, ſuppoſed it to have no magnitude; becauſe that, which is perfectly one, can have no parts. *In Phyſ. F.* 17. 2.

Wherefore it may be here obſerved, that this expreſſion of ἓν τὸ πᾶν, *one being all*, hath been uſed in very different ſenſes: for as *Parmenides* and *Xenophanes* underſtood it of the ſupreme Deity, that one moſt perfect and moſt ſimple being was the original of all things; ſo others of them meant it atheiſtically, concerning the moſt imperfect and loweſt of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but one and the ſame matter diverſly modified. Thus much we learn from that place of *Ariſtotle*'s in his Metaphyſicks, ὅσοι μὲν ἕν ἔνλε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι, *They, who affirm one to be all in this ſenſe, as if all things were nothing but one and the ſame matter, and that corporeal and endued with magnitude, it is manifeſt, that* *L.* 1 *c.* 7. [P. 274. Tom. IV. Oper.]

[1] Comment. in Phyſic. Ariſtot. p. 39. Edit. Græc. Aldin.

[2] Ex MS. Comment. in Libr. aliquot. Metaphyſic. Ariſtotel.

they err ſundry ways. But here is a great difference betwixt theſe two to be obſerved, in that, the atheiſtical aſſerters of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or ſomething elſe) did none of them ſuppoſe their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whoſe principle was one and all immoveable (as *Parmenides*, *Meliſſus* and *Zeno*) could not poſſibly mean any thing elſe thereby, but the Deity; that there was one moſt ſimple, perfect and immutable being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But *Heraclitus*, who is one of thoſe, who are ſaid to have affirmed ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, *that one was all*, or *that the univerſe was but one thing*, might poſſibly have taken both thoſe ſenſes together (which will alſo agree in the Stoical hypotheſis) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theiſts, who ſuppoſed an intellectual fire to be the firſt principle of all things.

And though *Ariſtotle* in his *Phyſicks* quarrels very much with *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*, for making one immoveable principle; yet in his *Metaphyſicks* himſelf doth plainly cloſe with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one incorporeal and immoveable principle of all things, and that the ſupreme Deity is an immoveable nature: εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητον, ὅπερ πειράσομαι δεικνύναι, ἐνταῦθα ἂν εἴη πως καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριοτάτη ἀρχή· *If there be any ſuch ſubſtance as this, that is ſeparate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we ſhall afterwards endeavour to ſhew that there is) then the divinity ought to be placed here, and this muſt be acknowledged to be the firſt and moſt proper principle of all.* But leſt any ſhould ſuſpect, that *Ariſtotle*, if not *Parmenides* alſo, might, for all that, hold many ſuch immoveable principles, or many eternal, uncreated and ſelf-exiſtent beings, as ſo many partial cauſes of the world; [1] *Simplicius* aſſures us, μὴ γεγονέναι δόξαν πολλὰς καὶ ἀκινήτους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσαν, i.e. *that though divers of the antient philoſophers aſſerted a plurality of moveable principles* (and ſome indeed an infinity) *yet there never was any opinion entertained amongſt philoſophers, of many, or more than one, immoveable principles.* From whence it may be concluded, that no philoſopher ever aſſerted a multitude of unmade, ſelf-exiſtent minds, or independent deities, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

L. 6. c. 1. & L. 13. c. 7.

Indeed *Plotinus* ſeems to think, that *Parmenides* in his writings, by his τὸ ὄν, or *ens*, did frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, there being no true entity (according to him) below that, which underſtands; (which mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to a ſphere, becauſe it comprehends all within it ſelf, and becauſe intellection is not from without, but from within:) But that when again he called his *On* or *Ens* one, he gave occaſion thereby to ſome, to quarrel with him, as making the ſame both one and many; intellect being that, which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore *Parmenides* his whole philoſophy (ſaith he) was better digeſted and more exactly and diſtinctly ſet down in *Plato's Parmenides*, where he acknowledgeth *three unities ſubordinate, or a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes*; ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρ-

[1] In Phyſ. Ariſtotel. fol. 17.

Παρμενίδης, ἀκριβέστερον λέγων, διαιρεῖ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἕν. καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλὰ λέγων· καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλά· καὶ σύμφωνος ἑαυτῷ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστι ταῖς Τριστίν· Parmenides *in* Plato, *ſpeaking more exactly, diſtinguiſhes three divine unities ſubordinate; the firſt of that, which is perfectly and moſt properly one; the ſecond of that, which was called by him one-many; the third of that, which is thus expreſſed, one and many. So that* Parmenides *did alſo agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of divine or archical hypoſtaſes.* Which obſervation of *Plotinus* is, by the way, the beſt key, that we know of, for that obſcure book of *Plato*'s *Parmenides*. Wherefore *Parmenides* thus aſſerting a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, it was the firſt of thoſe hypoſtaſes, that was properly called by him, ἓν τὸ πᾶν, *one the univerſe or all:* that is, one moſt ſimple being, the fountain and original of all. And the ſecond of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it ſeems, by him called, in way of diſtinction, ἓν πολλὰ or πάντα, *one-many* or *one-all things*; by which *all things* are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect mind. And of thoſe was *Parmenides* to be underſtood alſo, when he affirmed, that all things did ſtand, and nothing flow; not of ſingular and ſenſible things, which, as the Heracliticks rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: *Ariſtotle* himſelf acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, ſince there could be no immutable and certain ſcience, unleſs there were ſome immutable, neceſſary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the ſame *Ariſtotle* alſo declares, the true meaning of that controverſy betwixt the Heracliticks and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or ſome things ſtand? was the ſame with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, beſides ſingular ſenſibles, that were immutable? and conſequently, whether there were any ſuch thing as ſcience or knowledge which had a firmitude and ſtability in it? For thoſe Heracliticks, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were ſingular and ſenſible things, did with good reaſon conſequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and conſtant knowledge, ſince there can neither be any definition of ſingular ſenſibles, (as *Ariſtotle*[1] writes) nor any demonſtration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and ſtability of ſcience, did as reaſonably conclude thereupon, that beſides ſingular ſenſibles, there were other objects of the mind, univerſal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or underſtanding, and from thence participated by inferiour minds and ſouls. But it muſt be here acknowledged, that *Parmenides* and the Pythagoreans went yet a ſtep further, and did not only ſuppoſe thoſe intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all ſcience, but alſo, as they are contained in the divine intellect, to be the principles and cauſes of all other things. For thus *Ariſtotle* declares their ſenſe, αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, and again, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη παρέχεσθαι, τοῖς δὲ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν· *The ideas are the cauſes of all other things; and, the eſſence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themſelves derive their eſſence from the firſt unity:* thoſe

Eu. L. 1. c. 8.

Met. L. 4. c. 5 [P. 298. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Met. L. 1. c. 6. [P. 273 Tom. IV. Oper.]

[1] Metaph. Lib. I. cap. VI. p. 272. Tom. IV. Oper.

thoſe ideas in the divine underſtanding being look'd upon by theſe philoſophers, as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now theſe ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans *Numbers*, we may from hence clearly underſtand the meaning of that ſeemingly monſtrous paradox or puzzling *Griphus* of theirs, that [1] Numbers were the cauſes and principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it ſignifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the divine intellect, called Numbers; which themſelves alſo were derived from a monad or unity: *Ariſtotle* ſomewhere [2] intimating this very account of that aſſertion, τὰς ἀριθμὰς αἰτίας εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας, *that Numbers were the cauſes of the eſſence of other things*, namely, becauſe τὰ εἴδη ἀριθμοὶ, *the ideas were numbers.* Though we are not ignorant, how the Pythagoreans made alſo all the numbers within the decad, to be ſymbols of things. But beſides theſe two divine hypoſtaſes already mentioned, *Parmenides* ſeems to have aſſerted alſo a third, which, becauſe it had yet more alterity, for diſtinction ſake was called by him, neither ἓν τὸ πᾶν, *one the univerſe or all*; nor ἓν πάντα, *one-all things*; but ἓν καὶ πάντα, *one and all things:* and this is taken by *Plotinus* to be the eternal *Pſyche*, that actively produceth all things, in this lower world, according to thoſe divine ideas.

In Ariſt. Phyſ. fol. 7. & 17. & 31.

But that *Parmenides*, by his one-all immoveable, really underſtood nothing elſe but the ſupreme Deity, is further unqueſtionably evident from thoſe verſes of his cited by *Simplicius*, but not taken notice of by *Stephanus* in his *Poeſis Philoſophica*, of which we ſhall only ſet down ſome few here.

——Ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστὶν,
Οὐδέποτ' ἦν, οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν·
Ἓν συνεχές· Τίνα γαρ γένην διζήσαι αὐτοῦ;
Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δέσμων,
Ταυτὸν τ' ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον, καθ' ἑαυτὸ τε κεῖται· &c.

In which, together with thoſe that follow, the ſupreme Deity is plainly deſcribed as one ſingle, ſolitary, and moſt ſimple being, unmade or ſelf-exiſtent, and neceſſarily exiſting, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whoſe duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary ſucceſſion, but a conſtant eternity, without either paſt or future. From whence it may be obſerved, that this opinion of a ſtanding eternity, different from that flowing ſucceſſion of time, is not ſo novel a thing as ſome would perſuade, nor was firſt excogitated by Chriſtian writers, ſchoolmen or fathers, it being at leaſt as old as *Parmenides*; from whom it was alſo afterwards received and entertained by the beſt of the other Pagan philoſophers; however hath been of late ſo much decried, not only by Atheiſtical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits alſo, as non-ſenſe and impoſſibility.

It

[1] Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. Lib. I. cap. VI. p. 272. [2] Ibid.

It is well known, that *Meliſſus* held forth the very ſame doctrine with *Parmenides*, of one immoveable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewiſe, as *Parmenides* did; καὶ ὁ Μέλισσος ἓν ἐόν φησι, δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ ἔχει πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια· Meliſſus *alſo declared, that his one Ens muſt needs be devoid of body, becauſe if it had any craſſities in it, it would have parts.* But the only difference that was between them was this, that *Parmenides* called this one immoveable that was all, πεπερασμένον, *finite or determined*, but *Meliſſus* ἄπειρον, *infinite*; which difference notwithſtanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their ſenſe: whilſt each of them endeavoured in a different way, to ſet forth the greateſt perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in thoſe words finite and infinite, and both of them ſignifying in one ſenſe perfection, but in another imperfection. And the diſagreeing agreement of theſe two philoſophers with one another, *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus*, as alſo of *Xenophanes* with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by *Simplicius* after this manner; *Simplic. Ar. Phyſ. f.* 19.

ᾠδὲν δὲ ἴσως χεῖρον ὀλίγον παρεκβάντα, τοῖς φιλομαθεστέροις ἐπιδεῖξαι, πῶς. καίτοι διαφέρειν δοκοῦντες οἱ πάλαιοι, περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας, ἐναρμονίως ὅμως συμφέρονται· Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Χενοφάνης καὶ Παρμένιδης καὶ Μέλισσος· ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης ἓν λέγων καὶ πεπερασμένον· ἀνάλκη γὰρ τὸ ἓν τὸ πλήθος προϋπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ὅρος καὶ πέρατος αἴτιον, κατὰ τὸ πέρας μᾶλλον ἢπερ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀφορίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ πάντη τε τέλειον τὸ τέλος τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπειληφὸς, πεπερασμένον εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ τέλος τῶν πάντων ὡς ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἐνδεὲς ὄν, ὅπω πέρας ἀπείληφε· Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεάσατο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τό ἄπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀγένητον· πλὴν ὁ μὲν Χενοφάνης ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ πάντων ὑπερανέχον, καὶ κινήσεως αὐτὸ καὶ ἠρεμίας καὶ πάσης ἀντιστοιχείας ἐπέκεινα τίθησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ὑποθέσει· ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον αὐτῷ, καὶ πάσης μεταβολῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπέκεινα, θεασάμενος, ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ· *Ar. Phyſ. f.* 7.

Perhaps it will not be improper for us to digreſs a little here, and to gratify the ſtudious and inquiſitive reader, by ſhowing, how thoſe ancient philoſophers, though ſeeming to diſſent in their opinions concerning the principles, did notwithſtanding harmoniouſly agree together: As firſt of all, they who diſcourſed concerning the intelligible and firſt principle of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides *and* Meliſſus; *of whom* Parmenides *called it one finite and determined; becauſe as unity muſt needs exiſt before multitude, ſo that, which is to all things the cauſe of meaſure, bound and determination, ought rather to be deſcribed by meaſure and finitude, than infinity; as alſo that which is every way perfect, and hath attained its own end, or rather is the end of all things (as it was the beginning) muſt needs be of a determinate nature; for that which is imperfect and therefore indigent, hath not yet attained its term or meaſure. But* Meliſſus, *though conſidering the immutability of the Deity likewiſe, yet attending to the inexhauſtible perfection of its eſſence, the unlimitedneſs and unboundedneſs of its power, declareth it to be infinite, as well as ingenit or unmade. Moreover,* Xenophanes *looking upon the Deity, as the cauſe of all things and above all things, placed it above motion and reſt, and all thoſe antitheſes of inferiour beings, as* Plato *likewiſe doth in the firſt hypotheſis*

of

of his Parmenides; *whereas* Parmenides *and* Meliſſus, *attending to its ſtability and conſtant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praiſed it as immoveable.* From which of *Simplicius* it is plain, that *Parmenides*, when he called God περεασμένον, *finite and determined*, was far from meaning any ſuch thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal being of finite dimenſions, as ſome have ignorantly ſuppoſed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he underſtood it in that ſenſe, in which πέρας is taken by *Plato*, as oppoſite to ἀπειρία, and for the greateſt perfection, and as God is ſaid to be πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων, *the term and meaſure of all things.* But *Meliſſus* calling God ἄπειρον, *infinite*, in the ſenſe before declared, as thereby to ſignify his inexhauſtible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our preſent theology, and the now received manner of ſpeaking. We have the rather produced all this, to ſhew how curious the ancient philoſophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their deſcriptions of him. Wherefore however *Anaximander*'s Infinite were nothing but eternal ſenſeleſs matter (though called by him the τὸ θεῖον, *the divineſt thing of all*) yet *Meliſſus* his ἄπειρον, or *Infinite*, was the true Deity.

With *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus* fully agreed *Zeno Eleates* alſo, *Parmenides* his ſcholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he meaning thereby nothing elſe but the ſupreme Deity. For though it be true, that this *Zeno* did excogitate certain arguments againſt the local motion of bodies, proceeding upon that hypotheſis of the infinite diviſibility of body, one of which was famouſly known by that name of *Achilles*, becauſe it pretended to prove, that it was impoſſible (upon the hypotheſis) for the ſwift-footed *Achilles* ever to overtake the creeping ſnail; (which arguments of his, whether or no they are well anſwered by *Ariſtotle*[1], is not here to our purpoſe to inquire) yet all this was nothing elſe but *luſus ingenii*, a ſportful exerciſe of *Zeno*'s wit, he being a ſubtil logician and diſputant, or perhaps an endeavour alſo to ſhow, how puzling and perplexing to human underſtanding, the conception even of the moſt vulgar and confeſſed phænomena of nature may be. For that *Zeno Eleates* by his one immoveable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than *Meliſſus*, *Parmenides*, and *Xenophanes*, is evident from *Ariſtotle* writing thus concerning him; τὸ τοιοῦτον ἓν ὂν τὸν θεὸν λέγει, ὅτε κινεῖσθαι, ὅτε κινητὸν εἶναι, Zeno *by his one Ens, which neither was moved nor moveable, meaneth God.* Moreover the ſame *Ariſtotle* informs us, that this *Zeno* endeavoured to demonſtrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him; as that which is the beſt, the ſupreme and moſt powerful of all, or as an abſolutely perfect being; εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς ἀπάντων κράτιστον, ἵνα φησὶ προσήκειν αὐτὸν· *If God be the beſt of all things, then he muſt needs be one.* Which argument was thus purſued by him; τοῦτο θεὸς καὶ θεῖ δύναμις κρατεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ὥστε καθὸ μὴ κρείττον, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν· πλειόνων γὰρ ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἷεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους, τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεὸς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ θεοῦ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ἴσων, δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν θεοῦ φύσιν· δεῖν εἶναι κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον, οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου· ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε, καὶ τοιοῦτον

De Xenoph. Ze. & Gor. [Cap. III p. 840. Tom. I. Oper.]

[1] Phyſic. Lib. VI. cap. XIV. p. 359. Tom. I. Oper.

τοιοῦτον εἴη θεὸς, ἕνα μόνου εἶναι τὸν θεὸν· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι ἃ ἂν βούλοιτο· *This is God and the power of God, to prevail, conquer and rule over all. Wherefore by how much any thing falls ſhort of the beſt, by ſo much does it fall ſhort of being God. Now if there be ſuppoſed more ſuch beings, whereof ſome are better, ſome worſe, thoſe could not be all gods, becauſe it is eſſential to God not to be tranſcended by any; but if they be conceived to be ſo many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the beſt, one equal being neither better nor worſe than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then can there be but one. And indeed otherwiſe he could not be able to do whatever he would.*

Empedocles is ſaid to have been an emulator of *Parmenides* alſo, which muſt be underſtood of his metaphyſicks, becauſe in his phyſiology (which was atomical) he ſeems to have tranſcended him. Now that *Empedocles* acknowledged one ſupreme and univerſal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what hath been already cited out of his philoſophick poems. Beſides which the writer *De Mundo* [1] (who, though not *Ariſtotle*, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that *Empedocles* derived all things whatſoever from one ſupreme Deity; τὰ γὰρ δι' ἀέρος ἅπαντα, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος. ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, *P. 26.*

Πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἔστιν, ἰὼ ὅσσα τε ἔσται ὀπίσσω, &c.

All the things, that are upon the earth, and in the air and water, may truly be called the works of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of whom, according to the phyſical Empedocles, *proceed all things that were, are, and ſhall be,* viz. *plants, men, beaſts and gods.* Which notwithſtanding we conceive to be rather true as to *Empedocles* his ſenſe, than his words; he affirming, as it ſeems, in that cited place, that all theſe things were made, not immediately out of God, but out of contention and friendſhip; becauſe *Simplicius*, who was furniſhed with a copy of *Empedocles* his poems, twice brings in that cited paſſage of his in this connexion:

Ἐν δέ κότῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,
Σὺν δ' ἔβη ἐν Φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται,
Ἐκ τῶν γὰρ πάνθ' ὅσσ' ἦν, ὅσσα τέ ἐστι, καὶ ἔσται,
Δένδρα τε βεβλάστηκε, καὶ ἄνερες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
Θῆρες, τ' οἰωνοί τε, καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς,
Καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέροντοι.

Things are divided and ſegregated by contention, but joined together by friendſhip; from which two (contention and friendſhip) *all that was, is and ſhall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beaſts, birds and fiſhes, and laſt of all, the long-lived and honourable gods.* Wherefore the ſenſe of *Empedocles* his words here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, *viz.* plants, beaſts, men and gods, was made from contention and friendſhip.

[1] Cap. VI. p. 863. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtot.

friendſhip. Nevertheleſs, ſince, according to *Empedocles*, contention and friendſhip did themſelves depend alſo upon one ſupreme Deity, which he with *Parmenides* and *Xenophanes* called Τὸ ἓν, or *the very One*; the writer *De Mundo* might well conclude, that, according to *Empedocles*, all things whatſoever, and not only men, but Gods, were derived from one ſupreme Deity. And that this was indeed *Empedocles* his ſenſe, appears plainly from *Ariſtotle* in his *Metaphyſicks*, Τίθησι μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἀρχήν τινα τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος, ἔοικεν δ' ἂν ἐξ ἐκείνου ἤδη καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἑνός. Ἅπαντα γάρ ἐκ τούτου τἄλλα ἐστὶ πλὴν ὁ Θεός· λέγει γοῦν,

L. 3. *c.* 4. [P. 295. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Ἐξ ὧν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἐσθ', ὅσα τ' ἔσται ὀπίσσω, &c.

Empedocles *makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheleſs, he ſeems to generate this contention it ſelf alſo from the very One*, (that is, from the ſupreme Deity.) *For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted*; *he writing after this manner, from which* (that is, contention and friendſhip) *all the things that have been, are, and ſhall be* (plants, beaſts, men and gods) *derived their original.* For *Empedocles* it ſeems ſuppoſed, that were it not for νεῖκος, *diſcord* or *contention*, all things would be one: ſo that, according to him, all things whatſoever proceeded from contention or diſcord, together with a mixture of friendſhip, ſave only the ſupreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, becauſe he is eſſentially τὸ ἓν, *unity itſelf and friendſhip.* From whence *Ariſtotle* takes occaſion to quarrel with *Empedocles*, as if it would follow from his principles, that the ſupreme and moſt happy God was the leaſt wiſe of all, as being not able to know any thing beſides himſelf, or in the world without him; διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ, τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἥττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, ἢ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα τό γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τῷ ὁμοίῳ τῷ ὁμοίῳ,

Met. L. 3. *c.* 4. [p. 295 Tom. IV. Oper.]

Γαῖαν μὲν γὰρ (φησι) γαίαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, &c.

This therefore happens to Empedocles, *that, according to his principles, the moſt happy God is the leaſt wiſe of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, becauſe he hath no contention in him*; *all knowledge being by that, which is like: himſelf writing thus*; *We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire*; *friendſhip by friendſhip, and contention by contention.* But to let this paſs; *Empedocles* here making the gods themſelves to be derived from contention and friendſhip, the ſupreme Deity, or moſt happy God, only excepted, (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendſhip themſelves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the original of all things under the name of τὸ ἓν, *the very One*, and many other inferiour gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or diſcord, as this was alſo junior to unity, the firſt and ſupreme Deity. Which gods of *Empedocles*, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtleſs the ſtars and dæmons.

Moreover,

Moreover, we may here obſerve, that according to *Empedocles* his doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human ſouls and dæmons (which he ſuppoſed alike lapſable) was derived from that νεῖκος, *diſcord and contention*, that is neceſſarily contained in the nature of them, together with the ill uſe of their liberty, both in this preſent and their pre-exiſtent ſtate. So that *Empedocles* here trode in the footſteps of *Pythagoras*, whoſe praiſes he thus loudly ſang forth in his poems; According to that Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος. P. 23.

Ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,
Ὅς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
Παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν ἐπιήρανος ἔργων, &c.

Horum de numero quidam præſtantia norat
Plurima, mentis opes amplas ſub pectore ſervans,
Omnia veſtigans ſapientum docta reperta, &c.

Porphyr. de Vit. Pyth p. 194. [Ed. Cantab p. 35. Ed. Kuſteri.]

XXII. Before we come to *Socrates* and *Plato*, we ſhall here take notice of ſome other Pythagoreans, and eminent philoſophers, who clearly aſſerted one ſupreme and univerſal *Numen*, though doubtleſs acknowledging withal, other inferiour gods. *Philo* in his book *De mundi Opificio*, writing of the Hebdomad or Septenary number, and obſerving, that, according to the Pythagoreans, it was called both a motherleſs and a virgin number, becauſe it was the only number within the Decad, which was neither generated, nor did it ſelf generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a ſymbol of the ſupreme Deity, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων· *The Pythagoreans likened this number to the prince and governour of all things, or the ſupreme monarch of the univerſe*; as thinking it to bear a reſemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was before taken notice of by us. However, *Philo* hereupon occaſionally cites this remarkable teſtimony of *Philolaus* the Pythagorean; Ἐστὶ γάρ, φησὶν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων ὁ Θεὸς, εἷς ἀεὶ ὢν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων. *God* (ſaith he) *is the prince and ruler over all, always one, ſtable, immoveable, like to himſelf, but unlike to every thing elſe.* To which may be added what in *Stobæus* is further recorded out of the ſame *Philolaus*; ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἷς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τῷ συγγενέϊ καὶ κρατίστῳ κυβερνώμενος· *This world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the beſt.* Where notwithſtanding he ſeemeth, with *Ocellus*, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again, διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε, κόσμου ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον Θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιον· *Wherefore, ſaid* Philolaus, *the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of ſucceſſive generation.*

p. 23. [p. 22. Oper.] *Eccl. Phyſ. p.* 41.

Jamblichus, in his Protrepticks, cites a paſſage out of *Archytas* another Pythagorean, to the ſame purpoſe; ὅστις ἀναλύσαι οἷός τε ἐστὶ, πάντα τὰ γένεα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ αὐτὰν ἀρχὰν, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καλὰν σκοπιὰν εὑρηκέναι, ἀφ' ἃ δυνατὸς ἐσσεῖται τὸν Θεὸν καθορεῖσθαι, &c. *Whoſoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the ſame principle, this man ſeems to me to have found out an excellent ſpecula, or high ſtation, from whence he may be able to take a large view and proſpect of God, and of all other things; and he ſhall clearly perceive, that God*

C. 4. *p.* 20.

is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to juſtice and right reaſon. Upon which words of *Archytas* *Jamblichus* thus gloſſeth: Archytas *here declares the end of all theological ſpeculation to be this, not to reſt in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the ſame head.* Adding τοιαύτη ἐπιστήμη τῆ ἑνὸς, τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης θεωρίας, *that this knowledge of the firſt unity, the original of all things, is the end of all contemplation.* Moreover, *Stobæus* cites this out of *Archytas* his book of principles,

Ecl. Ph. p. 82. *viz.* That beſides matter and form, ἀναγκαιοτέραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσοισαν ἐνεργώτων πραγμάτων ἐπι τὰν μορφὰ, ταῦτα δὲ τὰν πράταν δυνάμει, καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν, ὀνομάζεσθαι δε Θεὸν, &c. *There is another more neceſſary cauſe, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the firſt and moſt powerful cauſe, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, Matter and Form; God the artificer and mover, and Matter that which is moved, and Form the art introduced into the Matter.* In which ſame Stobean excerption it alſo follows afterwards, δεῖ νόῳ τι κρέσσον εἶναι, νόῳ δὲ κρέσσον ἐστι ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν Θεὸν, *That there muſt be ſomething better than Mind; and that this thing better than Mind is that, which we (properly) call God.*

P. 32. [Lib. I. cap. XVI.] *Ocellus* alſo in the ſame *Stobæus* thus writeth, συνέχει τὰ μὲν σκάνεα ζῶα, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ψυχά· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ὁ Θεός. τὰς δ' οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ' αἴτιος νόμος· *Life contains the bodies of animals, the cauſe of which life is the ſoul; concord contains houſes and cities, the cauſe of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cauſe of which*

P. 45. *mundane harmony is God.* And to the ſame purpoſe *Ariſtæus*, ὡς ὁ τεχνίτας πρὸς τὰν τέχναν, ἅτως Θεὸς πρὸς ἁρμονίαν, *As the artificer is to art, ſo is God to the harmony of the world.* There is alſo this paſſage in the ſame *Stobæus* cited out of

P. 8. an anonymous Pythagorean, Θεὸς μὲν ἐστιν ἀρχὰ καὶ πρῶτον, θεῖος δὲ ὁ κόσμος, *God is the principle, and the firſt thing; and the world (though it be not the ſupreme God) yet is it divine.*

Timæus Locrus, a Pythagorean ſenior to *Plato*, in his book concerning *nature*, or *the ſoul of the world*, (upon which *Plato*'s *Timæus* was but a kind of commentary) plainly acknowledgeth both one ſupreme God, the maker and governour of the whole world, and alſo many other gods, his creatures and ſubordinate miniſters; in the cloſe thereof [1], writing thus concerning the puniſhment of wicked men after this life, ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἁ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἀγεμὼν Θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμω συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα δεδαμιόργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀριστὰν εἴδεος ἀγενάτω καὶ αἰωνίω· *All theſe things hath* Nemeſis *decreed to be executed in the ſecond circuit by the miniſtry of vindictive terreſtrial dæmons, that are overſeers of human affairs; to which dæmons that ſupreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and adminiſtration of the world. Which world is compleated and made up of gods, men and other animals, all created according to the beſt pattern of the eternal and unmade idea.* In which words of *Timæus* there are theſe three ſeveral points of the Pagan theology contained; firſt, that there is one

[1] Timæus de Animâ Mundi, p. 566. inter Scriptor. mythologic. à Th. Gale editos.

one ſupreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governour of the whole world, and who made it according to the beſt pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wiſdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the ſupreme God hath committed the adminiſtration of our human affairs to dæmons and inferior gods, who are conſtant inſpectors over us, ſome of which he alſo makes uſe of for the puniſhment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of *Timæus Locrus* the ſupreme God is often called ὁ Θεὸς, and ſometime ὁ δαίμων, *God in way of eminency*; ſometime Νόος *Mind*, ſometime τ' ἀγαθὸν, *the very Good*, ſometime ἀρχὰ τῶν ἀρίστων, *the Principle of the beſt things*, ſometime δαμιεργὸς τῦ βελτίονος, *the Maker of the better*, (evil being ſuppoſed not to proceed from him;) ſometime κράτιστον αἴτιον, *the beſt and moſt powerful Cauſe*; ſometime ἀρχαγὸς καὶ γενέτωρ ἁπάντων, *the Prince and Parent of all things*. Which God, according to him, is not the ſoul of the world neither, but the creator thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a ſecondary generated God [1]; δηλήμενος ὧν ἄριστον γέναμα ποιεῖν, τῦτον ἐποίει θεὸν γενατὸν, ὄποκα φθαρησόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλω αἰτίω, ἔξω τῶ αὐτὸν συντεταγμένω θεῶ, εἴποκα θήλετο αὐτὸν διαλύειν· *God willing to make the world the beſt, that it was capable of, made it a generated god, ſuch as ſhould never be deſtroyed by any other cauſe but only by that God himſelf, who framed it, if he ſhould ever will to diſſolve it. But ſince it is not the part of that which is good to deſtroy the beſt of works, the world will doubtleſs ever remain incorruptible and happy, the beſt of all generated things, made by the beſt cauſe, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible eſſence, as the paradigms, which whatſoever is made conformable to, muſt needs be the beſt, and ſuch as ſhall never need to be mended.* Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, ſo as to have a beginning, πρὶν ὠρανὸν γενέσθαι, λογῳ ἦν ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δαμιεργὸς τῦ βελλίονος, *before the heaven was made, exiſted the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the beſt.* Wherefore, whatever *Ocellus* and *Philolaus* might do, yet this *Timæus* held not the world's eternity; wherein he followed not only *Pythagoras* himſelf (as we have already ſhewed) but alſo the generality of the firſt Pythagoreans, of whom *Ariſtotle* pronounces without exception, γενῶσι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον, *that they generated the world.* *Timæus* indeed in this book ſeems to aſſert the pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a ſelf-exiſtent principle together with God; and yet *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites a paſſage out of him looking another way, ἀλλ' ἀπίκρυς καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἀκῦσαι πεθεῖς; Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῷ Φυσικῷ συγγράμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὧδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἀρχὰ πάντων ἐστιν ἀγενητος, εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχὰ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνα ἀρχὰ, ἐξ ἂς ἐγένετο· *Would you hear of one only principle of all things amongſt the Greeks?* Timæus Locrus, *in his book of nature, will bear no witneſs thereof; he there in expreſs words writing thus, There is one principle of all things unmade: for if it were made, it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle, from whence it was made.* Thus we ſee, that *Timæus Locrus* aſſerted one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and beſides this, another generated god, the world it ſelf animated, with its ſeveral

Met. L. 1. c. 7. [p. 276. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Strom. 5. p. 604. [p. 718. Edit. Potteri.]

[1] *P. 546.*

parts; the difference betwixt both which gods is thus declared by him [1], Θεὸν δέ, τὸν μὲν αἰώνιον νόῳ ὁρᾶν μόνος, τῶν ἁπάντων ἄρχαγον καὶ γενέτορα τετέων, τὸν δὲ γενατὸν ὄψει ὁρέοντες, κόσμον δὲ τόνδε, καὶ τὰ μέρα αὐτῷ ὁκόσα ὡράνια ἐντί. *That eternal God, who is the prince, original, and parent of all these things, is seen only by the mind; but the other generated god is visible to our eyes,* viz. *this world, and those parts of it which are heavenly*; that is, the stars, as so many particular gods contained in it. But here it is to be observed, that the eternal God is not only so called by *Timæus*, as being without beginning, but also as having a distinct kind of duration from that of time, which is properly called *Æon*, or Eternity, he therein following *Parmenides*, εἰκὼν δὲ ἐστι τῷ ἀγενάτῳ χρόνῳ, ὃν αἰῶνα ποταγορεύομες· ὡς γὰρ ποτ' ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδάνικον κόσμον ὅδε ὡρανὸς ἐγενάθη, ὅτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιργήθη· *Time is but an image of that unmade duration, which we call eternity: wherefore, as this sensible world was made according to that exemplar or pattern of the intelligible world, so was time made together with the world, as an imitation of eternity.*

Pag. 233. It hath been already observed, that *Onatus*, another Pythagorean, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time asserting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal *Numen*, many other inferiour and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these *Stob. Eccl. Phys.* assertions is contained in these following words; τοὶ δέ λέγοντες ἕνα θεὸν εἶμεν, *p.* 5. ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλῶς ἁμαρτάνοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τᾶς θείας ὑπεροχᾶς ὐ συνθεορῆντι· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἄρχεν καὶ καθηγέεσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ πολὶ τὸν πρωτὸν καὶ νοητὸν ὅτως ἔχοντι ὥσπερ χορευτὰ πολὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατίωτα πολὶ στραλαγὸν, καὶ λοχίτα, καὶ ἐντεταγμένοι πολὶ ταξιάρχαν καὶ λοχαγέταν, ἔχοντε φύσιν, ἕπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολυθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθηγεομένω· κοινὸν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι, καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀλλ' ὐκέτι δύναντο συντετάχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι πολὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος· ὥσπερ ὐδὲ χορευταὶ ποτὶ συναϊδίαν, ὐδὲ στραλὶ· ὥται πολὶ στρατηγίαν, ἀπολειφθέντες ἀγεμόνος, τοὶ μὲν στραλαγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαίω· *They who maintain, that there is only one God, and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as not considering aright, what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency chiefly consisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those which are like to it* (that is, gods) *and in excelling or surmounting others, and being superior to them. But all those other gods, which we contend for, are to that first and intelligible God but as the dancers to the* Coryphæus *or* Choragus, *and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain or general; to whom it properly belongeth, to follow and comply with their leader and commander. The work indeed is common, or the same to them both, to the ruler, and them that are ruled; but they that are ruled could not orderly conspire and agree together into one work, were they destitute of a leader; as the singers and dancers could not conspire together into one dance and harmony, were they destitute of a* Coryphæus; *nor soldiers make up one orderly army, were they without a captain or commander.*

And

[1] P. 549.

And as the ſupreme God is here called by *Onatus* the *Coryphæus* of the gods, ſo is he in like manner by the writer *De Mundo* [1] ſtyled the *Coryphæus* of the world, or the *Præcentor* and *Præſultor* of it, in theſe words: καθάπερ ἐν χορῷ, κορυφαίᾳ καλάρξαντος, συνεπηχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθ' ὅτι καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἁρμονίαν ἐμμελῆ κεραννύντων· ὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ τοῦ σύμπαντος διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδόσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος, κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα ἀεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός· *As in a chorus, when the* Coryphæus *or* Præcentor *hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and ſometimes of women too, followeth, ſinging every one their part, ſome in higher and ſome in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; ſo in the world God, as the* Coryphæus, *the* Præcentor *and* Præſultor, *beginning the dance and muſick, the ſtars and heavens move round after him, according to thoſe numbers and meaſures, which he preſcribes them, all together making up one moſt excellent harmony.*

It was alſo before [2] obſerved, that *Ecphantus* the Pythagorean, and *Archelaus* the ſucceſſor of *Anaxagoras* (who were both of them Atomiſts in their phyſiology) did aſſert the world to have been made at firſt, and ſtill to be governed by one divine Mind; which is more than ſome Atomiſts of ours in this preſent age, who notwithſtanding pretend to be very good Theiſts, will acknowledge. We ſhall, in the next place, mention *Euclides Megarenſis*, the head of that ſect called Megarick, and who is ſaid to have been *Plato*'s maſter for ſome time after *Socrates* his death; whoſe doctrine is thus ſet down by *Laertius* [3]: ὅτι τὸ ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ Φρόνησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ Θεὸν, καὶ ἄλλοτε Νοῦν, καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ Ἀγαθῷ, ἀνῄρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων· Which we underſtand thus, *That* Euclides (who followed *Xenophanes* and *Parmenides*) *made the firſt principle of all things to be one the very Good, called ſometimes Wiſdom, ſometimes God, ſometimes Mind, and ſometimes by other names; but that he took away all, that is oppoſite to good, denying it to have any real entity:* that is, he maintained, that there was no poſitive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle. And thus do we alſo underſtand that of *Cicero* [4], when he repreſents the doctrine of the Megaricks after this manner, *Id bonum ſolum eſſe, quod eſſet Unum, & Simile, & Idem, & Semper*; to wit, that they ſpake this concerning God, *that Good or Goodneſs it ſelf* is a name properly belonging to him, *who is alſo One, and Like, and the Same, and Always*; and that the true good of man conſiſteth in a participation of, and conformity with this firſt Good. Which doctrine *Plato* ſeems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the ſupreme Deity by thoſe two names, τὸ ἓν and τ' ἀγαθὸν, *the One* and *the Good*, and concluding true human felicity to conſiſt in a participation of the firſt Good, or of the divine Nature. *Pag.* 26.

In the next place we ſhall take notice of *Antiſthenes*, who was the founder alſo of another ſect, to wit, the Cynick; for he, in a certain phyſiological treatiſe

[1] Cap. VI. p. 861, 862. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtotel.
[2] Cap. I. §. XXVI.
[3] Lib. II. ſegm 106. p. 142.
[4] Academ. Quæſt. Lib. IV. cap. XLII. p. 2325. Tom. VIII. Oper.

treatiſe, is ſaid to have affirmed, *Eſſe populares deos multos, ſed naturalem unum*; *That though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God:* or, as it is expreſſed in *Lactantius*, *Unum eſſe naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes & urbes ſuos habeant populares*; *That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their ſeveral popular ones.* Wherefore *Velleius* the Epicurean in *Cicero* [1] quarrels with this *Antiſthenes*, as one, who deſtroyed the nature of the gods, becauſe he denied a multitude of independent deities, ſuch as *Epicurus* pretended to aſſert. For this of *Antiſthenes* is not ſo to be underſtood, as if he had therein deſigned to take away all the inferiour gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtleſs have been accounted an Atheiſt, as well as *Anaxagoras* was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning thoſe other gods of theirs, that were or might be look'd upon as abſolute and independent; that theſe, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the ſame natural God, called by ſeveral names. As for example, when the Greeks worſhipped *Zeus*, the Latins *Jovis*, the Egyptians *Hammon*, the Babylonians *Bel*, the Scythians *Pappæus*; theſe were indeed many popular gods, and yet nevertheleſs all but one and the ſame natural God. So again, when in the ſelf-ſame Pagan cities and countries, the reſpective laws thereof made mention of ſeveral gods, as ſupreme and abſolute in their ſeveral territories, as *Jupiter* in the heavens, *Juno* in the air, *Neptune* in the ſea; or as being chief in ſeveral kinds of functions, as *Minerva* for learning, *Bellona* for war, *&c.* (for this *Ariſtotle* takes notice of in his book againſt *Zeno* [2], κατὰ τὸν νόμον, πολλὰ κρείττους ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ, *That according to the laws of cities and countries, one god was beſt for one thing, and another for another*) *Antiſthenes* here declared concerning theſe alſo, that they were indeed many popular, or civil gods, but all really one and the ſame natural God.

Cic. De N. D. L. 1. [cap. XIII.]

Divin. D. c. 11.

To *Antiſthenes* might be added *Diogenes Sinopenſis*, of whom it is recorded by *Laertius* [3], that obſerving a woman too ſuperſtitiouſly worſhipping the ſtatue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her ſuperſtition, he thus beſpake her; ὐκ εὐλαβῇ, ὦ γύναι, μή ποτε Θεῷ ὄπιθεν ἑστῶτι (πάντα γὰρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πλήρη) ἀχημονήσῃς; *Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving your ſelf unſeem'ly, in the ſight of that God, who ſtands behind you; for all things are full of him:* thereby giving her occaſion, more to mind and regard that ſupreme and univerſal *Numen*, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that *Socrates* died a martyr for one only God, in oppoſition to thoſe many gods of the Pagans; and *Tertullian* [4], for one, writeth thus of him, *Propterea damnatus eſt* Socrates, *quia deos deſtruebat*; Socrates *was therefore condemned to die, becauſe he deſtroyed the gods.* And indeed that *Socrates* aſſerted one ſupreme God, the maker and governour of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be doubted. In his

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. I. Cap. XIII. p. 2898. Tom. IX. Oper.

[2] Cap. IV. p. 782. Tom. II. Oper.

[3] Lib. VI. ſegm. 37. p. 333.

[4] In Apologet. cap. XIV. p. 144. Edit. Havercamp.

his discourse with *Aristodemus*, in *Xenophon*'s first book of Memoirs [1], he convinced him. that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by Mind and Counsel; ὅτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφῦ τινος δημιουργῦ, καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι, *I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise artificer, who also was a lover of animals.* And so he endeavoured to persuade him, that that mind and understanding, which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water, which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe [2]: σὺ δὲ σεαυτὸν φρονίμου τινὸς δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ ὑδαμοῦ ὑδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, εἰδὼς ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς ὕσης ἔχεις, καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχύ, πολλοῦ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ συνήρμοσαί σοι; νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἆρα ὑδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι· *Do you think that you only have wisdom in your self, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and so of every other thing, that your body is compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them, which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy, you have, some way or other, luckily got and snatch'd unto your self, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance?* And when *Aristodemus* afterward objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers, which made all other human things, *Socrates* thus replies, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σεαυτοῦ σύγε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατάγε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ γνώμης ἀλλὰ τύχης πάντα πράττεις· *Neither do you see your own soul, which rules over your body; so that you might for the same reason conclude your self to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance.* Again, when he further disputed in this manner against the necessity of worshipping the Deity; οὐχ ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι· *I despise not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him:* *Socrates* again answers, ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτόν· *How much the more magnificent and illustrious that being is, which takes care of you, so much the more, in all reason, ought it to be honoured by you.* Lastly, *Aristodemus* discovering his disbelief of providence, as a thing, which seemed to him incredible, if not impossible, that one and the same Deity should be able to mind all things at once, *Socrates* endeavours to cure this disbelief of his in this manner [3]; ὦ ἀγαθέ, κατάμαθε, ὅτι καὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τοῦ σοῦ σώματος ὅπως θέλεται μεταχειρίζεται. οἴεσθαι δὲν χρὴ καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ πάντα ὅπως ἂν αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ἦ ἔχειν τεθεᾶσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν ὄμμα δύνασθαι, ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ὀφθαλμὸν ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν. *Consider, friend, I pray you, if that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it every way as it pleases; why should not that wisdom, which is in the universe, be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can*

[1] P. 573. Oper. These Words are not *Socrates*'s to *Aristodemus*, but *Aristodemus*'s to *Socrates*.

[2] P. 574.

[3] P. 575.

discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, *and in* Sicily; *why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places?* And then he concludes, that if *Aristodemus* would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ὥθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾶν, καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· *That God is such and so great a Being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and hear all things, and be present every where, and take care of all affairs.* Moreover, *Socrates*, in his discourse with *Euthydemus*, in *Xenophon*'s fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity, which governs the whole world [1]; οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντες, οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι, &c. οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τόδε οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν· ἐννόει δὲ καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγκειρῇ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται· *The other gods giving us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who continually supplieth us with them, he, though he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight: as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that, which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen,* ἃ χρὴ κατονοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀορατῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γινομένων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν, καταμανθάνοντα τιμᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον, *Which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects.* Where we have τὸ δαιμόνιον, as also before τὸ Θεῖον, plainly put for the *supreme Deity*. And we did the rather set down these passages of *Socrates* here, concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any *pudor* or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding *Socrates* his thus clear acknowledging one supreme and universal *Numen*, it doth not therefore follow, that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable *Socrates* was to the Pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his, (when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to *Æsculapius*: for which *Origen* thus perstringeth him, καὶ τηλικαῦτα φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν τῆς καλῶς βεβιωκυίας διεξελθόντες, καταλιπόντες τὸ μέγεθος ὧν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν, εὐτελῆ φρονοῦσι καὶ σμικρὰ, ἀλεκτρυόνα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀποδιδόντες· *And they, who had philosophized so excellently con-*

Cont. Cels. l. 9. P. 277.

[1] P. 633.

concerning the ſoul, and diſcourſed concerning the happineſs of the future ſtate to thoſe who live well, do afterward ſink down from theſe great, high, and noble things, to a ſuperſtitious regard of little, ſmall, and trifling matters, ſuch as the paying of a cock to Æſculapius. Where notwithſtanding, *Origen* doth not charge *Socrates* with ſuch groſs and downright idolatry, as he does elſewhere [1], for his ſacrificing to the Pythian *Apollo*, who was but an inferior dæmon. And perhaps ſome may excuſe *Socrates* here, as thinking, that he looked upon *Æſculapius* no otherwiſe than as the ſupreme Deity, called by that name, as exerciſing his providence over the ſickneſs and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an euchariſtick ſacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him, at once, of all diſeaſes by death. However *Plato* [2] informs us, that *Socrates*, immediately before he drunk his poiſon, did εὔχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὴν μεῖοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ εἶναι· *pray* (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the ſupreme and inferior Gods both together, as in *Plato's Phædrus* he did to *Pan*, and the other tutelar gods of that place) *that his tranſlation from hence into the other world might be happy to him.* And *Xenophon*, in his Memoirs [3], informs us, that *Socrates* did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian *Apollo*, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country; he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be ſingular herein. Laſtly, in his own apology, as written by *Plato*, he profeſſes to acknowledge the ſun, moon and ſtars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of *Anaxagoras*, as irrational and abſurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion, of *Socrates* his being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand, what that accuſation of impiety really was, which he was charged with, *Socrates* himſelf, in *Plato*'s *Euthyphro*, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning thoſe traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, diſhoneſt and unjuſt actions were imputed to them. For when *Euthyphro*, having accuſed his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into priſon, who happened to die there) would juſtify himſelf from the examples of the gods, namely *Jupiter* and *Saturn*, becauſe *Jupiter*, the beſt and juſteſt of the gods, had committed his father *Saturn* to priſon for devouring his ſons, as *Saturn* himſelf alſo had caſtrated his father *Cælius* for ſome miſcarriages of his, *Socrates* thus beſpeaks him [4]; Ἀράγε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐωεἰδωτις ωερὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγη, δυχερῶς πῶς ἀποδέχομαι, &c. *Is not this the very thing, O* Euthyphro, *for which I am accuſed? namely, becauſe when I hear any one affirming ſuch matters as theſe concerning the gods, I am very loth to believe them, and ſtick not publickly to declare my diſlike of them? And can you, O* Euthyphro, *in good earneſt think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among the gods, and that thoſe other things were alſo done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? ſuch as the* Peplum *or veil of* Minerva, *which in the* Panathenaicks *is with great pomp and ceremony brought*

[1] Vide Orig. adverſ. Celſum, Lib. VII. p. 335.
[2] In Phædone, p. 402. Oper.
[3] Lib. IV. p. 634 Oper.
[4] P. 49.

into the Acropolis, *is embroidered all over with?* Thus we ſee, that *Socrates*, though he aſſerted one ſupreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithſtanding, other inferior created gods, together with the reſt of the Pagans, honouring and worſhiping them; only he diſliked thoſe poetick fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar,) in which all manner of unjuſt and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reaſon, why he was then accuſed of impiety and atheiſm.

It hath been alſo affirmed by many, that *Plato* really aſſerted one only God and no more, and that therefore, whenſoever he ſpeaks of gods plurally, he muſt be underſtood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only in a way of politick compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poiſon in like manner as *Socrates* was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is alſo a paſſage cited out of that thirteenth epiſtle of *Plato*'s to *Dionyſius*, wherein he gives this as a mark, whereby his ſerious epiſtles, and ſuch as were written according to the true ſenſe of his own mind, might by his friends be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe, which were otherwiſe; τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπουδαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχει, θεοὶ δέ τῆς ἥττονος· *When I begin my epiſtles with God, then may you conclude I write ſeriouſly; but not ſo when I begin with gods.* And this place ſeems to be therefore the more authentick, becauſe it was long ſince produced by *Euſebius* to this very purpoſe, namely to prove, that *Plato* acknowledged one only God; δῆλος δέ ἐστιν ἕνα Θεὸν εἰδὼς, εἰ καὶ συνήθως Ἕλλησι, τῇ τῶν πλειόνων εἴωθε χρῆσθαι προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐν ᾗ σύμβολα δίδωσι, τῶν τε διὰ σπουδῆς αὐτῷ γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπερριμμένων· *It is manifeſt, that* Plato *really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often ſpake of gods plurally, from that epiſtle of his to* Dionyſius, *wherein he gives this ſymbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write ſeriouſly, namely, when he began his epiſtles with God, and not with Gods.*

Præp. Ev. l. 11. *c.* 13. [p. 530.]

Notwithſtanding which, we have already manifeſted out of *Plato*'s *Timæus*, that he did in good earneſt aſſert a plurality of gods; by which gods of his are to be underſtood animated or intellectual beings ſuperior to men, to whom there is an honour and worſhip from men due; he therein declaring, not only the ſun, and moon, and ſtars, but alſo the earth itſelf (as animated) to be a god or goddeſs. For though it be now read in our copies, πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων, *that the earth was the oldeſt of all the bodies within the heavens*; yet it is certain, that anciently it was read otherwiſe, πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, *the oldeſt of the gods*; not only from *Proclus* and *Cicero*, but alſo from *Laertius*[1] writing thus: γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, γενέσθαι δὲ δημιούργημα, ὡς νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν, ὅσαν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ μέσα, κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον· *Though* Plato*'s gods were for the moſt part fiery, yet did he ſuppoſe the earth to be a god or goddeſs too, affirming it to be the oldeſt of all the gods within the*

P. 40. *Ser.*

[1] III. ſegm. 75. p. 211.

the heavens, made or created to diſtinguiſh day and night, by its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world. For *Plato*, when he wrote his *Timæus*, acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is ſaid to have admitted its annual too. And the ſame might be further evinced from all his other writings, but eſpecially his book of laws (together with his *Epinomis*) ſaid to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much inſiſts upon the godſhips of the ſun, moon and ſtars; and complains, that the young gentlemen of *Athens* were then ſo much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate ſtones and earth; as alſo he approves of that then vulgarly received cuſtom of worſhipping the riſing and ſetting ſun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himſelf: Ἀνατέλλοντός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων, προσκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν εὐπραγίαις, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων, καὶ ἀδαμῆ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί. *The proſtrations and adorations, that are uſed both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the riſing and ſetting ſun and moon (as well in their proſperities as adverſities) declare them to be unqueſtionably eſteemed gods.* Wherefore we cannot otherwiſe conclude, but that this thirteenth epiſtle of *Plato* to *Dionyſius*, though exant, it ſeems, before *Euſebius* his time, yet was ſuppoſititious and counterfeit by ſome zealous but ignorant Chriſtian: as there is accordingly a Νοθεύεται, or brand of baſtardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of *Plato*'s works. *De Leg.* 10. [p. 664. Op.]

However, though *Plato* acknowledged and worſhipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no Polyarchiſt, but a Monarchiſt, an aſſertor of one ſupreme God, the only αὐτοφυὴς, or *ſelf-originated being*, the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all thoſe other gods. For firſt, it is plain, that, according to *Plato*, the ſoul of the whole world was not it ſelf eternal, much leſs ſelf-exiſtent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from theſe words of his; τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειρῶμεν λέγειν, ὅτως ἐμηχανήσαλο καὶ ὁ Θεὸς νεωτέραν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ πρεσβυτέραν καὶ πρεσβυτέραν ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρχουσαν ἀρχομένου συνεστήσαλο. *God did not fabricate or make the ſoul of the world, in the ſame order that we now treat concerning it, that is, after it, as junior to it; but that, which was to rule over the world, as its body, being more excellent, he made it firſt, and ſenior to the ſame.* Upon which account *Ariſtotle* quarrels with *Plato* as contradicting himſelf, in that he affirmed the ſoul to be a principle, and yet ſuppoſed it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν, ἣν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι ἐνίοτε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν, ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχὴ. *Neither is it poſſible for* Plato *here to extricate himſelf, who ſometimes declares the ſoul to be a principle, as that which moves it ſelf, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven.* For which cauſe ſome Platoniſts conclude, that *Plato* aſſerted a double Pſyche, one the third hypoſtaſis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which ſeems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, ſince, according to *Plato*, the ſoul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not ſelf-exiſtent, but made or produced by God in time, all *Plat. Tim. p.* 34. [p. 528. Oper.] *Ariſt. Met. L.* 14 *c.* 6. [p. 478. Tom. IV. Oper.]

all thoſe other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the ſun, moon, ſtars and dæmons, muſt needs be ſo too. But leſt any ſhould ſuſpect, that *Plato* might, for all that, ſuppoſe the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, ſelf-exiſtent principles, or deities conſpiring; we ſhall obſerve, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of anſwer to that quære, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds, (as ſome philoſophers had maintained,) or only one? he reſolving it thus, πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προ-
Tim. p. 31. [p. 527. Edit. Ficini.] εἰρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; ἕνα, εἴπερ καλὸν τὸ παράδειγμα δε-δημιουργημένον ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῷα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη, &c, ἵνα ἓν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν, ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ, διὰ ταῦτα ἄτε δύο, οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς, ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσεσθαι· *Whether have we rightly affimed, that there is only one heaven,* (or world) *or is it more agreeable to reaſon, to hold many or infinite? We ſay there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this reſpect of ſolitude or onelineſs, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten.* His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the *Demiurgus*, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to *Plato*, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his *Timæus* and elſewhere, ὁ Θεὸς. *God*, or *the God*, by way of excellency; ſometimes ὁ Δημιουργὸς, *the Architect or Artificer of the world*; ſometimes ὁ Ποιητὴς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, *the Maker and Father of this univerſe*, whom it is hard to find out, but impoſſible to declare to the vulgar; again, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸς, *the God over all*; τῆς Φύσεως κτίστης, *the Creator of nature*; τοῦ παντὸς Ἀρχὴ, *the ſole Principle of the univerſe*; πάντων Αἴτιον, *the Cauſe of all things*; Νοῦς πάντων βασιλεὺς, *Mind, the king of all things*; Νοῦς αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα κοσμῶν διὰ πάντων ἰὼν, *that ſovereign Mind, which orders all things, and paſſes through all things*; τοῦ παντὸς Κυβερνήτης, *the Governour of the whole*; τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, *that which always is, and was never made*; ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς, *the firſt God*; ὁ μέγιστος Δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, *the greateſt God*, and *the greateſt of the gods*; ὁ ἥλιου γενήσας, *he that ge-*
De Rep. l. 10. [p. 511.] *nerated or produced the ſun*; ὁ γῆν, οὐρανὸν καὶ θεὰς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἅδᾳ, καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργαζεται, *he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth:*
In Sophiſt. [p. 168.] again, he by whoſe efficiency the things of the world ὕστερον ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα, *were afterwards made when they were not before*; or *from an antecedent non-exiſtence brought forth into being.* This philoſopher ſomewhere intimating, that it was as eaſy for God to produce thoſe real things, the ſun, moon, ſtars and earth, *&c.* from himſelf, as it is for us to produce the images of our ſelves and whatſoever elſe we pleaſe, only by interpoſing a looking-glaſs. Laſtly, he
D. Rep l 10. [p. 511] is called ὃς πάντα τάτε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν, *he that cauſeth or produceth both all other things, and even himſelf*; the meaning whereof is this, he, that is αὐτοφυὴς, (as the ſame *Plato* alſo calls him) *a ſelf-originated Being, and from no*

no other cause besides himself, but the cause of all other things. Neither doth *Lactantius Firmianus*[1] himself refuse to speak of God after this very manner; that *se ipsum fecit*, and that he was *ex se ipso procreatus, & propterea talis, qualem se esse voluit*; *that he made himself*; and that *being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be.* Which unusual and bold strain of theology is very much insisted upon by *Plotinus*, in his book, Περὶ τῦ θελήματος τῦ ἑνός, *concerning the will of the first One, or unity*; he there writing thus of the supreme God, αἴτιον ἑαυτῦ, καὶ παρ' αὐτῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτός; *He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself.* And again, αὐτός ἐστιν ὅτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτον, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτῦ, καὶ ὐκ ὥς τις ἕτερος ἐθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτός· *This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself*; (in a certain sense) *for he was not made that, which another willed him to be, but he is that, which he willeth himself to be.* Moreover, αὐτὸς ὢν τῦτο ὅπερ ἠγάπησε, τῦτο δὲ ἐστιν ὑποστάς αὐτὸν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα· ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως μὲν ἀδενὸς, ἑαυτῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, ὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκεν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτὸς καὶ ὡς αὐτος ἐθελει, &c. *The supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved; thus, as it were, begetting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be* (in some sense) *his own work or energy; so that God is not that, which he happened to be, but that which he willeth himself to be.* Thus also a little before, ἀνακτέον εἰς ἓν τὴν βέλησιν καὶ τὴν ὐσίαν· τὸ δὲ θελειν παρ' αὐτῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ εἶναι παρ' αὐτῦ, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὐτὸν, ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βέλησις παρ' αὐτῦ, ϗ οἷον ἔργον αὐτῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταυτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτῦ αὐτὸς ἂν ὅτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτὸν, ὥστε ὐχ ὥπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐβελήθη αὐτός. *We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the first being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that He made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypostasis or substance; he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be.* But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of this philosopher's concerning it; ὐκ ἔξω τῆς βελήτεως αὐτῦ ἡ ὐσία, ἀλλὰ σύνεστιν αὐτῦ τῇ οἷον ὐσία ἡ θέλησις· καὶ ὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτὸν λαβεῖν. ἄνευ τῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἐστι· καὶ σύνδρομος αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, θέλων αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τῦτο ὢν ὅπερ θέλει· καὶ ἡ θέλησις καὶ αὐτὸς ἓν· καὶ τύτῳ ὐχ ἧττον, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός ὥπερ ἐτυχεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ὡς ἐβελήθη ἂν τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐθέλησε, ἢ τῦτο ὅ ἐστι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὑποθοίμεθα ἐλέσθαι αὐτῷ ὅτι θέλοι γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτε ἂν ἄλλο τι γενέσθαι βεληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι, ὡς ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τῦτο ὃν ὃ ἐστι, τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἠθέλησε καὶ θέλει. ἐστὶ γὰρ ὅλως ἡ ἀγαθῦ φύσις, θέλησις αὐτῦ. *The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is) and that he would will to be another: For what could*

P. 749, [ap. XIV. p. 750.] *En.* 6. *L.* 8.

P. 751.

P. 748.

P. 747.

[1] Instit. Divin. Lib. I. cap. VII. p. 53. & Lib. II. cap. VIII. p. 214.

could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should suppose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain, that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be
P. 755. *such.* Lastly, Πᾶν ἄρα βέλησις, καὶ ἀκέτι τὸ μὴ βελόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βελήσεως ἄρα· πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βέλησις αὐτὸς, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβέλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβέλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βελήσει ἑπόμενον οὐ ἦν τοιαύτη βέλησις ἐγένα· ἐγένα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτ ἦν αὐτῷ· *God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or he himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before.* And now we may in all probability conclude, that *Lactantius* derived this doctrine from *Plato* and *Plotinus*; which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word αὐτογενὴς, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans [1], seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of *Plotinus*, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened, by chance, to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and chuse to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of *Plato*'s, *that God causeth himself and all things*, but also to shew how punctually precise, curious and accurate some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.

To return therefore to *Plato:* though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonick, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists; yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that *Plato* himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For first, whereas, in his tenth book of Laws, he professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstanding there ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or universal mundane soul, as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, or proper cause of all that motion, which is in the world. And this is all the god, that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently asserts, above the self-moving Psyche, an immoveable and standing *Nous* or Intellect, which was properly the *Demiurgus*, or architectonick framer of the whole world. And lastly, above this multiform Intellect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἓν, in

[1] Vide Dionys. Patav. Dogmat. Theolog. de Trinitate, Lib. V. cap. V. §. XIV. p. 294.

in oppoſition to that multiplicity, which ſpeaks ſomething of imperfection in it, and τ'αγαθὸν, goodneſs itſelf, as being above mind and underſtanding; the firſt intelligible, and an infinite fecundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly in his ſecond epiſtle to *Dionyſius* does he mention a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, all together. Now the words ὁ θεὸς and τὸ θεῖον, *God* and *the divinity* in *Plato*, ſeem ſometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, as they are again ſometimes ſeverally applied to each of them, accordingly as we have already obſerved, that *Zeus* or *Jupiter* in *Plato* is not always taken for the firſt and higheſt hypoſtaſis in his trinity, but ſometimes the ſecond hypoſtaſis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and ſometimes again his third hypoſtaſis of the univerſal and eternal *Pſyche*; nevertheleſs the firſt of theſe three hypoſtaſes is that, which is properly called by the Platoniſts πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, *the fountain of the Godhead*, and by *Plato* himſelf [1], ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς, περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὃ αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν· *The king of all things, about whom are all things, and for whoſe ſake are all things, and the cauſe of all good and excellent things.*

And this firſt divine hypoſtaſis, which in *Plato*'s theology is properly αὐτόθεος, *the original Deity*, is largely inſiſted upon by that philoſopher in the ſixth of his *Politicks*, under the name and title of τ'ἀγαθὸν, *the good*; but principally there illuſtrated by that reſemblance of the ſun, called by that philoſopher alſo, *a heavenly God*, and ſaid to be the offſpring of this higheſt good, and ſomething analogous to it in the corporeal world, ὅ, τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ, πρὸς τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα· *This is the ſame in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the ſun is in the ſenſible world to ſight and viſibles. For, as the ſun is not ſight, but only the cauſe of it; nor is that light, by which we ſee, the ſame with the ſun itſelf, but only* ἡλιοειδὲς, *a ſun-like thing; ſo neither is the ſupreme and higheſt good* (properly) *knowledge, but the cauſe of knowledge; nor is intellect* (preciſely conſidered as ſuch) *the beſt and moſt perfect being, but only* ἀγαθοειδὲς, *a boniform thing.* Again, *As the ſun gives to things not only their viſibility, but alſo their generation; ſo does that higheſt good, not only cauſe the cognoſcibility of things, but alſo their very eſſences and beings.* Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, *This higheſt good being not itſelf properly eſſence, but above eſſence, tranſcending the ſame, both in reſpect of dignity and power.* Which language and conceit of *Plato*'s ſome of the Greek fathers ſeem to have entertained, yet ſo as to apply it to the whole Trinity, when they call God ἐπερούσιον, or *ſuper-eſſential.* But the meaning of that philoſopher was, as we conceive, no other than this, that this higheſt good hath no particular characteriſtick upon it, limiting and determining of it, it being the hidden and incomprehenſible ſource of all things. In the laſt place, we ſhall obſerve, that this firſt divine hypoſtaſis of the Platonick trinity is by that philoſopher called, τοῦτε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίᾳ πάντων πατὴρ, *The father of the prince, and cauſe of all things.* Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correſpondency betwixt the

[1] Epiſt. II. ad Dionyſ. p. 707. Oper.

Platonick philoſophy and Chriſtianity, in that the ſecond hypoſtaſis of both their trinities (called alſo ſometimes λόγος by the Platoniſts, as well as νῦς) is ſaid to be the immediate cauſe of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to *Plato* we might here join *Xenophon*, becauſe he was his equal, and a Socratick too, (though it ſeems there was not ſo good correſpondence betwixt them;) which *Xenophon*, however in ſundry places of his writings he acknowledge a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain teſtimony alſo of one ſupreme and univerſal Numen; as this particularly [1], ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις, καὶ δυνατὸς φανερός, ὁποῖος δ' ἐστὶ μορφὴν ἀφανής· *He that both agitates all things, and eſtabliſheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifeſt to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconſpicuous.*

XXIV. In the next place we come to *Ariſtotle*: who, that he acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) appears from his uſing the word ſo often plurally. As particularly in this paſſage of his Nicomachian Ethicks; ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη· τοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανῶνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; ἄλλα τὰς ἀνδρείας; ὑπομένουλας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύουλας, ὅτι καλόν· ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουζι; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμιζμα, ἢ τὶ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουζι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας· διεξιοῦζι δὲ πάνλα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀάξια θεῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς· καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα· τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας· *That perfect happineſs is a ſpeculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifeſt from hence, becauſe we account the gods moſt of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute to them? Whether thoſe of juſtice amongſt one another; as if it were not ridiculous to ſuppoſe the gods to make contracts and bargains among themſelves, and the like. Or elſe thoſe of fortitude and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or thoſe of liberality; as if the gods had ſome ſuch thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or laſtly, ſhall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods, to ſay, that they conquer and maſter their vitious luſts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be ſmall, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and conſequently to act; unleſs we ſhould ſuppoſe them perpetually to ſleep, as* Endymion *did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations, be taken away from that which lives and underſtands, what is there left to it beſides contemplation?* To which he there adds a further argument alſo of the ſame thing: *Becauſe other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happineſs. For to the gods all their life is happy;*

L. 10. *c.* 8. [P. 183. Tom. III. Oper.]

to

[1] Vide Clement. Alexandrin. in Cohort. ad Gentes, Cap. VI. p. 61, & Stromat. Lib. V. p. 417.

to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness. Where *Aristotle* plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his, ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασι θεὸς, *All men suppose the gods to live*, and from what follows in him, that opinion of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: *Aristotle* here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, *Aristotle* in his *Politicks*, writing of the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest; ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὰς θεὰς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως, ἧττόν τε γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φροντίζειν τῶν θεῶν· καὶ ἐπιβουλεύσουσιν ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι καὶ τὰς θεάς· *For a prince or monarch to seem to be always more than ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the gods: because men are less afraid of suffering any injustice from such kings or princes, as they think to be religiously disposed, and devoutly affected towards the gods. Neither will they be so apt to make conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants.* Where the word δεισιδαίμων seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that *Aristotle* himself does not here write so much like a δεισιδαίμων, as a meer politician. Likewise in his first book *de Cœlo*, he writeth thus; πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασι, καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένου, εἴπερ ἔν ἐστί τι θεῖον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστι, &c. *All men have an opinion or persuasion, that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well Barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore if there be any divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements.* And in the following book he tells us again, *That it is most agreeable* τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, *to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible.* Where *Aristotle* affirmeth, that men have generally μαντείαν, *a vaticination* in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μαντεία or *vaticination* of all.

L. 5. c. 11.

C. 3. [P. 615. Tom. I. Oper.]

We acknowledge it to be very true, that *Aristotle* does not so much insist upon dæmons, as *Plato* and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his *Metaphysicks* [1], speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in ζῶα τε καὶ δαιμόνια, *animals and dæmons*, and elsewhere he insinuates them to have airy bodies, in these

[1] Lib. V. Cap. VIII. p. 329. Tom. VI. Oper.

words; ἐπιζητήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν, ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ, τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις βελτίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα, *Some perhaps would demand a reaſon, why the ſoul that is in the air, is better and more immortal than that in animals.* However, whether *Ariſtotle* believed theſe lower dæmon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely the intelligences of all the ſeveral ſpheres, if not alſo the ſouls of them and the ſtars; which ſpheres being, according to the aſtronomy then received, forty ſeven in number, he muſt needs acknowledge at leaſt ſo many gods. Beſides which, *Ariſtotle* ſeems alſo to ſuppoſe another ſort of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, according to him, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, nor time; in theſe words; ὅτ' ἐν τόπῳ τ' ακεῖ πέφυκεν, ὅτε χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γηράζκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν ὑδενὸς ὐδεμία μεταβολὴ, τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων Φορὰν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ, τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα· *They, who exiſt there, are ſuch as are neither apt to be in a place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there any change at all in thoſe things above the higheſt ſphere; but they being impaſſible and unalterable, lead the beſt and moſt ſelf-ſufficient life, throughout all eternity.* But this paſſage is not without ſuſpicion of being ſuppoſititious.

De An. L. 1. [Cap. VIII. p. 17. Tom. II. Oper.]

De Cæl. L. 1. *c.* 9. [P. 631. Tom. I. Oper.]

Notwithſtanding all which, that *Ariſtotle* did aſſert one ſupreme and univerſal Numen, is a thing alſo unqueſtionable. For though it be granted, that he uſeth the ſingular θεὸς, as likewiſe τὸ θεῖον and τὸ δαιμόνιον, many times indefinitely, for a god in general, or any divine being; and that ſuch places as theſe have been oftentimes miſtaken by Chriſtian writers, as if *Ariſtotle* had meant the ſupreme God in them; yet it is nevertheleſs certain, that he often uſeth thoſe words alſo emphatically, for one only ſupreme God. As in that of his Metaphyſicks, ὅ, τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις· *God ſeemeth to be a cauſe and certain principle to all things.* And alſo in his *De Anima*, where he ſpeaks of the ſoul of the heavens, and its circular motion: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται γ' ἐχρῆν τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποιεῖν Φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τῷ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἄτως ἢ ἀλλως· *Neither is that a good cauſe of the circular motion of the heavens, which they* (that is the Platoniſts) *call the* τὸ βέλτιον, *becauſe it is better, that it ſhould be ſo than otherwiſe; as if God therefore ought to have made the ſoul of the world ſuch, as to move the heaven circularly, becauſe it was better for it to move ſo than otherwiſe: but this being a ſpeculation that properly belongs to ſome other ſcience, we ſhall no further purſue it in this place.* Thus afterwards again, in the ſame book[2], συμβαίνει δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ ἀφρονέσταλον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἓν ὐ γνωρίζει, τὸ Νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα, ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον· *It follows from* Empedocles *his principles, that God muſt needs be the moſt unwiſe of all, he alone being ignorant of that* (out of which all other things are compounded) νεῖκος, *or contention* (becauſe himſelf is nothing but φιλία, *unity and friendſhip*) *whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, they being commpounded of all.* Which ſame paſſage we have again alſo, in his

L. 1. [Cap. II. p. 263. Tom. IV. Oper.]

L. 1. *c.* 3. [P. 10. Tom. II. Oper.]

[2] Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 16. Tom. II. Oper.

is Metaphysicks [1], from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To these might be added another place out of his book *of Generation and Corruption* [2], τὸ ὅλον συνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεὸς, ἐντελεχῆ ποιήσας γένεσιν· *God hath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation.* Lastly, τὸ δαιμόνιον is sometimes plainly used by *Aristotle* also, not for the divinity in general, or any thing that is divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetorick to *Alexander*, τοῦτό ἐστιν ᾧ διαφέρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων, ἡμεῖς οἱ μεγίστες τιμῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίουτε τυχηκότες· *This is that, wherein we men differ from other animals, having received the greatest honour from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason.* *Cap.* 1. *p.* 609. *P.* [P. 833. Tom. III. Oper.]

Over and besides which, *Aristotle* in his Metaphysicks (as hath been already observed) professedly opposeth that imaginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existent deities; he confuting the same from the phænomena, because ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, *all things are plainly co-ordered to one*, the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas if there were many principles or independent Deities, the system of the world must needs have been ἐπεισοδιώδης, *incoherent and inconspiring*, like an ill-agreeing drama, botch'd up of many impertinent intersertions. Whereupon *Aristotle* concludes after this manner, τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται κακῶς πολιτεύεσθαι, *Lib.* 14. *c.* 10. *Par.* [P. 484. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν Πολυκοιρανίη, Εἷς Κοίρανος.

But things will not be ill administred (which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) *and according to* Homer, *the government of many is not good*, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) *wherefore there is one Prince or Monarch over all.* From which passage of *Aristotle*'s it is evident, that though he asserted Πολυθεΐαν, *a multiplicity of gods* in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied Πολυκοιρανίην and Πολυαρχίαν, *a polyarchy* or *mundane aristocracy*, that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore though *Aristotle* doated much upon that whimsey of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immovable minds (now commonly called intelligences) as there are movable spheres of all kinds in the heavens, (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles;) yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have derived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which, as *Simplicius* expresseth it, is Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, *the principle of principles*; and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the *primum mobile*, or highest sphere, contains all the lesser spheres within it: because otherwise there would not be εἷς Κοίρανος, *one prince* or *monarch* over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polykœrany or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as *Plotinus* represents *Aristotle*'s sense, it is not conceivable, that so many independent *Enn.* 5. *L.* 1. *c.* 7. [Cap. IX. p. 490, 491.]

[1] Lib. III. Cap. IV. p. 295. Tom. IV. Oper. [2] Lib. II. Cap. X. p. 741. Tom. I. Oper.

pendent principles ſhould thus conſtantly conſpire, πρὸς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίαν συμφωνίαν, *into one work, that agreeable ſymphony, and harmony of the whole heaven.* As there could not be any reaſon neither, why there ſhould be juſt ſo many of theſe intelligences, as there are ſpheres and no more; and it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, *that the firſt principles of the univerſe happened by chance.*

Now this higheſt principle, as it is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, *an immoveable eſſence*, is by *Ariſtotle* in the firſt place ſuppoſed to be ἀρχὴ κινήτεως, *the principle of motion in the univerſe*, or at leaſt of that chiefeſt motion of the *primum mobile* or higheſt ſphere, (which according to the aſtronomy of thoſe times ſeems to have been the ſphere of fixed ſtars) by whoſe rapid circumgyration, all the other ſpheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round, from eaſt to weſt. And accordingly the ſupreme Deity is by *Ariſtotle* called τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον, *the firſt immovable mover*, or the mover of the *primum mobile*, and whole heaven. Which firſt mover being concluded by him to be but one, he doth from thence infer the ſingularity of the heaven or world, ἓν μὲν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον ὄν· καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἓν μόνον. εἷς ἄρα οὐρανὸς μόνος· *There is one numerically firſt immovable mover and no more; and therefore there is but one movable neither, that is, but one heaven or world.* In which doctrine of *Ariſtotle*'s, there ſeems to be a great difference betwixt his philoſophy and that of *Plato*'s; in that *Plato* makes the principle of motion in the heavens and whole world to be a ſelf-moving ſoul, but *Ariſtotle* ſuppoſeth it to be an immovable mind or intellect. Nevertheleſs, according to *Ariſtotle*'s explication of himſelf, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; *Ariſtotle*'s immoveable mover being underſtood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, ὡς ἐρώμενον, *as being loved.* Which conceit of his *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus* perſtringeth after this manner; τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν τὸν κόσμον ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἐρωτος, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὀρεκτὸν, δόντες αὐτῷ τὴν κίνησιν, οὐδὲν ἔφασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καθήκειν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐν ἴσῳ προστάξαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐραζμίοις μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μηδὲν δὲ γεννητικὸν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει. *Some of the ancients converting the world to mind (or intellect) and making it move only by love of that firſt deſirable, acknowledged nothing at all to deſcend down from Mind (or God) upon the world; but equalized the ſame with other amiable things, amongſt ſenſibles, that have nothing generative in their nature.* Where *Proclus* ſeems to ſuppoſe *Ariſtotle* to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto ſhall be evidenly proved afterwards. In the mean time it is certain, that *Ariſtotle*, beſides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally, or as being loved, muſt needs ſuppoſe another immediate mover of them, or efficient cauſe of that motion; which could be nothing but a ſoul, that, enamoured with this ſupreme mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which ſeems to be nothing but *Plato*'s doctrine diſguiſed; that philoſopher affirming likewiſe, the circular motions of the heavens, cauſed efficiently by a ſoul of the world in his *Timæus*[1], to be, τὴν

Met. L. 14. *c.* 8. *p.* 1003. *P.*

[P. 481. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Met. L. 14. *c.* 8.

[P 483. Tom. IV. Oper.]

P. 167.

[1] Cap. XVII. p. 241. Edit. Fabricii.

τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν, *a motion, that is moſt agreeable to that of mind or wiſdom:* And again in his laws [1], τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν, οἰκειοτάτην καὶ ὁμοίαν, *that which of all corporeal motions only reſembles the circuit of intellect.* Which Platonick conceit found entertainment with *Boetius*, who writing of the ſoul of the world, repreſents it thus; *De Conſol. L. 3. Met. 9.*

Quæ cum ſecta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
In ſemet reditura meat, mentemque profundam
Circuit, & ſimili convertit imagine cœlum.

Wherefore, as well according to *Plato*'s hypotheſis, as *Ariſtotle*'s, it may be affirmed of the ſupreme Deity, in the ſame *Boetius* his language, that,

Stabiliſque manens dat cuncta moveri.

Being itſelf immoveable, it cauſeth all other things to move. The immediate efficient cauſe of which motion alſo, no leſs according to *Ariſtotle* than *Plato*, ſeems to have been a mundane ſoul; however *Ariſtotle* thought not ſo fit to make this ſoul a principle; in all probability, becauſe he was not ſo well aſſured of the incorporeity of ſouls, as of minds or intellects.

Nevertheleſs this is not the only thing, which *Ariſtotle* imputed to his firſt and higheſt immoveable principle, or the ſupreme Deity, its turning round of the *primum mobile*, and that no otherwiſe than as being loved, or as the final cauſe thereof, as *Proclus* ſuppoſed; but he, as well as *Anaxarogas*, aſſerted it to be alſo, τῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν, *the cauſe of well and fit*, or τὸ ἧ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, *that without which there could be no ſuch thing as well*; that is, no order, no aptitude, proportion and harmony in the univerſe: He declaring excellently, that εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τῆν ἀρχῆς ἀρχὴ, *Unleſs there were ſomething elſe in the world beſides ſenſibles, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end.* And again in another place already cited [2], τῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, ἴσως ὅτε πῦρ ὅτε γῆν, &c. ὅθ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοιοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πράγμα καλῶς ἔχει, *It is not at all likely, that either fire or earth, or any ſuch body, ſhould be the cauſe of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can ſo noble an effect as this be reaſonably imputed to chance or fortune.* Wherefore himſelf, agreeably with *Anaxagoras*, concludes, that it is Νοῦς or *Mind*, which is properly αἴτιον τῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, *the cauſe of well and right*, and accordingly does he frequently call the ſupreme Deity by that name. He affirming likewiſe [3], that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one higheſt and ſupreme Being in it, after the ſame manner as the order of an army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which higheſt Being of the univerſe is therefore called by him alſo, conformably to *Plato*, *Met. L. 14. c. 7. P.*

[1] Lib. X. p. 669.
[2] Ibid. Lib. VII. Cap. III. p. 266. Tom. II. Oper.
[3] Ibid. Lib. XIV. Cap. X. p. 484, 485. Tom. VI. Oper.

Plato, τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεχωριζμένον, *the ſeparate good of the world*, in way of diſtinction from that intrinſick or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itſelf: Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πότερόν ἐστι ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον; πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι, καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό; ἢ τὴν τάξιν; ἢ ἀμφοτέρως ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στρατηγός, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνος, οὐ γὰρ ἕνεκα διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν· πάντα γὰρ συντέτακταί πως· *It is to be conſidered alſo, what is the good, and beſt of the univerſe; whether its own order only? or ſomething ſeparate and exiſting by itſelf? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army conſiſteth both in its order, and likewiſe in its general or emperor, but principally in this latter, becauſe the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co-ordered together with God, and reſpectively to him.* Wherefore ſince *Ariſtotle*'s ſupreme Deity, by what name ſoever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cauſe of all that well and fit, that is in the univerſe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it muſt needs be granted, that beſides its being the final cauſe of motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was alſo the efficient cauſe of the whole frame of nature and ſyſtem of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his ſenſe, where he applauds *Anaxagoras* for maintaining Νοῦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης αἴτιον, *that mind is the cauſe not only of all order, but alſo of the whole world:* and when himſelf poſitively affirms, ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις, *that from ſuch a principle as this, depends the heaven, and nature.* Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before inſiſted on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the inſtrument of the divine mind. He alſo ſomewhere affirmeth, that if the heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, ſo as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by ſuch an artificial nature as is the inſtrument of a perfect mind. And in his Phyſicks, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes nevertheleſs, ἀνάγκη νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι τοῦδε παντός, *that mind together with nature muſt of neceſſity be the cauſe of this whole univerſe.* For though the world were never ſo much coeternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himſelf thus generouſly reſolving, εὐλογώτατόν εἶναι νοῦν προγενέστατον, καὶ κύριον καλὰ φύσιν· τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, *that though ſome* (that is the Atheiſts) *affirm the elements to have been the firſt Beings, yet it was the moſt reaſonable thing of all to conclude, that Mind was the oldeſt of all things, and ſenior to the world and elements; and that, according to nature, it had a princely and ſovereign dominion over all.* Wherefore we think it now ſufficiently evident, that *Ariſtotle*'s ſupreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cauſe of motion; but alſo was the efficient cauſe of this whole mundane ſyſtem, framed according to the beſt wiſdom, and after the beſt manner poſſible.

Met. l. 14. *cap.* 10. [P. 484. Tom IV. Oper.]

Met. L. 1. *c.* 3. [P. 266. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Met. L. 14. *c.* 7. [P. 479. Tom. IV. Oper.]

De Part. An. L. 1.

Lib. 2. *c.* 6. [P. 474. Tom I. Oper.]

Ar. de An. L. 1. *c.* 7. [P. 16. Tom. II. Oper.]

For perhaps it may not be amiſs here to obſerve, that God was not called Mind by *Ariſtotle*, and thoſe other ancient philoſophers, according

to that vulgar ſenſe of many in theſe days of ours; as if he were indeed an underſtanding or perceptive being, and that perfectly omniſcient, but yet nevertheleſs ſuch, as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodneſs, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to thoſe ancient philoſophers, that, which acts without reſpect to good, would not be ſo much accounted *mens* as *dementia*, *mind*, as *madneſs* or *folly*; and to impute the frame of nature or ſyſtem of the world, together with the government of the ſame, to ſuch a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But *Ariſtotle* and thoſe other philoſophers, who called the ſupreme God Νοῦς or *Mind*, underſtood thereby that, which of all things in the whole world is moſt oppoſite to chance, fortune, and temerity; that which is regulated by the τὸ εὖ ϗ καλῶς, *the well and fit* of every thing, if it be not rather the very rule, meaſure and eſſence of fitneſs itſelf; that which acteth all for ends and good, and doth every thing after the beſt manner, in order to the whole. Thus *Socrates* in that place before cited out of *Plato's Phædo*, interprets the meaning of that opinion, *that Mind made the world, and was the cauſe of all things:* ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο ὅτως ἔχει, τὸν νοῦν πάντα κοσμεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· *That therefore every thing might be concluded to have been diſpoſed of after the beſt manner poſſible.* And accordingly *Theophraſtus*, *Ariſtotle*'s ſcholar and ſucceſſor, deſcribeth God after this manner, τὸ πρῶτον καὶ θειότατον, πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλόμενον, *That firſt and divineſt Being of all, which willeth all the beſt things.* Whether of theſe two hypotheſes concerning God, one of the ancient Pagan philoſophers, that God is as eſſentially goodneſs as wiſdom, or, as *Plotinus* after *Plato* calls him, decency and fitneſs itſelf; the other, of ſome late profeſſors of Chriſtianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omniſcient; I ſay, whether of theſe two is more agreeable to piety and true Chriſtianity, we ſhall leave it to be conſidered.

Laſtly, it is not without probability, that *Ariſtotle* did, beſides the frame of nature, and fabrick of the world, impute even the very ſubſtance of things themſelves alſo to the divine efficiency, (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing ſave only the matter;) partly from his affirming God to be a cauſe and principle to all things, and partly from his commending this doctrine of *Anaxagoras*, ἅμα τῷ καλῶς, αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὅλων νοῦν, *That Mind was, together with well and fit, the cauſe and principle of things themſelves.* However, that *Ariſtotle*'s inferior gods at leaſt, and therefore his intelligences of the leſſer ſpheres, which were incorporeal ſubſtances, were all of them produced or created by one ſupreme, may be further confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetorick, τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς, ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον, *The divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God.* Where θεὸς is unqueſtionably uſed in way of eminency for the ſupreme Deity, as in thoſe other places of *Ariſtotle*'s before cited, to which ſundry more might be added, as, πάντα ἔχει τ' ἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτάρκης, *God poſſeſſeth all good things, and is ſelf-ſufficient:* and again where he ſpeaks of things, that are more than praiſe-worthy, τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ

Met. L. 1. c. 3. [P. 266. Tom. IV Oper.]

L. 2. c. 23. [P. 785. Tom. III. Oper.]

Mag. Mor. L. 2. c. 15. [P. 255. Tom. III. Oper.]

Eth. Nic. l. 1. *c.* 12. [P. 18. Tom. III. Oper.] καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν, πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι, *such are God and Good, for to these are all other things referred.* But here *Aristotle* affirming, *that there is nothing divine, but either God himself, or the work and effect of God,* plainly implies, that there was no multitude of self-existent deities, and that those intelligences of the lesser stars or spheres, however eternal, were themselves also produced or caused by one supreme Deity.

Met. l. 6. *c.* 1. [P. 346. Tom IV. Oper.] Furthermore, *Aristotle* declares, that this speculation concerning the Deity does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematicks; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematicks, and theology or metaphysicks: the former of these, that is, physiology, being conversant περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, *about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable*; the second (*viz.* geometry, or the pure mathematicks) περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστὰ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ, *About things immoveable indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves*; but the third and last, περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα, *Concerning things both immoveable and separable from matter*, that is, *incorporeal substances immoveable:* this philosopher there adding, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δὲ ἔστί τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη· *That if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any immoveable substance, the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other.* Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysicks the most honourable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelick theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingenit or unmade, according to that in his book against *Xenophanes* [5], ἆρ' ἀνάγκη ἀγένητα πάντα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲν κωλύει γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ ἑτέρων· *There is no necessity, that all things should be unmade, for what hinders but that some things may be generated from other things?* Yet there must needs be something eternal and unmade, as likewise incorruptible, because εἰ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι φθαρταὶ, πάντα φθαρτὰ· *If all substances were corruptible, then all might come to nothing.* Which eternal, unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible substance, according to *Aristotle*, is not senseless matter, but a perfect mind. Secondly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν, *separate from sensibles*, and not only so, but, according to *Aristotle*'s judgment likewise, ἀδιαίρετον, and ἀμερῆ, and ἀμεγέθη, *indivisible*, and *devoid of parts*, and *magnitude*. Nor can it be denied, but that besides *Aristotle*, the generality of those other ancients, who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from *Philo*) into διαστηματικαὶ, καὶ ἀδιάστατοι οὐσίαι, *distant and indistant*, or *extended and unextended substances*. Which doctrine, whether true

Met. l. 14. *c.* 6. [P. 477. Tom. IV. Oper.]

Met. l. 14. *c.* 7. [P. 180. Tom. IV. Oper.]

[5] De Xenophane, Zenone, & Gorgiâ, Cap. II. p. 836. Tom. II. Oper.

true or no, is not here to be diſcuſſed. Thirdly, τ'αυτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν, *That in God intellect is really the ſame thing with the intelligibles.* Becauſe the divine Mind being (at leaſt in order of nature) ſenior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itſelf, and therefore muſt needs contain them all within itſelf. Which determination of *Ariſtotle*'s is no leſs agreeable to Theiſm than to Platoniſm; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheiſts, who aſſert mind and underſtanding as ſuch, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypotheſis, ſuppoſe all intellection to be by way of paſſion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects within itſelf. *Met. Lib.* 14. *c.* 7. & *c.* 9.

Laſtly, that God being an immovable ſubſtance, his οὐσία is ἐνέργεια, *his eſſence* and *act or operation* the ſame; δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι οὐσιαν τοιαύτην ἥς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, *there muſt therefore needs be ſome ſuch principle as this, whoſe eſſence is act or energy.* From which theorem *Ariſtotle* indeed endeavours to eſtabliſh the eternity of the world, that it was not made ἐκ νυκτὸς, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, *from night, and a confuſed chaos of things, and from nothing*; that is, from an antecedent non-exiſtence, brought forth into being; becauſe God, who is an immoveable nature, and whoſe eſſence is act or energy, cannot be ſuppoſed to have reſted or ſlept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of *Ariſtotle*'s perhaps would not be inconſiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of exiſting from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elſewhere. However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that *Ariſtotle*, though aſſerting the world's eternity, nevertheleſs derived the ſame from God, becauſe he would prove this eternity of the world from the eſſential energy immutability of the Deity. *Met. Lib.* 14. *c.* 6.

We ſhall now conclude all concerning *Ariſtotle* with this ſhort ſummary, which himſelf gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the tradition of his Pagan anceſtors; παραδέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ πάλαιῶν, ὅτι θεοί τε εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ὕδη προσήχθαι πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρου χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια· *It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient times, that the ſtars are gods alſo; beſides that ſupreme Deity, which contains the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulouſly added hereunto, for the better perſuaſion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and political ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As for example, that theſe gods are of human form, or like to other animals; with ſuch other things as are conſequent hereupon.* In which words of *Ariſtotle* theſe three things may be taken notice of. Firſt, that this was the general perſuaſion of the civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one τὸ θεῖον, which comprehends the whole nature. Where τὸ θεῖον is by *Ariſtotle* plainly taken for the ſupreme Deity. And his own ſenſe concerning this particular is elſewhere thus declared after the ſame manner, where he ſpeaks *Met. Lib.* 14. *c.* 8. [P. 483.]

In Polit. of order, harmony, and proportion; θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, *this is the work of divine power, which alſo contains this univerſe.* Which Divinity containing and comprehending the whole nature and univerſe, muſt needs be a ſingle and ſolitary Being; according to that expreſſion of *Horace* before cited,

Nec viget quicquam ſimile aut ſecundum;

That, which hath nothing like it, nor ſecond to it. The next thing is, that according to the Pagan tradition, beſides this univerſal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities alſo, that is, underſtanding beings ſuperior to men; namely the animated ſtars or ſpheres, according to the vulgar apprehenſion, though *Ariſtotle*'s philoſophy would interpret this chiefly of their immovable Minds or Intelligences. Laſtly, that all the reſt of the Pagan religion and theology, thoſe two things only excepted, were fabulous and fictitious, invented for the better perſuaſion of the vulgar to piety, and the conſerving of them in obedience to civil laws; amongſt which this may be reckoned for one, that thoſe gods are all like men or other animals; and therefore to be worſhipped in images and ſtatues of thoſe ſeveral forms; with all that other fabulous farrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which being ſeparated from the reſt, the πάτριος δόξα, or *ancient tradition of their Pagan progenitors*, would remain comprized within thoſe two particulars above mentioned; namely, that there is one ſupreme Deity, that contains the whole univerſe, and that beſides it, the animated ſtars or their minds are certain inferior gods alſo.

To *Ariſtotle* may be here ſubjoined *Speuſippus* and *Xenocrates*, his equals and corrivals, they being *Plato*'s ſucceſſors; together with *Theophraſtus*, his own ſcholar and ſucceſſor. Concerning the former of which it is recorded in *Cicero*, that agreeably with *Plato*, he aſſerted *vim quandam, quâ omnia regantur, eamque animalem, one animal and intellectual force, by which all things are governed*; by reaſon whereof, *Velleius* the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring, *evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum, to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods*; as indeed both he and *Plato* did deſtroy thoſe Epicurean gods, which were all ſuppoſed to be independent and to have no ſway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of ſubordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one ſupreme, and by him employed as his miniſters in the oeconomy of the univerſe: for had they done any ſuch thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheiſts. And *Xenocrates* his theology, is thus repreſented in *Stobæus*, τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Δυάδα θεοὺς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥτινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα, καὶ Πείτλου, καὶ Νοῦν, ὅς ἐστιν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ θήλειαν μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγεμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, &c. *That both a Monad and Dyad were gods, the one maſculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth* Zen *and Mind,*

De N. D. Lib. 1. [Cap. XIII. p. 2898, 2899. Tom. IX. Oper.]

Ecl. Phyſ. Lib. 1. *c.* 3. [P. 17.]

Mind, and which is alſo to him the firſt God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the ſoul of the univerſe: beſides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be divine, that is, animated with a particular ſoul of its own, and the fiery ſtars to be celeſtial gods, as he aſſerted alſo certain ſublunary gods, *viz.* the inviſible dæmons. Where inſtead of the Platonick trinity, *Xenocrates* ſeems to have acknowledged only a duality of divine hypoſtaſes; the firſt called a Monad and Mind, the ſecond a Dyad and Soul of the univerſe. And laſtly, we have this teſtimony of *Theophraſtus*, beſides others, cited out of his Metaphyſicks, Θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴ, δι' ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ διαμένει, *There is one divine principle of all things, by or from which all things ſubſiſt and remain.*

XXV. The Stoicks and their chief doctors, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes* and *Chryſippus*, were no better naturaliſts and metaphyſicians than *Heraclitus*, in whoſe footſteps they trode; they in like manner admitting no other ſubſtance beſides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only διαστατὸν, *diſtant* and *extended*, but alſo ἀντίτυπον, *reſiſting* and *impenetrable*. So that, according to theſe Stoicks, the ſouls not only of other animals, but of men alſo, were properly corporeal, that is, ſubſtances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwiſe than that they were [1] σῶμα ἀραιότερον καὶ λεπτομερέστερον, *a more thin and ſubtile body*, and πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον, *a hot and fiery ſpirit*: it being ſuppoſed by theſe philoſophers, that cogitation, reaſon, and underſtanding, are lodged only in the firy matter of the univerſe. And though the generality of theſe Stoicks acknowledged human ſouls to have a certain permanency after death, and ſome of them till the next conflagration, (unleſs perhaps they ſhould be cruſhed and broken all to pieces, in their paſſage out of the body, by the down-fall of ſome tower, ſteeple, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude againſt their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as ſhall be afterwards declared) ſave only *Jupiter*, or the one ſupreme Deity. And as for the puniſhment of wicked ſouls after death, though ſome of them ſeem to have utterly exploded the fame, as a meer figment of poets, (inſomuch, that *Epictetus* [2] himſelf denies there was any *Acheron*, *Cocytus*, or *Phlegethon*), yet others granted, that as the better ſouls after death did mount up to the ſtars, their firſt original, ſo the wicked wandred up and down here in certain dark and miry ſubterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheleſs, they ſeem to have been all of this perſuaſion, that the frightning of men with puniſhments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, becauſe that ought to be purſued after for its own ſake, or the good of honeſty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil conſequent thereupon. Wherefore *Chryſippus* reprehended *Plato* for ſubjoining to his republick ſuch affrightful ſtories of puniſhments after death, Φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπολείπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ, τῆς ἀδικίας, τὸν Κέφαλον· εὐδιάβλητον. *Plut. de Stoic. Rep.* p. 1040.

[1] Theſe are the words of *Chryſippus*, preſerved by *Plutarch*, *Libro de Repugnantiis Stoicorum*, p. 1052. Tom. II. Oper.

[2] Arrian. in Epictet. Lib. III. Cap. XIII. p. 293.

βλητου τ' εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τἐναντίον ἐξάγουσα πολλὰς περιζπασμὰς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀνατιπιπτούσας, τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τᾶ θεᾶ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς ὐδὲν διαφέρουσα τᾶς Ἀκκᾶς καὶ τᾶς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τᾶ κακοχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργυσι. Chryſippus *affirmeth, that* Plato *(in the perſon of* Cephalus) *does not rightly deter men from injuſtice by the fear of divine puniſhments and vengeance after death; ſince this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; ſo that it ſeems to be but like to women's frighting of children from doing unhappy tricks, with thoſe bugbears of* Acco *and* Alphito. But how fondly theſe Stoicks doated upon that hypotheſis, that all was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themſelves to be bodies; for voice and ſound, night and day, evening and morning, ſummer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And not only ſo, but alſo the qualities of the mind itſelf, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that paſſage in *Seneca* [1], *Corporis bona ſunt corpora; corpora ergo ſunt & quæ animi, nam & hic corpus eſt; The goods of a body are bodies; now the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too.* And with as good logick as this did they further infer, that all the actions, paſſions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but alſo animals likewiſe [2]: *Animam conſtat animal eſſe, cum ipſa efficiat, ut ſimus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud eſt quàm animus taliter ſe habens, ergo animal eſt: It is manifeſt, that the ſoul is an animal, becauſe it is that, by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing elſe but the ſoul ſo and ſo affected or modified, and therefore theſe are animals too.* Thus we ſee what fine concluſions theſe doaters upon body (though accounted great maſters of logick) made; and how they were befooled in their ratiocinations and philoſophy.

Nevertheleſs, though theſe Stoicks were ſuch ſottiſh Corporealiſts, yet were they not for all that Atheiſts; they reſolving, that mind or underſtanding, though always lodged in corporeal ſubſtance, yet was not firſt of all begotten out of ſenſeleſs matter, ſo or ſo modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and the maker of the whole mundane ſyſtem. And therefore as to that controverſy ſo much agitated amongſt the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the neceſſity of material motions, or by mind, reaſon and underſtanding; they avowedly maintained, that it was neither by chance nor by material neceſſity, but *divinâ mente, by a divine and eternal mind* every way perfect. From which one eternal mind they alſo affirmed human ſouls to have been derived, and not from ſenſeleſs matter; *Prudentiam & mentem à diis ad homines perveniſſe* [3], *that mind and wiſdom deſcended down to men from the Deity.* And that *Ratio nihil aliud eſt, quàm in corpus humanum pars divini ſpiritus merſa* [4]; *Reaſon is nothing elſe but part of the divine ſpirit merged into a human body:* ſo that theſe human ſouls were to them no other than μόρια θεοῦ καὶ ἀποσπάσματα [5], *certain parts of*

[1] Epiſt. CVI. p. 399. Tom II. Oper.
[2] Seneca, Epiſt. CXIII. p. 422. Tom. II. Oper.
[3] Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXXI. p. 3000. Tom. IX. Oper.
[4] Senec. Epiſt. LXVI. p. 168. Tom. II. Oper.
[5] Arrian. in Epictet. Lib. I. Cap. XIV. p. 123.

of God, or decerptions and avulsions from him. Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoicks would prove the world to have had a divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those, which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that *Ennius* his Annals, or *Homer*'s Iliads might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many forms of letters, confounded all together; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any phantastick poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, nobooks or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think, that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognation of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, *nisi ea uno divino, & continuato spiritu continerentur, were they not all contained by one and the same divine spirit:* which is the most obvious argument for the unity or onelineſs of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either the world itself, or something presiding over it, was *à principio sapiens*[1], *wise from the beginning*, or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, *Natura suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit, nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of*; and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; *ita in omni naturâ necesse est absolvi aliquid & perfici, so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect, reach'd unto. Necesse est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius*; since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, *there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better*, at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner[2]; *Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem & rationem? Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain, that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituosity from the air? Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem & consilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cætera mundus habebit omnia? Hoc unum quod plurimi est non habebit? But that which far transcendeth all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those other things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us? Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantes compotesque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis: Nothing that*

[1] Cicero de Nat. Deor. Lib. II Cap. XIII. p. 2973. Tom. IX. Oper. [2] Id. ibid. Cap. VI, VII, VIII, IX.

that is devoid of mind and reaſon, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generateth ſuch, and therefore itſelf (or that which contains it, and preſides over it) muſt needs be animant and rational, or intellectual. Which argumentation is further ſet home by ſuch ſimilitudes as theſe; *Si ex oliva modulatè canentes tibiæ naſcerentur, non dubitares, quin eſſet in oliva tibicinis quædam ſcientia. Quid ſi platani fidiculas ferrent numeroſè ſonantes, idem ſcilicet cenſeres in platanis ineſſe muſicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans ſapienſque judicetur, cum ex ſe procreet animantes atque ſapientes? If from the olive-tree ſhould be produced pipes ſounding harmoniouſly, or from the plain-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord muſically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was ſome muſical, either skill or nature, in thoſe trees themſelves: why therefore ſhould not the world be concluded to be both animant and wiſe (or to have ſomething in it which is ſo) ſince it produceth ſuch beings from itſelf?* And though perhaps ſome may think that of *Cottâ*'s here to have been a ſmart and witty repartee [1], *Quærit* Socrates, *unde animam arripuerimus, ſi nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quæro, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? niſi verò loqui ſolem cum luna putemus, cum proprius acceſſerit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut* Pythagoras *exiſtimat.* Socrates *demandeth, whence we ſnatch'd ſoul, life, and reaſon, if there were none in the world? and I demand* (ſaith he) *whence did we ſnatch ſpeech, muſick, and numbers? Unleſs perhaps you will ſuppoſe the ſun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the* Syzygiæ; *or the world to ſound harmonically, as* Pythagoras *conceited.* Yet this, how ſmart ſoever it may ſeem, was really but an empty flaſh of Academick wit, without any ſolidity at all in it, as ſhall be manifeſted afterward. Laſtly, the Stoicks endeavoured to prove the exiſtence of a God after this manner, *Ut nulla pars corporis noſtri eſt, quæ non ſit minor quam noſmetipſi ſumus, ſic mundum univerſum pluris eſſe neceſſe eſt quam partem aliquam univerſi: As there is no part of our body, which is not inferior in perfection to ourſelves, ſo muſt the whole univerſe needs be ſuppoſed to be better and more perfect than any of the parts thereof.* Wherefore ſince it is better to be endued with life and underſtanding, than to be devoid thereof, and theſe are pure perfections; they being in ſome meaſure in the parts, muſt needs be much more in the whole. *Nullius ſenſu carentis pars poteſt eſſe ſentiens; No part of that, which is utterly dead and ſtupid, can have life and underſtanding in it.* And it is a madneſs for any man to ſuppoſe, *Nihil in omni mundo melius eſſe quam ſe, that there is nothing in the whole world better than himſelf, or than mankind*; which is but a part thereof. Now *Cotta* here again exerciſes his jeering Academick wit after the ſame manner as before; *Hoc ſi placet, jam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur, &c. Iſto modo etiam diſertus, mathematicus, muſicus, omni denique doctrina refertus, poſtremo philoſophus erit mundus. By this ſame argument you might as well prove, that the world is alſo book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a muſician, and laſt of all a philoſopher.* But neither this objection of his nor that former have any firmitude at all in them: becauſe though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cauſe, nor a part than the whole; and therefore whatſoever there is of

[1] Id. ibid. Lib. III. Cap. XI. p. 3064. Tom. IX. Oper.

of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those things there mentioned by *Cotta*, (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that, which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topick of prescience and divination) did the ancient Stoicks endeavour to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a meer plastick or methodical and sensless, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a meer heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, endued with a spermatick principle only; but an animal informed and inlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being Corporealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the firy principle in it, as intellectual, and the Hegemonick of the mundane soul; yet was the God of the Stoicks properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind and understanding, or in *Seneca*'s language, that *ratio incorporalis*, that rules the matter of the whole world. Which Stoical God was also called as well Τ'αγαθὸν as Νῦς, *good* as *mind*; as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in *Clemens Alexandrinus* [1]:

Τ'αγαθὸν ἐρωτᾶς μ', οἷόν ἐστι, ἄκκε δῆ,
Τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβῆς,
Κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλὸν, δέον, &c.

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoicks *Zeus* and *Zen*, or *Jupiter*; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one *Zeus* or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the onelinesse of this *Zeus*, or the supreme Deity, supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence, *Plutarch* would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds; ἀλλὰ τάγε ἄλλα τῶν Στωικῶν τίς ἂν φοβηθείη, πυνθανομένων πῶς εἱμαρμένη μία μένει καὶ πρόνοια, καὶ δ' πολλοὶ Διῆς καὶ Ζῆνες ἔσονται, πλειόνων ὄντων κόσμων; τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πολλοὺς εἶναι Δίας, ἂν πλείονες ὦσι κόσμοι, καὶ μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀρχοῦλα πρῶτον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τῶ ὅλω θεὸν, οἷος ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν κύριος ἁπάντων καὶ πατὴρ ἐπονομαζόμενος, &c. *Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoicks here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one fate, and one providence, and one* Jove, *(or independent Deity) were there many worlds? For what necessity is there, that there must be more* Zens *or* Joves *than one, if there were more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe,* *D. Def. Or.* p. 425.

[1] In Protreptico, Cap. VI. p. 61. and Stromat. Lib. V. p. 715.

called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the firſt prince, and higheſt governour in all thoſe worlds? Or what hinders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all ſubject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, *or ſupreme God, himſelf inſpecting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and ſpermatick reaſons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and diſpoſed? For can many diſtinct perſons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the univerſe, be all governed by one reaſon, and be ordered together in reference to one principle?* In which place theſe two things are plainly contained; firſt, that the Stoicks unqueſtionably aſſerted one ſupreme Deity, or univerſal monarch over the whole world; and ſecondly, that *Plutarch* was ſo far from giving any entertainment to the contrary opinion, that he concluded, though there were ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds, yet they were all ſubject to one ſupreme, ſolitary, and independent Deity.

But however, though theſe Stoicks thus unqueſtionably aſſerted one ſole independent and univerſal Numen, the monarch over the whole world; yet did they notwithſtanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding, πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων, *That all things were full of gods and dæmons.* And ſo far were they from falling ſhort of the other Pagans, as to this polytheiſm or multiplicity of gods, that they ſeem rather to have ſurpaſſed and outſtripped them therein. *Plutarch* [1] making mention of their τοσοῦτον πλῆθος θεῶν, *their ſo great multitude of gods*; and affirming them, ἐμπεπληκέναι τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, *to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and ſea with gods.* Nevertheleſs, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in time by that one, called *Zeus* or *Jupiter*, who was not only the ſpermatick reaſon, but alſo the ſoul and mind of the whole univerſe; and who from himſelf produced the world, and thoſe gods, out of non-exiſtence into being. And not only ſo, but that alſo in the ſucceſſive conflagrations they are all again reſolved and ſwallowed up into that one. Thus *Plutarch* in his defect of oracles, *P.* 420. writing of the mortality of dæmons, τοὺς Στωικοὺς γινώσκομεν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων τὴν λέγω δόξαν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ὄντων τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος· ἑνὶ χρωμένους ἀϊδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι νομίζοντας· *We know the Stoicks to maintain this opinion, not only concerning dæmons, but alſo the gods themſelves, that they are mortal. For though they own ſuch a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the reſt, that as they were made in time, ſo they ſhall be again corrupted and deſtroyed.* *Plutarch* himſelf there defends the mortality of dæmons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their preſent bodies, and tranſmigrate into others, their ſouls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoicks maintained the ſame as well concerning gods as dæmons; and that in ſuch a manner, as that their very ſouls, lives, and perſonalities, ſhould be utterly extinguiſhed and deſtroy'd. To the

[1] De Repugnant. Stoicor. p. 1075. Tom. II. Oper.

the ſame purpoſe *Plutarch* again writeth, in his book of *Common Notions* againſt the Stoicks, Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν, τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοιούτων ἄφθαρτον, οὐδὲ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διός· εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, &c. ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν, καὶ προνοίας, εἱμαρμένης, τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι, διαῤῥήδην μέγουσι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατὰ αὐτούς, ὥςπερ κηρίνους ἢ κατασίνους ὄντας· Chryſippus *and* Cleanthes, *having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and ſea with gods, leave not one of theſe their ſo many gods incorruptible nor eternal, ſave* Jupiter *only, into whom they conſume all the reſt; thereby making him to be a helluo and devourer of gods; which is as bad, as if they ſhould affirm him to be corruptible, it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nouriſhed and preſerved by the conſumption of other things into him, as for himſelf to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of conſequence from the other principles of the Stoicks, but it is a thing, which they expreſly aſſert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated, (or made in time) and that they ſhall be all deſtroyed by fire; they ſuppoſing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things.* This indeed is eſſential to the Stoical doctrine, and from their principles inſeparable and unavoidable; foraſmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the ſucceſſive conflagrations all corporeal ſyſtems and compages ſhall be diſſolved by fire; ſo that no other Deity can then poſſibly remain ſafe and untouched, ſave *Jupiter* alone, the firy principle of the univerſe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a conſiderable difference to be obſerved betwixt theſe Stoicks and the other Pagan Theiſts; that whereas the others for the moſt part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one ſupreme univerſal Numen, but yet nevertheleſs to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the Stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, ſave *Jupiter* alone, were not only γεγονότες, but alſo φθαρησόμενοι, ſuch as ſhould be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this ſo alſo, as that their very perſonalities ſhould be utterly aboliſhed and annihilated; all the Stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one. P. 1075.

Wherefore during the intervals of the ſucceſſive conflagrations, the Stoicks all agreed, that there is no more than one God (*Zeus* or *Jupiter*) left alone, (there being then indeed nothing elſe beſides himſelf) who afterwards produceth the whole mundane ſyſtem, together with all the gods, out of himſelf again. *Chryſippus* in *Plutarch* affirmeth, ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν Πρόνοιαν, ὅταν ἓν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους, ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους, *That as* Jupiter *and the world may be reſembled to a man, ſo may providence be to the ſoul: when therefore there ſhall be a conflagration,* Jupiter *of all the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himſelf into providence; and ſo both together remain in that ſame ethereal ſubſtance.* Where notwithſtanding *Ju-* P. 1077. [De Repugn. Stoicor.]

Ep. 6. [Epiſt IX. p. 22. Tom. II. Oper.] *piter* and providence are really but one and the ſame thing. And *Seneca* writeth thus concerning the life of a wiſe man in ſolitude, *Qualis futura eſt vita ſapientis, ſi ſine amicis relinquatur, in cuſtodiam conjectus, aut in deſertum littus ejectus? Qualis eſt* Jovis, *cum reſoluto mundo, & DIIS IN UNUM CONFUSIS, pauliſper ceſſante natura, acquieſcit ſibi, cogitationibus ſuis traditus: If you ask, what would be the life of a wiſe man either in a priſon, or deſert? I anſwer, the ſame with that of* Jupiter, *when the world being reſolved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the courſe of nature ceaſing, he reſteth in himſelf, converſing with his own cogitations. Arrianus* his *Epictetus* likewiſe, ſpeaking of the ſame thing, ironically introduces *Jupiter*, bemoaning himſelf in the conflagration as now left quite alone, after this manner; Τάλας ἐγὼ, ὅτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω, ὅτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, ὅτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, ὅτε ὅλως ἢ ἀδελφὸν, ἢ γὸν, ἢ συγγενῆ· *Alas, I am now left all alone; I have neither* Juno, *nor* Minerva, *nor* Apollo *with me; neither brother nor ſon, nor nephew, nor kinſman (neither God nor goddeſs) to keep me company.* He adding alſo, according to the ſenſe of the Stoicks, that in all theſe ſucceſſive conflagrations, ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἵα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ, Jupiter *being left alone, converſeth only with himſelf, and reſteth in himſelf, conſidering his own government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himſelf.* And thus have we made it unqueſtionably evident, that the Stoicks acknowledged only one independent and ſelf-exiſtent Deity, one univerſal Numen, which was not only the creator of all the other gods, but alſo, in certain alternate viciſſitudes of time, the decreator of them; he then ſwallowing them up, and devouring them all into himſelf, as he had before produced them together with the world out of himſelf.

Arr. l. 3. *c.* 13. [P. 291.]

It is granted, that theſe Stoicks as well as the other Pagans did religiouſly worſhip more gods than one, that is, more underſtanding beings ſuperior to men. For it was *Epictetus*[1] his own exhortation, εὔχου θεοῖς, *pray to the gods.* And the ſame philoſopher[2] thus deſcribeth the diſpoſition of a perſon rightly affected, θέλω εἰδέναι τί μοι καθῆκον πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, *I would willingly know, what is my duty, firſt to the gods, and then to my parents, and other relations.* And they are *M. Antoninus* his precepts[3], Αἰδοῦ θεούς, *revere the gods*, and[4] ἐν ἅπασι θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ, *In every thing implore the aid and aſſiſtance of the gods.* And accordingly in that cloſe of his firſt book[5], himſelf does thankfully aſcribe many particular benefits to the gods in common; παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἀγαθοὺς πάππους, &c. *I owe to the gods, that I had good progenitors and parents,* &c. Where, amongſt the reſt, he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetorick; becauſe theſe would probably (had he ſucceeded in his purſuit of them) have hindred him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enumeration, he concludeth thus, πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται, *For all theſe things need the aſſiſtance of the gods and fortune*, viz. becauſe they are not in our own power.

Neither

[1] Apud Arrian. Lib. I. Differt. I. p. 84.
[2] Ibid. Lib. III. Cap. XVII. p. 222.
[3] Lib. VI. §. 30. p. 190.
[4] Lib. VI. §. 23. p. 183.
[5] Lib. I. §. XVII. p. 30.

Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the ſupreme God, by attributing ſuch things to the gods in common, (as the donors of them,) which plainly belong to the ſupreme God only. As when *Epictetus* makes reaſon in men to be a gift of the gods; ἡμῖν ἦν λόγον ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν; *Is reaſon therefore given us by the gods merely to make us miſerable and unhappy?* And when he again imputes virtue to them; Haſt thou overcome thy luſt, thine intemperance, thine anger? πόζῳ μείζων αἰτία θυσίας, ἢ ὑπατεία ἢ ὑπαρχία, ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν, *How much greater cauſe then haſt thou of offering ſacrifice, than if thou hadſt got a conſulſhip or prætorſhip? for thoſe things come only from thyſelf, and from the gods.* Though the reaſon of theſe ſpeeches of theirs ſeems to have been no other than this, becauſe they took it for granted, that thoſe underſtanding beings, ſuperior to men, called by them gods, were all of them the inſtruments and miniſters of the ſupreme God in the government of the world; and had therefore ſome kind of ſtroke or influence, more or leſs, upon all the concernments of mankind. Whence it came to paſs alſo, that they often uſed thoſe words God and gods promiſcuouſly and indifferently: as one and the ſame celebrated ſpeech of *Socrates* is ſometimes expreſſed ſingularly, εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, *if God will have it ſo, let it be ſo,* (*Arr. Epict. l.* 1. *c.* 29. and *l.* 4. *c.* 4.) and ſometimes again plurally, εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς, *if the gods will have it ſo.*

L. 3. *c.* 24. [Apud Arrian. p. 329.]

L. 4. *c.* 3. [Pag. 388.]

Wherefore, notwithſtanding the many gods of thoſe Stoicks, they worſhipped for all that one ſupreme, that is, one univerſal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variouſly deſcribed by them, ſometimes as the nature and reaſon of the whole world; ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις πρεσβυτάτη θεῶν, *the nature of the whole, the oldeſt of all the gods*; and ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦζα φύσις, *that nature which governs all things*; ὁ τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐζίαν διοικῶν λόγος, *that reaſon which governs the ſubſtance of all*; ὁ διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομῶν τὸ πᾶν, *that reaſon which paſſes through the ſubſtance of the univerſe, and through all eternity, orders and diſpenſes all according to a pointed periods.* Sometimes is he called ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία, *the cauſe of all things*; ſometimes τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγεμονικὸν, *the hegemonick and ruling principle of the whole world*, and ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ κόσμου, *the prince of the world.* Again, ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα, *the governor of the whole*, as in this of *Epictetus*; ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχε τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως; *a good man ſubmits his mind to the governor of the whole univerſe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city.* Alſo ὁ διατάσσων, *the orderer of all*; in this other religious paſſage of the ſame philoſophers, τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τοῦτέστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται· πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων, *to be inſtructed is to will things to be as they are made: and how are they made? as that great diſpoſer of all hath appointed.* Again, the ſupreme God is ſometimes called by them, τὸ περιέχον τὰ ὅλα νοερὸν, *that intellectual principle, which contains the whole*, as in this inſtruction

Anton. L. 9. [§. 1. pag. 262.]

Ant. l. 7. §. 18. [Pag. 213.]

Ant. l. 6. §. 1. [Pag. 170.]

Ant. l. 5. §. 24.

Anton l. 9.

Ant. l. 7. §. 47. [Sect. 75. p. 236.]

L. 1. *c.* 12. [Apud Arrian. p. 118.]

Ep. p. 119. *Cant.*

of

L. 8 §. 45. [Sect. 54. Γ. 258.] of *M. Antoninus*, μὴ μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ, *that, as our bodies breathe the common air, ſo ſhould our ſouls ſuck and draw in vital breath from that great mind, that comprehends the univerſe, becoming as it were one ſpirit with the ſame.* He is

Anton. p. 125. [Lib. V. § 30. p. 164.] alſo called by them ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς καὶ διάνοια, *the mind and underſtanding of the whole world*, μία πάντων πήγη νοερά, *one intellectual fountain of all things*;

Ant. p. 257. and laſtly, to name no more, θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς,

Anton. l. 7. §. 7. *one God through all, one ſubſtance, and one law.* Which ſupreme God was commonly called alſo by the Stoicks, together with the generality of the

[Sect. 9. p. 210.] other Pagans, ὁ Θεὸς, or *God*, emphatically and in way of eminency, as in this of *Epictetus*[1], μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλε, ἢ ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει, καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει; *will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee?*

L. 2. *c.* 18 [Pag. 225.] And again, θέλητον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ, ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σεαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, *affect to ſeem fair to God, deſire to be pure with thy pure ſelf, and with God.* Alſo where[2] he ſpeaks of the regular courſe of things in nature, τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος Θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν βλαστάνει· *That it proceedeth orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God; when he bids the plants to bloſſom, they bloſſom; and when to bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit.* To which innumerable other inſtances might be added. And *Zeus* or *Ju-*

Epict. p. 251. [apud Arrian. Lib. II. Cap. XXIII.] *piter* was the proper name of this ſupreme God amongſt the Stoicks alſo; whence the government of the whole world is called by them Διὸς διοίκησις, *the government or œconomy of* Jupiter. Laſtly, this *ſupreme God* is ſometimes diſtinguiſhed by them from the other *gods*, expreſly and by name;

L. 4. *c* 12. [Pag. 426.] as in this of *Epictetus*, ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι ὑποτελάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκεῖνον, *I have, whom I ought to be ſubject to, whom to obey, God and thoſe, who are next after him*; that is, the ſupreme and inferior gods. So likewiſe, where he exhorteth not to deſire things out of our own power, ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτὰ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι κυβερνάτωσαν,

L. 2. *c.* 17. [Pag. 221.] *Let* Jupiter *alone with theſe things, and the other gods, deliver them up to be ordered and governed by them.* And ſo again, where he perſonates one, that places his happineſs in thoſe things without him, κάθημαι καὶ στένω, καὶ ὃν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας, *I then ſhall ſit lamenting, and ſpeaking evil of every one, even* Jupiter *himſelf and the other gods.*

And it muſt in reaſon be ſuppoſed, that this *Jupiter*, or univerſal Numen of the world, was honoured by theſe Stoicks far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all thoſe other gods, as hath been already declared, being as

De N. D. l. 2. *p.* 225. *Lamb.* well corruptible, mortal, and annihilable, as they were generated or created. For though *Cicero*'s *Lucilius Balbus*, where he pretends to repreſent

[Cap. XXX. pag. 2999. Tom. IX. Oper.] the doctrine of the Stoicks, attribute the very firſt original of the world to a plurality of gods, in theſe words, *Dico igitur* providentiâ Deorum *mundum & omnes mundi partes, & initio conſtitutas eſſe, & omni tempore adminiſtrari*; yet unqueſtionably *Cicero* forgat himſelf herein, and rather ſpake the

[1] Apud Arrian. Lib. II. Cap. XXVII. p. 221. [2] Apud Arrian. Lib. I. Cap. XIV. p. 122, 123.

the language of ſome other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) Deities, than of the Stoicks, who aſſerted one only eternal God; and ſuppoſed, in the reiterated conflagrations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one, ſo that *Jupiter* being then left alone, muſt needs make up the world again, as alſo all thoſe other gods out of himſelf. And thus does *Zeno* in *Laertius* [1] deſcribe the *Coſmopœia*, τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς, καθ' αὑτὸν ὄντα, *That God at firſt being alone by himſelf, converted the firy ſubſtance of the world by degrees into water*, that is, into a craſſer *Chaos*; *out of which water, himſelf afterwards, as the ſpermatick reaſon of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane ſyſtem.* And *Cicero* himſelf elſewhere, in his *de Legibus* [2], attributes the firſt original of mankind cautiouſly, not to the gods in common, but to the ſupreme God only, *Hoc animal providum*, &c. *quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum eſſe, à SUMMO DEO:* and this, rather according to the ſenſe of the Stoicks, than of the Platoniſts, whoſe inferior generated gods alſo (being firſt made) were ſuppoſed to have had a ſtroke in the fabrefaction of mankind, and other animals. Thus *Epictetus* plainly aſcribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one ſupreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Chriſtians, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to cuſtom in them, and not to right knowledge; (as *M. Antoninus* likewiſe aſcribes the ſame to ψιλὴ παράταξις, *meer obſtinacy of mind*) ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτω διατεθῆναι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκε τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον· *Can ſome be ſo affected out of madneſs, and the Galileans out of cuſtom? and can none attain thereunto by reaſon and true knowledge, namely, becauſe God made all things in the world, and the whole world itſelf perfect and unhinderable; but the parts thereof for the uſe of the whole, ſo that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole.* Thus does he again elſewhere demand, τὸν ἥλιον τίς πεποίηκε, καρποὺς δὲ τίς, &c. *Who made the ſun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the ſeaſons of the year? Who the agreeable fitneſs of things? Wherefore thou having received all from another, even thy very ſelf, doſt thou murmur and complain againſt the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? ſhew thee the light? beſtow ſenſe and reaſon upon thee?* Now the ſun was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the reſt of their gods muſt needs be ſo too. And thus is it plainly expreſſed in this following citation, εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατ' ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγημένως, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἀγενὲς, οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ· *If any one could be throughly ſenſible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himſelf, knowing that he is the ſon of* Jupiter *alſo.* Where Θεὸς is plainly put for the ſupreme God, and Θεοὶ for the inferior gods only. Again, he thus attributes the making of man and government of the whole world to God, or *Jupiter* only. Ὁ Θεὸς πάντας

L. 11. §. [P. 319.]

L. 4. *c.* 7. [P. 500]

L. 1. *c.* 3. [P 90. Vide etiam Lib. I. Cap. XIV. p. 124.]

[1] Lib. VII. ſegm. 136. p. 450.

[2] Lib. I. Cap. VIII. p. 3304. Tom. IX. Oper.

L. 3. *c.* 24. [*P.* 328.] πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐποίησε, &c. τὴν δὲ ὑγίειαν τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν, ὥσπερ ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν, καὶ πατρικῶς προϊσάμενον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις· *God made all men to this end, that they might be happy, and as became him, who had a fatherly care of us, he placed our good and evil in thoſe things, which are in our own power.* And

L. 3. *c.* 24. [*P.* 331.] τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικεῖται τὰ ὅλα, εἰ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵν' ὦσιν ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ εὐδαίμονες, *Things would not be well governed, if* Jupiter *took no care of his own citizens, that they alſo might be happy like himſelf.*

And that theſe Stoicks did indeed religiouſly worſhip and honour the ſupreme God above all their other gods, may appear from ſundry inſtances. As firſt, from their acknowledging him to be the ſovereign legiſlator, and profeſſing ſubjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their

L. 4. *c.* 7. greateſt liberty. Thus *Epictetus*, εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολὰς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται· *No man hath power over me, I am made free by God,* (by becoming his ſubject) *I know his*

L. 3. *c.* 5. *commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himſelf.* And again, ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρεθῆναι, ἵν' εἰπεῖν δύναμαι τῷ Θεῷ, μήτι παρέβην σου τὰς ἐντολὰς, &c. *Theſe things would I be found employing myſelf about, that I may be able to ſay to God; Have I tranſgreſſed any of thy commandments? have I uſed my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwiſe than thou requiredſt?*

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the ſupreme governour of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their profeſſing to ſubmit their wills to his will in every thing; *Epictetus* ſomewhere[1] thus beſpeaks the ſupreme God, μήτι ἐμεμψάμην σου τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα ὅτι ἐθέλησας, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἑκών· πένης ἐγενόμην σου θέλοντος ἀλλὰ χαίρων οὐκ ἤρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, οὐδεποτ' ἐπιθύμησα ἀρχῆς· μήτι με τούτου ἕνεκα συγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοι φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἕτοιμος εἴτι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἴτι σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως; ἄπειμι· χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ, σὰ, καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σου συμπαρακολουθῆσαι· ταῦτα με ἐνθυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, ταῦτα ἀναγινώσκοντα καταλάβοι ἂν θάνατος· *Did I ever complain of thy government? I was ſick when thou wouldſt have me to be, and ſo are others, but I was ſo willingly. I was poor alſo at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magiſtracy, or had any dignity, becauſe thou wouldſt not have me, and I never deſired it. Didſt thou ever ſee me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a diſcontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatſoever thou requiredſt? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this feſtival ſolemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou haſt honoured me ſo far as to let me keep the feaſt with thee, and behold thy works, and obſerve thy oeconomy of the world. Let death ſeize upon me no otherwiſe employed, than thus thinking and writing of*

L. 2. *c.* 16. [*P.* 217.] *ſuch things.* He likewiſe exhorts others after this manner, τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς, ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἵσος εἰμὶ· οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων, ὅπου θέλεις ἄγε, ἣν θέλῃς εἰθῆτα περίθες, ἄρχειν με θέλεις,

[1] Apud Arrian. Lib. III. Cap. V. p. 274.

θέλεις, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγὼ σοι ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομαι, δείξω τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν οἵα ἐστίν. *Dare to lift up thine eyes to God and ſay, Uſe me hereafter to whatſoever thou pleaſeſt. I agree, and am of the ſame mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuſe nothing, that ſhall ſeem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleaſeſt. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a publick or private perſon, of a rich man or a beggar. I will apologize for thee as to all theſe things before men. And I will alſo ſhew the nature of every one of them.*

The ſame is likewiſe manifeſt from their pretenſions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and aſſiſtance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus alſo *Epictetus*, Κἀγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἐλευθέρους, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας, ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ· *My deſign is this, to render you free and undiſturbed, always looking at God, as well in every ſmall, as greater matter.* Again the ſame Stoick concludes, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, &c. εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσπεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσιωμένον. *A man will never be able otherwiſe to expell grief, fear, deſire, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the obſervance of his commandments.* And he affirmeth of *Hercules*, that this great piece of piety was ſo long ſince obſerved by him, τὸν Δία αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκάλει, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν ἃ ἔπραττε· *that as he called* Jupiter, *or the ſupreme God, his father, ſo did he whatſoever he did, looking at him.* Thus *M. Antoninus* ſpeaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας, *to thoſe that live with us*; and another πρὸς τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν ἀφ' ἧς συμβαίνει πᾶσιν πάντα, *to that divine cauſe, from which all things happen to all.* As likewiſe he affirmeth, οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἄνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὐπράξεις, *that no human thing is well done without a reference to God.* And he excellently exhorteth men, ἐνὶ τέρπου, καὶ προσαναπαύου, τῷ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ· *To be delighted and ſatisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, tending to a common good, or the good of human ſociety; together with the remembrance of God.* Laſtly, he declareth his own confidence in the ſupreme Deity in theſe words; θαῤῥῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι, *I truſt and rely upon the governor of the whole world.*

L. 2. *c.* 19. [P. 231.]
L. 2. *c.* 16. [P. 218.]
L. 3. *c.* 24. [P. 330.]
L. 8. § 23. [Sect. 27. p. 247.]
L. 3. § 11. [Sect. 13. p. 87.]
L. 6. § 5. [Sect. 7. p. 172.]
L. 6. § 8. [Sect. 10. p. 174.]

This may be concluded alſo from their thanking the one ſupreme God for all, as the author of all good, and delightfully celebrating his praiſes. *Epictetus* declares it to be the duty of a good man, χάριν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ θεῷ, *to thank God for all things.* And elſewhere he ſpeaketh thus: εἰ νῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλό τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν, καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν, καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τοὺς χάριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας, καὶ ἀρῶντας, καὶ ἐθίοντας, ἄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέχει ὄργανα ταῦτα, δι' ὧν τὴν γῆν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεὸς ὅτι χεῖρας ἔδωκεν, &c. ὅτι αὔξεσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν· ταῦτα ἐφ' ἑκάστοις εὐφημεῖν ἔδει, καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκε τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τούτων· τί δ' ἦν; &c. εἰ γὰρ ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου, νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεόν. *Had we underſtanding, what ſhould we do elſe but both* [illegible]

L. 4. *c.* 7. [Pag. 401.]
L. 1. *c.* 16. [Pag. 127.]

lickly and privately praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him? Ought not they, who dig, plow, and eat, continually sing such a hymn to God as this; Great is that God, who gave us these organs to cultivate the earth withal; great is that God, who gave us hands, &c. *who enabled us to grow undiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise God for the faculty of understanding all these things. What then if for the most part men be blinded, ought there not to be some one, who should perform this office, and sing a hymn to God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God,* that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, called by them phancies. To this purpose is that of *Epictetus*, μέγας ὁ ἀγών ἐστι, θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλέοντες. *This is a great conflict or contention, a divine enterprize; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon* Castor *and* Pollux *in a tempest.* He commends also this form of devotional address, or divine ejaculation, which was part of *Cleanthes* his litany, to be used frequently upon occasion [1], Ἄγου δή με, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ' (ὑμῖν) εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἕψομαί γε ἄοκνος· ἢν δὲ γε μὴ θέλω, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι· *Lead me, O* Jupiter, *and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and chearfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow.* Where *Jupiter* and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two several names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no less truly and faithfully than elegantly thus rendered by *Seneca*:

L. 2. c. 18. [Apud Arrian. p. 226.]

Ep. 106. [CVII. Tom. II. Oper. p. 402.]

Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,
Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi est mora,
Assum impiger; fac nolle, comitabor gemens,
Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe, that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same *Cleanthes* to him; the rather, because it hath been but little taken notice of. And the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into *Latin* verse; which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. *Duport*.

Steph. Poes. Philos. p. 49. [Ex Stobœi Eclog. Physic.]

Κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ,
Ζεὺς, φύσεως ἀρχηγὲ, νόμου μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,
Χαῖρε. Σὲ γὰρ πᾶσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν·

Ἐκ

[1] Vide Arrian. Lib. III. Cap. XXVI. p. 366.

Ἐκ ζεῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν, ἦχω μίμημα λαχόντες
Μοῦνοι, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν.
Τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείσω.
Σοὶ δὲ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν
Πείθεται, ἦκεν ἄγῃς, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται.
Τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικήτοις ὑπὸ χερσὶν
Ἀμφήκη πυρόεντα, ἀειζώοντα κεραυνόν·
Τῷ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήγης Φύσεως πάντ' ἐρρίγασι,
Ὃ σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
Φοιτᾷ μιγνύμενος·
Ὅς τόσσος μεγαὼς ὕπαλος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντὸς·
Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ ζεῦ δίχα δαίμων,
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, ἤ τ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
Καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἄκοσμα καὶ ἤ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔσσιν.
Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὥσθ' ἕνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων.
Ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοί εἰσιν;
Δύσμοροι, ὅτ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κλῆσιν ποθέοντες,
Οὔτ' ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νόμον, ἤτε κλύουσιν·
Ὃ κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν·
Αὐτοὶ δ' αὖ ὁρμῶσιν ἄνευ καλοῦ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα
Οἱ μὲν ὑπὲρ δόξης στυγερὴν δυσέριδα ἔχοντες,
Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κερδοσύνας τετραμμένοι ἠδενὶ κόσμῳ,
Ἄλλοι δ' εἰς ἄνεσιν, καὶ σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα,
Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάνδωρε, κελαινεφὲς, ἀρχικέραυνε,
Ἀνθρώπου ῥῦσαι ἀπειροσύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
Ἣν σὺ πάτερ σκέδασον ψυχῆς ἀπὸ, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
Γνώμης, ᾗ πίσυνος σὺ δίκης μετὰ πάντα κυβερνᾷς·
Ὄφρ' ἂν τιμηθέντες ἀμειβώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,
Ὑμνοῦντες τὰ σὰ ἔργα διηνεκὲς, ὡς ἐπέοικε
Θνητὸν ἐόντα· ἐπεὶ οὔτε βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλοτε μεῖζον,
Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

Magne pater divûm, cui nomina multa, ſed una
Omnipotens ſemper virtus, tu Jupiter *autor*
Naturæ, certâ qui ſingula lege gubernas!
Rex ſalve. Te nempe licet mortalibus ægris
Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
Nos ſumus, æternæ quaſi imago vocis & echo
Tantum, quotquot humi ſpirantes repimus; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum & robur ſine fine celebrans.
Quippe tuo hic totus, terram qui circuit, orbis
Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultrò
Invictis telum manibus tibi tale miniſtrum,
Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen.
Ictu etenim illius tota & natura tremiſcit;
Illo & communem rationem dirigis, & quæ

Mundi agitat molem, magno ſe corpore miſcens:
Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque ſupremus.
Nec ſine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
Æthere nec dio fit, nec per cærula ponti,
Errore acta ſuo, niſi quæ gens impia patrat.
Confuſa in ſeſe tu dirigis ordine certo;
Auſpice te ingratis & ineſt ſua gratia rebus;
Fœlice harmonia, tu ſcilicet, omnia in unum
Sic bona mixta malis compingis, ut una reſurgat
Cunctorum ratio communis & uſque perennans:
Quam refugit, ſpernitque hominum mens læva malorum.
Heu miſeri! bona qui quærunt ſibi ſemper & optant,
Divinam tamen hanc communem & denique legem,
Nec ſpectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant:
Cui ſi parerent poterant traducere vitam
Cum ratione & mente bonam: nunc ſponte feruntur
In mala præcipites, trahit & ſua quemque voluptas.
Hunc agit ambitio, laudiſque immenſa cupido,
Illum & avarities, & amor veſanus habendi,
Blanda libido alium, veneriſque licentia dulcis:
Sic aliò tendunt alii in diverſa ruentes.
At tu, Jupiter *alme, tonans in nubibus atris,*
Da ſapere, & mentem miſeris mortalibus aufer
Inſanam, hanc tu pelle pater; da apprendere poſſe
Conſilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas:
Nos ut honorati pariter, tibi demus honorem,
Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,
Ut fas eſt homini; nec enim mortalibus ullum,
Nec ſuperis, majus poterit contingere donum,
Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.

XXVI. It would be endleſs now to cite all the teſtimonies of other philoſophers and pagan writers of latter times, concerning one ſupreme and univerſal Numen. Wherefore we ſhall content ourſelves only to inſtance in ſome of the moſt remarkable, beginning with *M. Tull. Cicero*; whom tho' ſome would ſuſpect to have been a Sceptick as to theiſm, becauſe in his *de natura deorum* he brings in *Cotta* the Academick, as well oppoſing *Q. Lucil. Balbus* the Stoick, as *C. Velleius* the Epicurean; yet from ſundry other places of his writings, it ſufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatick and hearty Theiſt; as for example, this in his ſecond book *de Divin*[1]. *Eſſe præſtantem aliquam æternamque naturam, & eam ſuſpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cæleſtium cogit confiteri: That there is ſome moſt excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the pulchritude of the world, and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confeſs.* And this in his oration *de haruſpicum reſponſis*[2]; *Quis eſt tam vecors, qui cum ſuſpexerit in cælum, Deos eſſe non ſentiat, & ea quæ tanta mente fiunt, ut vix quiſquam arte ulla, ordinem rerum ac viciſſitudinem*

[1] Cap. LXXII. p. 3255. Tom. IX. Oper. [2] Cap. X. p. 2333. Tom. V. Oper.

ſitudinem perſequi poſſit, caſu fieri putet? Who is ſo mad or ſtupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not preſently convinced, that there are gods? or can perſuade himſelf, that thoſe things, which are made with ſo much mind and wiſdom, as that no human ſkill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance? To which purpoſe more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philoſophick writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, ſet on foot by *Carneades*; that is, to write ſceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reaſons intimated by himſelf in theſe words; *Qui requirunt quid quaque de re ipſi ſentiamus, curioſiùs id faciunt quam neceſſe eſt. Non enim tam authoritatis in diſputando quam rationis momenta quærenda ſunt. Quinetiam obeſt plerumque iis, qui diſcere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui ſe docere profitentur. Deſinunt enim ſuum judicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident: They, who would needs know, what we ourſelves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, becauſe philoſophy is not ſo much a matter of authority as of reaſon; and the authority of thoſe, who profeſs to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learners, they neglecting by that means to uſe their own judgment, ſecurely taking that for granted, which is judged by another whom they value.* *De N. D. I.* 1. [Cap. V. p. 2886.] Nevertheleſs, *Cicero* in the cloſe of this diſcourſe *De natura deorum* (as St. *Auſtin*[1] alſo obſerveth) plainly declares himſelf to be more propenſe and inclinable to the doctrine of *Balbus*, than either that of *Velleius* or *Cotta*; that is, though he did not aſſent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point, (himſelf being rather a Platoniſt than a Stoick) yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureiſm of *Velleius*, but alſo the ſcepticiſm of *Cotta*. Wherefore *Auguſtinus Steuchus*, and other learned men, quarrel with ſundry paſſages of *Cicero*'s upon another account, not as atheiſtical, but as ſeeming to favour a multitude of independent gods; he ſometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but alſo the firſt conſtitution and fabrick of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus[2]; *Ut perpetuus mundi eſſet ornatus, magna adhibita cura eſt à providentia deorum: For the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods:* And *à diis immortalibus hominibus provisum eſſe*, &c. *That the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabrick and figure of them.* And that place before cited, *Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum & omnes mundi partes initio conſtitutas eſſe; I ſay, that the world and all its parts were at firſt conſtituted by the providence of the gods.* *De N. D.* 225. And laſtly, where he ſtates the controverſy of that book *De N. D.* thus: *Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contrà ab his & à principio omnia facta, & conſtituta ſint, & ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur? Whether the gods do nothing at all, but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at firſt made and conſtituted, and ever ſince are moved and governed by them?* P. 195. *Lamb.* Notwithſtanding which, it is evident, that this learned orator and philoſopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one ſupreme and univerſal Numen over all. And that firſt from

[1] De Civitate Dei Lib. IV. Cap. XXX. p. 86. Tom. VII. Oper.

[2] De Natur. Deor. Lib. III.

from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way of eminency; as *Ipsi Deo nihil minus gratum, quàm non omnibus patere ad se placandum & colendum viam: Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than that there should not be a liberty open to all* (by reason of the costliness of sacrifices) *to worship and appease him*; and *Nisi juvante Deo, tales non fuerunt* Curius, Fabricius, *&c.* Curius *and* Fabricius *had never been such men as they were, had it not been for the divine assistance.* Again, *Commoda, quibus utimur, lucemque quâ fruimur, spiritumque quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus; We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God.* And to mention no more, in his version of *Plato*'s *Timæus*[1], *Deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat; God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were sow some gods in the earth, some in the moon,* &c. Moreover, by his making such descriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his *Orat. pro Milone, Est, est profectò illa vis; neque in his corporibus, atque in hac imbecillitate nostrâ, inest quiddam, quod vigeat & sentiat, & non inest in hoc tanto naturæ tamque præclaro motu. Nisi fortè idcirco esse non putant, quia non apparet nec cernitur: proinde quasi nostram ipsam mentem, qua sapimus, qua providemus, qua hæc ipsa agimus & dicimus, videre, aut planè qualis & ubi sit, sentire possumus. There is, there is certainly such a divine force in the world; neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours there should be something, which hath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind, (whereby we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus) and perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged.* Where, as there is a strong asseveration of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly implied, in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions, *Nec verò Deus ipse alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, & libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens & movens: Neither can God himself be understood by us otherwise, than as a certain loose and free Mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all things.* So again in the same book, *Hæc igitur & alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt ut* Platoni *videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut* Aristoteli *placet, moderator tanti operis & muneris? When we behold these and other wonderful works of nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presideth over them, either one maker of all, if they had a beginning, as* Plato *conceiveth; or else, if they always were, as* Aristotle *supposeth, one moderator and governour?* And in the third *De Legibus, Sine imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam & hic Deo paret, & huic obediunt maria terræque, & hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat: Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation, nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature of things, nor the world itself could subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him, and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law.* Elsewhere

2 *Leg. p.* 335. [Cap. X. p. 3352. Tom. IX. Oper.]

D.N.D. l. 2. [Cap. LXVI. p. 3048.]

Pro S. Ros. [Cap. XLV. p. 449. Tom. III. Oper.]

P. 556. *Lamb.* [Cap. XXXI. p. 2846. Tom. III. Oper.]

L. 1. *p.* 126. [Cap. XXVII. p. 2604. Tom. VIII. Oper.]

Tusc. Q. L. 1. *p.* 126. [Cap. XXIX. p. 2606.]

P. 343. [Cap. I. p. 3389. Tom. IX. Oper.]

[1] Cap. XIII. p. 4034. Tom. X. Oper.

where he ſpeaks of *Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat hinc injuſſu ſuo demigrare*; *That God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart hence without his leave.* Of *Deus, cujus numini parent omnia*; *That God, whoſe divine power all things obey.* We read alſo in *Cicero* of *ſummus* or *ſupremus Deus, the ſupreme God*, to whom the firſt making of man is properly imputed by him; of *Summi rectoris & domini Numen, the divine power of the ſupreme Lord and governour*; of *Deus præpotens*, and *rerum omnium præpotens* Jupiter[1], *The moſt powerful God*, and Jupiter, *who hath power over all things*; of [2]*Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, ſicut animus humanus id corpus cui præpoſitus eſt*; *That chief or principal God, who governs the whole world in the ſame manner as a human ſoul governeth that body, which it is ſet over.* Wherefore, as for thoſe paſſages before objected, where the government of the world, as to the concernments of mankind at leaſt, is aſcribed by *Cicero* to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no other account but only this, becauſe the ſupreme God was not ſuppoſed by them to do all things himſelf immediately in the government of the world, but to aſſign certain provinces to other inferior gods, as miniſters under him; which therefore ſharing in the oeconomy of the world, were look'd upon as co-governours thereof with him. Thus when *Balbus* in *Cicero*, to excuſe ſome ſeeming defect of providence, in the proſperities of wicked and the adverſities of good men, pretended, *Non animadvertere omnia Deos, nè reges quidem*; *That the gods did not attend to all things, as neither do kings*; *Cotta* amongſt other things replied thus; *Fac divinam mentem eſſe diſtentam, cœlum verſantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem, cur tam multos deos nihil agere & ceſſare patitur? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos otioſos deos præfecit, qui à te*, Balbe, *innumerabiles explicati ſunt? Should it be granted, that the divine Mind (or ſupreme Deity) were diſtracted with turning round the heavens, obſerving the earth, and governing the ſeas, yet why does he let ſo many other gods to do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint ſome of thoſe idle gods over human affairs, which, according to* Balbus *and the Stoicks, are innumerable?* Again, when the immortal gods are ſaid by *Cicero* to have *provided for the convenience of mankind in their firſt conſtitution*, this doubtleſs is to be underſtood according to the Platonick hypotheſis, that the gods and dæmons being firſt made by the ſupreme God, were ſet a work and employ'd by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And laſtly, as to that, which hath the greateſt difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is ſaid by *Cicero* to have been made by the providence of the gods, this muſt needs be underſtood alſo of thoſe eternal gods of *Plato*'s, according to whoſe likeneſs or image the world and man are ſaid to have been made; that is, of the trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, called by *Amelius Plato*'s three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platoniſts the firſt and ſecond and third God, and the τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, and τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, &c. *the firſt and ſecond cauſe*, &c. And it may be here obſerved, what we learn from S. *Cyril*, that ſome Pagans endeavoured to juſtify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Moſaick writings themſelves, θεοῖς ἑτέροις ὑποβοπήσαντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων φᾶναι θεὸν, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον καθ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, *they ſuſpecting*,

Tuſc. Q. L. 1. [Cap. XXX. p. 2609.]

De Div. [Lib. I. Cap. LIII. p. 3177. Tom. IX. Oper.]

Somn. Scip. [Cap. IV. p. 3977.]

De Leg. [Lib I. Cap. VII. p. 3304.]

De N. D. l. 3. [Cap. XXXIX. p. 3107. Tom. IX. Oper.]

Contra Jul. l. 1.

[1] De Divinat. Lib. II. Cap. XVIII. p. 3204. Tom. IX. Oper.

[2] Vide Somnium Scipion. Cap. III. p. 3973. Tom. X. Oper.]

ſuſpecting, that the God of the univerſe being about to make man, did there beſpeak the other gods, (τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέροις καὶ ἐν μείοσιν ἔσι, *which were ſecondary and inferior to him*) *after this manner, Let us make man according to our own image and likeneſs.* Which S. *Cyril*, and other Chriſtian writers underſtand of the trinity. Now thoſe eternal gods of *Plato*, according to whoſe image the world and man is ſaid by him to have been made, and which, (though one of them were properly called the *Demiurgus*) yet had all an influence and cauſality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already obſerved) not ſo many independent and ſelf-originated deities, but all derived from one firſt principle. And therefore *Cicero* following *Plato* in this is not to be ſuſpected upon that account, to have been an aſſertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; eſpecially ſince in ſo many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a divine monarchy.

We paſs from *M. Tullius Cicero* to *M. Terentius Varro* his equal, a man famous for polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unqueſtionably (though not the moſt eloquent, yet) the moſt learned of all the Romans, at leaſt as to antiquity. He wrote one and forty books concerning the antiquities of human and divine things; wherein he tranſcended the Roman *Pontifices* themſelves, and diſcovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he diſtinguiſhed three kinds of theology, the firſt mythical or fabulous, the ſecond phyſical or natural, and the laſt civil or popular: the firſt being moſt accommodate to the theatre or ſtage; the ſecond to the world, or the wiſer men in it; the third to cities or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable alſo to the doctrine of *Scævola*, that learned *Pontifex*, concerning three ſorts of gods, poetical, philoſophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was cenſured after this manner by *Varro*; *In eo ſunt multa contra dignitatem & naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc enim eſt, ut Deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore ſit, alius ex guttis ſanguinis natus. In hoc ut Dii furati ſint, ut adulteraverint, ut ſervierint homini. Denique, in hoc omnia Diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem, ſed etiam in contemptiſſimum hominem cadere poſſunt. That, according to the literal ſenſe, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one god being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: ſome being repreſented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the moſt contemptible and flagitious of them.* And as for the ſecond, the natural theology, which is the true, this *Varro* conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there ſhould be another theology calculated, more accommodate for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which is called civil. For he affirmed, *Multa eſſe vera, quæ vulgo ſcire non ſit utile, & quædam, quæ tametſi falſa ſint, aliter exiſtimare populum expediat; That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, ſome things, which, though falſe, yet it was expedient they ſhould be believed by them.* As *Scævola*, the Roman *Pontifex*, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know, that

Aug. de Civ. D. l. 6. c. 5. [P. 116. Tom. VII. Oper.]

Aug. Civ. D. l. 4. c. 31. [P. 87.]

that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. *Expedire igitur existimat* (saith St. *Austin* of him) *falli in religione civitates, quod dicere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipse* Varro *non dubitat.* Scævola *therefore judgeth it expedient, that cities should be deceived in their religion; which also* Varro *himself doubteth not to affirm in his books of divine things.* Wherefore this *Varro*, though disapproving the fabulous theology, yet out of a pious design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to assert, as much as he could, the civil theology, then received amongst the *Romans*, and to vindicate the fame from contempt: yet nevertheless so, as that, *Si eam civitatem novam constitueret, ex naturæ potiùs formulâ, deos & deorum nomina se fuisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri: If he were to constitute a new* Rome *himself, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology.* Now what *Varro*'s own sense was concerning God, he freely declared in those books of Divine Things; namely, that he was the great soul and mind of the whole world. Thus St. *Austin*, *Hi soli* Varroni *videntur animadvertisse quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem: These alone seem to* Varro *to have understood what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason.* So that *Varro* plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. *Austin* conceives) that he called him a soul, and not the creator of soul, or a pure and abstract mind. But as *Varro* acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, *Tellus*; in the sea, *Neptune*, and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the pagans) other particular gods, which were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with souls superior to men: *A summo circuitu cœli, usque ad circulum lunæ, æthereas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque cœlestes deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lunæ verò gyrum & nimborum cacumina aëreas esse animas, sed eas animo non oculis videri; & vocari heroas, & lares, & genios: That from the highest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars, which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are aereal souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii.* So that, according to *Varro*, the only true natural gods were, as himself also determined, *anima mundi, ac partes ejus*; first, the great soul and mind of the whole world, which comprehendeth all; and secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be worshipped *castiùs*, more *purely* and *chastly*, without images, as they were by the first Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding; *Qui primi simulachra deorum populi posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis & metum demsisse & errorem addidisse; prudenter existimans* (saith St. *Austin*) *deos facilè posse in simulachrorum stoliditate contemni: That those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add*

Civ. D. l. 4. c. 27. [P. 84]

Civ. D. l. 4. c. 31. [P. 87.]

Civ. D. l. 4. c. 9. [Cap. XXXII p. 87.]

Civ. D. l. 7. c. 6. [P. 129.]

De Civ. D. l. 4. c. 31. [P. 87.]

error to them; he wiſely judging, that the foppery of images would eaſily render their gods contemptible.

L. Annæus Seneca, the philoſopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Chriſt and his Apoſtles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheleſs plainly aſſert one ſupreme, he not only ſpeaking of him ſingularly, and by way of eminency, but alſo plainly deſcribing him as ſuch; as when he calls him *Formatorem univerſi*; *rectorem & arbitrum & cuſtodem mundi*; *ex quo ſuſpenſa ſunt omnia*; *animum ac ſpiritum univerſi*; *mundani hujus operis dominum & artificem*; *cui nomen omne convenit*; *ex quo nata ſunt omnia*; *cujus ſpiritu vivimus*; *totum ſuis partibus inditum, & ſe ſuſtinentem ſua vi*; *cujus conſilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcuſſus eat, & actus ſuos explicet*; *cujus decreto omnia fiunt*; *divinum ſpiritum per omnia maxima & minima æquali intentione diffuſum*; *Deum potentem omnium*; *Deum illum maximum potentiſſimumque, qui ipſe vehit omnia*; *qui ubique & omnibus præſto eſt*; *cæli & deorum omnium Deum*; *a quo iſta numina, quæ ſingula adoramus & colimus, ſuſpenſa ſunt:* and the like. *The framer and former of the univerſe, the governor, diſpoſer and keeper thereof*; *him, upon whom all things depend*; *the mind and ſpirit of the world*; *the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabrick*; *to whom every name belongeth*; *from whom all things ſpring*; *by whoſe ſpirit we live*; *who is in all his parts, and ſuſtaineth himſelf by his own force*; *by whoſe counſel the world is provided for, and carried on in its courſe conſtantly and uninterruptedly*; *by whoſe decree all things are done*; *the divine ſpirit, that is diffuſed through all things both great and ſmall with equal intention*; *the God, whoſe power extends to all things*; *the greateſt and moſt powerful God, who doth himſelf ſupport and uphold all things*; *who is preſent every where to all things*; *the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are ſuſpended all thoſe other divine powers, which we ſingly worſhip and adore.* Moreover, we may here obſerve from St. *Auſtin*, that this *Seneca* in a book of his againſt ſuperſtitions (that is now loſt) did not only highly extol the natural theology, but alſo plainly cenſure and condemn the civil theology then received amongſt the Romans, and that with more freedom and vehemency than *Varro* had done the fabulous or theatrical and poetical theology. Concerning a great part whereof he pronounced, that a wiſe man would obſerve ſuch things, *tanquam legibus juſſa, non tanquam diis grata*; *only as commanded by the laws* (he therein exerciſing civil obedience) *but not at all as grateful to the gods.*

Nat. Q. l. 2. c. 45. [P. 537. Tom. II. Oper.]

P. 442. Lipſ.

Civ. D. l. 6. c. 10. [P. 122.]

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of *Seneca*, yet fully agreed with him in the ſame natural theology, and ſets down this, as the generally received notion or definition of God, *Deum eſſe ſpiritum omnibus partibus immiſtum, That God is a ſpirit mingled with and diffuſed through all the parts of the world*; he from thence inferring *Epicurus* to be an Atheiſt, notwithſtanding that he verbally aſſerted gods, becauſe he denied a God according to this generally received notion, he beſtowing upon his gods a circumſcribed human form, and placing them between the worlds. And the junior *Pliny*, though he were a perſecutor of the Chriſtians, he concluding,

L. 7. c. 3.

qualecunque

qualecunque eſſet quod faterentur, pervicaciam certè & inflexibilem obſtinationem debere puniri: that whatſoever their religion were, yet notwithſtanding their ſtubbornneſs and inflexible obſtinacy ought to be puniſhed; and who compelled many of them to worſhip the images of the emperor, and to ſacrifice and pray to the ſtatues of the Pagan gods, and laſtly to blaſpheme Chriſt; yet himſelf plainly acknowledged alſo one ſupreme univerſal Numen, as may ſufficiently appear from his panegyrick oration to *Trajan*, where he is called *Deus ille, qui manifeſtus ac præſens cœlum ac ſydera inſidet*; *that God, who is preſent with, and inhabits the whole heaven and ſtars* *: himſelf making a ſolemn prayer and ſupplication to him, both in the beginning and cloſe thereof, and ſometimes ſpeaking of him therein ſingularly and in way of eminency; as in theſe words, *Occultat utrorumque ſemina Deus, & plerumque bonorum malorumque cauſæ ſub diverſâ ſpecie latent: God hideth the ſeeds of good and evil, ſo that the cauſes of each often appear diſguiſed to men.* *L. Apuleius* alſo, whoſe pretended miracles the Pagans endeavoured to confirm their religion by [t], as well as they did by thoſe of *Apollonius*, doth in ſundry places of his writings plainly aſſert one ſupreme and univerſal Numen: we ſhall only here ſet down one: *Cum ſummus deorum cuncta hæc non ſolùm cogitationum ratione conſideret; ſed prima, media, & ultima obeat; compertaque intimæ providentiæ ordinationis univerſitate & conſtantia regat: Since the higheſt of the gods does not only conſider all theſe things in his mind and cogitation, but alſo paſs through and comprehend within himſelf the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and conſtantly govern all by his occult providence.* Laſtly *Symmachus*, who was a zealous ſtickler for the reſtitution of paganiſm, declared the Pagans to worſhip one and the ſame God with the Chriſtians, but in ſeveral ways; he conceiving, that there was no neceſſity God ſhould be worſhipped by all after the ſame manner. *Æquum eſt, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari: eadem ſpectamus aſtra; commune cœlum eſt; idem nos mundus involvit; quid intereſt, qua quiſque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non poteſt perveniri ad tam grande ſecretum. We ought in reaſon to think, that it is one and the ſame thing, which all men worſhip; as we all behold the ſame ſtars, have the ſame common heaven, and are involved within the ſame world. Why may not men purſue one and the ſame thing in different ways? One path is not enough to lead men to ſo grand a ſecret.* The ſcene whereof is thus elegantly expreſſed by *Prudentius:*

Ep. 97. [Lib. X.]

* And *Mundi parens*, and *Parens hominum deorumque.*

De Philoſ. p. 278. *Colo.*

P. 306. [Epiſt. Lib. X. Epiſt. LXI. p. 442.]

Uno omnes ſub ſole ſiti, vegetamur eodem
Aëre, communis cunctis viventibus aura.
Sed quid ſit qualiſque Deus, diverſa ſecuti
Quærimus; atque viis longe diſtantibus unum
Imus ad occultum; *ſuus eſt mos cuique genti,*
Per quod iter properans eat ad tam grande profundum.

P. 285. [Contra Symmachum Lib. II. verſ. 85.]

And again afterward,

Secretum ſed grande nequit rationis opertæ

P. 308. [Verſ. 842.]

[t] Vide Auguſtin. Epiſt. CXXXVIII. p. 317. Tom. II Oper.

Quæri aliter, quàm ſi ſparſis via multiplicetur
Tramitibus, & centenos terat orbita calles,
Quæſitura Deum variata indage latentem.

And the beginning of *Prudentius* his confutation is this,

[1] *Longè aliud verum eſt. Nam multa ambago viarum*
Anfractus dubios habet, & perplexius errat.
Sola errore caret ſimplex via, neſcia flecti
In diverticulum, biviis nec pluribus anceps, &c.

We ſhall now inſtance alſo in ſome of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book *De Mundo* were not *Ariſtotle*, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from ſome paſſages thereof; as where he approves of ſacrificing to the gods, and of worſhipping heroes and dead men: as alſo becauſe *Apuleius* would not otherwiſe have tranſlated ſo much of that book, and incorporated it into his *De Mundo*. He therefore does not only commend this of *Heraclitus*, ἐκ πάντων ἕν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, *That there is one harmonious ſyſtem made out of all things, and that all things are derived from one*; but doth himſelf alſo write excellently, concerning the ſupreme God, whom he calleth τὴν τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν, *the cauſe, which containeth all things*, and τὸ τῆ κόσμῳ κυριώτατον, *the beſt and moſt excellent part of the world*; he beginning after this manner; ἀρχαῖός μέν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα, καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας· *It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and conſiſt by him; and that no nature is ſufficient to preſerve itſelf, if left alone, and devoid of the divine aſſiſtance and influence.* Where we may obſerve, that the Apuleian Latin verſion, altering the ſenſe, renders the words thus; *Vetus opinio eſt, atque in cogitationes omnium hominum penitus incidit, Deum eſſe: originis non habere auctorem; Deumque eſſe ſalutem & perſeverantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum.* So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is ſaid to be the general opinion of all mankind, *That all things are from God, and ſubſiſt by him, and that nothing at all can conſerve itſelf in being without him*; *Apuleius*, correcting the words, makes the general ſenſe of mankind to run no higher than this; *That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the ſafety and preſervation of all thoſe things, that were made by himſelf.* From whence it may be probably concluded, that *Apuleius*, who is ſaid to have been of *Plutarch*'s progeny, was infected alſo with thoſe paradoxical opinions of *Plutarch*'s, and conſequently did ſuppoſe all things not to have been made by God, nor to have depended on him (as the writer *De Mundo* affirmeth) but that there was ſomething beſides God, as namely the matter and an evil principle, uncreated and ſelf-exiſtent. Afterwards the ſame writer *De Mundo* elegantly illuſtrates, by ſimilitudes, how God by one ſimple motion and energy of his own, without any labour or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the univerſe; and how he doth

C. 6. [P. 858. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtot.]

[1] Verſ. 846.

doth συνέχειν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἁρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν, *contain the harmony and ſafety of the whole.* And laſtly he concludes, ὅπερ ἐν νηὶ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἡγεμών, τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ· *That what a pilot is to a ſhip, a charioteer to a chariot, the* Coryphæus *to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the ſame is God to the world.* There being only this difference, that whereas the government of ſome of them is toilſome and ſolicitous, the divine government and ſteerage of the world is moſt eaſy and facil; for as this writer adds, *God being himſelf immoveable, moveth all things; in the ſame manner as law, in itſelf immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and diſpoſes all things.* [P. 864]

Plutarchus Chæronenſis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two falſe opinions, the firſt of matter's being ingenit or uncreated, upon this pretence, becauſe nothing could be made out of nothing; the ſecond of a poſitive ſubſtantial evil principle, or an irrational ſoul and dæmon ſelf-exiſtent, upon this ground, becauſe [1] τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει· *There is no greater abſurdity imaginable, than that evil ſhould proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet.* In which reſpect he was before called by us a Ditheiſt. *Plutarch* was alſo a worſhipper of the many Pagan gods, himſelf being a prieſt of the Pythian *Apollo.* Notwithſtanding which, he unqueſtionably aſſerted one ſole principle of all good, the cauſe of all things (evil and matter only excepted) the framer of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him, God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth [2] ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν θεὸν, *that God doth always act the geometrician*; that is, do all things in meaſure and proportion: and again [3], πάντα καθ' ἁρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καλασκευάζεσθαι, *that all things are made by God, according to harmony*; and that ὁ θεὸς ἁρμονικὸς καλεῖται καὶ μουσικὸς, *God is called a harmoniſt and muſician*: And he hath theſe epithets given him, ὁ μέγας θεὸς, *the great God*; and ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς, *the higheſt or uppermoſt God*, and ὁ πρωτος θεὸς, *the firſt God*, and ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς, *the unmade ſelf-exiſtent God*; all the other Pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewiſe ſtyled by *Plutarch*, πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, *the ſea of pulchritude*: and his ſtanding and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently deſcribed by the ſame writer, in his book concerning the Delphick inſcription. Laſtly, *Plutarch* affirmeth, that men generally pray to this ſupreme God for whatſoever is not in their own power, ὅσα μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶν, εὐχόμεθα τὸν θεὸν διδόναι.

Dio Chryſoſtomus, a ſophiſt, *Plutarch*'s equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheleſs aſſerteth, βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλου, *that the whole world is under a kingly power or monarchy*, he calling the ſupreme God, ſometime, τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα, καὶ πρύτανιν καὶ πατέρα, *the* P. 199. [Ed. Morell.] P. 210.

[1] De Fato, p. 572. Tom II. Oper.
[2] Vide Plutarch. Sympoſ. Lib. VIII. Quæſt. II. p. 718. Tom. II. Oper.
[3] Vide eund. de Muſicâ, p. 1147. Tom. II. Oper.

the common king of gods and men, their governor and father, τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα
P. 203. θεὸν, *the God that rules over all,* τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν, *the firſt and greateſt God,* τὸν κορυφαῖον προεστῶτα τῶν ὅλων, καὶ κατευθύνοντα τὸν ἅπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, &c. *The chief preſident over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and*
P. 446. *world, as a wiſe pilot doth a ſhip,* τὸν τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἡγεμόνα οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεσπότην οὐσίας, *the ruler of the whole heaven, and lord of the whole eſſence;* and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepſis in the
P. 201. minds of men concerning him, περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινῇ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους· ὁμοίως μὲν Ἑλλένων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, ἀναγκαία καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λογικῷ γιγνομένη κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνευ θνητοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ μυσταγωγοῦ· *Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but eſpecially of that ſupreme ruler over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher.* The meaning whereof is this, that men are naturally poſſeſſed with a perſuaſion, that there is one God, the ſupreme governor of the whole world, and that there are alſo below him, but above men, many other intellectual beings, which theſe Pagans called gods.

That *Galen* was no Atheiſt, and what his religion was, may plainly appear from this one paſſage out of his third book *De Uſu Partium*, to omit many
P. 402. [Cap. X. Tom. II. Oper. edit. Baſil.] others; Ἀλλὰ γαρ ἴσως εἰ ἐπίπλεον τοιούτων μνημονεύοιμι βοσκημάτων, οἱ σωφρονοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἄν μοι μέμψοιντο, καὶ μιαίνειν φαῖεν ἱερὸν λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς ὕμνον ἀληθινὸν συντίθημι, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν ὄντως εὐσέβειαν· οὐχὶ εἰ ταύρων ἑκατόμβας αὐτῷ παμπόλλους καταθύσαιμι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυρία μύρα θυμάσαιμι καὶ κασίας, ἀλλ' εἰ γνοίην μὲν αὐτὸς πρῶτος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξηγησαίμην, οἷος μέν ἐστι τὴν σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὁποῖος δὲ τὴν χρηστότητα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλειν κοσμεῖν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον κόσμον καὶ μηδενὶ φθονεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελεωτάτης χρηστότητός ἐγὼ δεῖγμα τίθεμαι, ταύτῃ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὑμνείσθω· τὸ δ' ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κοσμηθείη, πᾶν ἐξευρεῖν, ἄκρας σοφίας· τὸ δὲ καὶ δρᾶσαι πανθ' ὅσα προείλετο, δυνάμεως ἀηττήτου. *Should I any longer inſiſt upon ſuch brutiſh perſons as thoſe, the wiſe and ſober might juſtly condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which I compoſe as a true hymn to the praiſe of him that made us; I conceiving true piety and religion towards God to conſiſt in this, not that I ſhould ſacrifice many hecatombs, or burn much incenſe to him, but that I ſhould myſelf firſt acknowledge, and then declare to others, how great his wiſdom is, how great his power, and how great his goodneſs. For that he would adorn the whole world after this manner, envying to nothing that good, which it was capable of, I conclude to be a demonſtration of moſt abſolute goodneſs, and thus let him be praiſed by us as good. And that he was able to find out, how all things might be adorned after the beſt manner, is a ſign of the greateſt wiſdom in him. And laſtly, to be able to effect and bring to paſs all thoſe things, which he had thus decreed, argues an inſuperable power.*

Maximus Tyrius, in the cloſe of his firſt diſſertation, gives us this ſhort repreſentation of his own Theology; Βούλομαι δέ σοι δεῖξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρα εἰκόνι. Ἐννόει μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἐῤῥωμένην πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου

ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἑκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ Ἅλυν ποταμὸν, οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιῶτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἠιόνας, ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν τὸν μὲν τὴν δ' ἔνερθεν· βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ὥσπερ νόμον παρέχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις, σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς, πολλοὺς δε ἀφανεῖς· τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἰλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστάτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεστίους· τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι τούτων καταδεεστέρους· διαδοχὴν ὁρᾶς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς. *I will now more plainly declare my ſenſe by this ſimilitude: Imagine in your mind a great and powerful kingdom or principality, in which all the reſt freely and with one conſent conſpire to direct their actions, agreeably to the will and command of one ſupreme king, the oldeſt and the beſt: and then ſuppoſe the bounds and limits of this empire not to be the river* Halys, *nor the* Helleſpont, *nor the* Meotian *lake, nor the ſhores of the ocean; but heaven above, and the earth beneath. Here then let that great king ſit immoveable, preſcribing laws to all his ſubjects, in which conſiſts their ſafety and ſecurity: the conſorts of his empire being many, both viſible and inviſible gods; ſome of which, that are neareſt to him, and immediately attending on him, are in the higheſt royal dignity, feaſting as it were at the ſame table with him: others again are their miniſters and attendants; and a third ſort, inferior to them both. And thus you ſee, how the order and chain of this government deſcends down by ſteps and degrees, from the ſupreme God to the earth and men.* In which reſemblance, we have a plain acknowledgement of one ſupreme God, the monarch of the whole world, and three ſubordinate ranks of inferior gods, as his miniſters, in the government of the world; whom that writer there alſo calls, θεοὺς θεοῦ παῖδας καὶ φίλους, *gods, the ſons and friends of God.*

Ariſtides the famous Adrianean ſophiſt and orator, in his firſt oration or hymn vowed to *Jupiter*, after he had eſcaped a great tempeſt, is ſo full to the purpoſe, that nothing can be more: he, after his proem, beginning thus; Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διός ἐστιν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, καὶ ποταμὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανὸς· καὶ ὅσα τούτων μεταξὺ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταῦτα· καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα εἰς ὄψιν ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ νοήσει λαβεῖν. Ἐποίησε δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἄντροις τραφεὶς· οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν· οὐτ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν, οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσε Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσῃ· οὐδ' ἔστι πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διός· οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ἢ υἱεῖς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιτ' ἄν, καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιούντων· ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρώτος τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος, καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων· αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος· ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀλλ' ἦντε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεὶ, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔφυσε, καὶ γάμου οὐδεν προσεδεήθη εἰς αὐτὴν, οὕτως ἔτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε, καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη ἑτέρου εἰς τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον πάντα εἶναι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνον εἰπεῖν· Οὔτε γὰρ χρόνος ἦν πω τότε ὅτε μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν· δημιουργοῦ γὰρ ἔργον οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον· οὕτω δὴ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἁπάντων Ζεὺς καὶ ἐκ Διὸς πάντα, ἅτε δὲ ὢν χρόνου τε κρείττων, καὶ οὐδένα ἔχων τὸν ἀντικόψοντα, αὐτός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὕτω ταχὺ πάντα ἐποίησε, ἐποίησε δὲ ὧδε, &c. Jupiter *made all things, and all things whatſoever exiſt are the works of* Jupiter; *rivers, and earth, and ſea, and heaven, and what are between theſe, and gods and men and all animals, whatſoever is perceivable either by*

How God was ſaid to be ſelf made: See *p.* 405, and 406.

by ſenſe or by the mind. But Jupiter *firſt of all made himſelf ; for he was not educated in the flowery and odoriferous caves of* Crete, *neither was* Saturn *ever about to devour him, nor inſtead of him did he ſwallow down a ſtone. For* Jupiter *was never in danger, nor will he be ever in danger of any thing. Neither is there any thing older than* Jupiter, *no more than there are ſons older than their parents, or works than their opificers. But he is the firſt and the oldeſt, and the prince of all things, he being made from himſelf ; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced* Minerva *from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, ſo before this did he produce himſelf from himſelf, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time ; ſince there was not then any time when there was nothing elſe beſides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was* Jupiter *the beginning of all things, and all things were from* Jupiter, *who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world.* And again, ὡς δὲ καὶ θεῶν ὅσα φῦλα ἀπορρέοντα τῆς Διὸς τοῦ πάντων παλαιὸς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἔχει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὁμήρου σειρὰν, ἅπαντα εἰς αὐτὸν διήρτηται, καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήπται· ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἀνάγκην δύο τοῦτω συναγωγοτάτω καὶ ἰσχυροτάτω ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγένησεν, ὅπως αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα συνέχοιεν, &c. ἐποίει θεοὺς μὲν, ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητὰς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτάς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας, &c. πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ Διὸς μεστὰ, καὶ ἀπάντων θεῶν εὐεργεσίαι, Διὸς εἰσὶν ἔργον, &c. *All the ſeveral kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from* Jupiter ; *and, according to* Homer's *chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongſt the firſt, produced love and neceſſity, two the moſt powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cohere. He made gods to be the curators of men, and he made men to be the worſhippers and ſervers of thoſe gods. All things are every where full of* Jupiter, *and the benefits of all the other gods are his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had preſcribed them.*

It is certain, that all the latter philoſophers after Chriſtianity, whether Platoniſts or Peripateticks, though for the moſt part they aſſerted the eternity of the world, yet univerally agreed in the acknowledgment of one ſupreme Deity, the cauſe of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as *Numenius*, *Plotinus*, *Amelius*, *Porphyrius*, *Proclus*, *Damaſcius* and others, held alſo a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, ſo had ſome of thoſe philoſophers excellent ſpeculations concerning the Deity, as particularly *Plotinus* ; who notwithſtanding that he derived matter and all things from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book inſcribed againſt the Gnoſticks : χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, ἵνα γὰρ ἄπω ἄριστος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀρίστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεοὺς, τοὺς τε ἐν τῷ δὲ οὐλας κακεῖ βλέπουσας· πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεοὺς, ὑφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη, τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα·

En. 2. *Lib.* 9. *c.* 9. [P. 207.]

καὶ

καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν, τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένους. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἓν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτὸς, τοῦτό ἐστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων ὅς ἐστι, πολλὰς ποιῇ, πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅδε δι' ἐκεῖνον ἐστὶ κἀκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ πᾶς, καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος· *Every man ought to endeavour with all his might, to become as good as may be, but yet not to think himſelf to be the only thing that is good, but that there are alſo other good men in the world, and good dæmons, but much more gods; who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet look up to that ſuperior; and moſt of all, the prince of this univerſe, that moſt happy ſoul. From whence he ought to aſcend yet higher, and to praiſe thoſe intelligible gods, but above all that great king and monarch; declaring his greatneſs and majeſty by the multitude of gods, which are under him. For this is not the part of them, who know the power of god, to contract all into one, but to ſhew forth all that divinity, which himſelf hath diſplayed, who remaining one, makes many depending on him; which are by him and from him. For this whole world is by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as alſo doth every one of the gods in it.* And *Themiſtius*, the Peripatetick, (who was ſo far from being a Chriſtian, that, as *Petavius* probably conjectures, he perſtringes our Saviour Chriſt under the name of *Empedocles*, for making himſelf a God) doth not only affirm, that one and the ſame ſupreme God was worſhipped by Pagans, and the Chriſtians, and all nations, though in different manners; but alſo, that God was delighted with this variety of religions: ταύτῃ νόμιζε γάννυσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τῶν παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει πολιτεύεσθαι, ἄλλως Ἕλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους, καὶ αὐτὸς δ' αὐτὸς Σύρους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἤδη κατακεκερμάτισται εἰς μικρά· *The author and prince of the univerſe ſeems to be delighted with this variety of worſhip; he would have the Syrians worſhip him one way, the Greeks another, and the Egyptians another; neither do the Syrians* (or Chriſtians) *themſelves all agree, they being ſubdivided into many ſects.* *Orat.* 12. [P. 156. edit. Harduini.]

We ſhall conclude therefore with this full teſtimony of St. *Cyril*, in his firſt book againſt *Julian*; ἅπασιν ἐναργὲς, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφεῖν εἰωθόσιν, ἕνα μὲν ἐδόκει Θεὸν εἶναι συνωμολογεῖν, τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸν, καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ, νοητόν τε καὶ αἰθητόν· *It is manifeſt to all, that amongſt thoſe, who philoſophize in the Greek way, it is univerſally acknowledged, that there is one God, the maker of the univerſe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and ſenſible.* P. 23.

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philoſophers and learned men only, amongſt the Pagans, but even of the vulgar alſo. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the moſt ſottiſh vulgar amongſt them, who, as they little conſidered their religion, ſo probably did they not underſtand that myſtery of the Pagan theology (hereafter to be declared) that many of their gods were nothing but ſeveral names and notions of one ſupreme Deity, according to its various manifeſtations and effects; but becauſe, as we conceive, this tradition of one ſupreme God did run cur-

rent amongſt the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at leaſt, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the Poets and Mythologiſts, who were the chief inſtructors of them. Thus *Ariſtotle* in his Politicks, writing of muſick, judgeth of mens opinions concerning the gods from the poets, σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ἐκ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς· *We may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods, from hence, becauſe the poets never bring in* Jupiter *ſinging or playing upon an inſtrument.* Now we have already proved from ſundry teſtimonies of the poets, that (however they were depravers of the Pagan religion, yet) they kept up this traditionof one ſupreme Deity, one king and father of gods: to which teſtimonies many more might have been added, as of *Seneca* the tragedian, *Statius*, *Lucan*, *Silius Italicus*, *Perſius*, and *Martial*, but that we then declined them, to avoid tediouſneſs. Wherefore we ſhall here content ourſelves only to ſet down this affirmation of *Dio Chryſoſtomus*, concerning the theology of the poets; ἅτοι δ' ἂν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν πατέρα καλοῦσι συλλήβδην ἅπαντα τὰ λογικὰ γένη, καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλέα· οἷς πειθόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι Διὸς βασιλέως ἱδρύονται βωμούς· καὶ δὴ καὶ πατέρα αὐτὸν ἐκ ὀκνοῦσι προσαγορεύειν ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς· *All the poets call the firſt and greateſt God, the father, univerſally, of all the rational kind; as alſo the king thereof. Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erect altars to* Jupiter *king, and ſtick not to call him father in their devotions.*

L. 8. *c.* 5. [P. 607. Tom. III. Oper.]

Orat. 36. *p.* 447.

Moreover, *Ariſtotle* himſelf hath recorded this in his *Politicks* [1]; πάντες λέγουσι θεὸς βασιλεύεσθαι, *That all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power*; or, *that there is one ſupreme king and monarch over the gods.* And *Maximus Tyrius* declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole Pagan world, univerſally agreed in this, that there was one ſupreme God, the father of all the other gods: Εἰ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν τεχνῶν τύτων, κελεύεις ἅπαντας ἀθρόως διὰ ψηφίσματος ἑνὸς ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ τῦ θεῦ, οἴει ἄλλο μὲν ἂν τὸν γραφέα εἰπεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν, καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄλλο; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία τὸν Σκύθην, οὐδὲ τὸν Ἕλληνα, οὐδὲ τὸν Πέρσην, ἢ τὸν Ὑπερβόρειον· ἀλλὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ ταὐτὰ ψηφιζομένυς τοὺς ἀνθρώπυς, πάντας δὲ πᾶσι διαφερομένυς· οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ κακὸν ὅλοιον, οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐ τὸ καλὸν· νόμος μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένος γένει ὁμολογεῖ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλις πόλει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἶκος οἴκῳ, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· ἐν τοσύτῳ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ, ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον νόμου καὶ λόγου, ὅτι ΘΕΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΗΡ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ· ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλλην λέγει καὶ ἡ Βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἠπειρώτης καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος· *If there were a meeting called of all theſe ſeveral trades and profeſſions, a painter, a ſtatuary, a poet, and a philoſopher, and all of them were required to declare their ſenſe concerning God, do you think, that the painter would ſay one thing, the ſtatuary another, the poet another, and the philoſopher another? No nor the Scythian neither,*

Diſſ. 1. *p.* 4, 5.

[1] Lib. IV. Cap. XV. p. 510. Tom. III. Oper.

neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men ſpeaking very diſcordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The ſame thing is not good to all nor evil, honeſt nor diſhoneſt. For law and juſtice itſelf are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but alſo not one city with another city, nor one houſe with another houſe, nor one man with another man, nor laſtly any one man with himſelf. Nevertheleſs, in this ſo great war, contention, and diſcord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, That THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the ſons of God, co-reigners together with God. Theſe things both the Greek and the Barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent, and of the ſea-coaſt, both the wiſe and the unwiſe. Nothing can be more full than this teſtimony of *Maximus Tyrius*, that the generality of the Pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate, as wiſe and learned, did agree in this, that there was one ſupreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the ſame purpoſe was that other teſtimony before cited out of *Dio Chryſoſtomus*, περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλε φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνε γένες, ὁμοίως δὲ Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, &c. *That concerning the nature of the gods in general, but eſpecially concerning that prince of all things, there was one agreeing perſuaſion in the minds of all mankind, as well Barbarians as Greeks.* Where *Dio* plainly intimates alſo, that there was a more univerſal conſent of nations in the belief of one God, than of many gods.

Orat. 12. *p.* 201.

It hath been already obſerved, that the ſeveral Pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one ſupreme God. For as the Greeks called him *Zeus* or *Zen*, the Latins *Jupiter* or *Jovis*, ſo did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, *Hammon*. Which *Hammon* therefore was called by the Greeks the *Zeus* of the Africans, and by the Latins their *Jupiter*. Whence is that in *Cicero*'s *De natura Deorum*[1], *Jovis Capitolini nobis alia ſpecies, alia Afris* Ammonis Jovis, *the form of the Capitoline* Jupiter *with us Romans is different from that of* Jupiter Ammon *with the Africans*. The name of the Scythian *Jupiter* alſo, as *Herodotus* tells us, was *Pappæus* or father. The *Perſians* likewiſe had their Ζεὺς πατρῷος, as *Xenophon* ſtyles him, their country-*Zeus* or *Jupiter* (namely *Mithras* or *Oromaſdes*) who in the ſame *Xenophon* is diſtinguiſhed from the ſun, and called in *Cyrus* his proclamation in the Scripture, *The Lord God of heaven, who had given him all the kingdoms of the earth.* Thus the Babylonian *Bel* is declared by *Beroſus* (a prieſt of his) to have been that God, who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that *Baal* (which is the ſame with *Bel*, and ſignifies Lord) was firſt amongſt the Phenicians alſo a name for the ſupreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, ſometimes called *Beel ſamen*, *The Lord of heaven*. As likewiſe that *Molech*, which ſignifies king, was, amongſt the Ammonites, *the king of their gods*; and that *Marnas* (the chief God of the Gazites, who were Philiſtines) and ſignifies *the Lord of men*, was that from whence the Cretians derived their *Jupiter*, called *the Father of gods and men*.

[1] Lib. 1. Cap. XXIX. p. 2923. Tom. IX. Oper.

Origen[1] indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Chriſtians to call the ſupreme God by any of thoſe Pagan names, and probably for theſe reaſons, becauſe thoſe names were then frequently beſtowed upon idols, and becauſe they were contaminated and defiled by abſurd and impure fables. Nevertheleſs, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans really to have meant τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, *the God over all*, by thoſe ſeveral names: which yet *Lactantius Firmianus* would by no means allow of as to the Roman *Jupiter*, worſhipped in the Capitol, he endeavouring to confute it after this manner: *Vana eſt perſuaſio eorum, qui nomen* Jovis *ſummo Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores ſuos hac excuſatione defendere; qui victi de uno Deo, cum id negare non poſſunt, ipſum colere affirmant, verum hoc ſibi placere ut* Jupiter *nominetur, quo quid abſurdius?* Jupiter *enim ſine contubernio conjugis filiæque, coli non ſolet. Unde quid ſit apparet, nec fas eſt id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec* Minerva *eſt ulla nec* Juno. *It is a vain perſuaſion of thoſe, who would give the name of* Jupiter *to the ſupreme God. For ſome are wont thus to excuſe their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, ſo as that they could not contradict it, by ſaying, that themſelves worſhipped him, he being called by them* Jupiter: *than which, what can be more abſurd? ſince* Jupiter *is not worſhipped without the partnerſhip of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this* Jupiter *is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any* Minerva *nor* Juno. The ground of which argumentation of *Lactantius* was this, becauſe the great Capitoline temple of Jupiter had three *Sacella* or leſſer chapels in it, all contained under one roof, *Jupiter*'s in the middle, *Minerva*'s on the right hand, and *Juno*'s on the left; according to that of the poet;

L. 1. c. 11. [P. 76.]

Trina in Tarpeio fulgent conſortia templo.

Which *Juno*, according to the poetick theology, is ſaid to be the wife of *Jupiter*, and *Minerva* his daughter, begotten not upon *Juno*, but from his own brain. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mixture of the mythical or poetical theology, together with the natural, as almoſt every where elſe there was, to make up that civil theology of the Pagans. But here (according to the more recondit and arcane doctrine of the Pagans) theſe three Capitoline gods, *Jupiter*, *Minerva*, and *Juno*, as well as ſome others, may be underſtood to have been nothing elſe but ſeveral names and notions of one ſupreme Deity, according to its ſeveral attributes and manifeſtations; *Jupiter* ſignifying the divine power and ſovereignty, as it were ſeated and enthroned in the heavens; *Minerva*, the divine wiſdom and underſtanding; and *Juno* the ſame Deity, acting in theſe lower parts of the world. Unleſs we would rather, with *Macrobius*[2], phyſiologize them all three, and make *Minerva* to be the higher heaven, *Jupiter* the middle æther, and *Juno* the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one God, as acting differently in theſe three regions of the world. Which yet ſeems not ſo congruous, becauſe it would place *Minerva* above *Jupiter*.

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[1] Contra Celſum, Lib. I. p. 18. [2] Saturnal. Lib. III. Cap IV. p. 391, 392.

Nevertheleſs it may juſtly be ſuſpected, as *G. I. Voſſius* [1] hath already obſerved, that there was yet ſome higher and more ſacred myſtery in this Capitoline trinity, aimed at; namely, a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes. For theſe three Roman or Capitoline gods were ſaid to have been firſt brought into *Italy* out of *Phrygia* by the Trojans, but before that into *Phrygia* by *Dardanus*, out of the Samothracian iſland; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe *Euſebius*. And as theſe were called by the Latins *Dii Penates*, which *Macrobius* thus interprets [2], *Dii per quos penitus ſpiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi poſſidemus*, that is, *the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being*; but *Varro* in *Arnobius* [3], *Dii, qui ſunt intrinſecus, atque in intimis penetralibus cæli, the gods, who are in the moſt inward receſſes of heaven*: ſo were they called by the Samothracians Κάβειροι, or *Cabiri*, that is, as *Varro* [4] rightly interprets the word Θεοὶ δυναλοὶ, or *divi potes, the powerful and mighty gods*. Which *Cabiri* being plainly the Hebrew כבירים, gives juſt occaſion to ſuſpect, that this ancient tradition of three divine hypoſtaſes (unqueſtionably entertained by *Orpheus*, *Pythagoras*, and *Plato* amongſt the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Perſians) ſprung originally from the Hebrews; the firſt of theſe divine hypoſtaſes, called *Jove*, being the fountain of the godhead; and the ſecond of them, called by the Latins *Minerva*, (which, as *Varro* [5] interprets it, was, that wherein *ideæ & exempla rerum, the ideas and firſt exemplars or patterns of things were contained*) fitly expreſſing the divine Logos; and the third *Juno*, called *amor ac delicium* Jovis, well enough anſwering (as *Voſſius* thinks) to the divine Spirit. *De Theol. Gen. L. 8. c. 12.*

But *Lactantius* hath yet another objection againſt the Roman *Jupiter*'s being the ſupreme God; *Quid? quod hujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim ſed humanam exprimit?* Jovem *enim* Junonemque *à Juvando eſſe dictos* Cicero *interpretatur. Et* Jupiter *quaſi Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minimè convenit, quia juvare hominis eſt, &c. Nemo ſic Deum precatur, ut ſe adjuvet, ſed ut ſervet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, ſed etiam impius eſt, qui nomine* Jovis *virtutem ſummæ poteſtatis imminuit. What if we add, that the propriety of this word* Jupiter *does not expreſs a divine, but only a human force?* Cicero *deriving both* Jove *and* Juno *alike* à juvando, *that is, from helping: for* Juvans Pater, *or a helping father, is not a good deſcription of God; foraſmuch as it properly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to ſave him. Nor is a father ſaid to help his ſon, whom he was the begetter of,* &c. *Wherefore he is not only unskilful, but impious alſo, who, by the name of* Jove *or* Jupiter, *diminiſhes the power of the ſupreme God.* But as this of *Lactantius* ſeems otherwiſe weak enough; ſo is the foundation of it abſolutely ruinous, the true etymon of *Jupiter* (though *Cicero* knew not ſo much) being without peradventure, not *Juvans Pater*, but *Jovis pater*, Jove *the father of gods and men*; which *Jovis* is the very *Hebrew Tetragrammaton* (however theſe Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination. P. 63.

[1] De Theolog. Gentili, Lib. VIII. Cap. XII. p. 750, 751.
[2] Saturnal. Lib. III. Cap. IV. p. 391.
[3] Adverſ. Gentes, Lib. III. p. 155.
[4] De Linguâ Latin. Lib. IV. p. 66.
[5] Apud Auguſtinum de Civitate Dei, Lib. VII. Cap. XXVIII. p. 141. Tom. VII. Oper.

nation. Wherefore, as there could be no impiety at all in calling the ſupreme God *Jove* or *Jovis*, it being that very name, which God himſelf choſe to be called by; ſo neither is there any reaſon, why the Latins ſhould not as well mean the ſupreme God thereby, as the Greeks did unqueſtionably by *Zeus*, which will be proved afterwards from irrefragable authority.

Eſpecially if we conſider, that the Roman vulgar commonly beſtowed theſe two epithets upon that Capitoline *Jupiter* (that is, not the ſenſleſs ſtatue, but that God, who was there worſhipped in a material ſtatue) of *Optimus* and *Maximus*, the beſt and the greateſt; they thereby ſignifying him to be a being infinitely good and powerful. Thus *Cicero* in his *De Nat. Deorum* [1], Jupiter *à poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, à majoribus autem noſtris optimus maximus. That ſame* Jupiter, *who is by the poets ſtyled the father of gods and men, is by our anceſtors called the beſt, the greateſt.* And in his *Orat. pro S. Roſcio* [2], Jupiter *optimus maximus, cujus nutu & arbitrio cœlum, terra, mariaque reguntur*; Jupiter *the beſt, the greateſt, by whoſe beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the ſeas are governed.* As alſo the junior *Pliny*, in his panegyrick oration, *parens hominum deorumque, optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine colitur*; *The father of men and gods is worſhipped under the name, firſt of the beſt, and then of the greateſt.* Moreover *Servius Honoratus* informs us, that the *Pontifices* in their publick ſacrifices were wont to addreſs themſelves to *Jupiter* in this form of words; *Omnipotens* Jupiter, *ſeu quo alio nomine appellari volueris*; *Omnipotent* Jupiter, *or by what other name ſoever thou pleaſeſt to be called.* From whence it is plain, that the Romans, under the name of *Jupiter*, worſhipped the omnipotent God. And, according to *Seneca*, the ancient Hetrurians, who are by him diſtinguiſhed from philoſophers, as a kind of illiterate ſuperſtitious perſons (in theſe words, *Hæc adhuc Etruſcis & philoſophis communia ſunt, in illo diſſentiunt*) had this very ſame notion anſwering to the word *Jupiter*, namely, of the ſupreme monarch of the univerſe. For firſt he ſets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner; *Fulmina dicunt à* Jove *mitti, & tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) monet & placata eſt, & ipſius conſilio* Jovis *mittitur. Secundam quidem mittit* Jupiter, *ſed ex conſilii ſententiâ*; *duodecim enim deos advocat, &c. Tertiam idem* Jupiter *mittit, ſed adhibitis in conſilium diis, quos ſuperiores & involutos vocant, quæ vaſtat, &c. The Hetrurians ſay, that the thunderbolts are ſent from* Jupiter, *and that there are three kinds of them*; *the firſt gentle and monitory, and ſent by* Jupiter *alone*; *the ſecond ſent by* Jupiter, *but not without the counſel and conſent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth ſome good, but not without harm alſo*; *the third ſent by* Jupiter *likewiſe, but not before he hath called a council of all the ſuperior gods: and this utterly waſtes and deſtroys both private and publick ſtates.* And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only ſo as to impreſs an awe upon men, and to ſignify, that *Jupiter* himſelf intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partnerſhip with others, and when the neceſſity of the caſe required. Adding in the laſt place, *Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etruſci)* Jovem *qualem in Capitolio, & in cæteris ædibus*

Nat. Q. 1. *c.* 41. [P. 536. Tom. I. Oper.]

[1] Lib. II. Cap. XXV. p. 2992. Tom. IX. Oper. [2] Cap. XLV. p. 948. Tom. III. Oper.

ædibus colimus, mittere manu ſua fulmina; ſed eundem, quem nos, Jovem *intelligunt, cuſtodem rectoremque univerſi, animum ac ſpiritum, mundani hujus operis dominum & artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Neither did theſe Hetrurians believe, that ſuch a* Jupiter, *as we worſhip in the Capitol and in the other temples, did fling thunderbolts with his own hands, but they underſtood the very ſame* Jupiter, *that we now do, the keeper and governour of the univerſe, the mind and ſpirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabrick, to whom every name belongeth.* And laſtly, that the vulgar Romans afterwards, about the beginning of Chriſtianity, had the ſame notion of *Jupiter*, as the ſupreme God, evidently appears from what *Tertullian* hath recorded in his book *ad Scapulam* [1], that when *Marcus Aurelius* in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Chriſtian ſoldiers made to God, had obtained refreſhing ſhowers from heaven in a great drought; *Tunc populus adclamans* JOVI *DEO DEORUM, QUI SOLUS POTENS EST, in* Jovis *nomine Deo noſtro teſtimonium reddidit: That then the people with one conſent crying out, thanks be to* JUPITER *THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of* Jove *or* Jupiter *give teſtimony to our God.* Where, by the way we ſee alſo, that *Tertullian* was not ſo nice as *Lactantius*, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their *Jupiter* to have meant the true God.

As nothing is more frequent with Pagan writers, than to ſpeak of God ſingularly, they ſignifying thereby the one ſupreme Deity, ſo that the ſame was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans alſo, in their ordinary diſcourſe and common ſpeech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. *Tertullian* in his book *de Teſtimonio Animæ* [2], and his *Apologet.* [3] inſtanceth in ſeveral of theſe forms of ſpeech then vulgarly uſed by the Pagans; as *Deus videt, Deo commendo, Deus reddet, Deus inter nos judicabit, Quod Deus vult, Si Deus voluerit, Quod Deus dederit, Si Deus dederit,* and the like. Thus alſo *Minutius Felix* [4], *Cum ad cælum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quàm Deum dicunt, Et magnus eſt, & Deus verus eſt,* &c. *vulgi iſte naturalis ſermo, an Chriſtiani confitentis oratio? When they ſtretch out their hands to heaven, they mention only God; and theſe forms of ſpeech, He is great, and God is true; and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar) are they not a plain confeſſion of Chriſtianity?* And laſtly *Lactantius* [5], *Cùm jurant, & cum optant, & cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, ſed Deum nominant; adeò ipſa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit: When they ſwear, and when they wiſh, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by a ſecret force of nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether they will or no.* And again, *Ad Deum confugiunt, à Deo petitur auxilium, Deus ut ſubveniat oratur. Et ſi quis ad extremam mendicandi neceſſitatem redactus, victum precibus expoſcit, Deum ſolum obteſtatur, & per ejus divinum atque unicum numen hominum ſibi miſericordiam quærit: They fly to God, aid is deſired of God, they pray that God would help them; and when any one is reduced to extremeſt neceſſity, he*

[1] Lib. IV.
[2] Cap. II. p. 35. Oper. edit. Venet.
[3] Cap. XVII. p. 175.
[4] In Octavio, Cap. XVIII. p. 171. edit. Gronov.
[5] Inſtitut. Divin. Lib. II. Cap. I. p. 159.

he begs for God's ſake, and by his divine power alone implores the mercy of men. Which ſame thing is fully confirmed alſo by *Proclus* upon *Plato's Timæus*; where he obſerves, that the one ſupreme God was more univerſally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods:

P. 286. τάχα δὲ ϗ τοῦτο ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι δὴ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἑαυταῖς προσεχεστέρων θᾶττον ἐπιλανθάνονται, τῶν δὲ ὑπερτέρων ἀρχῶν μᾶλλον μνημονεύουσι. Δρῶσι γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτὰς δι' ὑπεροχὴν δυνάμεως, καὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐταῖς παρεῖναι δι' ἐνέργειαν· ὃ δὴ ϗ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν γίγνεται τὴν ἡμετέραν· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν γῇ κειμένων οὐχ ὁρῶντες, ὁμῶς αὐτὴν ὁρᾶν δοκοῦμεν τὴν ἁπλανῆ, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας, διότι καταλάμπουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ὄψιν τῷ ἑαυτῶν φωτί. Μᾶλλον οὖν καὶ τὸ ὅμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, λήθην ἴσχει καὶ ἀφορασίαν τῶν προσεχεστέρων, ἢ τῶν ἀνωτέρου καὶ θειοτέρου ἀρχῶν· οὕτω τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν πᾶσαι θρησκείαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωροῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ θεὸν πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἐπικαλοῦσι βοηθόν· θεοὺς δὲ εἶναι μετ' αὐτὴν, καὶ πρόνοιαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ, οὐ πᾶσαι πιστεύουσι· ἐναργέστριον γὰρ αὐταῖς καταφαίνεται τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλήθους· *And perhaps you may affirm, that ſouls do ſooner loſe their knowledge of thoſe things, which are lower and nearer to them, but retain a ſtronger remembrance of thoſe higher principles; becauſe theſe do act more vigorouſly upon them, by reaſon of the tranſcendency of their power, and by their energy ſeem to be preſent with them. And the ſame thing happens as to our bodily ſight; for though there be many things here upon earth, which none of us ſee, yet every one obſerves that higheſt ſphere, and takes notice of the fixed ſtars in it, becauſe theſe ſtrongly radiate with their light upon our eyes. In like manner does the eye of our ſoul ſooner loſe the ſight and remembrance of the lower than of the higher and diviner principles. And thus all religions and ſects acknowledge that one higheſt principle of all, and men every where call upon God for their helper; but that there are gods, after and below that higheſt principle, and that there is a certain providence deſcending down from theſe upon the univerſe, all ſects do not believe; the reaſon whereof is, becauſe the one or unity appears more clearly and plainly to them, than the many or a multitude.*

Moreover, we learn from *Arrianus* his *Epictetus*, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now ſo long in uſe in the Chriſtian church, *Kyrie Eleeſon*, *Lord have mercy upon us*, was anciently part of the Pagans litany to the ſupreme God, either amongſt the Greeks, or the Latins, or both, τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι, (ſaith *Epictetus*) δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ, Κύριε ἐλέησον, *invoking God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord have mercy upon us.* Now this *Epictetus* lived in the times of *Adrian* the emperor; and that this paſſage of his is to be underſtood of Pagans, and not of Chriſtians, is undeniably manifeſt from the context, he there ſpeaking of thoſe, who uſed *auguria* or divination by birds. Moreover, in the writings of the Greekiſh Pagans, the ſupreme God is often called Κύριος, or *Lord.* For, not to urge that paſſage of the τέλειος λόγος, or *Aſclepian Dialogue*, cited by *Lactantius* [1], where we read of ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάντων ποιητὴς, *the Lord and maker of all*, *Menander* in *Juſtin Martyr* [2] ſtyleth the ſupreme God, τὸν ὄντα πάντων Κύριον γενικώτατον, *the moſt univerſal Lord of all.* And *Oſiris* in *Plutarch* is called ἀπάντων Κύριος, *the Lord of all things.* And this is alſo done abſolutely, and without any adjection, and that not only by the LXX, and Chriſtians, but alſo by Pagan writers. Thus in *Plutarch's de Iſide & Oſiride*, we read of τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ, καὶ νοητοῦ

L. 2. c. 7. [P. 186.]

[1] Inſtit. Div. Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 419. [2] De Monarch. Dei, p. 108.

νοητῦ γνῶσις, *The knowledge of the firſt Intelligible, and the Lord*, that is, of the ſupreme God. And *Oromaſdes* is called ὁ Κύριος, *the Lord*, in *Plutarch*'s life of *Alexander*; as Νοῦς alſo, Κύριος, by *Ariſtotle*, that is, *the ſupreme ruler over all*. Thus likewiſe *Plato* in his ſixth epiſtle *ad Hermiam, &c.* ſtyles his firſt divine hypoſtaſis, or the abſolutely ſupreme Deity, τὸν ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίαν πατέρα Κύριον, *The father of the prince, and cauſe of the world*, (that is, of the eternal Intellect) *the LORD*. Again, *Jamblichus* writeth thus of the ſupreme God, δεῖν ὁμολογεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν, *It is confeſſed, that every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord*, that is, the ſupreme God; which words are afterwards repeated in him alſo, *p.* 129. but depraved in the printed copy thus, δεῖν δὲ ὁμολογεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου τ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Laſtly, *Clemens Alexandrinus* [1] tells us, that the ſupreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diverſly, namely, ἤτοι Ἕν, ἢ τ' Ἀγαθὸν, ἢ Νοῦν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ Ὄν, ἢ Πατέρα, ἢ Θεὸν, ἢ Δημιουργὸν, ἢ Κύριον, *Either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very* Ens, *or the Father, or the* Demiurgus, *or the Lord*. Wherefore, we conclude, that this *Kyrie Eleeſon*, or *Domine Miſerere*, in *Arrianus*, was a Pagan litany or ſupplication to the ſupreme God. Though from *Mauritius* the emperor's *Stratagemata* it appears, that in his time a *Kyrie Eleeſon* was wont to be ſung alſo by the Chriſtian armies before battel.

De An. l. 1. c. 7. [P. 16 Tom. II. Oper.]

Vit. Pyth. p. 89. [Cap. XVIII. p. 72. Ed. Kuſteri.]

Rigalt. Gloſſ.

And that the moſt ſottiſhly ſuperſtitious and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worſhippers of never ſo many gods amongſt them, did notwithſtanding generally acknowledge one ſupreme Deity over them all, one univerſal Numen, is poſitively affirmed, and fully atteſted by *Aurelius Prudentius*, in his *Apotheoſis*, in theſe words;

Verſ. 254.

Ecquis in Idolio recubans inter ſacra mille,
Ridiculoſque deos venerans, ſale, cæſpite, thure,
Non putat eſſe Deum ſummum, & ſuper omnia ſolum?
Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, & Cytheræis,
Portentiſque aliis, fumantes conſecret aras;
Attamen in cœlum quoties ſuſpexit, in uno
Conſtituit jus omne Deo, cui ſerviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis inſtructa miniſtris.

We are not ignorant, that *Plato* in his *Cratylus* [2], where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongſt the reſt of the word θεοὶ, writeth in this manner, concerning the *firſt and moſt ancient inhabitants of* Greece; *that they ſeemed to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than ſuch as were viſible and ſenſible, as the ſun and the moon, and the earth, and the ſtars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them* θεοὺς, from θέω, *that ſignifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other inviſible gods alſo, they beſtowed the ſame name of* θεοὶ *upon them likewiſe*. Which paſſage of *Plato*'s *Euſebius* ſomewhere [3] would make uſe of, to prove, that the Pagans univerſally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate; plainly contrary to that philoſopher's meaning, who as he no where affirms, that any nation ever was ſo barbarous, as to worſhip

[1 Stromat. Lib. V. p. 695. 2 P. 263. Oper. 3 Præparat. Evangel. Lib. I. Cap. IX. p. 29

ſenſleſs and inanimate bodies, as ſuch, for gods, but the contrary; ſo doth he there diſtinguiſh from thoſe firſt inhabitants of *Greece*, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of inviſible gods alſo. However, if this of *Plato* ſhould be true, that ſome of the ancient Pagans worſhipped none but viſible and ſenſible gods, (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings;) yet does it not therefore follow, that thoſe Pagans had no notion at all amongſt them of one ſupreme and univerſal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifeſt, that ſome of thoſe Corporealiſts looked upon the whole heaven and *Æther* animated as the higheſt God, according to that of *Euripides* cited by *Cicero*,

De N. D. p. 223. [Lib. II. Cap. XXV. p. 2993.]

Vides ſublime fuſum, immoderatum æthera,
Qui tenero terram circumvectu amplectitur;
Hunc ſummum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto Jovem.

As alſo that others of them conceived, that ſubtil firy ſubſtance, which permeates and pervades the whole world, (ſuppoſed to be intellectual) to be the ſupreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philoſophers alſo, as namely the Heracliticks and Stoicks. And laſtly, ſince *Macrobius*[1], in the perſon of *Vettius Prætextatus*, refers ſo many of the Pagan gods to the ſun; this renders it not improbable, but that ſome of theſe Pagans might adore the animated ſun, as the ſovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned[2], Ἥλιε παντοκράτωρ, κόσμου πνεῦμα, *O omnipotent ſun, the mind and ſpirit of the whole world*, &c. And even *Cleanthes* himſelf, that learned Stoick, and devout religioniſt, is ſuſpected by ſome to have been of this perſuaſion.

Nevertheleſs, we think it opportune here to obſerve, that it was not *Macrobius* his deſign, in thoſe his *Saturnalia*, to defend this, either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated ſun was abſolutely the higheſt Deity, (as ſome have conceived;) nor yet to reduce that multiplicity of Pagan gods, by this device of his, into a ſeeming monarchy, and nearer compliance with Chriſtianity; he there plainly confining his diſcourſe to the *dii duntaxat, qui ſub cælo ſunt*, that is, *the lower ſort of mundane gods*; and undertaking to ſhew, not that all of theſe neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the ſun, as *polyonymous*, and called by ſeveral names, according to his ſeveral virtues and effects. For, what *Macrobius* his own opinion was, concerning the ſupreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this paſſage of his commentary upon *Scipio*'s dream, where the higheſt ſphere and ſtarry heaven was called *Summus Deus, the ſupreme God*; *Quod hunc extimum globum, ſummum Deum vocavit, non ita accipiendum eſt, ut iſte prima cauſa, & Deus ille omnipotentiſſimus exiſtimetur; cum globus ipſe, quod cælum eſt, animæ ſit fabrica, anima ex mente proceſſerit, mens ex Deo, qui verè ſummus eſt, procreata ſit. Sed ſummum quidem dixit ad cæterorum ordinem, qui ſubjecti ſunt; Deum verò, quòd non modò immortale animal ac divinum ſit, plenum inclytæ ex illa puriſſima mente rationis,*

L. 1. c. 17. [P. 87.]

[1] Saturnal. Lib. I. Cap. XVII. p. 270. [2] Ibid. Cap. XXIII. p. 313.

rationis, ſed quod & virtutes omnes, quæ illam primæ omnipotentiam ſummitatis ſequantur, aut ipſe faciat, aut contineat ; ipſum denique Jovem *veteres vocaverunt, & apud theologos* Jupiter *eſt mundi anima. That the outmoſt ſphere is here called the ſupreme God, is not ſo to be underſtood, as if this were thought to be the firſt cauſe, and the moſt omnipotent God of all. For this ſtarry ſphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by ſoul. Which ſoul alſo proceeded from a perfect mind or intellect ; and again, Mind was begotten from that God, who is truly ſupreme. But the higheſt ſphere is here called the ſupreme God, only in reſpect to thoſe leſſer ſpheres or gods, that are contained under it ; and it is ſtyled a God, becauſe it is not only an immortal and divine animal, full of reaſon derived from that pureſt Mind, but alſo becauſe it maketh or containeth within itſelf all thoſe virtues, which follow that omnipotence of the firſt ſummity. Laſtly, this was called by the ancients* Jupiter, *and* Jupiter *to theologers is the ſoul of the world.* Wherefore though *Macrobius*, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worſhip the ſun as a great God, and probably would not ſtick to call him *Jupiter*, nor παντοκράτως neither (in a certain ſenſe) *omnipotent, or the governour of all*, nor perhaps *Deum Summum*, as well as the ſtarry heaven was ſo ſtyled in *Scipio*'s dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world ; yet nevertheleſs, it is plain, that he was far from thinking the ſun to be *primam cauſam*, or *omnipotentiſſimum Deum* ; *the firſt cauſe*, or *the moſt omnipotent God of all.* He acknowledging above the ſun and heaven, firſt, an eternal Pſyche, which was the maker or creator of them both ; and then above this Pſyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and laſtly, above that mind a God, who was *verè ſummus, truly and properly ſupreme, the firſt cauſe, and the moſt omnipotent of all gods.* Wherein *Macrobius* plainly Platonized, aſſerting a trinity of archical or divine hypoſtaſes. Which ſame doctrine is elſewhere alſo further declared by him after this manner; *Deus, qui prima cauſa eſt, & vocatur unus omnium, quæque ſunt, quæque videntur eſſe, principium & origo eſt. Hic ſuperabundanti majeſtatis fœcunditate de ſe mentem creavit. Hæc mens, quæ* Νοῦς *vocatur, qua patrem inſpicit, plenam ſimilitudinem ſervat auctoris, animam verò de ſe creat poſteriora reſpiciens. Rurſus anima partem, quam intuetur induitur, ac paulatim regrediente reſpectu in fabricam corporum, in corporea ipſa degenerat: God, who is and is called the firſt cauſe, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or ſeem to be ; he by his ſuperabundant fecundity produced from himſelf mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect reſemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced ſoul. And this ſoul again, as to its ſuperior part, reſembles that mind, from whence it was begotten ; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabrick, and acteth upon body.* Beſides which, the ſame *Macrobius* tells us [1], that *Summi & principis omnium Dei nullum ſimulachrum finxit antiquitas, quia ſupra animam & naturam eſt, quo nihil fas eſt de fabulis pervenire ; de diis autem cæteris, & de anima, non fruſtra ſe ad fabuloſa convertunt : The Pagan antiquity made no image at all of the higheſt God, or prince of all things, becauſe he is above ſoul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabuloſity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the ſoul of the world, and thoſe* [P. 73.]

Somn. Scip. l. 1. c. 14.

[1] Ibid. Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 9.

below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make uſe of images, and fiction & fabuloſity. From all which it plainly appears, that neither *Macrobius* himſelf, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehenſion, did look upon the animated ſun as the abſolutely ſupreme and higheſt Being.

And perhaps it may not be amiſs to ſuggeſt here, what hath been already obſerved, that the Perſians themſelves alſo, who of all Pagan nations have been moſt charged with this, the worſhipping of the ſun as the ſupreme Deity, under the name of *Mithras*, did notwithſtanding, if we may believe *Eubulus* [1], (who wrote the hiſtory of *Mithras* at large,) acknowledge another inviſible Deity ſuperior to it, (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world) as the true and proper *Mithras*. Which opinion is alſo plainly confirmed not only by *Herodotus*, diſtinguiſhing their *Jupiter* from the ſun, but alſo by *Xenophon* in ſundry places, as particularly where he ſpeaks of *Cyrus* his being admoniſhed in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addreſſing his devotion by ſacrifices and prayers, firſt to the Ζεὺς πάτριος, *the Perſian* Jupiter, and then to the ſun, and the other gods.

L. 1. N. 131.

Cyri Inſt. l. 8. p. 184.

Ἔθυε Διΐ τε πατρῴῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς Πέρσαι θύουσιν, ὧδε ἐπευχόμενος, Ζεῦ πάτριε καὶ ἥλιε καὶ πάντες θεοὶ, δέχεσθε τάδε χαριστήρια, &c. *He ſacrificed to their country* (*or the Perſian*) Jupiter, *and to the ſun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the cuſtom of the Perſians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country* Jupiter, (that is, thou *Mithras* or *Oromaſdes*) *and thou ſun, and all ye other gods; accept, I pray you, theſe my euchariſtick ſacrifices*, &c. And we find alſo the like prayer uſed by *Darius* in *Plutarch*, Ζεῦ πάτριε Περσῶν, *Thou our country* Jupiter, or *ſupreme God of the Perſians.* Moreover, *Herodotus* and *Curtius* record, that in the Perſian pomp and proceſſion there was wont to be drawn a chariot ſacred to *Jupiter*, diſtinct from that of the ſun. But *Cyrus* his proclamation in the book of *Eſdras* putteth all out of doubt; ſince *that Lord God of heaven*, who is there ſaid *to have given* Cyrus *all the kingdoms of the earth, and commanded him to build him a houſe at* Jeruſalem, cannot be underſtood of the ſun.

De Fort. Alex. l. 2.

The Ethiopians in *Strabo*'s time may well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet did they not only acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, but alſo ſuch as was diſtinct from the world, and therefore inviſible; he writing thus concerning them, Θεὸν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατον, τοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αἴτιον τῶν πάντων, τὸν δὲ θνητὸν, ἀνώνυμόν τινα, ὡς δ' ἐπιτοπολὺ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ βασιλικοὺς θεοὺς νομίζουσι· *They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cauſe of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the moſt part they account their benefactors and kings gods alſo.* And though *Cæſar* [2] affirm of the ancient Germans, *Deorum numero eos ſolos ducunt, quos cernunt, & quorum opibus apertè juvantur, Solem, & Vulcanum, & Lunam*; yet is he contradicted by *Tacitus*, who, coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded, that they acknowledged one ſupreme God, under the name of *Thau* firſt, and

L. 17. p. 822.

See Sched. de Dis Germ. [Part. I. Cap. XII. p. 291.]

[1] Apud Porphyr. de Antro Nymphar. p. 253, &c.

[2] De Bello Gallico, Lib. VI. Cap. XXI. p. 125. Edit. Cellarii.

and then of *Thautes*, and *Theutates*. Laſtly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the *Indians*, *Chineſes*, *Siamenſes* and *Guineans*, the inhabitants of *Peru*, *Mexico*, *Virginia*, and *New England*, (ſome of which are ſufficiently barbarous) acknowledge one ſupreme or greateſt God; they having their ſeveral proper names for him, as *Parmiſcer*, *Fetiſſo*, *Wiracocha*, *Pachacamac*, *Vitziliputzti*, &c. though worſhipping withal other gods and idols. And we ſhall conclude this with the teſtimony of *Joſephus Acoſta*: *Hoc commune apud omnes penè Barbaros eſt, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum ſupremum & ſummè bonum fateantur; ſpirituum vero quorundam perverſorum non obſcura opinio ſit, qui à noſtris Barbaris* Zupay *vocari ſolent. Igitur & quis ille ſummus, idemque ſempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt, per omnia doceri debent; mox quantum ab illo, illiuſque fidelibus miniſtris angelis, abſint gens peſſima cacodæmonum. This is common almoſt to all the Barbarians, to confeſs one ſupreme God over all, who is perfectly good; as alſo they have a perſuaſion amongſt them of certain evil ſpirits, which are called by our Barbarians* Zupay. *Wherefore they ought to be firſt well inſtructed, what that ſupreme and eternal maker of all things is, whom they ignorantly worſhip; and then how great a difference there is betwixt thoſe wicked dæmons, and his faithful miniſters, the angels.*

De proc. Indor. Sal. l. 5. 479.

XXVIII. It hath been already declared, that according to *Themiſtius* and *Symmachus*, two zealous Pagans, one and the ſame ſupreme God was worſhipped in all the ſeveral Pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diverſity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itſelf, ſo neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, ſtate, and grandeur, to be worſhipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was alſo the opinion of other ancienter Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable teſtimony of *Plutarch*'s in his book *De Iſide*, where defending the Egyptian worſhip, (which was indeed the main deſign of that whole book;) but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worſhipped as a God, he writeth thus: οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς, τοὺς δὲ δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας ἀέννασα καὶ διαρκῆ, θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέρους παρ' ἑτέρους, οὐδὲ Βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας, οὐδὲ νοτείους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ οὐρανὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλασσα, κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δὲ ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ἘΝΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΥ τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος καὶ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ ἐπιτροπευούσης, καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντας τεταγμένων, ἕτεραι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμον γεγόνασι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερώμενοι, οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς, οἱ δὲ τρανωτέρως, ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα νόησιν ὁδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως· *No inanimate thing ought to be eſteemed for a God, but they, who beſtow theſe things upon us, and afford us a continual ſupply thereof for our uſe, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations; as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the ſouthern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not any the ſame, but all other different gods. But as the ſun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the ſea are common to all, though called by ſeveral names in ſeveral countries; ſo ONE REASON ordering theſe things, and ONE PROVIDENCE diſpenſing all, and the inferior ſubſervient miniſters thereof, having had ſeveral names and honours beſtowed upon them by*

P. 377.

the laws of ſeveral countries have been every where worſhipped throughout the whole world. And there have been alſo different ſymbols conſecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on mens underſtandings to divine things; though this hath not been without ſome hazard or danger of caſting men upon one or other of theſe two inconveniences, either ſuperſtition or atheiſm. Where *Plutarch* plainly affirms, that the ſeveral religions of the Pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among theſe the Egyptians alſo, as well as others, conſiſted in nothing elſe, but the worſhipping of one and the ſame ſupreme mind, reaſon, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its ὑπηργοὶ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένοι, *its ſubſervient powers or miniſters*, appointed by it over all the ſeveral parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different ſymbols.

Moreover, that *Titus Livius* was of the very ſame opinion, that the Pagan gods of ſeveral countries, though called by ſeveral names, and worſhipped with ſo great diverſity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the ſame common to all, may be concluded from this paſ-
L. 28. c. 12. ſage of his, where he writeth of *Hannibal: Neſcio an mirabilior fuerit in ad-*
[P. 679] *verſis, quàm ſecundis rebus. Quippe qui miſtos ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia ſacra, alii PROPE dii eſſent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla ſeditio extiterit. I know not whether* Hannibal *were more admirable in his adverſity or proſperity; who having a mixt colluvies of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almoſt different gods from one another, did notwithſtanding ſo unite them all together in one common bond, that there happened no ſedition at all amongſt them.* Where *Livy* plainly intimates, that though there was as great diverſity of religious rites and ceremonies among the Pagans, as if they had worſhipped ſeveral gods, yet the gods of them all were really the ſame, namely, one ſupreme God, and his miniſters under him. And the ſame *Livy* elſewhere declares this to have been the general opinion of the Romans and Italians likewiſe at that time; where he tells us, how they quarrelled with *Q. Fulvius Flaccus*, for that when being cenſor, and building a new temple in *Spain*, he uncovered another temple dedicated to *Juno Lacinia* amongſt the *Brutii*, and taking off the marble-tiles thereof, ſent them into *Spain* to adorn his new erected temple withal; and how they accuſed him thereupon publickly in
Dec. 5. the ſenate-houſe in this manner, *Quod ruinis templorum templa ædificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales eſſent, ſed ſpoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique: That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not every where the ſame immortal gods; but that ſome of them might be worſhipped and adorned with the ſpoils of others*[1].

The Egyptians were doubtleſs the moſt ſingular of all the Pagans, and the moſt oddly diſcrepant from the reſt in their manner of worſhip; yet nevertheleſs, that theſe alſo agreed with the reſt in thoſe fundamentals of worſhipping one ſupreme and univerſal Numen, together

[1] Lib. XLII. Cap. III. p. 1113.

gether with his inferior miniſters, as *Plutarch* ſets himſelf induſtriouſly to maintain it, in that forementioned book *de Iſide*; ſo was it further cleared and made out (as *Damaſcius* informs us) by two famous Egyptian philoſophers, *Aſclepiades* and *Heraiſcus*, in certain writings of theirs, that have been ſince loſt: Αἰγυπλίως δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος ὠδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπλιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπλίοις, δή τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ, σκότος ἄγνωστον, &c. ἱστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπλίων, ὅτι διαιρετικοί εἰσι πολλαχῇ, τῶν κατὰ ἕνωσιν ὑφεστώτων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διηρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, ὡς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις· λέγω δὲ τῇ Ἡραΐσκου ἀναγραφῇ, τῷ Αἰγυπλίῳ καθόλου λόγῳ, πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλου γραφείσῃ τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ τῇ ἀρξαμένῃ γράφεσθαι συμφωνίᾳ ὑπὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου τῶν Αἰγυπλίων πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας θεολόγους· *Tho'* Eudemus *hath given us no certain account of the Egyptians, yet the Egyptian philoſophers of latter times have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in ſome Egyptian monuments, that, according to them, there is one principle of all things, celebrated under the name of the unknown darkneſs, and this thrice repeated,* &c. *Moreover, this is to be obſerved concerning theſe Egyptians, that they are wont to divide and multiply things, that are one and the ſame. And accordingly have they divided and multiplied the firſt Intelligible, or the one ſupreme Deity, into the properties of many gods; as any one may find, that pleaſes to conſult their writings: I mean that of* Heraiſcus, *intitled, the Univerſal doctrine of the Egyptians, and inſcribed to* Proclus *the philoſopher; and that ſymphony or harmony of the Egyptians with other theologers, begun to be written by* Aſclepiades, *and left imperfect.* Of which work of *Aſclepiades* the Egyptian *Suidas* alſo maketh mention, upon the word *Heraiſcus*; ὁ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπλίοις βιβλίοις ἀναγραφεὶς, ἀκριβέστερος ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον, ἀρχάς τε αὐτῆς καὶ μέσα διεσκεμμένος· ὡς ἔξεστιν εἰδέναι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὕμνων, ὧν συνέγραφεν εἰς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων θεούς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματείας, ἣν ὥρμητο γράφειν περιέχουσαν τῶν θεολογιῶν ἁπασῶν συμφωνίαν· *But* Aſclepiades *having been more converſant with ancient Egyptian writings, was more thoroughly inſtructed, and exactly ſkilled in his country theology; he having ſearched into the principles thereof, and all the conſequences reſulting from them; as manifeſtly appeareth from thoſe hymns, which he compoſed in praiſe of the Egyptian gods, and from that tractate begun to be written by him (but left unfiniſhed,) which containeth the ſymphony of all theologies.* Now, we ſay that *Aſclepiades* his ſymphony of all the Pagan theologers, and therefore of the Egyptian with the reſt, was their agreement in thoſe two fundamentals expreſſed by *Plutarch*; namely the worſhipping of one ſupreme and univerſal Numen, Reaſon and Providence, governing all things; and then of his ſubſervient miniſters (the inſtruments of providence) appointed by him over all the parts of the world: which being honoured under ſeveral names, and with different rites and ceremonies, according to the laws of the reſpective countries, cauſed all that diverſity of religions that was amongſt them. Both which fundamental points of the Pagan theology were in like manner acknowledged by *Symmachus* [1], the firſt of them being thus expreſſed: *Æquum eſt quicquid*

Damaſc. de Princ. M. S. [Vide Wolfii Anecdota Græca, Tom. III. p. 260]

[1] Epiſtolar. Lib. X. Epiſt. LXI. p. 442.

quicquid omnes colunt, unum putari; that all religions agreed in this, the worſhipping of one and the ſame ſupreme Numen: and the ſecond thus, *Varios cuſtodes urbibus mens divina diſtribuit; that the divine Mind appointed divers guardian and tutelar ſpirits under him, unto cities and countries.* He there adding alſo, that *ſuus cuique mos eſt, ſuum cuique jus, that every nation had their peculiar modes and manners in worſhipping of theſe;* and that theſe external differences in religion ought not to be ſtood upon, but every one to obſerve the religion of his own country. Or elſe theſe two fundamental points of the Pagan theology may be thus expreſſed; firſt, that there is one ſelf-originated Deity, who was the δημιουργὸς, or *maker of the whole world*; ſecondly, that there are beſides him other gods alſo, to be religiouſly worſhipped (that is, intellectual beings ſuperior to men) which were notwithſtanding all made or created by that one. *Stobæus* thus declareth their ſenſe: τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμενον, *That the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together with the world.*

Ecl. Phyſ. c. 1. [Lib. I. p. 4.]

XXIX. And that the Pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge one ſupreme and univerſal Numen, appears plainly from hence, becauſe they ſuppoſed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer *de Placitis Philoſ.* and out of him *Stobæus*, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον· Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ ἄτομα εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενὸν, ἔτε ἔμψυχον ἔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ· *All others aſſert the world to be an animal, and governed by providence; only* Leucippus, Democritus *and* Epicurus, *and thoſe, who make atoms and vacuum the principles of all things, diſſenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be animated, nor yet to be governed by providence, but by an irrational nature.* Where, by the way, we may obſerve the fraud and juggling of *Gaſſendus*, who takes occaſion from hence highly to extol and applaud *Epicurus*, as one who approached nearer to Chriſtianity than all the other philoſophers, in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the language and notions of thoſe times, to deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheiſt or to deny a God, was one and the ſame thing; becauſe all the Pagans, who then aſſerted providence, held the world alſo to be animated: neither did *Epicurus* deny the world's animation upon any other account than this, becauſe he denied providence. And the ground, upon which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was ſuch as might be obvious even to vulgar underſtandings; and it is thus expreſſed by *Plotinus*, according to the ſenſe of the ancients: ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν, ἡμῶν οἷ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔχειν, ἀψύχου τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος; *It is abſurd to affirm, that the heaven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and ſoul, when we ourſelves, who have but a part of the mundane body in us, are endued with ſoul. For how could a part have life and ſoul in it, the whole being dead and inanimate?* Now, if the whole world be one animal, then muſt it needs be governed by one ſoul, and not by many. Which one ſoul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was by ſome of the Pagan theologers (as namely

Plut. l. 2. c. 3. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 25.

En. 4. l. 3. c. 7. [de dubiis animæ, Lib. I. p. 576.]

namely the Stoicks) taken to be the πρῶτος θεὸς, *the firſt and higheſt God of all.*

Nevertheleſs, others of the Pagan theologers, though aſſerting the world's animation likewiſe, yet would by no means allow the mundane ſoul to be the ſupreme Deity; they conceiving the firſt and higheſt God to be an abſtract and immoveable mind, and not a ſoul. Thus the Panegyriſt, cited alſo by *Gyraldus*, invokes the ſupreme Deity doubtfully and cautiouſly, as not knowing well what to call him, whether ſoul or mind: *Te, ſumme rerum ſator, cujus tot nomina ſunt, quot gentium linguas eſſe voluiſti; quem enim te ipſe dici velis, ſcire non poſſumus: ſive in te quædam vis menſque divina eſt, quæ toto infuſa mundo omnibus miſcearis elementis, & ſine ullo extrinſecus accedente vigoris impulſu, per te ipſe movearis; ſive aliqua ſupra omne cœlum poteſtas es, quæ hoc opus totum ex altiore naturæ arce deſpicias: Te, inquam, oramus,* &c. *Thou ſupreme original of all things, who haſt as many names as thou haſt pleaſed there ſhould be languages; whether thou beeſt a certain divine force and ſoul, that infuſed into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulſe moved from thyſelf; or whether thou beeſt a power elevated above the heavens, which lookeſt down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke,* &c. And as the ſupreme Deity was thus conſidered only as a perfect mind ſuperior to ſoul, ſo was the mundane ſoul and whole animated world called by theſe Pagans frequently δεύτερος θεὸς, *the ſecond God.* Thus in the Aſclepian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and maker of all ſaid to have made a ſecond God viſible and ſenſible, which is the world. *Hiſt. Deor. p. 12.*

But for the moſt part, they who aſſerted a God, ſuperior to the ſoul of the world, did maintain a trinity of univerſal principles, or divine hypoſtaſes ſubordinate; they conceiving, that as there was above the mundane ſoul a perfect mind or intellect, ſo that mind and intellect, as ſuch, was not the firſt principle neither, becauſe there muſt be νοητὸν in order of nature before νοῦς, an Intelligible before Intellect. Which firſt Intelligible was called by them, τὸ ἓν and ταγαθὸν, *the One*, and *the Good*, or unity and goodneſs itſelf ſubſtantial, the cauſe of mind and all things. Now as the *Tagathon*, or higheſt of theſe three hypoſtaſes, was ſometimes called by them ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, *the firſt God*, and νοῦς or *Intellect* ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, *the ſecond God*; ſo was the mundane ſoul and animated world called τρίτος θεὸς, *the third God.* Thus *Numenius* in *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus*, Νουμήνιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεὺς, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόζμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς, ὡς ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς δισσὸς, ὅτε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος· Numenius *praiſing three gods, calls the father the firſt God, the maker the ſecond, and the work the third. For the world, according to him, is the third God; as he ſuppoſes alſo two opificers, the firſt and the ſecond God.* *Plotinus* in like manner ſpeaks of this alſo, as very familiar language amongſt thoſe Pagans, καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥζπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος, *and the world, as is commonly ſaid, is the third God.* *Pag. 93.* *En. 3. l. 5. §. 6.* [P. 296.].

But neither they, who held the ſupreme Deity to be an immoveable mind or intellect, ſuperior to the mundane ſoul, (as *Ariſtotle* and *Xenocrates*) did ſuppoſe that mundane ſoul and the whole world to have depended upon many ſuch immoveable intellects ſelf-exiſtent, as their firſt cauſe, but only upon one: nor they, who admitting a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, made the ſupreme Deity properly to be a Monad above Mind or Intellect, did conceive that intellect to have depended upon many ſuch monads, as firſt principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From whence it plainly appears, that the Pagan theologers did always reduce things under a monarchy, and acknowledge not many independent deities, but one univerſal Numen (whether called ſoul, or mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it hath been already declared, that thoſe Pagans, who were Trinitarians, eſpecially the Platoniſts, do often take thoſe their three hypoſtaſes ſubordinate (a monad, mind, and ſoul) all together, for the τὸ θεῖον, or one ſupreme Numen; as ſuppoſing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypoſtaſes, and ſo as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be obſerved concerning the Pagan theologers; firſt, that according to them generally the whole corporeal ſyſtem was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and ſoul was mingled with and diffuſed thorough it all: inſomuch that *Ariſtotle* himſelf taxes thoſe, who made the world to conſiſt of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheiſts. Secondly, that how much ſoever ſome of them ſuppoſed the ſupreme Deity and firſt Cauſe to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore conceive, either the world to be quite cut off from that, or that from the world, ſo as to have no commerce with it, nor influence upon it; but as all proceeded from this firſt cauſe, ſo did they ſuppoſe that to be cloſely and intimately united with all thoſe emanations from itſelf, (though without mixture and confuſion) and all to ſubſiſt in it, and be pervaded by it. *Plutarch*, in his *Platonick Queſtions*, propounds this amongſt the reſt, Τί δή ποτε τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν; *Why* Plato *called the higheſt God the father and maker of all?* To which he anſwers in the firſt place thus, τῶν μὲν θεῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστι, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων· *That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the world.* But afterward he adds, that this higheſt God might therefore be ſtyled the father of the whole corporeal world alſo, as well as the maker, becauſe it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: ἐμψύχου γὰρ γένησις ἡ γένησίς ἐστι· καὶ ποιητῷ μὲν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης, ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδριάντος, ἀπήλλακται τὸ γενόμενον ἔργον· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχὴ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι, καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύζιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον ὅσαν τοῦ τεκνώσαντος. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁ πεπλασμένος ὁ κόσμος, οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ μοῖρα πολλὴ ζωότητος καὶ θειότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐγκατέσπειρεν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῇ

P. 100. *par.*

τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιξεν, εἰκότως ἅμα πατήρτε τοῦ κόσμου ζώου γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητὴς ἐπονομάζεται· *Generation is the making or production of something animate. And the work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departeth and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsick dependance upon him; whereas from him, that begetteth, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works, that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath inserted into it, and mingled with it. God is therefore rightly styled by* Plato, *not only the maker, but also the father of the whole world as being an animal.* To the same purpose also *Plotinus*, γενομενος δὴ οἷον οἶκος τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος, οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτὸν· ἔχει κὰρ ψυχὴν κρατούμενος οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων, κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἄμοιρον ἔστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζωῇ· *The world being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. Forasmuch as he still remaineth above, presiding over it; the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul, than to possess it, it lying in that great Psyche, which sustaineth it, as a net in the waters, all moistned with life.* Thus *Plotinus* supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmeth it neither to be cut off from its maker, (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul) nor yet that mundane soul itself to be immersed into its body the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second divine hypostasis of Nous or Intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul, and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity, (called by him unity and goodness) above Intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from these neither; they being all three (monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimated united together.

Ep. 4. *l.* 3. *c.* 9. [P. 379.]

XXX. The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this Pagan polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, *viz.* Whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now *Philo* plainly understood the Pagan polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the *Confusion of Languages*, where speaking of the supreme God, (the Maker and Lord of the whole world) and of his δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὶ, his *innumerable assistant powers*, both visible and invisible, he adds, καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινὲς τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδεν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, ὧν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν κατιδὼν Μωϋσῆς φησὶ κύριε κύριε βασιλεῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἔνδειξιν τῆς παρ' ὑπηκόους ἄρχοντος διαφορᾶς· *Wherefore some men being struck*

Pag. 345.

with admiration of both theſe worlds, the viſible and the inviſible, have not only deified the whole of them, but alſo their ſeveral parts, as the ſun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, they not ſcrupling to call theſe gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moſes *reſpected in thoſe words of his,* Thou Lord the king of gods; *he thereby declaring the tranſcendency of the ſupreme God above all thoſe his ſubjects called gods.* To the ſame purpoſe *Philo* writeth alſo in his Commentary upon the Decalogue, πᾶσαν ἓν τὴν τοιαύτην τερθρείαν ἀπωσάμενοι, τὰς ἀδελφὰς φύσει μὴ προσκυνῶμεν, εἰ καθαρωτέρας καὶ ἀθανατωτέρας οὐσίας ἔλαχον, ἀδελφὰ δ' ἀλλήλων τὰ γενόμενα, καθ' ὃ γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πατὴρ ἁπάντων ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο καὶ ἱερώτατον παράγγελμα σηλιτεύσωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἕνα τὸν ἀνωτάτω νομίζειν τε καὶ τιμᾶν θεὸν· *Wherefore removing all ſuch impoſture, let us worſhip no beings, that are by nature brothers and germane to us, though endued with far more pure and immortal eſſences than we are. For all created things, as ſuch, have a kind of germane and brotherly equality with one another, the maker of all things being their common father. But let us deeply infix this firſt and moſt holy commandment in our breaſts, to acknowledge and worſhip one only higheſt God.* And again afterwards, ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίκ, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοχερεσ-άτων μερῶν ὡς θεῶν προπολοίτε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι, τὰς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες· *They, who worſhip the ſun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worſhip the ſubjects of the prince;* whereas the prince alone ought to be worſhipped. Thus, according to *Philo*, the Pagan polytheiſm conſiſted in giving religious worſhip, beſides the ſupreme God, to other created underſtanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.

Pag. 753.

Flavius Joſephus, in his *Judaick Antiquities* [1], extolling *Abraham*'s wiſdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him; πρῶτος ἓν τολμᾷ θεὸν ἀποφήνασθαι δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἕνα, which ſome would underſtand in this manner, *that* Abraham *was the firſt, who publickly declared, that there was one God the* Demiurgus *or maker of the whole world*; as if all mankind beſides, at that time, had ſuppoſed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of thoſe words is this, that *Abraham* was the firſt, who, in that degenerate age, publickly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the one only God, and alone to be religiouſly worſhipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the ſame writer, ᾧ καλῶς ἔχει μόνῳ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν εὐχαρισ-ίαν ἀπονέμειν, *to whom alone men ought to give honour and thanks.* And the reaſon hereof is there alſo ſet down, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, εἰ καὶ τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσ-αγὴν τὴν τούτου παρέχειν ἕκασ-ον καὶ οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν ἰσχύν· *Becauſe all thoſe other beings, that were then worſhipped as gods, whatſoever any of them contributed to the happineſs of mankind, they did it not by their own power, but by his appointment and command*; he inſtancing in the ſun and moon, and earth and ſea, which are all made and ordered by a higher power and providence, by the force whereof they contribute to our utility. As if he ſhould have ſaid, that no created being ought to be religiouſly worſhipped, but the Creator only. And this agreeth

[1] Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 28. Tom. I. Oper. Edit. Havercamp.

agreeth with what we read in Scripture concerning *Abraham*, that he *called upon the name of the Lord*, אל עילם, *the God of the whole world*; that is, he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that time did, but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and containeth the whole world. And thus *Maimonides* interprets that place, התחיל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא והלאל העולם Abraham *began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, save only the God of the whole world.* Moreover, the same *Josephus* afterwards in his twelfth book [1] brings in *Aristæus* (who seems to have been a secret proselyted Greek) pleading with *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*, in behalf of the Jews, and their liberty, after this manner; τὴν βασιλείαν ϛȣ διέποντος, τȣ̃ θεμένȣ τȣ̀ς νόμȣς αὐτοῖς. τὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα συϛησάμενον θεὸν, καὶ ȣ̃τοι καὶ ἡμεῖς σεβόμεθα, Ζῆνα καλȣ̃ντες αὐτὸν, ἑτοίμως ἀπὸ τȣ̃ σύμπαϛιν ἐμφύειν τὸ ζῆν, τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτȣ̃ νοήσαντες· *It would well agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that miserable captivity, which they are under: since the same God, who governeth your kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both they and we do alike worship the God, who made all things, we calling him* Zene, *because he gives life to all. Wherefore for the honour of that God, whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the liberty of returning to their native country.* Where *Aristæus* also, according to the sense of Pagans, thus concludes; Know, O king, that I intercede not for these Jews, as having any cognation with them, πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων δημιȣ́ργημα ὄντων τȣ̃ θεȣ̃, καὶ γινώϛκων αὐτὸν ἡδόμενον τοῖς εὐποιȣ́σιν, ἐπί τȣ́τῳ καὶ σε παρακαλῶ, *but all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing, that he is delighted with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you.*

Gen. 21. 23.

De Idol. c. 1. §. 7. [P. 7. Edit. Voss.]

As for the latter Jewish writers and Rabbins, it is certain, that the generality of them supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his ministers, or as mediators between him and them: *Maimonides* in *Halacoth* [2] עכו״ם describeth the rise of the Pagan polytheism in the days of *Enosh*, after this manner: בימי אנוש טעו בני האדם טעות גדול ונבערה עצת חמי אותו הדור ואנוש עצמו מן הטועים היה וזו היתה טעותם: אמרו הואיל והאל ברא כוכבים אלו וגלגלים להנחת את העולם ונתנם במדום והלק להם כבוד והם שמשים המשמשים לפניו ראויום הם לשבחם ולפארם ולחלוק להם כבוד וזהו רצון האל ברוך הוא לגדל זלכבד מי שגדלו וכבדו כמו שהמלך רוצה לכבוד רעומדום לפניו וזהו כבדו טל מלך *In the days of* Enosh, *the sons of men grievously erred, and the wisemen of that age became brutish,* (*even* Enosh *himself being in the number of them*;) *and their error was this, that since God had created the stars and spheres to govern the world, and placing them on high, had bestowed this honour upon them, that they should be his ministers and subservient instruments, men ought therefore to praise them, honour them, and worship them; this being the pleasure of the blessed God, that men should magnify and honour those, whom himself hath magnified and honoured, as a king will have his ministers to be reverenced, this honour redounding to himself.* Again, the same *Maimonides* in the beginning of the second chapter of that book writeth thus; עיקר הצווי העבודה זדה שלא לעבוד

[1] Cap. II. §. II. p. 586. Tom. I. Oper. [2] i. e. De Idololatriâ, Cap. I. §. 1. p. 3.

לעבור אחר מכל הברואים לא מלאך ולא גלגל ולא כוכב ולא אחד מן היסודות ולא אחד מכל הנבראים מהן ואפ עלפי שהעובר יודע שהשם הוא האלהים והוא עובר הנברא הזה על דרך שעבר אנוש ואנשי דורו תהלה חדי זה עבר עבודה זרה *The foundation of that commandment againſt ſtrange worſhip* (now commonly called idolatry) *is this, that no man ſhould worſhip any of the creatures whatſoever, neither angel, nor ſphere, nor ſtar, nor any of the four elements, nor any thing made out of them. For though he, that worſhips theſe things, knows, that the Lord is God, and ſuperior to them all, and worſhips thoſe creatures no otherwiſe than* Enoſh *and the reſt of that age did, yet is he nevertheleſs guilty of ſtrange worſhip or idolatry.* And that, after the times of *Enoſh* alſo, in ſucceeding ages, the polytheiſm of the Pagan nations was no other than this, the worſhipping (beſides one ſupreme God) of other created beings, as the miniſters of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewiſe by *Maimonides* (in his *More Nevochim*) to have been the univerſal belief of all the Hebrews or Jews;

P. 1. *c.* 36. ואתה יודע כי בל מי שעובד עבודה זרה לא יעבוד דעת שאין אלוה בלעדיה ולאדמה מעולם בלל מן העוברים ולא ידמה מן הבאים שהצורה אשר יעשה מן המתכות או מן האבנים והעצים שהצורה ההיא היה אשר בראה השמים והארץ אבל אמנם ועבדוה על צד שהיא דמיון לדבר שהוא אמצעי בינם ובין האלוה וזה ממה שלא יחלוק בו אחד מבעלי תורתנו *You know, that whoſoever committeth idolatry, he doth it not as ſuppoſing, that there is no other God beſides that which he worſhippeth, for it never came into the minds of any idolaters, nor never will, that that ſtatue, which is made by them of metal, or ſtone, or wood, is that very God, who created heaven and earth; but they worſhip thoſe ſtatues and images only as the repreſentation of ſomething, which is a mediator between God and them.* *Moſes Albelda*, the author of the book entitled, עולת תמיר *Gnolath Tamid*, reſolves all the Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry into theſe two principles, one of which reſpected God, and the other men themſelves:

Fol. 147. הא טוענין לזה מצדו ית ואומדום כי הוא גבוה מעל גבוה ואא להדבק בו רך עי תאמצעיום כמנהג תמלך בו שהרוצים לשאול שאלה מה ממנו ישאלוה עי אמצעי ולכן עשים אותה העא כדי להודיד השפע האלתי על ידה: הב טוענין מצד עצמם וזה כי היות הארם גשמו אינו יכול להתבודד מעצמו אם לא ישים נגדו דבר מה מוחש יעודהו ויעודדו להבין עצמי כדי שתדבק בו השגחתו יתברך *The idolaters firſt argued thus in reſpect of God; that ſince he was of ſuch tranſcendent perfection above men, it was not poſſible for men to be united to, or have communion with him, otherwiſe than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the hands of mediators and interceſſors. Secondly, they thus argued alſo in reſpect of themſelves; that being corporeal, ſo that they could not apprehend God abſtractly, they muſt needs have ſomething ſenſible to excite and ſtir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon.* *Joſeph Albo*, in the book called *Ikkarim*, concludes that *Ahab*, and the other idolatrous kings of *Iſrael* and *Judah* worſhipped other gods upon thoſe two accounts mentioned by *Maimonides* and no otherwiſe, namely that the ſupreme God *was honoured by worſhipping of his miniſters*, and that there ought to be *certain middles and mediators*

P. 3. *c.* 18. *betwixt him and men*, אחאב וזותו ממלכי ושראל ויהודה הו טוען אחר הבחות הגלגל ות משתי צדדין שאמרנו וגם שלמה טעה בזה עם היותם מאמינום

מאמינום במציאות השם ואחודתו אם כשהיו חושבים לגרד את השם בזה ואם כשחיו חושבין לעשות סדסוד ואמצעיים בינם ובין חשם ותב Ahab, *and other kings of* Iſrael *and* Judah, *and even* Solomon *himſelf, erred in worſhipping the ſtars, upon thoſe two accounts already mentioned out of* Maimonides, *notwithſtanding that they believed the exiſtence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they ſhould honour God in worſhipping of his miniſters, and partly worſhipping them as mediators betwixt God and themſelves.* And the ſame writer determines the meaning of that firſt commandment, (which is to him the ſecond) *Thou ſhalt have no other gods before my face*, to be this, להכים אותם אמצעיים ביני ובינך או שתחשוב לרומם אותי בעבורתם *Thou ſhalt not ſet up other inferior gods as mediators betwixt me and thyſelf, or worſhip them ſo, as thinking to honour me thereby. R. David Kimchi* (upon 2 *Kings* 17.) writeth thus concerning that Iſraelitiſh prieſt, who, by the king of *Aſſyria*'s command, was ſent to *Samariah* to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worſhip the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards ſaid, that they both feared the Lord, and ſerved their idols;) אם יאמר להם שלא יהיו עוברים עבורה זרה כלל לא היו מאמינים שהוא רבר שגרלו בו כל האומות מקרם והוא אצלם כמו מושכל ראשין אך אמר להם שיהיו עוברים את אלוהיהם כמו שהיו עוברים ובלבר שתהא כיונת האל בלבם כי אלא האלהים לא ורעו ולא ייטיבי כי אם ברצון האל אלא שעוברים אותם להיותם אמצעיים בינם ובין הבורא *If he ſhould have altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkned to him, that being a thing, which all thoſe eaſtern people were educated in from their very infancy, inſomuch that it was a kind of firſt principle to them. Wherefore he permitted them to worſhip all their ſeveral gods, as before they had done; only he required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of* Iſrael, (*as the ſupreme*) *for thoſe gods could do them neither good nor hurt, otherwiſe than according to his will and pleaſure: but they worſhipped them to this purpoſe, that they might be MEDIATORS betwixt them and the creator.* In the book *Nitzachon*, all the polytheiſm and idolatry of the Pagans is reduced to theſe three heads; firſt עברו משרתי תשם לכבורו *When they worſhipped the miniſters of God, as thinking to honour him thereby*; and ſecondly, עברו אותם שיהיו מליצים בערם *When they worſhipped them as orators and interceſſors for them with God*; and laſtly, עברו לעץ ואבן לזכרו *When they worſhipped ſtatues of wood and ſtone for memorials of him.* And though it be true, that *Iſaak Abrabanel* (upon 2 *Kings* 17.) does enumerate more ſpecies of Pagan idolatry, even to the number of ten, yet are they all of them but ſo many ſeveral modes of creature-worſhip; and there is no ſuch thing amongſt them to be found, as the worſhipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, thoſe Rabbinick writers commonly interpret certain places of the ſcripture to this ſenſe, that the Pagan idolaters did notwithſtanding acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, as that *Jeremy* 10. 7. *Who is there, that will not fear thee, thou king of nations? For amongſt all their wiſe men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they are become all together brutiſh, and their worſhiping of ſtocks is a doctrine of vanity:* for *Maimonides* thus gloſſeth upon thoſe words, בלומר הכל יורעום שאתה הוא לברך אכל טעותם ובסילותם שמרמים שוה ההבל רצונך הוא *As if he ſhould ſay, all the Gen-*

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tiles know, that thou art the only ſupreme God, but their error and folly conſiſteth in this, that they think this vanity of worſhipping inferior gods, to be a thing agreeable to thy will. And thus alſo *Kimchi* in his Commentaries, מי לא יראך אגילו הגוים העובדים האלילים ראוי להם שיראוך כי אתה מלך עליהם בכל חכמי חגוים ובכל ממלכותם אומרים מאין ככוך ואינם עוברים הכוכבים אלא להיותם אמצעיים בינך ובינם ואמר חכמי הגוים כי הם יודעים כי הפסל איני כלום ואם יעברו הכוכבים לא יעכרום אלא מפני שהם משרתיך להיותם אמצעים *Who will not fear thee? It is fit, that even the nations themſelves, who worſhip idols, ſhould fear thee, for thou art their king; and indeed amongſt all the wiſemen of the nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worſhip the ſtars otherwiſe than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wiſe men know, that an idol is nothing; and though they worſhip ſtars, yet do they worſhip them as thy miniſters, and that they may be interceſſors for them.* Another place is that, *Malachi* 1. 11. which though we read in the future tenſe, as a prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews underſtand it of that preſent time, when thoſe words were written, *From the riſing of the ſun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incenſe is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great amongſt the Gentiles, ſaith the Lord of hoſts. But you profane it,* &c. Upon which words *R. Solomon* gloſſeth thus, מי שיש לו עין יודע שהוא אלוה שהוא על כולם ובכל מקום מתנדבים לשמו אפ האומות *The Pagan polytheiſts and idolaters know, that there is one God ſuperior to all thoſe other gods and idols worſhipped by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongſt the Gentiles.* And *Kimchi* agreeth with him herein, אפ על פי שהגוים עובדים לצבא השמים מודים בי שאני הסבה הראשונה אלא שעובדים אותם שיהיו אמצעיים ביני ובינם *Although the Pagans worſhipped the hoſt of heaven, yet do they confeſs me to be the firſt cauſe, they worſhipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them.* Whether either of theſe two places of ſcripture does ſufficiently prove what theſe Jews would have, or no; yet, however, is it evident from their interpretations of them, that themſelves ſuppoſed the Pagans to have acknowledged one ſupreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and miniſters. Nevertheleſs, there is another place of ſcripture, which ſeems to ſound more to this purpoſe, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by *Rabbi Solomon* and others, *Pſal.* 65. 6. where God is called מבטח כל קצוי אדץ וים רחקים *The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the ſea*, that is, even of all the Pagan world.

Thus we ſee plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and Rabbins have been generally of this perſuaſion, that the Pagan nations anciently, at leaſt the intelligent amongſt them, acknowledged one ſupreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior miniſters; which were worſhipped by them upon theſe two accounts, either as thinking, that the honour done to them redounded to the ſupreme; or elſe that they might be מלוצין, סרסורים, and אמצעים, *their mediators, and interceſſors, orators*, and *negotiators* with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were

were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels, and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual: for thus *Maimonides* expressly; בל הכוכבים והגלגלים בולן בעלי נפש וריעה והשבל הם והם חיים ועומדים ומבירין את מי שאמר והיה העולם בל אחר ואחר רפי נולו ולפי מעלתו משבחין ומפארים ליוצרם כמו המלאכים *The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do.* And this they would confirm from that place of Scripture, *Neh.* ix. 6. *Thou, even thou art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things that are therein, the seas and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee:* the host of heaven being commonly put for the stars. *Jesode Hattorah c 3. §. 9.*

XXXI. But lastly, this same thing is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the New Testament also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however polytheists and idolaters, were not unacquainted with the knowledge of the true God, that is, of the one only self-existent and omnipotent Being, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. *Paul* in his epistle to the Romans [1] tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχειν, *hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same.* Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however, by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as is afterwards declared; οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, *They liked not to retain God in the agnition,* or *practical knowledge of him.* Where there is a distinction to be observed betwixt γνῶσις and ἐπίγνωσις, *the knowledge* and *the agnition* of God; the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into polytheism and idolatry; which is the meaning of these words, μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει, *They changed the truth of God into a lye.* Again, the same Apostle there affirmeth, that the τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, *That, which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having shewed it unto them.* There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. *The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made.* Moreover, this Apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that censure, which he giveth of them, διότι *V. 28.* *V. 25.*

[1] Cap. I. 25.

V. 21. διότι γνόντες τὸν Θεὸν, οὐχ ὡς Θεὸν ἐδόξασαν, *that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God*; becauſe they fell into polytheiſm and idolatry. Though the Apoſtle here inſtanceth only in the latter of thoſe two, their *changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beaſts, and creeping things.* The reaſon whereof is, becauſe this idolatry of the Pagans, properly ſo called, that is, their worſhipping of ſtocks and ſtones, formed into the likeneſs of man or beaſt, was generally taken amongſt the Jews for the groſſeſt of all their religious miſcarriages. Thus *Philo* plainly declareth; ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίῳ, καὶ σελήνῃ, καὶ τῷ σύμπαντι οὐρανῷ τε καὶ κόσμῳ, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοχερεστάτων μερῶν ὡς Θεῶν πρόπολοί τε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι μέν· (πῶς γὰρ οὔ, τὸς ὑπηκόους τῷ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες) ἧττον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι, τῶν ξύλα καὶ λίθους, ἀργυρόν τε καὶ χρύσον, καὶ τὰς παραπλησίας ὕλας μορφωσάντων, &c. *Whoſoever worſhip the ſun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world, and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unqueſtionably err (they honouring the ſubjects of the prince) but they are guilty of the leſs iniquity and injuſtice than thoſe, who form wood and ſtone, gold and ſilver, and the like matters, into ſtatues to worſhip them,* &c. of which aſſertion he afterwards gives this account, τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον ἔρεισμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξέκοψαν, τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζῶντος ἀεὶ Θεοῦ προσήκουσαν ὑρόληψιν, *becauſe theſe have cut off the moſt excellent* fulcrum *of the ſoul, the perſuaſion of the ever-living God, by means whereof, like unballaſted ſhips, they are toſſed up and down perpetually, nor can be ever able to reſt in any ſafe harbour.* And from hence it came to paſs, that the polytheiſm of the Pagans, their worſhipping of inferior gods (as ſtars and dæmons) was vulgarly called alſo by the Jews and Chriſtians idolatry, it being ſo denominated by them *à famoſiore ſpecie.* Laſtly, the Apoſtle plainly declares, that the error of the Pagan ſuperſtition univerſally conſiſted (not in worſhipping many independent gods and creators, but) in joining creature-worſhip, as ſuch, ſome way or other, with the worſhip of the creator; *V.* 25. ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which words are either to be thus rendred; *They* [religiouſly] *worſhipped the creature, beſides the Creator*, that prepoſition being often uſed in this ſenſe, as for example, in this of *Ariſtotle*, where he affirmeth concerning *Plato*, that he did τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸς ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, (not make *numbers to be the things themſelves*, as the Pythagoreans had done, but) *unity and numbers to be beſides the things*; or τὸς ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, *numbers to exiſt by themſelves, beſides the ſenſibles:* he by numbers meaning, as *Ariſtotle* himſelf there expounds it, τὰ εἴδη, *the ideas* contained in the firſt intellect (which was *Plato's* ſecond divine hypoſtaſis) as alſo by τὸ ἓν, ὃ τοῖς εἴδεσι παρέχειλαι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, *that* ipſum unum, *or unity, which gives being to thoſe ideas*, is underſtood *Plato's* firſt divine hypoſtaſis. Or elſe the words ought to be tranſlated thus; *And worſhipped the creature above or more than the creator*, that prepoſition παρὰ being ſometimes uſed comparatively, ſo as to ſignify exceſs, as for example in *Luke* xiii. 2. *Think you that theſe Galileans were* ἁμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τὸς Γαλιλαίους, *ſinners beyond all the Galileans?* And *ver.* 4. *Think you, that thoſe eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell, were* ὀφειλέται παρὰ πάντας, *debtors above all the men, that dwelt in Jeruſalem?* According to either of which interpretations, it is ſuppoſed,

De Decal. p. 753.

Met. l. 1. *c.* 6. [P. 272. Tom. IV. Oper.]

poſed, that the Pagans did worſhip the true God, the Creator of the whole world; though they worſhipped the creature alſo, beſides him, or (perhaps in ſome ſenſe) above him, and more than him alſo. But as for that other interpretation of παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which *Beza* choſe rather to follow, that *they worſhipped the creature, the Creator being wholly paſſed by*, this is no true literal verſion, but only a gloſs or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain preconceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worſhip the ſupreme God or Creator, but univerſally transfer all their worſhip upon the creature only. But in what ſenſe the Pagans might be ſaid to worſhip the creatures, above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (becauſe it is not poſſible, that the creature, as a creature, ſhould be worſhipped with more internal and mental honour than the Creator thereof, look'd upon as ſuch) we leave others to enquire. Whether or no, becauſe when religious worſhip, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpretation and account, ſuch may be ſaid to worſhip the creature more than the Creator? Or whether becauſe ſome of theſe Pagans might more frequently addreſs their devotions to their inferior gods (as ſtars, dæmons and heroes) as thinking the ſupreme God, either above their worſhip, or incomprehenſible, or inacceſſible by them? Or laſtly, whether becauſe the image and ſtatue-worſhippers among the Pagans (whom the Apoſtle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to ſenſible objects, and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought, that the Apoſtle here taxes the Pagans meerly for worſhipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worſhipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtleſs their ſin was, that they gave any religious worſhip at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be ſaid, that they alſo worſhipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we ſee plainly, that the Pagan ſuperſtition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) conſiſted not in worſhipping of many creators, but in worſhipping the creatures together with the Creator.

Beſides this we have in the Acts of the Apoſtles an oration, which St. *Paul* made at *Athens* in the Areopagitick court, beginning after this manner; *Ye men of Athens, I perceive, that ye are every way more than ordinarily religious*; for the word δεισιδαιμονεστέρους ſeems to be taken there in a good ſenſe; it being not only more likely, that St. *Paul* would in the beginning of his oration thus *captare benevolentiam, conciliate their benevolence*, with ſome commendation of them, but alſo very unlikely, that he would call their worſhipping of the true God by the name of ſuperſtition, for ſo it followeth; *for as I paſſed by and beheld your ſacred things* (or monuments) *I found an altar with this inſcription*, Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ, *TO THE UNKNOWN GOD.* It is true, that both *Philoſtratus* [1] and *Pauſanias* [2] write, that there were at *Athens*, Ἀγνώστων Θεῶν βωμοί, *altars of unknown gods*: but their meaning in this might well be, not that there were altars dedicated to unknown gods plurally,

[1] De Vita Apollonii, Lib. VI. Cap. III. p. 232. [2] Lib. V. p. 199.

plurally, but that there were ſeveral altars, which had this ſingular inſcription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at leaſt one ſuch, beſides this ſcripture-record, is evident from that dialogue in *Lucian*'s works, intitled *Philopatris*[1], where *Critias* uſeth this form of oath, Νὴ τὸν Ἄγνωστον ἐν Ἀθήναις, *No, by the unknown god at* Athens: and *Triephon* in the cloſe of that dialogue ſpeaketh thus[2], Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἄγνωστον ἐφευρόντες, καὶ προσκυνήσαντες, χεῖρας εἰς ὕψος ἐκτείναντες, τούτῳ εὐχαριστήσομεν, ὡς καταξιωθέντες, &c. *But we having found out that unknown God at* Athens, *and worſhipped him, with hands ſtretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made ſubject to this power.* Which paſſages, as they do unqueſtionably refer to that Athenian inſcription either upon one or more altars, ſo does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the ſupreme governor of the world. And ſo it follows in St. *Paul*'s oration, ὃν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν, *Whom therefore you ignorantly worſhip* (under this name of the *Unknown God*) *him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth.* From which place we may upon firm ſcripture-authority conclude theſe two things; firſt, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who in all probability was therefore ſtyled by them, Ἄγνωστος Θεὸς, *the Unknown God*, becauſe he is not only inviſible, but alſo incomprehenſible by mortals; of whom *Joſephus* againſt *Appion*[3] writeth thus, that he is δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γνώριμον, ὁποῖος δὲ κατὰ οὐσίαν ἄγνωστος, *knowable to us only by the effects of his power, but as to his own eſſence, unknowable or incomprehenſible.* But when in *Dion Caſſius* the God of the Jews is ſaid to be ἄῤῥητον καὶ ἀειδῆ, not only *inviſible* but alſo *ineffable*, and when he is called in *Lucan*, *Incertus Deus*, *an Uncertain God*, the reaſon hereof ſeems to have been, not only becauſe there was no image of him, but alſo becauſe he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiouſly forborn amongſt the Jews in common uſe, that it might not be profaned. And what ſome learned men have here mentioned upon this occaſion, of the Pagans ſometimes ſacrificing προσήκοντι Θεῷ, *to the proper and convenient God*, without ſignifying any name, ſeems to be nothing to this purpoſe; that proceeding only from a ſuperſtitious fear of theſe Pagans (ſuppoſing ſeveral gods to preſide over ſeveral things) leſt they ſhould be miſtaken, in not applying to the right and proper God, in ſuch certain caſes, and ſo their devotion prove unſucceſsful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here ſaid to be ignorantly worſhipped by the Athenians, is to be underſtood chiefly in regard of their polytheiſm and idolatry. The ſecond thing, that may be concluded from hence, is this, that theſe Athenian Pagans did εὐσεβεῖν, *religiouſly worſhip the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth*; and ſo we have a ſcripture-confutation alſo of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worſhip the ſupreme God.

Laſtly, St. *Paul* citing this paſſage out of *Aratus* a heathen poet, concerning *Zeus* or *Jupiter*,

Τοῦ

[1] Cap. IX. p. 122. edit. Geſneri. [2] Cap. XXIII. p. 203. [3] Lib. II. Cap. XV. p. 482.

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν———

For we are his off-ſpring, and interpreting the ſame of the true God, *in whom we live and move, and have our being*; we have alſo here a plain Scripture-acknowledgment, that by the *Zeus* of the Greekiſh Pagans was ſometimes at leaſt meant the true God. And indeed that *Aratus* his *Zeus* was neither a man born in *Crete* nor in *Arcadia*, but the maker and ſupreme governor of the whole world, is evident both from the antecedent and the ſubſequent verſes. For *Aratus* his phænomena begins thus,

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα———

(which in *Tully*'s verſion is *ab Jove muſarum primordia*) and then follows a deſcription of this *Zeus* or *Jupiter:*

———τὸν μηδέποτ' ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
Ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαὶ,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραὶ, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

To this ſenſe; *Him, of whom we men are never ſilent; and of whom all things are full, he permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whoſe beneficence we all conſtantly make uſe of and enjoy: for we alſo are his off-ſpring.* Where *Theon* the ſcholiaſt writeth thus; πάνυ πρεπόντως ὁ Ἄρατος τὴν τῶν ἄστρων διεξιέναι μέλλων θέσιν, τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργὸν, Δία, ἐν πρώτοις προσφωνεῖ· Δία δὲ νῦν τὸν Δημιουργὸν ἀκουστέον· Aratus *being about to declare the poſition of the ſtars, doth, in the firſt place, very decorouſly and becomingly invoke* Zeus, *the father and maker of them: for by* Zeus *is here to be underſtood the Demiurgus of the world*; or, as he afterwards expreſſeth it, ὁ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσας θεὸς, *the God who made all things.* Notwithſtanding which, we muſt confeſs, that this ſcholiaſt there adds, that ſome of theſe paſſages of the poet, and even that cited by the Apoſtle, τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν, may be underſtood alſo in another ſenſe, of the Ζεὺς φυσικὸς, *the phyſical* Jupiter; that is, the air; but without the leaſt ſhadow of probability, and for no other reaſon, as we conceive, but only to ſhew his philological ſkill. However this is ſet down by him, in the firſt place, as the genuine and proper ſenſe of thoſe words, πρὸς τὸ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶντε· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἐδημιούργησε πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις βιωφιλὲς, αὐτῷ ἂν κληθείημεν, αὐτὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγραφόμενοι· *This agreeth with that title of* Jupiter, *when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all theſe other things for our uſe, we may well be called his, and alſo ſtyle him our father and maker.* And that this was the only notion, which the poet here had of *Zeus* or *Jupiter*, appears undeniably alſo from the following words; as,

———ὁ δ' ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι
Δέξια σημαίνει———

Who

Who, as a kind and benign father, sheweth lucky signs to men; which to understand of the air were very absurd. And,

Αὐτὸς γὰρ τάγε σήματ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν,
Ἄστρα διακρίνας· ἐσκέψατο δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
Ἀστέρας·

For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year.

And from this,

Τῷ μιν ἀεὶ πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται,

Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last. Upon which the scholiast thus, Ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σπονδῶν· τῷ τὴν μὲν πρώτην σπονδὴν εἶναι θεῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, δευτέραν δὲ ἡρώων, καὶ τρίτην Διὸς σωτῆρος· *This perhaps refers to the libations, in that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for* Jupiter *the Saviour.* From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget *Jupiter the Saviour*, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus;

Χαῖρε πάτερ μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ·

Where the supreme God is saluted, as *the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind.*

Wherefore it is evident from *Aratus* his context, that by his *Zeus* or *Jupiter* was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St. *Paul* and the Scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that *Aratus* was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also. Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by *M. Antoninus*, for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise, Ὗσον ὗσον ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων, *Rain, rain, O good* (or gracious) *Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians:* upon which the emperor thus, ἢ οὐκ δεῖ εὔχεσθαι, ἢ οὕτως ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως· *We should either not pray at all* (to God) *or else thus plainly and freely.* And since the Latins had the very same notion of *Jupiter*, that the Greeks had of *Zeus*, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their *Jupiter* also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We know nothing, that can be objected against this from the Scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. *Paul*[x], *In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God.* But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to

L. 5. §. 5. [§ VIII. *P.* 146.]

[x] 1 Corinth. I. 21.

o ſuch a practical knowledge of God, as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.

XXXII. But in order to a fuller explication of this Pagan theology, and giving yet a more ſatisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requiſite to be inſiſted on; firſt, that the intelligent Pagans worſhipped the one ſupreme God under many ſeveral names; ſecondly, that beſides this one God, they worſhipped alſo many gods, that were indeed inferior deities ſubordinate to him; thirdly, that they worſhipped both the ſupreme and inferior gods, in images, ſtatues and ſymbols, ſometimes abuſively called alſo gods. We begin with the firſt, that the ſupreme God amongſt the Pagans was *polyonymous*, and worſhipped under ſeveral perſonal names, according to ſeveral notions and conſiderations of him, from his ſeveral attributes and powers, manifeſtations, and effects in the world. *P.* 314, 315.

It hath been already obſerved out of *Origen*, that not only the Egyptians, but alſo the Syrians, Perſians, Indians, and other Barbarian Pagans, had, beſide their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one, amongſt their prieſts and learned men; and that the ſame was true concerning the Greeks and Latins alſo, is unqueſtionably evident from that account, that hath been given by us of their philoſophick theology. Where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we underſtand not only their mythical or fabulous, but alſo their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. *Auſtin* concerning both theſe, *Et civilis & fabuloſa ambæ fabuloſæ ſunt, ambæque civiles*; *That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous.* And by their more arcane or recondite theology, is doubtleſs meant that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which diſtinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philoſophers, but moſt expreſly by *Antiſtines*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and the Stoicks; ſo was it owned and much inſiſted upon, both by *Scævola*, that famous Roman *Pontifex*, and by *Varro*, that moſt learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then eſtabliſhed by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the true; and that there was another theology beſides it, called by them natural, which was the theology of wiſe men and of truth: nevertheleſs granting a neceſſity, that in cities and commonwealths, beſides this natural and true theology (which the generality of the vulgar were incapable of) there ſhould be another civil or political theology, accommodate to their apprehenſions; which civil theology differ'd from the natural, only by a certain mixture of fabuloſity in it, and was therefore look'd upon by them as a middle, betwixt the natural, and the fabulous or poetical theology. *P.* 114, 115. *Civ. D. l.* 4. *c.* 8. [Lib. V. Cap. VIII. p. 120. Tom. VII. Oper.]

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil alſo, was oftentimes very diſcrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wiſe men amongſt them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to diſſemble

and

and diſguiſe this difference, and by allegorizing the poetick fables of the gods, to bring that theology into ſome ſeeming conformity with the natural and philoſophick; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excuſed upon the neceſſity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only generate all the other gods, but even *Jupiter* himſelf alſo, their ſupreme Numen, it aſſigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. *Auſtin* [1] for ſuffering the ſtatue of *Jupiter*'s nurſe to be kept in the Capitol for a religious monument. And however this differ'd nothing at all from that atheiſtick doctrine of *Evemerus* [2], *That all the gods were really no other than mortal men*, yet was it tolerated and connived at by the politicians, in way of neceſſary compliance with the vulgar, it being ſo extremely difficult for them to conceive any ſuch living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Inſomuch, that *Callimachus* [3], who would by no means admit of *Jupiter*'s ſepulchre, either in *Crete* or *Arcadia* (but look'd upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reaſon,

Σὺ δ' ὦ θάνες, ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί,

Becauſe he was immortal and could never die; did notwithſtanding himſelf attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as *Origen* [4] and others obſerve. Nevertheleſs, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themſelves, did all this while conſtantly retain thus much of the natural and true theology amongſt them, that *Jupiter* was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole world, and conſequently himſelf without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of *Pauſanias*,

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεύς ἐστι, Ζεὺς ἔσσεται·———

Again the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetick, had not only many phantaſtick gods in it, but alſo an appearance of a plurality of independent deities; it making ſeveral ſupreme in their ſeveral territories and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the ſea, and another over the earth and hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learning, another the god of pleaſure, and another the god of war; and ſo for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (ſo called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain ſenſe, that is, of inferior deities ſubordinate to one ſupreme; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but ſuch as were natural, that is, ſuch as had a real exiſtence in nature and the world without, and

[1] De Civitate Dei, Lib. V. Cap. VII. p. 119.
[2] Apud Auguſtin. ubi ſupra
[3] Hymno in Jovem, Verſ. 9.
[4] Adverſ. Celſum, Lib. III. p. 137.

and not in men's opinion only. And theſe *Varro*[1] concluded to be no other than firſt, the ſoul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof ſuperior to men; that is, one ſupreme univerſal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, ſuch as ſtars, dæmons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods beſides theſe are frequently exploded by Pagan writers (as *Cicero* and others) under the name of *Dii Poetici*, that is, *not philoſophical, but poetical gods*, and *Dii Commentitii* and *Fictitii*, that is, *not natural and real, but feigned and fictitious gods.* They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing elſe but ſo many ſeveral names and notions of one ſupreme Numen, according to his ſeveral powers and various manifeſtations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wiſdom of the ancient Pagan theologers, that all thoſe manifold glories and perfections of the Deity ſhould not be huddled up, and as it were crouded and crumpled together, in one general acknowledgment of an inviſible Being, the Maker of the world, but that they ſhould be diſtinctly and ſeverally diſplayed, and each of them adored ſingly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and ſolemnity) under ſo many perſonal names. Which perhaps the unſkilful and ſottiſh vulgar might ſometimes miſtake, not only for ſo many real and ſubſtantial, but alſo independent and ſelf-exiſtent deities.

We have before proved, that one and the ſame ſupreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had ſeveral proper and perſonal names given him, according to ſeveral notions of him, and his ſeveral powers and effects; *Jamblichus* himſelf, in that paſſage already cited, plainly affirming thus much; *De Myſt. Ægypt.* [Sect. VIII. Cap. III. p. 159]

ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, &c. τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμοῦν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς Φθᾶ, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει· *The demiurgical Mind and preſident of truth, as with wiſdom it proceedeth to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power of the occult reaſons, contained within itſelf, into light, is called in the Egyptian language* Ammon; *as it artificially effects all things with truth,* Phtha; *as it is productive of good things,* Oſiris; *beſides which it hath alſo ſeveral other names, according to its other powers and energies:* as namely, *Neith,* (or according to *Proclus* his copy, Νηΐθας, *Neïthas*) the tutelar god of the city *Sais*, from whence probably the Greek Ἀθηνᾶ was derived, (the Athenians being ſaid to have been at firſt a colony of theſe *Saites*) and this is the divine wiſdom diffuſing itſelf thorough all. So likewiſe *Serapis*, which though ſome would have to be the ſun, is by others plainly deſcribed as an univerſal Numen. As *Ariſtides* in his eighth oration upon this god *Serapis*; Οἱ μὲν δὴ τῆς μεγάλης πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ πόλεως πολῖται, καὶ ἕνα τοῦτον ἀνακαλοῦσι Δία· ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται δυνάμει περιτῇ ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων ἥκει, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πεπλήρωκε· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων θεῶν διήρηνται αἱ δυνάμεις τε καὶ τιμαὶ, καὶ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ ὥσπερ κορυφαῖος πάντων, ἀρχὰς καὶ πέρατα ἔχει. *They, who inhabit the great city in* Egypt, *call upon this god* Serapis *as their only* Jupiter, *he being ſuppoſed to be no way defective in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole univerſe. And whereas the powers and honours of* *P. 95.*

[1] Apud Auguſtin. de Civitate Dei, Lib. V. Cap. IV, V. p. 116. Tom. VII. Oper. & Lib. VII. Cap. V, VI. p. 128.

the other gods are divided, and ſome of them are invoked for one thing, and ſome for another; this is looked upon by them as the Coryphæus *of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to ſupply all wants. Cneph* is alſo deſcribed by *Euſebius* [1] as that divine intellect, which was the demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by *Plutarch* [2] ſaid to be ἀγέννητος or *unmade*; ſo that this was alſo another Egyptian name of God; as likewiſe was *Emeph* and *Eicton* in *Jamblichus* [3]; though theſe may be ſeverally diſtinguiſhed into a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes. Laſtly, when *Iſis*, which was ſometimes called *Multimammea*, and made all over full of breaſts, to ſignify her feeding all things, thus deſcribes herſelf in *Apuleius* [4], *Summa numinum, prima cælitum, deorum dearumque facies uniformis, cujus numen unicum multiformi ſpecie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis*; as ſhe plainly makes herſelf to be the ſupreme Deity, ſo doth ſhe intimate, that all the gods and goddeſſes were *compendiouſly contained in her alone, and that ſhe (i. e.* the ſupreme God) *was worſhipped under ſeveral perſonal names, and with different rites, over the whole Pagan world.* Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by *Damaſcius* [5] the philoſopher, that, τὸ νοητὸν διηρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, *They multiplied the firſt intelligible (or the ſupreme Deity) breaking and dividing the ſame into the names and properties of many gods.* Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the reſt, but eſpecially of thoſe European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewiſe, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their beſtowing ſo many proper and perſonal names upon each of thoſe inferior gods of theirs; the ſun, and the moon, and the earth; the firſt whereof, uſually called *Apollo*, had therefore this epithet of πολυώνυμος commonly given to him, *the god with many names.* Which many proper names of his *Macrobius* inſiſteth upon in his *Saturnalia*, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only ſo called, but alſo *Diana*, and *Lucina*, and *Hecate*, and otherwiſe; inſomuch that this goddeſs alſo hath been ſtyled *Polyonymous* as well as her brother the ſun. And laſtly, the earth, beſides thoſe honorary titles, of *bona dea*, and *magna dea*, and *mater deorum*, *The good goddeſs*, and *the great goddeſs*, and *the mother of the gods*, was multiplied by them into thoſe many goddeſſes, of *Veſta*, and *Rhea*, and *Cybele*, and *Ceres*, and *Proſerpina*, and *Ops*, &c. And for this cauſe was ſhe thus deſcribed by *Æſchylus* [6];

Καὶ Γαῖα πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία·

Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

Now if theſe inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them ſo many perſonal names beſtowed upon them, much more might the ſupreme God be polyonymous amongſt them; and ſo indeed he was commonly ſtyled, as that learned

[1] Ex Porphyrio, Præpar. Evangel, Lib. III. Cap. XI. p. 115.
[2] De Iſide & Oſiride, p. 357. Oper.
[3] De Myſter. Ægypt. §. 8. Cap. III. p. 158.
[4] Metamorph. Lib. XII. p. 258, 259. Edit. Elmenhorſti.
[5] MS. περὶ πρώτων ἀρχῶν.
[6] In Prometheo vincto, p. 29. Edit. Guil. Canteri, Antwerp. 1580. in 12°.

learned Grammarian *Heſychius* intimates, upon that word Πολυώνυμον, τὴν μονάδα οὕτως ἐκάλεν, καὶ ἐπίθετον Ἀπόλλωνος, *they called the Monad thus, and it was alſo the epithet of* Apollo; where, by the Monad, according to the Pythagorick language, is meant the ſupreme Deity, which was thus ſtyled by the Pagans πολυώνυμον, *the Being that hath many names.* And accordingly *Cleanthes* thus beginneth that forecited hymn of his to him,

Κύδιϛ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε,

Thou moſt glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names. And *Zeno*, his maſter, in *Laertius* [1], expreſly declareth, ὁ Θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις ὀνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις· *God is called by many ſeveral names, according to his ſeveral powers and virtues*; whoſe inſtances ſhall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus alſo the writer *De Mundo* [2], Εἷς δὲ ὢν πολυώνυμός ἐϛι, καλανομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμεῖ. *God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variouſly denominated from his ſeveral attributes, and the effects produced by him. Quæcunque voles* (ſaith *Seneca*) *illi propria nomina aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cæleſtium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus poſſunt eſſe quot munera: You may give God whatſoever proper names you pleaſe, ſo they ſignify ſome force and effect of heavenly things: He may have as many names, as he hath manifeſtations, offices and gifts.* *Macrobius* [3] alſo, from the authority of *Virgil*, thus determines, *Unius Dei effectus varios pro variis cenſendos eſſe* (or as *Voſſius* corrects it, *cenſeri*) *numinibus, That the various effects of one God were taken for ſeveral gods*; that is, expreſſed by ſeveral perſonal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the ſun to have given names to divers gods, becauſe they gave occaſion for the ſun to be called by ſeveral proper and perſonal names. We ſhall conclude with that of *Maximus Madaurenſis* [4], before cited out of St. *Auſtin*, *Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffuſas nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut dum ejus quaſi quædam membra carptim variis ſupplicationibus proſequimur, totum colere profectò videamur. The virtues of this one ſupreme God, diffuſed throughout the whole world, we* (Pagans) *invoke under many ſeveral names, becauſe we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worſhipping his ſeveral divided members, muſt needs be judged to worſhip him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.* With which latter words ſeemeth to agree that of the Poet, wherein *Jupiter* thus beſpeaks the other gods;

Cœlicolæ, mea membra, Dei; quos noſtra poteſtas
Officiis diviſa facit.

De Ben. l. 1. [Cap. VII. p. 427. Tom. I. Oper.]

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many Pagan gods were but the ſeveral divided members of the one ſupreme Deity, whether, becauſe according to the Stoical ſenſe, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane ſoul; or elſe becauſe all thoſe other fantaſtic gods were nothing but ſeveral perſonal names, given to the ſeveral powers, virtues, and offices of the one ſupreme.

[1] Lib. VII. Segm. 147. p. 458.
[2] Cap. VII. p. 866. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtot.
[3] Saturnal. Lib. I. Cap. XVII. p. 272.
[4] Epiſt. ad Auguſtin. Vide Auguſtin. Oper. Tom. II. Epiſt. XVI. p. 15.

Now the ſeveral names of God, which the writer *De Mundo* [1] inſtanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are firſt of all ſuch as theſe; Βρονταῖος, and and Ἀστραπαῖος, *the Thunderer* and *Lightner*, Ὑέτιος, *the Giver of rain*, Ἐπικάρπιος, *the Beſtower of fruits*, Πολιεύς, *the Keeper of cities*, Μειλίχιος, *the Mild and Placable*, under which notion they ſacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth; together with many other ſuch epithets, as Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Στράτιος, Τροπαιοῦχος, Καθάρσιος, Παλαιμιαῖος, &c. and laſtly, he is called Σωτὴρ and Ἐλευθέριος, *Saviour and Aſſerter*. Anſwerably to which, *Jupiter* had many ſuch names given him alſo by the *Latins*, as *Victor*, *Invictus*, *Opitulus*, *Stator*; the true meaning of which laſt, (according to *Seneca* [2]) was not that, which the hiſtorians pretend, *quod poſt votum ſuſceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium ſtetit, becauſe once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to ſtand*; *ſed quod ſtant beneficio ejus omnia, but becauſe all things by means of him ſtand firm and are eſtabliſhed*. For which ſame reaſon he was called alſo by them (as St. *Auſtin* informs us [3]) *Centupeda, as it were, ſtanding firm upon an hundred feet*; and *Tigillus, the beam, prop, and ſupporter of the world*. He was ſtyled alſo by the Latins (amongſt other titles) *Almus* and *Ruminus*, i. e. *He that nouriſheth all things as it were with his breaſts*. Again that writer *De Mundo* addeth another ſort of names, which God was called by; as Ἀνάγκη, *Neceſſity*, becauſe he is an immoveable eſſence, though *Cicero* gives another reaſon for that appellation, *Interdum Deum neceſſitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter eſſe poſſit, atque ab eo conſtitutum ſit*; *they ſometimes call God Neceſſity, becauſe nothing can be otherwiſe than as it is by him appointed*. Likewiſe Εἱμαρμένη, *becauſe all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unhinderably*. Πεπρωμένη, *becauſe all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined.)* Μοῖρα, *becauſe he makes an apt diviſion and diſtribution of all things*. Ἀδράστεια, *becauſe his power is ſuch, as that none can poſſibly avoid or eſcape him*. Laſtly, that ingenious fable, (as he calls it) of the three fatal ſiſters, *Clotho*, *Lacheſis*, and *Atropos*, according to him, meant nothing but God neither, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν ἓν ἀλλό τι, πλὴν ὁ Θεὸς, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησὶ, *All this is nothing elſe but God, as the noble and generous* Plato *alſo intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things*. And both *Cicero* and *Seneca* tell us, that, amongſt the Latins, God was not only called *Fatum*, but alſo *Natura*, and *Fortuna*. *Quid aliud eſt natura* (ſaith *Seneca* [4]) *quam Deus, & divina ratio, toti mundo & partibus ejus inſerta? What is nature elſe, but God and the divine Reaſon, inſerted into the whole world and all its ſeveral parts?* He adding, *that God and nature were no more two different things, than* Annæus *and* Seneca. And, *Nonnunquam Deum* (ſaith *Cicero* [5]) *Fortunam appellant, quod efficiat multa improviſa, & nec opinata nobis, propter obſcuritatem ignorationemque cauſarum*; *They ſometimes call God alſo by the name of Fortune, becauſe he ſurpriſeth us in many events, and bringeth to paſs things unexpected to us, by reaſon of the obſcurity of cauſes and our ignorance*. *Seneca* thus concludes concerning theſe, and the like names of God, *Omnia ejuſdem*

Ruma Mamma.

Acad. Q. l. 1. [Cap. VII. p. 2233. Tom VIII. Oper.]

[1] Cap. VII. p. 866. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtot.

[2] De Benefic. Lib. IV. Cap. VII. p. 427. Tom. I. Oper.

[3] De Civit. Dei. Lib. VII. Cap. XI. p. 131. Tom. VII. Oper.

[4] Ut ſupra.

[5] Acad. Quæſt. Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 2233. Tom. VIII. Oper.

ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, variè utentis sua potestate ; these are all names of one and the same God, variously manifesting his power.

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. *Austin*, that they had no such appearance or shew of many distinct gods ; *Hæc omnia cognomina imposuerunt uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res, etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt, &c. Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them ; as if* Victor *were one god, and* Invictus *another god, and* Centupeda *another god, and* Tigillus *another, and* Ruminus *another*, &c. Wherefore there are other names of God used amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts ; first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature ; and secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For first of all, *PAN*, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the *Harmostes* of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of *Orpheus* [a] (or *Onomacritus*) C. D. l. 7. c. 11. [P. 131.]

Ἁρμονίαν κόσμοιο κρέκων Φιλοπαίγμονι μολπῇ.

So have we before showed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously ; and as being still kept in tune, acted and governed by the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other Orphick passage,

Βόσκων ἀνθρώπων γενεὴν, καὶ ἀτέρμονα γαῖαν,

Pascens humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.

And this *Pan Socrates*, in *Plato*'s *Phædrus*, plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. *Pan* therefore is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one *Pan*, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in a manner all things.

Again, *JANUS*, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of *Martial* [b],

———*Nitidique fator pulcherrime mundi.*

And

[a] In Hymno in Panem, p. 109. edit. Eschenbach. [b] Epigr. Lib. X. Epigr. XXVIII. p. 411.

Faſt. 1. [Ver. 117.] And again in this of *Ovid*;

Quicquid ubique vides, cœlum, mare, nubila, terras,
Omnia ſunt noſtra clauſa patentque manu:
Me penes eſt unum vaſti cuſtodia mundi.

From which paſſages it alſo appears, that *Janus* was not the meer ſenſeleſs and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle preſiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this *Janus*, becauſe he was accounted the moſt ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. *Auſtin* concluding him to be the ſame with *Jupiter*, therefore quarrels with the Pagans (that is, with their civil theology) for thus making two gods of one: *Cum ergo* Janus *mundus ſit, &* Jupiter *mundus ſit, unuſque ſit mundus, quare duo dii ſunt* Janus *&* Jupiter? *Quare ſeorſum habent templa, ſeorſum aras, diverſa ſacra, diſſimilia ſimulachra? Si propterea, quia alia vis eſt primordiorum, alia cauſarum, ex illa* Jani, *ex iſta* Jovis *nomen accepit: nunquid ſi unus homo in diverſis rebus duas habeat poteſtates, aut duas artes, (quia ſingularum diverſa vis eſt) ideo duo dicuntur artifices? &c. Since therefore* Janus *is the world, and* Jupiter *is the world, and there is but one world, how can* Janus *and* Jupiter *be two gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, diſtinct ſacred things, and ſtatues of different forms? If becauſe the force of beginnings is one, and the force of cauſes another, he is therefore called* Janus *from the former, and* Jupiter *from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two ſeveral arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reaſon, why one and the ſame god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the cauſes, ſhould therefore be accounted two gods?* Where, when *Jupiter* and *Janus* are both ſaid to be the world, this is to be underſtood properly not of the matter, but the ſoul or mind of the world, as St. *Auſtin* himſelf elſewhere declares; *Sit* Jupiter *corporei hujus mundi animus, qui univerſam iſtam molem, ex quatuor elementis conſtructam atque compactam, implet & movet*; *Let* Jupiter *be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements.* Nevertheleſs, as the ſoul and body both together are called the man, ſo was the whole animated world, by the Pagans, called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. *Auſtin*, though it be good againſt the Pagans civil theology, yet their other arcane and natural theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reaſons was worſhipped under ſeveral names, and with different rites. Wherefore *Janus* and *Jupiter*, being really but different names for one and the ſame ſupreme God, that conjecture of *Salmaſius* ſeems very probable, that the Romans derived their *Janus* from Ζανὸς, the *Ætolian Jupiter*.

C. D. l. 7. *c.* 10. [P. 131.]

C. D. l. 4. *c.* 11. [P. 76.]

GENIUS was alſo another of the twenty ſelect Roman gods; and that this was likewiſe a univerſal Numen, containining the whole nature of things, appears

appears from this of *Festus*[1], *Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium genendarum; They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things*, Genius. And St. *Austin* also plainly declareth *Genius* to be the same with *Jupiter*; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God; *Cum alio loco* [Varro] *dicit, Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic est igitur, quem appellant* Jovem. And afterwards, *Restat ut eum singulariter & excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc* Jovem. *When* Varro *elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one, a* Genius, *and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world, to be God; he plainly implieth, that God is the universal* Genius *of the world, and that* Genius *and* Jupiter *are the same. And though* Genius *be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god* Genius, *spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or* Jupiter. C. D. l. 7. c. 13. [P. 132.]

Again, that *CHRONOS* or *SATURN* was no particular Deity, but the universal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by *Dionysius* of *Halicarnassus*, where commending the fertility of *Italy*, he writeth thus; οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς παλαίους ἱερὰν ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦ Κρόνου τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τὸν μὲν δαίμονα τοῦτον, οἰομένους εἶναι πάσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα, καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε Χρόνον αὐτὸν δεῖ καλεῖν, ὡς Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσιν, εἴτε Κρόνον ὡς Ῥωμαῖοι, πᾶσαν δὲ περιειληφότα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἄν τις ὀνομάσοι· *Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to* Saturn, *they supposing this god to be the giver and perfecter of all happiness to men; whether we ought to call him* Chronos, *as the Greeks will have it, or* Cronos *as the Romans; he being either way such a god, as comprehends the whole nature of the world.* But the word *Saturn* was Hetrurian (which language was originally Oriental) and being derived from סתר, signifies *hidden*; so that by *Saturn* was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans *Deus Latius, the hidden God*; as the wife of *Saturn* in the pontifical books is *Latia Saturni*, and the land itself (which in the Hetrurian language was *Saturnia)* is in the Roman *Latium*; from whence the inhabitants were called Latins, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that *Saturn* could not be inferior to *Jupiter*, according to the fabulous Theology, is plain from hence, because he is therein said to have been his Father. But then the question will be, how *Saturn* and *Jupiter* could be both of them one and the same universal Numen? To which there are several Answers. For first, *Plato* who propounds this difficulty in his *Cratylus*, solves it thus; That by *Jupiter* here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which *Chronos* is interpreted to be) as *Chronos* also depended upon *Uranus* or *Cœlus*, the *supreme heavenly God*, or *first original Deity*. So that *Plato* here finds his Trinity of divine hypostases, archical and universal, Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς, and Ψυχὴ, in *Uranus*, *Chronos*, and *Zeus*; in *Cœlus*, *Saturn*, and *Jupiter*. Others conceive, that according to the plainer and Rom. Ant. l. 1. p. 24. Steph.

[1] De Verborum Significat. Lib. VII. p. 292. Edit. Godofredi.

and more ſimple ſenſe of *Heſiod*'s *Theogonia*, that *Jupiter*, who, together with *Neptune* and *Pluto*, is ſaid to have been the ſon of *Saturn*, was not the ſupreme Deity, nor the ſoul of the world neither, but only the *Æther*, as *Neptune* was the ſea, and *Pluto* the earth. All which are ſaid to have been begotten by *Chronos* or *Saturn* the ſon of *Uranus*; that is as much as to ſay, by the hidden virtue of the ſupreme heavenly God. But the writer *De Mundo*[1], though making *Jupiter* to be the firſt and ſupreme God, yet (taking *Chronos* to ſignify *immenſity of duration*, or *eternity*) will have *Jupiter* to be the ſon of *Chronos* in this ſenſe, becauſe he doth διήκειν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, *continue from one eternity to another*; ſo that *Chronos* and *Zeus* are to him in a manner one and the ſame thing. But we are apt to think, that no ingenious and learned Pagan, who well underſtood the natural theology, would deny, but that the beſt anſwer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent ſenſe to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. *Auſtin*[2], from *Varro*, gives us this account of *Saturn*, that it is he, who produceth from himſelf continually the hidden ſeeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himſelf; which ſome think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning *Saturn* his devouring his male-children, becauſe the forms of theſe corporeal things are perpetually deſtroyed, whilſt the material parts (ſignified by the female) ſtill remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being alſo ſometimes thus defined by them, as St. *Auſtin* likewiſe informs us, *Sinus quidam naturæ in ſeipſo continens omnia, A certain boſom, or deep hollow, and inward receſs of nature, which containeth within itſelf all things.* And St. *Auſtin* himſelf concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of *Saturn* likewiſe, the Pagans *Jupiter* and *Saturn* were really but one and the ſame Numen. *De Civ. D. l. 7. c. 13.* Wherefore we may with good reaſon affirm, that *Saturn* was another name for the ſupreme God amongſt the Pagans, it ſignifying that ſecret and hidden power, which comprehends, pervades, and ſupports the whole world; and which produces the ſeeds or ſeminal principles and forms of all things from itſelf. As alſo *Uranus* or *Cœlus* was plainly yet another name for the ſame ſupreme Deity; (or the firſt divine *hypoſtaſis*) comprehending the whole.

C. D. l. 4. c. 12. [P. 77.]

Thus in that old Inſcription, *OPTIMUS MAXIMUS COELUS ÆTERNUS JUPITER.*

In the next place, though it be true, that *Minerva* be ſometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifeſtation of him in the *Æther*, (as ſhall be ſhewed afterwards;) yet was it often taken alſo for the ſupreme God, according to his moſt general notion, or as a univerſal Numen diffuſing himſelf through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that *Neith* or *Neithas* was the ſame amongſt the Egyptians, as *Athena* amongſt the Greeks, and *Minerva* amongſt the Latins; which that it was a univerſal Numen, appears from that Egyptian inſcription in the temple of this god, *I am all that was, is, and ſhall be.* And accordingly *Athenagoras* tells us[3], that *Athena* of the Greeks was, ἡ φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, *Wiſdom paſſing and diffuſing itſelf through all things:* as in the book of *Wiſdom* it is called, ἡ πάντων τεχνίτις, *the Artifex of all things*, and is ſaid διήκειν καὶ χωρεῖν διὰ πάντων, *to paſs and move through all things.* Wherefore this *Athena*

[1] Cap. VII. p. 869. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtot. Tom. VII. Oper.
[2] De Civit. Dei. Lib. VII. Cap. XIII. p. 132. [3] Legat. pro Chriſtianis. Cap. XIX. p. 86.

Athena or *Minerva* of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite Mind, the original of all things; or else a second divine hypostasis, the immediate off-spring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus *Aristides* in his oration upon *Minerva*[1], πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα περὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀθηνᾶς· κεφάλαιον δὲ εἰπεῖν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστι μόνη δὴ μόνου· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν ἐξ ὅτου ὁμοτίμου ποιήσειεν αὐτήν· ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας αὐτὸς εἰς αὐτὸν, αὐτός ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενᾶ τε καὶ τίκτει τὴν θεόν· ὥστε ἔστι μόνη βεβαίως γνησία τοῦ πατρός, ἐξ ἴσου καὶ ὁμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ γένους γενομένη, &c. *Wherefore all the most excellent things are in* Minerva, *and from her: but to speak briefly of her, this is the only immediate off-spring of the only maker and king of all things; for he had none of equal honour with himself, upon whom he should beget her, and therefore retiring into himself, he begot her and brought her forth from himself: so that this is the only genuine off-spring of the first father of all.* And again, Πίνδαρος δ' αὖ φησὶ, δεξιὰν κατὰ χεῖρα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὴν καθεζομένην, τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδέχεσθαι· ἀγγέλου μὲν γάρ ἐστι μείζων ἡ δὲ, τῶν ἀγγέλων ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτάττει πρώτη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παραλαμβάνουσα ἀντ' ἐξηγητοῦ τινος οὖσα τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ εἰσαγωγέως ὅταν καὶ τούτου δέῃ· Pindar *also affirmeth concerning* Minerva, *that sitting at the right-hand of her father, she there receiveth commands from him to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater than the angels, and commandeth them some one thing and some another, accordingly as she had first received of her father; she performing the office of an interpreter and introducer to the gods, when it is needful.* Where we may observe by the way, that this word *angel* came to be in use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians, about this very age that *Aristides* lived in; after which we meet with it frequently in the writings of their philosophers. Lastly, *Aristides* thus concludeth his oration upon *Minerva*; σχεδὸν γὰρ δύναμιν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι λέγων τὶς αὐτὴν ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· ὥστε τί δε μικρολογεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν μέρει πράξεις αὐτῆς διηγούμενον, ὅποτ' ἔξεστι τὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργα κοινὰ τοῦ Διὸς, εἶναι φῆσαι καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς· *He that from what we have said will determine, that* Minerva *is as it were the power and virtue of* Jupiter *himself, will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to* Minerva) *we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of* Jupiter *are common with* Jupiter *and* Minerva. Wherefore that conceit, which the learned and industrious *Vossius*[2] somewhere seems to favour, that the Pagans universal Numen was no other than a sensless nature, or spermatick reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle, (which is indeed no better than downright atheism) is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of *Neith*, *Athena*, and *Minerva*, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten off-spring of it.

To *Minerva* may be added *Apollo*, who, though often taken for the sensible sun animated, and so an inferior Deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve *Consentes*, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly

 testified

[1] Pag. 192. [2] De Idololatr. Lib. VII. Cap. I. p. 718.

teſtified by *Plutarch* (who is a competent witneſs in this caſe, he being a prieſt of this *Apollo*) writing thus concerning him in his defect of oracles;
Pag. 413. εἴτε ἥλιός ἐστιν εἴτε κύριος ἡλίου, καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὁρατοῦ παντὸς, οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀπαξιοῦν φωνῆς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους, οἷς αἴτιός ἐστι γενέσεως καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν. *Whether* Apollo *be the ſun, or whether he be the lord and father of the ſun, placed far above all ſenſible and corporeal nature, it is not likely, that he ſhould now deny his oracles to them, to whom himſelf is the cauſe of generation and nouriſhment, of life and underſtanding.*

Moreover *Urania Aphrodite*, the Heavenly *Venus* or Love, was a univerſal Numen alſo, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the ſame with that Ἔρως, or *Love*, which *Orpheus*, and others in *Ariſtotle*, made to be the firſt original of all things: for it is certain, that the ancients diſtinguiſhed concerning a double *Venus* and Love. Thus *Pauſanias* in *Plato*'s *Sympoſium*,
Pag. 108. ἡ μέν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα, Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὲ πάνδημον καλοῦμεν· ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ Ἔρωτα, τὸν μὲν ἑτέρᾳ συνεργὸν, πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ οὐράνιον· *There are two* Venus's, *and therefore two Loves; one the older and without a mother, the daughter of* Uranus *or heaven, which we call the heavenly* Venus; *another younger, begotten from* Jupiter *and* Dione, *which we call the vulgar* Venus: *and accordingly are there of neceſſity two loves, anſwering to theſe two* Venus's, *the one vulgar and the other heavenly.* The elder of theſe two *Venus's* is in *Plato* ſaid to be ſenior to *Japhet* and *Saturn*, and by *Orpheus* [1] the oldeſt of all things, and πρῶτος γενέτωρ, *the firſt begetter of all.* Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations *Mylitta* or *Genitrix*; as being the fruitful mother of all. This was alſo the ſame with *Plato*'s τὸ πρῶτον καλὸν, *the firſt fair*; the cauſe of all pulchritude, order and harmony in the world And *Pauſanias* [2] the writer tells us, that there were temples ſeverally erected to each of theſe *Venus's* or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that *Urania*, or the heavenly *Venus*, was ſo called, ἐπὶ ἔρωτι καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπηλαμένῳ πόθου σωμάτων, *becauſe the love belonging to it was pure and free from all corporeal affection*: which, as it is in men, is but a participation of that firſt *Urania*, or heavenly *Venus* and Love, God himſelf. And thus is *Venus* deſcribed by *Euripides* in *Stobæus* [3], as the ſupreme Numen:

Thus alſo by *Æſchylus*, Ἐρᾶ μὴν ἁγνὸς οὐρανὸς, &c. Ἔρως δὲ γαῖαν λαμβάνει, &c. — τῶν δ' ἐνὼ παραίτιος *Grot. Excerp. p.* 45.

Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὅση θεός;
Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἀν,
Ὅση πέφυκε καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον διέρχεται·
Αὕτη τρέφει δὲ κἀμὲ καὶ πάντας βροτοὺς, &c.

To this ſenſe; *Do you not ſee, how great a God this* Venus *is? but you are never able to declare her greatneſs, nor to meaſure the vaſt extent thereof. For this is ſhe, which nouriſheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conſpire together*, &c. But by *Ovid* this is more fully expreſſed, in his *Faſtorum* [4]:

Illa

[1] In Hymno in Venerem, p. 151. Oper.
[2] In Bœotic. Lib. IX. Cap. XVI. p. 742.
[3] Eclog. Phyſ. Lib. I. Cap. XVII. p. 97.
[4] Lib. IV. verſ. 91.

Illa quidem totum diguiſſima temperat orbem,
Illa tenet nullo regna minora Deo:
Juraque dat cælo, terræ, natalibus undis;
Perque ſuos initus continet omne genus.
Illa deos omnes (longum enumerare) creavit;
Illa ſatis cauſas arboribuſque dedit.

Where all the gods are ſaid to have been created or made by *Venus*, that is, by the one ſupreme Deity. But laſtly, this is beſt of all performed by *Severinus Boetius*, a Chriſtian philoſopher and poet, in this manner: *De Conſ. l. 2. Met. 8.*

Quod mundus ſtabili fide
Concordes variat vices,
Quod pugnantia ſemina
Fœdus perpetuum tenent;
Quod Phœbus *roſeum diem*
Curru provehit aureo; &c.
Hanc rerum ſeriem ligat,
Terras ac pelagus regens,
Et cœlo imperitans, AMOR, &c.
Hic ſi frœna remiſerit,
Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
Bellum continuò geret.
Hic ſancto populos quoque
Junctos fœdere continet;
Hic & conjugii ſacrum
Caſtis nectit amoribus, &c.
O felix hominum genus,
Si veſtros animos AMOR,
Quo cœlum regitur, regat.

And to this *Urania*, or heavenly *Venus*, was near of kin alſo that third *Venus* in *Pauſanias* called Ἀποστροφία, and by the *Latins Venus verticordia*, *pure and chaſte Love*, expulſive of all unclean luſts, to which the *Romans* conſecrated a ſtatue, as *Valerius M.* tells us, *(L. 8. c. 15.) quo facilius virginum mulierumque mentes à libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur*; *to this end, that the minds of the female ſex might then the better be converted from luſt and wantonneſs to chaſtity.* We conclude therefore, that *Urania*, or the heavenly *Venus*, was ſometimes amongſt the Pagans a name for the ſupreme Deity, as that which is the moſt amiable being, and firſt pulchritude, the moſt benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the conſtant harmonizer of the whole world.

Again, though *Vulcan*, according to the moſt common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongſt the particular gods, yet had he alſo another more univerſal conſideration. For *Zeno* in *Laertius*[1] tells us, that the ſupreme God was called Ἥφαιστος or *Vulcan*, κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ διάτα-

[1] Lib. VII. ſegm. 147. p. 458.

σιν τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτοῦ, *as his Hegemonick acted in the artificial fire.* Now *Plutarch* [1] and *Stobæus* [2] teſtify, that the Stoicks did not only call nature, but alſo the ſupreme Deity itſelf, (the architect of the whole world) τεχνικὸν πῦρ, *an artificial fire*, they conceiving him to be corporeal. And *Jamblichus* [3] making *Phtha* to be the ſame ſupreme God, amongſt the Egyptians, with *Oſiris* and *Hammon*, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the ſoul of the world, tells us, that *Hephæſtus*, in the Greekiſh theology, was the ſame with this Egyptian *Phtha*; Ἕλληνες εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθᾶ, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, *amongſt the Greeks* Hephæſtus *(or* Vulcan*) anſwers to the Egyptian* Phtha. Wherefore as the Egyptians by *Phtha*, ſo the Greeks by *Hephæſtus*, ſometimes underſtood no other than the ſupreme God, or at leaſt the ſoul of the world, as artificially framing all things.

De Ben. l 4. *c.* 8. Furthermore, *Seneca* gives us yet other names of the ſupreme Deity, according to the ſenſe of the Stoicks; *Hunc & liberum patrem, &* Herculem, *ac* Mercurium *noſtri putant*, Liberum Patrem, *quia omnium parens*, &c. Herculem, *quod vis ejus invicta ſit*; Mercurium, *quia ratio penes illum eſt, numeruſque, & ordo, & ſcientia. Furthermore, our philoſophers take this auctor of all things to be* Liber Pater, Hercules, *and* Mercury; *the firſt, becauſe he is parent of all things*, &c. *the ſecond, becauſe his force and power is unconquerable*, &c. *and the third, becauſe there is in and from him reaſon, number, order, and knowledge.* And now we ſee already, that the ſupreme God was ſufficiently polyonymous amongſt the Pagans; and that all theſe, *Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cœlus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephæſtus, Liber Pater, Hercules*, and *Mercury*, were not ſo many really diſtinct and ſubſtantial gods, much leſs ſelf-exiſtent and independent ones; but only ſeveral names of that one ſupreme univerſal and all-comprehending Numen, according to ſeveral notions and conſiderations of him.

But beſides theſe, there were many other Pagan gods called by *Servius dii ſpeciales, ſpecial or particular gods*; which cannot be thought neither to have been ſo many really diſtinct and ſubſtantial beings (that is, natural gods) much leſs ſelf-exiſtent and independent, but only ſo many ſeveral names or notions of one and the ſame ſupreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifeſtations of it. It is true, that ſome late Chriſtian writers againſt the polytheiſm and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at leaſt a trinity of independent gods, *viz. Jupiter, Neptune*, and *Pluto*, as ſharing the government of the whole world amongſt theſe three, and conſequently acknowledging no one univerſal Numen. Notwithſtanding which it is certain, that according to the more arcane doctrine, and *Cabala* of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, theſe three conſidered as diſtinct and independent gods, were accounted but *dii poetici & commentitii, poetical and fictitious gods*, and they were really eſteemed no other, than ſo many ſeveral names and notions of one and the ſame ſupreme Numen, as acting variouſly in thoſe ſeveral parts of the world, the heaven, the ſea, the earth, and hell. For firſt, as to *Pluto* and *Hades*, called alſo

[1] De Placit. Philoſ. Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 881. Oper.

[2] Eclog. Phyſ. Lib. I. Cap. II. p. 17.

[3] De Myſter. Ægyptior. Sect. VIII. Cap. III. p. 159.

also by the Latins *Orcus*, and *Dis*, (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of *Dives* to answer the Greek *Pluto*) as *Balbus* in *Cicero*[1] attributes to him, *omnem vim terrenam, all terrene power*, so others commonly assign him the *regimen of separate souls after death.* Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by *Plato* understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of *the divine providence, which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death.* This *Ficinus* observed upon *Plato's Cratylus, Animadverte præ cæteris*, Plutonum *hic significare præcipuè providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem: You are to take notice, that by* Pluto *is here meant that part of divine providence, which belongeth to separate souls.* For this is that, which, according to *Plato, binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the best vinculum of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights, which they there enjoy.* And thus is he also to be understood in his book of laws, writing in this manner concerning *Pluto*; Καὶ ὁ δυχεραντέου πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεὸν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον, ὡς ὄντα ἀεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον· κοινωνία γὰρ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι, διαλύσεως ἄκ ἔστιν ἢ χρεῖττον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν σπουδῇ λέγων· *Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this God* Pluto, *but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolution or separation of them.* *Pluto* therefore, according to *Plato*, is nothing else but a name for that part of the divine providence, that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies. And upon this account was *Pluto* styled by *Virgil*[2], the Stygian *Jupiter.* But by others *Pluto*, together with *Ceres*, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer *de Mundo*[3] to be understood, when he tells us, that God or *Jupiter* is ἠραιός τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος ὢν φύσεως τε καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν· *Both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things.* *Pluto* therefore is Ζεὺς χθόνιος or καταχθόνιος, *the terrestrial* (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean) *Jupiter*; and that other *Jupiter*, which is distinguished both from *Pluto* and *Neptune*, is properly Ζεὺς ἠράνιος, *the heavenly* Jupiter, God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that *Zeus* and *Hades*, *Jupiter* and *Pluto* are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage, which *Julian*[4] cites as an oracle of *Apollo*, but others impute to *Orpheus*,

Lib. 8. [P. 642.]

Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης,

Jupiter *and* Pluto *are one and the same God.* As also that *Euripides*, in a place before produced, is so doubtful, whether he should call the supreme God (τὸν παντὸς μεδέοντα, *that takes care of all things here below*) *Zeus* or *Hades*:

—— Ζεὺς

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVII. p. 2994. Oper.
[2] Æneid. Lib. VII. vers. 327.
[3] Cap. VII. p. 869. Oper. Aristot.
[4] Orat. IV. in Regem Solem, p. 136.

——— Ζεὺς, εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος σέργεις·

Whether thou hadſt rather be called Jupiter *or* Pluto.

Laſtly, *Hermeſianax* the Colophonian poet, in thoſe verſes of his (afterward to be ſet down) makes *Pluto* in the firſt place, (with many other Pagan gods) to be really one and the ſame with *Jupiter*.

That *Neptune* was alſo another name of the ſupreme God, from another particular conſideration of him, namely, as acting in the ſeas, (at leaſt according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans,) is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. *Xenocrates* in *Stobæus* [1], and *Zeno* in *Laertius* [2], affirm, that God as acting in the water is called *Poſidone* or *Neptune*.

De N. D. l. 2. [Cap. XXVIII. p. 2996] To the ſame purpoſe *Balbus* in *Cicero*: *Sed tamen his fabulis ſpretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujuſque rei, per terras* Ceres, *per maria* Neptunus, *alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, qui qualeſque ſint*, &c. *But theſe poetick fables concerning the gods being deſpiſed and rejected, it is eaſy for us to underſtand, how God paſſing through the nature of every thing, may be called by ſeveral names, as through the earth* Ceres, (and *Pluto*) *through the ſeas* Neptune; *and through other parts of the world by other names*: ſo that all theſe titular gods were but ſo many ſeveral denominations of one ſupreme Deity. And *Cotta* afterward thus repreſents the ſenſe of this theology, Neptunum *eſſe dicis animum cum intelligentiâ per mare pergentem, idem de* Cerere: *Your meaning is,* Neptune *is a mind, which with underſtanding paſſes through the ſea, and the like of* Ceres *through the earth.* Laſtly, to name no more, *Maximus Tyrius* agreeth alſo herewith, καλεῖ τὸν μὲν Δία νῶν πρεσβύταλον, &c. τὸν δὲ Ποσειδῶ, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάτης ἰὸν, οἰκονομῶν αὐτῶν τὴν σύσιν καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν· *You are to call* Jupiter *that princely mind, which all things follow and obey*, &c. *and* Neptune *that ſpirit, which paſſing through the earth and ſea, cauſes their ſtate and harmony.*

De N. D. l. 3. [Cap. XXV. p. 3090.]

Diſſert. 30. [Cap. XXIX. p. 290.]

Laſtly, that theſe three *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, were not three really diſtinct ſubſtantial beings, but only ſo many ſeveral names for one ſupreme God, (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans) is thus plainly declared by *Pauſanias* in his *Corinthiacks* [3]; he there expounding the meaning of a certain ſtatue of *Jupiter* with three eyes, (called the country *Jupiter* of the Trojans) in this manner: τρεῖς δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷ δε ἄν τις τεκμαίροιτο αὐτὸν· Δία γὰρ ἐν ὐρανῷ βατιλεύειν, ἔτος μὲν λόγος κοινὸς πάντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. Ὃν δὲ ἄρχειν φασὶν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἔστιν ἔπος τῶν Ὁμήρου Δία ὀνομάζον καὶ τοῦτον,

Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Αἰσχύλος δὲ ὁ Εὐφορίωνος καλεῖ Δία καὶ τὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ· Τρισὶν ἓν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὅστις δὴ ἓν ὁποιήσας, ἅτε ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις λήξεσιν ἄρχοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον θεόν· *Now that this ſtatue of* Jupiter *was made to have three eyes, one may gueſs this to have been the reaſon; becauſe firſt the common*

[1] Eclog. Phyſic. Lib. I. Cap. IX. p. 56.
[2] Lib. VII. Segm. 147. p. 458.
[3] Lib. II. Cap. XXIV. p. 166.

common ſpeech of all men makes Jupiter *to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is, ſaid to rule under the earth, is in a certain verſe of* Homer, *called* Zeus *or* Jupiter *too, namely the infernal or ſubterraneous* Jupiter *together with* Proſerpina. *And laſtly,* Æſchylus, *the ſon of* Euphorion, *calls that God, who is the king of the ſea alſo,* Jupiter. *Wherefore this ſtatuary made Jupiter with three eyes, to ſignify, that it is one and the ſame God, which ruleth in thoſe three ſeveral parts of the world, the heaven, the ſea, and the earth.* Whether *Pauſanias* were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed ſtatue of *Jupiter*, it is evident, that himſelf, and other ancient Pagans acknowledged *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*, to be but three ſeveral names, and partial conſiderations of one and the ſame God, who ruleth over the whole world. And ſince both *Proſerpina* and *Ceres* were really the ſame with *Pluto*, and *Salacia* with *Neptune*; we may well conclude, that all theſe, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, *Salacia*, *Pluto*, *Proſerpina*, and *Ceres*, though ſeveral poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the ſame natural and philoſophical God.

Moreover, as *Neptune* was a name for God, as manifeſting himſelf in the ſea, and ruling over it, ſo was *Juno* another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expreſly affirmed both by *Xenocrates* in *Stobæus* [1], and *Zeno* in *Laertius* [2]. And St. *Auſtin* [3] propounding this *quære*, why *Juno* was joined to *Jupiter* as his wife and ſiſter, makes the Pagans anſwer thus to it, *Quia* Jovem (*inquiunt*) *in æthere accipimus, in aëre* Junonem; *becauſe we call God in the æther* Jupiter, *in the air* Juno. But the reaſon, why *Juno* was feminine and a goddeſs, is thus given by *Cicero* [4], *Effæminarunt autem eum,* Junoni*que tribuerunt, quod nihil eſt aëre mollius*; *they effeminated the air, and attributed it to* Juno *a goddeſs, becauſe nothing is ſofter than it. Minerva* was alſo ſometimes taken for a ſpecial or particular God, and then was it nothing (as *Zeno* informs us) but a name for the ſupreme God, as paſſing through the (higher) æther: which gave occaſion to St. *Auſtin* thus to object againſt the Pagan theology; *Si ætheris partem ſuperiorem* Minerva *tenere dicitur, & hac occaſione fingere poetas, quod de* Jovis *capite nata ſit, cur non ergo ipſa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod ſit* Jove *ſuperior? If* Minerva *be ſaid to poſſeſs the higheſt part of the æther; and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from* Jupiter's *head, why is not ſhe rather called the queen of the gods, ſince ſhe is ſuperior to* Jupiter? Furthermore, as the ſupreme God was called *Neptune* in the ſea, and *Juno* in the air, ſo by the ſame reaſon may we conclude, that he was called *Vulcan* in the fire. Laſtly, as the ſun and moon were themſelves ſometime worſhipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being ſuppoſed to be animated with particular ſouls of their own; ſo was the ſupreme God alſo worſhipped in them both, (as well as in the other parts of the world) and that under thoſe names of *Apollo*, and *Diana*. Thus the Pagans appointing a God to preſide over every part of the world, did thereby but make the ſupreme God polyonymous, all thoſe gods of theirs being indeed nothing but ſeveral names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, *Maximus Tyrius*, treating concerning

C. D. l. 4. c. 10. [P. 74.]

[1] Ubi ſupra.
[2] Ubi ſupra.
[3] De Civit. Dei, Lib. IV. Cap. X. p. 74.
[4] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVI. p. 2994. Tom. IX. Oper.

concerning *Homer*'s philoſophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, ſhared between *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto*) thus declareth; *Differt.* 16. *p.* 163. εὕροις δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλας παρ' Ὁμήρῳ ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις παυλοδοπῶν ὀνομάτων. ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀνόητος ὡς μύθων ἀκούει, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων· ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρχή, ἀλλ' Ἀθηνᾶ λέγεται, &c. *You may find alſo in* Homer *other principles, and the originals of ſeveral names; which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philoſopher will underſtand as things and realities. For he aſſigns a principle of virtue and wiſdom, which he calls* Minerva; *another of love and deſire, which he calls* Venus; *another of artificialneſs, and that is* Vulcan, *who rules over the fire. And* Apollo *alſo with him preſides over dancings, the muſes over ſongs,* Mars *over war,* Æolus *over winds, and* Ceres *over fruits.* And then does he conclude thus, καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος Ὁμήρῳ ἄθεον, οὐδὲ δυνάστα ἄπορον, οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μετὰ θείων ὀνομάτων, καὶ θείων λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης· *So that no part neither of nature, nor of the world, is to* Homer *godleſs* (or void of a God) *none deſtitute of a ruler, or without a ſuperior government; but all things full of divine names, and of divine reaſon, and of divine art.* Where his θεῖα ὀνόματα, his *divine names*, are nothing but ſeveral names of God, as manifeſting himſelf variouſly in the ſeveral things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as preſiding over them.

Wherefore, beſides thoſe ſpecial gods of the Pagans, already mentioned, that were appointed to preſide over ſeveral parts of the world, there are others, which are but ſeveral names of the ſupreme God neither, as exerciſing ſeveral offices and functions in the world, and beſtowing ſeveral gifts upon mankind: as when in giving corn and fruits, he is called *Ceres*; in beſtowing wine, *Bacchus*; in men's recovery of their health, *Æſculapius*; in preſiding over traffick and merchandizing, *Mercury*; in governing military affairs, *Mars*; in ordering the winds, *Æolus*; and the like.

That the more philoſophick Pagans did thus really interpret the fables of the gods, and make their many poetical and political gods to be all of them but one and the ſame ſupreme natural God, is evident from the teſtimonies of *Antiſthenes*, *Plato*, *Xenocrates*, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chryſippus*, (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly) and of *Scævola* the Roman *Pontifex*, of *Cicero*, *Varro*, *Seneca*, and many others. But that even their Poets alſo did ſometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifeſt from thoſe fragments preſerved of *Hermeſianax* the Colophonian amongſt the Greeks, and of *Valerius Soranus* amongſt the Latins; the former thus enumerating the chief Pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the ſame Numen:

Πλούτων, Περσεφόνη, Δημήτηρ, Κύπρις, Ἔρωτες,
Τρίτωνες, Νηρεὺς, Τηθὺς, καὶ Κυανοχαίτης,
Ἑρμῆς, θ' Ἡφαιστός τε κλυτὸς, Πὰν, Ζεύς τε καὶ Ἥρη,
Ἄρτεμις, ἠδ' ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, εἷς Θεὸς ἐστί·

Pluto, Perſephone, Ceres, & Venus alma, & Amores,

Tri-

Tritones, Nereus, Tethys, Neptunus & ipse,
Mercurius, Juno, Vulcanus, Jupiter, & Pan,
Diana, & Phœbus Jaculator, sunt Deus unus.

The latter [1] pronouncing universally, that *Jupiter Omnipotens* is

——————— *Deus unus & omnes,*

one God, and all gods. Whether by his *Jupiter* he here meant the soul of the world only, as *Varro* would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this *Jupiter* to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans inferior deities, (as the stars and dæmons;) secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. *Austin*, making a more full and particular enumeration of the Pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods, (which are not now commonly taken notice of,) does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of the more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same *Jupiter*; *Ipse in æthere sit* Jupiter, *ipse in aëre* Juno, *ipse in mari* Neptunus, *in inferioribus etiam maris ipse* Salacia, *in terra* Pluto, *in terra inferiore* Proserpina, *in focis domesticis* Vesta, *in fabrorum fornace* Vulcanus, *in divinantibus* Apollo, *in merce* Mercurius, *in* Jano *initiator*, *in* Termino *terminator*, Saturnus *in tempore*, Mars & Bellona *in bellis*, Liber *in vineis*, Ceres *in frumentis*, Diana *in silvis*, Minerva *in ingeniis*. *Ipse sit postremò etiam illa turba quasi plebeiorum deorum, ipse præsit nomine* Liberi *virorum seminibus*, & *nomine* Liberæ *fœminarum*. *Ipse sit* Diespiter, *qui partum perducat ad diem: ipse sit dea* Mena, *quam præfecerunt menstruis fœminarum, ipse* Lucina, *quæ à parturientibus invocatur, ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos sinu terræ, & vocetur* Opis. *Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, & vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, & vocetur dea Levana. Ipse cunas tueatur & vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, & vocantur* Carmentes. *Præsit fortuitis, voceturque* Fortuna. *In Diva Rumina mammam parvulis immulgeat. In Diva Potina potionem immisceat. In Diva Educa escam præbeat. De pavore infantium* Paventia *nuncupetur. De spe quæ venit* Venilia; *de voluptate* Volupia. *De actu* Agenoria. *De stimulis, quibus ad nimium actum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Strenua dea sit, strenuum faciendo.* Numeria *quæ numerare doceat*; Camæna *quæ canere. Ipse sit & Deus Consus præbendo consilia*; *& Dea Sentia sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, quæ post prætextam excipiat juvenilis ætatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, quæ adultos barba induit, quos honorare voluerit. Ipse in Jugatino Deo conjuges jungat*; *& cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse invocetur & dea Virginensis invocetur. Ipse sit* Mutinus, *qui est apud Græcos* Priapus, *si non pudet. Hæc omnia quæ dixi, & quæcunque non dixi, hi omnes dii deæque*

De Civ. D. l. 4. c. 11. [Pag. 76.]

[1] Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei, Lib. VII. Cap. IX. p. 131.

ſit unus Jupiter; *ſive ſint, ut quidam volunt, omnia iſta partes ejus, ſicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet eſſe mundi animum; ſive virtutes ejus, quæ ſententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum eſt. Let us grant, according to the Pagans, that the ſupreme God is in the æther* Jupiter; *in the air* Juno; *in the ſea* Neptune; *in the lower parts of the ſea* Salacia; *in the earth* Pluto; *in the inferior parts thereof* Proſerpina; *in the domeſtick hearths* Veſta; *in the ſmiths forges* Vulcan; *in divination* Apollo; *in traffick and merchandize* Mercury; *in the beginnings of things* Janus; *in the ends of them* Terminus; *in time* Saturn; *in wars* Mars *and* Bellona; *in the vineyards* Liber; *in the corn-fields* Ceres; *in the woods* Diana; *and in wits* Minerva. *Let him be alſo that troop of plebeian gods; let him preſide over the ſeeds of men under the name of* Liber, *and of women under the name of* Libera; *let him be* Dieſpiter, *that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddeſs* Mena, *whom they have ſet over womens monthly courſes; let him be* Lucina, *invoked by women in child-bearing; let him be* Opis, *who aids the new-born infants; let him be* Deus Vagitanus, *that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddeſs* Levana, *which is ſaid to lift them up from the earth; and the goddeſs* Cunina, *that defends their cradles; let him be the* Carmentes *alſo, who foretel the fates of infants; let him be* Fortune, *as preſiding over fortuitous events; let him be* Diva Rumina, *which ſuckles the infant with the breaſts;* Diva Potina, *which gives it drink; and* Diva Educa, *which affords it meat; let him be called the goddeſs* Paventia, *from the fear of infants; the goddeſs* Venilia, *from hope; the goddeſs* Volupia, *from pleaſure; the goddeſs* Agenoria, *from acting; the goddeſs* Stimula, *from provoking; the goddeſs* Strenua, *from making ſtrong and vigorous; the goddeſs* Numeria, *which teacheth to number; the goddeſs* Camæna, *which teaches to ſing; let him be* Deus Conſus, *as giving counſel; and* Dea Sentia, *as inſpiring men with ſenſe; let him be the goddeſs* Juventas, *which has the guardianſhip of young men; and* Fortuna Barbata, *which upon ſome more than others liberally beſtoweth beards; let him be* Deus Jugatinus, *which joins man and wife together; and* Dea Virginenſis, *which is then invoked, when the girdle of the bride is looſed; laſtly, let him be* Mutinus *alſo (which is the ſame with* Priapus *amongſt the Greeks) if you will not be aſhamed to ſay it. Let all theſe gods and goddeſſes, and many more (which I have not mentioned) be one and the ſame* Jupiter, *whether as parts of him, which is agreeable to their opinion, who hold him to be the ſoul of the world; or elſe as his virtues only, which is the ſenſe of many and great Pagan doctors.*

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and induſtrious writer, *G. I. Voſſius*, may not here ſtand in our way, or be a prejudice to us, we think it neceſſary to take notice of one paſſage of his, in his book *de Theologia Gentili*, and freely to cenſure the ſame; where, treating concerning that Pagan goddeſs *Venus*, he writeth thus[1]: *Ex philoſophica de diis doctrina*, Venus *eſt vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, ſive Heſperus. Sed ex poetica ac civili, ſupra hos cœlos ſtatuuntur mentes quædam à ſyderibus diverſæ: quomodò* Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, *cæteroſque Deos Conſentes, conſiderare jubet* Apuleius. Quippe eos, *(inquit)* natura viſibus noſtris denegavit: necnon tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius contemplantes.

[1] De Theolog. Gentili, Lib. II. Cap. XXXI. p. 172.

plantes. *Quid apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Consentes intelligi, non corpora cœlestia vel subcœlestia, sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicuam? According to the philosophick doctrine concerning the gods,* Venus *is either the* Moon, *or* Lucifer, *or* Hesperus; *but according to the poetick and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as* Apuleius *requires us to consider* Jupiter *and* Apollo, Juno *and* Venus, *and all those other gods called* Consentes; *he affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain* (saith *Vossius*) *than that the* Dii Consentes *were understood by* Apuleius, *neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds.* Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks; first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophick theology of *Scævola* and *Varro*, and others, for that which was physiological only; (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us.) For the philosophick theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the principal part thereof was the asserting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was *Venus*, according to this philosophick and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for *Lucifer* or *Hesperus*, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophick theology, both of *Scævola* and *Varro*, and others, was called natural, not as physiological only, but (in another sense) as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it: philosophy being that properly, which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophick theology therefore was opposed, both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only. Our second remark is, that *Vossius* does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was propely nothing but the law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction and fabulosity. *Poetarum ista sunt*, saith *Cotta* in *Cicero* [1]; *nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum authores, non fabularum. Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things* (or realities) *and not of fables.* But the main thing, which we take notice of in these words of *Vossius* is this, that they seem to imply the *Consentes*, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings superceleſtial and independent; their *Jupiter* being put only in an equality with *Apollo*, *Juno*, *Venus*, and the rest. For which, since *Vossius* pretends no other manner of proof than only from *Apuleius* his *de Deo Socratis*, who was a Platonick philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by *Vossius* neither: which yet ought not to be thought any dero-

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. III. Cap. XXXI. p 3096. Tom. IX. Oper.

gation from this eminent philologer, (whoſe polymathy and multifarious learning is readily acknowledged by us) that he was not ſo well verſed in all the niceties and punctilio's of the Platonick ſchool. For though *Apuleius* do in that book, beſides thoſe viſible gods the ſtars, take notice of another kind of inviſible ones, ſuch as the twelve *Conſentes*, and others, which (he ſaith) we may *animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadverſas in iis rebus, quibus eorum ſinguli curant* ; *make a conjecture of by our minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from thoſe things, which each of theſe take care of:* yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology, is manifeſt from hence, becauſe in that very place, he declares as well againſt ſuperſtition, as irreligious prophaneneſs. And his deſign there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into ſome handſome conformity and agreement with that philoſophical, natural, and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one ſupreme and univerſal Numen : but this he endeavours to do in the Platonick way, himſelf being much addicted to that philoſophy. *Hos deos in ſublimi ætheris vertice locatos*, Plato *exiſtimat veros, incorporales, animales, ſine ullo neque fine neque exordio, ſed prorſus ac retro æviternos, corporis contagione ſuâ quidem naturâ remotos, ingenio ad ſummam beatitudinem porrecto*, &c. *Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor eſt, ſolum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obſtrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum* Plato *cæleſti facundia præditus, frequentiſſimè prædicet, hunc ſolum majeſtatis incredibili quadam nimietate & ineffabili, non poſſe penuria ſermonis humani quavis oratione vel modicè comprehendi. All theſe gods placed in the higheſt æther* Plato *thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themſelves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and ſuffering, why ſhould I go about in words to deſcribe him? Since* Plato, *who was endued with moſt heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this higheſt God, by reaſon of his exceſs of majeſty, is both ineffable and incomprehenſible.* From which words of *Apuleius* it is plain, that according to him, the twelve *Conſentes*, and all the other inviſible gods were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of *Plato* theſe ſhould be, to which *Apuleius* would here accommodate the civil and poetick gods contained in thoſe two verſes of *Ennius*,

Juno, Veſta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
Mercurius, Jovi, Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo.

and the reſt of this kind, that is, all their other gods (properly ſo called) inviſible? we reply, that theſe are no other than *Plato*'s ideas, or firſt paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the divine Intellect (and his ſecond hypoſtaſis) derived from his firſt original Deity, and moſt ſimple monad. For as *Plato* writeth in his *Timæus*, ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι, *This ſenſible world*

world muſt needs be the image of another intelligible one. And again afterwards, τίνι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστηκε; τῶν μὲν δὴ ἐν μέρος εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καλαξιώτωμεν· ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν· ὃ δ' ἔστι τἆλλα ζῶα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ εἶναι τιθῶμεν. Τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά· *What animal was the pattern, according to whoſe likeneſs he that made this great animal of the world, framed it? Certainly, we muſt not think it to be any particular animal, ſince nothing can be perfect, which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let us therefore conclude it to be that animal, which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the ſame manner as this ſenſible world doth us, and other ſenſible animals.* Wherefore *Plato* himſelf, here and elſewhere ſpeaking obſcurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder, if many of his Pagan followers have abſurdly made ſo many diſtinct animals and gods of them. Amongſt whom *Apuleius* accordingly would refer all the civil and poetick gods of the Pagans (I mean their gods, properly ſo called inviſible) to this intelligible world of *Plato*'s, and thoſe ſeveral ideas of it. Neither was *Apuleius* ſingular in this, but others of the Pagan theologers did the like; as for example, *Julian* in his book againſt the Chriſtians; Θεὺς ὀνομάζει Πλάτων τὰς ἐμφανεῖς, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανὸν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰσὶν εἰκόνες· ὁ φαινόμενος τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἥλιος, τὸ νοητὸν καὶ μὴ φαινομένου· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ φαινομένη τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἕκαστον, εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἐκείνους δὴ τοὺς ἀφανεῖς θεοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας καὶ συνυπάρχοντας, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεννηθέντας, καὶ προελθόντας, ὁ Πλάτων οἶδεν· εἰκότως δὴ φησὶν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ παρ' αὐτῷ, θεοὶ, πρὸς τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λέγων, θεῶν, τῶν ἐμφανῶν δηλονότι· κοινὸς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων δημιουργὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ τεχνησάμενος οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἄστρα γενήσας, τὰ τούτων ἀρχέτυπα· Plato *indeed ſpeaketh of certain viſible gods, the ſun, and the moon, and the ſtars, and the heaven; but theſe are all but images of other inviſible gods; that viſible ſun, which we ſee with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and inviſible one: ſo likewiſe the viſible moon, and every one of the ſtars, are but the images and reſemblances of another moon, and of other ſtars intelligible. Wherefore* Plato *acknowledged alſo theſe other inviſible gods, inexiſting and coexiſting with the* Demiurgus, *from whom they were generated and produced. That* Demiurgus *in him thus beſpeaking theſe inviſible and intelligible gods; Ye gods of gods, that is, ye inviſible gods, who are the gods and cauſes of the viſible gods. There is one common maker therefore of both theſe kinds of gods; who firſt of all made a heaven, earth, ſea, and ſtars, in the intelligible world, as the archetypes and paradigms of theſe in the ſenſible.* Where St. *Cyril* in his *Confutation* writeth thus; ἔοικε δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁ γενναῖος ἡμῖν Ἰουλιανὸς, τὰς ἰδέας βέλεσθαι καλαδηλοῦν, ἃς πολὺ μὲν οὐσίας, καὶ ὑφεστάναι καθ' ἑαυτὰς διηχυρίζεσθαι Πλάτωνι, πολὺ δὲ καὶ ἐννοίας εἶναι θεῶν διορίζεσθαι· πλὴν ὅπως περ ἂν ἔχοι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἀπαράδεκτον εἶναι φασὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῷ δὲ λόγου οἱ ταῦτα τεχνίται· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τερετίσματα γάρ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον. *This our excellent* Julian, *by his intelligible and inviſible gods, ſeems here to mean thoſe ideas, which* Plato *ſometimes contends to be ſubſtances, and to ſubſiſt alone by themſelves, and ſometimes again determineth*

Plato in Tim. p. 30. [Cap. XV. p. 23.]

S. Cyril. cont. Jul. l. 2. p. 65.

to

to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But however the matter be, the ſkilful in this kind of learning affirm, that theſe ideas have been rejected by Plato's *own diſciples*; Ariſtotle *diſcarding them as figments, or at leaſt ſuch, as being meer notions could have no real cauſality and influence upon things.* But the meaning of this Pagan theology may be more fully underſtood from what the ſame St. *Cyril* thus further objecteth againſt it; προσεπάγει δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς, ὁ γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν τεχνιτάμενος, ὅτε τοίνυν καθὰ καὶ αὐτὸς διωμολόγηκεν ἐναργῶς, τούτων τε κἀκείνων γενεσιουργός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς, πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγενῆσθαι φησὶν αὐτὰς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰπέ μοι, τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ συνυπάρξει τὸ γεννητόν; ἐνυπάρξει δὲ κατὰ ποῖον τρόπον; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγέννητον ὄντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, συνυπάρχειν ἀναλκαίως τῷ φύσαντι διχυριζόμεθα, καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, προελθεῖν δὲ γεννητῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ γῆ τῆς Πλάτωνος εὐρεσιεπείας συνηγόρος ἀκριβὴς, ἀγέννητον μὲν εἶναι φησὶ τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν· ἐνυπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ προελθεῖν τὰς παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότας, τὰ πάντα κυκῶν καὶ συγχέων· The ſenſe whereof ſeems to be this; Julian *addeth, that the God of the univerſe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the* Demiurgus, *both of theſe ſenſible, and of the other intelligible things. If therefore the ingenit God be alike the creator of both, how can he affirm thoſe things, that are created by him, to co-exiſt with, and inexiſt in him? How can that, which is created, co-exiſt with the ingenit God? but much leſs can it inexiſt in him. For we Chriſtians indeed affirm, that the unmade Word of God doth of neceſſity co-exiſt with, and inexiſt in the father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonick trifles, acknowledging the ſupreme God to be ingenit, affirmeth, notwithſtanding, thoſe things, which were made and created by him, to inexiſt in him; thus mingling and confounding all things.* Where notwithſtanding, *Julian*, and the Platonick Pagans would in all probability reply, that thoſe ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the firſt νοῦς, or *Intellect*) proceeding from the higheſt hypoſtaſis, and original Deity, by way of neceſſary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Chriſtian λόγος; and therefore might, with as little abſurdity, be ſaid to exiſt with and in that firſt original Deity. But beſides, the ſame *Julian*, elſewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonick notion alſo to the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as *Apuleius* had done before, he writing of *Æſculapius*, after this canting way; ὁ γὰρ Ζεὺς, ἐν μὲν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς ἡλίκα γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν· οὕτως ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποιησάμενος πρόοδον, ἐνοεισδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώπου μορφῇ περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη, &c. Jupiter, *amongſt the intelligible things, generated out of himſelf* Æſculapius, *and by the generative life of the ſun manifeſted him here upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, firſt about* Epidaurus, *and from thence extending his ſalutary power or virtue over the whole earth.* Where *Æſculapius* is, firſt of all, the eternal idea of the medicinal art or ſkill generated by the ſupreme God in the intelligible world; which afterward, by the vivifick influence of the ſun, was incarnated, and appeared in a human form at *Epidaurus*. This is the doctrine of that *Julian*, who was ſo great an oppoſer of the incarnation of the eternal Logos, in our

Cyr. C. Jul. l. 6. p. 200.

our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal, (of which the archetypal world conſiſteth) firſt invented by Platonick Pagans, after the times of Chriſtianity, as ſome might ſuſpect; but that there was ſuch a thing extant before amongſt them alſo, may be concluded from this paſſage of *Philo*'s: εἷς ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀμυθήτους περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἀρωγὰς καὶ σωτηρίας τῷ γενομένῳ πάσας· δι' αὗ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων, ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τῷ φαινομένῳ τῷδε ἀρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συγκαθεὶς, ὥσπερ ὅτος σώμασιν ὁρατοῖς· καὶ ἀπλαγέντες ἤν τινὲς τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν· *Though God be but one, yet hath he about himſelf innumerable auxiliatory powers, all of them ſalutiferous, and procuring the good of that which is made, &c. Moreover, by theſe powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compacted, which is the archetype of this viſible world, that conſiſting of inviſible ideas, as this doth of viſible bodies. Wherefore, ſome admiring, with a kind of aſtoniſhment, the nature of both theſe worlds, have not only deified the whole of them, but alſo the moſt excellent parts in them, as the ſun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they ſcruple not at all to call gods.* Where *Philo* ſeems to ſpeak of a double ſun, moon, and heaven, as *Julian* did, the one ſenſible, the other intelligible. Moreover, *Plotinus* himſelf ſometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the divine Intellect νοητοὺς θεοὺς, *intelligible gods*; as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, aſcending upward above the ſoul of the world, θεοὺς ὑμνεῖν νοητοὺς, *to praiſe the intelligible gods*, that is, the divine Intellect, which, as he elſewhere [1] writeth, is both εἷς καὶ πολλοὶ, *one and many*.

De Conſuſ. l. 345. *Par.*

We have now given a full account of *Apuleius* his ſenſe in that book *de Deo Socratis*, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to aſſert a multitude of ſubſtantial and eternal deities or minds independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into ſome conformity with the natural, real, and philoſophick theology; and this according to Platonick principles. Wherein many other of the Pagan Platoniſts, both before and after Chriſtianity, concurred with him; they making the many Pagan inviſible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the divine intellect, (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world) which they ſuppoſed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this ſenſible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monſtrous extravagancy in theſe Platonick philoſophers, thus to talk of the divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as ſubſtantial, but alſo as ſo many ſeveral animals, perſons and gods; it being their humour thus upon all ſlight occaſions to multiply gods: yet nevertheleſs muſt it be acknowledged, that they did at the very ſame time declare all theſe to have been derived from one ſupreme Deity, and not only ſo, but alſo to exiſt in it; as they did likewiſe at other times, when unconcerned in this buſineſs of their Pagan polytheiſm,

[1] Vide Ennead. V. Lib. VIII. Cap. IX. p. 550.

lytheiſm, freely acknowledge all theſe intelligible ideas to be really nothing elſe but νοήματα, *conceptions in the mind of God*, or the firſt Intellect, (though not ſuch ſlight accidental and evanid ones, as thoſe conceptions and modifications of our human ſouls are) and conſequently not to be ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances, perſons, and gods, (much leſs independent ones) but only ſo many partial conſiderations of the Deity.

What a rabble of inviſible gods and goddeſſes the Pagans had, beſides thoſe their *dii nobiles*, and *dii majorum gentium*, *their noble* and *greater gods* (which were the *Conſentes* and *Selecti*) hath been already ſhowed out of St. *Auſtin*, from *Varro*, and others; as namely, *Dea Mena*, *Deus Vagitanus*, *Dea Levana*, *Dea Cunina*, *Diva Rumina*, *Diva Potina*, *Diva Educa*, *Diva Paventina*, *Dea Venilia*, *Dea Agenoria*, *Dea Stimula*, *Dea Strenua*, *Dea Numeria*, *Deus Conſus*, *Dea Sentia*, *Deus Jugatinus*, *Dea Virginenſis*, *Deus Mutinus*. To which might be added more out of other places of the ſame St. *Auſtin*, as *Dea Deverra*, *Deus Domiducus*, *Deus Domitius*, *Dea Manturna*, *Deus Pater Subigus*, *Dea Mater Prema*, *Dea Pertunda*, *Dea Ruſina*, *Dea Collatina*, *Dea Vallonia*, *Dea Seia*, *Dea Segetia*, *Dea Tutilina*, *Deus Nodotus*, *Dea Volutina*, *Dea Patelena*, *Dea Hoſtilina*, *Dea Flora*, *Dea Lacturtia*, *Dea Matura*, *Dea Runcina*. Beſides which, there are yet ſo many more of theſe Pagan gods and goddeſſes extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very ſmall, mean, and contemptible offices aſſigned to them, as their names for the moſt part do imply; ſome of which are ſuch, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was μηδὲν ἄθεον, *nothing at all without a God* to theſe Pagans, they having ſo ſtrong a perſuaſion, that divine providence extended itſelf to all things, and expreſſing it after this manner, by aſſigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatſoever was done by men, ſome particular god or goddeſs by name, to preſide over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans ſhould believe in good earneſt, that all theſe inviſible gods and goddeſſes of theirs were ſo many ſeveral ſubſtantial minds, or underſtanding beings eternal and unmade, really exiſting in the world, is a thing in itſelf utterly incredible. Fow how could any poſſibly perſuade themſelves, that there was one eternal unmade mind or ſpirit; which, for example, eſſentially preſided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing elſe? another over the ſweeping of houſes? another over ears of corn? another over the huſks of grain? and another over the knots of ſtraw and graſs, and the like? And the caſe is the very ſame for thoſe other noble gods of theirs (as they call them) the *Conſentes*, and *Selecti*; ſince there can be no reaſon given, why thoſe ſhould, all of them, be ſo many ſubſtantial and eternal ſpirits ſelf-exiſtent or unmade, if none of the other were ſuch. Wherefore, if theſe be not all ſo many ſeveral ſubſtantial and eternal minds, ſo many ſelf-exiſting and independent deities, then muſt they, of neceſſity, be either ſeveral partial conſiderations of the Deity, *viz.* the ſeveral manifeſtations of the divine power and providence perſonated, or elſe inferior miniſters of the ſame. And thus have we already

ſhewed, that the more high-flown and Platonick Pagans (as *Julian*, *Apuleius*, and others) underſtood theſe *Conſentes* and ſelect gods, and all the other inviſible ones, to be really nothing elſe, but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world, (which is the divine intellect;) that is indeed, but partial conſiderations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things: whilſt others of them, going in a more plain and eaſy way, concluded theſe gods of theirs to be all of them but ſeveral names and notions of the one ſupreme Deity, according to the various manifeſtations of its power in the world; as *Seneca* [1] expreſly affirmeth, not only concerning fate, nature, and fortune, *&c.* but alſo *Liber Pater*, *Hercules*, and *Mercury*, (before mentioned by him) that they were *omnia ejuſdem Dei nomina, variè utentis ſuâ poteſtate, all names of one and the ſame God, as diverſly uſing his power*; and as *Zeno* in *Laertius* [2] concludes of all the reſt: or elſe, (which amounts to the ſame thing,) that they were the ſeveral powers and virtues of one God fictitiouſly perſonated and deified; as the Pagans in *Euſebius* apologize for themſelves, that they did θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτῆ τῆ ἐπὶ πᾶζιν, *deify nothing but the inviſible powers of that God, which is over all.* Nevertheleſs, becauſe thoſe ſeveral powers of the ſupreme God were not ſuppoſed to be all executed immediately by himſelf, but by certain other ὑπηρετικὰ δυνάμεις, ſubſervient miniſters under him, appointed to preſide over the ſeveral things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind, (commonly called dæmons;) therefore were thoſe gods ſometimes taken alſo for ſuch ſubſervient ſpirits or dæmons collectively; as perhaps in this of *Epictetus*, πότε ὁ ζέφυρος πνεύσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιζε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον· *When will* Zephyrus, *or the weſt-wind, blow? When it ſeemeth good to himſelf or to* Æolus; *for God hath not made thee ſteward of the winds, but* Æolus.

Pr. Ev. l. 3. c. 13. p. 121.

L. 1. c. 1. p. 85. [Apud Arrian.]

But for the fuller clearing of the whole Pagan theology, and eſpecially this one point thereof, that their Πολυθεία was in great part nothing elſe but Πολυωνυμία, *their polytheiſm*, or *multiplicity of gods*, nothing but the polyonomy of one god, or his being called by many perſonal proper names, two things are here requiſite to be further taken notice of; firſt, that, according to the Pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffuſed throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exiſt in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we obſerved before out of *Horus Apollo* [3], that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as τὸ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκον πνεῦμα, *a ſpirit pervading the whole world*; as likewiſe they concluded [4] ἄτοπα θεῷ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεζάναι, *that nothing at all conſiſted without God.* Which ſame theology was univerſally entertained alſo amongſt the Greeks. For thus *Diogenes* the Cynick, in *Laertius* [5], αὐτῆ πάντα πλήρη, *All things are full of him.* And *Ariſtotle*, or the writer *De Plantis*, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but alſo to be an inward principle of life in animals; τίς ἔν ἐζιν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῆ ζώου; τί ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τὸ εὔγενες ζῷον, ὃ τὸν οὐρανὸν περιοδεύει, τὸν ἥλιον, τὰ ἄζρα, καὶ τὰς πλάνητας· *Lib. 1. cap. 1.* [Tom. IV. Oper. Ariſt. p. 492.]

[1] De Beneficiis, Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 427, 428.
[2] Lib. VII. ſegm. 147. p. 458.
[3] Hieroglyph. Lib. I. Cap. LXIV. p. 77.
[4] Ibid. Lib I. Cap. XIII. p. 26.
[5] Lib. VI. ſegm. 37. p. 333.

What is the principle in the life or ſoul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompaſſes and ſurrounds the whole heaven, the ſun, the ſtars, and the planets. *Sextus Empiricus* thus repreſents the ſenſe of *Pythagoras*, *Empedocles*, and all the Italick philoſophers; μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς κόσμου διῆκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα· *That we men have not only a conjunction amongſt ourſelves with one another, but alſo with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; becauſe there is but one ſpirit, which, like a ſoul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together.* *Clemens Alexandrinus* writeth thus of the Stoicks, διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγουσι; *They affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the univerſe, and even the moſt vile parts thereof,* which that Father ſeems to diſlike; as alſo did *Tertullian*[1], when he repreſented their doctrine thus; *Stoici volunt Deum ſic per materiam decucurriſſe, quomodo mel per favos, the Stoicks will have God ſo to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs.* *Strabo* teſtifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans, περὶ πολλῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν, ὅτι γὰρ γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς λέγειν κἀκείνους, ὅ τε διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεός, δι' ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτῷ· *That in many things they philoſophized after the Greekiſh manner, as when they affirm, that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it.* The Latins alſo fully agreed with the Greeks in this: for though *Seneca* ſomewhere [2] propounds this queſtion, *Utrum extrinſecus operi ſuo circumfuſus ſit Deus, an toti inditus? Whether God be only extrinſically circumfuſed about his work, the world, or inwardly inſinuating do pervade it all?* yet himſelf elſewhere [3] anſwers it, when he calls God, *Divinum Spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, æquali intentione diffuſum: A divine ſpirit, diffuſed through all things, whether ſmalleſt or greateſt, with equal intention.* God, in *Quintilian*'s [4] theology, is *ſpiritus omnibus partibus immiſtus*; and *Ille fuſus per omnes rerum naturæ partes ſpiritus, a ſpirit which inſinuates itſelf into, and is mingled with all the parts of the world*; and *that ſpirit, which is diffuſed through all the parts of nature.* *Apuleius* [5] likewiſe affirmeth, *Deum omnia permeare, That God doth permeate all things*; and that *Nulla res eſt tam præſtantibus viribus, quæ viduata Dei auxilio, ſui natura contenta ſit; There is nothing ſo excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the divine aid or influence.* And again, *Dei præſtantiam, non jam cogitatio ſola, ſed oculi, & aures, & ſenſibilis ſubſtantia comprehendit; That God is not only preſent to our cogitation, but alſo to our very eyes and ears, in all theſe ſenſible things.* *Servius*, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagans, determineth, that *Nulla pars elementi ſine Deo eſt, That there is no part of the elements devoid of God.* And that the poets fully cloſed with the ſame theology, is evident from thoſe known paſſages of theirs, *Jovis omnia plena* [6], and μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαὶ [7], &c. i. e. *All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God*; as alſo from this of *Virgil*,

Adv. Mathem. p. 331. [Lib. I. Adverſ. Phyſic. §. CXXVII. p. 580.]

Protrept. p. 44. [Cap. V. p. 58. Tom. I. Oper.]

Lib. 15. p. 730.

Virg. Georg. l. 4. [Verſ. 222.]

——*Deum*

[1] Adverſ. Hermogen. Cap. XLIV. p. 149.
[2] De Otio Sapientis, Cap. XXXI. p. 347. Tom. I. Oper
[3] De Conſol. ad Helviam. Cap. VIII. p. 106.
[4] Inſtit. Orator. Lib. VII. Cap. III. p. 412.
[5] De Mundo, p. 68. edit. Elmenhorſtii.
[6] Virgil. Eclog III.
[7] Arati Phænomen. apud Clement. Alexand. Stromat. Lib. V. p. 708.

——————Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.

Lastly, we shall observe, that both *Plato* and *Anaxagoras*, who neither of them confounded God with the World, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be ἀδεὲς μεμιγμένον, *unmingled with any thing*; nevertheless concluded, αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα, *that he did order and govern all things, passing through and pervading all things*; which is the very same with that doctrine of Christian theologers[1], τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμίγως διήκειν, *that God permeates and passes through all things, unmixedly.* Which *Plato* also there, in his *Cratylus*, plainly making δίκαιον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from διὰ ἰὸν, i. e. *passing through all things*, and thereupon gives us the best account of *Heraclitus* his theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of *Heraclitus* his own) in these words; ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτῆ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον ὑδὲ ἄλλο, ἢ χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τάυτα παντὸς εἶναι διεξιὸν, δι' ὃ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον, ἐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθ' ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνεπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διιὸν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐσημίας ἕνεκα, τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβόν· *They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something, which passes through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things, as if they stood still, that so nothing might scape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called* δικαίον, quasi διιὸν; *the letter* Cappa *being only taken in for the more handsome pronunciation.* Here we have therefore *Heraclitus* his description of God, namely this, τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ τάχιστον, διὰ παντὸς διεξιὸν, δι' ὃ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι, *that most subtile and most swift substance, which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made.* Now, saith *Plato*, some of these Heracliticks say, that this is *fire*, others that it is *heat*; but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes, with *Anaxagoras*, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all. *Cratyl. p. 413.*

Wherefore this being the universally received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use *Cicero*'s language[2], no wonder, if *Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras* Ceres, *per maria* Neptunus, *&c. if God pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called* Ceres, *in the sea* Neptune, *in the air* Juno, *&c.* And this very account does *Paulus Orosius* (in his historick work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. *Austin*) give of the

[1] Joh. Damascen. de orthodoxa fide, Lib. I. Cap. XIII. p. 149. Tom. I. Oper. Edit. Lequien.

[2] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXVIII. p. 2996. Oper.

L.6. c.1. [P.416.] the original of the Pagan polytheism; *Quidam, dum in multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscreto timore, finxerunt*; *That some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscreet fear, feigned many gods:* in which words he intimates, that the Pagans many gods were really but several names of one God, as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, The Pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world) but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitick inscription often mentioned, *I am all, that was, is, and shall be.* And the Trismegistick books insisting so much every where upon this notion, *that God is all things* (as hath been observed) renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and suppositious; but that, according to the testimony of *Jamblichus*, they did at least contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς, some of the old Theutical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from *Egypt*, in all probability, was this doctrine by *Orpheus* derived into *Greece*, the Orphick verses themselves running much upon this strain, and the Orphick theology being thus epitomized by *Timotheus* the chronographer; *That all things were made by God*, and *that himself is all things.* To this purpose is that of *Æschylus*,

Grot. Exc. p. 57.

Ζεύς ἐστιν αἰθὴρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός·
Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα, χὠ, τι τῶν δ' ὕπερτερον·

Et terra, & æther, & poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cuncta solus, & aliquid sublimius.

And again,

Ib. p. 53.

——— Ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται
Ἄπλαστον ὁρμῇ· ποτὲ δ' ὕδωρ, ποτὲ δὲ γιόφῳ·
Καὶ θηρσὶν αὐτὸς γίνεται παρεμφερὴς,
Ἀνέμῳ, νέφει τε, καὶ ραπῇ, βρουτῇ, βροχῇ·

——— *Nunc ut implacabilis*
Apparet ignis: nunc tenebris, nunc aquæ
Par ille cerni: simulat interdum feram,
Tonitrua, ventos, fulmina, & nubila.

As also this of *Lucan*, amongst the Latins,

Lib.9. v.580.

——— *Superos quid quærimus ultra?*
Jupiter *est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.*

Whereunto agree also these passages of *Seneca* the philosopher [1], *Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, & quod non vides, totum.* And [2] *Sic solus est omnia; opus suum*

[1] Natural. Quæst. Lib. I. Præfat. p. 485. [2] De Benefic. Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 247.

ſuum & extra & intra tenet: What is God? he is all that you ſee, and all that you do not ſee. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but alſo within. Neither was this the doctrine only of thoſe Pagans, who held God to be the ſoul of the world, and conſequently the whole animated world to be the ſupreme Deity, but of thoſe others alſo, who conceived of God as an abſtract mind, ſuperior to the mundane ſoul, or rather as a ſimple Monad, ſuperior to mind alſo; as thoſe philoſophers, *Xenophanes*, *Parmenides*, and *Meliſſus*, who deſcribed God to be one and all things, they ſuppoſing, that, becauſe all things were from him, they muſt needs have been firſt in a manner in him, and himſelf all things. With which agreeth the author of the Aſclepian Dialogue, when he maketh *Unus omnia*, and *Creator omnium*, *One all things*, and *the Creator of all things*, to be but equivalent expreſſions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made, *In eo jam tunc erant, unde naſci habuerunt*; *They then exiſted in him, from whom afterwards they proceeded.* So likewiſe the other Triſmegiſtic books, when they give this account of God's being both all things that are, and all things that are not, τὰ μὲν γαρ ὄντα ἐφανέρωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, *becauſe thoſe things, that are, he hath manifeſted from himſelf, and thoſe things, that are not, he ſtill containeth within himſelf*; or, as it is elſewhere expreſſed, he doth κρύπτειν, *hide them and conceal them in himſelf.* And the Orphick verſes gave this ſame account likewiſe of God's being all things, Πάντα τὰ δὲ κρύψας, &c. *becauſe he firſt concealed and hid them all within himſelf before they were made, and thence afterward from himſelf diſplayed them, and brought them forth into light:* or becauſe

——— Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνι γαστέρι σύρρα πεφύκει,

before they were produced, they were all contain'd together in the womb of God.

Now this was not only a further ground of that ſeeming polytheiſm amongſt the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their perſonating his ſeveral powers; but alſo of another more ſtrange and puzzling phænomenon in their theology, namely, their perſonating alſo the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and beſtowing the names of gods and goddeſſes upon them. It was before obſerved out of *Moſchopulus*, that the Pagans did ἑνὶ ὀνόματι τότε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχου, καὶ τὸν ἐπισατοῦντα τούτῳ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν, *call the things in nature, and the gods, which preſided over them, by one and the ſame name.* As for example, they did not only call the god, which preſideth over thoſe arts that operate by fire, *Hephæſtus* or *Vulcan*, but alſo *fire* itſelf: and *Demeter* or *Ceres* was not only taken by them for that god, who was ſuppoſed to give corn and fruits, but alſo for corn itſelf. So *Dionyſus* or *Bacchus* did not only ſignify the god that giveth wine, but alſo wine itſelf. And he inſtancing further in *Venus*, and *Minerva*, and the Muſes, concludes the ſame univerſally of all the reſt. Thus *Arnobius*, in his book againſt the Pagans, *in uſu ſermonis veſtri*, Martem *pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua* Neptunum, Liberum Patrem *pro vino*, Cererem *pro pane*, Minervam *pro ſtamine, pro obſcœnis libidinis* Venerem. Now we will not deny, but that this was ſometimes done metonymically, the efficient

P. 229.

L. 5. [p. 236.]

ficient cauſe, and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently ſtyled *Mars*; and that of *Terence* may be taken alſo in this ſenſe, *Sine Ce-*
De Iſ. & Oſ. p. 379. *rere & Libero friget Venus.* And *Plutarch* (who declares his great diſlike of this kind of language) conceives, that there was no more at firſt in it than this, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος, ὠνεῖσθαι φαμὲν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρος τὸν ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποτιθέμενον, ὅτως ἐκεῖνοι, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο, τιμῶντες ὑπὸ χρείας καὶ σεμνύνοντες· *As we, when one buys the books of* Plato, *commonly ſay, that he buys* Plato; *and when one acts the plays of* Menander, *that he acts* Menander; *ſo did the ancients not ſpare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of thoſe gods reſpectively, thereby honouring them alſo for their utility.* But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant perſons abuſed, and carried on further, and that not without great impiety; οἱ δὲ ὕστεροι ἀπαιδεύτως δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἀναγράφοντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ πάθη τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς παρασίας τῶν ἀναισκαίων καὶ ἀποκρύψεις, θεῶν γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς, ἃ προσαγορεύοντες μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ νομίζοντες, ἀτόπων καὶ παρανόμων καὶ τεταραγμένων δοξῶν αὐτοὺς ἐνέπλησαν· *Their followers miſtaking them, and thereupon ignorantly attributing the paſſions of fruits (their appearances and occultations) to the gods themſelves, that preſide over them, and ſo not only calling them, but alſo thinking them to be the generations and corruptions of the gods, have by this means filled themſelves with abſurd and wicked opinions.* Where *Plutarch* well condemns the vulgar both amongſt the Egyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful ſolemnities, they ſottiſhly attributed to the gods the paſſions belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheleſs the inanimate parts of the world, and things of nature, were frequently deified by the Pagans, not only thus metonymically, but alſo in a further ſenſe, as *Cicero* plainly
De N.D. l. 2. p. 222. declares; *Tum illud, quod erat à Deo natum, nomine ipſius Dei nuncupabant, ut*
[Cap. XXIII. p. 2987] *cum fruges* Cererem *appellamus, vinum autem* Liberum: *tum autem res ipſa, in qua vis ineſt major, ſic appellatur, ut ea ipſa res nominetur Deus. Both that which proceeds from God, is called by the name of a god, as corn is ſometimes thus called* Ceres, *and wine* Liber; *and alſo whatſoever hath any greater force in it, that thing itſelf is often called a god too.* *Philo* alſo thus repreſents
De Decal. p. 751, 752. the religion of the Pagans, as firſt deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then beſtowing thoſe proper perſonal names upon them: ἐκτεθειώκασι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχὰς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ· οἱ δ' ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντα κόσμον· τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύταλον, τὸν γεννήτην, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατάρχην τῆς ἀηττήτου στρατιᾶς, τὸν κυβερνήτην ὃς οἰκουμένῃ σωτηρίως ἀεὶ ἄπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, ψευδωνύμοις προσρήσεις ἐκείνοις ἐπιφημίσαντες, ἑτέρας ἕτεροι· καλοῦσι γὰρ τὴν γῆν Κόρην, Δήμητρα, Πλούτωνα· τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν Ποσειδῶνα, δαίμονας ἐναλίους ὑπάρχους αὐτῷ προσαναπλάττοντες, &c. Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον, καὶ ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ σελήνην Ἄρτεμιν, &c. *Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the air and the fire: Some the ſun and the moon, and the planets and fixed ſtars: others the heaven, others the whole world. But that higheſt and moſt ancient Being, the parent*

of

of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things ſalutiferouſly, him have they covered, concealed, and obſcured, by beſtowing counterfeit perſonal names of gods upon each of theſe things. For the earth they called Proſerpina, Pluto, *and* Ceres; *the ſea* Neptune, *under whom they place many dæmons and nymphs alſo as his inferior miniſters; the air* Juno; *the fire* Vulcan; *the ſun* Apollo; *the moon* Diana, &c. *and diſſecting the heaven into two hemiſpheres, one above the earth, the other under it, they call theſe the* Dioſcuri, *feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another.* We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the ſun, moon, and ſtars, were ſuppoſed by ſome of the Pagans to be animated with particular ſouls of their own, (which *Ammianus Marcellinus*[1] ſeems principally to call *ſpiritus elementorum, the ſpirits of the elements*, worſhipped by *Julian*) and upon that account to be ſo many inferior gods themſelves. Notwithſtanding which, that the inanimate parts of theſe were alſo deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; becauſe *Plato*, who in his *Cratylus* etymologizeth *Dionyſius* from giving of wine, and elſewhere calls the fruits of the earth τὰ Δήμητρος δῶρα, *the gifts of Ceres*, doth himſelf nevertheleſs, in compliance with this vulgar ſpeech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glaſs (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth, that a city ought to be δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, ἵ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος κεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ, καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν, ἀγαθὸν πόμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται· *ſo temper'd, as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and ſparkles, but being corrected by another ſober god*, (that is, by water) *both together make a good and moderate potion.* *Cicero* alſo tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to ſea, they were wont to offer up a ſacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents, and affections of things in nature, were by theſe Pagans commonly perſonated and deified; as Time, in *Sophocles* his *Electra*[2], is a god; Χρόνος γὰρ εὔμαρὴς Θεὸς, *for Time is an eaſy god*; and Love, in *Plato*'s *Sympoſium*, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn τῷ Ἔρωτι τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, *to Love, being ſuch and ſo great a god.* Though the ſame *Plato*, in his *Philebus*, when *Protarchus* had called Pleaſure a goddeſs too, was not willing to comply ſo far there with vulgar ſpeech; τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου· καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅτῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον· *My fear, O* Protarchus, *concerning the names of the gods is extraordinary great: wherefore, as to* Venus, *I am willing to call her what ſhe pleaſes to be called; but Pleaſure, I know, is a various and multiform thing.* Wherefore it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in ſome ſenſe or other deify or theologize all the parts of the world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at firſt upon no other ground than this, becauſe God was ſuppoſed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffuſed thorough all, and to act in and upon all, but alſo to be himſelf in a manner all things; which they expreſſed after this way, by perſonating the things of nature ſeverally, and

De Leg. p. 788.

De Leg. l. 6.

[1] Vide Lib. XXI. Cap. I. p. 263.

[2] Ex Stobæo apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. veter. Comicor. & Tragic. p. 66.

and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things; first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus *Cicero*, *Multæ aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sine causa, & à* Græciæ *sapientibus, & à majoribus nostris, constitutæ nominatæque sunt: Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of* Greece, *and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them.* The reason whereof is thus given by him; *Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur: Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the divine goodness.* Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprizing; to which that of *Seneca* seems pertinent, *Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur: subita & ex abdito vasti amnis eruptio aras habet: coluntur aquarum calentium fontes; & stagna quædam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacravit. We adore the rising heads and springs of great rivers: every sudden and plentiful eruption of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.*

N. D. l. 2. p. 222.

Ep. 41. [P. 101. Tom. II. Oper.]

Now, this is that, which is properly called the Physiological Theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the affections of substances. A great part of which Physiological Theology was allegorically contained in the poetick fables of the gods. *Eusebius* indeed was of opinion, that those poetick fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous: τοιαύτη ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβαλόντες νέοι τινὲς, χθὲς κ᾽ πρώην ἐπιφυέντες, λογικώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν αὐχοῦντες, τὴν δὲ φυσικωτέραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνοτέρας εὑρεσιολογίας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσαντες, &c. θεραπεῦσαι δὲ ἓν ὅμως οἵδε τὸ πατρικὸν ἁμάρτημα προθυμηθέντες, ἐπὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις κ᾽ θεωρίας τὰς μύθας μετεσκευάσαντο· *Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans* (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) *which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might thereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those fopperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them, have gone about to cure them thus by physiological interpretations.* Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetick mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as *Porphyrius* and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; *Origen*, before both him and *Porphyry*, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did περὶ τούτων ἀπολογούμενοι ἐπ᾽ ἀλληγορίας καταφεύγειν, *apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories.*

Pr. Ev. l. 3. c. 6. [Lib. II. Cap. VI. p. 73.]

l. 3. c. Celf. p. 123.

But

But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoicks, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*, were famous for the great pains, which they took in allegorizing these poetick fables of the gods. Of which *Cotta* in *Cicero*[1] thus; *Magnam molestiam suscepit & minime necessariam primus* Zeno, *post* Cleanthes, *deindè* Chrysippus, *commentitiarum fabularum reddere rationem, & vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini, longè aliter rem se habere atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui Dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras Deorum.* Zeno *first, and after him* Cleanthes *and* Chrysippus, *took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing which they confessed, that the matter was far otherwise than according to mens opinion, in as much as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but the natures of things.* From whence it is plain, that, in the poetick theology, the Stoicks took it for granted, that the natures of things were personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. *Origen* also gives us a taste of *Chrysippus* his thus allegorizing, in his interpreting an obscene picture or table of *Jupiter* and *Juno*, in *Samos*; λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῦ συγγράμμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τὰς σπερματικὰς λόγους τῦ θεῦ ἡ ὕλη παραδεξαμένη, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, εἰς καλακόσμησιν τῶν ὅλων· ὕλη γάρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Σάμον γραφῇ, ἡ Ἥρα, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ὁ Ζεύς· *This grave philosopher, in his writings, saith, that matter having received the spermatick reasons of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that* Juno, *in this picture in* Samos, *signifies Matter, and* Jupiter *God.* Upon which occasion that pious father adds, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὰς τοιάτας μύθας καὶ ἄλλας μυρίας, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος θέλομεν Δία καλεῖν τὸν ἐπι πᾶζι θεὸν, ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιυργὸν ἀσκοῦντες, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα· *For the sake of which, and innumerable other such like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of* Jupiter, *but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile divine things with impure names.* And here we see again, according to *Chrysippus* his interpretation, that *Hera* or *Juno* was no animal nor real God, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetick god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from *Hesiod*'s *Theogonia*, that many of these poetick fables, according to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified. *Plato* himself, though no friend to these poetick fables, plainly intimates as much, in his second *De Rep.* καὶ θεομαχίας, ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας, οὔτ' ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν· ὁ γὰρ νέος, οὐκ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅ, τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μη· *The fightings of the gods, and such other things, as* Homer *hath feigned concerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonwealth, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge, when it is an allegory, and when not.* And it appears from *Dionysius Halicarnass.* that this was the general opinion concerning the Greekish fables, that some of them were physically, and some tropologically allegorical:

L. 4. p. 196.

P. 378. [P. 430.]

[1] De Nat. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXIV. p. 3089. Tom. IX. Oper.

l. 2. *p.* 68. rical: μηδεὶς ὑπολάβοι με ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μύθων εἰσί τινες ἀνθρώποις χρήσιμοι, οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα δι' ἀλληγορίας, οἱ δὲ παραμυθίας ἕνεκα συνκείμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συμφορῶν, &c. *Let no man think me to be ignorant, that some of the Greekish fables are profitable to men, partly as declaring the works of nature by allegories, partly as being helpful for human life,* &c.

N. D. l. 2. *p.* 223. [Cap. XXIV. p. 2990.] Thus also *Cicero*, *Alia quoque ex ratione, & quidem physicâ, magna fluxit multitudo Deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditav erunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni refercerunt.*

Eusebius[1], indeed, seems sometimes to cast it as an imputation upon the whole Pagan theology, that it did θειάζειν τὴν ἄψυχον οὐσίαν, *deify the inanimate nature*; but this is properly to be understood of this part of their theology only, which was physiological, and of their mythology or poetick fables of the gods allegorized; it being otherwise both apparently false, and all one as to make them downright Atheists. For he that acknowledges no animant God, as hath been declared, acknowledges no God at all, according to the true notion of him; whether he derive all things from a fortuitous motion of matter, as *Epicurus* and *Democritus* did, or from a plastick and orderly, but senseless nature, as some degenerate Stoicks, and *Strato* the Peripatetick; whose Atheism seems to be thus described by *Manilius*[2]:

> *Aut neque terra patrem novit, nec flamma, nec aër,*
> *Aut humor, faciuntque Deum per quatuor artus,*
> *Et mundi struxere globum, prohibentque requiri*
> *Ultra se quidquam.*

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in personating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded (as it hath been by some late writers) with that philosophical theology of *Scævola*, *Varro* and others, (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real) it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humour it was perpetually to personate things and natures. But the philosophick theology, properly so called, which, according to *Varro*[3], was that, *de qua multos libros philosophi reliquerunt*; as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature, (which therefore were called natural) namely one supreme universal Numen, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his ὑπεργοὶ δυνάμεις, other inferior understanding beings his ministers created by him, such as stars and dæmons, so were all those personated gods, or natures of things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.

St. *Austin* often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same: as in his 49th epistle; [4]*Neque illinc excusant impii sua sacrilega sacra & simulachra, quòd eleganter interpretantur quid quæque significent: omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam refertur, non ad creatorem, cui uni debetur servitus*

[1] Præpar. Evang. Lib. III. Cap. I.
[2] Astronomic. Lib. I. Vers. 137.
[3] Apud Augustin. de Civit. Dei. Lib. V. Cap. V. p. 116. Tom. VII. Oper.
[4] Epist. CII. Quæst. III. §. XX. p. 212. Tom. II. Oper. Edit. Benedictin.

vitus religionis, illa quæ uno nomine Latria Græcè appellatur. Neither do the Pagans ſufficiently excuſe their ſacrilegious rites and images from hence, becauſe they elegantly (and ingeniouſly) interpret, what each of thoſe things ſignifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worſhip, that which by the Greeks is called Latria. And again in his book *de Civ. D. l. 6. c. 8. Atenim habent iſta phyſiologicas quaſdam (ſicunt aiunt) id eſt, naturalium rationum interpretationes. Quaſi verò nos in hac diſputatione phyſiologiam quæramus, & non theologiam; id eſt, rationem naturæ, & non Dei. Quamvis enim qui verus Deus eſt, non opinione ſed natura ſit Deus; non tamen omnis natura Deus eſt. But the Pagans pretend, that theſe things have certain phyſiological interpretations, or according to natural reaſons; as if in this diſputation we ſought for phyſiology, and not theology, or the reaſon of nature, and not of God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet is not every nature God.* But certainly the firſt and chief ground of this practice of theirs, thus to theologize phyſiology, and deify (in one ſenſe or other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already intimated, their ſuppoſing God to be not only diffuſed thorough the whole world, and in all things, but alſo in a manner all things; and that therefore he ought to be worſhipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the world.

Wherefore theſe perſonated Gods of the Pagans, or thoſe things of nature deified by them, and called gods and goddeſſes, were for all that by no means accounted, by the intelligent amongſt them, true and proper gods. Thus *Cotta* in *Cicero*; *Cum fruges* Cererem, *vinum* Liberum *dicimus, genere nos quidem ſermonis utimur uſitato: ſed ecquem tam amentem eſſe putas, qui illud, quo veſcatur, Deum eſſe credat? Though it be very common and familiar language amongſt us, to call corn* Ceres, *and wine* Bacchus, *yet who can think any one to be ſo mad, as to take that to be really a god, which he feeds upon?* The Pagans really accounted that only for a God, by the worſhipping and invoking whereof they might reaſonably expect benefit to themſelves, and therefore nothing was truly and properly a God to them, but what was both ſubſtantial, and alſo animant and intellectual. For *Plato* writes, that the atheiſtick wits of his time therefore concluded the ſun, and moon, and ſtars, not to be gods, becauſe they were nothing but earth and ſtones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all underſtanding and ſenſe; and for this cauſe, ἀδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φρονΐζειν δυνάμενα, *unable to take notice of any human affairs.* And *Ariſtotle*[1] affirmeth concerning the gods in general, ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, &c. *That all men conceived them to live, and conſequently to act, ſince they cannot be ſuppoſed to ſleep perpetually as* Endymion *did.* The Pagans univerſally conceived the gods to be happy animals; and *Ariſtotle* there concludes the happineſs of them all to conſiſt in contemplation. *Lucretius* himſelf would not debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongſt the Pagans) of calling the ſea *Neptune*, corn *Ceres*, wine *Bacchus*, and the *Earth* the mother

De N. D. l. 3. p. 345. [Cap. XVI. P. 3071. Tom. IX.]

L. 10. De Leg. [p. 665.]

[1] Magn. Moral. Lib. V. Cap. VIII. p. 184. Tom. III. Oper.

mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

L. 2. p. 165. [Vers. 654. p. 380. Ed. Havercamp.]

Hîc siquis mare Neptunum, Cereremque *vocare*
Constituit fruges, & Bacchi *nomine abuti*
Mavolt, quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen;
Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dictitet orbem
Esse deum matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.

And the reason, why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him;

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

N. D. l. 2. p. 220. *Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense.* Thus *Balbus* in *Cicero* tells us, that the first thing included in the notion or idea of a god is this, *Ut sit animans*, *That it be animant*; or endued with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: *Quoniam tenuissimus est æther, & semper agitatur & viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu acerrimo esse. Quare cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse & intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda. Because the æther is most subtile, and in continual agitation, that animal, which is begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore since the stars are begotten in the æther, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding; from whence it follows, that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods.* And *Cotta* in the third book affirms, that all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that *multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant, many would not so much as admit them to be animals*; plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, *Plutarch*, for this very reason, absolutely condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical; δεινὰς καὶ ἀθέους ἐμποιοῦσι δόξας, ἀναισθήτοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις, καὶ φθειρομέναις ἀναγκαίως ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων δεομένων καὶ χρωμένων φύσεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐπιφέροντες· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῆσαι θεὸς οὐκ ἔστιν· ὁ γὰρ ὂν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός· *They, who give the names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are destroyed by men in the use of them, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived, how these things should be gods, for nothing, that is inanimate, is a god.* And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of Pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by *natural* being meant *inanimate*) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense, and understanding. Wherefore those personated gods, that were nothing but the natures of things deified, as such, were but *dii commentitii & fictitii, counterfeit and fictitious gods*; or, as *Origen* calls them in that place before cited, τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, σωμαλαποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, *figments of the Greeks* (and other Pagans) *that were but things turned into persons and deified.* Neither

De N. D. p. 241. D.

De Is. & Os. p. 377.

can

can there be any other ſenſe made of theſe perſonated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really ſo many ſeveral names of one ſupreme God, or partial conſiderations of him, according to the ſeveral manifeſtations of himſelf in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is ſaid to have both no name, and every name; or, as it is expreſſed in the Aſclepian Dialogue, *Cum non poſſit uno quamvis è multis compoſito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus eſt, ſiquidem ſit unus & omnia; ut neceſſe ſit, aut omnia ipſius nomine, aut ipſum omnium nomine nuncupari. Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never ſo many, therefore is he rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things: ſo that either every thing muſt be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing.* With which Egyptian doctrine *Seneca* [1] ſeemeth alſo fully to agree, when he gives this deſcription of God, *Cui nomen omne convenit, He to whom every name belongeth*; and when he further declares thus concerning him, *Quæcunque voles illi nomina aptabis*; and, *Tot appellationes ejus poſſunt eſſe, quot munera, You may give him whatſoever names you pleaſe*, &c. and, *There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his:* and laſtly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the ſame thing, and every thing we ſee to be God. And the writer *De Mundo* [2] is likewiſe conſonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that God is πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν, or, *may be denominated from every nature, becauſe he is the cauſe of all things.* We ſay therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of phyſiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name God, or God by the name of every thing.

Wherefore theſe perſonated and deified things of nature were not themſelves properly and directly worſhipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a God) ſo as to terminate their worſhip ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the ſupreme God, or elſe at moſt in way of complication with him, whoſe effects and images they are, ſo that they were not ſo much themſelves worſhipped, as God was worſhipped in them. For theſe Pagans profeſſed, that they did, τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ παρέργως, μηδὲ ὥσπερ τὰ βοσκήματα θεωρεῖν, *look upon the heaven (and world) not ſlightly and ſuperficially; nor as meer brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but thoſe ſenſible phantaſms, which from the objects obtrude themſelves upon them*; or elſe, as the ſame *Julian*, in that oration, again more fully expreſſeth it, τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐχ ὥσπερ ἵππος καὶ βοὸς ὁρᾶν, ἤτι τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀμαθῶν ζώων· ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φανησομένου τὴν ἀφανῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν· *Not view and contemplate the heaven and world, with the ſame eyes that oxen and horſes do, but ſo as from that, which is viſible to their outward ſenſes, to diſcern and diſcover another inviſible nature under it.* That is, they profeſſed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to ſee God in every thing, not only as pervading all things, and diffuſed thorough all things, but alſo as being in a manner all things. Wherefore they looked upon the whole world as a ſacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity in it; it being, according to their theology, nothing

Julian Orat. 4. [P.148.]

P. 286.

[1] De Benefic. Lib. IV. Cap. VII. p. 427.

[2] Cap. VII. p. 869. Tom. I. Oper. Ariſtot.

thing but God himſelf viſibly diſplayed. And thus was God worſhipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the univerſe, under the name of *Pan*. As they alſo commonly conceived of *Zeus* and *Jupiter*, after the ſame manner; that is, not abſtractly only (as we now uſe to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus deſcribed in that old Egyptian monument, to be *all that was, is, and ſhall be*; ſo was it before obſerved out of *Plutarch*, that the Egyptians took the firſt God, and the univerſe, for one and the ſame thing; not only becauſe they ſuppoſed the ſupreme God virtually to contain all things within himſelf, but alſo becauſe they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world diſplayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewiſe do the Pagans in *Plato* confound τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν, and ὅλον τὸν κόσμον, *the greateſt God*, and *the whole world* together, as being but one and the ſame thing. And this notion was ſo familiar with theſe Pagans, that *Strabo* himſelf, writing of *Moſes*, could not conceive of his God, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwiſe than thus, τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν, *namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the ſea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole.* By which notwithſtanding, *Strabo* did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a ſenſeleſs nature, but an underſtanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the ſame, which was conceived together with it: of which therefore he tells us, that, according to *Moſes*, no wiſe man would go about to make any image or picture, reſembling any thing here amongſt us. From whence we conclude, that when the ſame *Strabo*[1], writing of the Perſians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι Δία, *take the heaven for* Jupiter; and alſo *Herodotus*[2] before him, that they did κύκλον πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν Δία καλεῖν, *call the whole circle of the heaven* Jupiter, that is, the ſupreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the higheſt God, but that though he were an underſtanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the ſame, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worſhipped alſo by the Pagans, in the ſeveral parts of the world, under ſeveral names; as for example, in the higher and lower æther, under thoſe names of *Minerva* and *Jupiter*; in the air, under the name of *Juno*; in the fire, under the name of *Vulcan*; in the ſea, under the name of *Neptune*, *&c.* Neither can it be reaſonably doubted, but that when the Roman ſea-captains ſacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worſhip that God, who acteth in the waves, and whoſe *wonders are in the deep.*

De Leg. l. 7. p. 821.

L. 16. p. 761.

But beſides this, the Pagans ſeemed to apprehend a kind of neceſſity of worſhipping God thus, in his works, and in the viſible things of this world, becauſe the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an inviſible Deity; and therefore unleſs they were detained in a way of religion, by ſuch a worſhip of God as was accommodate

[1] Lib. XV. p. 697. [2] Lib. I. Cap. CXXXI. p. 55.

commodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in *Eusebius*; ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὕλα Θεὸν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φάσι, *That God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable, that men should worship him, by and through those things, that are visible and manifest.* *Plato* likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans in his time, τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν, τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι, *That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do.* The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to content themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that, which is incomprehensible to them. Which though *Plato* professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun and moon, and stars. *Maximus Tyrius* doth indeed exhort men to ascend up, in the contemplation of God, above all corporeal things; τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ οὐχ ὁ οὐρανὸς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σώματα (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ θεσπέζια, ἅτε ἐκείνου ἔγγονα ἀκριβοῦς καὶ γνήσια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡρμοσμένα) ἀλλά καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἐλθεῖν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον, &c. *The end of your journey* (saith he) *is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and divine, and the genuine off-spring of that supreme Deity, framed after the best manner, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens,* &c. Nevertheless, he closes his discourse thus[1]; εἰ δὲ ἐξαθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁρᾶν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγονα, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα ὁ Βοιώτιος ποιητὴς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τρισμύριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἄληπτοι ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις, &c. *But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or off-spring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Bœotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God; but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the æther dæmons,* &c. Lastly, *Socrates* himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God, (because himself is invisible) in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to *Euthydemus*; ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ ἂν μὴ ἀνακμένης ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς· *That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them.* Which he afterward particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole

Pr. Ev. l. 3. *c.* 13.

De Leg. l. 7. *p.* 821. [P. 640.]

Dissert. 1. [P. 12.]

Xenoph. Memor. l. 4. [P. 633.]

[1] P. 14, 15.

whole world, that being inviſible, he hath made himſelf viſible in his works, and conſequently was to be worſhipped and adored in them. Whether *Socrates* and *Plato*, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, ſuch as the ſun, moon, and ſtars were to them, we cannot certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many of thoſe Pagans, who are charged with worſhipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithſtanding direct their worſhip to the ſpirits of thoſe elements, as *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us *Julian* did, that is, chiefly the ſouls of them, all the elements being ſuppoſed by many of theſe Pagans to be animated, (as was before obſerved
P. 236, 237. concerning *Proclus*;) and partly alſo thoſe dæmons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preſide over the parts of them; upon which account it was ſaid by *Plato*, and others of the ancients, that πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, *all things are full of gods and dæmons.*

XXXIII. But that theſe phyſiological gods, that is, the things of nature perſonated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much leſs independent and ſelf-exiſtent ones, may further appear from hence, becauſe they did not only thus perſonate and deify things ſubſtantial, and inanimate bodies, but alſo meer accidents and affections of ſubſtances. As for example, firſt, the paſſions of the mind; τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, ſaith S. *Greg. Nazianzen*, [1] *They accounted the paſſions of the mind to be gods*, or at leaſt worſhipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was *Hope*, not only a goddeſs to the poet *Theognis* [2],

Ἔλπις ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλὴ ἔνεστιν,
Ἄλλοι δ' οὔλυμπονδ' ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν·

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Numen, that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forſaken thoſe manſions and the world;) but alſo had real temples dedicated to her at *Rome*, as that conſecrated by *Attilius* in the *Forum Olitorium*, and others elſewhere, wherein ſhe was commonly pictured or feigned, as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand [3]. Thus alſo *Love* and *Deſire* were gods or goddeſſes too, as likewiſe were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, juſtice, clemency, concord, victory, *&c.* Which *Victory* was, together with *Virtue*, reckoned up amongſt the gods by *Plautus* in the prologue of his *Amphitryo*; and not only ſo, but that there was an altar erected to her alſo, near the entrance of the ſenate-houſe at *Rome*, which having been once demoliſhed, *Symmachus* earneſtly endeavoured the reſtauration thereof, in the reign of *Theodoſius*; he amongſt other things writing thus concerning it, [4] *Nemo colendam neget, quam profitetur optandam*; *Let no man deny that of right to be worſhipped, which he acknowledgeth to be wiſhed for, and to be deſirable.* Beſides all which, *Echo* was a goddeſs to theſe pagans too, and ſo was *Night* (to whom they ſacrificed a cock) and *Sleep* and *Death* itſelf, and very many more ſuch affections of things,

[1] Orat. XXXIV. Tom. I. Oper. p. 546.
[2] In Sententiis, Verſ. 1131, 1132. p. 115.
[3] Vide Voſſium. de Idololatr. Lib. VIII. Cap. X. p. 748.
[4] Epiſtolar. Lib. IX. Epiſt. LXI. p. 441.

things, of which *Voſſius* has collected the largeſt catalogue, in his eighth book *de Theologia Gentili*. And this perſonating and deifying of accidental things was ſo familiar with theſe Pagans, that, as St. *Chryſoſtome* hath obſerved, St. *Paul* was therefore ſaid by ſome of the vulgar Athenians to have been a ſetter forth of ſtrange gods, *when he preached to them Jeſus and the reſurrection*, becauſe they ſuppoſed him, not only to have made Jeſus a God, but alſo *Anaſtaſis*, or reſurrection, a goddeſs too. Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature tranſported theſe Pagans ſo far, as to deify evil things alſo, that is, things both noxious and vicious. Of the former *Pliny* thus; *Inferi quoque in genera deſcribuntur, morbique, & multæ etiam peſtes, dum eſſe placatas trepido metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publicè febri fanum in palatio dedicatum eſt*, Orbonæ *ad ædem larium ara, & malæ fortunæ Exquiliis. So great is the number of theſe gods, that even hell, or the ſtate of death itſelf, diſeaſes and many plagues are numbred amongſt them, whilſt with a trembling fear we deſire to have theſe pacified. And therefore was there a temple publickly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewiſe altars elſewhere erected to* Orbona, *and to evil fortune.* Of the latter, *Balbus* in *Cicero*; *Quo ex genere Cupidinis & Voluptatis, & Lubentinæ Veneris, vocabula conſecrata ſunt, vitioſarum rerum & non naturalium. Of which kind alſo are thoſe names of luſt, and pleaſure, and wanton venery, things vicious, and not natural, conſecrated and deified.* *Cicero*, in his book of laws [1], informs us, that at *Athens* there were temples dedicated alſo to contumely and impudence, but withal giving us this cenſure of ſuch practices, *Quæ omnia ejuſmodi deteſtanda & repudianda ſunt, All which kind of things are to be deteſted and rejected, and nothing to be deified, but what is virtuous or good.* Notwithſtanding which, it is certain, that ſuch evil things as theſe were conſecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as theſe things of nature, or natures of things, were ſometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, ſo was this again ſometimes done diſguiſedly, under other counterfeit proper names: as pleaſure was deified under the names of *Volupia*, and of *Lubentina Venus*; time, (according to the opinion of ſome) under the name of *Cronos* or *Saturn*, which as it produceth all things, ſo devours all things into itſelf again; prudence or wiſdom likewiſe, under the names of *Athena* or *Minerva*. For it is plain, that *Origen* underſtood it thus, when *Celſus* not only approved of worſhipping God Almighty, in the ſun, and in *Minerva*, as that which was lawful, but alſo commended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply; ἐυφημῶμεν ἥλιον ὡς καλὸν θεῦ δημιούργημα, &c. Ἀθηνᾶν μέντοι μετὰ ἡλίκ ταττομένην, ἐμυθοποίησαν οἱ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι, εἴτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, εἴτε χωρὶς ὑπονοιῶν, φάσκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεγενῆθαι κεφαλῆς, καθωπλιζμένην, &c. *We ſpeak well of the ſun, as a good work of God's*, &c. *but as for that* Athena *or* Minerva, *which* Celſus *here joineth with the ſun, this is a thing fabulouſly deviſed by the Greeks, (whether according to ſome myſtical, arcane, and allegorical ſenſe, or without it) when they ſay that ſhe was begotten out of* Jupiter's *brain all armed.* And again afterwards, ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγεσθαι φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, *If it be granted, that by* Athena *or* Minerva *be tropologically meant prudence*, &c. Wherefore, not only

H. N. l. 2. c. 7.

N. D. l. 2. [Cap. XXIII. p. 2988. Tom. IX. Oper.].

Gruter's Edition a little otherwiſe.

C. Celſ. l. 8. p. 421.

[1] Lib. II. Cap. XI. p. 3354. Tom. IX. Oper.

only according to the poetical, but alſo to the political, and civil theology of the Pagans, theſe accidental things of nature, and affections of ſubſtances, perſonated, were made ſo many gods and goddeſſes; *Cicero* himſelf in his book of laws approving of ſuch political gods as theſe: *Benè verò, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides, conſecratur manu; quarum omnium* Romæ *dedicata publicè templa ſunt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipſos in animis ſuis collocatos putent. It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are conſecrated, (all which have their temples publickly dedicated at* Rome*) that ſo they, who poſſeſs theſe things, (as all good men do) may think, that they have the gods themſelves placed in their minds.* And himſelf makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary proviſion, that no evil and vicious things be conſecrated amongſt them: *Aſt olla, propter quæ datur homini adſcenſus in cælum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra ſunto. Nec ulla vitiorum ſolemnia obeunto. Let them alſo worſhip thoſe things, by means whereof men aſcend up to heaven; and let there be ſhrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things.*

L. 2. [Cap. XI. p. 3354.]

Notwithſtanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by *Varro* natural, (whereby is meant not that which was phyſiological only, but that which is true and real) and by *Scævola* philoſophical; and which is by both oppoſed, not only to the poetical and fabulous, but alſo to the political and civil: I ſay, according to this theology of theirs, theſe accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; becauſe they were ſo far from having any life and ſenſe in them, that they had not ſo much as ὑπόστασιν ϗ οὐσίαν, *any real ſubſiſtence or ſubſtantial eſſence* of their own. And thus does *Origen* diſpute againſt *Minerva*'s godſhip, as tropologically interpreted to prudence, ἵνα δὲ ϗ τροπολογῆται ϗ λέγηλαι Φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, παρασησάτω τις αὐτῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ὑφεστηκυίας κατὰ τὴν τροπολογίαν ταύτην· *If* Athena *or* Minerva *be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans ſhow what ſubſtantial eſſence it hath, or that it really ſubſiſts according to this tropology.* Which is all one, as if he ſhould have ſaid, let the Pagans then ſhew, how this can be a god or goddeſs, which hath not ſo much as any ſubſtantial eſſence, nor ſubſiſts by itſelf, but is a meer accidental affection of ſubſtances only. And the ſame thing is likewiſe urged by *Origen*, concerning other ſuch kind of gods of theirs, as *Memory* the mother of the muſes, and the *Graces* all naked, in his firſt book; where *Celſus* contended for a multiplicity of gods againſt the Jews; that theſe things having not ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν, *any ſubſtantial eſſence or ſubſiſtence*, could not poſſibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing elſe, but Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα σωματοποιηθέντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, *meer figments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and ſo perſonated and deified.* And we think, there cannot be a truer commentary upon this paſſage of *Origen*'s, than theſe following verſes of *Prudentius*, in his ſecond book againſt *Symmachus*;

Pag. 422.

Pag. 285.

Deſine,

Deſine, ſi pudor eſt, gentilis ineptia, tandem
Res incorporeas ſimulatis fingere membris:

Let the Gentiles be at laſt aſhamed, if they have any ſhame in them, of this their folly, in deſcribing and ſetting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members. Where accidents and affections of things, ſuch as victory was, (whoſe altar *Symmachus* there contended for the reſtauration of) are by *Prudentius* called *res incorporeæ*, *incorporeal things*, accordingly as the Greek philoſophers concluded, that ποιότητες were ἀσώματοι, *qualities incorporeal*. Neither is it poſſible, that the Pagans themſelves ſhould be inſenſible hereof; and accordingly we find, that *Cotta* in *Cicero* doth for this reaſon utterly baniſh and explode theſe gods out of the philoſophick and true theology: *Num cenſes igitur ſubtiliore ratione opus eſſe ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, ſpem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, ſalutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejuſmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobiſmet inſunt ipſis, ut mens, ut ſpes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandæ nobis ſunt, ut honos, ut ſalus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum ſit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero. Is there any need, think you, of any great ſubtilty to confute theſe things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we ſee them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Becauſe they either exiſt in us, as mind, hope, virtue, concord; or elſe they are deſired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory,* (that is, they are nothing but meer accidents or affections of things) *and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them, cannot poſſibly be underſtood.* And again, afterwards he affirmeth, *Eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas eſſe, non figuras deorum*, that thoſe, who, in the allegorical mythology of the Pagans, *are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods.* *N. D. l. 3.* [Cap. XXIV. p. 3088.]

Wherefore ſince the Pagans themſelves acknowledged, that thoſe perſonated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were ſo many ſeveral names, and partial conſiderations of one ſupreme God, as manifeſting himſelf in all the things of nature. For that *vis* or *force*, which *Cicero*[1] tells us, was that in all theſe things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than ſomething of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwiſe underſtand thoſe following words of *Balbus* in *Cicero*, *Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut ſine Deo regi non poſſet, ipſa res deorum nomen obtinuit: Of which things becauſe the force is ſuch, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themſelves obtained the names of gods*; that is, God was acknowledged and worſhipped in them all, which was paganically thus ſignified, by calling of them gods. And *Pliny*, though no very divine perſon, yet being ingenious, eaſily underſtood this to be the meaning of it; *Fragilis & laborioſa mortalitas in partes iſta digeſſit, infirmitatis ſuæ memor, ut portionibus* *N. D. l. 2.* [Cap. XXIII. p. 2988.] *Nat. H. l. 2. c. 7.*

[1] De Natur. Deor. Lib. II. Cap. XXIII. p. 2988. Tom. IX. Oper.

tionibus quiſque coleret, quo maximè indigeret ; frail and toilſome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity ; that ſo every one, by parcels and pieces, might worſhip that in God, which himſelf moſt ſtands in need of. Which religion of the Pagans, thus worſhipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one moſt ſimple being, unmixed with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is ſeverally manifeſted in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, *Prudentius* thus perſtringeth in his ſecond book againſt *Symmachus* ;

N. 236. [p. 289.]

Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,
Quæ ſimules parere meis virtutibus, ut me
Per varias partes minuas, cui nulla recidi
Pars aut forma poteſt, quia ſum ſubſtantia ſimplex,
Nec pars eſſe queo.

From which words of his we may alſo conclude, that *Symmachus* the Pagan, who determined, that it was one thing, that all worſhipped, and yet would have victory, and ſuch like other things, worſhipped as gods and goddeſſes, did by theſe, and all thoſe other Pagan gods before mentioned, underſtand nothing but ſo many ſeveral names, and partial conſiderations of one ſupreme Deity, according to its ſeveral virtues or powers: ſo that when he ſacrificed to victory, he ſacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before obſerved out of *Plutarch*, that the Egyptian fable of *Oſiris* being mangled and cut in pieces by *Typhon*, did allegorically ſignify the ſame thing, *viz.* the one ſimple Deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial conſiderations of him, as ſo many nominal and titular gods ; which *Iſis* notwithſtanding, that is true knowledge and wiſdom, according to the natural or philoſophick theology, unites all together into one. And that not only ſuch gods as theſe, victory, virtue, and the like, but alſo thoſe other gods, *Neptune*, *Mars*, *Bellona*, &c. were all really but one and the ſame *Jupiter*, acting ſeverally in the world, *Plautus* himſelf ſeems ſufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his *Amphitryo* in theſe words ;

That *Oſiris* was the ſupreme Deity, ſee the Egyptian Inſcription, in *Theo. Smyrn. Mathem. c.* 47. Πρεσβύτατος πάντων βασιλεὺς Ὄσιρις, Oſiris *the moſt ancient king of all things.*

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdiis
Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare quæ bona
Vobis feciſſent ? Queis benefactis meus pater,
Deûm regnator, architectus omnibus.

Whereas there was before cited a paſſage out of *G. I. Voſſius* his book *de Theolog. Gent.* which we could not underſtand otherwiſe than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant ſo many eternal minds independent and ſelf-exiſtent ; we now think ourſelves concerned to do *Voſſius* ſo much right, as to acknowledge, that we have ſince met

met with another place of his in that ſame book, wherein he either corrects the former opinion, or elſe declares himſelf better concerning it, after this manner; that the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be ſo many ſubſtantial minds (or ſpirits) not independent and ſelf-exiſtent, nor indeed eternal neither, but created by one ſupreme Mind or God, and appointed by him to preſide over the ſeveral parts of the world, and things of nature, as his miniſters. Which ſame thing he affirmeth alſo of thoſe deified accidents and affections, that by them were to be underſtood ſo many ſubſtantial minds or ſpirits created, preſiding over thoſe ſeveral things, or diſpenſing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book [1], (where he ſpeaks concerning theſe affections and accidents deified by the Pagans) are as followeth: *Hujuſmodi deorum propè immenſa eſt copia. Ac in civili quidem theologia conſiderari ſolent, tanquam mentes quædam, hoc honoris à ſummo Deo ſortitæ, ut affectionibus iſtis præeſſent. Nempe crediderunt Deum, quem optimum max. vocabant, non per ſe omnia curare, quo pacto, ut dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decederet, ſed, inſtar regis, plurimos habere miniſtros & miniſtras, quorum ſingulos huic illive curæ præfeciſſet. Sic juſtitia, quæ &* Aſtræa *ac* Themis, *præfecta erat actibus cunctis, in quibus juſtitia attenderetur*; Comus *curare creditus eſt comeſſationes*; *& ſic in cæteris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione ſortitis, cujus cura cuique commiſſa crederetur. Quo pacto ſi conſiderentur, non aliter different à ſpiritibus ſive angelis bonis maliſque, quam quòd hi reverà à Deo conditi ſint*; *illæ verò mentes, de quibus nunc loquimur, ſint figmentum mentis humanæ, pro numero affectionum, in quibus vis eſſe major videretur, comminiſcentis mentes affectionibus ſingulis præfectas. Facilè autem ſacerdotes ſua commenta perſuadere ſimplicioribus potuerunt, quia ſatis videretur veriſimile, ſummæ illi menti, deorum omnium regi, innumeras ſervire mentes, ut eò perfectior ſit ſummi dei beatitudo, minuſque curis implicetur*; *inque tot famulantium numero, ſummi numinis majeſtas magis eluceat. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologiæ civilis. Of ſuch gods as theſe there was an innumerable company amongſt the Pagans. And in their civil theology they were wont to be conſidered*; *as certain minds (or ſpirits) appointed by the ſupreme God, to preſide over the affections of things*; *they ſuppoſing, that God, whom they called the beſt, and the greateſt, did not immediately himſelf take care of every thing, ſince that muſt needs be a diſtraction to him, and a hinderance of his happineſs*; *but that he had, as a king, many he and ſhe-miniſters under him, which had their ſeveral offices aſſigned to them. Thus juſtice, which was called alſo* Aſtræa *and* Themis, *was by them thought to preſide over all thoſe actions, in which juſtice was concerned*; *and* Comus *over all revellings*; *and the like. Which gods, if conſidered after this manner, will no otherwiſe differ from angels good and bad, than only in this, that theſe latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of men only*; *they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater force in them, deviſing and imagining certain minds to preſide over each of them. And the vulgar might therefore be the more eaſily led into this perſuaſion by their prieſts, becauſe it ſeemed reaſonable to them, that that ſupreme Mind, who is the king of all the gods, ſhould have many other minds as his ſubſervient miniſters under him, both to free him from ſollicitous care, and alſo to add to his grandeur*

[1] Pag. 735.

grandeur and majeſty. And ſuch was the doctrine of the civil theology. Where, though *Voſſius* ſpeak particularly of that kind of Pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified, (which no man in his wits could poſſibly ſuppoſe to be themſelves true and proper gods, they having no ſubſiſtence of their own) that theſe by the generality of the vulgar Pagans were conceived to be ſo many created minds or ſpirits, appointed by the ſupreme God, to preſide as his miniſters over thoſe ſeveral affections of ſubſtances; yet does he plainly imply the ſame of all thoſe other political gods of theſe Pagans likewiſe, that they were not looked upon by them, as ſo many unmade, ſelf-exiſtent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or ſpirits, created by the ſupreme God, and by him appointed to preſide over the ſeveral parts of the world, and things of nature, and having their ſeveral offices aſſigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and *Voſſius* are now well agreed, *viz.* that the ancient Pagans aſſerted no ſuch thing as a multitude of independent deities; ſo that there only remain ſome particular differences of ſmaller moment betwixt us.

Ourſelves have before obſerved, that *Æolus* was probably taken by *Epictetus* in *Arrianus*, (not indeed for one, but) for many created miniſters of the ſupreme God, or dæmons collectively, appointed by him to preſide over the winds, in all the ſeveral parts of the world. And the Pagans in St. *Auſtin* ſeem to interpret thoſe deified accidents, and things of nature, after the ſame manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or dæmons, (one or more) that were appointed to preſide over them reſpectively, or to diſpenſe the ſame. *Quoniam ſciebant majores noſtri nemini talia, niſi aliquo Deo largiente concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab iis ſentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde flectentes; ſicut à bello* Bellonam *nuncupaverunt, non* Bellum; *ſicut à cunis* Cuninam, *non* Cunam; *ſicut à ſegetibus* Segetiam, *non* Segetem; *ſicut à pomis* Pomonam, *non* Pomum; *ſicut à bobus* Bobonam, *non* Bovem. *Aut certè nulla vocabuli declinatione ſicut res ipſæ nominantur; ut* Pecunia *dicta eſt dea, quæ dat pecuniam, non omninò pecunia dea ipſa putata: Ita virtus, quæ dat virtutem, honor qui honorem, concordia quæ concordiam, victoria quæ victoriam dat. Ita, inquiunt, cum felicitas dea dicitur, non ipſa quæ datur, ſed numen illud attenditur, à quo felicitas datur. Becauſe our forefathers knew well, that theſe things do not happen to any, without the ſpecial gift and favour of ſome god; therefore were thoſe gods, whoſe names they knew not, called from the names of thoſe very things themſelves, which they perceived to be beſtowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the God, that cauſeth war, was called not* Bellum, *but* Bellona; *the God, which preſideth over infants cradles, not* Cuna, *but* Cunina; *that which giveth corn,* Segetia; *and that which affordeth apples,* Pomona, &c. *But at other times, this was done without any declenſion of the word at all, they calling both the thing, and the god, which is the beſtower of it, by one and the ſelf-ſame name. As* Pecunia *doth not only ſignify money, but alſo the goddeſs, which giveth money;* Virtus, *the goddeſs, which giveth virtue;* Honor, *the god, that beſtoweth honour;* Concordia, *the goddeſs, that cauſeth concord;* Victory, *the goddeſs, which affordeth victory. So alſo*

Civ. D. l. 4. c. 24. [P. 83. Tom. VII. Oper.]

alſo when Felicity is called a goddeſs, by it is not meant that thing, which is given, but that divine power, from whence it is given. Here, I ſay, the Pagans may ſeem to have underſtood, by thoſe deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or dæmons (one or more) the miniſters of the ſupreme God, appointed by him to preſide over thoſe ſeveral things reſpectively, or to diſpenſe the ſame. Neither can we deny, but that in ſo much ignorance and diverſity of opinions, as there was amongſt the Pagans, ſome might poſſibly underſtand thoſe political gods, and deified things alſo, after the way of *Voſſius*, for ſo many ſingle minds or ſpirits, appointed to preſide over thoſe ſeveral things reſpectively throughout the whole world, and nothing elſe. Nevertheleſs, it ſeemeth not at all probable, that this ſhould be the general opinion amongſt the civilized Pagans, that all thoſe gods of theirs were ſo many ſingle created minds or ſpirits, each of them appointed to preſide over ſome one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing elſe. As for example, that the goddeſs *Victory* was one ſingle created ſhe-ſpirit, appointed to beſtow victory, to whoſoever at any time enjoy'd it, in all parts of the world; and ſo, that the goddeſs *Juſtice* ſhould be ſuch another ſingle mind or ſpirit, created to diſpenſe juſtice every where, and meddle with nothing elſe. And the like of all thoſe other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, *&c.*

And *Lactantius Firmianus*, taking notice of that profeſſion of the Pagans, to worſhip nothing but one ſupreme God, and his ſubſervient miniſters, generated or created by him, (according to that of *Seneca* in his exhortations, *Genuiſſe regni ſui miniſtros deum*; *That the ſupreme God had generated other inferior miniſters of his kingdom under him*, which were called by them alſo gods) plainly denies all the Pagan gods ſave one, to be the created miniſters of that one ſupreme, he making this reply; *Verum hi neque dii ſunt, neque deos ſe vocari, aut coli volunt*, &c. *Nec tamen illi ſunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum & exiguus & certus eſt numerus. But theſe miniſters of the divine kingdom, or ſubſervient created ſpirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as ſuch*, &c. *Nor indeed are they thoſe gods, that are now vulgarly worſhipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a ſmall and certain number.* That is, the Pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and ſelect gods are but a few. Whereas, ſaith he, the miniſters of the ſupreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and ſixty, but innumerable, ſtars and dæmons. *De Fal. Rel. c. 7.* [Inſtit. Divin. Lib. I. Cap. VII. p. 51.]

Moreover, *Ariſtotle*, in his book againſt *Zeno*, (ſuppoſing the idea of God to be this, the moſt powerful of all things, or the moſt perfect being) objecteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries, (that is, the civil theology) there ſeems to be no one abſolutely powerful being, but one God is ſuppoſed to be moſt powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: εἴπερ ἅπαντα ἐπικράτιστον τοῦ θεοῦ λαμβάνει τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ κρείττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί· ὅκαν ἐκ τῶ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε ταύτην κατὰ τῶ θεῶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν· *Whereas* Zeno *takes it for granted, that* *Ariſt. in Zen. Gor. p. 1246.* [Cap. IV. p. 841. Tom. II. Oper.]

that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one the moſt excellent and moſt powerful being of all; this doth not ſeem to be according to law, (that is, the civil theology) *for there the gods are mutually better one than another, reſpectively as to ſeveral things; and therefore* Zeno *took not this conſent of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly ſeemeth.* From which paſſage of *Ariſtotle*'s we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon as the ſubſervient miniſters of one ſupreme God; and yet they generally acknowledging, (as *Ariſtotle* himſelf confeſſeth) a monarchy, and conſequently not many independent deities, it muſt needs follow, as *Zeno* doubtleſs would reply, that theſe their political gods were but one and the ſame ſupreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: that is, receiving ſeveral denominations, according to ſeveral notions of him, and as he exerciſeth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have ſufficiently proved already to have been the general ſenſe of the cheif Pagan doctors; that theſe many political and popular gods were but the polyonymy of one natural God, that is, either partial conſiderations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifeſtations in the world, ſeverally perſonated and deified.

And thus does *Voſſius* himſelf afterwards confeſs alſo; that according to the natural theology, the many Pagan gods were but ſo many ſeveral denominations of one God; though this learned philologer doth plainly ſtraiten and confine the notion of this natural theology too much, and improperly call the God thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it ſuch a nature, as was endued with ſenſe and underſtanding. His words are theſe; *Diſpar verò ſententia theologorum naturalium, qui non aliud numen agnoſcebant, quàm naturam rerum, eóque omnia gentium numina referebant,* &c. *Nempe mens eorum fuit, ſicut natura eſſet occupata circa hanc vel illam affectionem, ita numina nominaque deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent; eò etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum dearumque fingerent catervam. Sagaciores interim hæc cuncta, unum eſſe numen aiebant; putà rerum naturam, quæ licet una foret, pro variis tamen effectis varia ſortiretur nomina, vario etiam afficeretur cultu. But the caſe is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other God, but the nature of things, and referred all the Pagan gods to that. For they conceived; that as nature was occupied about ſeveral things, ſo were the divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diverſified. And where-ever they ſaw any greater force, there did they preſently conceit ſomething divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an innumerable company of gods and goddeſſes. But the more ſagacious in the mean time affirmed all theſe to be but one and the ſame God; to wit the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worſhipped after different manners.* Where *Voſſius* calls the ſupreme God of theſe natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from phyſicks, or natural philoſophy only; whereas we have already ſhewed, that the natural theo-

L. 8. c. 1.

logy of *Varro* and *Scævola*, was of equal extent with the philoſophick; whoſe only *Numen*, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth ſufficiently appear from that hiſtory thereof before given by us: as alſo that it was called natural in another ſenſe, as real, and as oppoſite to opinion, fancy and fabuloſity, or what hath no reality of exiſtence any where in the world. Thus does St. *Auſtin* diſtinguiſh betwixt *natura deorum*, *the true nature of the gods*, and *hominum inſtituta*, *the inſtitutes of men concerning them*. As alſo he ſets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of *Varro*, in this manner: *Fieri poteſt, ut in urbe, ſecundum falſas opiniones ea colantur & credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura ſit nuſquam: It may come to paſs, that thoſe things may be worſhipped and believed in cities, according to falſe opinions, which have no nature or real exiſtence any where, either in the world, or without it.* Wherefore, if inſtead of this nature of things, which was properly the god of none but only of ſuch atheiſtick philoſophers, as *Epicurus* and *Strato*, we ſubſtitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffuſed thorough all, (which was the true God of the Pagan Theiſts;) this of *Voſſius* will be unqueſtionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, thoſe many poetical and political gods before mentioned were but one and the ſame natural or real god; who, in reſpect of his different virtues, powers and effects, was called by ſeveral names, and worſhipped after different manners; yet nevertheleſs ſo, as that, according to thoſe Theologers, there were really alſo many other inferior miniſters of this one ſupreme God, (whether called minds or dæmons,) that were ſuppoſed to be the ſubſervient executioners of all thoſe ſeveral powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans natural theology ſet down out of *Prudentius* [1]:

C.D. *l.* 6. *c.* 5. [p. 116. Tom. VII]

Ibid.

> ——————*In uno*
> *Conſtituit jus omne Deo, cui ſerviat ingens*
> *Virtutum ratio, variis inſtructa miniſtris.*

viz. *That it acknowledged one ſupreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who diſplayeth and exerciſeth his manifold virtues and powers in the world,* (all ſeverally perſonated and deified in the poetick and civil theologies) *together with the ſubſervient miniſtry of other inferior created minds, underſtanding beings, or dæmons, called alſo by them gods.*

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonick Pagans did reduce thoſe many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtleſs all the perſonated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonick ideas, or firſt paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the ſupreme Deity, that is, from the firſt hypoſtaſis of the Platonick trinity; and which were commonly called by them νοητοὶ θεοὶ, *intelligible gods*, as if they had been indeed ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances and perſons. And, as we have alſo proved out of *Philo*, that this high-flown Paganick theology was ancienter than

[1] In Apotheoſi, verſ. 191.

either *Julian* or *Apuleius*; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by *Celsus*, imputed also to the Egyptian Theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than a symbols of those eternal Ideas; καὶ φυσί γε ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν Αἰγυπτίων καταγελᾶν, καὶ τοι πολλὰ καὶ οὐ φαῦλα παρεχόντων αἰνίγματα ἐπὰν ἰδεῶν ἀϊδίων, καὶ οὐχ (ὡς δοκοῦσι οἱ πολλοὶ) ζώων ἐφημερίων τιμὰς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκωσιν· *Celsus* also addeth, *that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion, for as much as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas.* According to which of *Celsus* it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to *Plato*, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however supposed to have been generated from that first divine hypostasis of the Platonick and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them, all to exist in one divine intellect, according to that of *Plotinus* [1], οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ, *That the intelligibles exist no where of themselves, without Mind or Intellect*; which Mind or Intellect being the second divine hypostasis, these intelligible and invisible gods, (however generated from God) yet are therefore said by *Julian*, in his book against the Christians, both to co-exist with God, and to in-exist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of *Julian*'s in his sixth oration, πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχοι τῶν ὁποσοῦν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας· εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους. εἴτε ἐπικήρων οὐ θνητὰς οὐδὲ ἐπικήρους, ἀϊδίους δὲ καὶ μενούσας ἀεὶ, αἰκαὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς ἀειγενεσίας. *For God is all things, forasmuch as he containeth within himself, the causes of all things, that any way are; whether of immortal things immortal; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible but eternal also, and always remaining; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production.* Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the divine Ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonick and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of Gods to the divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the supreme God, (though dependent on him too) but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in *Origen*, that, as the Egyptian Theologers called their religious animals, symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. Τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σεμνολογούντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ φασκόντων εἶναί τινα αὐτὰ καὶ Θεοῦ σύμβολα· Celsus *applauds the Egyptian Theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God.*

Orig. c. Cels. L. 3. p. 120.

p. 347.

Or. c. Cels. p. 102.

And now we have given some account of the Polyonymy of the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper, personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several Gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different

[1] Ennead. V. Lib. V. p. 519.

different notions and partial conſiderations of him, according to his univerſal and all-comprehending nature. *Janus*, as the beginning of the world, and the firſt original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyrick poet, *Septimius Apher*, accordingly thus invoked [1];

O cate rerum Sator! O PRINCIPIUM DEORUM!
Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumultus,
Cui reſerata mugiunt aurea clauſtra mundi:

Genius, as the great mind and ſoul of the whole world. *Saturn*, as that hidden ſource and principle, from which all forms and lives iſſue forth, and into which they again retire; being there laid up as in their ſecret ſtore-houſe: or elſe, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaick writers expreſſeth it, that which doth πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν, *make all things out of it ſelf, and unmake them into it ſelf again*; this Hetrurian *Saturn*, anſwering to the Egyptian *Hammon*, that likewiſe ſignified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by *Jamblichus* [2], ὁ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, *he that bringeth forth the ſecret power of the hidden reaſons of things* (contained within himſelf) *into light*. God was alſo called *Athena* or *Minerva*, as wiſdom diffuſing it ſelf through all things: and *Aphrodite Urania*, the heavenly *Venus* or Love. Thus *Phanes*, *Orpheus* his ſupreme God, (ſo called according to *Lactantius* [3], *Quia cum adhuc nihil eſſet, primus ex infinito apparuerit*; *becauſe when there was yet nothing, he firſt appeared out of that infinite abyſs*; but according to *Proclus*, becauſe he did ἐκφαίνην τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας, *diſcover and make manifeſt the intelligible unities* (or ideas) *from himſelf*; though we think the conjecture of *Athanaſius Kircherus* [4] to be more probable than either of theſe, that *Phanes* was an Egyptian name;) this *Phanes*, I ſay, was in the Orphick and Egyptian theology, as *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Timæus* informs us, ſtiled ἀβρὸς ἔρως, *tender and ſoft Love*. And *Pherecydes Syrus* [5] likewiſe affirmed, εἰς ἔρωτα μεταβέβλῆθαι τὸν Δία μέλλοντα δημιουργεῖν, *that* Jupiter *was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world*. Beſides which, there were other ſuch names of the ſupreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us; as for example, *Summanus* amongſt the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obſolete: of which St. *Auſtin* thus; *Romani veteres neſcio quem* Summanum, *cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam* Jovem, *ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed poſtquam* Jovi *templum inſigne ac ſublime conſtructum eſt, propter ædis dignitatem, ſic ad eum multitudo confluxit, ut vix inveniatur, qui* Summani *nomen, quod audiri jam non poteſt, ſe ſaltem legiſſe meminerit. The ancient Romans worſhipped I know not what god, whom they called* Summanus *more than they did* Jupiter. *But after that a ſtately and magnificent temple was erected to* Jupiter, *they all betook themſelves thither; in ſo much that the name of* Summanus, *now not at all heard, is ſcarcely to be found in ancient writings.* C. D. l. 4. c. 23. [P. 82. Tom. VII. Oper.]

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called *ſpecial*; ſo were theſe but ſeveral names of that ſupreme God alſo, according to particular

[1] Apud Terentium Maurum de Litteris, &c. inter Grammaticos veteres à Putſchio editos, p. 2396.

[2] De Myſteriis Ægyptior. Sect. VIII. cap. III. p. 159.

[3] Inſtitut. Divin. Lib. I. cap. V. p. 31.

[4] In OEdipo Ægyptiaco, p. 498.

[5] Apud Proclum in Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. III. p. 156.

particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, tho' they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all thing, to be himself in a manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. *Austin*[1] *Usque adeone, inquiunt, majores nostros insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut hæc nescirent munera divina esse, non deos? Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottish, as not to know, that these things are but divine gifts, and not gods themselves?* And *Cicero* also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature, was only to signify, that they acknowledged the force of all things to be divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made it self visible, accordingly as they declare in that place of *Eusebius* before cited in part; μὴ τὰ ὁρώμενα σώματα ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων, μηδέγε τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φήσασι θεοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἀοράτους δυνάμεις, αὐτῷ δὴ τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα θεὸν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν· *That they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passes through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things.*

Pr. Evan. l. 3. c. 13. [P. 121.]

Athanasius Bishop of *Alexandria*, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious or phantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these; εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεοὺς, οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξε, καὶ τοὺς τὴν κτίσιν θεοποιοῦντας ἤλεγξε πλανωμένους, &c. *Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the Pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole Pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now*

[1] Ubi supra.

now but the true piety left; he, who is worſhipped by us Chriſtians, being the only true God, the lord of nature, and the maker of all ſubſtances. From whence we may obſerve, that, according to *Athanaſius*, the Pagan poetick gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they could be no other, than the ſeveral notions and the powers of the one ſupreme God deified, or ſeveral names of him. So that *Athanaſius* his poetick Gods, or οἱ παρὰ ποιηταῖς μυθευόμενοι θεοὶ, *Gods fabulouſly deviſed by the poets*, were chiefly thoſe two kinds of Pagan gods, firſt mentioned by us; that is, the various conſiderations of the one ſupreme Numen, according to its general notion, expreſſed by ſo many proper names; and ſecondly his particular powers diffuſed thorough the world, ſeverally perſonated and deified. Which, conſidered as ſo many diſtinct deities, are nothing but meer fiction and phancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themſelves in *Athanaſius* acknowledge: ἴσως γὰρ ὡς αὐτοί φασι, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πέπλασται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅλως Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ Κρόνος, οὐδὲ Ἥρα, οὐδὲ Ἄρης· πλάτταυσι δὲ τούτους, ὡς ὄντας οἱ ποιηταὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκουόντων, *They ſay, that the names of thoſe gods are meerly fictitious, and that there does no where really exiſt any ſuch* Jupiter, *or* Saturn, *or* Juno, *or* Mars; *but that the poets have feigned them to be ſo many perſons exiſting, to the deception of their auditors.* Notwithſtanding which, that third ſort of Pagan gods alſo mentioned by us, which were inanimate ſubſtances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewiſe; becauſe though thoſe things themſelves be real and not feigned, yet is their perſonation and deification meer fiction and fancy: and however the firſt occaſion thereof ſprung from this theological opinion or perſuaſion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cauſe of all things, ought to be worſhipped in all things, eſpecially he being himſelf inviſible; yet the making of thoſe things themſelves therefore to be ſo many perſons and gods, was nothing but poetick fiction and phantaſtry, accordingly as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this ſtrain. P. 14 [Tom. I. Oper. p. 17.]

XXXIV. Hitherto have we declared the ſenſe of the Pagans in general, thoſe alſo being included, who ſuppoſed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in theſe two things: Firſt, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the ſimple Deity, and parcelling out of the ſame into many particular notions and partial conſiderations, according to the various manifeſtations of its power and providence in the world; by the perſonating and deifying of which ſeverally they made, as it were, ſo many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this, becauſe they conſidered not the Deity according to its ſimple nature, and abſtractly only, but concretely alſo with the world, as he diſplayeth himſelf therein, pervadeth all, and diffuſeth his virtues through all. For as the ſun, reflected by groſſer vapours, is ſometimes multiplied, and the ſame object beheld through a polyedrous glaſs, by reaſon of thoſe many ſuperficies, being repreſented in ſeveral places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the ſpectator; ſo one and the ſame ſupreme God, conſidered concretely with the world, as manifeſting his ſeveral powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into ſeveral names, not without the appearance of ſo many ſeveral gods. Whereas πολυώνυμον with thoſe

thoſe ancient Pagans, was the ſame thing with πολυδύναμον, that which hath *many names*, all one with that which hath *many powers:* according to this of *Callimachus* [1] concerning *Diana*,

Δός μοι παρθενίην αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάσσειν,
Καὶ Πολυωνυμίην·

And this of *Virgil* concerning *Alecto* [2],

Tibi nomina mille,
Mille nocendi artes.

And accordingly the many Pagan gods are, in *Plato*'s *Cratylus*, interpreted as the many powers of one God diffuſed through the world. And the Pagan theologers ſeemed to conceive this to be more ſuitable to the pomp, ſtate and grandeur of the ſupreme God, for him to be conſidered diffuſively, and called by many names, ſignifying his many ſeveral virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted and ſhrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the Maker or Creator of the whole world. The ſecond thing, in which the Pagans agreed, is their perſonating and deifying alſo the parts of the world, and things of nature themſelves, and ſo making them ſo many gods and goddeſſes too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this; that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but alſo was the cauſe of all things, and therefore himſelf is in a manner all things, ought to be worſhipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as alſo that the force of every thing was divine, and that in all things, that were beneficial to mankind, the divine goodneſs ought to be acknowledged.

We ſhall now obſerve, how both thoſe forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the ſeeming polytheiſm of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by thoſe amongſt them, who had no higher notion of the ſupreme Deity, than as the ſoul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongſt ſo many of them, probably might be from hence, becauſe it was ſo obvious for thoſe of them, that were religious, to conceive, that as themſelves conſiſted of body and ſoul, ſo the body of the whole world was not without its ſoul neither; and that their human ſouls were as well derived from the life and ſoul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies was from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before obſerved, ſuppoſe God to pervade and paſs through all things ἀμιγῶς, *unmixedly*; theſe concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in *Quintilian*, taken in a rigid ſenſe) *Spiritum omnibus partibus immiſtum*; *a ſpirit immingled with all the parts of the world:* or elſe in *Manilius* his language,

Infuſumque Deum cœlo, terriſque fretoque,
Infuſed

[1] Hymn. in Dianam, verſ. 5, 6. [2] Æneid. Lib. VII. verſ. 324.

Infuſed into the heaven, earth, and ſeas: Sacroque meatu conſpirare Deum, and *intimately to conſpire with his own work the world*, as being almoſt one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called *Nature* alſo, that being thus defined by ſome of the Stoicks, *Deus mundo permiſtus*; *God mingled throughout with the world*; and *divina Ratio toti mundo inſita*, *The divine, reaſon inſerted into the whole world.* Which Nature notwithſtanding, in way of diſtinction from the particular natures of things, was called κοινὴ φύσις, and *communis natura*, *the common nature.* And it was plainly declared by them not to be a ſenſeleſs nature; according to that of *Balbus* in *Cicero*, *Natura eſt, quæ continet mundum omnem, eumque tuetur*; *atque ea quidem non ſine ſenſu, atque ratione: It is nature, by which the whole world is contained and upheld, but this ſuch a nature, as is not without ſenſe and reaſon.* As it is elſewhere ſaid to be perfect and eternal Reaſon, the divine Mind and Wiſdom containing alſo under it all the λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, *the ſpermatick principles*, by which the things of nature (commonly ſo called) are effected. Wherefore we ſee, that ſuch Naturaliſts as theſe may well be allowed to be Theiſts, (*Moſes* himſelf in *Strabo* being accounted one of them;) whereas thoſe, that acknowledge no higher principle of the world, than a ſenſeleſs nature, (whether fortuitous, or orderly and methodical,) cannot be accounted any other than abſolute Atheiſts. Moreover, this ſoul of the world was by ſuch of theſe Pagans as admitted no incorporeal ſubſtance, it ſelf concluded to be a body too, but λεπτότατον καὶ τάχιστον, *a moſt ſubtile and moſt ſwift body*, as was before obſerved out of *Plato* (though endued with perfect mind and underſtanding, as well as with ſpermatick reaſons) which inſinuating it ſelf into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole univerſe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling it ſelf with all; *Heraclitus* and *Hippaſus* thinking this to be fire, and *Diogenes Apolloniates* air; whom *Simplicius*, who had read ſome of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of atheiſm, which *Hippo* and *Anaximander* lie under.

Again, whereas the more ſublimated Pagans affirmed the ſupreme God to be all, ſo as that he was nevertheleſs ſomething above all too, he being above the ſoul of the world; (and probably *Æſchylus* in that forecited paſſage of his, is to be underſtood after this manner, Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα καί τι τῶνδ' ὑπέρτερον, *Jupiter is the æther*, Jupiter *is the earth*, Jupiter *is the heaven*; Jupiter *is all things, and yet ſomething higher than all, or above all*:) thoſe Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the ſoul of the world, made God to be all things in a groſſer ſenſe, they ſuppoſing the whole corporeal world animated to be alſo the ſupreme Deity. For though God, to them, were principally and originally, that eternal unmade ſoul and mind, which diffuſeth it ſelf through all things; yet did they conceive, that as the human ſoul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal, or man; ſo this mundane ſoul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire divine animal, or God.

As *Simplicius* deſcribeth God, to be πάντα πρὸ πάντων, *Omnia ante omnia. In Epictet. p.* 234.

It is true indeed, that as the human ſoul doth principally act in ſome one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the *Hegemonicon* and *Prin-*

Principale, ſome taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but *Strato* in *Tertullian* [1] ridiculouſly, the place betwixt the eye-brows; ſo the Stoicks did ſuppoſe the great ſoul or mind of the world, to act principally in ſome one part thereof, (which what it was notwithſtanding they did not all agree upon) as the *Hegemonicon* or *Principale*: and this was ſometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheleſs they all acknowledged this mundane ſoul, as the ſouls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or leſs its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by *Laertius* in the life of *Zeno* [2]: Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· ὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ἢ τὸν οὐρανὸν, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον· ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι, διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἕξιν· *The Stoicks affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind paſſing through all the parts of it, as the ſoul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in ſome more, in ſome leſs; it paſſing through ſome parts only as a habit, (as through the bones and nerves) but through others as mind or underſtanding, (as through that which is called the* Hegemonicon *or* Principale.) *So the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its* Hegemonicon *or principal part too, which according to* Antipater *is the æther, to* Poſſidonius *the air, to* Cleanthes *the ſun*, &c. *And they ſay alſo, that this firſt God is, as it were, ſenſibly diffuſed through all animals and plants, but through the earth it ſelf, only as a habit.* Wherefore the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one divine ſoul, is it ſelf, according to theſe Stoicks, alſo the ſupreme God. Thus *Didymus* in *Euſebius*, ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον προσαγορεύουσι θεὸν, *The Stoicks call the whole world God*; and *Origen* againſt *Celſus*, σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεὸν, Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον· *The Greeks univerſally affirm the world to be a God, but the Stoicks, the firſt and chief God.* And accordingly *Manilius* [3],

P. Ev. l. 15. c. 25. [P. 817.]

L. 5. p. 235.

> *Quâ pateat mundum divino numine verti*
> *Atque ipſum eſſe Deum:*

Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a divine mind, and alſo it ſelf to be God. As likewiſe *Seneca* [4] the philoſopher, *Totum hoc, quo continemur, & unum eſt, & Deus eſt*; *this whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing, and God.* Which is not to be underſtood of the meer matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as endued with a plaſtick and ſenſeleſs nature only; but of it as animated by ſuch a ſoul, as beſides ſenſe was originally endued with perfect underſtanding; and as deriving all its godſhip from thence. For thus *Varro* in St. *Auſtin* declares both his own, and the Stoical ſenſe concerning this point, *Dicit idem* Varro, *adhuc de naturali theologia præloquens, Deum ſe arbitrari eſſe animam*

C. D. l. 7. c. 6.

[1] De Animâ, cap. XV. p. 169.
[2] Lib. VII. Segm. 138, 139. p. 452.
[3] Lib. I. verſ. 484, 485.
[4] Epiſtol. XCII. p. 323. Tom. II. Opera. Vide etiam Epiſt. XCV. p. 355

animam mundi (quem Græci vocant κόσμον) & hunc ipſum mundum eſſe Deum. Sed ſicut hominem ſapientem, cum ſit ex corpore & animo, tamen ab animo dici ſapientem; ita mundum Deum dici ab animo, cum ſit ex animo & corpore. The ſame Varro *diſcourſing concerning natural theology, declareth, that, according to his own ſenſe, God is the ſoul of the world, (which the Greeks call* Coſmos) *and that this world it ſelf is alſo God. But that this is ſo to be underſtood, that as a wiſe man, though conſiſting of ſoul and body, yet is denominated wiſe only from his mind or ſoul; ſo the world is denominated God, from its mind or ſoul only, it conſiſting both of mind and body.*

Now if the whole animated world be the ſupreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the ſeveral parts and members thereof muſt be the parts and members of God; and this was readily acknowledged by *Seneca* [1]; *Membra ſumus corporis magni*; *We are all members of one great body*: and [2] *Totum hoc Deus eſt, ſocii ejus & membra ſumus*; *This whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but alſo his fellows or companions*; as if our human ſouls had a certain kind of fellowſhip alſo with that great ſoul of the univerſe. And accordingly, the ſoul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worſhipped by the Pagans, in theſe its ſeveral members; the chief parts of the world, and the moſt important things of nature; as it were by piece-meal. Nevertheleſs it doth not at all follow from thence, that theſe were therefore to them really ſo many ſeveral gods; for then not only every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of graſs, every river and hill, and all things elſe whatſoever, muſt be ſo many ſeveral gods. And that the Pagans themſelves did not take them for ſuch, *Origen* obſerves againſt that aſſertion of *Celſus*; *That if the whole were God, then the ſeveral parts thereof muſt needs be gods*, or divine too: ὡς εἶναι θεῖα ἃ μόνον ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, μέρη ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ φυτά· εἰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι· ἆρ' ἐπεὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεός ἐστιν, ἤδη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι θεοί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' ὐδὲ τοῦτο φήσουσιν Ἕλληνες· τοὺς δ' ἐπισατοῦντας (εἰ ἄρα δαίμονας, ἢ θεοὺς, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ὀνομάζουσι) ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάσσαις, τούτους ἂν λέγοιεν θεούς. Καὶ τὸ καθολικὸν Κέλσου γίνεται καὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ψεῦδος, ὅτι ἐάνπερ ὅλον ᾖ θεὸς, πάντων τὰ μέρη τοῦτο ἐστι θεῖα· κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖα ἔσται ζῶα, καὶ μυῖαι, καὶ σκνῖφες, καὶ σκώληκες, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ὄφεων εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ἅπερ ὐδ' οἱ λέγοντες Θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, φήσουσιν· *From hence it would follow, that not only men muſt be divine and gods, but alſo all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay rivers, and mountains, and ſeas, being parts of the world likewiſe, (if the whole world be God) muſt, according to* Celſus, *needs be gods alſo. Whereas the Greeks themſelves will not affirm this; but they would only call thoſe ſpirits or dæmons, which preſide over theſe rivers and ſeas, gods. Wherefore this univerſal aſſertion of* Celſus *is falſe even according to the Greeks themſelves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof muſt needs be divine or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kind of ſerpents, and birds, and fiſhes, are all divine animals or gods: which they themſelves, who aſſert the world to be God, will not affirm.* L. 5. p. 234.

Zzz. Where-

[1] Epiſt. XCV. p. 355.

[2] Epiſt. XCII. p. 323.

Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times perſonate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the ſeveral powers and virtues of the mundane ſoul, diffuſed through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongſt them therefore look upon theſe, as ſo many true and proper gods, but only worſhip them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worſhip the ſoul of the whole world, their ſupreme deity, in them all, as its various manifeſtations. This St. *Auſtin* intimates, when writing againſt *Fauſtus* the Manichean, he prefers even the Pagan gods before the Manichean [1]: *Jam verò cœlum, & terra, & mare, & aër, & ſol, & luna, & cætera ſydera omnia, hæc manifeſta oculis apparent, atque ipſis ſenſibus præſto ſunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam univerſum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, quæ ſunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omninò non ſunt, propinquiores eſſetis veræ pietati, ſi ſaltem Pagani eſſetis, qui corpora colunt, etſi non colenda, tamen vera. Now the heaven, earth, ſea, and air, ſun, moon, and ſtars, are things all manifeſt and really preſent to our ſenſes; which when the Pagans worſhip as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD, (for ſome of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD) they worſhip things, that are; ſo that you worſhipping things, that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans and worſhipped bodies too; which though they ought not to be worſhipped, yet are they true and real things.* But this is further inſiſted upon by the ſame St. *Auſtin* in his book *De C. D.* where after that large enumeration of the Pagan gods before ſet down, he thus convinces their folly in worſhipping the ſeveral divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner perſonated: *Hæc omnia quæ dixi, & quæcunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus ſum) hi omnes dii deæque ſit unus* Jupiter; *ſive ſint, ut quidam volunt, omnia iſta partes ejus, ſive virtutes ejus, ſicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet eſſe mundi animum; quæ ſententia velut magnorum, multorumque doctorum eſt. Hæc, inquam, ſi ita ſunt, quod quale ſit, nondum interim quæro, quid perderent, ſi unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio? Quid enim ejus contemneretur, cum ipſe coleretur? Si autem metuendum ſit, nè prætermiſſæ ſive neglectæ partes ejus iraſcerentur; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unius animantis hæc tota vita eſt, quæ omnes ſimul continet deos, quaſi ſuas VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES: ſed ſuam quæque pars habet vitam à cæteris ſeparatam, ſi præter alteram iraſci altera poteſt, & alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dicitur omnia ſimul, id eſt, totum ipſum* Jovem *potuiſſe offendi, ſi PARTES ejus non etiam ſingillatim minutatimque colerentur, ſtultè dicitur. Nulla quippe earum prætermitteretur, cum ipſe unus, qui haberet omnia, coleretur. All theſe things, which we have now ſaid, and many more, which we have not ſaid (for we did not think fit to mention all) all theſe gods and goddeſſes, let them be one and the ſame* Jupiter: *whether they will have them to be his PARTS, or his POWERS, and VIRTUES, according to the ſenſe of thoſe, who think God to be the ſoul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I ſay, if it be ſo, which, what it is, we will not now examine; what would theſe Pagans loſe, if in a*

L. 4. c. 11. [P. 76.]

more

[1] Lib. XX. contra Fauſtum, cap. V. p. 238. Tom. VIII. Oper.

more prudent compendium, they ſhould worſhip one only God? For what of him could be deſpiſed, when his whole ſelf was worſhipped? But if they fear, leſt his parts pertermitted, or neglected, ſhould be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the Gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by it ſelf, ſeparate from the reſt, ſince one of them may be angry, when another is pleaſed, and the contrary. But if it ſhould be ſaid, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter *might be offended, if his parts were not worſhipped all of them ſeverally and ſingly; this would be fooliſhly ſaid, becauſe none of the parts can be pretermitted, when he, that hath all, is worſhipped.*

Thus do the Pagans in *Athanaſius* [z] alſo declare, that they did not worſhip the ſeveral parts of the world, as really ſo many true and proper gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one ſupreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing; ἀλλ' ἴσως διαιρούμενα μὲν, καθ' ἑαυτὰ λαμβανόμενα, ἐπιδεῆ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ὡμοῦ δὲ πάντα συνάπτοντες, καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι· *But the Pagans themſelves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken ſeverally, are but indigent and imperfect things; nevertheleſs do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body,* (enlivened by one ſoul,) *ſo is the whole of them truly and properly God.* And now we think it is ſufficiently evident, that though theſe Pagans verbally perſonated and deified, not only the ſeveral powers and virtues of the one ſupreme God, or mundane ſoul, diffuſed throughout the whole world, but alſo the ſeveral parts of the world it ſelf, and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make theſe in themſelves really ſo many ſeveral true and proper gods, (much leſs independent ones,) but to worſhip one ſupreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in thoſe his ſeveral parts and members, as it were by piece-meal, or under ſo many inadequate conceptions.

The Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the ſupreme God; ſome of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mundane ſoul: whereas others of them, to uſe *Origen*'s language, did ὑπερβαίνειν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, καὶ μηδαμοῦ αὐτῆς νομίζειν ἱδρύσθαι τὸν Θεὸν, ἄνω καὶ δὲ ὑπερ τὰ σώματα ζητεῖν αὐτὸν, *tranſcend all the ſenſible nature, and thinking God not at all to be ſeated there, look'd for him above all corporeal things.* Now the former of theſe Pagans worſhipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God, than as a mundane ſoul, yet ſuppoſing him to have been the cauſe of all things, and ſo at firſt to have contained all things within himſelf; as likewiſe that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from him, nor ſubſiſted alone by it ſelf, as a dead thing, but was cloſely united to him, and livingly dependent on him: theſe, I ſay, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they alſo look upon it as θεῖον, as that which was *divine and ſacred*; and ſuppoſed, that God

Cont. Celſ. p. 260

[z] Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31. Tom. I. Oper.

was to be worſhipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worſhipped, as his image or temple. Thus *Plutarch* [1], though much diſliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himſelf nevertheleſs approve of worſhipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be ἱερὸν ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον, *a moſt holy, and moſt god-becoming temple.* And the ancient Perſians or *Magi*, who by no means would allow of worſhipping God in any artificial temples made with mens hands, did notwithſtanding thus worſhip God, *ſub dio*, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as *Cicero* teſtifieth: *Nec ſequor Magos Perſarum, quibus auctoribus* Xerxes *inflammaſſe templa* Græciæ *dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent eſſe patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum eſſet & domicilium: Neither do I adhere to the Perſian Magi, by whoſe ſuggeſtion and perſuaſion* Xerxes *is ſaid to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, becauſe they incloſed and ſhut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whoſe temple and habitation this whole world is.* And therefore when *Diogenes Laertius* [2] writeth thus of theſe Magi, that they did, θεὸς ἀποφαίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, τῶν δὲ ξοάνων καταγινώσκειν, *make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all ſtatues and images*; we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worſhipped God in no temple, ſave only that of the whole world, ſo neither did they allow any other ſtatues or images of him, than the things of nature, and parts of the world, ſuch as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this ſenſe and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly repreſented by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and that according to the expreſs teſtimony of *Dino*; Θύειν ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ τὺς Μάγυς ὁ Δίνων λέγει, θεῶν ἀγάλματα μόνα τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ νομίζοντας· Οὐκ ἀπεκρυψάμην δὲ τῶν τότων ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀποφεύγειν οἴονταί τῆς πλάνης, ἀλλ' εἰς ἑτέραν κατολισθαίνυσιν ἀπάτην. Ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν ὑ ξύλα καὶ λίθυς ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες· ὑδὲ μὲν Ἰβιδας καὶ Ἰχνεύμονας καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι· ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ὡς φιλόσοφοι· *Dinon affirmeth, that the Perſian Magi ſacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and water to be the only ſtatues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fall into another; whilſt they allow not wood and ſtones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do, nor* Ichneumones *and* Ibides, *as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philoſophers.* Which difference betwixt the Pagan theologers, that ſome of them look'd upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by *Macrobius* upon *Scipio*'s dream, where the world was called a temple. *Benè autem univerſus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos, qui æſtimant, nihil eſſe aliud Deum, niſi cœlum ipſum, & cœleſtia iſta quæ cernimus. Ideò ut ſummi omnipotentiam Dei oſtenderet poſſe vix intelligi, nunquam poſſe videri, quicquid humano ſubjicitur aſpectui templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hæc veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori; ſciatque quiſquis in uſum templi hujus inducitur, ritu ſibi vivendum ſacerdotis. The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of oppoſition to thoſe, who think God*

De Leg. l. 2. p. 335.

Protrept. p. 43. [Cap. V. p. 56. Edit. Potteri.]

L. 1. c. 14.

[1] De Iſide & Oſir. p. 382. [2] Proëm. Oper. ſegm. 6. p. 5.

think God to be nothing else, but the heaven it self, and those heavenly things which we see, (or the whole sensible world animated :) *wherefore* Cicero, *that he might shew the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever falleth under human sight, his temple ; that so he, that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the maker and creator of them ; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or* mysta, *holily and religiously.* And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally *Cosmolatræ*, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other ; not that they worshipped the world as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great mind or soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly ; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but) φύσις κοινὴ, *the common nature*, and φύσις τοῦ παντὸς or τῶν ὅλων, *the nature of the universe*, because it contained under it the spermatick reasons, or plastick principles of the whole world.

Furthermore, these Pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a God ; those of them, who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second or at least a third God. And thus *Origen*[1], σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεὸν, Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν Πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δεύτερον, τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν Τρίτον· *The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a God ; some of them, as the Stoicks, the first God ; others, as the Platonists,* (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) *the second God ; though some of these Platonists call it the third God.* Those of the Platonists, who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, look'd upon that whole Platonick trinity of divine hypostases (Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς and Ψυχὴ) all but as one first God : but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a greater distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods of them ; the first, a monad or simple goodness ; the second, mind or intellect ; the third, psyche or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it. Now this second god, which was the whole animated world as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the son of the first God. That the Egyptians called the animated world the son of God, hath been already proved ; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of *Celsus*, where he pretends, that the Christians called their *Jesus* the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient Pagans, who had styled the world so : Ὁπόθεν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς, Θεοῦ υἱὸν καλεῖν, σημαίνω· Ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ, τόνδε δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενόμενον, παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡίδεον προσεῖπον. Πάνυ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἔτός τε κἀκείνως παῖς Θεοῦ· *Whence these Christians came to call their* Jesus *the Son of God, I shall now declare ; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by*

P. 329, 330, 331.

Orig. contr. Cels. p. 308.

[1] Contra Celsum, Lib. I. p. 235.

made by God, the ſon of God, and God. Now is there not a goodly ſimilitude (think you) *betwixt theſe two ſons of God, theirs and ours?* Upon which words of his, *Origen* writeth thus; ᾠήθη δὲ ἡμῶν Θεὸν ἡμᾶς λέγειν, παραποιήσαντας τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ Θεοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἡμᾶς οὕτω αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεόν. Celſus *ſuppoſed us Chriſtians to have borrowed this appellation of the ſon of God, from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the ſon of God, and God.* Wherefore theſe Pagans, who look'd upon the whole animated world only as the ſecond God, and ſon of God, did unqueſtionably alſo worſhip the firſt God, in the world, and that probably by perſonating and deifying his ſeveral parts and members too. Thus do we underſtand, what that was, which gave occaſion to this miſtake of late writers, that the Pagans worſhipped the inanimate parts of the world, as ſuch, for true and proper gods; *viz.* their not perceiving, that they worſhipped theſe only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the firſt God, yet at leaſt the ſecond God; the temple, image, and ſon, of the firſt God.

Orig. contra Celſ. p. 208.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the ſeeming polytheiſm of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but alſo their political or civil theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and inſtitutes of ſtateſmen and politicians, deſigned principally to amuſe the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and ſubjection to civil laws. Beſides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged *another theology*, which was neither fiction, nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philoſophy, or abſolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philoſophick theology of theirs, there was only one unmade ſelf-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferiour miniſters. So that thoſe many poetical and political gods could not poſſibly be look'd upon otherwiſe, than either as the created miniſters of one ſupreme God, whether taken ſingly or collectively; or elſe as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to ſeveral notions and partial conceptions of him; and his ſeveral powers and manifeſtations of the world perſonated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the moſt generally received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of *Euclides* [1] the philoſopher, ἓν Τἀγαθὸν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλέμενον, *there is one ſupreme Good* (or higheſt Deity) *called by many names:* and, according to that of *Antiſthenes* before cited, *That the many popular gods were but one and the ſame natural God, viz.* as *Lactantius* adds, *Summæ totius artifex, The maker of the whole world.*

L. I. *c.* 5.

We ſhall conclude with repeating what hath been already ſuggeſted, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally diſclaim their fabulous theology; St. *Auſtin* telling us, that when the abſurdities thereof were urged againſt them, they would commonly make ſuch replies as theſe, *Abſit, inquiunt, fabularum eſt iſta garrulitas*; and again, *Rurſus, inquiunt, ad fabulas redis*; *Far*

C. D. l. 4. *c.* 10. [p. 15.]

[1] Apud Diogen. Laert. lib. II. ſegm. 106. p. 142.

Far be it from us (ſay they) to think ſo or ſo, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables, and, *You would bring us again to fables.* And though they owned another theology beſides their civil alſo, which was the natural and philoſophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithſtanding acknowledge a kind of neceſſity, that, in thoſe times at leaſt, there ſhould be, beſides the natural and philoſophical theology, which the vulgar were not ſo capable of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehenſions. Thus that Roman pontifex *Scævola* in St. *Auſtin* declareth [1], *Expedire exiſtimat falli in religione civitates, That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths ſhould be deceived in their religion, or have ſomething falſe or fabulous intermingled with it*; he giving this reaſon for the ſame, becauſe the natural and philoſophick theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as for example, *Quod verus Deus nec ſexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra; That the true God hath neither ſex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that* Hercules *and* Æſculapius, *&c. were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the ſame infirmities with others*; and the like. And the learned *Varro*, in his book of religions [2], publickly maintained the ſame doctrine: Varro *de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa eſſe vera, quæ vulgo ſcire non ſit utile; multaque, quæ tametſi falſa ſint, aliter exiſtimare populum expediat: & ideò Græcos teletas & myſteria taciturnitate parietibuſque clauſiſſe, &c. That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewiſe many things falſe, of which it was expedient they ſhould think otherwiſe: and that for this cauſe, the Greeks encloſed their* Teletæ *or myſteries within walls, and kept them under a ſeal of ſecrecy.* Upon which of *Varro* St. *Auſtin* thus noteth; *Hîc certè totum conſilium prodidit ſapientium, per quos civitates & populi regerentur:* Varro *here plainly diſcovers and betrays the whole counſel and ſecrecy of ſtates-men and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very* arcanum *of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their goverours.* The ſame father there adding, *That evil dæmons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and impoſture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived.* Laſtly, *Strabo* alſo [3], though otherwiſe a grave and ſober writer, ſpeaks freely and broadly to the ſame purpoſe; ὁ γὰρ ὄχλον τε γυναικῶν καὶ παντοδαπὸν ἰδιώτην πλῆθος ἐπαγάγειν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας καὶ τερατείας· *It is not poſſible, that women, and others of the vulgar ſort, ſhould be conducted and carried on towards piety, holineſs and faith, meerly by philoſophick reaſon and truth; but this muſt be done by ſuperſtition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations.* From whence it is plain, that *Strabo* did not only allow a neceſſity of a civil theology beſides the natural and philoſophical, but alſo of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the leſs to be wondred at in theſe Pagans, becauſe ſome Chriſtians alſo ſeem to acknowledge a kind of truth herein; *Syneſius* himſelf writing after this manner;

[1] De Civit. Dei, Lib. IV. cap. XXVII. p. 84. Tom. VII. Oper.

[2] Apud Auguſtin. ubi ſupra, p. 88.

[3] Lib. I. p. 18.

ner[1]: τὸ δὲ ῥᾷστον καταγελᾶσθαι ὁ δῆμος· δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας· *That, which is easy and ordinary, will be contemned by the vulgar, or common people; and therefore there is need of something strange and prodigious in religion for them.* *Flavius Josephus* making this free acknowledgment, concerning the wise men among the Greeks, ταῦτα περὶ θεῶν φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, *That they held the same things concerning God which the Jews did*; adds notwithstanding afterwards, εἰς πλῆθος δόξαις προκατειλημμένου, τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, *That they were afraid to declare the truth of this their doctrine to the vulgar, prepossessed with other opinions.* And indeed they did not think it safe to declare the natural and true theology promiscuously to all; *Plato*[2] himself intimating as much in these words, τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τόνδε τοῦ παντος, εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν· *That as it was hard to find out the maker of this universe, so neither, being found out, could he be declared to the vulgar.* Wherefore since God was so hard to be understood, they conceived it necessary, that the vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works, by parts and piece-meal, according to the various manifestations of himself; that is, should have a civil theology at least, distinct from the natural and philosophical, if not another fabulous one too.

C. *Ap. l.* 2. [§. XVI. p. 482. Tom. II. Edit. Havercamp.]

XXXV. We have now dispatched the first of those three heads proposed to be insisted on, *viz.* that the Pagans worshipped one and the same supreme God, under many personal names, so that much of their polytheism was but seeming and phantastical, and indeed nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, they making many poetical and political gods of that one natural God; and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, according to that clear acknowledgment of *Maximus Madaurensis*[3] before cited: *Unius summi Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus diffusas, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; & dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere videmur: The virtues of the one supreme God diffused throughout the whole world, we* (Pagans) *invoke under many several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, his as it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him.* We shall proceed to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and phantastick polytheism, they had another real polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophick theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superiour to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be ἀγέννητοι and αὐτογενεῖς, *unmade and self-existent, or independent beings*, but all of them (one only excepted) γενητοὶ θεοὶ, *generated gods*, according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not καθ' χρόνον, yet at least, ἀπ' αἰτίας γενητοὶ, though not as *made in time*, yet as *produced from a superiour cause*. *Plutarch* propounding this for one amongst his Platonick questions, why ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς, *the highest and supreme God*, was called by *Plato*, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words

Fag. 243, 254.

[1] In Encomio Calvitiei, p. 73. Oper. Edit. Petavii.

[2] In Timæo, Cap. XIII. p. 236. Edit. Fabricii.

[3] Apud Augustin. Epist. XVI. p. 15. Tom. II. Oper.

words before cited; ἢ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστιν (ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐπονομάζει) ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων; *that perhaps he was ſaid to be the father of all the generated gods, and of men, (as he is alſo ſtyled in* Homer) *but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings.* From which paſſage of *Plutarch*'s it plainly appears, that the ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς, *the one higheſt God*, being every way ἀγέννητος, *unmade* and *unproduced*, was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called γεννητοὶ. Which is further plainly declared elſewhere by the ſame *Plutarch* in theſe words; Πλάτων πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦτε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννετῶν, τὸν ἀγεννητὸν καὶ ἀΐδιον θεὸν ἐπονομάζουσι· Plato *calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated.* And though ſome of thoſe many gods of *Plato*'s were by him alſo called ἀΐδιοι, or *eternal*, yet were they likewiſe γεννητοὶ too, in another ſenſe, that is, *produced* and *derived*, by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way ἀγέννητος, *underived and independent upon any other cauſe.* And thus *Proclus* univerſally pronounces; Τῷ εἶναι θεοὶ, πάντες οἱ θεοὶ, διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἔχουσι θεόν· *All the gods owe their being gods to the firſt God*; he adding, that he is therefore called πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, *the fountain of the godhead.*

Sympoſ. l. 8. c. 1. [p. 718.]

Theol. P. I. 3. c. 7. [p. 132.]

Wherefore the *many gods* of the intelligent Pagans were derived from one God, and but ὑπερχοὶ δυνάμεις, (as *Plutarch* ſomewhere calls them) *the ſubſervient powers*, or *miniſters of the one ſupreme, unmade Deity.* Which (as hath been before obſerved) was frequently called by theſe Pagans Θεὸς *God*, κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or in way of eminency; as likewiſe were thoſe other inferior, or generated gods, in way of diſtinction from him, called θεοὶ, *the gods.* And accordingly the ſenſe of *Celſus* is thus repreſented in *Origen*, Θεοὺς δημιουργοὺς εἶναι πάντων σωμάτων, μόνης ψυχῆς ἔργου ὄσης Θεοῦ· *That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the ſouls of them only being the work of God.* Moreover, theſe inferiour gods are ſtyled by *Ammianus Marcellinus*, *ſubſtantiales poteſtates*, *ſubſtantial powers*, probably in way of diſtinction from thoſe other Pagan gods, that were not ſubſtantial, but only ſo many names and notions of the one ſupreme God, or his powers ſeverally perſonated and deified, which ſubſtantial powers of *Am. Marcellinus* [1], (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men) were all ſaid to be ſubject to that one ſovereign Deity called *Themis:* whom (ſaith he) the antient Theologers ſeated *in cubili & ſolio* Jovis, *in the bed-chamber and throne of* Jupiter; as indeed ſome of the poets have made her to be the wife of *Jupiter*, and others his ſiſter. And *Anaxarchus* in *Plutarch* ſtyles her πάρεδρον τοῦ Διὸς, *Jupiter*'s *aſſeſſor*, though that philoſopher abuſed the fable, and groſly depraved the meaning of it, as if it ſignified πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θέμιστον εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, *That whatſoever is done by the ſovereign power, is therefore juſt and right:* whereas the true moral thereof was this, that juſtice or righteouſneſs ſits in council with God, and in his mind and will, preſcribes laws to nature and the whole world. *Themis* therefore was another name of God, amongſt the Pagans, according to his univerſal conſideration, beſides thoſe before mentioned: and when *Plato*, in his

L. 4. p. 200.

L. 22.

Vit. Alex. [p. 596. Tom. I. Oper.]

[1] Hiſtor. Lib. XXI. cap. I. p. 253.

book of laws [1], would have men to ſwear by the names of thoſe three gods, *Jupiter*, *Apollo*, and *Themis* ; theſe were but ſo many ſeveral partial notions of the one ſupreme Deity ; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as *Pighius* obſerveth, *Timore divino, veritate ipſa, ac æquitate ſanciri debere juramenta. In* Jove *enim ſummi numinis poteſtatem, falſi ac perjurii vindicem ; in* Apolline *veritatis lumen ; in* Themide, *jus, fas, atque licitum eſſe intelligitur. Eſt enim* Themis *ipſa lex æterna atque univerſalis, mundo ac naturæ præſcripta* ; or, according to *Cicero*, *Ratio recta ſummi* Jovis. And *Ficinus*, in his commentary as to the main agreeth herewith. So that, when the Pagan theologers affirmed the Numen of *Themis* to preſide over the ſpirits of the elements, and all thoſe other ſubſtantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men ; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this ; that there was one ſupreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the divine Mind, which preſcribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of which things come to paſs in the world, was the fountain, from whence all divination proceeded ; as theſe ſecrets were more or leſs imparted from thence to thoſe inferiour created ſpirits. The philoſophy of the Pagan theology amongſt the Greeks was plainly no other than this ; that there is one unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other ſubſtantial powers or ſpirits, created by it, as the miniſters of its providence in the world : but there was much of poetry, or poetick phancy, intermingled with this philoſophy, as the flouriſh to it, to make up their Pagan theology.

De Dea Themide, p. 39.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different ſenſes ; one unmade ſelf-exiſtent Deity, and many generated or created gods ; *Onatus* [2] the Pythagorean declaring, that they, who aſſerted one only God, and not many, *underſtood not what the dignity and majeſty of the divine tranſcendency conſiſted in, namely in ruling over gods* ; and *Plotinus* conceiving, that the ſupreme God was moſt of all glorified, not by being *contracted into one*, but *by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him* ; and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be diſtinguiſhed ; firſt, that, according to the Pagan Theiſts, God was no ſolitary being ; but that there were multitudes of gods, or ſubſtantial powers, and living underſtanding natures, ſuperiour to men, which were neither ſelf-exiſtent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or created from one ſupreme. Secondly, that foraſmuch as theſe were all ſuppoſed to have ſome influence, more or leſs, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worſhip, adoration and invocation ; and accordingly was the Pagan devotion ſcattered amongſt them all. Nor were the Gods of the oriental Pagans neither meer dead ſtatues and images, as ſome would conclude from the Scripture, but *living underſtanding beings, ſuperiour to men*, (though worſhipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans,

[1] Lib. XII. p. 685. Oper.

[2] Libro περὶ θεῦ καὶ θείᾳ, apud Stobæum in Eclog. phyſic. Lib. I. cap. I. p. 4.

deans in *Daniel* to *Nebuchadnezzar*, when he required them to tell his dream, *There is none other, that can ſhew this thing before the king, except thoſe Gods, whoſe dwelling is not with fleſh*; that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though ſome conceive, that theſe words are to be underſtood of a peculiar ſort of gods; namely, that this was ſuch a thing, as could not be done by thoſe dæmons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converſe with men, but was reſerved to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converſe. Now, as to the former of theſe two things, that God is no ſolitary being, but that there are multitudes of underſtanding beings ſuperiour to men, the creatures and miniſters of one ſupreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Teſtament fully agree with the Pagans herein. *Thouſand Thouſands miniſtred unto him, and ten thouſand times ten thouſand ſtood before him*; and *Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels.* But the latter of them, that religious worſhip and invocation doth of right belong to theſe created ſpirits, is conſtantly denied and condemned in theſe writings, that being a thing peculiarly reſerved to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of *Jeremy* to be underſtood, expreſſed in the Chalday tongue, that ſo the Jews might have it in readineſs for thoſe Chaldean idolaters, when they came into *Babylon*; *Thus ſhall ye ſay unto them, the gods, that have not made the heavens and the earth, ſhall periſh from the earth, and from under theſe heavens.* That is, there ſhall come a time, when none ſhall be *religiouſly worſhipped* any where upon the face of the whole earth, ſave only that God, who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, ſhall then have its complete accompliſhment, when the kingdoms of this world ſhall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Chriſt. And thus is the controverſy rightly ſtated betwixt the Pagans and the Chriſtrians by *Lactantius: Sed fortaſſe quærat aliquis à nobis, quod apud* Ciceronem *quærit* Hortenſius; *Si Deus unus eſt, quæ eſſe beata ſolitudo queat? Tanquam nos, qui unum eſſe dicimus, deſertum ac ſolitarium eſſe dicamus. Habet enim miniſtros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et eſt iſtud verum, quod dixiſſe* Senecam *ſuprà retuli*; *genuiſſe regni ſui miniſtros Deum. Verùm hi neque dii ſunt, neque deos ſe vocari aut coli volunt*; *quippe, qui nihil præter juſſum ac voluntatem Dei faciant. As if we who ſay, there is but one God, therefore made a ſolitary and deſerted Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his miniſters, whom we call Angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of* Seneca, *that God hath generated or created miniſters of his kingdom. But theſe are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worſhipped*; *foraſmuch as they only execute the will and command of God.* And again afterwards to the ſame purpoſe, *Si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos ſexaginta quinque* (*ut* Orpheus) *ſed innumerabiles, & arguimus eorum errores in diverſum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen quo nomine appellari debeant*; *nè Deum verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt*, &c. *If multitude delight them, we ſay not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred ſixty five, as* Orpheus, *but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be ſo few. Nevertheleſs, let them know, by what name*

Daniel vii. 10. *Heb.* xii. 22. *Jeremy* x. 11. *Rev.* xi. 15. *L.* i. [cap. VII. p. 50, 51.]

they ought to be called, leſt they violate the true God, whoſe name is profaned, when it is given to many. From which paſſages of *Lactantius* it plainly appeareth, that the main controverſy between the Chriſtians and the Pagans was then only this, *Whether or no, the created miniſters of the ſupreme God might be called gods, and religiouſly worſhipped.* But this Pagan objection againſt the ſolitary Deity of the Chriſtians is by ſome ancient Chriſtian writers alſo otherwiſe anſwered; namely, from thoſe three hypoſtaſes or perſons of the trinity; they affirming upon that account, that though Chriſtians did not acknowledge ſuch a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did they not therefore make God a ſolitary and ſteril being, before the creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way betwixt Jews and Pagans, they interpreting *Moſes* alſo his *faciamus hominem*, to this ſenſe.

XXXVI. We ſhall now ſhew particularly what theſe many gods of the Pagans were. It hath been often obſerved, that the Pagans were divided in their philoſophick or natural theology, as to their opinions concerning the ſupreme God; ſome of them thinking, τὸ Θεῖον ἐξῃρημένον εἶναι τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, *that the ſupreme Deity was an abſtract being, elevated above nature and the whole world*; but others, that he was nothing higher than an *anima mundi*, or *ſoul of the world.* Now the former of theſe two were chiefly amongſt the Greeks, the Pythagoreans and the Platoniſts, who had accordingly ſeveral diſtinctions amongſt them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπερκόσμιοι θεοὶ and the ἐγκόσμιοι, *the ſuper-mundane and the mundane gods*; the θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and the γεννητοὶ, the *eternal* and the *generated gods*; that word *latter* being now taken in a narrower and more confined ſenſe, for ſuch as were made in time, or had a beginning of their exiſtence: and laſtly, the νοητοὶ θεοὶ and the αἰσθητοὶ, the *intelligible* and the *ſenſible gods.* And the ὑπερκόσμιοι, ἀΐδιοι and νοητοὶ θεοὶ, *ſupermundane, eternal*, and *intelligible gods*, of theſe Pythagoreans and Platoniſts, were firſt of all, and principally, thoſe τρεῖς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις, (as *Plotinus* calls them) thoſe *three divine hypoſtaſes*, that have the nature of principles in the univerſe, *viz. Tagathon* or *Hen*, *Nous* and *Pſyche*, or *Monad*, *Mind* and *Soul.* That this trinity was not firſt of all a meer invention of *Plato*'s, but much ancienter than him, is plainly affirmed by *Plotinus* in theſe words; Καὶ εἶναι τὰς λόγους τάσδε μὴ καινὰς, μὴ δὲ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρῆσθαι μὴ ἀναπεπταμένως, τὰς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι· μαρτυρίοις πιστωσαμένοις τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι, τοῖς αὐτῆ τῆ Πλάτωνος γράμμασιν· ἤπλετο μὲν δὴ καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης δόξης· *That theſe doctrines are not new, nor of yeſterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obſcurely (the diſcourſes now extant, being but explications of them) appears from* Plato's *own writings*; Parmenides *before him having inſiſted on them.*

En 5. *l.* 1. [P. 489.]

Now it is well known, that *Parmenides* was addicted to the Pythagorick ſect, and therefore probable, that this doctrine of a divine triad was one of the arcanums of that ſchool alſo. Which is further confirmed from hence, becauſe *Numenius* a famous Pythagorean entertained it as ſuch. And *Moderatus*,

Moderatus (as *Simplicius* informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagorick cabala: ἔτος γὰρ κατὰ τὰς Πυθαγορείας τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ Δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ Τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχικὸν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· *This* (Moderatus) *declareth, that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that, which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and that the third, which is psychical or soul, partaketh both of the first unity, and of the ideas.* *In Ar. Phys. fol. 50.*

Lastly, we have *Jamblichus* his testimony also in *Proclus* to the same purpose; τρεῖς εἶναι θεὰς τάττας καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνουμένας, *That there were three gods also praised by the Pythagoreans.* Now we have before shewed, that *Pythagoras* his philosophy was derived from the Orphick cabala, which *Proclus*[1] in another place thus fully testifieth; ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ παρ' Ἕλλησι θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστὶ μυσταγωγίας ἔκγονος· πρῶτα μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφήμου τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος· Δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος ὑποδεξαμένου τὴν παντελῆ περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήμην, ἔκ τε τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Ὀρφικῶν γραμμάτων· *All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphick Mystagogia;* Pythagoras *being first instructed by* Aglaophemus *in the Orphick Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and* Plato *being the next, who received a perfect knowledge of all these divine things, both out of the Pythagorick and the Orphick writings.* *Theol. Plat. l. 1. c. 5. [P. 13.]*

And that a Trinity was part of that Orphick cabala, we have already proved out of *Amelius*, he affirming (in *Proclus*) that *Plato*'s three kings were the same with *Orpheus* his trinity, of *Phanes*, *Uranus*, and *Cronus*. Moreover, since all these three, *Orpheus*, *Pythagoras*, and *Plato*, travelling into *Egypt*, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaical) it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath been also noted, that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraick mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from *Zoroaster*; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magick or Chalday oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified, that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the highest of all their gods, and that called by an Hebrew name too, *Cabbirim*, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman Capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was *Minerva*, which among the Latins, as *Athena* amongst the Greeks, was understood to signify the divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as *Aristotle* informeth us: διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἁγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χρώμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ· *Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications.* *De Cœlo, l. 1. c. 5. [Cap. 1. p. 610. Tom. I. Oper.]*

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of divine hypostases should be first discovered meerly by human wit and reason, though there

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 94.

there be nothing in it (if rightly underſtood) that is repugnant to reaſon: and ſince there are in the ancient writings of the Old Teſtament certain ſignifications of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypoſtaſis, we may reaſonably conclude that, which *Proclus* aſſerteth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaick Oracles, to be true, that it was at firſt Θεοπαράδοτος Θεολογία, *a theology of divine tradition or revelation*, or a divine cabala, *viz.* amongſt the Hebrews firſt, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it to be thought any conſiderable objection to the contrary, becauſe the Platoniſts, Pythagoreans, and other Pagan theologers, did not expreſs this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanaſian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Foraſmuch as this myſtery was gradually imparted to the world, and that firſt but ſparingly to the Hebrews themſelves, either in their written or oral cabala; but afterwards more fully under Chriſtianity, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheleſs was it not ſo diſtinctly and preciſely determined, nor ſo punctually and ſcrupulouſly ſtated among the Chriſtians neither, till after the riſing up of hereſies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themſelves at firſt univerſally agree, in the ſignification of the word Ὁμούσιος, *co-eſſential* or *conſubſtantial*. Nor laſtly, is it a thing at all to be wondred at, that in ſuch a difficult and myſterious point as this, there ſhould be ſome diverſity of apprehenſions amongſt the reputed orthodox Chriſtians themſelves; and much leſs therefore amongſt Pagans and Philoſophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this divine cabala was but little underſtood by many of thoſe, who entertained it among the Pagans, ſo was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated alſo.

For firſt, the Pagans univerſally called this their trinity, a trinity of gods, τὸν Πρῶτον, τὸν Δεύτερον, and τὸν Τρίτον Θεὸν, *the firſt*, *the ſecond*, and *the third god*; as the more philoſophical amongſt them called it alſo a trinity of cauſes, and a trinity of principles, and ſometimes a trinity of opificers. Thus is this cabala of the trinity ſtyled in *Proclus*, ἡ τῶν Τριῶν Θεῶν παράδοσις, *the tradition of the three gods*. And accordingly is it ſaid of *Numenius* by him, that τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας Θεὸς, he did τραγωδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, ἔγγονον, ἀπόγονον, *having praiſed the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them, the grandfather, the ſon, and the nephew*; *Numenius* thereby intimating, that as the ſecond of theſe gods was the offſpring of the firſt god, ſo the third, called the nephew of the firſt, was derived both from him and from the ſecond; from the firſt as the grandfather, and from the ſecond, as the father of him. *Harpocration* likewiſe, *Atticus*, and *Amelius*, are ſaid by *Proclus* to have entertained this ſame cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of theſe ſtyling them βασιλέας τρεῖς, and τριτλὸν δημιυργὸν, *three kings*, and *three opificers*, or makers of the whole world. In like manner *Plotinus*, ſpeaking of the ſecond of theſe three hypoſtaſes, (that is, νᾶς *the firſt mind* or *intellect*) calls him δεύτερον Θεὸν, *the ſecond god*; Καὶ Θεὸς αὕτη ἡ Φύσις, καὶ Θεὸς Δεύτερος, προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν, πρὶν ὁρᾶν ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς ἕτως οἷον κρηπίδος, ἢ ἐξ αὐτᾶ ἐξήρτηται· ἔδει γὰρ ἐκεῖνον βαίνουσα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχᾳ τινὸς, μηδ' αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι,

In Timæ. Plat. p. 93.

Ibid.

Enn. 5. l. 5. c. 3 [p. 522.]

κέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν· *And this nature is God, I say a second God, offering himself to view, before that other God can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit, that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in meer soul neither, but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendour shining before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king.* He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of them all: Εἰκότως ἂν λέγεται ὅτι ὁ κόσμος εἰκών, ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος· ἐστηκότων μὲν τῶν πρώτου, καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἑστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ κατὰ συμβέβηκος κινουμένου· *Wherefore this world may well be called an image, it depending upon that above, (as an image in a glass) which is threefold. Whereof the first and second God always stand immoveably; the third likewise is in it self stable too, but accidentally moved, by reason of the mobility of matter and things below it.* And that we may here give a taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too, *Porphyrius* in the life of *Plotinus*[1] affirmeth, that both *Plotinus* and himself had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatick union with the first of these three gods, that which is above mind and understanding: πολλάκις ἐνάγουλι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις, ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ μήτε μορφὴν, μὴ τέ τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι· Plotinus *often endeavouring to raise up his mind to the first and highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who hath neither form nor idea, but is placed above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to whom I* Porphyrius *affirm my self to have been once united in the sixty eighth year of my age.* And again afterwards, τέλος αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν, τὸ ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, ἔτυχε δὲ τετράκις ὅτε ὅτε συνήμην αὐτῷ τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου· Plotinus *his chief aim and scope was, to be united to, and conjoined with the supreme God, who is above all; which scope he attained unto four several times, whilst my self was with him, by a certain ineffable energy.* That is, *Plotinus* aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatick union with the Τὸ ἓν, and Τ'αγαθὸν, *the first of the three highest gods*, (called the one and the good) as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book[2], where he calls it ἐπαφὴν, and παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα, and τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον, τῷ οἷον πάντων κέντρῳ συνάπτειν, *a kind of tactual union*, and *a certain presence better than knowledge*, and *the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe.* Thus we see, that the Platonick trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferiour gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the Pagan theology expresly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

En 2. *l.* 3. *c.* 18 [P. 148.]

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the Pagan polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since

[1] Cap. XXIII. p. 137. in Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. Lib. IV. cap. XXVI.

[2] De Bono vel Uno, Ennead. VI. Lib. IX. cap. X. p. 772.

ſince in the ſcripture, which is the only true rule and meaſure of this divine cabala of the trinity, though the λόγος or word be ſaid to have been with God, (that is, God the father;) and alſo it ſelf to be God, (that is, not a creature:) yet is it no where called an other, or ſecond God. Therefore cannot we Chriſtians entertain this Pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but muſt call it either a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, or ſubſiſtences, or perſons, or the like. Nevertheleſs it is obſervable, that *Philo* [1], though, according to his Jewiſh principles, he was a zealous oppoſer of the Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, ſcruple to call the Θεῖον λόγον, *the divine Word*, after the Platonick way, Δεύτερον Θεὸν, *a ſecond God*; as not ſuſpecting this to claſh with the principles of his religion, or that ſecond commandment of the decalogue, *Thou ſhalt have no other gods before my face*; poſſibly becauſe he conceived, that this was to be underſtood of creature-gods only: whereas his ſecond God, the divine λόγος or *Word*, is declared by him to be ἀΐδιος, *eternal*, and therefore, according to the Jewiſh theology, uncreated. However, this language of a ſecond and third God is not ſo excuſable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; becauſe the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were ſo far from having any ſcrupuloſity againſt a plurality of gods, (ſo long as there was only one fountain of the godhead acknowledged) that they rather accounted it an honour to the ſupreme God, as hath been already ſhewed, that he ſhould have many other, not only titular gods under him, but alſo ſuch as were religiouſly worſhipped: wherefore, beſides this ſecond and third God, they alſo did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. *Auſtin* doth upon this account ſeem ſomewhat to excuſe the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in theſe words: *Liberis enim verbis loquuntur philoſophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offenſionem religioſarum aurium pertimeſcunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas eſt, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quæ in his ſignificantur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; ſicut nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum eſt dicere, quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam ſingulum quemque Deum eſſe fateamur. The philoſophers uſe free language; nor in theſe things, which are extremely difficult to be underſtood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and ſcrupulous ears. But the caſe is otherwiſe with us Chriſtians; for we are tied up to phraſes, and ought to ſpeak according to a certain rule, leſt the licentious uſe of words ſhould beget a wicked opinion in any concerning thoſe things, that are ſignified by them.* That is, though this might be in a manner excuſable in the Pagans, becauſe each of thoſe three hypoſtaſes is God, therefore to call them ſeverally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods, and principles; they having no ſuch rule then given them to govern their language by as this, *That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghoſt God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God:* yet is not this allowable for us Chriſtians, to ſpeak of a ſecond or third God or principle, or to call the Holy Trinity a Trinity of Gods, notwithſtanding that when we ſpeak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghoſt ſeverally, we confeſs each of them to be God.

C. D. l. 10. c. 23.

And

[1] Vide Euſebium, Præpar. Evangel. Lib. VII. cap. XIII. p. 323.

And indeed when the Pagans thus ſpake of a firſt, ſecond and third God, and no more, though having innumerable other Gods beſides, they did, by this language, plainly imply, that theſe three gods of theirs, were of a very different kind from all the reſt of their gods; that is, not θεοὶ γεννητοὶ, but, ἀΐδιοι, not *created*, but *eternal* and *uncreated ones*. And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of gods for the τὸ Θεῖον in general, the *divine Numen*, and ſometimes call it the firſt God too, in way of diſtinction from their generated gods, will be ſhowed afterward. So that the Πρῶτος Θεὸς, the *firſt God*, was uſed in different ſenſes by theſe Pagans, ſometimes in a larger ſenſe, and in way of oppoſition to all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, the *generated* or *created gods*, or the gods, that were made in time, together with the world; and ſometimes again, more particularly, in way of diſtinction from thoſe two other divine hypoſtaſes eternal, called by them the ſecond and third god. Which firſt of the three gods is alſo frequently by them called Θεὸς, *God*, emphatically and by way of excellency, they ſuppoſing a gradual ſubordination in theſe principles.

Neither was this trinity of divine ſubſiſtences only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of gods; but alſo the Cabala thereof was otherwiſe much depraved and adulterated by ſeveral of the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans. For firſt, the third of theſe three hypoſtaſes, commonly called *Pſyche*, is by ſome of them made to be ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, *the immediate ſoul of the corporeal world*, informing, acting and enlivening it, after the ſame manner as the ſouls of other animals do their reſpective bodies; inſomuch that this corporeal world itſelf, as together with its ſoul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third god. This *Proclus* [1] affirmeth of *Numenius* the Pythagorean, ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς, *That the world, according to him, was the third god.* And *Plotinus*, being a great reader of this *Numenius*, ſeems to have been ſomewhat infected by him with this conceit alſo, though contrary to his own principles, from thoſe words before cited out of him [2], ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥσπερ συνηθὲς λέγειν, τρίτος, *the world, as is commonly ſaid, is the third god.*

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only *Timæus Locrus*, but alſo *Plato* himſelf calls it θεῖον γεννητὸν, that is, a created god, the word γεννητὸν being here put for that, which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by *Plato*, made to be only the chief of all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, that is, the *creature-gods*. Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of ſome Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confuſed jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the firſt of thoſe gods is the father and fountain of all, or the original of the god-head. And the ſecond, foraſmuch as he is called by them, both ποιητὴς and δημιουργὸς, *the maker*, and *the opificer of the whole world*, he therefore can be no creature neither:

[1] Comment in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 93.

[2] This is a miſtake, for Dr. *Cudworth* had not cited theſe words before, but they are to be found in *Plotinus*, Ennead. III. Lib. V. cap. VI. p. 296.

whereas the third, which is ſaid to be the world, was by *Numenius* himſelf alſo expreſly called, both ποίημα and τὸ δημιουργέμενον, *the work*, or *thing made*, that is plainly, the creature of both the former. *Proclus*[1] thus fully repreſents his ſenſe; Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὥστε ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττὸς, ὅ, τε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος Θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργέμενον ὁ τρίτος· Numenius *called the firſt of the three Gods the father, the ſecond of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made; ſo that, according to* Numenius, *there were two opificers, or creators of the world, the firſt and the ſecond God; and the world it ſelf*, (that is, the thing made and created by them both) *is ſaid to be the third God.*

And that this notion of the Trinity is an adulterated one, may be alſo further concluded from hence, becauſe, according to this hypotheſis, they might have ſaid, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; ſince all the other γεννητοὶ Θεοὶ, *generated gods*, might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore theſe philoſophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, diſtinguiſhed from all the reſt, but rather firſt to have diſtributed their gods into Θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and γεννητοὶ, that is, *eternal* or *uncreated*, and *created gods*, and then to have ſubdivided thoſe created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But becauſe it may be here alledged in favour of this ſpurious hypotheſis of the Trinity, that the world was accounted the third God, only by accident, in reſpect of its ſoul, which is properly that third God; though *Numenius*, with others, plainly affirm the world it ſelf, as ποίημα and δημιουργέμενον, as the *work* and *thing* made, to be the third; we ſhall therefore reply to this, that even the ſoul of the mundane animal it ſelf, according to *Timæus*, and *Plato*, and others, is affirmed to be γεννητὸς Θεὸς, *a generated god*, that is, ſuch as was produced from non-exiſtence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which *Ariſtotle*[2] obſerving, therefore took occaſion to tax *Plato* as contradicting himſelf, in making the ſoul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet ſuppoſing it to be ὕστερον καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ, *not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven*, of which ſomething before. Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient Cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by thoſe Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itſelf, or elſe ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, *an informing ſoul of the world*, to be the third hypoſtaſis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themſelves, notwithſtanding, call a trinity of cauſes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable, that this was the true reaſon, why *Philo*, though he admitted the ſecond hypoſtaſis of the Platonick and Pythagorick (if not Egyptian) Trinity, called by him Θεῖος λόγος, *the divine Word*, and ſtyled

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. Lib. II. p. 93. Tom. IV. Oper. & Phyſic. Auſcultat. Lib. VIII. cap. I. p. 578. Tom. I. Oper.

[2] Vide Metaphyſ. Lib. I. cap. VII. p. 278.

ſtyled δεύτερος θεὸς, *the ſecond God*, and, as *Euſebius* [1] adds, δεύτερον αἴτιον, *the ſecond cauſe*; yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, ſo as to take in that third God, or cauſe, ſuppoſed by many of them to be the ſoul of the whole world, as an animal; becauſe he muſt then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans. It is true, that he ſomewhere ſticks not to call God alſo the ſoul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τοῦ λόγου θεὸν, *that God, who is before the Word*, or elſe rather the *Word* itſelf, the ſecond God, (according to him the immediate creator and governour of the ſame;) nevertheleſs, he does not ſeem to underſtand thereby ſuch a deeply immerſed ſoul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, *a ſuper-mundane ſoul.*

To this firſt depravation of that θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, that *theology of divine tradition*, and ancient Cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, may be added another, that ſome of them declaring the ſecond hypoſtaſis of their Trinity to be the archetypal world, or τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν παγέντα κόσμον, as *Philo* calls it [2], *the world that is compounded and made up of ideas*, and containeth in it all thoſe kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world ſenſibly; and further concluding, that all theſe ſeveral ideas of this archetypal and intelligible world are really ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances, animals and gods, have thereby made that ſecond hypoſtaſis, not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. Theſe are thoſe gods commonly called by them, νοητοὶ θεοὶ, *intelligible gods*, not as before in way of diſtinction from the αἰσθητοὶ, the *ſenſible gods* (which is a more general notion of the word) but from thoſe other gods of theirs (afterwards to be inſiſted on alſo) called νοεροὶ θεοὶ, *intellectual gods*. *Proclus* upon *Plato*'s *Politia* [3] concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this reaſon, becauſe if there were, καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ἰδέα θεὸς ἔσται, ἐπείπερ πᾶσα ἰδέα θεὸς ὡς Παρμενίδης εἴρηκεν· *that very idea of evil alſo would it ſelf be a god, becauſe every idea is a god, as* Parmenides *hath affirmed.* Neither was *Plotinus* himſelf, though otherwiſe more ſober, altogether uninfected with this fantaſtick conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing thus concerning the ſecond God, the firſt Mind or Intellect; γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη τὰ ὄντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοὺς νοητούς, *That he being begotten by the firſt God*, (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity) *generated all entities together with himſelf, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods.* *Apuleius* [3] alſo (as hath been already noted) groſly and fulſomely imputes the ſame to *Plato*, in thoſe words; *Quos deos* Plato *exiſtimat, veros, incorporales, animales, ſine ullo neque fine neque exordio, ſed prorſus ac retrò æviternos, ingenio ad ſummam beatitudinem porrecto, &c.* And he with *Julian* and others reduce the greater part of the Pagan gods to theſe ideas of the intelligible, or archetypal world, as making *Apollo*, for example, to be the intelligible ſun, the idea of the ſenſible; and *Diana* the intelligible moon, and the like for the reſt. Laſtly, it hath been obſerved alſo, that the Egyptian

P. 357.

En. 5. l. 1. c. 7. [p. 489.]

[1] Præparat. Evang. Lib. VII. cap. XIII.
[2] De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.
[3] De Deo Socratis, p. 43.

Theologers pretended, in like manner, to worſhip theſe intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as ſymbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized ſo far, as to ſuppoſe God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and ſenſible:

De Mun. Opif. p. 5. [p. 3, 4.] Βεληθεὶς (ὁ Θεὸς) τὸν ὁρατὸν τυτονὶ κόσμον δημιυργῆσαι, προεξετύπυ τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεςάτῳ παραδείγμαλι, τὸν σωμαλικὸν ἀπεργάσηλαι, πρεσβυτέρᾳ νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη, ὥσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά. τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν συνες῀ῶτα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινι ὑπονοεῖν ἀδύναλον· *God intending to make a viſible world, firſt formed an intelligible one; that ſo having an incorporeal and moſt god-like pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to the ſame, this younger an image of that older, that ſhould contain as many ſenſible kinds in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not poſſible* (ſaith he) *to conceive this world of ideas to exiſt in any place.* Nay, according to him, *Moſes* himſelf philoſophized alſo after the ſame manner in his *Coſmopœia*, deſcribing, in the firſt five verſes of *Geneſis*, the making of an intelligible heaven and earth, before the ſenſible:

P. 6. πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ ὁ ποιῶν ἐποιει ὐρανὸν ἀσώμαλον καὶ γῆν ἀόραλου, καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν καὶ κενῦ, εἰθ' ὕδαλος ἀσωμάτυ ὐσίαν καὶ πνεύμαλος, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἑβδόμῳ φῶτος, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώμαλον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίυ παράδειγμα, &c. *The Creator firſt of all made an incorporeal heaven and an inviſible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum; incorporeal water and air; and laſt of all light, which was alſo the incorporeal and intelligible paradigm of the ſun and ſtars, and that from whence their ſenſible light is derived.* But *Philo* does not plainly make theſe ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances and animals, much leſs gods; though he ſomewhere[1] takes notice of thoſe, who admiring the pulchritude of both theſe worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but alſo their ſeveral parts; that is, the ſeveral ideas of the intelligible world alſo, as well as the greater parts of the ſenſible, an intelligible heaven and earth, ſun and moon; they pretending to worſhip thoſe divine ideas in all theſe ſenſible things. Which high-flown Platonick notion, as it gave ſanctuary and protection to the groſſeſt and fouleſt of all the Pagan ſuperſtitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worſhip brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature, (inanimate ſubſtances, and mere accidents) under a pretence of worſhipping the divine ideas in them; ſo did it directly tend to abſolute impiety, irreligion and atheiſm; there being few, that could entertain any thoughts at all of thoſe eternal ideas, and ſcarcely any, who could thoroughly perſuade themſelves, that theſe had ſo much reality in them, as the ſenſible things of nature; as the idea of a houſe in the mind of an architect hath not ſo much reality in it as a material houſe made up of ſtones, mortar and timber; ſo that their devotion muſt needs ſink down wholly into thoſe ſenſible things, and themſelves naturally at length fall into this atheiſtick perſuaſion, That the good things of nature are the only deities.

Here therefore have we a multitude of Pagan gods ſupermundane and eternal, (though all depending upon one ſupreme) the gods by them

[1] De Confuſione Linguar. p. 345.

them properly called νοητοὶ, *intelligible*, or the divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another depravation of the ancient Moſaick Cabala of the trinity, that the ſecond hypoſtaſis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the divine ideas, as ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances, animals, and gods; that is, not one God, but a whole world of gods.

But over and beſides all this, ſome of theſe Platoniſts and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Moſaick Cabala of the trinity, (the certain rule whereof is now only the Scriptures of the New Teſtament) when they concluded, that as from the third hypoſtaſis of their trinity, called ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ, *the firſt ſoul*, there were innumerable other particular ſouls derived, namely the ſouls of all inferiour animals, that are parts of the world; ſo in like manner, that from their ſecond hypoſtaſis, called ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, *the firſt mind or intellect*, there were innumerable other μερικοὶ Νόες, *particular minds*, or intellects ſubſtantial derived, ſuperiour to the firſt ſoul; and not only ſo, but alſo, that from that firſt and higheſt hypoſtaſis of all, called Τὸ ἕν, and Τἀγαθὸν, *the one*, and *the good*, there were derived likewiſe many particular Ἑνάδες, and Ἀγαθότητες, *unities* and *goodneſſes ſubſtantial*, ſuperiour to the firſt intellect. Thus *Proclus* in his Theologick Inſtitutions, *N.* 21. [Cap. XXI. p 426.] Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον, ἑνάδες· καὶ μετὰ νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον, νόες· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαὶ· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις· *After the firſt one, (and from it) there are many particular Henades or unities; after the firſt Intellect and from it, many particular Noes, minds or intellects; after the firſt Soul, many particular and derivative ſouls; and laſtly, after the univerſal Nature, many particular natures, and ſpermatick reaſons.* Where it may be *obiter* obſerved, that theſe Platoniſts ſuppoſed, below the univerſal Pſyche, or mundane ſoul, a univerſal φύσις, or *ſubſtantial nature* alſo; but ſo as that beſides it there were other particular λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, *ſeminal reaſons*, or plaſtick principles alſo.

As for theſe *Noes*, and that beſides the firſt univerſal mind or intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects ſubſtantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wiſe, but alſo every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all ſouls, that are ſelf-moveable beings; *Proclus* was not ſingular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platoniſts with him; amongſt whom *Plotinus* may ſeem to be one, from this paſſage of his beſides others, ὅτι ἀθάνατοι δὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται· *That ſouls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elſewhere largely proved.* Upon which words *Ficinus* thus; *Hîc, & ſuprà & infrà ſæpè, per verba* Plotini *notabis, plures eſſe mentium animarumque ſubſtantias inter ſe diſtinctas, quamvis inter eas unio ſit mirabilis. Here, and from many other places, before and after, you may obſerve, that, according to* Plotinus, *there are many ſubſtantial minds, diſtinct from ſouls, though there be a wonderful union betwixt them.* Moreover, that there was alſo above theſe *Noes*, or immoveable but multiform minds, not only one perfect Monad, and firſt Good, but alſo a rank of many particular Henades or Monades, and Agathotetes; was, beſides

P. 653. [Ennead. VI. lib. IV. cap. X.]

In Epiſt. Ench. p. 9. ſides *Proclus* and others, aſſerted by *Simplicius* alſo; ἀφ' ἑαυτῆ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντα παράγει, τάτε πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ μέσα, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἑαυτῷ παράγει, μιὰ ἀγαθότης πολλὰς ἀγαθότητας, καὶ μία ἑνὰς ἡ ὑπερ πάσας, πολλὰς ἑνάδας· *The higheſt good* (ſaith he) *produceth all things from himſelf, in ſeveral ranks and degrees; the firſt, the middle, and the laſt or loweſt of all. But the firſt and the next to himſelf doth he produce like himſelf, one goodneſs many goodneſſes, and one unity or henade many henades.* And that by theſe Henades and Autoagathotetes he means ſubſtantial beings, that are conſcious

P. 11. of themſelves, appears alſo from theſe following words; τὰ μὲν ἕν πρῶτα τῶν ὑπὸ τῆ πρώτη ἀγαθῆ παραγομένων, διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτό ὁμόφυες, ἀκ ἐξέστη τῆ εἶναι ἀγαθά, ἀκίνητα ὄντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, καὶ ἐν τῆ αὐτῆ ἀεὶ μακαριότητι ἱδρυμένα, ἀκ ἐνδεῆ τῆ ἀγαθῆ, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητές εἰσι· *Thoſe beings, which are firſt produced from the firſt good, by reaſon of their ſameneſs of nature with him, are immoveably and unchangeably good, always fixed in the ſame happineſs, and never indigent of good or falling from it, becauſe they are all eſſential goodneſſes.* Where afterward he adds ſomething concerning the νόες alſo, that though theſe were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοαγαθὰ, not eſſentially goodneſſes, but only by participation; yet, being by their own nature alſo immoveable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithſtanding which, we muſt confeſs, that ſome of theſe Platoniſts ſeem to take the word *Henades* ſometimes in another ſenſe, and to underſtand nothing elſe thereby but the intelligible idea before mentioned; though the ancient Platoniſts and Pythagoreans were not wont to call theſe unities, but numbers.

And now have we diſcovered more of the Pagans inferiour gods, ſupermundane and eternal, *viz.* beſides thoſe νοητοὶ θεοὶ, thoſe *intelligible gods*; troops of *Henades* and *Autoagathotetes*, unities and goodneſſes; and alſo of *Noes*, immoveable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, θεοὶ ἑνιαῖοι, and θεοὶ νοεροὶ, *henadical* (or *monadical) gods*, and *intellectual gods*.

But ſince theſe *Noes*, or νοεροὶ θεοὶ, are ſaid to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above ſouls, and therefore ſuperiour to that firſt ſoul, which is the third hypoſtaſis of this trinity; as all thoſe *Henades* or ἑνιαῖοι θεοὶ, thoſe ſimple monadical gods, are likewiſe yet a higher rank of beings above the *Noes*, and therefore ſuperiour to the ſecond hypoſtaſis alſo, the firſt mind; and yet all theſe *Henades* and *Nous*, however ſuppoſed by theſe philoſophers to be eternal, foraſmuch as they are particular beings only, and not univerſal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the ſecond and third hypoſtaſis of this trinity, as well the firſt mind as the firſt ſoul, muſt be accounted creatures alſo; becauſe no created being can be ſuperiour to any thing uncreated. Wherefore *Proclus*, and ſome others of thoſe Platoniſts, plainly underſtood this trinity no otherwiſe, than as a certain ſcale or ladder of beings in the univerſe; or a gradual deſcent of things from the firſt or higheſt, by ſteps downward, lower and lower, ſo far as to the ſouls of all

animals. For which cauſe, *Proclus* to make up this ſcale complete, adds to theſe three ranks and degrees, below that third of ſouls, a fourth of natures alſo; under which there lies nothing but the paſſive part of the univerſe, body and matter. So that, their whole ſcale of all that is above body was indeed not a trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the firſt of Henades or Unities, the ſecond of Noes, Minds or Intellects, the third of Souls, and the laſt of Natures; theſe being, as it were, ſo many orbs and ſpheres, one within and below another. In all which ſeveral ranks of being, they ſuppoſed one firſt univerſal, and unparticipated, as the head of each reſpective rank, and many particular, or participated ones: as one firſt univerſal Henade, and many ſecondary particular Henades; one firſt univerſal Nous, Mind or Intellect, and many ſecondary and particular Noes or Minds; one firſt univerſal Soul, and many particular ſouls; and laſtly, one univerſal Nature, and many particular natures. In which ſcale of beings, they deified, beſides the firſt Τὸ ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, *one*, and *good*, not only the firſt mind, and the firſt ſoul, but alſo thoſe other particular Henades, and Noes univerſally; and all particular ſouls above human: leaving out, beſides them and inferiour ſouls, that fourth rank of natures, becauſe they conceived, that nothing was to be accounted a God, but what was intellectual and ſuperiour to men. Wherein, though they made ſeveral degrees of gods, one below another, and called ſome ἀϊδίους and ſome γεννητὲς, ſome *eternal*, and ſome *generated*, or made in time; yet did they no where clearly diſtinguiſh betwixt the Deity properly ſo called, and the creature, nor ſhow how far in this ſcale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commiſſure betwixt God and the creature ſo ſmooth and cloſe, that where they indeed parted was altogether undiſcernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not abſolute but comparative terms, and conſiſted but in more and leſs. All which was doubtleſs a groſs miſtake of the ancient Cabala of the Trinity.

This is therefore that Platonick Trinity, which we oppoſe to the Chriſtian, not as if *Plato*'s own trinity, in the very eſſential conſtitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Chriſtian; it ſelf in all probability having been at firſt derived from a Divine or Moſaick Cabala; but becauſe this Cabala, (as might well come to paſs in a thing ſo myſterious and difficult to be conceived) hath been by divers of theſe Platoniſts and Pythagoreans miſunderſtood, depraved, and adulterated, into ſuch a trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; ſinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees, (ſtill multiplying of it, as it goes,) till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to ſtop there neither, but extends it further ſtill to the animated parts thereof, ſtars and dæmons; the deſign or direct tendency thereof being nothing elſe, but to lay a foundation for infinite polytheiſm, coſmolatry,

(or

(or world-idolatry) and creature-worſhip. Where it is by the way obſervable, that theſe Platonick Pagans were the only publick-and profeſſed champions againſt Chriſtianity; for though *Celſus* were ſuſpected by *Origen* to have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at leaſt perſonate a Platoniſt too. The reaſon whereof might be; not only becauſe the Platonick and Pythagorick ſect was the divineſt of all the Pagans, and that which approached neareſt to Chriſtianity and the truth, (however it might by accident therefore prove the worſt, as the corruption of the beſt thing,) and by that means could with greateſt confidence hold up the bucklers againſt Chriſtianity and encounter it; but alſo becauſe the Platonick principles, as they might be underſtood, would, of all other, ſerve moſt plauſib'y to defend the Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry.

Concerning the Chriſtian Trinity, we ſhall here obſerve only three things; firſt, that it is not a Trinity of meer names or words, nor a Trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame thing. For ſuch a kind of Trinity as this might be conceived in that firſt Platonick hypoſtaſis it ſelf, called τὸ ἓν and τἀγαθὸν, *the one* and *the good*, and perhaps alſo in that firſt perſon of the Chriſtian Trinity; namely of goodneſs, and underſtanding or wiſdom, and will or active power, three inadequate conceptions thereof. 'Tis true, that *Plotinus* was ſo high flown, as to maintain, that the firſt and higheſt principle of all, by reaſon of its perfect unity and ſimplicity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and underſtanding, and therefore does not ſo much as νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ, in a proper ſenſe, *underſtand it ſelf:* notwithſtanding which, this philoſopher himſelf adds, that it cannot therefore be ſaid to be ignorant nor unwiſe neither; theſe expreſſions belonging only to ſuch a being, as was by nature intellectual, νῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν, ἀνόητος; *Intellectus, niſi intelligat, demens meritò judicatur.* And he ſeems to grant, that it hath a certain ſimple clarity and brightneſs in it, ſuperiour to that of knowledge; as the body of the ſun has a certain brightneſs ſuperiour to that ſecondary light, which ſtreameth from it; and that it may be ſaid to be νόησις αὐτὴ, *knowledge it ſelf*, that does not underſtand, as motion it ſelf does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by ordinary mortals, that the higheſt and moſt perfect of all beings ſhould not fully comprehend it ſelf, the extent of its own fecundity and power, and be conſcious of all that proceedeth from it, though after the moſt ſimple manner. And therefore this high-flown conceit of *Plotinus* (and perhaps of *Plato* himſelf too) has been rejected by latter Platoniſts, as phantaſtical, and unſafe: for thus *Simplicius*, ἀλλὰ καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκροτάτην, ἃ γὰρ ἄν τι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ παραγομένων ἀγνοήσειεν· *But it muſt needs have alſo the moſt perfect knowledge, ſince it cannot be ignorant of any thing, that is produced from it ſelf.* And St. *Auſtin* [1], in like manner, confutes that aſſertion of ſome Chriſtians, that the λόγος, or *eternal Word*, was that very wiſdom and underſtanding, by which the father himſelf was wiſe; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God. But this opinion, that the Chriſtian Trinity is but a Trinity of words, or meer logical notions, and inadequate conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Chriſtian Church

En 6. l. 7. c. 35. [p. 729.]

In Epict. p. 235.

[1] De Trinit. Lib. VI. cap. II. III. p. 598, 599. Tom. VIII. Oper.

Church in *Sabellius* and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons.

The second thing, that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity, is this, that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first, and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second, nor third, creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, as *Arius* maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, *Erat quando non erant, that once they were not*, but *their going forth was from eternity*, and they were both coëve and coëternal with the father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that, which is both eternal and undestroyable, is *ipso facto* uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the Deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the Holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this Holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, and necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal, or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of *Origen*, Θρησκεύομεν ἕν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βουλήσεως· *We worship the father of truth, and the son the truth it self, being two things as to hypostasis; but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will:* but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual περιχώρησις, and ἐνύπαρξις, *inexistence* and *permeation of one another*, according to that of our Saviour Christ, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doth the works.* We grant indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together, as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three divine hypostases to be one God.

C. Cels. p. 386. [Liv. VIII.]

We ſhall conclude here with confidence, that the Chriſtian Trinity, though there be very much of myſtery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reaſon, that is, of impoſſibility to be found therein, as the Atheiſts would pretend, who cry down all for nonſenſe and abſolute impoſſibility, which their dull ſtupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds eaſily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity it ſelf. And it were to be wiſhed, that ſome Religioniſts and Trinitarians did not here ſymbolize too much with them, in affecting to repreſent the myſtery of the Chriſtian Trinity as a thing directly contradictious to all human reaſon and underſtanding; and that perhaps out of deſign to make men ſurrender up themſelves and conſciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as alſo to debauch their underſtandings by this means, to the ſwallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who ſhould ſay, he that believes the Trinity, (as we all muſt do, if we will be Chriſtians) ſhould boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor ſcrupulouſly chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictious, or impoſſible to human underſtanding propounded, than this article of the Chriſtian faith.

But, for the preſent, we ſhall endeavour only to ſhew, that the Chriſtian Trinity (though a myſtery, yet) is much more agreeable to reaſon, than that Platonick, or Pſeudo-Platonick Trinity before deſcribed; and that in thoſe three particulars then mentioned. For firſt, when thoſe Platoniſts and Pythagoreans interpret their third God, or laſt hypoſtaſis of their trinity, to be either the world, or elſe a ψυχὴ ἐκόσμιος, ſuch an *immediate ſoul* thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their ſecond and third hypoſtaſis, ſo do they debaſe the Deity therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for coſmo-latry, or world-idolatry in general, but alſo for the groſſeſt and moſt ſottiſh of all idolatries, the worſhiping of the inanimate parts of the world themſelves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal, and ſenſible god.

It is true indeed, that *Origen* and ſome others of the ancient Chriſtian Writers have ſuppoſed, that God may be ſaid, in ſome ſenſe, to be the ſoul of the world. Thus in that book *Peri Archon*, *Sicut corpus noſtrum unum ex multis membris aptatum eſt, & ab una anima continetur, ita & univerſum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quaſi ab una animâ, virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam à ſanctâ Scripturâ indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum eſt per prophetam; Nonne cœlum & terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? & cœlum mihi ſedes, terra autem ſcabellum pedum meorum; & quod Salvator, cum ait, Non eſſe jurandum neque per cœlum, quia ſedes Dei eſt, neque per terram, quia ſcabellum pedum ejus. Sed & illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipſo vivimus & movemur & ſumus. Quomodo enim in Deo vivimus, & movemur, & ſumus, niſi quod in virtute ſuâ univerſum conſtringit & continet mundum? As our own body is made up*

L. 2. *c.* 1.

up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be look'd upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the Scripture in sundry places; as in that of the Prophet, Do not I fill heaven and earth? And again, heaven is my throne and the earth my foot-stool. And in that of our Saviour, Swear not at all, neither by heaven, because it is the throne of god, nor by the earth, because it is his foot-stool. And lastly, in that of Paul *to the Athenians, For in him we live, and move, and have our being. For how can we be said to live and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does constringe and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his foot-stool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth?* Nevertheless, God is here said by *Origen* to be but *quasi anima, as it were, the soul of the world:* as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be look'd upon, according to *Aristotle*'s notion thereof, merely as ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an *immoveable essence*; for then it is not conceiveable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffectible, inflexible, rocky and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, *quasi anima mundi, as it were the soul thereof:* though St. *Cyprian* would have this properly to belong to the third hypostasis, or person of the Christian Trinity, *viz.* the Holy Ghost. But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this notion of a mundane soul, besides something of Paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third divine hypostasis, cannot be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed thereinto, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one intire animal, each part whereof were incompleat alone by it self. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to *Origen* himself, we may learn from these words of his; *Solius Dei, id est, Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, naturæ, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, & absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere. It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, to subsist without any material substance, or body, vitally united to it.* Where *Origen* affirming, that all created souls, and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the Holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed) he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

περὶ ἀρχῶν, L. 1. c. 6.

And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, *the immediate soul of this mundane animal*, but only ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, *a supermundane soul*; that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus *Proclus* plainly affirmeth, not only of *Amelius*, but also of *Porphyrius* himself, who likewise pretended to follow *Plotinus* therein; μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συνᾴδειν, τὴν μὲν ψυκὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργὸν, τὸν δὲ νῶν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπέρραπται, τὸ αὐτοζῶον, ὡς εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ τοῦτον· *After* Amelius, Porphyrius *thinking to agree with* Plotinus, *calls the super-mundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof.* And though *Proclus* there makes a question, whether or no this was *Plotinus* his true meaning, yet *Porphyrius* is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, *Plotinus*, *Amelius*, and *Porphyrius*, the third hypostasis of the Platonick trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was δημιουργὸς, *the opificer and creator of the world*, and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, *the immediate soul* of this *mundane animal*, and another ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, *a supermundane soul*, which was the third in their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was *Plato*'s opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of laws he undertakes to prove, was ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, a *super-mundane soul*, and not the same with that ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, *that mundane soul*, whose *genesis*, or *generation*, is described in his *Timæus*; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because, in order of nature, before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the Cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be ποίημα and δημιουργούμενον, *a creature* and *thing made*; yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a super-mundane soul, and δημιουργὸν, not a creature, but the *creator* or *opificer* of the whole world.

In Tim. p. 93, 94.

And as for the second particular proposed; it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostases, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostases; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and

and animals. Which, beſides others, *Tertullian* in his book *de Anima* thus imputes to *Plato*: *Vult* Plato *eſſe quaſdam ſubſtantias inviſibiles, incorporeales, ſupermundiales, divinas, & æternas, quas appellat ideas, id eſt, formas & exempla, & cauſas naturalium iſtorum manifeſtorum, & ſubjacentium corporalibus; & illas quidem eſſe veritates, hæc autem imagines earum.* Plato *conceiveth, that there are certain ſubſtances, inviſible, incorporeal, ſupermundial, divine and eternal; which he calls Ideas, that is, forms, exemplars and cauſes of all theſe natural and ſenſible things; they being the truths, but the other the images.* Neither can it be denied, but that there are ſome odd expreſſions in *Plato*, ſounding that way, who therefore may not be juſtified in this, nor I think in ſome other conceits of his, concerning theſe ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of ſcience, but alſo the proper and phyſical cauſes of all things here below; as for example, that the ideas of ſimilitude and diſſimilitude are the cauſes of the likeneſs and unlikeneſs of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheleſs, it cannot be at all doubted, but that *Plato* himſelf, and moſt of his followers very well underſtood, that theſe ideas were, all of them, really nothing elſe but the *noëmata*, or conceptions, of that one perfect intellect, which was their ſecond hypoſtaſis; and therefore they could not look upon them in good earneſt, as ſo many diſtinct ſubſtances exiſting ſeverally and apart by themſelves out of any mind, however they were guilty of ſome extravagant expreſſions concerning them. Wherefore, when they called them οὐσίας, *eſſences or ſubſtances*, (as they are called in *Philo* ἀναγκαιότατα οὐσίαι, *the moſt neceſſary eſſences*,) their true meaning herein was only this, to ſignify, that they were not ſuch accidental and evanid things, as our conceptions are; they being the ſtanding objects of all ſcience, at leaſt, if not the cauſes alſo of exiſtent things. Again, when they were by them ſometimes called animals alſo, they intended only to ſignify thereby, that they were not meer dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and ſtatues. And thus *Amelius* [1] the philoſopher, plainly underſtood that paſſage of St. *John* the Evangeliſt, concerning the eternal λόγος, he pointing the words otherwiſe than our copies now do, ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, *that, which was made, in him was life:* this philoſopher gloſſing after this manner upon it, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν, καὶ ζωὴν, καὶ ὂν τετυκέναι, *in whom whatſoever was made, was living, and life, and true being.* Laſtly, no wonder, if from animals theſe ideas forthwith became gods too, to ſuch men as took all occaſions poſſible to multiply gods; in which there was alſo ſomething of that ſcholaſtick notion, *Quicquid eſt in Deo, eſt Deus; Whatſoever is in God, is God.* But the main thing therein was a piece of Paganick poetry; theſe Pagan theologers being generally poſſeſſed with that poetick humour of perſonating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were ſo many titular gods to many of the Platonick Pagans, yet did *Julian* himſelf, for example, who made the moſt of them, ſuppoſe them all συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν, *to co-exiſt with God and in-exiſt in him*, that is, in the firſt mind, or ſecond hypoſtaſis of their trinity.

P. 320. *Rig.*

So *Clem. Al. S. Cyril, S. Aug.* and other Latins.

Laſtly,

[1] Apud Euſeb. Præpar. Evangel. Lib. IX. cap. XIX. p. 540.

Laſtly, whereas *Proclus*, and others of the Platoniſts, intermingle many particular gods with thoſe three univerſal principles or hypoſtaſes, of their Trinity, as *Noes*, Minds, or Intellects ſuperiour to the firſt ſoul; and *Henades* and *Agathotetes*, Unities and Goodneſſes ſuperiour to the firſt Intellect too; thereby making thoſe particular beings, which muſt needs be creatures, ſuperiour to thoſe hypoſtaſes, that are univerſal and infinite, and by conſequence creaturizing of them: this hypotheſis of theirs, I ſay, is altogether abſurd and irrational alſo; there being no created beings eſſentially good and wiſe, but all by participation, nor any immoveable, natures amongſt them, whoſe οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, their *eſſence*, their *operation*; but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as *Origen* and others of the fathers add, lapſible and peccable. *Nulla natura eſt, quæ non recipiat bonum & malum, exceptâ Dei naturâ, quæ bonorum omnium fons eſt; & Chriſti ſapientia, ſapientiæ enim fons eſt, & ſapientia utique ſtultitiam recipere non poteſt; & juſtitia eſt, quæ nunquam profecto injuſtitiam capiet; & verbum eſt vel ratio, quæ utique irrationalis effici non poteſt; ſed & lux eſt, & lucem certum eſt, quod tenebræ non comprehendent. Similiter & natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ ſancta eſt, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel ſubſtantialiter ſancta eſt. Siqua autem alia natura ſancta eſt, ex aſſumptione hoc vel inſpiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut ſanctificetur, non ex ſuâ naturâ hoc poſſidens, ſed ut accidens; propter quod & decidere poteſt, quod accidit. There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good; and the wiſdom of Chriſt, for he is the fountain of wiſdom, and wiſdom it ſelf never can receive folly; he is alſo juſtice it ſelf, which can never admit of injuſtice; and the reaſon and word it ſelf, which can never become irrational; he is alſo the light it ſelf, and it is certain, that darkneſs cannot comprehend this light, nor inſinuate it ſelf with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghoſt is ſuch, as can never receive pollution, it being ſubſtantially and eſſentially holy. But whatſoever other nature is holy, it is only ſuch in way of participation and by the inſpiration of this Holy Spirit; ſo that holineſs is not its very nature and eſſence, but only an accident to it; and whatſoever is but accidental, may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodneſs and wiſdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly.* Which of *Origen*'s is all one, as if he ſhould have ſaid, there is no ſuch rank of beings as *Autoagathotetes*, eſſential goodneſſes, there being only one Being eſſentially good, or goodneſs it ſelf. Nor no ſuch particular created beings exiſting in nature, as the Platoniſts call *Noes* neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and eſſentially wiſe, or wiſdom itſelf, whoſe οὐσία is their ἐνεργεία, whoſe eſſence is their operation, and who conſequently have no flux at all in them, nor ſucceſſive action; (only the eternal Word and Wiſdom of God being ſuch) who alſo are abſolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that *Origen* did ſometimes make mention of Νόες, *minds* or *intellects*, but it was in another ſenſe, he calling all ſouls, as firſt created by God, and before their lapſe, by that name; which was as much as if he ſhould have ſaid, though

Περὶ ἀρχῶν, l. 1. c. 8. p. 685.

though ſome of the Platoniſts talk much of their *Noes*, yet is there nothing anſwerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only *Noes* really exiſting in nature, are unfallen, but peccable ſouls; he often concluding, that the higheſt rank of created Beings are indeed no better than thoſe, which the Platoniſts commonly call ψυχαὶ, or *ſouls*. By which ſouls he underſtood firſt of all, beings in their own nature ſelf-moveable and active; whereas the *Noes* of the Platoniſts are altogether immoveable and above action. And then again, ſuch beings or ſpirits incorporeal, as exiſt not abſtractly and ſeparately from all matter, as the *Noes* of the Platoniſts were ſuppoſed to do, but are vitally unitable to bodies, ſo as, together with thoſe bodies, to compound and make up one animal. Thus, I ſay, *Origen* conceived even of the higheſt angelical, and arch-angelical orders, that they were all of them ψυχαὶ, *ſouls*, united to bodies, but ſuch as were pure, ſubtile and ethereal: however, he ſuppoſed it not impoſſible for them to ſink down into bodies, more groſs and feculent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Chriſtian writers concurred with *Origen* herein, that the higheſt created ſpirits were no naked and abſtract minds, but ſouls clothed with ſome corporeal indument. Laſtly, *Origen*'s ſouls were alſo ſuppoſed to be, all of them, endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or *free-will*, and conſequently to be ſelf-improvable and ſelf-impairable; and no particular created ſpirits to be abſolutely in their own nature impeccable, but lapſible into vitious habits: whereas the Platonick *Noes* are ſuppoſed to be ſuch beings, as could never fall nor degenerate. And the generality of the Chriſtian writers ſeem'd to have conſented, or conſpired with *Origen* in this alſo, they ſuppoſing him, who is now the prince of devils, to have been once an angel of the higheſt order. Thus does St. *Jerome* [1] determine; *Solus Deus eſt, in quem peccatum non cadit; cætera, cùm ſint liberi arbitri, poſſunt in utramque partem ſuam flectere voluntatem. God is the only Being, that is abſolutely incapable of ſin; but all other beings, having free-will in them, may poſſibly turn their will to either way*; that is, to evil as well as to good. It is certain, that God, in a ſenſe of perfection, is the moſt free agent of all, neither is contingent liberty univerſally denied to him; but here it is made the only privilege of God, that is, of the Holy Trinity, to be devoid of *liberum arbitrium*, namely as it implieth imperfection, that is, peccability and lapſibility in it.

It is true, that ſome of the Platonick philoſophers ſuppoſe, that even in that rank of beings called by them *Souls*, though they be not eſſentially immutable, but all ſelf-moveable and active, yet there are ſome of them of ſo high a pitch and elevation, as, that they can never degenerate, nor ſink down into vitious habits. Thus *Simplicius* for one; ἀλλὰ αἱ μὲν πρῶται τῶν ψυχῶν, ἅτε πρωτεχῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοαγαθῶν παραχθεῖσαι, κἂν ἔχου τί πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὑφειμένον, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθότητες, ἀλλὰ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλὴν ὡς συγγενεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸ, συμφυῶς τε αὐτῷ καὶ ἀναπροσπάστως ὀρέγονται, καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν μονοειδῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τεταμένην ἔχουσι, ἀδέποτε ἀποκλίνασαι πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις αὐτ' ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν αἵρεσις, τάχα ἂν καὶ εἴη προαίρεσις ἐκείνοις; εἰ μήτις αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν ὡς τὰ πρῶτα. *In Epiſt. p.* 12, 13.

[1] Epiſtol. CXLI.

πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ αἱρεμένην καλοῖ· *But the firſt and higheſt of ſouls, which were immediately produced from what are eſſentially good, although they have ſome abatement in them, they being not goodneſſes eſſentially, but deſirous of good, nevertheleſs are they ſo near a-kin to that higheſt good of all, as that they do naturally and individualſively cleave to the ſame, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worſer. Inſomuch that if* Proæreſis *be taken for the chuſing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no ſuch thing as* Proæreſis *to be imputed to them, unleſs one ſhould call the chuſing of the firſt goods* Proæreſis. By theſe higher ſouls *Simplicius* muſt needs underſtand, either the ſouls of the ſun, moon and ſtars, or elſe thoſe of the ſuperiour orders of demoniack or angelick beings. Where though he make a queſtion, whether *Proæreſis* or *Deliberation* belong to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricous *liberum arbitrium* or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be ſaid of this, there ſeems to be no neceſſity at all for admitting that aſſertion of *Origen*'s, that all rational ſouls whatſoever, even thoſe of men and thoſe of the higheſt angelical orders, are univerſally of one and the ſame nature, and have no fundamental or eſſential difference in their conſtitution; and conſequently that all the difference, that is now betwixt them, did ariſe only from the difference of their demeanour, or uſe of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made ſuch by their merits; and human ſouls, though now ſunk ſo low, yet are not abſolutely uncapable of commencing angels, or aſcending to thoſe higheſt altitudes: as it is not impoſſible, according to him, neither, but that the higheſt angels alſo, the Seraphim and Cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but alſo ſink down into human bodies; his reaſon for which monſtrous paradox is only this, that the divine juſtice cannot otherwiſe well be ſalved, but God muſt needs be a προσωπολήπτης, *an accepter of perſons*, ſhould he have arbitrarily made ſuch vaſt differences amongſt intellectual beings. Which ground he alſo extendeth ſo far, as to the human ſoul of our Saviour Chriſt himſelf, as being not partially appointed to that tranſcendent dignity of its hypoſtatick union, but by reaſon of its moſt faithful adherence to the divine word and wiſdom, in a pre-exiſtent ſtate, beyond all others ſouls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the Scripture, *Quòd dilectionis perfectio, & affectus ſinceritas, ei inſeparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ità ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum perſonæ acceptione, animæ ejus aſſumptio, ſed virtutum ſuarum ſibi merito delata; audi ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dilexiſti juſtitiam & odiſti iniquitatem; propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ participibus tuis: dilectionis ergo merito ungitur oleo lætitiæ anima Chriſti, id eſt, cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Ungi namque oleo lætitiæ, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleri. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia ſpiritus ſicut prophetis ei data eſt, ſed ipſius verbi Dei in ea ſubſtantialis inerat plenitudo. That the perfection of love, and ſincerity of divine affection,*

Περὶ ἀρχῶν, l. 1. c. 6.

affection, procured to this ſoul its inſeparable union with the God-head, ſo that the aſſumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with proſopolepſy (the acception of perſons) but beſtowed upon it juſtly for the merit of its virtues; hear (ſaith he) *the prophet thus declaring to him, Thou haſt loved righteouſneſs and hated iniquity; therefore hath God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladneſs above thy fellows. The ſoul of Chriſt therefore was anointed with the oil of gladneſs, or made one with the Word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwiſe. For to be anointed with the oil of gladneſs here properly ſignifies nothing elſe, but to be repleniſhed with the Holy Ghoſt. But when it is ſaid, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy-Ghoſt beſtowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the ſubſtantial fulneſs of the Word of God dwelt in him.* But this reaſon of *Origen*'s ſeems to be very weak; becauſe if there be a rank of ſouls below human, ſpecifically differing from the ſame, as *Origen* himſelf muſt needs confeſs, (he not allowing the ſouls of brutes to have been human ſouls lapſed, as ſome Pythagoreans and Platoniſts conceited, but renouncing and diſclaiming that opinion, as monſtrouſly abſurd and irrational) there can be no reaſon given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of ſouls ſuperiour to thoſe of men, without the injuſtice of proſopolepſy; as, beſides *Simplicius*, *Plotinus* and the generality of other Platoniſts conceived.

But leaſt of all can we aſſent to *Origen*, when from this principle, that ſouls, as ſuch, are eſſentially endowed with *liberum arbitrium*, or *free will*, and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers thoſe endleſs circuits of ſouls upwards and downwards, and ſo makes them to be never at reſt, denying them any fixed ſtate of holineſs and happineſs by divine grace; ſuch as wherein they might be free from the fear and danger of ever loſing the ſame. Of whom St. *Auſtin*[z] therefore thus; *Illum & propter alia nonnulla, & maximè propter alternantes ſine ceſſatione beatitudines & miſerias, & ſtatutis ſeculorum intervallis ab iſtis ad illas, atque ab illis ad iſtas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immeritò reprobavit eccleſia; quia & hoc quod miſericors videbatur, amiſit, faciendo ſanctis veras miſerias, quibus pœnas luerent, & falſas beatitudines, in quibus verum ac ſecurum, hoc eſt, ſine timore certum ſempiterni boni gaudium non haberent. The church hath deſervedly rejected* Origen, *both for certain other opinions of his, and eſpecially for thoſe his alternate beatitudes and miſeries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, aſcents and deſcents of ſouls from one to the other, in reſtleſs viciſſitudes and after periods of time. For-aſmuch as hereby he hath quite loſt that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwiſe he ſeemed to have deſerved, by making ſo many true miſeries for the beſt of ſaints, in which they ſhould ſucceſſively undergo puniſhment and ſmart; and none but falſe happineſs for them, ſuch as wherein they could never have any true or ſecure joy, free from the fear of loſing that good, which they poſſeſs.* For this Origenical hypotheſis ſeems directly contrary to the whole tenour of the Goſpel, promiſing *eternal and everlaſting life* to thoſe, who believe in

[z] De Civitate Dei, Lib. XXI. cap. XVII. p. 481. Tom VIII. Oper.

Chriſt, and perſeveringly obey him; 1 *Joh.* ii. *This is the promiſe, that he hath promiſed us, even eternal life:* and *Tit.* i. 2. *In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lye, hath promiſed.* And, *God ſo loved the world, that he gave his only begotten ſon, that whoſoever believeth in him ſhould no periſh, but have everlaſting life:* and leſt all this ſhould be taken for a periodical eternity only, *John* iii. 26. *He, that believeth in me, ſhall never die.* And poſſibly this might be the meaning of St. *Paul*, 2 *Tim.* i. 10. when he affirmeth of our Saviour Chriſt, That *he hath aboliſhed death, and brought life and immortality to light, through the Goſpel*; not becauſe he was the firſt, who had diſcovered, and publiſhed to the world, the ſoul's immortality, which was believed before, not only by all the Phariſaick Jews, but alſo by the generality of Pagans too; but becauſe theſe, for the moſt part, held their endleſs circuits and tranſmigrations of ſouls: therefore was he the firſt, who brought everlaſting life to light, and gave the world aſſurance, in the faith of the Goſpel, of a fixed and permanent ſtate of happineſs, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained; *Him that overcometh will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he ſhall go no more out.* Apoc. iii. 12.

Now the reaſon, why we mentioned *Origen* here, was becauſe he was a perſon, not only thoroughly ſkilled in all the Platonick learning, but alſo one, who was ſufficiently addicted to thoſe dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindneſs for them; and therefore, had there been any ſolidity of reaſon for either thoſe particular *Henades* or *Noes* of theirs, created beings above the rank of ſouls, and conſequently, according to the Platonick hypotheſis, ſuperiour to the univerſal *Pſyche* alſo, (which was the third hypoſtaſis in their trinity, and ſeems to anſwer to the Holy Ghoſt in the Chriſtian;) *Origen* was as likely to have been favourable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifeſtly repugnant to reaſon, that there ſhould be any ſuch particular, that is, created *Henades*, and αὐτοαγαθότητες *eſſential goodneſſes*, ſuperiour to the Platonick firſt Mind; or any ſuch *Noes*, and αὐτοσοφίαι, *eſſential wiſdoms*, ſuperiour to their univerſal *Pſyche*; it being all one, as if, in the Chriſtian Trinity, beſides the firſt perſon, or the Father, one ſhould ſuppoſe a multitude of particular paternities ſuperiour to the ſecond; and alſo, beſides the ſecond perſon, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular ſons, or words, all ſuperiour to the third perſon, the Holy Ghoſt. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the creator and creature, together; and to ſuppoſe a company of ſuch creaturely gods, as imply a manifeſt contradiction in the very notion of them.

Wherefore, we ſhall here obſerve, that this was not the catholick doctrine of the Platonick ſchool, that there were ſuch *Henades* and *Noes*, but only a private opinion of ſome doctors amongſt them, and that of the latter ſort too. For firſt, as for thoſe *Henades*, as there are not the leaſt footſteps of them to be found any where in *Plato*'s writings, ſo may it be plainly gathered from them, that he ſuppoſed no ſuch thing. Foraſmuch as, in his ſecond

ſecond epiſtle, where he deſcribes his Trinity [1], he doth not ſay of the firſt, περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα, *about the firſt are the firſt*; as he doth of the ſecond, δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, and of the third, τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα, *about the ſecond are the ſecond*, and *about the third the third*: but of the firſt he ſaith, περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, *about the king of all things are all things, and for his ſake are all things; and he is the cauſe of all things, that are good.* Wherefore here are no particular *Henades* and *Autoagathotetes*, *Unities* and *Goodneſſes*, about the firſt Τὸ Ἕν and Τἀγαθὸν, *One* and *Good*; but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cauſe of all. Moreover *Plotinus*, throughout all his works, diſcovers not the leaſt ſuſpicion neither of theſe *Henades* and *Agathotetes*, this language being ſcarcely to be found any where in the writings of any Platoniſts ſenior to *Proclus*; who alſo, as if he were conſcious, that this *aſſumentum* to the Platonick theology were not ſo defenſible a thing, doth himſelf ſometime, as it were, tergiverſate and decline it, by equivocating in the word *Henades*, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps *Syneſius* alſo uſes the word, in his firſt hymn, when God is called by him

Ἑνοτήτων ἑνὰς ἀγνὴ,
Μονάδων μονάς τε πρώτη,

The firſt Henad of Henades, and the firſt Monad of Monades; that is, *the firſt idea of good, and cauſe of all the ideas.* And as for the particular *Noes*, Minds or Intellects, theſe indeed ſeem to have crept up ſomewhat before *Plotinus* his time; he, beſides the paſſage before cited, elſewhere giving ſome intimations of them, as *Enn.* 6. *l.* 4. *c.* 4. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῦς πολλοί; *But how can there be many ſouls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia?* From which, and other places of his, *Ficinus* concluded *Plotinus* himſelf really to have aſſerted, above the rank of ſouls, a multitude of other ſubſtantial beings, called νόες or νοῦς, *Minds* or *Intellects*. Nevertheleſs, *Plotinus* ſpeaking of them ſo uncertainly, and making ſuch an union betwixt all theſe *Noes* and their particular reſpective ſouls, it may well be queſtioned, whether he really took them for any thing elſe but the heads and ſummities of thoſe ſouls; he ſuppoſing, that all ſouls have a mind in them, the participation of the firſt Mind; as alſo unity too, the participation of the firſt Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both: δεῖ νῶν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦ ἀρχὴν, καὶ αἰτίαν, καὶ θεοῦ· ὥσπερ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμεῖς ἐφαπλόμεθα, καὶ σύνεσμεν, καὶ ἀνηρτήμεθα ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ, οἷ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ· *There muſt needs be mind in us, as alſo the principle and cauſe of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but becauſe, though remaining in himſelf, yet he is alſo conſidered in many, as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itſelf, yet is it alſo in every line drawn from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And* *Enn. l.* 5. *c.* 11. [Lib. I. p. 492.]

[1] P. 707. Oper.

by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him. And in the next chapter he adds, ἔχοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀργοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τὰ πολλὰ· οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰεὶ, νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, &c. *That though we have these things in us, yet do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; Mind, and that which is before Mind, Unity; but every thing, which is in our souls, is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose our selves towards it, &c.* Where *Plotinns* seems to make the *Noes*, or *Minds*, to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of *Porphyrius*, who was well acquainted with *Plotinus* his philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these *Noes* or *Intellects*, as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are no where plainly mentioned by *Plato*, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, (before mentioned) his *second about the second things, or second things about the second*; yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonick, or rather Pseudo-Platonick trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favour of the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason it self, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares, how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepred, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But it is already manifest, that all the forementioned depravations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, and that spurious trinity, described, (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical, in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon *Plato* himself, nor yet upon all his followers universally. But on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that *Plato* and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine Cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First therefore we affirm, that *Plato* himself does, in the beginning of his *Timæus*, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them, after this manner[1]: Ἔστις οὖν δὲ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ

[1] Cap. XII. p. 235. Edit. Fabricii.

τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν· τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν· πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι· *We being here to treat concerning the univerſe, judge it neceſſary to begin with a diſtinction, betwixt that, which always is, and hath no* ortus *or generation; and that, which is made, but never truly is. The former of which, being always like it ſelf and the ſame, is comprehenſible by intellection with reaſon, or is the object of knowledge; the latter of them, that which is made and periſheth, but never truly is, is not properly knowable, but opinable only, or the object of opinion, together with irrational ſenſe. Now every thing, that is made, muſt of neceſſity be made by ſome cauſe.* The reaſon, why *Plato*, being to treat of the univerſe, begins here with this diſtinction, was, as *Proclus*[1] well obſerves, becauſe, ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκειται, τὸ εἶναί τι ἀεὶ ὄν· *it is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonſtrable, that there muſt be ſomething eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning.* And it is evident by ſenſe and experience, that all things are not ſuch, but that ſome things are made and periſh again, or generated and corrupted. Now the latter Platoniſts, being ſtrongly poſſeſſed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered ſtrange violence to *Plato*'s text in this place, and wreſted his words to quite a different ſenſe from what he intended; as if by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, *that which is made*, he did not at all mean that, which had a beginning, but only that, whoſe duration is flowing and ſucceſſive, or temporary, which might notwithſtanding be without beginning; and as if he ſuppoſed the whole corporeal world to be ſuch, which though it hath a ſucceſſive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran ſo ſtrong this way, that even *Boetius*, that learned Chriſtian philoſopher, was himſelf alſo carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted likewiſe, that *Plato* held the eternity of the world in this ſenſe, that is, its being without beginning: *Non rectè quidam* (ſaith he) *qui cum audiunt viſum* Platoni *mundum hunc nec habuiſſe initium temporis, nec habiturum eſſe defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coæternum putant. Aliud eſt enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo* Plato *tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexum eſſe præſentiam; quod divinæ mentis proprium eſſe manifeſtum eſt. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, ſed ſimplicis potius proprietate naturæ. Some, when they hear* Plato *to have held, that the world had no beginning, nor ſhall never have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that* Plato *therefore made the world co-eternal with God, becauſe it is one thing always to be, and another thing, to poſſeſs an endleſs life all at once, which is proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in reſpect of time, but only in reſpect of the ſimplicity of his nature.* To which purpoſe he adds afterwards, *Itaque ſi digna rebus nomina velimus imponere,* Platonem *ſequentes, Deum quidem æternum, mundum verò dicemus eſſe perpetuum. Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following* Plato, *we ſhould ſay, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual.* But as this doctrine of the latter Platoniſts quite fruſtrates *Plato*'s deſign in this place,

Conſol. Phil. l. 5. Pro. 6.

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. I. p. 10.

place, which was to prove or assert a God, because if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, *ortum*, or *that which is made*, he did not understand only that, whose duration is successive, but also τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχον, *that which had a beginning of its generation*, and τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενον, *that which begun from a certain epocha of time*; or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that *Plato* there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very *Timæus* of his, that *Time it self was not eternal*, or *without beginning*, but *made together with the heaven or world*; and from thence does he infer, that there must of necessity be another eternal being, *viz.* such as hath both a permanent duration, and was without beginning, and was the cause both of time and the world: forasmuch as nothing can possibly be made without a cause; that is, nothing, which once was not, could of it self come into being, but must be produced by some other thing; and so at last we must needs come to something, which had no beginning. Wherefore *Plato*, thus taking it for granted, that whatsoever hath a temporary and flowing duration, was not without beginning; as also that whatsoever was without beginning, hath a *permanent duration* or *standing eternity*; does thus state the difference betwixt uncreated and created beings, or betwixt God and creature; namely, that creature is that, whose duration being temporary or successive, once had a beginning; and this is his τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, οὐν δὲ ὐδέποτε, *that which is made, but never truly is*, and that which ὑπ' αἰτίου τινος ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται, *must of necessity be produced by some cause*; but that whatsoever is without beginning, and hath a permanent duration, is uncreated or divine; which is his τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ ὐκ ἔχον, *that which always is, and hath no generation, nor was ever made.* Accordingly as God is styled in the septuagint translation of the Mosaick writings, ὁ Ὤν, *he that truly is.*

Now as for this ἀίδιος οὐσία or Φύσις, *this eternal nature*, which always is, and was never made, *Plato* speaks of it, not singularly only, as we Christians now do, but often in the paganick way plurally also; as when, in this very *Timæus*, he calls the world τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα, *a made or created image of the eternal gods.* By which eternal gods he there meant doubtless that τὸ πρῶτον, and τὸ δεύτερον, and τὸ τρίτον, *that first*, and *second*, and *third*, which, in his second epistle to *Dionysius*, he makes to be the principles of all things; that is, his trinity of divine hypostases, by whose concurrent efficiency, and according to whose image and likeness, the whole was made; as *Plotinus* also plainly declareth in these words of his before cited, ὅτος μὲν ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος, ἑστηκότων μὲν τῶ πρώτῳ καὶ τῶ δευτέρῳ, καὶ τῶ τρίτῳ· *This world is an image always iconized, or perpetually renewed* (as the image in a glass is) *of that first, second, and third principle, which are always standing*; that is, fixed in eternity, and were never made. For thus *Eusebius* records,

cords, that the ancient interpreters of *Plato* expounded this firſt, ſecond and third of his in the forementioned epiſtle, of a *trinity of Gods*; ταῦτα οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν πειρώμενοι, ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπίτε τὸ Δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ Τρίτον τὴν τῦ κόσμυ Ψυχὴν, Θεὸν Τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὁριζόμενοι εἶναι· *Theſe things do the interpreters of* Plato *refer to the firſt God, and to the ſecond cauſe; and to the third the ſoul of the world, they calling this alſo the third God.* Wherefore we think there is good reaſon to conclude, that thoſe eternal or uncreated gods of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, whoſe image or ſtatue this whole generated or created world is ſaid by him to be, were no other than his trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, the makers or creators thereof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly gueſſed, that *Cicero* alſo was to be underſtood of the ſame eternal Gods, as Platonizing, when he affirmed; *A diis omnia à principio facta, That all things were at firſt made by the gods*; and *à providentiâ deorum mundum & omnes mundi partes conſtitutas eſſe; That the world and all its parts were conſtituted by the providence of the gods*[1]. *Pr. Ev. l. 11. c. 20. [p. 541.]*

But that the ſecond hypoſtaſis in *Plato*'s trinity, *viz.* Mind or Intellect, though ſaid to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the firſt called *Tagathon*, the *Good*, was notwithſtanding unqueſtionably acknowledged to have been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by many expreſs teſtimonies of the moſt genuine Platoniſts: but we ſhall here content our ſelves only with two, one of *Plotinus* writing thus concerning it; *Enn. 5. l. 1. c. 6.* ἐκποδὼν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω γένεσις ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ποιυμένοις, &c. *Let all temporal generation here be quite baniſhed from our thoughts, whilſt we treat of things eternal, or ſuch as always are, we attributing generation to them only in reſpect of cauſality and order, but not of time.* And though *Plotinus* there ſpeak particularly of the ſecond hypoſtaſis or *Nous*, yet does he afterwards extend the ſame alſo to the third hypoſtaſis of that trinity, called *Pſyche*, or the mundane ſoul; which is there ſaid by him likewiſe to be the word of the ſecond, as that ſecond was the word of the firſt; Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος Νῦ, Νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρειττόνων ἁπάντων Νῦς, ὅτι τἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν, οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νῦ, καὶ ἐνέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος· *That which is generated from what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, becauſe mind is the beſt of all things, and every thing elſe is after it, and junior to it, as Pſyche or Soul, which is in like manner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as Mind is the word and energy of the firſt good.* The other teſtimony is of *Porphyrius*, cited by St. *Cyril* out of the fourth book of his philoſophick hiſtory, where he ſets down the doctrine of *Plato* after this manner; εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τῦ Ἀγαθῦ ὅτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τύτυ τρόπον τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νῦν γενέσθαι τε ὅλου καὶ ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ δὴ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα ὑσία τῶν ὄντων· ὃ δὲ καὶ πρώτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτοκαλὸν, παρ' ἑαυτῦ τῆς καλοποιῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος· προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ' αἰτίυ τῦ Θεῦ ὡρμημένος, αὐτογένητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· ὁ γὰρ ἐκείνυ κινηθεὶς πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τύτυ ἡ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τύτυ παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ Θεῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ ἐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος χρονικῆς, ἔπω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν· ἀλλὰ ὁδὲ χρόνυ γενομένυ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστί τι ὁ χρόνος, *S. Cyril. C. Jul. l. 1. p. 32.*

[1] Plat. Timæ. p. 529. Oper.

νος, ἄχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νᾶς· Plato *thus declareth concerning the first good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by it self, are contained the things, that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude it self, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own-parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time; nor when time was afterwards made, did it any way affect him; for Mind is always timeless, and alone eternal.* Here, besides the eternity of Mind or Intellect, the second divine hypostasis in the Platonick trinity, there are other strange and unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledged to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet is it called αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτογένητος, its *own-parent*, and its *own-offspring*, and said to have sprung out αὐτογόνως, *self-begottenly.*

Now because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is worth the while to consider its true meaning and the ground thereof; which is thus declared by *Porphyrius.* Mind, though it *sprung from the first good* or *supreme Deity* from *eternity*, yet is it said to be *self-begotten*, because it did not spring from that, as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always standing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delivered by *Plotinus* after this manner; ὁ κινηθέντος φατέον γίγνεσθαι, εἰ γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτῷ τι γίνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γινόμενον μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο, καὶ ὁ δεύτερον· δεῖ δὴ ἀκινήτου ὄντος, εἴτι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτὸ, ὁ προσνεύσαντος, ὅδε βληθέντος, ὅδε ὅλως κινηθέντος, ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. *That, which was immediately generated from the first, did not proceed from it as any ways moved towards its generation, because then it would not have been the second, but the third after that motion. Wherefore if there be any second after that first good, it must needs proceed from that first, as remaining immoveable, and not so much as actively consenting thereto, nor willing it, which would be motion.* Now this in *Porphyrius* his language is paraphrased to be, a being produced from the first good or original Deity, αὐτογόνως, *self-begottenly*, or in a way of self-genration. But the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this, that though this second divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from the first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely, or in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof, or by a particular *fiat* of the supreme Deity, but by way of natural and necessary emanation. Neither was *Porphyrius* singular in this language, we finding the very same expression, of αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, *self-parent* and *self-begotten*, in *Jamblichus* his mysteries; where it is likewise by him applied not to the first principle of all, but to a second divine hypostasis [1], ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτογονος. *From this one, the self-sufficient God made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he called* Sui-Pater, *and* Seipso-genitus *his own father, and self-begotten.* But of this God or divine hypostasis in *Jamblichus* more afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as this in the Christian Trinity, because we

En. 5. *l.* 1. *c.* 6. [p. 487.]

[1] Jamblich. de Mysteriis Ægyptior. Sect. VIII. cap. II. p. 158.

we have no warrant for it from the ſcripture; though we are not ignorant that ſome late divines have ventured to call the Chriſtian *Logos* after the ſame manner αὐτοθεου, and *ex ſeipſo Deum, God from himſelf*.

Dionyſius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of *Arius*, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been produced into being; ſubjoins theſe words; *In ea verò profeſſione, quod ſuprà memoravi, planiſſimè conſtat, germanum Platonicum Arium extitiſſe. From the profeſſion of this doctrine, it is moſt undeniably manifeſt (what was before affirmed) that* Arius *was a german or genuine diſciple of* Plato's. But from what we have now cited out of *Plato* himſelf, and others of his moſt genuine followers, it is certain, that *Petavius* (though otherwiſe learned and induſtrious) was herein groſly miſtaken, and that *Arius* was no Platoniſt at all. And indeed for either *Plato* or *Plotinus* to have denied the eternity of that ſecond hypoſtaſis of his, called *Nous*, or *Logos*, and the ſon of the firſt, would have been all one as if they ſhould have denied the eternity of Wiſdom and Underſtanding itſelf; becauſe, according to them, this ſecond hypoſtaſis is eſſentially nothing but αὐτοσοφία, *original Wiſdom it ſelf*, and conſequently, that very Wiſdom, by which God himſelf is wiſe. Which how far, or in what ſenſe it is true, we do not here diſpute. Nevertheleſs, *Athanaſius* ſeems to have been fully of the ſame opinion with them herein, from this paſſage of his; Καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀληθειά ἐστιν ὁ Κύριος, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄλλης σοφίας δεύτερος, ἀλλὰ μόνος ὅτου δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν ὁ πατὴρ, &c. *Our Lord is both wiſdom and truth, neither is he ſecond from any other wiſdom; but it is he alone, by whom the Father made all things.* And again, ὅτε γὰρ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ λόγου πατὴρ, *for the Father of the Word is not properly himſelf the Word.* And οὐκ ἦν Λόγος ὁ τὸν Λόγον προέμενος, ἦν γὰρ ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Σοφία γεγέννηλαι ὁ Κύριος· οὐκ ἦν οὖν σοφία ὁ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείς· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην, φησὶν, ᾗ προσέχαιρεν· *That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wiſdom, therefore that was not Wiſdom, which produced Wiſdom, that ſpeaks thus of her ſelf, His delight was with me.* But thoſe latter words he citeth with approbation out of *Dionyſius* Biſhop of *Alexandria*. And the ſame *Athanaſius* affirmeth *Arius*, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wiſdom ſenior to that Word and Wiſdom in our Saviour Chriſt. To conclude, no Platoniſt in the world ever denied the eternity of that *Nous*, or *univerſal Mind*, which is the ſecond hypoſtaſis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already obſerved, ſome of them ſeemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, its *own parent* and its *own off-ſpring*, as that which was ſelf-begotten, though this but in a certain myſtical ſenſe; they otherwiſe not denying it to have proceeded alſo, from the firſt good, and to be the off-ſpring thereof. Wherefore *Plato*, who ſuppoſed the world not to have been eternal, aſſerting the eternity of that ſecond hypoſtaſis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to *Athanaſius* his own doctrine, εἰ ἀΐδιός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς, οὐκ ἦν

De Trin. l. 1. c. 8 § 2. [Tom II. Dogmat. Theolog. p. 38.]

De Sent. Dion. Tom. 1. p. 567.

Page 119. [Tom I. Oper in Diſput. cum Ario.

ἦν κτίσμα, εἰ δὲ κτίσμα τυγχάνει, οὐκ ἦν ἀΐδιος. *If the Son be eternal, he was no creature; and, on the contrary, if he be a creature, he was not eternal.*

Neither is there any force at all in that teſtimony of *Macrobius* [1], which *Petavius* urgeth to the contrary; wherein the firſt Cauſe is ſaid *de ſe mentem creaſſe, to have created Mind from it ſelf*; and again this Mind, *animam ſe creaſſe, to have created from it ſelf ſoul*; becauſe it is certain, that theſe antient Pagans did not then ſo ſtrictly confine that word *creare*, (as we Chriſtians now do) to that narrow ſenſe and notion, of the production of things in time; but uſed it generally for all manner of production or efficiency. But the chief ground of *Petavius*'s miſtake herein, beſides his prejudice againſt Platoniſm in general, was his not diſtinguiſhing betwixt that ſpurious trinity of ſome Platoniſts, wherein the third hypoſtaſis was the whole animated world, (which gave him occaſion to write thus, *Tertius verò Deus manifeſtè creatus ab iiſdem Platonicis putatur, quem & ποίημα nominant*;) and that other doctrine of thoſe, who made it not to be the world it ſelf, that is a creature, but the opificer or creator thereof.

But we grant, that there may be ſome more reaſon to make a queſtion, whether *Plato* himſelf held the eternity of the mundane ſoul (commonly ſaid to be the third hypoſtaſis of his trinity) or no; becauſe in his *Timæus*, though he acknowledged it to be ſenior to the world, yet does he ſeem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheleſs, it is no way probable, that *Plato*'s third principle of all things, in his epiſtle to *Dionyſius*, and that *Pſyche*, or *Soul* of his, which is the only God, that in his tenth *de Legibus* he goes about to prove againſt the Atheiſts, ſhould ever not have been; and therefore it is moſt reaſonable to compound this buſineſs, thus, by ſuppoſing, with *Plotinus* and others, that *Plato* held a double Pſyche, or ſoul, one ἐγκόσμιον, or *mundane*, which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a ſecond, or created God; another ὑπερκόσμιον, *ſupramundane*, or ſeparate; and which is not ſo much the form, as the artificer of the world. The firſt of which two *Plotinus*, calling it the heavenly *Venus*, thus deſcribeth; τὴν δὲ

Enn. 3. *l.* 5. c. 2 [p. 293] οὐρανίαν λεγομένην, ἐκ Κρόνου νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου, μείνασαν ἄνω ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν, μήτε ἐθελήσασαν, μήτε δυναμένην, ὅτι ἦν φύσεως μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φύσαν βαίνειν. Κωφὴν οὖσαν τινὰ ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν· ὅθεν αὐτὴν τοῦτο ἠνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι ἣν δὲ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὖσαν, καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, &c. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νᾶ ἐξηρτημένη πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτᾶ, ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον· ἑφεπομένη δὲ τῷ Κρόνῳ, ἤ εἰ βούλει τῷ παῖδι τοῦ Κρόνου οὐρανῷ, ἐνήργησε τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ὠκείωθη, καὶ ἐραθεῖσα ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε. *This heavenly* Venus, *which they affirm to have been begotten from* Saturn, *that is, from a perfect Mind or Intellect, muſt needs be that moſt divine ſoul (the third archical hypoſtaſis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, ſo that it neither can, nor will ever deſcend down to theſe lower things, ſo as to be immerſed in them; it being of ſuch*

[1] In Somn. Scipion. Lib. I. cap. XIV. p. 73.

ſuch a nature, as is not inclinable to ſink, or lapſe downward. A certain ſeparate ſubſtance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherleſs; and therefore may it well be ſtyled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to paſs, that this ſoul can never fall, it being much more cloſely united and connected with that immoveable Mind or Intellect, than that light, which is circumfuſed about the ſun, is connected with the ſun. This Venus *therefore following* Chronus, *or rather the father of* Chronus, Uranus, *acting towards it, and being enamoured with it, begat love,* Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες, τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα. *Moreover, as we call this ſoul it ſelf ſeparate, ſo is this love of it, or begotten by it, a ſeparate love.* After which, he ſpeaks of another ſoul of the world, which is not ſeparate from it, but cloſely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower *Venus* and Love; namely, that other *Venus*, which in the fable is ſaid to have been begotten from *Jupiter* himſelf (the ſuperior ſoul of the world) and *Dione*, a watry nymph. We conclude therefore, that though this lower mundane ſoul, might, according to *Plato*, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it; yet that other ſuperiour and moſt divine ſoul, which *Plotinus* calls the heavenly *Venus* and Love, the ſon of *Chronus* without a mother, and which was truly the third hypoſtaſis of *Plato*'s trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the forementioned principle of *Athanaſius*, none of theſe three hypoſtaſes of *Plato*'s trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.

Which to make yet more evident, we ſhall further obſerve, firſt, that *Plato* himſelf, in that ſecond epiſtle of his to *Dionyſius*, after he had mentioned his firſt, ſecond and third; that is, his trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, immediately ſubjoins theſe words: Ἡ ἓν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὀρέγεται μαθεῖν ποῖ ἄττα ἐστι, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὐτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς ἔχει· τὸ δὲ βασιλέως πέρι, καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο· *The mind of man* (as parturient,) *has always a great deſire to know what theſe things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate to it, which are all inſufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, ſecond and third, which I ſpake of, there is nothing of this kind*; that is, nothing like to theſe created things.

Secondly, the three hypoſtaſes of *Plato*'s trinity are not only all eternal, but alſo neceſſarily exiſtent, and abſolutely undeſtroyable. For the firſt of them can no more exiſt without the ſecond, nor the firſt and ſecond without the third, than original light can exiſt without its ſplendour, coruſcation, or effulgency. And *Plotinus*, writing againſt ſome Gnoſticks in his time, who would make more of theſe divine hypoſtaſes, or principles, than three, concludes, that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner;

ὁ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προτεταμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ *Enn.* 2 *l.* 9 *c.* 1.
νοῦν πρώτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν· αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τίθεσθαι [p. 199]
ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω· εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταυτὸ φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐδείχθη πολλαχῆ. λειπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν

τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τούτων, &c. *Wherefore we ought not to entertain any other principles, but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind, or the supreme Intellect next after it, and then the universal Soul in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles,* (or universal principles) *nor yet fewer than these three. For he, that will contract the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse from one another, hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be,* &c.

Thirdly, as all these three Platonick hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, *contain and comprehend the whole world under them,* and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them infinite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called, by Platonick writers, ἀρχαὶ and αἴτια, and δημιουργοὶ, *principles,* and *causes,* and *opificers* of the whole world. First, as for Νοῦς, *Mind,* or *Understanding*; whereas the old philosophers before *Plato,* as *Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c.* and *Aristotle* after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magick or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind,

Ὃν πρῶτον κλήιζεσκαι ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν,

That, *Mind is generally by all men look'd upon, as the first and highest God: Plato* considering, that Unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, an *Intelligible* before *Intellect*; so that knowledge could not be the first; and lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple Good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first divine hypostasis; and Mind or Intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his *Philebus* [1], though he agrees thus far with those other ancient philosophers, ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς Νοῦς ἄρχει, *that Mind always rules over the whole universe*; yet does he add afterwards, ὅτι Νοῦς ἐστι γενοῦς της τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, *that Mind is* (*not absolutely the first principle,* but) *cognate with the cause of all things*; and that therefore it rules over all things, with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is *Tagathon,* or the *Highest Good:* Where, when *Plato* affirms, that Mind, or his second divine hypostasis, is γενούς της with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is συγγενὴς, and ὁμοειδὴς, and ὁμογενὴς, with it; all which words are used by *Athanasius,* as synonymous with ὁμοούσιος, *co-essential,* or *con-substantial.* So that *Plato* here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of *Arius,* but with that of the Nicene council, and *Athanasius*; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not ἑτερούσιος,

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[1] Oper. p. 30. Edit. Ficini.

ετερούσιος, but γενέτης or ὁμοούσιος, *co-eſſential* or *con-ſubſtantial* with the firſt; and therefore not a creature.

And then, as for the third hypoſtaſis, called *Pſyche*, or the ſuperiour mundane ſoul, *Plato* in his *Cratylus*, beſtowing the name of *Zeus*, that is, of the ſupreme God upon it, and etymologizing the ſame from ζῆν, adds theſe words concerning it; ὃ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅτις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων· *There is nothing, which is more the cauſe of life to us and other animals, than this prince and king of all things; and that therefore God was called by the Greeks* Zeus, *becauſe it is by him, that all animals live.* And yet that all this was properly meant by him of the third hypoſtaſis of his trinity, called *Pſyche*, is manifeſt from thoſe words of his that follow; where he expounds the poetick mythology before mentioned, making *Zeus* to be the ſon of *Chronos*; εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία, *It is agreeable to reaſon, that* Zeus *ſhould be the progeny or offſpring of a certain great mind.* Now ἔκγονος and γενέτης are equivalent terms alſo; and therefore *Plato* here makes the third hypoſtaſis of his trinity likewiſe to be ὁμοούσιος, *co-eſſential* with the ſecond; as he elſewhere made the ſecond co-eſſential with the firſt.

It is true, that by the δημιουργὸς, or *Opificer* in *Plato*, is commonly meant Nous or Intellect, his ſecond hypoſtaſis; (*Plotinus* affirming as much, δημιουργος ὁ νοῦς Πλάτωνι, *The* Demiurgus *to* Plato *is Intellect.*) Nevertheleſs, both *Amelius*, and *Plotinus*, and other Platoniſts, called his third hypoſtaſis alſo δημιουργὸν, *the artificer* or *opificer* of the whole word; ſome of them making him to be the ſecond from Mind or Intellect; others the third from the firſt Good, the ſupreme cauſe of all things; who was by *Atticus* and *Amelius* ſtyled *Demiurgus* alſo. Wherefore, as was before ſuggeſted, according to the genuine and ancient Platonick doctrine, all theſe three hypoſtaſes were the joint-creators of the whole world, and of all things beſides themſelves; as *Ficinus* more than once declares the tenour thereof, *Hi Tres uno quodam conſenſu omnia producunt, Theſe three with one common conſent produce all things*; and before him *Proclus* [1], πάντα ἀνήρτηται τοῦ ἑνὸς διὰ νοῦ μὲν καὶ ψυχῆς, *All things depend upon the firſt One, by Mind and Soul*; and accordingly we ſhall conclude in the words of *Porphyrius*, that the true and real Deity, according to *Plato*, extends to three divine hypoſtaſes, the laſt whereof is *Pſyche* or Soul.

Enn. 5 *l.* 1. [cap. VIII. p. 489.]

In Plot. Enn. 1. *l.* 2.

From all which it appears, that *Arius* did not ſo much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and *Athanaſius*; who notwithſtanding made not *Plato*, but the Scripture, together with reaſon deducing natural conſequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonick trinity was a certain middle thing alſo betwixt the doctrine of *Sabellius* and that of *Arius*, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or meer modes, but a trinity of hypoſtaſes; nor yet a jumbled confuſion of God and creature (things heterouſious)

[1] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. 1. p. 66.

ousious) together; neither the second nor third of them being creatures, or made in time, but all eternal, infinite, and creators.

But that it may yet more fully appear, how far the most refined Platonick and Parmenidian, or Pythagorick trinity, doth either agree, or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent, and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus *Plotinus*, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the second in the Platonick trinity, and answers to the Son or Word in the Chri-

Enn. 5. *l.* 1. *c.* 6. [p. 487.] stian; Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ ἑαυτῷ γεννᾷ. Τί οὖν χρὴ περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννᾶν, ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν; Μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν Νοῦς καὶ Δεύτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ Νοῦς ἐκεῖνον, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτου οὐδέν. Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ, νοῦν εἶναι· Καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων ὁ Νοῦς, ὅτι τἄλλα μετ' αὐτόν. Οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά τις. *That which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it generates, is always less than it self. What shall we therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being of all? Does that produce nothing from it self? or rather does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now the greatest of all things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is Mind or Intellect; and this is second to it. For Mind beholdeth this as its father, and standeth in need of nothing else besides it: whereas that first principle standeth in need of no mind or intellect. What is generated from that, which is better than mind, must needs be mind or intellect; because mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of nature after it and junior to it; as* Psyche *it self, or the first soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and energy of the first good.* Again, the same is more particularly declared by him, concerning the third hypostasis called *Psyche*, that as it essentially dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way infe-

P. 489. riour to it. Ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ Νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα, γεννᾶν ἔδει, καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὖσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι· Κρεῖττον δὲ οὐχ οἷόντε ἦν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ ὄν, εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ· *Perfect Intellect generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power could not remain steril. But that, which is here begotten also, cannot be greater than its begetter; but must needs be inferiour to it, as being the image thereof.* Elsewhere the same philosopher, calling the first hypostasis of this trinity *Uranus*, the second *Chronos*, and the third *Zeus*, (as *Plato* had done before)

P. 554. [Ennead. V. lib VIII. cap. XIII.] and handsomly allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning *Chronos*, or the second of these; μεταξὺ ὢν πατρός τε ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἥττονος υἱέος, *That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferiour.*

P. 513. [Ennead. V. lib III. cap. XVI.] Again, the same thing is by that philosopher thus asserted in general, ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ

πρὸς

πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν· *In the things generated from eternity, or produced by way of natural emanation, there is no progreſs upwards, but all downwards, and ſtill a gradual deſcent into greater multiplicity.* We ſhall cite but only one paſſage more out of this philoſopher, which containeth ſomething of argumentation in it alſo: οὐ ταυτὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνε ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὖν μὴ ταυτὸν, οὐδέγε βέλτιον· *That which is generated, or emaneth, immediately from the firſt and higheſt Being, is not the very ſame thing with it, as if it were nothing but that repeated again and ingeminated; and as it is not the ſame, ſo neither can it be better than it.* From whence it follows, that it muſt needs be gradually ſubordinate and inferiour to it. *En* 5. *l.* 3. *c.* 15. [*p.* 512.]

Which gradual ſubordination and eſſential dependence of the ſecond and third hypoſtaſes upon the firſt is by theſe Platonicks illuſtrated ſeveral ways. *Ficinus* reſembles it to the circulations of water, when ſome heavy body falling into it, its ſuperficies is depreſſed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. *Alius* (ſaith he) *ſic fermè profluit ex alio, ſicut in aqua circulus dependet à circulo; one of theſe divine hypoſtaſes doth in a manner ſo depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another.* Where it is obſervable alſo, that the wider the circulating wave grows, ſtill hath it the more ſubſidence and detumeſcence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at laſt all becomes plain and ſmooth again. But, by the Pagan Platoniſts themſelves, each following hypoſtaſis is many times ſaid to be ἴχνος καὶ τύπος, *a print, ſtamp* or *impreſſion*, made by the former, like the ſignature of a ſeal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them, εἰκὼν, and εἴδωλον, and μίμημα, *an image*, and *repreſentation*, and *imitation*; which if conſidered in *Audibles*, then will the ſecond hypoſtaſis be look'd upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the ſecond and third hypoſtaſes were but certain replications of the firſt original Deity with abatement; which though not accidental or evanid ones, but ſubſtantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual ſubordination. Or if it be conſidered in *Viſibles*, then will the ſecond hypoſtaſis be reſembled to the image of a face in a glaſs, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glaſs, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or elſe the ſecond and third may be conceived as two *Parhelii*, or as a ſecond and third ſun. For thus does [z] *Plotinus* call the *univerſal Pſyche*, or third hypoſtaſis, εἰκόνα νοῦ σώζουσάν τι φῶς ἐκείνε, *the image of Mind* (which is the ſecond) *retaining much of the ſplendour thereof.* Which ſimilitude of theirs, notwithſtanding, they would not have to be ſqueezed or preſſed hard; becauſe they acknowledge, that there is ſomething of diſſimilitude in them alſo, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glaſs is ſaid ἑτέρε εἶναι, eſſentially to belong to ſomething elſe, and to depend upon it; ſo each following hypoſtaſis doth eſſentially depend upon the former or firſt, and hath a ſubordination to it. But we meet with no expreſſion in any of theſe Pagan Platoniſts ſo unhandſome and offenſive, as that of *Philo*'s, in his

3 ſecond

[z] Ennead. V. lib. I. cap. VI. p. 487.

second book of allegories [1], σκία δὲ θεοῦ ὁ Λόγος αὐτός ἐστιν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει, *The Word is the shadow of God, which he made use of, as an instrument, in the making of the world.* Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, a *second God*, and *the son of the first God.* As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is it self the archetype of other things, αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκία, καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα, ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον, ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος, ἣν σκιὰν νυνὶ κέκληκα, ἕτως ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλο γίνεται παράδειγμα· *This shadow and as it were image (of the first God) is it self the archetype and pattern of other things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow;) so is this image it self another pattern or paradigm also.* But this dependence and subordination of the divine hypostases is most frequently illustrated in Platonick writings, by the ἔκλαμψις or ἀπαύγασμα, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies; the *Nous*, or second hypostasis being resembled to that radious effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus *Plotinus*, πῶς δ' ἂν καὶ τὶ δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένου, περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίῳ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν, ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος· *How should we consider this second hypostasis, otherwise than as the circumfused splendour, which encompasseth the body of the sun; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated a-new.*

P. 48. [Ennead. V. lib. I. cap. VI]

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostases, in the Platonick trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters, which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be Ἓν πρὸ πάντων, *one before all things*; a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as *Plotinus* writes, οὕτως εἶχε πάντα ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ· *This so containeth all things, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason:* that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and fecund power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by *Parmenides*, Ἓν πάντα, *one actually all things*; that is, in their distinct ideas. And the third, according to the same philosopher, as *Plotinus* [2] tells us, was Ἓν καὶ πάντα, *one and all things*; as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectively all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly, the first of these is sometimes said to be Πάντα ἑνικῶς, *all things unitively*; the second Πάντα νοερῶς, *all things intellectually*; and the third, Πάντα ψυχικῶς, *all things animally*; that is, self-moveably, actively and productively. Again, the first of these is commonly styled Τ'ἀγαθὸν, *the*

P. 515. [Ennead. V. lib. III. cap. XV.]

[1] P. 79. Oper. [2] Ennead. V. lib. I. cap. VIII. p. 490. Oper.

the Good, or Goodneſs itſelf, above Mind and Underſtanding, and alſo ὑπερούσιον, *above eſſence*, ineffable and incomprehenſible. And ſometimes alſo φῶς ἁπλοῦν, *a ſimple light*; the ſecond Νοῦς, Λόγος, Σοφία, *Unity and Goodneſs* only by participation, or Ἀγαθοειδής, *Boniform*, but eſſentially and formally; Mind, or Underſtanding, Reaſon and Wiſdom, all-comprehending, or infinite Knowledge. The third, Ψυχή, *Self-moveable Soul*; Goodneſs and Wiſdom by participation, but eſſentially and formally, infinite Self-activity, or Effectiveneſs; infinite, active, perceptive and animadverſive power. Sometimes it is ſtyled alſo Ἀφροδίτη and Ἔρως, *Venus* and *Love*; but differently from that of the Firſt Good, which is Love too; but a Love of redundancy, or overflowing fulneſs and fecundity: οὗ γὰρ τέλειον, τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, μὴ δὲ δεῖσθαι, οἷον ὑπερερρύη, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε πάντα, *That which being abſolutely perfect, and ſeeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant redundancy produced all things.* Whereas this latter is a Love of infinite activity. Of the firſt, it is ſaid, by *Plotinus*, that it is ἀνενέργητος, *above all manner of action*, for which cauſe, the making of the world is not properly aſcribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of *Numenius*, Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστι χρεὼν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦτο δημιουργοῦντος Θεοῦ (τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι) χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ νομίζεσθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον Θεοῦ· *Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the firſt God, but rather to account him the father of that God, who is the artificer.* Who again ſpeaks further to the ſame purpoſe thus; τὸν μὲν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ξυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα· *It is to be acknowledged, that the firſt God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the king of all things.* Of the ſecond, to whom the energy of intellection is attributed, it is ſaid, notwithſtanding, that his οὐσία is his ἐνέργεια, his *eſſence* his *operation*; and that he is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, though a *multiform*, yet an *immoveable nature.* He therefore is properly called the *Demiurgus*, as the *contriving architect, or artificer*, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the firſt paradigm, or pattern of the whole univerſe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity, τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον (as *Plotinus* ſpeaks) καὶ νοῦ φῶς, καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου· *That, which moveth about Mind, or Intellect, the light or effulgency thereof, and its print or ſignature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it.* This is that, which reduces both the fecundity of the firſt ſimple Good, and alſo the immoveable wiſdom and architectonic contrivance of the ſecond into act or energy. This is the immediate, and, as it were, manuary Opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντὸς, *that which actually governs, rules and preſideth over all. Amelius*, in that paſſage of his before cited out of *Proclus*, calling theſe three divine hypoſtaſes three Minds, and three Kings, ſtyles the firſt of them, Τὸν ὄντα, *Him that is*; the ſecond Τὸν ἔχοντα, *Him that hath*; and the third Τὸν ὁρῶντα, *Him that beholds.* In which expreſſions, though peculiar to himſelf, he denotes an eſſential dependence, and gradual ſubordination in them.

Plot. 494. [Ennead. V. Lib II. cap. I.]

Euſ. Pr. Ev. l. 11. *c.* 18. [p. 537.]

Now that which is moſt liable to exception, in this Platonick ſcale, or gradation of the Deity, ſeems to be the difference betwixt the firſt and the ſecond. For whereas the eſſential character of the ſecond is made to

be underſtanding, reaſon and wiſdom, it ſeems to follow from hence, that either the firſt and the ſecond are really nothing elſe but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame thing; or elſe, if they be diſtinct hypoſtaſes, or perſons, that the firſt of them muſt needs be ἄνους and ἄλογος, *devoid of mind, reaſon* and *wiſdom*; which would be very abſurd. To which, all the reply we can make, is as follows: Firſt, that this is indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonick and Pythagorick theology, (which yet ſeems to have been firſt derived from *Orpheus* and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themſelves) that whereas the Pagan Theologers generally concluded, νοῦν πάντων πρεσβύτατον, *That Mind and Underſtanding, properly ſo called, was the oldeſt of all things*, the higheſt principle and firſt original of the world; thoſe others placed ſomething above it, and conſequently made it to be not the firſt, but the ſecond. Which they did chiefly upon theſe three following grounds. Firſt, becauſe underſtanding, reaſon, knowledge and wiſdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwiſe than ſo as to contain ſomething of multiplicity in them; whereas it ſeems moſt reaſonable to make the firſt principle of all, not to be number or multitude, but a perfect *Monad*, or *Unity*. Thus *Plotinus*, ἀόριστον μὲν νόησις ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὁριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς. διὸ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλά, &c. *Intellection, as well as viſion, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore it is ſaid, that ideas, as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity; and ſuch is intellect, which conſequently is not ſimple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is underſtood, and that which underſtands.* And again elſewhere, τὸ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου νοητοῦ, οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε κόσμος νοητός, ἁπλούστερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολύ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὗ πολλοῦ, &c. *The principle of every thing is more ſimple than the thing it ſelf. Wherefore the ſenſible world was made from Intellect, or the Intelligible; and before this, muſt there needs be ſomething more ſimple ſtill. For many did not proceed from many; but this multiform thing Intellect proceeded from that, which is not multiform, but ſimple, as number from unity.* To this purpoſe does he alſo argue in theſe words, εἰ τὸ νοῦν τι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοεῖν μὴ εἶναι· ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖν, καὶ νοῦς ἔσται· *If that which underſtands be many, or contain multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly underſtand; and this is the firſt thing: but intellection and knowledge properly ſo called are to be placed among things, which follow after it, and are ſecond.* And he often concludes, ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ Φύσει εἶναι τὸ γινώσκειν· *That knowledge (properly ſo called, by reaſon of its multiplicity) belongs to the ſecond rank of being, and not the firſt.* Another ground or reaſon is, becauſe, in order of nature, there muſt be Νοητὸν before Νους, ſomething *Intelligible* before *Intellect*; and from hence does *Plotinus* conclude, τὸ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον, οὔτε τῷ εἶναι, οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεύτερον, καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ γενόμενον ἐκίνητε πρὸς αὐτὸ, &c. *That to underſtand is not the firſt, neither in eſſence, nor in dignity, but the ſecond; a thing in order of nature, after the firſt Good, and ſpringing up from thence, as that which is moved with deſire towards it.* Their third and laſt ground or reaſon is, becauſe intellection and knowledge are not the higheſt

P. 518. [Ennead. V. Lib. IV. cap II.]

P. 514. [Ennead. V. Lib. III. cap. XVI.]

P. 535. [Ennead. V. Lib. VI cap. III.]

P. 536.

highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superiour to Intellect. Which consideration *Plato* much insisteth upon, in his sixth book *De Republica*. Now upon these several accounts do the Platonists confidently conclude, ὅτι Θεὸς κρείττων Λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παραχὼν ταῦτα οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα· *That the supreme Deity is more excellent and better than the* Λόγος (*Reason, or the Word*) *Intellect and Sense, he affording these things, but not being these himself.* And τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἦν δηλονότι οὐ Λογος· πῶς ἂν ἐξ οὐκ λόγου Λόγος· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοείδες ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ· *That, which was generated from the first principle, was* Logos (*Word or Reason*) *manifold; but the first principle it self was not Word: if you demand therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is boniform, from goodness it self.* With which Platonick and Pythagorick Doctrine exactly agreeth *Philo* the Jew also[1], ὁ πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου, Θεὸς κρείσσων ἐστιν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις, τῷ δὲ ὑπερ τὸν πάντων ἐν τῇ βελτίσῃ καὶ τινι ἐξαιρέτῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέᾳ, οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γένητον ἐξομοιωθῆναι· *That God which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit, that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that, which is originally from it self and above all.* And indeed, we should not have so much insisted upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration, that we have for all the Scripture-mysteries; which scripture seems to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or Off-spring of God the Father. And *Athanasius*, as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonick notion, when he denies, that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any *Reason* or *Wisdom*, before that Word and Son of God, which is the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. What then? shall we say, that the first hypostasis, or person in the Platonick trinity, (if not the Christian also,) is ἄνους and ἄλογος, *senseless* and *irrational*, and altogether devoid of Mind and Understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of mysterious atheism; and under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the same? For why might not sensless matter, as well be supposed to be the first original of all things, as a sensless, incorporeal being? *Plotinus* therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to *Plato*'s text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being, as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge and reason, but also above essence it self, (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and Goodness substantial) and consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or post-nate thing, though eternal; but notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity

Plot. p. 512. [Ennead. V. Lib. III. cap. XIV.]

P. 514. [Cap. XVI.]

[1] Apud Euseb. Præpar. Evang. Lib. VII cap. XIII. p. 323.

only, (whoſe ſimple original light he reſembles to the luminous body of the ſun it ſelf;) the latter of them to the ſecond hypoſtaſis, as being the ἔκλαμψις or ἀπαύγασμα, the *circumambient fulgor*, or *outſhining ſplendour* of that ſun. Thus *Enn.* 5. *l.* 6. *c.* 4. [1] τὸ παρέχον τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν, *That from which this multiform light of* Νοῦς *or Intellect* (the ſecond hypoſtaſis,) *is derived*, is φῶς ἁπλοῦν, *another moſt ſimple light*. As he elſewhere accordingly writeth of the firſt principle, or ſupreme Deity, that it is ἐν νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν, *in knowledge or underſtanding, but of a different kind from that underſtanding of the ſecond hypoſtaſis, called Intellect*. Sometimes again, this philoſopher ſubtilly diſtinguiſheth betwixt νοήσις αὐτὴ, *intelligence itſelf*, and τὸ νοοῦν, or τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· *That which doth underſtand*, or *which hath intelligence in it*; making the firſt principle to be the former of theſe two, and the ſecond hypoſtaſis of their trinity to be the latter: οὐδ' ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο ἓν πάλιν αὖ, ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνηται· τοῦτο δὴ διδυμὴ δύο· *Intelligence it ſelf doth not underſtand, but that which hath intelligence. For in that, which doth underſtand, there is a kind of duplicity. But the firſt principle of all hath no duplicity in it.* Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that, which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him, that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence it ſelf, as being not the ſame; or elſe of him, and the τὸ νοητὸν, *the intelligible*, or *object of his intellection*; Intellect ſuppoſing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this ſubtilty would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth underſtand, or hath intelligence, ἔνδεες τὸ νοοῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν, *That which underſtandeth is indigent as that which ſeeth*. But perhaps this difficulty might be more eaſily ſolved, and that according to the tenour of the Platonick hypotheſis too, by ſuppoſing the abatement of their ſecond hypoſtaſis to conſiſt only in this, that it is not eſſentially τ'ἀγαθὸν, *Goodneſs it ſelf*, but only ἀγαθοειδὴς, *boniform*, or *good by participation*; it being eſſentially no higher than Νοῦς, Λόγος and Σοφία, *Mind*, *Reaſon* and *Wiſdom*; for which cauſe it is called by thoſe names, as the proper characteriſtick thereof. Not as if the firſt were devoid of wiſdom, under pretence of being above it; but becauſe this ſecond is not eſſentially any thing higher. As in like manner, the third hypoſtaſis is not eſſentially wiſdom it ſelf, ſtanding or quieſcent, and without motion or action; but wiſdom as in motion, or wiſdom moving and acting.

P. 537.

The chief ground of this Platonick doctrine of an eſſential dependence, and therefore gradual ſubordination, in their trinity of divine hypoſtaſes, is from that fundamental principle of their theology, that there is but one Original of all things, and μία πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, *only one Fountain of the Godhead*; from whence all other things whatſoever, whether temporal or eternal, created or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore this ſecond hypoſtaſis of their trinity, ſince it muſt accordingly derive its whole being from the firſt, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the φῶς, *the ſplendour* from the *original light*, muſt of neceſſity have alſo an eſſential dependence

[1] P. 536.

dependence upon the ſame; and conſequently, a gradual ſubordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their ſecond hypoſtaſis to have been begotten from their firſt, and their third from their ſecond; yet do they by no means underſtand thereby any ſuch generation as that of men; where the father, ſon and grandſon, when *adulti* at leaſt, have no eſſential dependence one upon another, nor gradual ſubordination in their nature, but are all perfectly co-equal, and alike abſolute. Becauſe this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from that, which didbeget,but from God and nature; the begetter being but either a channel or an inſtrument, and having been himſelf before begotten or produced by ſome other. Whereas the firſt divine hypoſtaſis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the ſole principle and original of all things, and therefore muſt the ſecond needs derive its whole eſſence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the ſun; and conſequently, though co-eternal, have an eſſential dependence on him, and gradual ſubordination to him.

Moreover, the Platoniſts would recommend this their gradation in the deity, or trinity of hypoſtaſes ſubordinate, from hence; becauſe by this means there will not be ſo vaſt a chaſm and hiatus betwixt God and the higheſt creatures, or ſo great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwiſe there muſt needs be. Nor will the whole Deity be ſkrewed up to ſuch a diſproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether uncapable of having any intercourſe or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypotheſis of theirs, brought down by certain ſteps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one ſimple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently repreſented to be; then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it ſhould contain the diſtinct ideas of all things within it ſelf, and that multiform platform and paradigm of the created univerſe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immoveable mind; as *Ariſtotle*'s God is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, *an abſolutely immoveable ſubſtance*, whoſe eſſence and operation are one and the ſame; and, as other theologers affirm, that *whatſoever is in God, is God*; it would be likewiſe utterly unconceivable, not only, how there ſhould be any liberty of will at all in God, (whereas the ſame theologers, contradicting themſelves, zealouſly contend notwithſtanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not neceſſary, and but few of them ſuch,) but alſo, how the Deity ſhould have any commerce or intercourſe with the lower world; how it ſhould quicken and actuate the whole, be ſenſible of all the motions in it, and act *pro re natâ* accordingly; all which the inſtincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without raſing the very foundations of all religion, ſince it would be to no more purpoſe, for men to make their devotional addreſſes to ſuch

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an immoveable, inflexible, and unaffectible Deity, than to a ſenſeleſs adamantine rock. But theſe difficulties (as the Platoniſts pretend) are all removed by that third hypoſtaſis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phænomena of the deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though ſeemingly repugnant and claſhing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and ſolved by this trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſubordinate.

Laſtly, they pretend alſo, that according to this hypotheſis of theirs, there may be ſome reaſonable ſatisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are ſo many divine hypoſtaſes, and why there could be no more: whereas according to other ways, it would ſeem to have been a meer arbitrary buſineſs; and that there might have been either but one ſolitary divine hypoſtaſis, or but a duality of them; or elſe they might have been beyond a trinity, numberleſs.

The ſecond thing, which we ſhall obſerve concerning the moſt genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity, is this; that though theſe philoſophers ſometimes called their three divine hypoſtaſes, not only τρεῖς φύσεις, *three natures*, and *three principles*, and *three cauſes*, and *three opificers*, but alſo *three Gods*, and a firſt, and ſecond, and third God; yet did they often, for all that, ſuppoſe all theſe three to be really one Θεῖον, one *Divinity*, or *Numen*. It hath been already proved from *Origen* and others, that the Platoniſts moſt commonly called the animated world the *ſecond God*, though ſome of them, as for example *Numenius*, ſtyled it the *third God*. Now thoſe of them, who called the world the ſecond God, attributed indeed (not more, but) leſs divinity to it, than thoſe, who would have it to be the third God. Becauſe theſe latter ſuppoſed, that ſoul of the world to be the third hypoſtaſis of their trinity; but the other taking all theſe three divine hypoſtaſes together, for one ſupreme and firſt God, called the world the ſecond God; they ſuppoſing the ſoul thereof to be another ſoul inferiour to that firſt Pſyche, which was properly their third hypoſtaſis. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they ſhould have called the animated world the fourth God; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a ſecond God, they intimated, that though thoſe three divine hypoſtaſes were frequently called three gods, yet were they notwithſtanding, really all but one Θεῖον, *Divinity* or *Numen*; or, as *Plotinus* ſpeaks, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, *the divinity which is in the whole world*. Thus when God is ſo often ſpoken of in *Plato* ſingularly, the word is not always to be underſtood of the firſt hypoſtaſis only, or the *Tagathon*, but many times plainly of the πρῶτον, and δεύτερον, and τρίτον, the *firſt*, and *ſecond* and *third* all together; or that whole divinity, which conſiſteth or is made up of theſe three hypoſtaſes. And this will further appear from hence, becauſe when the whole world is ſaid in *Plato* to be the image of the eternal gods, as alſo by *Plotinus*, of the firſt, ſecond and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glaſs is; this is not to be underſtood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was ſeverally pro-

duced or created by one of thoſe three; nor yet can it be conceived, how there could be three really diſtinct creations of one and the ſame thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by thoſe three divine hypoſtaſes; it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in *Plato* and *Plotinus*, the lives and ſouls of all animals, (as ſtars, dæmons and men) are attributed to the third hypoſtaſis, the firſt and great *Pſyche*, as their fountain and cauſe after a ſpecial manner; accordingly as in our Creed, the Holy Ghoſt is ſtyled *the Lord and giver of life*; this is not ſo to be underſtood, as if therefore the firſt and ſecond hypoſtaſes were to be excluded from having any cauſality therein. For the firſt is ſtyled by *Plato* alſo, αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, *The cauſe of all good things*; and therefore doubtleſs chiefly of ſouls: and the ſecond is called by him and others too, αἴτιον and δημιουργὸς, *the cauſe and artificer of the whole world.* We conclude therefore, that ſouls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of theſe three hypoſtaſes ſubordinate, they are all really but one and the ſame God. And thus it is expreſly affirmed by *Porphyrius* in St. *Cyril*[1], ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θεῖα προελθεῖν οὐσίαν· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, τὸν δημιουργὸν· τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῆ κόσμε ψυχήν· ἄχρι γὰρ ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν· *That the eſſence of the divinity proceeds or propagates it ſelf (by way of deſcent downwards) unto three hypoſtaſes or ſubſiſtences. The higheſt God is the* Tagathon, *or ſupreme Good; the ſecond next after him is the* Demiurgus *ſo called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the Soul of the world, that is the third: for the divinity extendeth ſo far as to this ſoul.* Here we plainly ſee, that though *Porphyrius* calls the three divine hypoſtaſes three Gods; yet does he at the very ſame time declare, that ἡ θεία οὐσία and θεότης, *the eſſence of the Godhead* and *the Divinity* extends it ſelf to all theſe three hypoſtaſes, including the third and laſt alſo, (which they call the *mundane ſoul*) within the compaſs of it. And therefore that even according to the Porphyrian theology it ſelf, which could not be ſuſpected to affect any compliance with Chriſtianity) the three hypoſtaſes in the Platonick trinity are ὁμοούσιοι, *co-eſſential*, both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. *Cyril* himſelf alſo acknowledging as much; where he writeth thus of the Platoniſts[2], τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι ἢ αὐτοὶ, ἢ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τῦ Θεοῦ προτήκειν ἰχυρισάμενοι· *That ſuppoſing three hypoſtaſes, which have the nature of principles (in the univerſe,) they extend the eſſence of God to all theſe three hypoſtaſes.*

Indeed many conceive, that the Platoniſts making the three hypoſtaſes of their trinity to be thus gradually ſubordinate one to another, could not, for that very reaſon, acknowledge them to be one divinity: but the Platoniſts themſelves do upon this very account, and no other, declare all theſe three to be one divinity, becauſe they have an eſſential dependence and gradual ſubordination in them; the ſecond being but the image of the firſt, and the third the image both of the firſt and ſecond. Whereas, were theſe three ſuppoſed to be perfectly co-equal, and to have no eſſential dependence one upon another,

[1] Contra Julian. lib. VIII. p. 271. [2] Ibid. p. 270.

another, they could not by theſe Platoniſts be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate Gods, having only a generical or ſpecifical identity; and ſo no more one, than three men are one man: a thing, which the Platonick theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconſiſtent with the perfect monarchy of the univerſe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the ſupreme God and firſt Cauſe. For example, ſhould three ſuns appear in the heaven all at once, with co-equal ſplendour, and not only ſo, but alſo be concluded, that though at firſt derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike abſolute and independent; theſe three could not ſo well be thought to be one ſun, as three that ſhould appear gradually differing in their ſplendour, two of them being but the *Parhelii* of the other, and eſſentially depending on it; foraſmuch as the ſecond would be but the reflected image of the firſt, and the third but the ſecond refracted. At leaſt thoſe three co-equal ſuns could not ſo well be thought to be one thing, as the ſun, and its firſt and ſecondary ſplendour, (which can neither be beheld without the ſun, nor the ſun without them) might be accounted one and the ſame thing

The Platoniſts, therefore, firſt of all ſuppoſe ſuch a cloſe and near conjunction betwixt the three hypoſtaſes of their trinity, as is no where elſe to be found in the whole world. To this purpoſe *Plotinus*, ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν, ὡ χωριστὸν, θεὸς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν· ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ· πόθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνοι, τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἢ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι· *Intellect is ſaid to behold the firſt good; not as if it were ſeparated from it, but only becauſe it is after it, but ſo as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and ſoul. Every thing, which is begotten, deſires and loves that, which begat it; eſpecially when theſe two (that which begat, and that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing beſides them. Moreover, when that which begot, is abſolutely the beſt thing, that, which is immediately begotten from it, muſt needs cohere intimately with it, and ſo as to be ſeparated from it only by alterity.* Which is all one as if he ſhould have ſaid, that theſe three divine hypoſtaſes are ſo intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are *tantum non, only not*, the very ſelf ſame. Again, the Platoniſts further declare, that theſe three hypoſtaſes of their trinity are ἀδιαίρετοι, *abſolutely indiviſible* and inſeparable, as the ἀπαύγασμα is ἀδιαίρετον from the φῶς, *the ſplendour indiviſibly conjoined with the light* or *ſun*. Which ſimilitude alſo *Athanaſius* often makes uſe of to the ſame purpoſe. Thirdly, theſe Platoniſts ſeem likewiſe to attribute to their three divine hypoſtaſes juſt ſuch an Ἐμπεριχώρησις, *circuminſeſſion*, or mutual in-being, as Chriſtians do. For as their ſecond and third hypoſtaſes muſt needs be in the firſt, they being therein virtually contained; ſo muſt the firſt likewiſe be in the ſecond and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or it ſelf gradually diſplayed and expanded. But to ſpeak particularly, the firſt muſt needs be in the ſecond, the *Tagathon* in the *Nous*; and ſo both of them really one and the ſame God; becauſe the common notions of all mankind attribute underſtanding and

En. 5. *l.* 1 *c.* 6. [p. 488.]

and Wiſdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of *Plato*, *Plotinus*, and others, the Deity does not properly underſtand any where but in the ſecond hypoſtaſis, which is the Mind and Wiſdom of it. And the *Emperichoreſis* of the ſecond or third hypoſtaſes, was thus intimated by *Plato* alſo; Σοφία μὴν καὶ Νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει, βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. Where having ſpoken of that divine Wiſdom and Mind, which orders all things in the world, he adds; *But Wiſdom and Mind can never be without ſoul*, (that is, cannot act without it:) *wherefore, in the nature of* Jupiter, *is at once contained both a kingly Mind, and a kingly Soul.* Here he makes *Jupiter* to be both the ſecond and third hypoſtaſes of his trinity, *Nous* and *Pſyche*; and conſequently thoſe two to be but one God. Which *Nous* is alſo ſaid to be both the γενότης, i. e. *of the ſame kind*, and co-eſſential with the firſt cauſe of all things. To conclude; as that firſt Platonick hypoſtaſis, which is it ſelf ſaid to be above Mind and Wiſdom, is properly wiſe and underſtanding in the ſecond; ſo do both the firſt and the ſecond move and act in the third. Laſtly, all theſe three hypoſtaſes, *Tagathon*, *Nous* and *Pſyche*, are ſaid by the Platoniſts to be one Θεῖον, or *Divinity*; juſt in the ſame manner as the centre, immoveable diſtance, and moveable circumference of a ſphere, or globe, are all eſſentially one ſphere. Thus *Plotinus* expreſly, writing of the third hypoſtaſis, or *Pſyche*; σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ψυκὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλῳ προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ, εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρου αὐξηθεὶς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον· ἕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα, εἰ τ'αγαθὸν τις καὶ τὸ κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε· *For this* Pſyche, *or third hypoſtaſis, is a venerable and adorable thing alſo; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indiſtant diſtance*, (foraſmuch as it is no corporeal thing.) *For theſe things are juſt ſo, as if one ſhould make the* Tagathon, *or firſt Good, to be the centre of the univerſe; in the next place, Mind, or Intellect to be the immoveable circle, or diſtance; and laſtly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference; acted by Love, or Deſire.* Theſe three Platonick hypoſtaſes therefore, ſeem to be really nothing elſe but infinite Goodneſs, infinite Wiſdom, and infinite active Love and Power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as ſubſtantial things, that have ſome kind of ſubordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one Θεῖον, or *Divinity*, juſt as the centre, immoveable diſtance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one ſphere.

Phileb. p. 30. [p. 80]

P. 409. [Enn. IV. Lib. IV. Cap. XVI.]

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonick and Parmenidian or Pythagorick trinity; from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeth or diſagreeth with the Chriſtian. Firſt therefore, though ſome of the latter Platoniſts have partly miſunderſtood, and partly adulterated that ancient Cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the Creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite polytheiſm; yet did *Plato* himſelf, and ſome of his genuine followers (though living before Chriſtianity) approach ſo near to the doctrine thereof, as in ſome manner to correſpond therewith, in thoſe three fundamentals before mentioned. Firſt, in not

making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the ſame thing; but a trinity of hypoſtaſes, or ſubſiſtences, or perſons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypoſtaſes to be creatures, but all eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent and univerſal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world: which is all one, in the ſenſe of the ancients, as if they ſhould have affirmed them to be *Homoouſian*. Laſtly, in ſuppoſing theſe three divine hypoſtaſes, however ſometimes paganically called three gods, to be eſſentially one Divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianiſm is commonly ſuppoſed to approach nearer to the truth of Chriſtianity than Photinianiſm, ſo is Platoniſm undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianiſm; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabellianiſm, which in general was that mark, that the Nicene council alſo aimed at.

Notwithſtanding which, there is a manieſt diſagreement alſo betwixt the Platonick Trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Chriſtian church; conſiſting in a different explication of the two latter points mentioned. Firſt, becauſe the Platoniſts dreamed of no ſuch thing at all, as one and the ſame numerical eſſence, or ſubſtance, of the three divine hypoſtaſes. And ſecondly, becauſe, though they acknowledged none of thoſe hypoſtaſes to be creatures, but all God; yet did they aſſert an eſſential dependence of the ſecond and third upon the firſt, together with a certain gradual ſubordination; and therefore no abſolute co-equality. And this is the true reaſon, why ſo many late writers have affirmed Platoniſm to ſymbolize with Arianiſm, and the latter to have been indeed nothing elſe but the ſpawn of the former; merely becauſe the Platoniſts did not acknowledge one and the ſame numerical eſſence, or ſubſtance of all their three hypoſtaſes, and aſſerted a gradual ſubordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account ſome of the ancients alſo have done the like, as particularly St. *Cyril* (*contra Jul. lib.* 1.) he writing thus concerning *Plato*; P. 34. Τεθεώρηκε μὲν ὐ ὐχ ὑγιῶς εἰσάπαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ Ἀρείᾳ πεφρονηκόσιν, ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, κὴ ὑφίςησιν, ὑποκαθεμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποςάσεις εἰσφέρει· Plato *did not thorougly perceive the whole truth of the trinity, but, in like manner with thoſe who follow* Arius, *divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced ſubordinate hypoſtaſes:* as elſewhere the ſame pious father alſo taxes the Platoniſts, for not declaring the three hypoſtaſes of their trinity to be, in his ſenſe, *Homo-ouſian*, that is, *abſolutely co-equal.* But though we have already proved, that Platoniſm can by no means be confounded with Arianiſm, becauſe it directly confronted the ſame in its main eſſentials, which were, *Erat quando non erat*, or the ſecond hypoſtaſis being made ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων, together with its being mutable and lapſable; ſince, according to Platoniſm, the *Nous* is eſſentially both eternal and immutable: yet that the moſt refined Platoniſm differed from the now received doctrine of the Chriſtian church, in reſpect of its gradual ſubordination, is a thing ſo unqueſtionably evident, as that it can by no means be diſſembled, palliated, or excuſed.

Over

Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of *Plato*'s followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus *Plotinus* himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, he subjoins immediately, ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, ἢ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῇς, λαβὼν κεκαθαρμένην, εὑρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον ὃ ἦν ψυχή· *That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one* (saith he) *will consider it as in it self, pure and naked, or stript from all things adventitious to it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable.* Agreeably whereunto doth this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul πρεσβυτέραν ἢ ἀδελφήν, that is, *but the elder sister of our human souls.* Which, as it rankly savours of philosophick pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of that third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be ὁμοειδὴς, *of the same kind* or *species*, with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only ὁμότιμος, *of like honour and dignity*, but also, in the language of the Christian church, ὁμοούσιος, *co-essential* with our human souls, (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in *Athanasius*, is said to be ὁμοούσιος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *co-essential with us men.*) From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls divine. Wherefore, unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them, to suppose that first eternal Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom, which was the Architect or *Demiurgus* of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover, these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the informing soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their polytheism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry) that is, for their cosmo-latry, astro-latry, and demono-latry. For thus much is plainly intimated in this following passage of *Plotinus*, διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος ὅδε θεός· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεὸς ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τἆλλα ἄστρα· *This whole corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods.* Where he afterwards adds, τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι, ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι· *That which is to these gods, or goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs it self be the elder god, or goddess.* So that this third hypostasis of the Platonick Trinity, called the mundane soul, is but a kind of sister goddess with the souls of the sun, moon

Enn. 5. *l.* 1. *c.* 2. [p. 483.]

Tom 1. *p.* 557. [Libro de Sententiâ Dionys.]

P. 483. [Ennead. V. Lib. I. Cap. II.]

and ſtars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddeſſes by her. Where there is a confuſed jumble of things contradictious together; that Soul of the world being at once ſuppoſed to be a ſiſter to other ſouls, and yet, notwithſtanding, to deify them; whereas this ſiſterly relation and conſanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane Soul, which is their third God, or divine hypoſtaſis, than advance and deify thoſe particular created ſouls. Here therefore we ſee the inconvenience of theſe Platonick βαθμοὶ, *ſtories*, ſtairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abuſed to creature-worſhip and idolatry, when the diſtances are made ſo wide, and the loweſt of the Deity is ſuppoſed to differ but gradually only from the higheſt of created beings. And becauſe *Porphyrius* trode in *Plotinus* his footſteps here, as elſewhere, this was, in all probability, the true reaſon, why the Arians (as *Socrates* recordeth [1]) were by *Conſtantine* called Porphyrianiſts; not becauſe their trinities were exactly the ſame, but becauſe *Arius* and *Porphyrius* did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foundation for creature-worſhip and idolatry. But nevertheleſs, all this (as many other things) was but heedleſly and inadvertently written by *Plotinus*; he, as it were, drouſily nodding all the while, as it was alſo but ſupinely taken up by *Porphyrius* after him: it being plainly inconſiſtent with the genuine tenour of both their hypotheſes, thus to level the third hypoſtaſis of the trinity with particular created ſouls, and thereby to make ſo diſproportionate a diſtance, and ſo vaſt a chaſm, betwixt it and the ſecond. For *Plotinus* himſelf, when in a more ſober mood, declares, that third hypoſtaſis not to be the immediate, informing ſoul of the corporeal world, but a higher ſeparate ſoul, or ſuperiour *Venus*, which alſo was the *Demiurgus*, the *maker*, both of other ſouls, and of the whole world. As *Plato* had before expreſly affirmed him to be the Inſpirer of all life, and Creator of ſouls, or the Lord and Giver of life: and likewiſe declared, that amongſt all thoſe things, which are ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς συγγενῆ, *congenerous and cognate with our human ſouls*, there is οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, *nothing any where to be found at all like unto it.* So that *Plato*, though he were alſo a ſtar-worſhipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probability would he not at all have approved of *Plotinus* his ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, *our ſouls being of the ſame ſpecies with that third hypoſtaſis of the divine triad*; but rather have ſaid, in the language of the Pſalmiſt, *It is he that hath made us, and not we our ſelves; we are his people, and the ſheep of his paſture.*

Notwithſtanding all which, a Chriſtian Platoniſt, or Platonick Chriſtian, would, in all probability, apologize for *Plato* himſelf, and the ancient and moſt genuine Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, after this manner. Firſt, that ſince they had no ſcriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their ſteps in the darkneſs of this myſtery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any ſcrupuloſity, every one according to his own private apprehenſions; it is no wonder at all

[1] Vide Lib. I. Cap. IX. p. 32.

all, if they did not only ſpeak, many times unadviſedly, and inconſiſtently with their own principles, but alſo plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondred at, that living ſo long before Chriſtianity, as ſome of them did, they ſhould in ſo abſtruſe a point, and dark a myſtery, make ſo near an approach to the Chriſtian truth afterwards revealed, than that they ſhould any where fumble or fall ſhort of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypoſtaſes, but alſo calling the ſecond of them, λόγου, *reaſon* or *word* too, (as well as νοῦν, *mind* or *intellect*) and likewiſe the Son of the firſt hypoſtaſis, the Father; and affirming him to be the δημιυργὸς and αἴτιον, *the artificer and cauſe of the whole world*; and laſtly deſcribing him, as the ſcripture doth, to be the image, the figure and character, and the ſplendour or brightneſs of the firſt. This, I ſay, our Chriſtian Platoniſt ſuppoſes to be much more wonderful, that this ſo great and abſtruſe a myſtery, of three eternal hypoſtaſes in the Deity, ſhould thus by Pagan philoſophers, ſo long before Chriſtianity, have been aſſerted, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themſelves; they then not ſo much as determining, that the Holy Ghoſt was an hypoſtaſis, much leſs that he was God.

But particularly as to their gradual ſubordination of the ſecond hypoſtaſis to the firſt, and of the third to the firſt and ſecond; our Platonick Chriſtian, doubtleſs, would therefore plead them the more excuſable, becauſe the generality of Chriſtian doctors, for the firſt three hundred years after the Apoſtles times, plainly aſſerted the ſame; as *Juſtin Martyr*, *Athenagoras*, *Tatianus*, *Irenæus*, the author of the Recognitions, *Tertullian*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Origen*, *Gregorius Thaumaturgus*, *Dionyſius* of *Alexandria*, *Lactantius*, and many others. All whoſe teſtimonies becauſe it would be too tedious to ſet down here, we ſhall content our ſelves only with one of the laſt mentioned: *Et Pater & Filius Deus eſt; ſed ille quaſi exuberans fons, hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: Ille tanquam ſol, hic tanquam radius à ſole porrectus. Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a ſtream derived from him: he like to the ſun, this like to a ray extended from the ſun.* And though it be true that *Athanaſius*[1], writing againſt the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and amongſt others cites *Origen*'s teſtimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for ſuch an abſolute co-equality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, ſubordination and inferiority; thoſe ancients ſo unanimouſly agreeing therein, that they are by *Petavius*[2] therefore taxed for Platoniſm, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Chriſtian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with thoſe other opinions of eccleſiaſtick tradition being a rule of faith, and the impoſſibility of the viſible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot eaſily be underſtood. However, this general tradition or conſent of the Chriſtian church, for three hundred years together

Inſtit. l. 4. c. 29. [p. 514]

[1] Vide Epiſtol. de Synodi Nicænæ contra Hæreſin Arian. Decretis, Tom. I. Oper. p. 257.

[2] Vide Lib. I. de Trinitate cap. III. p. 20, & cap. IV. p. 24. Tom. II. Dogmat. Theolog.

gether after the Apoſtles times, though it cannot juſtify the Platoniſts, in any thing diſcrepant from the ſcripture, yet may it in ſome meaſure doubtleſs plead their excuſe, who had no ſcripture-revelation at all, to guide them herein; and ſo at leaſt make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonick Chriſtian would further apologize for theſe Pagan Platoniſts after this manner: That their intention in thus ſubordinating the hypoſtaſes of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they ſuppoſed an abſolute co-equality of them would infer. And that they made only ſo much ſubordination of them, as was both neceſſary to this purpoſe, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion ſo cloſe, that there was, μηδὲν μεταξὺ, *nothing intermedious*, or that could poſſibly be thruſt in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the co-equality of the perſons in the Holy Trinity is, becauſe it cannot well be conceived, how they ſhould otherwiſe all be God; ſince the eſſence of the Godhead, being abſolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; theſe Platoniſts do on the contrary contend, that notwithſtanding that dependence and ſubordination, which they commonly ſuppoſe in theſe hypoſtaſes, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general eſſence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of *Porphyrius* before cited, ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θεία προελθεῖν οὐσίαν, *the eſſence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypoſtaſes*. Now theſe Platoniſts conceive, that the eſſence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypoſtaſes of their trinity, conſiſteth (beſides perfect intellectuality) in theſe following things: Firſt, in being eternal, which, as we have already ſhewed, was *Plato*'s diſtinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatſoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatſoever was not eternal, is a creature. He by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but alſo a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but neceſſary exiſtence, and therefore being abſolutely undeſtroyable; which perhaps is included alſo in the former. Laſtly, in being not particular but univerſal, ἓν καὶ πάντα, *one and all things*, or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to ſay, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, ſay theſe Platoniſts, if any thing more were to be added to the general eſſence of the Godhead beſides this, then muſt it be ſelf-exiſtence, or to be underived from any other, and the firſt original, principle, and cauſe of all: but if this be made ſo eſſential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatſoever is not thus originally of it ſelf, is therefore *ipſo facto* to be detruded and thruſt down into the rank of creatures; then muſt both the ſecond and third hypoſtaſes, as well in the Chriſtian as the Platonick Trinity, upon this ſuppoſition, needs be creatures, and not God; the ſecond deriving its whole being and godſhip from the firſt; and the third, both from the firſt and ſecond; and ſo neither firſt nor ſecond being the cauſe of all things. But it is unqueſtionable to theſe Platoniſts, that whatſoever is eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the

creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth alike to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonick grounds, that all the three divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are co-equal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing betwixt οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, *the essence of the Godhead*, and the *distinct hypostases* or *personalities* thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general and universal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as τὸ κοινὸν from τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, *that which is common and general, differs from that which is singular and individual.* Thus, besides many others, St. *Cyril* [1], ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ γένος, ἢ εἶδος, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει· *The essence or substance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum.* So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generical or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases, (approved by the orthodox fathers) neither *Plato*, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word, is ὁμοούσιος, *co-essential*, or *con-substantial*, and *co-equal* with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council it self, that the Son was therefore co-essential or con-substantial with the Father, meerly because he was God, and not a creature.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homo-ousian, co-essential or con-substantial, yet in a further sense than this; namely, as being all of them one Θεῖον or *divinity*. For thus, besides that passage of *Porphyrius* before cited, may these words of St. *Cyril* be understood concerning them [2]; μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰχνηρίζουσι· *That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it:* that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but also that they are not so many separate and divided Gods, but all of them together one God or Divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language as we Christians are, do often call them three Gods, and a first, second, and third God; yet notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one Θεῖον or *Divinity*; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following. First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second in

[1] This seems to be a mistake for *Theodoret*, in whom we find these very words, *Dialog.* I. *adverſ. Hæreſ. Tom.* II. *Oper. p.* 297. Tho' the same thing is said in other words in St. *Cyril*, *Dialog.* I. *de Trinitate*, p. 408. *Tom.* V. *Oper. Ed. Auberti.*

[2] Contra Julian. lib. VIII. p. 270.

in the third. And lastly, because the entireness of the whole divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, *one and the same energy* or *action* ad extrà. And therefore, as the centre, radious distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be coessential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and bows or branches, co-essential to an entire tree: so, but in much a more perfect sense, are the Platonick *Tagathon*, *Nous* and *Psyche*, coessential to that ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, *that divinity in the whole universe*. Neither was *Athanasius* a stranger to this notion of the word ὁμοούσιος also, he affirming τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι τῆς ἀμπέλου, *That the Branches are co-essential with, and indivisible from the vine*; and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought, that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in it self one, for then should there be a Trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it; (which were to make the mystery contemptible:) but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in *Plato*'s trinity, (as it is commonly represented) yet this is only *ad intrà*, *within the Deity* itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves; but *ad extrà*, *outwardly*, and to us, are they all one and the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

De Sent. Dionys. p. 556. [Tom. I. Oper.]

Furthermore, the Platonick Christian would, in favour of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependence and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only τάξεως, but also ἀξιώματος, of *dignity* as well as *order*, amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and underived from any other, must needs have some superiority and preheminence over that, which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all those three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent *ad extrà*, or *outwards*, yet *ad intrà*, *inwards*, or *within the Deity* it self, are they not so; the Son being not able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases (who is the original fountain of all) by *Macrobius* [1] styled, *omnipotentissimus Deus*, *the most omnipotent God*; he therein implying the second and third hypostases, *Nous* and *Psyche*, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together; however, *ad extrà*, or *outwardly*, and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And *Plotinus* writeth also to the same purpose, εἰ τέλειον ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, &c. *If the first be absolutely perfect, and the first power, then must it needs be the most powerful of all beings; other powers only*

P. 517. [Enn. V. Lib. IV. Cap. I.]

[1] In Somnium Scipion. Lib. I. Cap. XVII. p. 87.

only imitating and partaking thereof. And accordingly hereunto would the Platonick Christian further pretend, that there are sundry places in the Scripture, which do not a little favour some subordination and priority both of order and dignity, in the persons of the holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious, than that of our Saviour Christ, *My Father is greater than I:* which to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as *Athanasius* himself, St. *Basil*, St. *Gregory Nazianzen* and St. *Chrysostom*, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the divinity of our Saviour Christ. Insomuch that *Petavius* himself, expounding the Athanasian creed, writeth in this manner: *Pater major Filio, ritè & catholicè pronuntiatus est à plerisque veterum; & origine prior sine reprehensione dici solet. The Father is, in a right catholick manner, affirmed, by most of the ancients, to be greater than the Son; and he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before him in respect of original.* Whereupon he concludeth the true meaning of that creed to be this, that no person in the Trinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of the Godhead common to them all; *Quia vera Deitas in nullo esse aut minor aut major potest; Because the true Godhead can be no where greater or less:* but that, notwithstanding, there may be some inequality in them, as they are *hic Deus*, and *hæc persona*; *this God*, and *that person.* It is true indeed, that many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this inequality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm, that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also, as for example, St. *Hilary*, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus[z]; *Siquis unum dicens Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante secula Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confitetur, anathema sit.* And again, *Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, sed subjectum intelligimus.* And *Athanasius* himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxality in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the ἥλιος, or to the φῶς, the *sun*, or the *original light*, and the Son to the ἀπαύγασμα, the *splendor* or *brightness of it*, (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependence of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be look'd upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun, and its splendor, and its derivative light; οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεδέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἡλίου καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· ὅτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν· *For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles* (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) *we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendor; so that we acknowledge only one principle.* *De Trin.* p. 863. *Cont. Ar. Or.* 4. p. 467. [Tom. 1. Oper.]

[z] P. 1178, & 1182. Oper. Ed. Benedict.

As also where he approves of this of *Dionysius* of *Alexandria*, ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς αἰώνιον ἐστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρξάμενον, οὔτε λῆξόν ποτε· οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόσκειται καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀείγενες προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ· *God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendor also co-existent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him.* For if the Son of God be as the splendor of the sun ἀειγενὴς, *always generated*, then must he needs have an essential dependence upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same *Dionysius* maketh, of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by *Athanasius*; *viz.* to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὕδατος, and not πνεύματος, as appeareth from his book of the Nicene synod, where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father; ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμὶς, *as the splendor of the light, and as the vapour of the water*; adding, οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, οὔτε ἡ ἀτμὶς, αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστὶν, ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ ἥλιος· οὔτε ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας· *For neither the splendor nor the vapour is the very sun, and the very water; nor yet is it aliene from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby.* Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendor) seem plainly to imply some dependence and subordination. And *Dionysius* doubtless intended them to that purpose, he asserting, as *Photius* informeth us, an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did *Origen* before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, *Athanasius* maketh use of, without any censure or reprehension of them. Wherefore when *Athanasius*, and the other orthodox fathers, writing against *Arius*, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three Persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to *Arius* only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as ἑτεροούσιον, *of a different essence from him*, one being God and the other a creature; they affirming on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as ὁμοούσιος, *of the same essence with him*; that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as *hic Deus* and *hæc persona* (to use *Petavius* his language) *this God and that person.*

P. 565. [Lib. de Sententiâ Dionys. contra Arian. Tom. I.]

P. 275. [Tom. I. Oper.]

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt the more genuine Platonists, and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many conceived. However, our Platonick Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely orthodox fathers themselves. For according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the character of the first hypostasis is supposed by them, to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite

active love and power, (theſe not as accidents and qualities, but as all ſubſtantial) it is more eaſy to conceive, that all theſe are really but one and the ſame God, than how there ſhould be any conſiderable inferiority in them. But beſides this, there is another Platonick hypotheſis (which St. *Auſtin* hinteth from *Porphyrius*, though he profeſſeth he did not well underſtand it) where the third hypoſtaſis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the firſt and ſecond. And this does *Proclus* alſo ſometimes follow, calling the third in like manner, μέσην δύναμιν, *a middle power*, and σχέσιν ἀμφοῖν, *the relation of both the firſt and ſecond to one another*. Which agreeth exactly with that apprehenſion of ſome Chriſtians, that the third hypoſtaſis is as it were the nexus betwixt the firſt and the ſecond, and that love, whereby the Father and Son love each other. Now, according to this latter Platonick hypotheſis, there would ſeem to be not ſo much a gradation or deſcent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which conſiderations, the Platonick Chriſtian will conclude, that though ſome junior Platoniſts have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no ſuch great difference betwixt the genuine Platonick Trinity, rightly underſtood, and the Chriſtian; or elſe, that as the ſame might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

De Civ. D. l. 10. *c.* 23. *Cum dicit medium, non poſtponit, ſed interponit.*

But though the genuine Platoniſts do thus ſuppoſe the three hypoſtaſes of their Trinity to be all of them, not only God, but alſo one God, or μία θεότης, *one entire Divinity*; upon which latter account, the whole may be ſaid alſo by them, to have one ſingular or numerical eſſence: yet notwithſtanding muſt it be acknowledged, that they no where ſuppoſe each of theſe three hypoſtaſes to be numerically the very ſame, or to have no diſtinct ſingular eſſences of their own; this being, in their apprehenſions, directly contradictious to their very hypotheſis itſelf, and all one, as if they ſhould affirm them, indeed not to be three hypoſtaſes, but only one. Nevertheleſs, the Chriſtian Platoniſt would here alſo apologize for them after this manner; that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Chriſtian church were generally of no other perſuaſion than this, that that eſſence or ſubſtance of the Godhead, which all the three perſons or hypoſtaſes agree in, as each of them is God, was not one ſingular and individual, but only one common and univerſal eſſence or ſubſtance; that word ſubſtance being uſed by them as ſynonymous with eſſence, and applied to univerſals likewiſe, as it is by the Peripateticks, when they call a man, or animal in general, *ſubſtantiam ſecundam*, *a ſecond ſubſtance*. Now this is evident from hence, becauſe theſe orthodox fathers did commonly diſtinguiſh, in this controverſy of the Trinity, betwixt Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις, *the eſſence or ſubſtance of the Godhead*, and the hypoſtaſes or perſons themſelves, after this manner; namely, that the hypoſtaſis or perſon was ſingular and individual, but the eſſence or ſubſtance common and univerſal. Thus does *Theodoret* pronounce of theſe fathers in general, κατάγε τὴν τῶν πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἴδιον, ἢ τὸ γένος ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἔχει Ἡ ΟΥΣΙΑ πρὸς ΤΗΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΙΝ· *According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the ſpecies or individuum, ſo doth*

Dial. 1. *adv. Hær.* [Tom. II. Oper. p. 297.]

doth eſſence or ſubſtance, differ from hypoſtaſes; that is to ſay, that eſſence or ſubſtance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypoſtaſes, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers, not to be one ſingular or individual, but one general or univerſal eſſence and ſubſtance; *Theodoret*, notwithſtanding, there acknowledging, that no ſuch diſtinction was obſerved by other Greek writers betwixt thoſe two words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, *eſſence or ſubſtance* and hypoſtaſis, as that the former of them ſhould be reſtrained to univerſals only, generical or ſpecifical eſſences or ſubſtances; but that this was peculiar to the Chriſtian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the mean time not denying, but that each hypoſtaſis, proſopon, or perſon, in the Trinity, might be ſaid in another ſenſe, and in way of oppoſition to *Sabellius*, to have its own ſingular, individual, or exiſtent eſſence alſo; and that there are thus, τρεῖς οὐσίαι, *three ſingular exiſtent eſſences* in the Deity, as well as τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, *three hypoſtaſes*; an hypoſtaſis being nothing elſe to them, but an exiſtent eſſence: however, for diſtinction's ſake, they here thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the ſignification of theſe two words, that a ſingular and exiſtent eſſence ſhould not be called eſſence, but hypoſtaſis; and by οὐσία, *eſſence* or *ſubſtance*, ſhould be meant that general or univerſal nature of the Godhead only, which is common to all thoſe three ſingular hypoſtaſes or perſons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more teſtimonies for a further confimation of this; as that of St. *Baſil*; ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν, *What common is to proper, the ſame is eſſence or ſubſtance* (in the Trinity) *to the hypoſtaſes* But we ſhall content ourſelves only, with this full acknowledgment of *D. Petavius*; *In hoc uno Græcorum præſertim omnium judicia concordant, οὐσίαν, id eſt, eſſentiam ſive ſubſtantiam, aut naturam (quàm φύσιν vocant) generale eſſe aliquid & commune, ac minimè definitum*; ὑπόστασιν *verò proprium, ſingulare, & circumſcriptum, quod ex illo communi, & peculiaribus quibuſdam notis ac proprietatibus veluti componitur. In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks eſpecially agree, that* Uſia, *eſſence or ſubſtance, and nature, which they call* Phyſis *(in the trinity) is ſomething general, common and undetermined; but hypoſtaſis is that, which is proper, ſingular and circumſcribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common eſſence or ſubſtance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumſtances.*

Greg. Nyſſen. adv. Eunom. l. 12. [P. 301. Tom. II. Oper.]

Ep. 369. [Ep. CCCXLIX. Tom. II. Oper. p. 1046. Edit. Paris 1638.]

De Trin. L. 4. c. 7. [§. II. p. 215. Tom. II. Dogmat. Theolog.]

But beſides this, it is further certain, that not a few of thoſe ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, becauſe they zealouſly oppoſed Arianiſm, did entertain this opinion alſo, that the three hypoſtaſes or perſons of the Trinity, had not only one general and univerſal eſſence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being all God; but were alſo three individuals, under one and the ſame ultimate ſpecies, or ſpecifick eſſence and ſubſtance of the Godhead; juſt as three individual men (*Thomas*, *Peter*, and *John*) under that ultimate ſpecies of man; or that ſpecifick eſſence of humanity, which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypoſtaſis, or perſon (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus

thus defined by ſome of theſe fathers (*viz. Anaſtaſius* and *Cyril*[1]) to be *Eſſentia cum ſuis quibuſdam proprietatibus ab iis, quæ ſunt ejuſdem ſpeciei, numero differens*; *an eſſence or ſubſtance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumſtances) differing only numerically from thoſe of the ſame ſpecies with it.* This doctrine was plainly aſſerted and induſtriouſly purſued, (beſides ſeveral others both of the Greeks and Latins) eſpecially by *Gregory Nyſſen*, *Cyril* of *Alexandria*, *Maximus* the Martyr, and *Damaſcen*; whoſe words, becauſe *Petavius*[2] hath ſet them down at large, we ſhall not here inſert. Now theſe were they, who principally inſiſted upon the abſolute co-equality and independent co-ordination of the three hypoſtaſes or perſons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Becauſe, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a ſon, and the third a nephew, yet have no eſſential dependence one upon another, but are naturally co-equal and unſubordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; ſo did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypoſtaſes, or perſons of the Deity, (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt) being likewiſe but three individuals, under the ſame ultimate ſpecies or ſpecifick eſſence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were abſolutely co-equal, unſubordinate and independent: and this was that, which was commonly called by them their ὁμοσιότης, their co-eſſentiality or con-ſubſtantiality. Wherefore it is obſervable, that St. *Cyril*, one of theſe theologers, finds no other fault at all with the Platonick Trinity, but only this, that ſuch an Homoouſiotes, ſuch a co-eſſentiality or con-ſubſtantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein; ἐλελοίπει δ' ἂν πρός τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν, εἰ τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον ἐφαρμόττειν ἤθελον ὑποστάσεσι ταῖς τρισὶν, ἵνα καὶ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τρίχηδες οὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φυσικὴν, καὶ τό γε δὴ δεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν μείοσιν ὁρᾶσθαι ὑποστάσεις. *There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonick trinity for an abſolute agreement of it with the Chriſtian, had they but accommodated the right notion of co-eſſentiality or con-ſubſtantiality to their three hypoſtaſes; ſo that there might have been but one ſpecifick nature or eſſence of the Godhead, not further diſtinguiſhable by any natural diverſity, but numerically only, and ſo no one hypoſtaſis any way inferiour or ſubordinate to another.* That is, had theſe Platoniſts complied with that hypotheſis of St. *Cyril* and others, that the three perſons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate individuals, under the ſame ultimate ſpecies or ſpecifick eſſence of the Godhead, as *Peter*, *Paul* and *John*, under that ſpecies or common nature of humanity, and ſo taken in this co-eſſentiality or con-ſubſtantiality of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already ſhewed, that this Platonick Trinity was, in another ſenſe, Homoouſian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was ſo alſo in the very ſenſe of the Nicene fathers, and of *Athanaſius*. Again, theſe theologers ſuppoſed the three perſons of their Trinity to have really no other than a ſpecifick unity or indentity; and becauſe it ſeems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they muſt needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; theſe learned fathers endeavoured with their logick to

Cont. Jul. l. 8. *p.* 270.

[1] Vide Expoſition. Compendiar. Fidei Orthodox. in Biblicthec. Patrum, p. 677. Tom. XV. Edit. Paris 1645.

[2] Lib. IV. de Trinit. Cap. IX. §. IV. Tom. II. Dogmat. Theolog.

to prove, that three men are but abuſively and improperly ſo called three, they being really and truly but one, becauſe there is but one and the ſame ſpecifick eſſence or ſubſtance of human nature in them all; and ſeriouſly perſuaded men to lay aſide that kind of language. By which ſame logick of theirs, they might as well prove alſo, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all *Epicurus* his gods were but one God neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypotheſis, there cannot poſſibly be any reaſon given, why there ſhould be ſo many as three ſuch individuals in the ſpecies of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very ſame thing thrice repeated; and yet that there ſhould be no more than three ſuch neither, and not three hundred, or three thouſand, or as many as there are individuals in the ſpecies of man; we ſay, not to urge this, it ſeems plain, that this Trinity is no other than a kind of Tritheiſm, and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too. And therefore ſome would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonick trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. *Cyril* and St. *Gregory Nyſſen*, and ſeveral other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Chriſtianity and of reaſon. However, it is evident from hence, that theſe reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypoſtaſes of the Trinity to have the ſame ſingular exiſtent eſſence, they ſuppoſing them to have no otherwiſe one and the ſame eſſence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one God, than three individual men have one common ſpecifical eſſence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decried for tritheiſtick; ſo in the room thereof ſtarted there up that other trinity of perſons numerically the ſame, or having all one and the ſame ſingular exiſtent eſſence; a doctrine, which ſeemeth not to have been owned by any publick authority in the Chriſtian Church, ſave that of the Lateran council [1] only.

And that no ſuch thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and thoſe firſt oppoſers of Arianiſm, might be render'd probable in the firſt place from the free confeſſion and acknowledgment of *D. Petavius*, (a perſon well acquainted with eccleſiaſtick antiquity;) and for this reaſon eſpecially, becauſe many are much led by ſuch new names and authorities; *In eo præcipuam vim collocaſſe patres, ut æqualem patri naturâ excellentiâque filium eſſe defenderent, citra expreſſam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conjicere. Etenim Nicæni iſti præſules, quibus nemo melius Arianæ ſectæ arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimenda maximè foret, acrius dijudicare potuit, nihil in profeſſionis ſuæ formulâ ſpectarunt aliud, niſi ut æqualitatem illam eſſentiæ, dignitatis, æternitatis aſtruerent. Teſtatur hoc ὁμοούσιος vox ipſa, quæ arx quædam fuit catholici dogmatis. Hæc enim æqualitatem potius eſſentiæ, quam SINGULARITATEM ſignificat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cætera ejudem modi ſunt in illo decreto, ut, &c. The chief force, which the ancient fathers oppoſed againſt the Arian hereticks, was in aſſerting only the equality of the ſon with the father, as to nature or eſſence, without any expreſs mention of the SINGULARITY of the ſame. For thoſe*

De Trin. l. 4. *c.* 13. [§. VII. p. 248. Tom. II. Dogmat. Theolog.]

[1] The fourth general Lateran Council held in 1215, under Pope Innocent III.

those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugned, aimed at nothing else in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity and eternity between them. This does the word Homoousios *itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY of essence, as we have before shewed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different* hypostasis, *or essence.* Thus does *Petavius* clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not asserted by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: *First*, Because these orthodox Anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one *hypostasis*, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and consequently that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct *hypostases* or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an *hypostasis*, according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a *trinity* only, but a *quaternity* of *hypostases*, in the Deity. Which is a thing, that none of those fathers ever dream'd of.

Again, the word *Homoousios*, as was before intimated by *Petavius*, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things, numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely, that the Greek tongue should have any name for that, which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, *viz.* several things having one and the same singular essence. And accordingly St. *Basil* interprets the force of this word thus, ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς ὑποστάσεως ὁ γὰρ αὐτῷ τί ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἑτερὸν ἑτέρῳ· *That it plainly takes away the sameness of* hypostasis, *that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that, which the ancient fathers meant by* [*In Epist.* CCC. p. 1070. Tom. II. Oper.]

ly the word hypostasis:) *for the same thing is not* homoousios, *co-essential or con-substantial with itself, but always one thing with another.* Wherefore as τὸ ὁμοούσιον and συγγένειᾳ are used by *Plotinus* as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul, θείων μεστὴ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον, *that it is full of divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congenerous, and homoousious with them*; so doth *Athanasius* in like manner use them, when he affirmeth, τὰ κλήματα εἶναι ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῆ τῆς ἀμπέλου, *That the branches are homoousious* [co-essential or consubstantial] *and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof.* Besides which, the same father uses ὁμογενὴς, and ὁμοειδὴς, and ὁμοφυὴς, indifferently for ὁμοούσιος, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an *identity of singular essence*, but only of *generical* or *specifical.* And thus was the word *Homoousios* plainly used by the council of *Chalcedon* [1], they affirming, that our Saviour Christ was ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, *co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, as to his divinity; but co-essential or consubstantial with us men, as to his humanity.* Where it cannot reasonably be suspected, that one and the same word should be taken in two different senses in the same sentence, so as in the first place to signify a numerical identity, but in the second, a generical or specifical only. But lastly, which is yet more, *Athanasius* himself speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's being *homoousious* with us men; εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοούσιός ἐστιν ἡμῖν υἱὸς, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῖν ἔχει γένεσιν, ἔστω κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἀλλότριος κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἄμπελος τοῦ γεωργοῦ· *If the Son be co-essential or consubstantial (or of the same essence or substance) with us men, he having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the husbandman.* And again, a little after, in the same epistle, ἢ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἴδιον, τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίας, ἐφρόνει τοῦτον ὁμοούσιον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων· *Or did* Dionysius, *think you, when he affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be co-essential or consubstantial with us men?* From all which it is unquestionably evident, that *Athanasius* did not, by the word *homoousios*, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common generical or specifical only; and consequently, that he conceived the Son to be co-essential or consubstantial with the Father after that manner.

En. 4. l. 7. c. 10. [p. 464.]

Epist. de Sent. Dion. p. 556. [Tom. I. Oper.]

Tom. I. p. 556. [De sentent. Dionys.]

Thus also in his 1st Epistle to *Serapion*, ἄνθρωποι γὰρ ὄντες ὅμοιοι καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα ἔχοντες ὁμοούσιοί ἐσμεν ἀλλήλων· *We men being alike, and having the sameness of nature, are consubstantial with one another.* And *p.* 170. ὥσπερ ἂν μαίνοιτ' ἄν τις λέγων, τὴν οἰκίαν ὁμοούσιον τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ, καὶ τὸ σκάφος τῷ ναυπηγῷ, οὕτως τρεπόντως ἂν τις εἴποι, πάντα υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τῷ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς· *It were madness to say, that a house is co-essential or consubstantial with the builder, or a ship with the ship-wright; but it is proper to say, that every son is co-essential or consubstantial with his father.*

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of *Arius* was, which they opposed and condemned. Now *Arius* maintained, the *Son* or *Word* to be κτίσμα, *a creature, made in time*, and *mutable* or *defectible*; and for that reason, as *Athanasius* tells us, ἑτερούσιον and ἀλλοτριούσιον, *of a different essence or substance from the Father*, (that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated.) Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of *Arius*, determined, that the Son or Word was not thus ἑτερούσιος, nor

[1] Vide Tom. II. Concilior. p. 456. Edit. Harduini.

nor ἀλλοτριούσιος, but ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ, *co-essential or consubstantial with the Father*; that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that οὐσία, *essence* or *substance* of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. *Hilary*, *Natura una, non unitate personæ, sed generis*; *one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind.* Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so much insist upon against *Arius*; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. *Austin* writing thus against the Arians; *Patris, ergo & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti, etiamsi disparem cogitant potestatem, naturam saltem confiteantur æqualem: Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal.* And St. *Basil* likewise; *Though the Son be in order second to the Father, because produced by him, and in dignity also, (forasmuch as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet is he not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one divinity in them both.* And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of *Athanasius*, in their *Homoousiotes*, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality, and co-equality of the Son with the Father, namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as *Arius* contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will appear undeniably from many passages in *Athanasius*, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us, how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it; πάντων τε ὑπογραψάντων ὑπέγραψαν καὶ οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν οἷς αἰτιῶνται νῦν ἔτοι· λέγω δὲ τῷ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ, καὶ ὅτι μήτε κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα, μήτε τῶν γενητῶν ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός· ἀλλὰ γέννημα καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος. *All the rest subscribing, the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and co-essential or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or facture, or any of the things made, but the genuine off-spring of the essence or substance of the Father.* Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of scripture words and phrases, against the Arians; τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελεῖν· τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολογουμένας φωνὰς γράψαι, ὅτι τε υἱός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ ποίημα· ἴδιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς

De Synodis, [seu Fide Orientalium, §. LXXVI. p. 1193. Oper.]

Cont. Serm. Arian. c. 18. [P. 451. Tom. VIII. Oper.]

3. *Cont. Eunom.* [P. 79. Tom. II Oper. Edit. Par. 1615.]

P. 251.

P. 267.

πατρὸς γένημα· *As that Chriſt was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wiſdom of God, and conſequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived, that the Euſebian faction would evade all thoſe expreſſions by equivocation,* ἠναγκάσθησαν λοιπὸν λευκότερον εἰπεῖν τὸ ἐκ τῆ Θεῆ. καὶ γράψαι ἐκ τῆς ὑσίας τοῦ Θεῆ εἶναι τὸν ὑὸν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεῆ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ τε ὑῆ καὶ τῶν γενητῶν νομίζεσθαι· *They conceived themſelves neceſſitated, more plainly to declare, what they meant by being from God, or out of him; and therefore added, that the Son was out of the ſubſtance of God, thereby to diſtinguiſh him from all created beings.* Again, a little after, in the ſame epiſtle, he adds; ἡ συνοδὸς τοῦτο νοῆσα, καλῶς ὁμοούσιον ἔγραψεν, ἵνα πήντε τῶν αἱρετικῶν κακοήθειαν ἀναιρέψωσι· καὶ δείξωσιν ἄλλον εἶναι τῶν γενητῶν τὸν λόγον· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γράψαντες εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸν ὑὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ κλισ-τόν· ἢ τρεπτόν· ἢ ποίημα· ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, τούτες ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καὶ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία· *The ſynod perceiving this, rightly declared, that the Son was homoouſious with the Father; both to cut off the ſubterfuges of hereticks, and to ſhew him to be different from the creatures. For after they had decreed this, they added immediately, They who ſay, that the Son of God was from things that are not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another ſubſtance or eſſence, all ſuch does the holy and catholick church anathematize. Whereby they made it evident, that theſe words, Of the Father, and coeſſential or conſubſtantial with the Father, were oppoſed to the impiety of thoſe expreſſions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which he that affirmeth, contradicteth the ſynod, but whoſoever diſſents from* Arius, *muſt needs conſent to theſe forms of the ſynod.* In this ſame epiſtle, to cite but one paſſage more out of it, χαλκὸς, σίλβων καὶ χρυσὸς, &c. ἀλλ' ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτερούσια ἀλλήλων· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ υἱὸς ὕτως ἐσ-τὶν, ἔσ-ω κλίσμα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, εἰ δὲ υἱός ἐσ-τι λόγος, σοφία, εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀπαύγασμα, εἰκότως ὁμοούσιος ἂν εἴη· *Braſs and gold, ſilver and tin, are alike in their ſhining and colour; nevertheleſs in their eſſence and nature are they very different from one another. If therefore the Son be ſuch, then let him be a creature as we are, and not coeſſential (or conſubſtantial;) but if he be a ſon, the word, wiſdom, image of the Father, and his ſplendour, then of right ſhould he be accounted coeſſential and conſubſtantial.* Thus in his epiſtle concerning *Dionyſius*, we have ἕνα τῶν γενητῶν εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν, and μὴ ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ· *the Son's being one of the creatures*, and *his not being coeſſential or conſubſtantial with the Father*, put for ſynonymous expreſſions, which ſignify one and the ſame thing.

P. 272.

P. 581.

Wherefore it ſeemeth to be unqueſtionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Chriſtian church maintained, againſt *Arius*, the Son to be homoouſion, coeſſential or conſubſtantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, *Of the ſame eſſence or ſubſtance*, yet they univerſally underſtood thereby, not a ſameneſs of ſingular and numerical, but of common or univerſal eſſence only; that is, the generical or ſpecifical eſſence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more teſtimonies cited out of *Athanaſius* to this purpoſe. As from his epiſtle *De*

Synodis Arimini & Seleuciæ, where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt thoſe two words; Ὁμοιούσιον, *of like ſubſtance*, and Ὁμούσιον, *of the ſame ſubſtance* [1], Οἶδαλε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιοτήτων λέγεται ὅμοιον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ Ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἂν λεχθείη· ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσιαν---- τῇ γὰρ οὐζίᾳ Ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσι· καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος κυνὶ οὐκ Ἀνόμοιος λέγεται ἀλλ' Ἑτεροφυής· Ὅ κοῦν τὸ Ὁμοφυὲς καὶ Ὁμοούσιοι, τὸ δὲ Ἑλεροφυὲς καὶ ἑτερούσιον· *For even yourſelves know, that ſimilitude is not predicated of eſſences or ſubſtances, but of figures and qualities only. But of eſſences or ſubſtances, identity or ſameneſs is affirmed, and not ſimilitude. For a man is not ſaid to be like to a man, in reſpect of the eſſence or ſubſtance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being ſaid, as to their eſſence, to be congenerous, of the ſame nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly ſaid to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that, which is congenerous, of the ſame nature, kind, or ſpecies, is alſo* Homoouſion, *co-eſſential or conſubſtantial (of the ſame eſſence or ſubſtance) and that, which is of a different nature, kind or ſpecies, is* Heterouſion, *(of a different eſſence or ſubſtance.)* Again, *Athanaſius*, in that fragment of his againſt the hypocriſy of *Meletius*, *&c.* concerning conſubſtantiality, writeth in this manner [2]: Ὁ τοίνυν ἀναιρῶν τὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, λέγων δὲ ὅμοιον, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ εἶναι Θεὸν· ὡζαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ Ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ὅμοιον, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἑτέραν τὴν οὐσίαν λέγει, Θεῷ δὲ ὁμοιωμένην· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἶναι πρεπόντως λέγει μὴ Φρονῶν ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπε ὐσίας· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπε κατὰ οὐζιαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὁμοιώματι καθάπερ ἀνδριὰς ἀνθρώπῳ· ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δῆλός ἐ-τιν ὁ τοιῶτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμούσιον δὲ ὐ Φρονῶν· Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν βάλεται τὸ Ὁμοούσιον ἀκούεθαι, ὅπερ ἐ-τὶν, περὶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ ἵνα διαβάλλῃ ταύτην, Ἑλληνικὴν ῥῆσιν εἰρηκέναι τὸ ὁμούσιον ῥῆμα τῶ ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἔθως ἐπ' ὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ κειμένου ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν Φύζιν παρα-ῆζαι, &c. *He that denies the ſon to be* Homoouſion, *conſubſtantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner, he, who retaining the word* Homoouſion *or conſubſtantial, interprets it notwithſtanding only of ſimilitude or likeneſs in ſubſtance, affirmeth the Son to be of another different ſubſtance from the Father, and therefore not God; but like to God only. Neither doth ſuch a one rightly underſtand thoſe words,* Of the ſubſtance of the Father, *he not thinking the Son to be ſo conſubſtantial, or of the eſſence and ſubſtance of the Father, as one man is conſubſtantial, or of the eſſence or ſubſtance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not ſo of God, as a man is of a man, according to eſſence or ſubſtance; but that he is like him only, as a ſtatue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifeſt, that ſuch a one, though he uſe the word* Homoouſios, *yet he doth not really mean it. For he will not underſtand it, according to the cuſtomary ſignification thereof, for that, which hath one and the ſame eſſence or ſubſtance; this word being uſed by Greeks and Pagans in no other ſenſe, than to ſignify that, which hath the ſame nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son and Holy Ghoſt.* Where we ſee plainly, that though the word *Homoouſios* be interpreted,

[1] P. 928. Tom. I. Oper. [2] Tom. I. Oper. p. 572.

That which hath one and the same essence or substance, yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with another. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. *Austin* to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, *contra Maxim.* chap. the 15th [1], writeth thus, *Duo veri homines, etsi nullus eorum filius sit alterius, unius tamen & ejusdem sunt substantiæ. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiæ, etiamsi non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca verus Dei filius, & unius cum patre substantiæ est, quia verus filius est; & per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius. Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God.* Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same substance with his father, or any one man with another. Again, the same St. *Austin*, in his *Respons. ad Sermonem Arianorum* [2], expresseth himself thus: *Ariani nos vocitant Homoousianos, quia contra eorum errorem, Græco vocabulo ὁμοούσιον defendimus, Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdemque substantiæ, vel, ut expressius dicamus, essentiæ (quæ οὐσία Græcè appellatur) quod planius dicitur unius ejusdemque naturæ. Et tamen siquis istorum, qui nos Homoousianos vocant, filium suum non cujus ipse esset, sed diversæ diceret esse naturæ, exhæredari ab ipso mallet filius, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate isti cæcantur, qui cum confiteantur unicum Dei filium, nolunt ejusdem naturæ cujus pater est confiteri, sed diversæ atque imparis, & multis modis rebusque dissimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo sit creatus; gratiâ filius, non naturâ. The Arians call us Homoousians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks* Homoousious, *that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called* Ousia, *which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons, who thus call us Homoousians, who would not as willingly be disinherited, as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety therefore are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge, that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only.* Lastly (to name no more places) in his first book *De Trinitate* [3], he hath these words: *Si filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum patre substantiæ est. Omnis enim substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est; & quæ creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est filius ejusdem substantiæ, cujus est pater, ergo facta substantia est. If the son be not a creature, then is he of the same*

To the same purpose is that in his Second Book, ch. 6. *Diversa quidem substantia est Deus Pater, & Homo Mater: non tamen diversa substantia est Deus Pater & Deus Filius: sicut non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater, & Homo Filius.*

[1] Cap. XVI. §. II. p. 503. Tom. VIII. Oper. Ed. Benedict.

[2] Cap. XXXVI. p. 458. Tom. VIII. Oper.

[3] Cap. VI. p. 534, 535. Tom. VIII. Oper.

same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, That the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word *Homoousios* against *Arius*, intended not therein to assert the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, Ταυτοούσιον and Μονούσιον. Concerning the former of which, *Epiphanius* thus; Καὶ οὐ λέγομεν Ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ λέξις παρά τισι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικασθῇ· Ταυτὸν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει· *We affirm not the Son to be* Tautoousion, *(one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with* Sabellius; *nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power.* Where it is plain, that when *Epiphanius* affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a generical or specifical, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is; and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word *Homoousios*; he therefore rejecting that other word *Tautoousios*, because it would be liable to misinterpretation, and to be taken, in the Sabellian sense, for that, which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word *Homoousios* could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word *Monoousios*, *Athanasius* himself, in his *Exposition of Faith*, thus expressly condemns it, οὔτε γὰρ ὑοπατέρα φρονοῦμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι Μονούσιον καὶ οὐχ Ὁμούσιον· *We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be* Monoousios, *and not* Homoousios; *they thereby destroying the very being of the Son.* Where *ousia*, *essence* or *substance*, in that fictitious word *Monoousios*, is taken for *singular* or *existent essence*, the whole Deity being thus said, by *Sabellius*, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word *Homoousios* is understood a common or universal, generical or specifical essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore *Athanasius* here disclaimeth a Monoousian trinity, as *Epiphanius* did before a Tautoousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the Homoousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated, or creators. From whence it is plain, that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several persons of the trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by *Athanasius*[1]; Τριὰς δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνης, καὶ φαντασίας λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθεία καὶ ὑπάρξει Τριάς, *The trinity is not a trinity*

Hær. 76. N. 7. [Hæres. Anomæor. p. 920. Tom. I. Op.]

[1] Epistol. ad Serapion. Tom. I. Oper. p. 202.

trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases, truly and really existing. But the Homoousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that Monoousian trinity of *Sabellius*, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing, and that other Heteroousian trinity of *Arius*, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances, (one of which only was God, and the other creatures;) this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by *Athanasius*; οὔτε ἔλαττόν τι φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν κατὰ Καιάφαν Ἰουδαίους, ᾖ εἰς Σαβέλλιον περιπέσῃ· οὔτε πλεῖον ἐπινοεῖ, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεότητα καλακυλισθῇ· *The catholick church doth neither believe less than this Homoousian trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan polytheism and idolatry*; it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures, together with the Creator.

Ad Serap. Ep. p. 202.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonick Christian would conclude, that the orthodox trinity of the ancient Christian church did herein agree with the genuinely Platonick trinity, that it was not Monoousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As likewise, the right Platonick trinity does agree with the trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not *Heteroousian*, but *Homoousian, co-essential*, or *consubstantial*; none of their three hystostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time; but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this Homoousiotes, or co-essentiality of the three persons in the trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? shall we conclude, that *Athanasius* himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons in the trinity being but three individuals under the same species (as *Peter*, *Paul*, and *Timothy*) and having no other natural unity or identity, than specifical only? Indeed some have confidently fastned this upon *Athanasius*, because, in those *Dialogues of the Trinity* [1], published amongst his works, and there entitled to him, the same is grosly owned, and in defence thereof this absurd paradox maintained, that *Peter*, *Paul*, and *Timothy*, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be accounted three men, but only then when they dissent from one another, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from several passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could not be written by *Athanasius*; and there hath been also another father found for them, to wit, *Maximus* the martyr. Notwithstanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that *Athanasius*, in those others his reputedly genuine writings, does sometime approach

[1] Dialog. I. p. 160. Tom. II. Oper.

approach ſo near hereunto, that he lays no ſmall ſtreſs upon this *homoouſiotes*, this coeſſentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three perſons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, *Concerning the common eſſence of the three perſons*, and the chapter inſcribed, Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοὶ, *That there are not three Gods*, doth *Athanaſius* lay his foundation here. When to that queſtion propoſed, *How it can be ſaid, that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghoſt God, and yet that there are not three Gods?* the firſt reply which he makes is this, ὅπου κοινὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, κοινὸν καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἀξίας· οἷον ὁ θεὸς τὰ εἰς πλῆθη διῃρημένα ἀπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως, ἑνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτε ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τῇ ὀργῇ ὑποκείμενον, ἕνα ἄνθρωπον καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτι διαλλάσσεται τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ διαλλάσσεται· *Where there is a communion of nature, there is alſo one common name of dignity beſtowed. And thus doth God himſelf call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one ſingular name. For both when he is angry with men, doth he call all thoſe, who are the objects of his anger, by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world, is he reconciled thereto as to one man.* The firſt inſtances, which he gives hereof, are in *Gen.* the 6th, the 3d and 7th verſes; *My ſpirit ſhall not always ſtrive with man*, and *I will deſtroy man whom I have created.* Upon which, *Athanaſius* makes this reflection; καίτοι οὐκ ἦν εἷς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἄπειροι· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς φύσεως, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἐκάλεσεν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας· *Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheleſs by the name of one nature, doth the Scripture call all thoſe men, one man, by reaſon of their community of eſſence or ſubſtance.* Again, he commenteth in like manner upon that other Scripture paſſage, *Exodus* xv. 1. *The horſe and his rider hath he thrown into the ſea*; Ὅτε ἐξῆλθε Φαραὼ κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, πίπτων μετὰ μυρίων ἁρμάτων ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, καὶ ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ βυθιζόμενοι μετ' ἐκείνου, καὶ ἵπποι πολλοὶ· ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἰδὼς, ὅτι πάντων τῶν βυθιζομένων μία ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵππων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγει, ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην ἔρριψεν εἰς θάλασσαν· τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάλεσεν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἵππων ἐκάλεσεν ἵππον ἕνα, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως· *When* Pharaoh *went out to the Red-ſea, and fell, with infinite chariots in the ſame; and there were many men, that were drowned together with him, and many horſes; yet* Moſes *knowing, that there was but one common nature of all thoſe, that were drowned, ſpeaketh thus both of the men and horſes; The Lord hath thrown both the horſe and the rider into the ſea: he calling ſuch a multitude of men but one ſingular man, and ſuch a multitude of horſes but one horſe.* Whereupon *Athanaſius* thus concludeth; εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅπου συγκέχυται τὰ τῆς φύσεως· ὅπου διάφορα τὰ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ βουλῆς· ἃ γάρ ἐστιν ἅτε γνώμη ἴση, ἅτε μορφὴ, ἅτε ἰσχύς· καὶ διάφοροι γλῶτται, διὸ καὶ ἄνθρωποι μέροπες λέγονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη εἷς ἄνθρωπος ἐκλήθη· ὅπου δὲ ἀμέριστος ἡ ἀξία, μία βασιλεία, μία δύναμις, καὶ βουλὴ, καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἰδιάζουσα τὴν τριάδα ἀπὸ τῆς κλίσεως, Ἕνα λέγω Θεόν· *If therefore amongſt men, where the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men not having the ſame diſpoſition of mind, nor form, nor ſtrength) as alſo different languages, (from whence men are called by the poets* Meropes) *nevertheleſs, by reaſon of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trinity*

P. 213, 214.

P. 214.

nity of perſons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God? But though it be true, that *Athanaſius* in this place (if at leaſt this were a genuine fœtus of *Athanaſius*) may juſtly be thought to attribute too much to this κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας, *a common nature, eſſence, or ſubſtance*, of all the three perſons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that thoſe Scripture-paſſages are but weakly urged to this purpoſe: yet it is plain, that he did not acquieſce in this only, but addeth other things to it alſo, as their having not only one will, but alſo one energy or action, of which more afterwards. Moreover, *Athanaſius* elſewhere plainly implieth, that this common eſſence or nature of the Godhead is not ſufficient alone to
P. 467. make all the three hypoſtaſes one God. As in his fourth oration againſt the Arians, where he tells us, that his Trinity of divine hypoſtaſes cannot therefore be accounted three gods nor three principles, becauſe they are not reſembled by him to three original ſuns, but only to the ſun, and its ſplendour, and the light from both. Now, three ſuns, according to the language of *Athanaſius*, have κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ ὐσίας, *a common nature, eſſence, and ſubſtance*, and therefore are coeſſential or conſubſtantial; and ſince they cannot be accounted one ſun, it is manifeſt, that, according to *Athanaſius*, this ſpecifick identity or unity, is not ſufficient to make the three divine hypoſtaſes one God. Again, the ſame *Athanaſius*, in his *Expoſition of Faith*[1], writeth thus; οὔτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις· μεμερισμένας καθ' ἑαυτὰς, ὥστερ σωμαλοφυῶς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐνθυμηθῆναι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθεΐαν ὡς τὰ ἔθνη φρονήσωμεν· *Neither do we acknowledge three hypoſtaſes, divided or ſeparate by themſelves (as is to be ſeen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the pagan polytheiſm.* From whence it is evident, that neither three ſeparate men, though co-eſſential to *Athanaſius*, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the ſpecifick nature and eſſence of the Godhead can alone, by itſelf, exclude polytheiſm from the Trinity. Wherefore, the true reaſon, why *Athanaſius* laid ſo great a ſtreſs upon this *Homoouſiotes*, or co-eſſentiality of the Trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not becauſe this alone was ſufficient to make them one God, but becauſe they could not be ſo without it. This *Athanaſius* often urges againſt the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them, πολλοὺς ἂν εἰσάγοιεν [θεοὺς] διὰ τὸ ἑτερόειδες αὐτῶν, *That they muſt needs introduce a plurality of gods, becauſe of the heterogeneity of their trinity.* And again afterwards determining, that there is ἓν εἶδος τῆς θεότητος, *one ſpecies of the Godhead*, in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds[2]; ὅτω καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν θεὸν· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερον λέγομεν τῆς πολυειδοῦς τῶν αἱρετικῶν θεότητος, ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος——ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεοὺς, ἕνα μὲν κτιστὸν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον κτιστόν· *And thus do we acknowledge one only God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiouſly, than thoſe hereticks do, who introduce a multiform Deity, conſiſting of divers ſpecies; we ſuppoſing only one univerſal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called God by theſe Arians, then*

[1] Tom. I. Oper. p. 241. [2] P. 468.

then muſt he and his father of neceſſity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature. In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council, he affirmeth, concerning the Arians, τρεῖς θεοὺς τρόπον τινα κηρύτ]ουσιν εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ξένας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας, διαιροῦντες τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα, *That they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy monad into three heterogeneous ſubſtances, ſeparate from one another.* Whereas the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is elſewhere thus deſcribed by him; Τριὰς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελεία ἐστὶν, ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογουμένη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γενητοῦ συνεστραμένη, ἀλλ' ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν οὖσα· *The holy and perfect Trinity theologized in the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing aliene, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together.* And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Chriſt, *I and my father are one*, only in reſpect of conſent or agreement of will, *Athanaſius* ſhewing the inſufficiency hereof, concludeth thus, ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν καλὰ τὴν οὐσίαν νοεῖν καὶ τὴν ἑνότητα, *Wherefore beſides this conſent of will, there muſt of neceſſity be another unity of eſſence or ſubſtance alſo, acknowledged in the Father and the Son.* Where by unity of eſſence or ſubſtance, that *Athanaſius* did not mean a unity of ſingular and individual, but of general or univerſal eſſence only, appears plainly from theſe following words: τὰ μὲν γὰρ γενητὰ κἂν συμφωνίαν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸν ποιητὴν, ἀλλ' ἐν κινήσει καὶ μετοχῇ ταύτην ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ φυλάξας ἐκβέβληται τῶν οὐρανῶν, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν γέννημα, οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ· *For thoſe things, which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the ſame, was caſt out of heaven. But the Son, being begotten from the eſſence or ſubſtance of the Father, is eſſentially or ſubſtantially one with him.* So that the oppoſition here is betwixt unity of conſent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of eſſence in that, which is uncreated, and immutably of the ſame will with the father. There are alſo many other places in *Athanaſius*, which though ſome may underſtand of the unity of ſingular eſſence, yet were they not ſo by him intended, but either of generick or ſpecifick eſſence only, or elſe in ſuch other ſenſe as ſhall be afterwards declared. As for example, in his fourth oration, τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν, *We acknowledge only one Godhead in the Trinity*; where the following words plainly imply this to be underſtood, in part at leaſt, of one common or general eſſence of the Godhead, εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, &c. *Becauſe if it be not ſo, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then muſt they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature.* Again, when in the ſame book it is ſaid, ἓν εἰσὶν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος· *That the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the ſameneſs of one Godhead*; it is evident from the context, that this is not to be underſtood of a ſameneſs of ſingular eſſence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of ſuch another ſameneſs or unity, as will be hereafter expreſſed. Laſtly, when the three hypoſtaſes are ſomewhere [a] ſaid

P. 275.

Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

Ep. de Syn. Arim. & Sel. p. 923.

P. 468.

P. 456.

[a] Vide Quæſtion. VI. p. 442. Tom. II. Oper. Athanaſ.

by him to be μία οὐσία, *one essence or substance*, this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other senses before mentioned.

But though *Athanasius* no where declare the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be monoousian; and though he lay a great stress upon their εἰδικὴ ἑνότης, their *specifick* or *generick unity*, and coessentiality, in order to their being one God, for as much as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration [1], μία ἀρχὴ, ᾗ κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς θεὸς, *There is but one principle, and accordly but one God.* P. 656. Again, in his book against the Sabellianists, οὐκ εἰσὶ δύο θεοὶ, ὅτι μηδὲ δύο πατέρες, μηδὲ ἑτερούσιος τοῦ γεννήσαντος ὁ γεγεννημένος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει Θεούς, αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἡ δυσέβεια· *There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that, which is begotten, is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods; which was the impiety of* Marcion. Accordingly, the same *Athanasius* declareth, τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ πηγὴν εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ, *That the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root, and fountain of the Son.* *& Syn. Arim. De Sel. p. 920.* And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of *Dionysius*, ὅτι πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς, ποτα μὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχεόμενος ὁ υἱός· *That God* (the father) *is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him.* To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendor; to the prototype and the image. And he concludeth the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner; τὴν θεῖαν τριάδα εἰς ἕνα ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα, λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη· *The divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head.* *De Syn. Nic. p. 275.* But the chief force of this consideration is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity is a Trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: forasmuch as, were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

In the next place therefore, *Athanasius* further addeth, that these three divine hypostases are not μεμερισμέναι and κεχωρισμέναι, *separate* and *disjoined* beings,

[1] Pag. 500.

beings, but ἀδιαίρετοι, *indiviſibly united to one another.* Thus in his fifth oration [1]; πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἓν ὄντας τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῷ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἀμέριστον, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός. *The father and the ſon are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indiviſibly and inſeparably conjoined with him.* Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the ſame ſingular eſſence, but only generical and univerſal; becauſe in the following words he ſuppoſes them to be two, but indiviſibly and inſeparably united together. Again, in his book *De Sent. Dionyſ.* ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός, ὡς ἔστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς, *The Son is indiviſible from the Father, as the ſplendor is from the light.* And afterwards in the ſame book he inſiſteth further upon this point, according to the ſenſe of *Dionyſius*, after this manner [2]; ὁ δὲ ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τὸν υἱὸν εἶναι διδάσκει, ὡς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ποταμὸς πρὸς τὴν πηγήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν διαιρεῖν καὶ ἀποξενοῦν τὸν λόγου καὶ τὸν νοῦν τις δύναται, ἢ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πηγὴν μερίσαι καὶ τειχίσαι διελεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἅμα διελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός, &c. Dionyſius *teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indiviſible from him, as reaſon is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there therefore, that would go about to alienate reaſon from the mind, and to ſeparate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the ſplendor from the light?* Thus alſo in his epiſtle to *Serapion*, that the Holy Ghoſt is not a creature, ἢ διελέτωσαν πρῶτον αὐτοὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγάζματος τὸ φῶς, ἢ τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ μὴ εἰπάτωσαν, πῶς ἐστι ταῦτα· *Let theſe men firſt divide the ſplendor from the light, or wiſdom from him that is wiſe; or elſe let them wonder no more, how theſe things can be.* P. 194. Elſewhere *Athanaſius* calls the whole Trinity, τριάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἡνωμένην πρὸς ἑαυτήν, *a Trinity undivided and united to itſelf.* Which Athanaſian indiviſibility of the Trinity is not ſo to be underſtood, as if three were not three in it; but firſt of all, that neither of theſe could be without the other, as the original light or ſun could not be without the ſplendor, nor the ſplendor without the original light, and neither one nor the other of them without a diffuſed derivative light. Wherefore God the Father being an eternal ſun, muſt needs have alſo an eternal ſplendor, and an eternal light. And ſecondly, that theſe are ſo nearly and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of συνέχεια, *continuity*, betwixt them; which yet is not to be underſtood in the way of corporeal things, but ſo as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, *Athanaſius* aſcendeth yet higher, affirming the hypoſtaſes of the Trinity not only to be indiviſibly conjoined with one another, but alſo to have a mutual inexiſtence in each other, which later Greek fathers [3] have called ἐμπεριχώρησιν, their *circuminſeſſion.* To this purpoſe does he cite the words of *Dionyſius*, ἀπόῤῥοια γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος ἐξοχέτευσις, ἕτερος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου. καὶ ὅτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ, ἕτερος ὢν θατέρου, καὶ ἓν εἰσιν ὄντες δύο· ὅτω καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἕν, P. 665. [Tom. I. Oper. Libro de Sentent. Dionyſ. p. 565.]

[1] P. 529. [2] P. 566. [3] See Petav. Lib. IV. de Trinitate, Cap. XVI. p. 263. Tom. II. Dogmat. theolog.

ἓν, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι· *For reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other.* And *Athanasius* further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendor, he affirming φῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάζματι, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ, *That the original light is in the splendor, and again the splendor in the sun*; and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus

Orat. 4. *p.* 457. insisteth upon, ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι εἶδος ἐστιν· *In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of the picture. And therefore if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a* prosopopœia *bespeak him after this manner*; ἐγὼ καὶ

Ibid. ὁ βασιλεὺς ἓν ἐσμεν, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰμὶ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν ἐμοί· καὶ ὃ ὁρᾷς ἐν ἐμοὶ, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ βλέπεις, καὶ ὃ ἑώρακας ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτο βλέπεις ἐν ἐμοί· ὁ γὰρ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τὸν βασιλέα· *I and the king am one, for I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same may you observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me: he therefore, that worshippeth the image, therein worshippeth the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king.* Elsewhere, in the fourth oration,

P. 456. he thus insisteth upon this particular; ἔστι γὰρ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὥστε νοεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἐπειδὴ σύμπαν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ υἱοῦ, τοῦτο τῆς πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς ποταμός, ὥστε τὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν υἱὸν ὁρᾶν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἴδιον, τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς τυγχάνει ὢν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἡ πηγὴ. *The Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendor from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that he, who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendor, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river.* What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, *Athanasius* also informs us:

Orat. 4. [p. 453.] ἤρξαντο διασύρειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον, Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται ὅτε ἐν ἐκείνῳ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν τούτῳ χωρεῖν; ἢ πῶς ὅλως δύναται ὁ πατὴρ μείζων ὢν, ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ἐλάττονι ὄντι χωρεῖν· καίτοι τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ ὁ υἱὸς ἐν τῷ πατρὶ, ὅπερ καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν γέγραπται, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν. *Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is lesser? And yet what wonder is it, if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also, That in him we live, and move, and have our being?* In way of reply whereunto, *Athanasius* first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavillation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did τὰ ἀσώματα σωματικῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν, *conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner.* And then does he add,

οὐ

ὁ γὰρ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλεμβαζόμενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείοις κενοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων πληρωμένοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν υἱὸν πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ πατρός, τὸν δὲ πατέρα πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ υἱοῦ, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι πλήρη καὶ τέλειον· *For the Father and Son are not, as they ſuppoſe, tranſvaſated and poured out one into another, as into an empty veſſel; as if the Son filled up the concavity of the Father, and again, the Father that of the Son; and neither of them were full or perfect in themſelves. For all this is proper to bodies: wherefore though the Father be, in ſome ſenſe, greater than the Son; yet notwithſtanding may he be in him after an incorporeal manner.* And he replieth to their laſt cavil thus, *That the Son is not ſo in the Father, as we ourſelves are ſaid to live and move, and be in God*; αὐτὸς γὰρ ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ πατρός ἐστι ζωὴ, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα ζωογονεῖται καὶ συνέστηκεν, ὁ γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν ζωῇ ζῇ, &c. *For he himſelf, from the fountain of the Father, is that life, in whom all things are quickned and conſiſt; neither does he, who is the life, live in another life, which were to ſuppoſe him not to be the life itſelf. Nor* (ſaith he) *muſt it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwiſe in the Son, than he is in holy men corroborating of them; for the Son himſelf is the power and wiſdom of God, and all created beings are ſanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit.* Wherefore this *perichoreſis*, or mutual in-being of the Father and the Son, is to be underſtood after a peculiar manner, ſo as that they are really thereby one; and what the Son and Holy Ghoſt doth, the Father doth in them, according to that of *Athanaſius*[1], ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ πατρὸς θεότης ἐστὶ· καὶ ὅτως ἐν τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται, *The Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and ſo the Father exerciſes a providence over all things in the Son.*

Laſtly, the ſame *Athanaſius*, in ſundry places, ſtill further ſuppoſes thoſe three divine hypoſtaſes to make up one entire divinity, after the ſame manner as the fountain and the ſtream make up one entire river; or the root, and the ſtock, and the branches, one entire tree. And in this ſenſe alſo, is the whole trinity ſaid by him to be μία θεότης, and μία φύσις, and μία οὐσία, and εἷς θεὸς, *one divinity*, and *one nature*, and *one eſſence*, and *one God*. And accordingly the word *Homoouſios* ſeems here to be taken by *Athanaſius*, in a further ſenſe, beſides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general eſſence, as three individual men are coeſſential with one another; but alſo for ſuch as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly eſſential thereunto. For when he affirmeth, τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι ῥίζης ὁμοφυὲς, and τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου, *That the tree is congenerous or homogeneal with the root*, and *the branches coeſſential with the vine*; his meaning is, that the root, ſtock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but alſo all together make up the entire eſſence of one plant or tree. In like manner, thoſe three hypoſtaſes, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, are not only congenerous and coeſſential, as having all the eſſence of the Godhead alike in them, but alſo as concurrently making up one entire Divinity. Accordingly whereunto, *Athanaſius* further concludes, that theſe three divine hypoſtaſes have not a conſent of will only, but eſſentially one and the ſelf-ſame will, and that they do alſo jointly produce *ad extra*, μίαν ἐνέργειαν, *one and the ſelf-ſame energy, operation, or action*; nothing

[1] Pag. 457.

Ep. ad Serap. p. 202. nothing being peculiar to the Son as such, but only the œconomy of the incarnation: Ὁμοία ἑαυτῇ κ᾽ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡ Τριάς· καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὁ γὰρ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἑνότης τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως εἷς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγή· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ, ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ· *The trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things. And thus is the unity of the holy Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle, and fountain; through all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit.* And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to *Athanasius*, the three divine hypostases, though not *Monoousious*, but *Homoousious* only, are really but one God or Divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonick trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonick Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonick trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare, that whersoever this most genuine Platonick trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitane councils; and further from the doctrine of *Athanasius* too, in his genuine writings, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of *Athanasius*, to whom it was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgement of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of *Athanasius*. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to divine providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing, by Arianism, into a kind of paganick and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those, which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason, why we introduced the Platonick Christian here thus apologizing, was first; because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity, that the ancient Platonick trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian, than indeed it is. And secondly, because, as we

have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonick trinity was doubtless Anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity Anti-Platonick; the second and third hypostases, in the Platonick trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonick Βαθμοὶ, or *gradations*, so much spoken of, these (by St. *Cyril*'s [1] leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore *Socrates*, the ecclesiastick historian, not without cause wonders, how those two presbyters *Georgius* and *Timotheus* should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were accounted such great readers of *Plato* and *Origen*; Θαυμάσαι ἔν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς ἅτοι οἱ ἄνδρες, τῇ Ἀρειανῶν θρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν, ὧν, ὁ μὲν Πλάτωνα ἀεὶ μελὰ χεῖρας εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ τὸν Ὠριγένην ἀνέπνεεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ Δεύτερον καὶ τὸ Τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως, εἰληφέναι φησί· καὶ Ὠριγένης συνεχῶς ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί· *It seems to me wonderful, how those two persons should persist in the Arian persuasion; one of them having always* Plato *in his hands, and the other continually breathing* Origen. *Since* Plato *no where affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their existence; and* Origen *every where confesseth the Son to be coeternal with the Father.* *L. 7. c. 6. [P. 343.]*

Besides which, another reason for this apology of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Platonick Pagans after Christianity did approve of the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, represent the genuine Platonick trinity as really the same thing with the Christian, or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or the manner of expression. The former of these is evident from that famous passage of *Amelius* contemporary with *Plotinus*, recorded by *Eusebius*, St. *Cyril*, and *Theodoret*; Καὶ ἔτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινόμενα ἐγίνετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσειε, καὶ νὴ Δί' ὃν ὁ Βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξίᾳ καθεστηκότα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι· δι' ὃ πάντ' ἁπλῶς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ οὖ πεφυκέναι· καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον, φαντάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, μετὰ καὶ τὴν τηνικαῦτα δεικνύειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον ἀμέλει· καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθεωθῆναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι, οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καταχθῆναι· *And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to* Heraclitus, *all things were made, and whom that Barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God; and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also that he descended into a body, and being cloathed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body.* In which words, *Amelius* speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. And the same is further manifest from what St. *Austin* writeth concerning a Platonist in his time, *Initium sancti evangelii, cui nomen est secundum* Johannem, *quidam Platonicus, sicut à sancto sene* Simpliciano, *qui postea Mediolanensi ecclesiæ præsedit episcopus,* *Pr. Ev. l. 11. c. 9. [Cap. XIX. p. 540.]* *De Civ. Dei. l. 10. c. 29. [P. 202. Tom. VII. Oper.]*

[1] Adversus Julian. Lib. VIII. p. 270. & Lib. I. p. 34.

ſcopus, ſolebamus audire, aureis literis conſcribendum, & per omnes eccleſias in locis eminentiſſimis proponendum eſſe dicebat. We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, *afterward biſhop of* Milan, *that a certain Platoniſt affirmed, the beginning of St.* John's *goſpel deſerved to be writ in letters of gold, and to be ſet up in all the moſt eminent places throughout the Chriſtian churches.* And the latter will ſufficiently appear from theſe following teſtimonies; *Juſtin Martyr*, in his apology affirmeth of *Plato*, δευτέραν χώραν τῷ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ δίδωσι· τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῷ λεχθέντι ἐπιφέρεσθαι τῷ ὕδατι πνεύματι, &c. *That he gave the ſecond place to the Word of God; and the third to that ſpirit, which is ſaid to have moved upon the waters.* *Pag.* 93. [Apol. II.]

Clemens Alexandrinus ſpeaking of that paſſage in *Plato*'s ſecond epiſtle to *Dionyſius*, concerning the firſt, ſecond, and third, writeth thus; οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω, ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύεσθαι, τρίτον μέν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός· *I underſtand this no otherwiſe, than that the Holy Trinity is ſignified thereby, the third being the Holy Ghoſt, and the ſecond the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father.* *Strom. l.* 5. *p.* 598. [p. 710. Edit. Potteri.]

Origen alſo affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly ſpoken of by *Plato*, in his epiſtle to *Hermias* and *Coriſcus*, ὁ πάντ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος εἰδέναι Κέλσος, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος παρατιθέμενος, ἐκὼν, οἶμαι, σιώπᾳ τὸν περὶ υἱοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, τὸν παρὰ Πλάτωνι λεγόμενον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ· Celſus, *who pretendeth to know all things, and who citeth ſo many other paſſages out of* Plato, *doth purpoſely (as I ſuppoſe) diſſemble and conceal that, which he wrote concerning the Son of God, in his epiſtle to* Hermias *and* Coriſcus; *where he calls him the God of the whole univerſe, and the prince of all things, both preſent and future; afterwards ſpeaking of the Father of this prince and cauſe.* *L.* 6. *c. Celſ.* [P. 280.]

And again, elſewhere in that book, he writeth to the ſame purpoſe, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐβουλήθη τὸ παρά Πλάτωνι ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς λελεγμένον, ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐμνήσθημεν, περὶ τοῦ διακοσμήσαντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ὄντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ, παραθέσθαι· ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὃν πολλάκις ἐσέμνυνεν, ἀναγκασθῇ, παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, υἱός ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ· *Neither would* Celſus (here ſpeaking of Chriſtians making Chriſt the Son of God) *take any notice of that paſſage in* Plato's *epiſtle before mentioned, concerning the framer and governour of the whole world, as being the Son of God; leſt he ſhould be compelled by the authority of* Plato, *whom he ſo often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the* Demiurgus *of the whole world is the Son of God; but the firſt and ſupreme Deity, his Father.* *Cont. Celſ. l.* 6. *p.* 308.

Moreover, St. *Cyprian*, or whoever were the author of the book inſcribed *de Spiritu Sancto*, affirmeth the Platoniſts firſt and univerſal Pſyche, to be the ſame with the Holy Ghoſt in the Chriſtian theology, in theſe words: *Hujus ſempiterna virtus & divinitas, cum in propria natura, ab inquiſitoribus mundi antiquis philoſophis propriè inveſtigari non poſſet; ſubtiliſſimis tamen intuiti conjecturis compoſitionem mundi, & diſtinctis elementorum affectibus, præſentem omnibus animam adfuiſſe dixerunt; quibus, ſecundum genus & ordinem ſingulorum, vitam præberet & motum, & intranſgreſſibiles figeret metas, & ſtabilitatem aſſignaret; & univerſam hanc vitam, hunc motum, hanc rerum eſſentiam,*

[a] The following are not *Origen*'s words, but Dr. *Cudworth*'s, who thus explains the paſſage of *Plato* cited by *Origen*.

eſſentiam, animam mundi vocaverunt. In the next place *Euſebius Cæſarienſis* gives a full and clear teſtimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonick, at leaſt as to the main, with the Chriſtian trinity, which he will have to have been the Cabala of the ancient Hebrews, thus: τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸν περὶ παλρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ λόγου, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καλαλεγόντων· καὶ τήν γε ἁγίαν καὶ μακαρίαν Τριάδα τῶλου ὑποτιθεμένων τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἂν τῆς τρίτης δυνάμεως πᾶσαν ὑπερβεβηκυίας γενητὴν φύσιν· ὅσαν πρώτην μὲν τῶν διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ συνεσταώτων νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, τρίτην δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Αἰτίου· θέα ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοιαῦτά τινα αἰνίζαλο διὰ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, &c. *The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghoſt, after the Father and the Son, in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and bleſſed Trinity after this manner, ſo as that this third power does alſo tranſcend all created nature, and is the firſt of thoſe intellectual ſubſtances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the firſt cauſe: ſee how* Plato *enigmatically declareth the ſame things in his epiſtle to* Dionyſius, *in theſe words, &c Theſe things the interpreters of* Plato *refer to a firſt God, and to a ſecond cauſe, and to a third the ſoul of the world, which they call alſo the third God. And the divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghoſt, in the place or degree of a principle.* But it is moſt obſervable what *Athanaſius* affirmeth of the Platoniſts; that though they derived the ſecond hypoſtaſis of their Trinity from the firſt, and the third from the ſecond, yet they ſuppoſed both their ſecond and third hypoſtaſes to be uncreated; and therefore does he ſend the Arians to ſchool thither, who, becauſe there is but one Ἀγέννητος, *one ſelf-originated Being*, would unſkilfully conclude, that the Word or Son of God muſt therefore needs be a creature. Thus in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council; ἐχρήσανλο παρ' Ἑλλήνων λοιπὸν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀγεννήτου· ἵνα προφάσει καὶ τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόμαλι, ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς πάλιν καὶ τοῖς κλίσμασι συναριθμῶσι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον· διὸ ἅ αὐτὰ τὰ γενητὰ γέγονεν· εἰ μὲν ἦν ἀγνοοῦνλες τὸ ὄνομα ὅτως ἀναισχυνῶσιν, ἔδει μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων αὐτό, ὅτι καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Νοῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ Νοῦ ψυχὴν· καίτοι γινώσκουλες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν ὅμως· καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν Ἀγέννητα· εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο λέγουλες οὐκ ἐλαττοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ καὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε· καὶ ἢ καὶ αὐτοὺς οὕτω λέγειν, ἢ μηδόλως λέγειν περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν· *The Arians borrowing the word* Agennetos *from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one ſuch) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongſt creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right ſignification of that word* Agennetos *from thoſe very Platoniſts, who gave it them. Who, though acknowledging their ſecond hypoſtaſis of* Nous *or Intellect, to be derived from the firſt called* Tagathon, *and their third hypoſtaſis or* Pſyche *from the ſecond; nevertheleſs doubt not to affirm them both to be* Ageneta *or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majeſty of the firſt, from whom theſe two are derived. Wherefore, the Arians either ought ſo to ſpeak as the Platoniſts do, or elſe to ſay nothing at all concerning theſe things, which they are ignorant of.* In which words of *Athanaſius*, there is a plain diſtinction made betwixt ἀγέννητος and ἀγένλος, that is, *unbegotten* and *uncreated*; and the ſecond perſon of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him,

Pr. Ev. l. xi. c. 20. [P. 541.]

Pag. 278.

not to be Ἀγέννητος, *unbegotten*, (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only *Agennetos*) yet is he here said to be Ἀγένητος, *uncreated*; he declaring the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity, not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of *Athanasius*, concerning the Platonick trinity, is a great vindication of the fame. We might here further add St. *Austin*'s confession also, that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt *Plotinus* and *Porphyrius*, in that the former did *postponere animæ naturam paterno intellectui*, the latter, *interponere*; Plotinus *did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellect*; *but* Porphyrius *interponed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both.* It was before observed, that St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria* affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonick trinity, but only that Homoousiotes of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated, but also three coequal individuals, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men; he conceiving that gradual subordination, that is in the Platonick trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludeth [1], πλὴν ὃκ ἠγνόησεν ὁλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς, *That* Plato *notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth*, but that he had the knowledge of the *only begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche*; *and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of* Anitus *and* Melitus, *and that poison, which* Socrates *drunk.* Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of *Chalcidius*, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian; though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third God: *Istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est*; *originem quidem rerum esse summum & ineffabilem Deum*; *post providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis utriusque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ*; *tertium esse porro substantiam, quæ secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quædam custos legis æternæ. His subjectas esse rationabiles animas, legi obsequentes, ministras verò potestates*, &c. *Ergo summus Deus jubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animæ verò legem agunt. This thing is to be conceived after this manner*; *that the first original of things is the supreme and ineffable God*; *after his providence, a second God, the establisher of the law of life both eternal and temporary*; *and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second Mind or Intellect) is a certain keeper of this eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers*, &c. *So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the third executes. But souls are subject to the law.* Where *Chalcidius*, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledgeth no such beings as *Henades* and *Noes*; but only three divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony

De Civit. Dei, [Lib. X. Cap. XXIII.]

Pag. 277. [Cap. VII. §. 186. p. 346, 347. Edit. Fabricii.]

[1] Adverf. Julian. Lib. I. p. 34.

teſtimony of *Theodoret* in his book *De Principio* [1]; τὴν Πλάτωνος διάνοιαν ἀναπλύσσοντες ὁ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ὁ Νουμήνιος, τρία φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι ὑπέρχρονα καὶ ἀΐδια, τ' ἀγαθὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τὸ παντὸς τὴν ψυχήν· ὧν μὲν ἡμεῖς Πατέρα καλοῦμεν Τἀγαθὸν ὀνομάζοντες, Νοῦν δὲ ὃν ἡμεῖς Λόγον προσαγορεύομεν, τὴν δὲ τὰ πάντα ψύχουσαν καὶ ζωοποιοῦσαν δύναμιν, Ψυχὴν καλοῦντα, ἣν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον οἱ θεῖοι προσαγορεύουσι λόγοι· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων φιλοσοφίας καὶ θεολογίας σεσύλεται. Plotinus *and* Numenius, *explaining* Plato's *ſenſe, declare him to have aſſerted three ſuper-temporals or eternals, Good, Mind or Intellect, and the Soul of the univerſe; he calling that* Tagathon, *which to us is Father; that Mind or Intellect, which to us is Son or Word; and that* Pſyche, *or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghoſt. And theſe things* (ſaith he) *were by* Plato *purloined from the philoſophy and theology of the Hebrews.*

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of Almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of divine hypoſtaſes ſhould find ſuch admittance and entertainment in the Pagan world, and be received by the wiſeſt of all their philoſophers, before the times of Chriſtianity; thereby to prepare a more eaſy way for the reception of Chriſtianity amongſt the learned Pagans. Which that it proved ſucceſsful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platoniſts, who were moſt oppoſite and adverſe to Chriſtianity, became at length ſo ſenſible hereof, that beſides their other adulterations of the Trinity before mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheiſm and idolatry, they did in all probability, for this very reaſon, quite innovate, change and pervert the whole Cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of divine hypoſtaſes; they firſt of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another ſupreme and higheſt hypoſtaſis, not to be reckoned with the others, but ſtanding alone by himſelf. And we conceive the firſt innovator in this kind to have been *Jamblichus*, who in his Egyptian Myſteries [2], where he ſeems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypotheſes, writeth in this manner: πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἔστι θεὸς εἷς πρῶτος, καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως· ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἄλλό τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἵδρυται τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ· μεῖζον γάρ τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοερῶν πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς, ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτάρκης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἔτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν· μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας. *Before thoſe things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God ſuperiour to the firſt God and king, immoveable, and always remaining in the ſolitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing elſe mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is ſelf-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the firſt intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that ſelf-ſufficient God, who is* Autopator, *or his own parent, cauſe himſelf to ſhine forth; for this*

[1] Tom. II. Oper. p. 496. [2] Sect. VIII. Cap. II. p. 158.

is alſo a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the firſt one, before all eſſence. Where, ſo far as we can underſtand, *Jamblichus*'s meaning is, that there is a ſimple unity in order of nature, before that *Tagathon*, or monad, which is the firſt of the three divine hypoſtaſes. And this doctrine was afterward taken up by *Proclus*, he declaring it in this manner; πανταχῆ ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τῶ πλήθυς ἐπὶ τὰς ἑνάδας ἀνατρέχειν εἰώθεν· μᾶλλον δὲ ϗ πρὸ τῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν πρὸ τῦ πλήθυς ἓν ἀεί ἐστι, ϗ πᾶσα θεία τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἄρχεται· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριάδος προιέναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος ἡ μονάς· ἔστω μὲν ἕν ϗ οἱ δημιύργικοὶ τρεῖς ἀλλὰ τὶς ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἷς, ὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν θείων τάξεων ἐκ πλήθυς ἄρχεται· ϗκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τριάδος ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ τὸν δημιργικὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μονάδος· Plato *every where aſcends from multitude to unity, from whence alſo the order of the many proceeds; but before* Plato, *and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity muſt there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypoſtaſes; nevertheleſs, before theſe muſt there be one, becauſe none of the divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, ſtanding alone by itſelf before that trinity.* Here *Proclus*, though endeavouring to gain ſome countenance for this doctrine out of *Plato*, yet, as fearing leſt that ſhould fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before the trinity of demiurgick hypoſtaſes, there muſt be a ſingle monad or henad, ſtanding alone by itſelf, as the head thereof. And St. *Cyril* of *Alexandria*, who was junior to *Jamblichus*, but ſenior to *Proclus*, ſeems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonick theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of *Porphyry*: ἀλλ' οἵ γε προειρημένοι ϗ πρὸς τῦτο ἀντιλέγυσι, φάσκοντες μὴ δεῖν ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ συναριθμεῖν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτῦ· ἐξῆρθαι γὰρ ἀπὸ πάσης κοινωνίας διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁπλῦν πάντη ϗ ἀδεκτον τινὸς συμβάσεως· Ἀπὸ δὲ τῦ ΝΟΥ, (ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἔτος) τὴν τριάδα μίαν σωθῆναι· *But thoſe before mentioned contradict this doctrine* (of *Porphyrius* and the ancient Platoniſts) *affirming, that the* Tagathon *ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with thoſe which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, becauſe it is altogether ſimple, and uncapable of any commixture or conſociation with any other. Wherefore theſe begin their trinity with* Nous *or Intellect, making that the firſt.* The only difference here is, that *Jamblichus* ſeems to make the firſt hypoſtaſis of the trinity after a monad to be *Tagathon*, but St. *Cyril*, *Nous*. However, they both meant the ſame thing, as alſo did *Proclus* after them. Wherefore, it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene council and *Athanaſius*, the Chriſtian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually ſtated and ſettled, and much to be inſiſted upon by Chriſtians, *Jamblichus* and other Platoniſts, who were great antagoniſts of the ſame, perceiving what advantage the Chriſtians had from the Platonick Trinity, then firſt of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of divine hypoſtaſes, inſtead of a trinity, the firſt of them being not coordinate with the other three, nor conſociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though ſubordinate, yet univerſal, and ſuch as comprehend the whole; that

In Timæ. Lib. 2. p. 93.

C. Jul. l. 8. p. 271.

that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that *Jamblichus* lived in, there was no ſuch thing at all dreamed of by any Platoniſt, as an unity before and above the trinity, and ſo a quaternity of divine hypoſtaſes; *Plotinus* poſitively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and *Proclus* himſelf acknowledging the ancient tradition, or Cabala, to have run only of three gods; and *Numenius*, who was ſenior to them both, writing thus of *Socrates*, Τρεῖς θεὸς τιθεμένῃ Σωκράτης, that he alſo (before *Plato*) *aſſerted three gods*; that is, three divine hypoſtaſes, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans. *Euſeb. P. E. l. 14. c. 5.* [P. 728.]

Moreover, the ſame *Proclus*, beſides his *Henades* and *Noes* before mentioned, added certain other phantaſtick trinities of his own alſo; as this, for example, of the firſt eſſence, the firſt life, and the firſt intellect, (to omit others;) whereby that ancient Cabala and θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, *theology of divine tradition*, of *three archical hypoſtaſes*, and no more, was diſguiſed, perverted, and adulterated.

But beſides this advantage from the ancient Pagan Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Chriſtianity doth, (whereby Chriſtianity was the more recommended to the philoſophick Pagans) there is another advantage of the ſame extending even to this preſent time, probably not unintended alſo by divine providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits precipitantly condemning the doctrine of the trinity for nonſenſe, abſolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impoſſibility, have thereupon ſome of them quite ſhaken off Chriſtianity, and all revealed religion, profeſſing only theiſm; others have fruſtrated the deſign thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worſhip or idolatry; this ignorant and conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, becauſe the moſt ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philoſophers, the Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, who had no byaſs at all upon them, nor any ſcripture revelation, that might ſeem to impoſe upon their faculties, but followed the free ſentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithſtanding not only entertain this trinity of divine hypoſtaſes eternal and uncreated, but were alſo fond of the hypotheſis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platoniſts and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or divine hypoſtaſes, were independent, ſo neither were they γενητοὶ θεοὶ, *creature-gods*, but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and neceſſarily exiſtent, and immutable, but alſo univerſal, that is infinite and omnipotent; cauſes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that theſe Platoniſts could not juſtly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worſhip to each hypoſtaſis of this their trinity. And we have the rather inſiſted ſo long upon this Platonick trinity, becauſe we ſhall make uſe of this doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Chriſtianity, where

we are to ſhow, that one grand deſign of Chriſtianity being to aboliſh the Pagan idolatry, or creature-worſhip, itſelf cannot juſtly be charged with the ſame from that religious worſhip given to our Saviour Chriſt, and the Trinity, (the Son and Holy Ghoſt) they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Chriſtianity, creatures; however the Arian hypotheſis made them ſuch. And this was indeed the grand reaſon, why the ancient fathers ſo zealouſly oppoſed Arianiſm, becauſe that Chriſtianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate Pagan idolatry, was thereby itſelf paganized and idolatrized, and made highly guilty of that very thing, which it ſo much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worſhip. This might be proved by ſundry teſtimonies of *Athanaſius*, *Baſil*, *Gregory Nyſſen*, *Gregory Nazianzen*, *Epiphanius*, *Chryſoſtom*, *Hilary*, *Ambroſe*, *Auſtin*, *Fauſtinus*, and *Cyril* of *Alexandria*; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very ſame idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worſhip even to the Word and Son of God himſelf, (and conſequently to our Saviour Chriſt) as he was ſuppoſed by them to be but a creature. But we ſhall content ourſelves here only to cite one remarkable
P. 468, 469. paſſage out of *Athanaſius*, in his fourth oration againſt the Arians: διὰ τί ἦν οἱ Ἀρειομανῖται τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦντες, ἑαυτὸς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι ὥσπερ ἔστι τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν ——— εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, ἔστι δὲ ἑνὶ γενητῷ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ, διὰ ἕτω διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· ὅ, τε γὰρ πάρ αὐτῶν λεγόμενος εἷς γενητὸς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστι, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἑνὶ τούτῳ φύσιν ἔχουσι, καὶ ἵνα γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι κτίσματά εἰσιν· ἄθλιοι καὶ πλέον ὅσον ἐβλάβησαν κατὰ χριστὸν φρονοῦντες· ἐξέπεσαν γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰουδαίων προδοσίαν ὑπερέβησαν ἀρνούμενοι τὸν Χριστόν· τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι συνκυλίονται, κτίσμασι καὶ διαφόροις θεοῖς λατρεύοντες οἱ θεομυσεῖς· *Why therefore do not theſe Arians, holding this, reckon themſelves amongſt the Pagans or Gentiles, ſince they do in like manner worſhip the creature, beſides the creator? For though the Pagans worſhip one uncreated and many created gods, but theſe Arians only one uncreated, and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference betwixt them; becauſe the Arians one created is one of thoſe many Pagan gods; and thoſe many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles, have the ſame nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore theſe wretched Arians are apoſtates from the truth of Chriſtianity, they betraying Chriſt more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of Pagan idolatry; worſhipping creatures, and different kinds of gods,* Where, by the way, we may take notice, that when *Athanaſius* affirmeth of the Arians, what St. *Paul* doth of the Pagans, that they did τῇ κτίσει λατρεύειν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, his meaning could not well be, that they worſhipped the creature more than the creator; foraſmuch as the Arians conſtantly declared, that they gave leſs worſhip to Chriſt the Son or Word of God, he being by them accounted but a creature, that they did to the Father the Creator; but either that they worſhipped the creature beſides the Creator, or the creature inſtead of the Creator, or in the room of him, who was alone of right to be religiouſly worſhipped. Again, when the ſame *Athanaſius* declareth, that the Greeks, Gentiles, or Pagans, did univerſally worſhip ἑνὶ ἀγεννήτῳ, *only one uncreated*, he ſeems to imply, that the Platonick trinity of

hypoſtaſes, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire divinity.

But the principal things, which we ſhall obſerve from this paſſage of *Athanaſius*, and thoſe many other places of the fathers, where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very ſame idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worſhipped our Saviour Chriſt himſelf, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them ſuppoſed to be nothing but a creature, are theſe following; firſt, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worſhip a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or ſelf-exiſtent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as as his creatures. This, as it is expreſly affirmed by *Athanaſius* here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύειν, *worſhip only one uncreated, and many created gods*; ſo is it plainly implied by all thoſe other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: becauſe, had the Pagans worſhipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolaters, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the ſenſe of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry, that it conſiſted not in worſhipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwiſe manifeſted; and it might be further confirmed by ſundry teſtimonies of them; as this of St. *Gregory Nazianzen* in his 37th oration [1]; Τί δαὶ οὐχὲ καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησι φαῖεν ἄν Μία Θεότης, ὡς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ' ἐκείνοις Θιλοσοφοῦντες; *What then would ſome ſay, is there not one divinity alſo amongſt the Pagans, as they, who philoſophize more fully and perfectly amongſt them, do declare?* And that full and remarkable one of *Irenæus*, where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles; *Ita creaturæ potius quam Creatori ſerviebant, & his qui non ſunt dii, ut primum deitatis locum attribuerent uni alicui & ſummo fabricatori hujus univerſitatis Deo: That they ſo ſerved the creature, and thoſe who are not gods, rather than the Creator; that notwithſtanding they attributed the firſt place of the Deity to one certain ſupreme God, the maker of this univerſe.* The ſecond thing is, that *Athanaſius*, and all thoſe other orthodox fathers, who charged the Arians with Pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, thoſe not to be uncapable of idolatry, who worſhip one ſovereign Numen, or acknowledge one ſupreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; ſince not only the Arians unqueſtionably did ſo, but alſo, according to theſe fathers, the very Pagans themſelves. The third thing is, that in the judgment of *Athanaſius*, and all the orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worſhip to any created being whatſoever, though inferiour to that worſhip, which is given to the ſupreme God, and therefore according to the modern diſtinction, not λατρεία, but δουλεία, is abſolutely idolatry. Becauſe it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferiour worſhip to Chriſt, the Son, or Word of God, whom they contended to be a meer creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God, who was the Creator of him,

L. 2. c. 9. [P. 129 Ed. Grabii, p. 126. Ed. Maſſueti.]

[1] Pag. 601. Tom. I. Oper.

him. As those fathers imply, the Pagans themselves to have given much an inferiour worship to their πολλοὶ γενητοὶ θεοὶ, their *many gods*, whom themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, to that *one uncreated God*.

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless, by the fathers, condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferiour kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt, who bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferiour to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the Creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them, to give an inferiour kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted less, to bestow the same upon those other creatures, made by him, as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and Son of God, however supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such; and is in Scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship, (*worship him all ye gods*;) so that the Arians, though formally idolaters, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so: whereas these religious angel and saint-worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into *Latria*, as peculiar to the supreme God, it being that, whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all; and *Doulia*, such an inferior religious worship, as is communicable to creatures: but concluded of religious worship universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus *Athanasius* plainly in his third oration [r], εἰ γὰρ ὡς τῇ δόξῃ ὑπερέχων προσεκυνεῖτο, ἔδει καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων, τὸν ὑπερέχοντα προσκυνεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, κτίσματι γὰρ κτίσμα οὐ προσκυνεῖ, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα θεόν· *If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped*, (though a creature) *because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferiour being to worship what is superiour to it: whereas the case is otherwise; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator.* Now they, who distinguish religious worship, into *Latria* and *Doulia*, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that, which is superiour to us, and not the Creator only; which is here contradicted by *Athanasius*. But because it was objected against these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account *Athanasius* gives of this: οὐ κτίσμα προσκυνοῦμεν, μὴ γένοιτο· Ἑθνικῶν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρειανῶν ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη· ἀλλὰ τὸν Κύριον τῆς κτίσεως σαρκωθέντα τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον προσκυνοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν

Ad. Adelph. p. 157. [Tom. I. Oper.]

4 μέρος

Pag. 394. Tom. I. Oper.

μέρος ἐστί τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ γέγονε σῶμα, ἢ ὅτε τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα, καθ' ἑαυτὸ διαιροῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, προσκυνοῦμεν, ὅτε τὸν Λόγον προσκυνῆσαι θέλοντες, μακρύνομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς· ἀλλ' εἰδότες, τὸ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενον ἐπιγινώσκομεν θεόν· *We give no religious worſhip to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians: but we worſhip the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the fleſh of Chriſt, conſidered alone by it ſelf, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheleſs was it made the body of God. And we neither worſhip this body by it ſelf alone, divided from the Word, nor yet intending to worſhip the Word, do we remove it at a great diſtance from this fleſh; but knowing that of the Scripture,* the Word was made fleſh, *we look upon this Word even in the fleſh as God.* And again to the ſame purpoſe, Καὶ γινωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὸν Κύριον ἐν σαρκὶ προσκυνοῦντες, p. 160. ὐ κτίσματι προσκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ἐνδυσάμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα. *Let theſe* Arians *know at length, that, we who worſhip the Lord in fleſh, worſhip no creature, but only the Creator cloathed with a creaturely body.* And for the ſame cauſe was it, that *Neſtorius* afterwards, dividing the Word from the fleſh, the divinity of Chriſt from the humanity, and not acknowledging ſuch an hypoſtatick union betwixt them as he ought, but, nevertheleſs, religiouſly worſhiping our Saviour Chriſt, was therefore branded by the Chriſtian church with the name of Ἀνθρωπολάτρης, *a man-worſhipper*, or *idolater*. To conclude, they, who excuſe themſelves from being idolaters no otherwiſe, than becauſe they do not give that very ſame religious worſhip to ſaints and angels, which is peculiar to God Almighty, and conſiſts in honouring him as ſelf-exiſtent, and the Creator of all things, but ackowledge thoſe others to be creatures; ſuppoſe that to be neceſſary to idolatry, which is abſolutely impoſſible, *viz.* to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as ſuch creators; as they imply all thoſe to be uncapable of idolatry, who acknowledge one ſupreme God the Creator of the whole world; which is directly contradictious to the doctrine of the ancient church.

Hitherto in way of anſwer to an atheiſtick objection againſt the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneline ſs in it, from the Pagan polytheiſm, have we largely proved, that at leaſt the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one ſovereign *Numen*; and that their polytheiſm was partly but phantaſtical, nothing but the polyonymy of one ſupreme God, or the worſhiping him under different names and notions, according to his ſeveral virtues and manifeſtations; and that though, beſides this, they had another natural and real polytheiſm alſo; yet this was only of many inferiour, or created gods, ſubordinate to one *Supreme* Ἀγένητος, or *uncreated*.

Which, notwithſtanding, is not ſo to be underſtood, as if we did confidently affirm that opinion of many independent deities never to have ſo much as entred into the mind of any mortal. For ſince human nature is ſo mutable and depravable, as that, notwithſtanding the connate idea and *prolepſis* of God in the minds of men, ſome unqueſtionably do degenerate and lapſe into atheiſm; there can be no reaſon, why it ſhould be thought abſolutely impoſſible, for any ever to entertain that falſe conceit of more independent

deities. But as for independent Gods inviſible, we cannot trace the footſteps of ſuch a polytheiſm as this any where, nor find any more than a ditheiſm, of a good and evil principle: only *Philo* and others ſeem to have conceived, that amongſt the ancient Pagans, ſome were ſo groſly ſottiſh, as to ſuppoſe a plurality of independent gods viſible, and to take the ſun, and moon, and all the ſtars for ſuch. However, if there were any ſuch, and theſe writers were not miſtaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain, that they were but very few; becauſe, amongſt the moſt Barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found, without an acknowledgment of a ſovereign Deity, as appears from all thoſe diſcoveries, which have been made of them, ſince the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a ſufficient anſwer to the forementioned atheiſtick objection againſt the idea of God. Notwithſtanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a further account of the natural and real polytheiſm of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry, chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Chriſtianity againſt Atheiſts; foraſmuch as one grand deſign hereof was unqueſtionably to deſtroy the Pagan polytheiſm and idolatry, which conſiſted in worſhiping the creature beſides the Creator.

But we are very ſenſible, that we have been ſurprized in the length of this chapter, which is already ſwelled into a diſproportionate bigneſs; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compaſs of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with ſuch a full and copious confutation of the atheiſtick grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we ſhall here divide the chapter, and reſerve thoſe remaining contents, together with a further confutation of atheiſm, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leiſure, we intend ſhall follow. Only ſubjoining, in the mean time, a ſhort and compendious confutation of all the atheiſtick arguments propoſed.

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